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China’s military strategy, which emphasizes conventional operations, has been dynamic, changing nine times since 1949. By contrast, China’s nuclear strategy, based on achieving deterrence through assured retaliation, has remained largely unchanged since China exploded its first nuclear device in October 1964. China has also not sought to alter its nuclear strategy despite its vulnerability, at various times, to an invasion or nuclear first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union. In addition, no apparent relationship exists between China’s conventional and nuclear strategies. Although China’s nuclear strategy is consistent with the general principle of “active defense,” planning for the use of nuclear weapons has been decoupled from the planning for the use of conventional forces. China’s declaratory strategy and operational doctrine envision only using nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack, not in conventional conflicts. Why has China’s nuclear strategy been constant while its conventional strategy has varied, often substantially? Why have China’s conventional and nuclear strategies not been more closely integrated?

This chapter advances several arguments to answer these questions. First, unlike conventional military strategy, top party leaders never delegated authority over nuclear strategy to senior military officers. Nuclear strategy was viewed as a matter of supreme national policy that only the party’s top leaders could determine, not the PLA leadership more broadly, including the Second Artillery or the General Staff Department (GSD). Top party leaders never delegated China’s nuclear strategy to senior military officers, including decisions regarding force structure and force posture. Even after the Second Artillery began to develop into an operational branch in the late 1970s, it has acted primarily as the custodian of China’s nuclear forces under the close supervision of the CMC, the party’s decision-making body for military affairs. Second, because top party leaders never delegated nuclear strategy to senior military officers, the views of China’s top party leaders on nuclear weapons, especially Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, have had an especially powerful influence on China’s nuclear strategy, even today. Their views, based on the limited utility of nuclear weapons, support maintaining a strategy of assured retaliation and not integrating nuclear strategy with conventional strategy or pursuing limited nuclear warfighting.

New sources permit the reconsideration of existing arguments about China’s development of nuclear weapons advanced by John Lewis and Xue Litai in their landmark 1988 book, China Builds the Bomb . 1 First, China seriously considered pursuing the bomb earlier than Lewis and Xue claim. Lewis and Xue emphasize the role of the 1954–55 Taiwan Straits Crisis and the US shift to massive retaliation in China’s January 1955 decision to build the bomb. Nevertheless, a consensus among China’s top leaders to acquire nuclear weapons formed earlier, by the spring of 1952, directly in response to US nuclear threats during the Korean War. Moreover, the political decision to develop the bomb in 1955 did not reflect a response to intensified external threats but instead the view that, after discovering uranium in Guangxi in 1954, China could now launch such a project.

Second, Lewis and Xue’s explanation of China’s nuclear strategy is based on technological determinism. They argue that China’s nuclear strategy was shaped critically by the technologies available to China and the capabilities that China could develop. As Lewis and Xue write, “China had no clearly articulated nuclear doctrine that would shape its early nuclear weapons procurement and deployment policies.” Moreover, “technological imperatives began to drive the army’s actual policy decisions.” 2 Similarly, Lewis and another coauthor, Hua Di, conclude that “technology, not strategy, determined the pace and main direction of the ballistic missile program at least until the late 1970s.” 3

China’s leaders, however, did not develop their nuclear strategy or force structure based on what was technically possible. Instead, their views of the utility of nuclear weapons shaped the parameters of the strategy of assured retaliation that they pursued. China’s leaders viewed the role of nuclear weapons as limited to preventing nuclear coercion and deterring a nuclear attack on China. Such objectives required only a small force capable of launching a counterstrike because China’s leaders did not envision either engaging in nuclear warfighting or using nuclear weapons to deter conventional threats. Choices made during the early years of China’s nuclear program reflect these goals, such as focusing on missiles rather than gravity bombs, adopting a no-first-use policy, and giving the Second Artillery the sole mission of conducting a nuclear counterstrike. These early decisions, informed by Chinese leaders’ views of nuclear strategy, continued to shape the parameters in which the Second Artillery started to develop operational doctrine for executing a counterstrike in the 1970s. More broadly, the strongest evidence against the claim that technology has determined China’s nuclear strategy is its consistency over the past fifty years, when the availability of technology has changed dramatically.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section describes how China’s nuclear strategy has remained largely constant since 1964, focused on deterring nuclear coercion or attack with the smallest possible force. The next section reviews the beliefs of China’s top leaders regarding the utility of nuclear weapons, which not only influenced the strategy that was adopted but also the decision to decouple nuclear strategy from conventional strategy. The third section examines the development of China’s nuclear forces and strategy, from the initial decision to pursue the bomb to the development of operational doctrine for China’s rocket forces, to highlight the role of top party leaders in these decisions. The last section discusses the relationship between China’s nuclear strategy and the strategic guidelines discussed elsewhere in this book.

Since testing its first atomic device in October 1964, China has pursued a nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. China seeks to prevent other states from using nuclear weapons to coerce or attack China by developing a secure second-strike capability. For many decades, China’s nuclear strategy was based on the statements of China’s leaders and internal doctrinal publications. In 2006, China’s nuclear strategy was articulated publicly in a defense white paper.

Across several generations, China’s top party leaders embraced the notion of deterrence through assured retaliation. This was the belief that a small number of survivable weapons would be sufficient to impose unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike and thus deter nuclear attack or coercion. These ideas were most forcefully articulated by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the 1960s and by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Subsequent Chinese leaders have embraced the same nuclear strategy. 4

The emphasis on building a small but survivable arsenal began with Mao Zedong. His ideas regarding the size of China’s nuclear force along with a simple notion of what deters has endured for decades. In 1960, Mao suggested that a few weapons would be sufficient for deterrence, stating that “our country in the future may produce a few atomic bombs, but we by no means intend to use them. Although we do not intend to use them, why produce them? We will use them as a defensive weapon.” 5 In 1961, Zhou Enlai concurred, noting that “only when [we] have missiles and nuclear weapons, can we prevent [others] from using them; if we do not have missiles and nuclear weapons, imperialists will use missiles and nuclear weapons [against us].” 6 A few months after China’s first successful nuclear detonation, Mao observed in an interview with Edgar Snow, “We don’t wish to have too many atom bombs ourselves. What would we do with so many? To have a few is just fine.” 7

This view of deterrence required only China’s ability to retaliate after being attacked, not nuclear parity with an adversary. Given China’s no-first-use pledge issued in 1964, assured retaliation required that China’s forces be able to survive a first strike and then launch a retaliatory counterstrike. As Marshal Nie Rongzhen described in his memoir, China needed to develop nuclear weapons “to have the minimum means of counterattacking [ you qima de huanji shouduan ] when our country sustains an imperialist surprise attack with nuclear weapons.” 8 As Deng told Chile’s foreign minister in 1978, “We also want to build some nuclear weapons, but we are not preparing to make many. When we have the power [ liliang ] to counterattack [ huanji ], we won’t continue to develop them.” 9 Deng Xiaoping offered the most complete statement of Chinese leadership views about nuclear deterrence during a meeting with the Canadian Prime Minister in 1983:

We have a few nuclear weapons. France also has a few. These weapons themselves are useful only for [creating] pressure. We have said many times that is the point of our few nuclear weapons! Only to show that we also have what they have. If they want to destroy us, they themselves will also suffer some retaliation. We have consistently said that we want to force the superpowers not to dare to use nuclear weapons. In the past, this was to deal with the Soviet Union, to force them not to use these weapons rashly. To have even only a few weapons after all is a kind of restraining power [zhiyue liliang ]. 10

Mao, Zhou, and Deng never openly discussed in any detail the operational requirements for China’s nuclear forces. In 1970, for example, Zhou Enlai stated at a planning meeting of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) that China did not intend to use nuclear weapons to intimidate others and thus did not need many weapons. Nevertheless, Zhou stated that China “must build a certain number of a certain quality and a certain variety.” 11 In 1978, as China was developing its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Dongfeng-5 (DF-5), Deng outlined the general requirements for the development of China’s nuclear forces. According to Deng, “Our strategic weapons should be updated [ gengxin ] and the guideline [for their development] is few but capable [ shao er jing ]. Few means numbers and capability should increase with each generation.” 1 2

Among the first two generations of Chinese leaders, General Zhang Aiping offered the most detailed description of China’s view of the requirements of deterrence. Zhang played a leading role in China’s strategic weapons program, in both the early 1960s and from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. 13 In 1980, Zhang noted, “As for strategic weapons … our task is to ensure a certain power to strike back. This of course is not in terms of a numerical comparison with the enemy and also not focusing first on precision. Instead, the key point is having nuclear weapons that are complete [ wanshan ] and can be used operationally.” Furthermore, Zhang argued, “we must think of ways to strengthen the survivability of these weapons and shorten the preparation time so that when the enemy launches a surprise nuclear attack, the missiles that we do have can be preserved and then be used to carry out a counterattack, ‘gaining control by striking afterwards’ [ houfa zhiren ]. This requires that the weapons be reliable and that the preparation time be shorter. After these two problems are resolved, we can consider again precision.” 14

Zhang made his remarks just months after China had successfully tested the DF-5 and while it was in the final stages of developing its first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Julang-1 (JL-1). If his speech is viewed as an outline for China’s future plans for the development of its nuclear force in the 1980s, when China faced an overwhelming conventional and nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, reliability and survivability were paramount. Consistent with Deng’s perspective, having the capability to retaliate, even with only a few weapons, was viewed as sufficient for deterring a nuclear attack against China.

