THE LEVELS OF CONSTITUTION OF TIME AND TEMPORAL OBJECTS [OBJECTE]
§ 34. The Differentiation of the Levels of Constitution22
Proceeding from the most obvious phenomena, after we have studied time-consciousness according to several principal lines of thought and indifferent strata, it would be wise to determine the different levels of constitution in their essential structure and go through them in a systematic way.
We discovered:
1. The things of experience in Objective time (whereby still different levels of empirical being were to be differentiated which hitherto had not been taken into account: the experiential thing of the individual subject, the intersubjectively identical thing, the thing of physics).
2. The constitutive multiplicities of appearances of different levels, the immanent unities in pre-empirical time.
3. The absolute, temporally constitutive flux of consciousness.
§ 35. Differences between the Constituted Unities and the Constitutive Flux23
This absolute consciousness which precedes all constitution must first of all be discussed somewhat more closely. Its unique quality stands out clearly in contrast to the constituted unities of the most diverse levels.
1. Every individual Object (every Object in the stream of constituted unity, be it immanent or transcendental) endures, and necessarily endures, i.e., it is continuous in time and is identical in this continuous being, which also can be considered as process. Conversely, what is in time is continuous in time and is unity of the process, which inseparably carries with it unity of what endures in the procedure. In the tonal process lies the unity of the tone which endures during the process and, conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the fulfilled duration, i.e., in the process. Therefore, if anything whatsoever is determined as existing in a temporal point, it is thinkable only as the phase of a process in which the duration of an individual being also has its point.
2. In principle, individual or concrete being is invariant or variant; the process is a process of alteration or is static. The enduring Object itself is altering or static. Every alteration, therefore, has its rate of alteration or “acceleration” (metaphorically speaking) with reference to the same duration. In principle, every phase of alteration can broaden into something static, every phase of the static can lead to an alteration.
If, in comparison therewith, we now consider the constitutive phenomena, we find a flux, and every phase of this flux is a continuity of shading. However, in principle, no phase of this flux is to be broadened out to a continuous succession; therefore, the flux should not be thought to be so transformed that this phase is extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we find necessarily