Available sources lack discussion of Chinese leadership views on why only a small number of nuclear warheads would be enough to impose unacceptable damage and deter potential adversaries from attacking China. Nevertheless, the consistency with which China’s leaders focused on a small, retaliatory force implies that they viewed the threshold for such damage as low. In 1967, Mao reportedly told André Malraux, “When I have six atomic bombs, no one can bomb my cities.… The Americans will never use an atom bomb against me.” 15 Deng expanded on this view in 1981, noting that “in the future, there may not be a nuclear war. We have [nuclear weapons] because they also have them. We will have more if they have more. Probably everyone will not dare to use them.” 16

In the post–Deng era, Chinese leaders’ beliefs about deterrence have remained unchanged. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Jiang Zemin’s views are remarkably similar to those of his predecessors. In the aftermath of the 1990–91 Gulf War, Jiang noted that China would maintain “a necessary deterrent capability [ weishe nengli ],” but would focus defense spending on conventional, not nuclear, forces, again implying a preference for a small and survivable nuclear force. 17 According to an authoritative book on Jiang’s military thought, he held the same views regarding the sources of deterrence: “China developed strategic nuclear weapons, not to attack but for defense.… it is a kind of great deterrent toward nuclear weapons states and makes them not dare to act indiscriminately.” 18 In 2002, he highlighted the broader and multifaceted Chinese concept of “strategic deterrence” ( zhanlue weishe ) for which he noted that “nuclear weapons were the core capability.” 19

Very few public statements by Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping on questions of nuclear strategy are available. Reporting of these statements, however, indicates that they are consistent with the views of previous leaders, focusing on the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. On the fortieth anniversary of the Second Artillery’s founding in 2006, Hu Jintao stated that it “played an extremely important role in containing wars and crises, defending national security and maintaining world peace.” 20 Likewise, during remarks at the meeting of the Eighth Party Congress of the Second Artillery in late 2012, Xi Jinping echoed Jiang by stating that the Second Artillery was “the core force [ hexin liliang ] of China’s strategic deterrent.” 21 Articles by high-ranking members of the Second Artillery on nuclear strategy refer to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s views in ways that are consistent with the views of previous leaders. 22

The Second Artillery’s operational doctrine demonstrates that China has pursued a consistent nuclear strategy based on assured retaliation. As the Second Artillery was formally established on July 1, 1966, only weeks before Mao called for “bombarding the headquarters” and launched the Cultural Revolution, the organization faced numerous challenges as it sought to become an operational unit for China’s nuclear-armed missiles. During this period, China continued to develop bases for its existing missiles, the DF-2 and DF-3, but achieved little else. 23 At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Second Artillery gained new leadership and clear guidance from Deng Xiaoping, which accelerated its development, including operational doctrine.

Statements made in the first few years after the Second Artillery’s establishment reflect the adoption of a strategy of assured retaliation. Although the Second Artillery did not begin to draft its operational doctrine until the late 1970s, its original mission was to develop a retaliatory force. In July 1967, the CMC issued temporary regulations for the Second Artillery, stating that its task ( renwu ) was “building a nuclear counterattack force to realize active defense.” 24 This remains the mission of China’s nuclear forces today. When an old Deng ally Li Shuiqing was appointed as commander of the Second Artillery in 1977, he emphasized that the Second Artillery’s operational principles should “let the troops know how to wage counter-strike operations [ fanji zuozhan ],” focusing, again, on this singular mission. 25 During a meeting on operations in 1978, Li again stressed developing the Second Artillery as a “nuclear counterstrike force.” 26 The meeting discussed how to implement the “guiding thought, guideline and principles, and main tasks [ renwu ] of strategic counter-attack.” 27 In December 1979, the Second Artillery convened a meeting to study “operational employment” ( zuozhan yunyong ). The meeting’s final report emphasized the “principles and guidelines for the Second Artillery’s counterstrike operations.” 28 The 1980 training program noted that command officers ( zhihui ganbu ) in the Second Artillery should focus on “command training for defense and counterstrike operations.” 29

China’s approach to nuclear strategy was detailed in the 1987 Science of Military Strategy , the PLA’s first comprehensive text on military strategy published after 1949. Reflecting the views of Mao, Zhou, and Deng, the book describes the primary purpose of nuclear weapons as deterring a nuclear attack against China. 30 The Second Artillery’s mission is to possess “a type of deterrent and retaliatory capability” to counter “nuclear monopoly, nuclear blackmail, and nuclear threats.” 31 A “nuclear counterstrike” ( he fanji ) is the only campaign described in the book in which nuclear weapons would be used: “If the enemy first uses nuclear weapons, we must resolutely implement a counterattack and carry out nuclear retaliation.” 32 The 1987 Science of Military Strategy also identified the “basic guiding thought” ( jiben zhidao sixiang ) for “bringing into play the deterrent and retaliatory uses” of nuclear weapons. 33 The four principles are centralized control ( jizhong zhihui ), striking only after the enemy has struck ( houfa zhiren ), close defense ( yanmi fanghu ) and keypoint counterstrikes ( zhongdian fanji ). 34

In 1996, the Second Artillery published its first document on strategy, the Science of Second Artillery Strategy . Although the text outlined China’s strategy for the Second Artillery as an independent branch of the PLA, it closely approximated China’s nuclear strategy at the time of its publication. 35 The book describes the service strategy for the Second Artillery as “emphasize deterrence, effective counterattack” ( zhongzai weishe, youxiao fanji ). Echoing the 1987 Science of Military Strategy , the purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against China and to prevent a conventional war from escalating to a nuclear war. The text describes three major actions. First, strategic defense refers to ensuring the survivability of the force. Second, strategic deterrence describes how to deter a nuclear attack or the nuclear escalation of a conventional war. And, third, strategic counterattack outlines how China will retaliate if attacked with nuclear weapons. Importantly, the book maintains the clear firebreak between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons. The Science of Second Artillery Strategy indicates that China will use nuclear weapons only after attacked first with nuclear weapons. It does not envision the use of nuclear weapons first in a major conventional conflict as a form of “invasion insurance. ”

Subsequent publications on China’s military strategy and operational doctrine continue to describe the nuclear counterstrike campaign ( he fanji zhanyi ) as the only nuclear campaign for the Second Artillery. Various descriptions of this campaign are contained in the 2000 and 2006 editions of the National Defense University’s (NDU) Science of Campaigns , the 2002 Campaign Theory Study Guide, and the 2001 and 2013 editions of the Science of Military Strategy , among others . 36 Limited circulation texts by the Second Artillery—such as doctrinal texts on campaign methods and tactics from the mid-1990s, along with the 2004 edition of the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns —also describe the nuclear counterstrike campaign as the only nuclear campaign for the Second Artillery. 37

By the early 2000s, the Chinese government’s official statements about nuclear strategy became clearer as well. An initial attempt at articulating a nuclear strategy was made in 2000, in China’s second national defense white paper, but it amounted to a restatement of past policies. The most complete official explanation appeared in the 2006 defense white paper, which for the first time ever publicly articulated China’s nuclear strategy. It stated that China pursues a “self-defensive nuclear strategy” (ziwei fangyu he zhanlue ), which is the official government formulation. The two principles of this strategy are “counterattack in self-defense” (ziwei fanji ) and “limited development” (youxian fazhan ) of nuclear weapons. The 2006 white paper noted that China seeks to possess “a lean and effective nuclear force” (jinggan youxiao he liliang ) as a “strategic deterrent” (zhanlue weishe zuoyong ). 38 Subsequent white papers have repeated this formulation, along with China’s no-first-use policy. The 2008 white paper, for example, stated the conditions under which China would use nuclear weapons. In peacetime, China’s nuclear forces did not target any country. When China faced nuclear threats, however, it would place its forces on alert status. If China was attacked with nuclear weapons, it would “resolutely counterattack against the enemy” with nuclear weapons. 39

Since 1949, China’s top party leaders have emphasized that the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent nuclear coercion and deter a nuclear attack. Senior Chinese leaders never viewed them as a means for fighting or winning wars. The atomic bomb was also seen as imparting other benefits, such as demonstrating China’s status as a major power in the international community and serving as a source of national pride for the Chinese people. 40 These latter functions, however, are less central to understanding the consistency of China’s nuclear strategy across several decades. As the 1996 Science of Second Artillery Strategy states unequivocally, the Second Artillery’s strategy is “based on and even determined by the nuclear strategic thought of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.” 41 These views are described below.

China’s top leaders’ notion of deterrence through assured retaliation discussed in the previous section reflects their view that the most important function of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against China. Despite Mao Zedong’s well-known denigration of nuclear weapons as “paper tigers,” he valued such weapons for deterring their use against China by the United States and, later, the Soviet Union. 42 Mao was keenly aware of China’s vulnerability to nuclear strikes and the need for a solution to this problem. In 1950, during the Korean War, he observed that “if the United States strikes with atomic bombs, we have none and can only allow it to strike. This is something that we cannot resolve.” 43 Twenty years later, in 1970, he noted the deterrent role of nuclear weapons in the US-Soviet superpower competition. In meeting with a delegation from North Vietnam, he stated that “although the possibility of the major powers fighting a world war remains, everyone does not dare to start such a war only because they have nuclear weapons.” 44 Mao clearly embraced the notion of mutual deterrence, which was reflected in the statement that China issued after its first test of a nuclear device in October 1964.

Zhou Enlai held similar views. In 1955, Zhou described how after World War I the possession of chemical weapons, another weapon of mass destruction, created a condition of mutual vulnerability and thus deterrence. Based on this, he concluded in 1955 that “now it is also possible to ban the use of atomic weapons,” as the mutual possession of nuclear weapons would deter states from using them. Later, in 1961, he was more blunt, arguing, “If we don’t have missiles, then the imperialists can use missiles [against us].” 45 Zhou’s remark reflected the PLA’s focus in the 1950s on preparing to fight a conventional war after the United States used nuclear weapons as part of an attack against China (as described in chapter 3 ). 46

China’s second generation of leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, similarly emphasized the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. During a 1975 meeting with the prime minister of Guyana, Deng alluded to the deterrent function of these weapons, stating that “France has also built some [nuclear weapons]. We understand [why] France has built them. Britain has also made some, but not many. Our reason for building a few is that we will have them if others [ tamen ] have them. Nuclear weapons have only this function.” 47 Although only by implication, he was referring to their deterrent role. Later that year, he likewise told officials from the Seventh Machine Industry (Aerospace), which was responsible for developing China’s ballistic missiles, “We must have some deterrent force [ weishe liliang ] if they also have it. We are unable to do too much, but to have it is useful.” 48

Finally, China’s other generations of leaders stressed the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. Jiang Zemin, for example, stated that “as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world and there is nuclear deterrence, we must maintain and develop a nuclear counterstrike force.” 49 Elsewhere Jiang stated that “keypoint counterstrikes reflect the use of the concentration of forces in nuclear war. Our country’s nuclear strength [ liliang ] is limited, only by concentrating nuclear firepower and executing keypoint counterstrikes against limited targets can it effectively achieve its strategic goal.” 50 Although few primary source documents on Hu Jintao’s approach to military affairs have been published, authoritative articles by senior military scholars have continued to stress this view of nuclear weapons since Hu became general secretary of the CCP in 2002. 51 According to Zhang Qihua, former director of the Second Artillery’s equipment department, “Chairman Hu’s important instructions were the continuation and development of the thought of the core three generations of leaders on the development of our country’s strategic deterrent.” 52 Authoritative books on Chinese strategy published after Xi Jinping became general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC also indicate that nuclear weapons are intended primarily to deter nuclear attacks. 53

China’s top party leaders, especially the first generation, stressed another role of nuclear weapons: to resist and prevent nuclear coercion, when a nuclear weapons state threatens a state without nuclear weapons. 54 Ironically, one reason why Mao likely disparaged the atomic bomb as a “paper tiger” was instrumental—namely, to encourage the Chinese public not to be intimidated by such destructive weapons possessed by China’s opponents. 55

The need to prevent nuclear coercion is a theme that runs through Mao’s limited references to nuclear weapons. During the first meeting of the National Defense Commission in 1954, for example, Mao noted, “Imperialists [i.e., the United States] assess that we only have a few things and then they come to bully us. They say, ‘how many atomic bombs do you have?’ ” 56 When meeting with French parliamentarians in 1964 before China’s first nuclear test, he argued, “With batches and batches of nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union, they often shake them in their hands to intimidate people.” 57 Likewise, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, one of the key figures in China’s nuclear weapons program, observed that “when the Chinese people have this weapon, [the United States’] nuclear blackmail toward the people of the world will be completely destroyed.” 5 8

Mao’s focus on countering coercion reflects the initial decision to pursue nuclear weapons. In his famous 1956 speech “On the Ten Great Relationships,” Mao noted that “we want to have not only more planes and heavy artillery, but also the atomic bomb. In today’s world, if we don’t want to be bullied, then we cannot do without this thing.” 59 During a 1958 CMC meeting, he linked them with the ability to stand up to stronger states, noting that “[we] also want that atomic bomb. I hear that with such a big thing, if you don’t have it, then others will say that you don’t count. Fine, we should build a few.” 60

Although China’s concern with countering nuclear coercion was perhaps most evident during the early Cold War, other generations of Chinese leaders have also emphasized this function of nuclear weapons. In 1975, for example, Deng Xiaoping told a delegation of foreign visitors that China does “not advocate nuclear proliferation at all, but we even more strongly oppose nuclear monopolies.” 61 Similarly, Jiang Zemin observed that by acquiring the bomb in the 1960s, China “smashed the U.S.-Soviet nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail, making our country one of the world’s few nuclear weapons states.” 62

China’s top party leaders agreed that nuclear weapons lacked any meaningful warfighting utility. Mao Zedong, of course, stressed that only people and not weapons enabled countries to win wars. After the strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, he concluded that nuclear weapons could not resolve wars, in general, or force Japan to surrender, in particular. For Mao, “with only atomic bombs and without people’s struggles, then atomic bombs are meaningless.” 63 Indeed, Mao’s writings on military affairs are replete with references to the superiority of people over weapons on the battlefield, a view that was central to the main strategic problem that the CCP encountered before and after 1949: defeating an adversary with superior weapons and equipment.

China’s early leaders also viewed nuclear weapons as blunt instruments that were hard to employ on the battlefield. When Marshal Ye Jianying discussed the appearance of tactical nuclear weapons in a 1961 speech, for example, he noted “the use of atomic weapons is subject to certain conditions. They cannot be used to strike at any time or at any target as one pleases.” 64 Ye further observed that terrain, climate, and battlefield developments all influenced whether they could be employed.

Mao and Zhou viewed conventional weapons, not nuclear weapons, as the source of victory in war. During a meeting of the National Defense Industry Commission (NDIC) in August 1961, Zhou highlighted the need to possess nuclear weapons to deter an “imperialist” attack with nuclear weapons. But “for face to face struggles, [we] must still rely on conventional weapons and must grasp the development of conventional weapons.” 65 The following month, in a lengthy conversation with British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Mao said nuclear weapons “will not be used. If more are made, then nuclear war will not be fought.” Instead, he underscored the importance of conventional weapons, observing that “if you want to fight, you still need to use conventional weapons to fight.” 66 In January 1965, during an enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee, he noted that “we will only use conventional weapons to fight with them,” referring to “imperialists” and “revisionists.” 67

Deng Xiaoping shared Mao, Zhou and Ye’s views. By the mid-1970s, Deng Xiaoping had concluded that the United States and the Soviet Union were unlikely to fight a nuclear war, despite the development of nuclear warfighting doctrines in both countries. When meeting with the Mexican defense minister in 1978, Deng observed that “future wars will mainly be wars with conventional weapons and not atomic wars. The reason is that the destructive power of nuclear weapons is too great and the enemy will not easily use them.” In Deng’s view, wars were fought to control territory and extract resources, not to destroy another state’s infrastructure completely. Thus, Deng concluded, “we will mainly develop conventional weapons.” 68 In 1981, during a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, Deng warned not to “ignore conventional war. Because with nuclear weapons, if you have them, I will have them. If you have more, I will have more and perhaps no one will dare to use them. Conventional war is possible.” 69 Finally, as part of the 1985 CMC meeting on China’s strategic transformation in force modernization, Deng expressed again his view that nuclear war was unlikely: because “the US and USSR today both have so many atomic bombs, so if war breaks out who will launch the first one if they fight a war—this is not an easy decision to make.” Furthermore, he noted, “a future world war will not necessarily be a nuclear war. This is not only our view, but the Americans and Soviets also believe that in the future it is quite likely that conventional wars will be fought.” 70

China’s top party leaders, not senior military officers, have dominated the development of China’s nuclear strategy and forces. These leaders, especially Zhou Enlai, decided what kinds of weapons to develop, how many to develop, as well as basing modes and strategy. When the development of the Second Artillery as an independent branch of the PLA accelerated in the late 1970s, the CMC became much more directly involved in its development, but as the party’s leading body for military affairs .

China’s top party leaders began to consider developing nuclear weapons while still fighting the Korean War. Key discussions about developing nuclear weapons were held in early to mid-1952. The political decision to move forward with a nuclear program was not made until January 1955, after discovering a domestic source of uranium. 71 China’s leaders also wanted to be able to assemble a team of qualified scientists to develop nuclear weapons.

In June 1951, a Chinese graduate student in France, Yang Chengzong, received his PhD in radiology from the University of Paris under the supervision of Irene Joliot-Curie. As Yang was preparing to return to China, Irene arranged a meeting with her husband, Frederick Joliot-Curie, also a noted French physicist. Frederick asked him to pass along a message to Mao: “If you want to defend peace and oppose the atomic bomb, you must have the atomic bomb yourself.” Furthermore, “the atomic bomb is not so terrible and the principles of the atomic bomb were not invented by Americans.” To encourage China, Frederick told Yang that China had its own scientists, such as Qian Sanqiang, He Zehui, and Wang Dezhao. 72 After Yang returned to China, he joined the Institute of Modern Physics and told its director, Qian Sanqiang, about Joliot-Curie’s message for Mao. In October 1951, Qian then asked another member of the institute, Ding Zan, to inform the central leadership. 73

It is unclear when Mao and other leaders first received Joliot-Curie’s message, but later they would refer to it frequently. Regardless, China began to explore developing the bomb in March 1952, when Zhou Enlai instructed two of his secretaries, Lei Yingfu and Wei Ming, to visit the noted Chinese scientist Zhu Kezhen. 74 The purpose of the meeting was to better understand “the technological prerequisites for the trial production of the atomic bomb and other sophisticated weapons.” 75 Zhu told Lei and Wei that such an endeavor would be much more expensive than developing conventional weapons, require a group of talented personnel (including overseas Chinese with advanced technical training), and depend on imported materials and equipment. When Lei Yingfu reported back to Zhou, Lei said Zhu’s “opinion is expert.” 76

In May 1952, Zhou Enlai met with members of the CMC to discuss the first five-year plan for military development. Other participants in the meeting included Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, and Su Yu. 77 They discussed the development of nuclear weapons but decided more research was needed to determine how to develop it and when to begin. 78 Zhou Enlai also understood the importance of identifying a domestic supply of uranium, which China had not yet discovered. In November 1952, Zhou Enlai read a report about a piece of uranium ore sent from the Anshan Iron Company, which he immediately shared with Mao and other party leaders. He also suggested inviting Soviet experts to jointly explore for uranium 79 and supported the development of the Institute of Modern Physics within the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), which would be the center of China’s technical and theoretical work. 80 The recollection of Guo Yinghui, another secretary for Zhou Enlai, describes how the development of nuclear weapons was discussed at the May 1952 meeting. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai “both believed that if China did not have the atomic bomb and other sophisticated weapons, others would not respect China.” 81

After the May 1952 meeting, senior Chinese leaders continued to discuss the need for China to acquire nuclear weapons and began to approach the Soviet Union for aid. Acting on Zhou Enlai’s instructions, Qian Sanqiang asked to visit atomic physics research institutes and facilities when a delegation from CAS visited Moscow in March 1953. 82 While visiting the Moscow Institute of Physics, Qian asked his counterpart if the Soviet Union could provide assistance to build a cyclotron and experimental reactor. 83 In November 1953, Peng Dehuai expressed his desire for China to have all the weapons that the United States possessed, including nuclear weapons. 84 Peng continued to explore the process of building nuclear weapons, meeting with Qian in August 1954 before traveling to Moscow. 85 In September 1954, during a trip to Moscow with other senior Chinese leaders to observe the SNOWBALL nuclear exercise, Peng again explored the possibility of assistance to build a cyclotron and experimental reactor. 86

The situation changed in the fall of 1954, when uranium was discovered in Guangxi. In February 1954, Zhou Enlai established an office in the Ministry of Geology responsible for developing China’s uranium resources. 87 Surveys conducted between June and October yielded samples from Shanmuchong in Guangxi that suggested China would have a sufficient indigenous supply to support a nuclear weapons program. 88 Leading the effort was Liu Jie, the vice minister of geology, who recalls that the discovery in Guangxi was made in late August or early September. 89 The day after he reported the discovery to Zhou Enlai, Liu was instructed to fly to Beijing. In Mao’s office in Zhongnanhai, Liu displayed the ore that had been found. He described Mao as “excited,” stating that “our country has abundant resources and we must develop atomic energy.” At the end of the meeting, Mao stated that “this must be dealt with well, it will determine our destiny.” 90 Thus, by late August or early September 1954, the decision to pursue the bomb had been made informally.

Following the discovery of uranium, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai believed that China could now pursue the development of nuclear weapons. Mao himself directly raised the question during Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in October 1954 to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Mao reportedly asked Khrushchev to “reveal to China the secret of the atomic bomb and to assist the PRC in launching the production of atomic bombs.” 91 Peng Dehuai asked Li Fuchun, who was supervising negotiations over cooperation with the Soviet Union, to request aid with a reactor and accelerator during Khrushchev’s visit. 92 According to Peng, they “must be built as soon as possible.” 93 Later in October 1954, Mao told Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that “China now does not have an atomic bomb … we are beginning to study [it].” 94

On January 14, 1955, Zhou Enlai convened a small meeting with two leading scientists, Li Siguang (also minister of geology) and Qian Sanqiang, along with economic planner Bo Yibo and vice minister of geology Liu Jie. They reviewed the technical requirements for developing nuclear weapons to prepare for a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat. At the meeting, for example, Zhou reviewed the nuclear threats that China had faced during the Korean War as the main rationale for acquiring the bomb. To underscore the need for China to have nuclear weapons, Zhou quoted Joliot-Curie’s 1951 message to Mao Zedong: “If you want to oppose the atomic bomb, you need to possess the atomic bomb.” 95 With the discovery of uranium, Zhou concluded that “the situation had now changed.… It is time to consider the development of atomic energy.” 96

The next day, on January 15, an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat convened to discuss whether to develop nuclear energy and pursue the bomb. The secretariat was the party’s top leadership decision-making body, roughly equivalent to today’s Politburo Standing Committee. At the time, no active duty military officers were members of the secretariat. 97 Other participants in the meeting included Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, and Liu Jie. 98 Out of the roughly ten participants, only one, Peng Dehuai, was a senior military officer. In other words, although Peng had favored the development of the bomb, the party’s top leaders collectively made the decision to pursue it. Participants watched the demonstration of a Chinese-made Geiger counter from the Institute of Modern Physics with a piece of uranium from Guangxi. Qian Sanqiang, head of the institute, said that China’s research on atomic energy had “started from scratch,” but now, “after several years of effort, a foundation has been established,” including forming a team of experts to work on the project. 99 The meeting ended with the “strategic decision” to develop nuclear weapons. 100

Soon after the January 1955 meeting, steps were taken to create the necessary organizations to develop nuclear weapons. Top party leaders, especially Zhou Enlai, and not senior military officers, made all the key decisions. Zhou Enlai would play a dominant role in overseeing the development of China’s strategic weapons from 1955 until his death. The first coordinating body for China’s nuclear program was established in July 1955, and was composed of vice-premier Chen Yun, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, and economic planner Bo Yibo. 101 They were charged with overseeing all work for establishing China’s nuclear industry and reported to Zhou, with Bo Yibo handling daily affairs. In early 1955, China signed several agreements with the Soviet Union in the areas of uranium mining and nuclear energy, which became the focus of the Chen-Nie-Bo coordinating group. In December 1955, the State Council published a twelve-year plan for the development of China’s nuclear industry, which was then included as a task in the 1956 twelve-year plan for the development of science and technology in China. In November 1956, a ministry to manage the development of China’s nuclear industry was established and replaced the Chen-Nie-Bo group. 102

In 1961, China’s top party leaders confronted a critical decision about developing the bomb. In 1959 and 1960, the Soviet Union terminated all support for China’s nuclear program. Although the role of Soviet nuclear assistance in China’s strategic weapons program has probably been overstated, the withdrawal of advisors left China without much-needed equipment to continue specific parts of the projects, and without manuals and technical materials for the equipment that had been delivered. 103 The disastrous economic policies of the Great Leap Forward also sparked a devastating famine and the collapse of China’s economy at precisely the time that a key decision about how to allocate resources for strategic weapons would need to be made. As discussed in chapter 4 , in January 1961 the top party leadership began to focus on rehabilitating the economy through the policy of “adjustment, consolidation, replenishment, improvement.”

Under these conditions, the NDIC held a work conference at the leadership retreat in Beidaihe from July 18 to August 12. The work conference covered many topics, such as reducing the number of workers in the defense industrial sector (consistent with efforts to reduce the urban population more generally). On July 27, the focus turned to the merits of emphasizing conventional versus “sophisticated” weapons and a debate arose over whether to “mount the horse” ( shangma ) or “dismount the horse” ( xiama )—that is, whether to continue with the nuclear program or not. 104 Those in charge of economic planning opposed continuing with the program, while most of the senior military officers, including Nie Rongzhen, He Long, and Chen Yi, argued for continuing with the program. 105 Zhou Enlai called for continuing to produce conventional weapons, which he justified as the basis for developing “sophisticated” ones. 106 Zhou’s remarks appeared to indicate that he favored prioritizing conventional weapons production over strategic weapons development. 107

The discussion about whether to halt the nuclear program continued in the Politburo in August and September 1961. A majority favored continuing. 108 Nie Rongzhen even wrote a report to Mao in late August arguing for the program’s continuation. 109 Nevertheless, Liu Shaoqi, vice-chairman of the CCP, instructed that the “basic condition of the nuclear industry” should be investigated before deciding. 110 Mao, Chen Yi and Nie Rongzhen agreed. Afterwards, Nie proposed that Zhang Aiping lead the investigation. 111 Zhang was a deputy chief of the general staff and deputy director of the NDSTC, among other posts related to weapons development.

To conduct his investigation, Zhang worked closely with key scientists, including Liu Xiyao, Liu Jie, and Zhu Guangya. He studied all aspects of the program and facilities in the Second Ministry of Machine Building, which was now responsible for China’s nuclear weapons. In November 1961, Zhang submitted his report to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and the CMC. Zhang Aiping concluded that China would be able to test its first device in 1964. However, “the next year is the critical year, if organized well and grasped firmly.” 112 Improved coordination among the units involved in the nuclear program would be required to achieve this goal. The program included fifty organizations with more than three thousand people. 113 Zhang stressed that success required the “vigorous support” of central departments, regional bureaus, provinces, and cities. 114 Deng Xiaoping forwarded the report to Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Zhen. 115 Zhou Enlai and Peng Zhen both indicated agreement with Zhang’s report, while members of the CMC expressed their approval. 116 This is believed to have ended the debate over whether or not to halt the program. 117

Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Zhang’s recommendations were implemented. Nie Rongzhen’s secretary suggests that Mao may not have given his final blessing to continue with the program until June 1962. 118 After receiving a report that month on war preparations for a Nationalist attack, Mao said “the research and development of sophisticated weapons should continue, we cannot relax or stop [ xiama ].” 119 Whether other party leaders were waiting for Mao’s final blessing or whether efforts to rehabilitate the economy after the Great Leap Forward had slowed progress of the nuclear program in the previous year, the program received renewed attention from the leadership at the Beidaihe retreat in August 1962. 120 If China had nuclear weapons, foreign minister Chen Yi said at the meeting, “it would be much easier for me to be foreign minister!” 121 Afterward, the Second Ministry of Machine Building (in charge of China’s nuclear industry) prepared a report for Mao and the leadership, which reviewed the progress achieved so far and concluded that China would be able to conduct its first nuclear test by 1964 or in the first half of 1965, at the very latest. 122 The report became known as the “two-year plan.” 123 The plan was refined in October 1962 to first test a device from a tower and then conduct an air-dropped test. 124

To be able to test a bomb within two years, however, required the coordination of many departments beyond the Second Ministry. To achieve this goal, the Politburo decided to create a special coordinating body. When the Politburo discussed the nuclear program in early October, Liu Shaoqi stated that “the cooperation of all sides is very important, the center should create a commission to strengthen leadership in this area.” 125 As head of the National Defense Industry Office (NDIO), Luo Ruiqing was asked to propose a list of names for such a body, which he submitted on October 30, 1962. 126 In early November, Mao approved, urging them to “make a great effort to coordinate and complete this work.” 127

The Politburo established the Central Special Commission ( zhongyang zhuanmen weiyuanhui ), a body under the Central Committee of the CCP, on November 17, 1962. Reflecting the role of top party leaders, Zhou Enlai chaired the new commission, along with seven vice-premiers and seven members with ministerial rank. Although most of the members were from the state apparatus, military members included He Long (as NDIC director), Nie Rongzhen (as NDSTC director), Zhang Aiping (as NDSTC deputy director), and Luo Ruiqing (as NDIO director). 128 In March 1965, the scope of the Central Special Commission’s (CSC) responsibility was expanded to include the development of China’s ballistic missile program, and more members were added. The CSC played a key role in China’s first test of an atomic device in October 1964, along with key decisions about what kind of nuclear forces to develop and how to develop them. The first few meetings of the CSC in November and December 1962 reviewed the Second Ministry’s two-year plan and how to achieve a test by early 1965.

In his capacity as CSC chairman, Zhou Enlai directly supervised the preparations for China’s first nuclear test. In April 1964, the CSC established a command department (zhihui bu ) headed by Zhang Aiping. From this point forward, Zhang’s main task was to manage the preparations for the test of China’s first device, reporting directly to Zhou. 129 In August 1964, Zhang, along with Liu Xiyao, vice minister of the Second Ministry, supervised a pretest (yuyan ) of all components that would be used in the actual test. Zhou instructed Zhang to report the results of this test to him directly, using a special telephone line that had been established to link the test site with Zhou’s office. 130

Following the success of these pretests, Zhou convened the ninth meeting of the CSC. On September 16 and 17, the commission then debated the timing of the actual test. One group favored testing earlier, in October 1964, while another group favored testing later, in the spring of 1965. 131 He then reported the options to Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong, who would make the final decision. Mao favored testing sooner rather than later, stating that “since it will scare people, let’s do it earlier.” 132 Although the original plan called for testing in early October, the date was changed to mid-October so that it would not overlap with the presence of foreign dignitaries who would be visiting for China’s national day.

Secrecy regarding the test offers another indication of party control over China’s nuclear program. Zhou instructed that the timing of the test would only be known by members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the two vice-chairmen of the CMC, and Peng Zhen: a total of eight people. Zhou also devised code words to be used for the test. The bomb would be called “Miss Qiu” ( qiu xiaojie ), the testing tower as the “dressing table” ( shuzhuangtai ), and the fuse or detonator as the “braid” ( shubianzi ). 133 To maintain secrecy, Zhang Aiping communicated with Zhou Enlai through Zhang’s assistant, Li Xuge. When an updated weather report threatened to disrupt the test, Zhang dispatched Li to Beijing to inform Zhou Enlai and propose delaying the test until a window of good weather between October 15 and 20. Zhou agreed and then sent the report to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, He Long, Nie Rongzhen, and Luo Ruiqing to review; they approved the changes. 134 When the test occurred, Zhang reported the results directly to Zhou Enlai, using a direct phone link that had been established at China’s testing facility in Lop Nor.

After the successful test of China’s first atomic device, top party leaders continued to dominate the development of China’s nuclear weapons. Soon after the first test, Zhou Enlai informed Zhang Aiping and Liu Xiyao that “the center” ( zhongyang ) had decided on the following plan for developing China’s strategic weapons: to conduct an air-drop test in 1965, to test a missile with a nuclear warhead in 1966, and to test a hydrogen bomb in 1967. 135

China’s approach to nuclear weapons distinguishes between nuclear policy and nuclear strategy. China’s nuclear policy (he zhengce ) refers to national policy positions adopted after the successful test in October 1964. These policies established the parameters for China’s nuclear strategy and force posture, which highlights the role of top party leaders in determining nuclear strategy. China’s nuclear strategy (he zhanlue ) refers to more specific operational questions and cannot violate the main tenets of the policy, such as not using nuclear weapons first. China’s top party leaders, especially Mao and Zhou, determined China’s nuclear policy, which remains influential today.

A statement issued after China successfully tested its first nuclear device introduced China’s nuclear policy. Reflecting the dominant role of top party leaders, the document was entitled “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.” 136 Since 1949, the use of government statements ( zhengfu shengming ) to announce policy decisions is relatively rare, underscoring the authoritativeness of its content. 137 The key phrase was: “The Chinese government solemnly declares that China at any time and under any circumstances will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.” The statement indicated that China had developed nuclear weapons for defensive purposes (“China’s development of nuclear weapons is for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from U.S. threats to launch nuclear war”), and that China would not attack nonnuclear weapons states with nuclear weapons and would pursue complete disarmament.

China’s nuclear policy has influenced the development of China’s nuclear strategy in several ways. First, in the hierarchy of China’s military science, military strategy is defined as serving broader national political goals. In the nuclear realm, China’s nuclear policy outlines these political goals and defines the essential purposes of China’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, changing these political goals lies beyond the purview of military leaders and is an issue reserved for top party leaders. Second, the party created clear guidelines for China’s nuclear strategy. Put simply, the no-first-use pledge determined that China’s nuclear forces would adopt a retaliatory posture (because China would not use nuclear weapons first) and would need to create a force that would be capable of surviving an initial nuclear attack to be able to retaliate. Not only does China’s nuclear policy reflect the dominance of top party leaders in China’s approach to nuclear weapons. Morever, it has also constrained China’s subsequent nuclear strategy and force development. Third, the policy explains the overriding emphasis on survivability in China’s force development, reflected first in the decision to base the bulk of China’s nuclear forces in tunnels and silos, and then the desire to add mobile components, with road-mobile missile systems and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

China’s top party leaders formulated China’s nuclear policy. On October 11, 1964, Zhou Enlai began to draft the statement that would be issued with China’s first test. To discuss the content of the statement, he gathered officials from the MFA, CSC, and GSD. On October 13, Zhou supervised the drafting of the statement. Assisting him was Wu Lengxi (editor of the People’s Daily ), Qiao Guanhua (deputy minister of foreign affairs), and Yao Qin (deputy director of the propaganda department). Zhou described what he wanted the statement to cover and a draft was completed later that day. On October 14, Zhou submitted the draft to top party leaders for their approval, including Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and He Long. 138

The effect of China’s nuclear policy is perhaps most evident in the 1996 Science of Second Artillery Strategy. Overall, the text mentions “no-first-use” eighteen times and China’s “nuclear policy” twenty-six times. The terms are used to establish the parameters for the Second Artillery’s use of nuclear weapons. The text states, for example, that “our country’s policy of not using nuclear weapons first determines that the Second Artillery must adopt the principle of ‘gaining control by striking afterwards’ [ houfa zhiren ].” 139 Furthermore, “only after an enemy nuclear state attacks us can the Second Artillery resolutely conduct a nuclear counterattack according to the order of the Central Military Commission.” 140 Likewise, the text notes that “the Second Artillery will strictly abide by our country’s nuclear policy of no-first-use to develop and employ nuclear missile forces.” 141 In short, China’s nuclear policy influences and constrains the key elements of strategy: when China will use nuclear weapons and how it will do so.

Before and after China’s first test of an atomic device in 1964, top party leaders played a key role in determining the type of nuclear weapons that China should develop and how they would develop them. China’s strategy and force posture were not dictated by technology. Instead, the goal of possessing a retaliatory force capable of deterring a nuclear attack guided the development of China’s nuclear forces.

Even before the CSC was established, senior party leaders provided top-level guidance on the question of force structure. In July 1962, for example, the head of the Fifth Academy at the Ministry of Defense (responsible for missile design and development), Wang Binzhang, delivered a report to the Central Committee on a framework for developing missiles, including an intermediate range ( zhongcheng ) missile that would become the DF-3. Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping approved Wang’s report, which focused on lessons learned from the failed test of the DF-2 in March 1962 and other lessons from the DF-2 program for the development of the DF-3. 142

When the CSC was established, it allowed top party leaders to continue to supervise the development of these weapons systems. After the first design for a nuclear device was developed in March 1963, for example, Zhou Enlai signaled the importance of focusing on weaponization and not just the initial test of an atomic device. Specifically, Zhou said that China “not only must explode a nuclear device, but must also resolve the question of weapons production.” 143 A nuclear test by itself would have little deterrent effect. Instead, China would need a deliverable and thus usable nuclear weapon.

In December 1963 and January 1964, party leaders under Zhou Enlai made a series of important decisions about the development of China’s nuclear forces. The impetus was twofold. First, in November 1963, scientists had successfully tested the explosive assembly and the initiator—crucial components in an atomic device. After this test, the last step was manufacturing the uranium core. 144 Thus, China had made an important “breakthrough” that increased confidence in a successful test. Second, in August 1963, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed a limited test-ban treaty that proscribed testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. China viewed this as part of an effort to prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons, especially since it had planned its first test to be above ground.

At its seventh meeting in December 1963, the CSC decided what kind of nuclear weapons China should develop. As Zhou Enlai instructed, “The direction of research on nuclear weapons should prioritize missile warheads, while air-dropped bombs should be secondary.” 145 China was perhaps choosing the more difficult path, as it had made only some progress on developing a medium-range missile, the DF-2. Nevertheless, as noted Chinese scholar and scientist Sun Xiangli has observed, the poor survivability and limited range of airplanes “made it difficult [for them] to play a strategic deterrent role.” 146 Over the longer term, missiles would provide a more robust retaliatory deterrent than bombers. Later that month, Qian Xuesen submitted a report to the NDSTC on pathways for the development of missile technologies. When Nie Rongzhen approved the report in January 1964, he underscored the need for China to have a long-term plan for developing missiles. 147

On January 29, 1964, Zhou Enlai prepared a report in the name of the CSC for Mao Zedong, suggesting that China must accelerate the development of its nuclear weapons. Zhou wanted to reduce the time between development and actually equipping the force with an operational weapon and be able to deploy China’s first weapons within the timeframe of the Third Five-Year Plan (1966–70). Zhou then suggested that, after a successful nuclear test, China should immediately commence with research on a warhead and accelerate development of the DF-2 so that the force could be equipped with a nuclear-tipped missile as soon as possible. 148

Mao and other top party leaders approved Zhou’s report. Afterward, Zhou called on relevant departments to determine concrete development plans. Over the next year, each department outlined how they would achieve this goal. In July 1964, even before a successful nuclear test, Zhou dispatched his military secretary, Zhou Jiading, to the Second Ministry of Machine Building with instructions to accelerate miniaturization, which was required for a missile delivery system. 149 The Second Ministry indicated it would first focus on research necessary for the test of a nuclear-tipped missile with a fission bomb and then aim to conduct a test of a hydrogen bomb by 1968 that would serve as the foundation of the warheads for China’s strategic missiles. The CSC approved the Second Ministry’s plan in February 1965. 150

At the same meeting in February 1965, the CSC made two other crucial decisions. The CSC decided to increase the range of the DF-2 by twenty percent and set 1975 as the deadline for China to develop an ICBM. In this way, top party leaders provided high-level guidance for the development of China’s nuclear forces. An ICBM is the essential component of a retaliatory capability and clearly the desired goal.

In March 1965, the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building submitted a missile development plan to the CSC. The plan became known as “four bombs in eight years” because it outlined benchmarks for developing a series of liquid-fueled missiles of various ranges between 1965 and 1972: the DF-2 (medium range), DF-3 (intermediate range), DF-4 (long range), and DF-5 (intercontinental). Initial discussion of the plan began in 1963, before Zhou’s 1964 report, as part of a review of the failure of the first DF-2 test launch in March 1962. 151 Given the CSC’s requirement that China develop an ICBM by 1975, the main question in 1964 was how to achieve this goal and, specifically, whether China should first develop a long-range missile or move straight to developing an ICBM.

To decide this issue, the Seventh Ministry convened a meeting from February 18 to March 7 that involved more than two thousand researchers, management cadre, and production experts. 152 Zhou Enlai dispatched a team to participate, headed by Zhao Erlu, one of the deputy directors of the CSC’s office. 153 Among other issues, debate revolved around whether to develop an experimental long-range missile as part of the effort to develop an ICBM, or whether to design a class of long-range missiles that would then be deployed along with an ICBM. 154 In the end, the participants decided to build a class of long-range missiles, the DF-4, which would be a two-stage design, using the DF-3 as the first stage. Doing so would not only give China experience designing a two-stage missile and allow for a long-range missile to be developed more quickly, but it would also cover targets between China’s medium-range missiles and an ICBM. 155 Although technology was certainly a factor, it did not determine the choices made about China’s nuclear strategy and force posture. Possessing an ICBM was the desired end goal and the only question was how to achieve it, either directly or by first mastering related technologies through the design and development of the DF-4. As early as 1961, Zhou Enlai had outlined such a phased development of missiles, from shorter-range to longer-range. 156

On March 20, 1965, the CSC approved the plan to develop “four missiles in eight years.” It affirmed the development schedule for the DF-2 with extended range and plans to develop the DF-3 that had been set in 1964. 157 In addition to the DF-2, the development plan outlined milestones for the other missiles that China planned to build. The plan called for conducting the first flight test of the DF-4 in 1969 and certifying the missile ( dingxing ) by 1971, and for the DF-5 to conduct its first flight test in 1971 and to be certified in 1973. 158 Of course, these goals were wildly optimistic. The DF-4 was not completed until 1980, while the first full-range test of the DF-5 occurred nine years behind schedule. 159

Another example of the dominance of China’s top party leaders in nuclear strategy is the decision to create the Second Artillery as an independent branch under the CMC to control China’s nuclear weapons. At midnight on May 30, 1965, Zhou Enlai summoned Zhang Aiping for an urgent meeting. Zhou stated that the Central Committee and CMC had decided to create a leading body (lingdao jiguan ) for China’s missile forces (daodan budui ). The time was right, as China was preparing to test a nuclear warhead mated to a missile for the first time. 160 Zhou asked Zhang to create the new unit. What is noteworthy about Zhou’s request is that he was not even a CMC member. Instead, he was acting in his capacity as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and CSC chair, with final authority over China’s strategic weapons programs.

Zhang acted quickly to implement Zhou’s request. On June 2, Zhang established a group that included the commander of the CMC’s artillery corps, the deputy director of the NDSTC, and the heads of the GSD’s operations and military affairs departments. 161 On June 15, Zhang submitted a preliminary report to Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing, then chief of the general staff. Based on Zhang’s report, the CMC in July 1965 instructed that the Artillery Corps under the CMC would be reorganized to focus on missiles as well as conventional artillery and then be split into two different units that would focus on missiles and conventional artillery, respectively. 162 Based on these instructions, the artillery forces under the CMC began to create new offices in its three general departments to focus on missiles.

In March 1966, for reasons unrelated to the creation of the Second Artillery, the CMC decided to disband the PLA’s public security force ( gong’an budui ). At the time, reorganization of the artillery corps to include missile units was not proceeding as quickly as China’s leaders had hoped. 163 Zhang Aiping decided that this presented an opportunity, whereby the leadership of the public security force could be combined with the departments of the artillery corps overseeing missiles. The new organization would be housed in the offices of the old public security force. The commander of the artillery corps, We Kehua, in consultation with Zhang, submitted a report to the GSD proposing the change. Zhang Aiping approved the report in his capacity as deputy chief of the general staff and then submitted it to the CMC, which approved it shortly thereafter. 164

In his report, Zhang wanted to use two different names for China’s missiles forces. Internally, the name would be the rocket artillery force ( huojian paobing budui ). Externally, it would be called the Second Artillery ( di’er paobing ). Zhou Enlai, however, suggested that just the name “Second Artillery” should be used. 165 Zhou stated that this name “differentiated it from the American’s Strategic Air Force and was different than the Soviet Union’s Strategic Rocket Corps. The name is roughly the same as rocket forces and will also maintain secrecy.” 166 On June 6, 1966, the Central Committee and CMC decided to establish the Second Artillery based on units from the public security and artillery forces. On July 1, 1966, the Second Artillery was formally established. 167 Although Zhang Aiping played a key role in how the organization was formed, he did so under the direct instructions of China’s top party leaders, who reviewed and approved his proposals. Although the CMC would come to play a much larger role in managing the development of the Second Artillery in the late 1970s, it did not play an important role in its establishment despite being a military unit under its command.

The decision to establish the Second Artillery as an independent branch directly under the CMC underscores the desire to centralize command of China’s strategic weapons. At the time, other “specialized” units were also directly under the CMC, including the artillery and armored branches. As relatively new technologies for the PLA to master, their development also required close supervision. Over time, these branches were all eventually downgraded as units under the GSD and eventually incorporated into the combined arms group armies formed in the mid-1980s. The Second Artillery, however, remained as the only independent branch directly under the CMC—in effect, functioning like a service. In 2016, China’s missile forces were formally established as a service ( junzhong ) and renamed the PLA Rocket Force.

After the Second Artillery’s establishment, the CMC would play a more direct role in the organization’s development. This reflected the chain of command, given that the Second Artillery was created as a unit directly under the CMC. It also still allowed for more direct influence of top party leaders over the organization, some of whom were on the CMC.

On July 12, 1967, the CMC issued temporary regulations for the Second Artillery that outlined its mission and organizational structure. The CMC’s primary mission for the Second Artillery was “building a nuclear counterattack force to realize active defense.” 168 Furthermore, the regulations underscored the Second Artillery’s subordination to the CMC: “Its development, deployment, movements, and especially operations must all be under the centralized leadership of the CMC and it must extremely strictly and accurately follow the orders of the CMC.” 169 On September 12, 1967, the CMC standing committee discussed the question of the Second Artillery’s mission. 170 The CMC for the first time clearly outlined the development goal for the Second Artillery as “strict and pure, small but effective” ( yanmi jietun, duanxiao jinggan ). 171 The former referred to the quality and organization of the force, while the latter described the capabilities that China aspired to achieve.

The chaos of the Cultural Revolution also engulfed the Second Artillery. Even though established in July 1966, a commander and commissar were not appointed until almost a year later, in 1967, but the order was not disseminated and the designated commander, Xiang Shouzhi, was not informed. A month later, Xiang fell victim to factional politics and was persecuted, leaving the Second Artillery without a commander until 1968. 172 During this period, the organization focused primarily on the construction of several missile bases and associated infrastructure, but not operational doctrine. The Second Artillery’s first detailed deliberation of a nuclear counterstrike operation occurred in October 1975, when the Second Artillery’s new leadership held a meeting to examine operational employment, marking the first time that operational guiding thought and employment principles for the Second Artillery were discussed (almost a decade after it was established). The crux was that they be compatible with “active defense” so that the troops would know how to conduct “counterstrike operations” ( fanji zuozhan ). 173

In October 1978, the Second Artillery held an operations meeting to discuss force development. Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and other members of the Central Committee and the CMC met with the participants to comment on the deliberations. During the meeting, Commander Li Shuiqing described the need to develop the Second Artillery into a “lean and effective nuclear counterstrike force.” 174 Li’s speech again underscored the emphasis on a counterstrike campaign and raised for the first time the concept of “lean and effective” that would later be adopted as the overall guiding principle for the development of China’s nuclear forces. The meeting also produced a document on the general principles for the Second Artillery’s operations. 175 In 1980, nuclear counterstrike operations were incorporated into the PLA’s training program. 176

In September 1980, the CMC established the basic operational principles for the Second Artillery. This occurred during the “801” meeting on strategy described in chapter 5 . The Second Artillery’s leadership was invited to participate, with He Jinheng, then a deputy commander and chief of staff, delivering a speech on how the Second Artillery would be used in a future war. Given the high degree of centralization and secrecy surrounding China’s nuclear weapons, He’s speech marked the first time that other senior officers in the PLA were introduced to how China’s nuclear weapons would be used. 177 The CMC instructed that two principles should serve as the basis for the Second Artillery’s operations in a way that was consistent with the concept of active defense and the no-first-use policy—“close defense” ( yanmi fanghu ) and “keypoint counterstrikes” ( zhongdian fanji) . At the meeting, Yang Dezhi, then chief of the general staff and a member of the CMC, stated that “the Second Artillery must be closely defended and, according to the order of the CMC, carry out keypoint counterstrikes.” 178

After the “801” meeting, the Second Artillery leadership acted quickly to flesh out the meaning of these principles. In October 1980, Li Shuiqing convened a third meeting to study the operational employment of the Second Artillery. 179 The participants emphasized increasing survivability, rapid reaction, and integrated operational capabilities. 180 In July 1981, the Second Artillery’s leadership held a fourth meeting on operational employment, which discussed operational guiding thought. The Second Artillery then formally adopted “close defense, keypoint counterstrikes” as its operational principles, based on the strategic guideline of active defense and the “spirit” of the “801” meeting. 181 These principles remain the basis of China’s nuclear operations to this day. 182

In August 1983, the Second Artillery’s first campaign-level exercise codified these operational principles and its nuclear counterstrike mission. Previously, select units had conducted launch exercises, but this marked the first time that the Second Artillery as an independent branch conducted a campaign-level exercise. Planning for the exercise began in February 1983, with CMC approval. The scenario was based on defending against a nuclear attack and launching a nuclear counterstrike after being attacked with nuclear weapons during an invasion by a “blue force” striving for “global hegemony.” 183 According to He Jinheng, now commander of the Second Artillery, the exercise was undertaken “to deepen understanding of the operational principles of ‘close defense’ and ‘keypoint counterstrikes.’ ” 184 To underscore survivability and rapid reaction, the exercise emphasized the organization, command, and coordination of protection and counterstrike operations at the start of a war. 185 The exercise was held in the northeast and involved two bases ( jidi ) and two launch contingents ( zhidui ). The PLA leadership, including CMC members Yang Shangkun and Yang Dezhi, attend the live-fire launches that were part of the exercise. 186 A group training event on campaign methods held alongside the exercise produced a draft document on campaign methods that was then revised into the first Science of Second Artillery Campaigns , which was published in 1985. 187

During this period, only one core principle for the development of the Second Artillery was not directly given to the Second Artillery by the CMC. This was the concept of developing a “lean and effective” ( jinggan youxiao ) force. As noted earlier, Li Shuiqing first raised this formula during the 1978 operations meeting. He Jinheng further developed the idea in a 1984 article for the internal journal Military Arts . 188 After some debate, the standing committee of the Second Artillery adopted “lean and effective” as its overall development goal in December 1984. 189 Nevertheless, the phrase was adopted because it reflected the views of China’s top party leaders regarding the mission of the CMC, especially the 1967 instruction to develop a “small but effective” force and Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 instruction to develop a “few but capable” nuclear weapons.

An attempt by the Second Artillery to draft a document on China’s nuclear strategy in the late 1980s offers a rarely observed example of the CMC exercising its authority over the content of nuclear strategy and the lack of delegation in the area of strategy from top party leaders to senior military officers. Because the document was recalled in 1989 and never published, source materials on this episode remain incomplete. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the Second Artillery lacked the standing to issue documents or statements on China’s nuclear strategy without the approval of China’s top party leaders.

In March 1985, the Second Artillery published the first edition of the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns , a doctrinal text on how to conduct a nuclear counterstrike. During a meeting to review and revise a draft of the text, the participants concluded that such campaigns involved questions of national and military strategy. Li Lijing, a former base commander and then consultant to the Second Artillery headquarters, recalls that “because the rational basis and authoritative interpretation of China’s nuclear strategy had not been finalized, the science of campaigns for China’s strategic rocket forces could not be finalized.” For example, “if a great power nuclear war were to start, it was unclear where China should strike and how much of the enemy’s nuclear equivalent should be destroyed.” 190

After further investigation, Li Lijing discovered that no other department was researching nuclear strategy. Li then submitted a report to He Jinheng and Li Xuge, the commander and deputy commander of the Second Artillery, respectively, suggesting that a group be formed to study the issue. He and Li approved the establishment of a small research group, headed by Li Lijing and composed of members of the military studies department ( junshixue bu ) within the Second Artillery’s headquarters. 191 Li Lijing suggested that the group research and write an authoritative document entitled China’s Nuclear Strategy ( Zhongguo hezhanlue ) within two or three years. As one account notes, the project was “inspired by research on strategy throughout the army” in the mid-1980s following the shift to peacetime modernization in 1985. 192 According to one account, Li Lijing then discussed the project with a deputy chief of the general staff involved in an army-wide strategy small group. The GSD then entrusted ( zecheng ) the Second Artillery and AMS to work together and complete the project. 193

The project’s pace accelerated in 1987. Shen Kehui, head of the military studies department, recalls that the Second Artillery, along with AMS, NDU, COSTIND, and the Ministry of State Security, organized a series of seminars on “academic issues of strategy and nuclear strategy.” 194 Roughly fifty to sixty people from twenty different units inside and outside the military participated. The topics covered included national security and nuclear strategy, general strategy and nuclear strategy, China’s nuclear strategy, and the development strategy for China’s missiles. 195 Following these discussions, Li Lijing’s research group began to draft a document entitled Nuclear Strategy Outline ( he zhanlue gangyao ). After almost three years of work, the group completed a preliminary draft at the end of 1988. The outline was circulated as a “classified document” ( jimi wenjian ) within the Second Artillery as well as some of the PLA’s academies and the GSD for feedback. 196

Top party leaders, however, strongly criticized the circulation of the draft. According to a biography of Li Xuge, then the commander of the Second Artillery, “nuclear strategy should be a matter for the headquarters and should not be carried out by the Second Artillery.” 197 When the CMC learned of the document, the reaction was even stronger. Vice-chairman Liu Huaqing met with Liu Lifeng, then the Second Artillery’s political commissar, and transmitted a message from Yang Shangkun, who at the time was the highest-ranking member of the CMC after Deng and PRC President. 198 Yang “severely criticized” the document and said “it should be killed.” Yang ordered that all copies be recalled and that discussion of it be prohibited, as it “involved the highest secrets of the state, which would have serious consequences.” 199

The problem with the strategy outline was not its content, but, rather, the Second Artillery’s lack of authority to write a document on China’s nuclear strategy. Several sources indicate that the statements of China’s leaders served as the basis for the strategy that was discussed in the draft. According to Li Lijing, for example, the draft was based on Deng’s idea of “limited retaliation” ( youxian baofu ). 200 Shen Kehui likewise recalls that the outline was based on “related speeches by party and national leaders and our country’s nuclear policy.” 201 The problem was that the Second Artillery, as the custodian of China’s nuclear missile forces, lacked the standing to write about much less formulate China’s nuclear strategy. In his critique of the document’s circulation, Yang Shangkun said that “the Second Artillery does not have the authority to do this, it cannot be permitted.” 202

In 1996, the Second Artillery published a textbook entitled the Science of Second Artillery Strategy . It was part of a three-volume series that examined campaign methods and tactics as well as strategy, as part of an effort to create an “operational theoretical system” for the Second Artillery. Yet even this volume was not a statement of China’s national nuclear strategy but, instead, the Second Artillery’s service strategy. 203 It underscores the subordination of the strategic actions of the Second Artillery to the nation’s overall strategy. Importantly, unlike the previous document on strategy discussed above, the CMC approved (and likely supervised) the drafting of this volume as a military research project in the Eighth Five-Year Plan. 204

China’s force posture is consistent with the singular use of nuclear weapons to execute a retaliatory strike. Given the no-first-use policy, survivability has been a dominant driver of China’s nuclear force posture. China has pursued survivability in several ways. First, leveraging China’s sheer size, China’s nuclear forces are dispersed throughout the country. When China began creating missile units, even before the Second Artillery’s formal establishment, dispersion was a key principle. In the early 1960s, for example, China’s first missile battalions were located in Xi’an, Shenyang, Beijing, and Jinan. 205 When plans to develop ICBMs were discussed in the mid-1960s, Zhou Enlai planned to deploy some in mountains in the north and others in jungles in the south. 206 Today, the Second Artillery has six bases, each headquartered in a different province. Each base is composed of launch brigades that operate specific missile systems. China’s ICBMs, the DF-5 and DF-31A, are similarly organized into ten launch brigades under five bases in six provinces. 207

Second, most bases and launch brigades are part of tunnel networks, sometimes described as an “underground great wall” ( dixia changcheng ). As China learned in the Korean War, tunnels offered a relatively cheap solution for defending fixed targets. With a no-first-use policy, it was essential to use whatever means available to ensure that China’s nuclear forces could survive a first strike. Amid growing tensions between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, reports emerged that Moscow was considering a “surgical strike” on China’s nuclear forces. After reading reports on the subject in the Western media, Zhou Enlai summoned Ye Jianying to discuss the construction of missile locations ( zhendi ). Zhou stated that China had to accelerate the development of these facilities to create an operational capability. Once created, Zhou stated, “we won’t fear others’ threats or coercion. Plans to conduct a surgical strike will be wishful thinking.… We promised early on not to use nuclear weapons first, but as soon as we suffer a nuclear attack, we have the right to retaliation and self-defense.” 208

In the mid-1980s, as China was developing and deploying its first true ICBM, the DF-5, the Second Artillery began a large-scale construction project for the missile’s launch brigades. The DF-5 itself was so large that it could only be based in silos. Initial plans called for the silos to be placed in mountainous and jungle areas, where the terrain would provide some natural concealment. Some DF-5 launch brigades would be located toward the north in Henan province and others toward the south in Hunan province. Deng Xiaoping approved the plans in the late 1970s, and construction began in the early 1980s and was not completed until 1995. 209

Third, as China developed newer missiles, it emphasized increasing mobility to enhance survivability. In August 1978, Deng Xiaoping had called on the Second Artillery to “use missiles to fight guerrilla warfare” ( yong daodan da youjizhan ). 210 On land, China pursued mobility by creating missiles that could be more easily transported. This required reducing the weight of the missile so that it could be carried by a TEL (transporter-erector-launcher) and shifting from liquid to solid fuel to reduce time to launch. The first solid-fuel mobile missile was the DF-21, which was developed in the 1980s and first deployed in 1991. The first road-mobile ICBMs were the DF-31 and DF-31A, respectively, which began to be deployed in 2006. At sea, China has sought to develop SSBNs. Although China has pursued such ambitions since the late 1950s, they have yet to be fully realized. China’s first SSBN, the Xia class, encountered so many technical problems that it never conducted a single deterrent patrol. 211 China deployed a newer design in the late 2000s, the Type-094 or Jin class SSBN. The missile for this submarine, the JL-2, remains under development and it is unclear when deterrent patrols will begin.

China’s nuclear force structure is consistent with the singular focus on a nuclear counterstrike campaign in China’s nuclear strategy. Early on, China’s top party leaders decided to create a diversified nuclear force. This included short, medium, and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking targets on China’s periphery and beyond. China did not achieve a true intercontinental strike capability until the successful test of the DF-5 in May 1980. By that time, China had also successfully deployed shorter-range missiles, including the DF-3 (1971) and DF-4 (1980). In 1984, the CMC placed China’s nuclear forces on alert status for the first time, signifying the establishment of a rudimentary retaliatory capability. 212

Since then, China has continued to modernize its force. Although the number of ICBMs in the arsenal has increased significantly when compared with 1984, the overall size of the force remains small when compared with the world’s two major nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. By 1991, China may have deployed only four DF-5s. 213 The initial design for the missile was being revised to produce to a longer-range and more accurate version, the DF-5A, which entered service in the 1990s. In 2000, the Department of Defense estimated that China had eighteen silos for the DF-5 and roughly twenty missiles. 214 During the 1999 military parade to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the PRC, China unveiled the DF-31 series of missiles, which began to be deployed in 2006. Unlike the DF-5, which was liquid-fueled and silo-based, the DF-31 was a three-stage, solid-fueled mobile missile. The longer-range variant, the DF-31A, is capable of striking most of the continental United States.

Today, the overall size of China’s force posture remains consistent with a strategy of assured retaliation limited to deterring nuclear coercion and attack. China has roughly sixty ICBMs capable of striking the United States. As half of the DF-5 missiles have now been equipped with MIRVs, China can strike the United States with approximately eighty warheads. 215 China also has roughly sixty shorter-range missiles with single warheads, including the DF-21 and the DF-4. 216 The DF-26 introduced at the 2015 military parade was described as “dual capable” with conventional and nuclear variants but appears to have primarily a conventional, antiship role. 217

Looking forward, the size of the force will almost certainly grow. China could equip the remainder of its DF-5s with MIRVs. China is also reportedly developing a new mobile ICBM, the DF-41, that may likely be able to carry MIRVs. China may finally deploy its second-generation SSBN, the Jin class, each of which would carry twelve JL-2 missiles. Although, in part, these developments represent a desire to modernize the force and retire old systems such as the DF-3, DF-4, and JL-1, China also seeks to ensure its ability to retaliate as US missiles defense and conventional counterforce capabilities increase.

The strategic guidelines discussed throughout this book emphasize conventional military operations. In the documents available on the various guidelines, nuclear strategy and the Second Artillery as a nuclear force are rarely mentioned. Nevertheless, the development and deployment of China’s nuclear forces have been consistent with the basic principle in all the guidelines of “active defense.” Although the concept has been interpreted differently at various times since 1949, it has been the basic organizing principle for all of the PRC’s military strategies and has served as a general principle for China’s nuclear strategy as well.

The prominence of nuclear issues in past strategic guidelines has varied. The 1956 strategic guideline was based on the assumption that the PLA would have to wage war “under nuclear conditions.” Although the 1964 strategic guideline was later sometimes described as preparing to fight an “early, major, nuclear war,” it did not contain specific guidance for how China’s nuclear forces would be used. In fact, the emphasis on “luring the enemy in deep” into Chinese territory suggested that they would not be used. Moreover, although China had exploded its first nuclear device, it did not possess any reliable means of delivering nuclear weapons. Despite the lack of a reliable delivery system, the CMC’s 1967 temporary regulations for the Second Artillery linked future nuclear operations with active defense. The regulations noted that the “Second Artillery is an important nuclear strike force to realize our country’s strategic task [ renwu ] of active defense.” 218 At around the same time, the CMC described the Second Artillery’s mission as “developing a nuclear counterstrike force to realize active defense.” 219

Only with the 1980 guideline did nuclear strategy appear to be discussed in the context of China’s national military strategy. At the “801” meeting described in chapter 5 , China adopted a new strategic guideline to deal with the Soviet threat that emphasized active defense and abandoned luring the enemy in deep as a strategic concept. At the meeting, the CMC raised “close defense” and “keypoint counterstrikes” as the Second Artillery’s operational principles, which were intended to be consistent with a retaliatory posture. He Jinheng, commander of the Second Artillery from 1982 to 1985, recalls that the development of the principle of “lean and effective” in the early 1980s was designed to carry out the strategic guideline of active defense. 220 His biography also notes that the concept of active defense shaped the drafting of the 1985 edition of the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns . Likewise, the Second Artillery’s first campaign exercise in 1983 “used the strategic guideline of active defense as guidance.” 221

The relationship between the overall strategic guidelines and nuclear strategy is perhaps most clear in the 1993 strategic guideline. At this time, the Second Artillery’s role in the PLA had expanded to include conventional missiles in addition to nuclear ones, which gave the Second Artillery a long-range conventional strike mission in addition to its nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack mission. Immediately after the adoption of the 1993 strategy, the Second Artillery held a meeting for all senior officers to “disseminate and study the spirt of the enlarged meeting of the CMC.” 222 Thereafter, like other services in the PLA, the Second Artillery launched a series of training reforms to implement the new strategic guideline. Other recollections by senior officers in the Second Artillery link the organization’s development in the 1990s to the 1993 strategy. 223 Reflecting the connection, Jiang Zemin penned an inscription when inspecting a Second Artillery unit in 1998: “Carry out the strategic guideline of active defense, build a lean and effective strategic rocket force.” 224

Doctrinal publications also highlight the relationship between the strategic guidelines and nuclear strategy. The 1996 Science of Second Artillery Strategy contains numerous references to the strategic guidelines as the basis for developing the Second Artillery’s strategy. For example, the text describes the Second Artillery as “a strategic rocket force to carry out our country’s active defense military strategy.” 225 The Second Artillery’s service strategy of “emphasizing deterrence, effective counterstrike” is “based on our country’s nuclear policy and our army’s active defense military strategy.” 226 Moreover, the 1993 strategic guideline is “the basic guidance and foundation for the development and strategic employment of the Second Artillery.” 227 In terms of strategic operations, the text contains a detailed discussion of how commanders should “obey the basic spirit of the military strategic guideline.” 228 For example, “according to our country’s active defense strategic guideline for the new period and nuclear policy, the ultimate goal of the Second Artillery’s strategic deterrence is to make enemy nuclear states stop risking actions of nuclear threats and nuclear attacks.” 229

References to the strategic guidelines also appear in the 2004 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns . It states, for example, that “according to our country’s strategic guideline of active defense, nuclear forces carry out counterstrike operations.” 230 Furthermore, the book notes that “Second Artillery campaigns are part of a local war and are restricted by the military strategic guideline. Therefore, raising the issue of the guiding thought for Second Artillery campaigns must be based on the military strategic guideline and resolutely implement the requirements of the military strategic guideline.” 23 1

In sum, the PLA’s strategic guidelines emphasize conventional operations. Most of these guidelines have been based on the general principle of active defense, which includes the idea of “gaining control by striking afterwards.” The development of China’s nuclear strategy and forces has been consistent with the guidelines at this most general level—that is, to focus on active defense by developing a retaliatory capability. However, as shown throughout this chapter, China’s nuclear strategy has not changed with each new strategic guideline.

China’s nuclear strategy is the exception that proves the rule. Since 1949, China’s strategic guidelines, which emphasize conventional operations, have changed frequently. Senior military officers have pushed for changes in China’s military strategy in response to significant shifts in the conduct of warfare in the international system. By contrast, China’s strategy for the use of nuclear weapons has been roughly constant. China has developed nuclear forces to deter nuclear strikes and to prevent nuclear coercion. China has sought to achieve these goals through assured retaliation, or developing a retaliatory capability that can survive a first strike and inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary. China’s nuclear strategy has remained constant because this aspect of military affairs has not been delegated by top party leaders to senior military officers. Since the decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1950s, the establishment of the Second Artillery in 1966, and its development since the 1970s, top party leaders have dominated decision-making for China’s nuclear strategy. What has changed is how China implements this strategy. 232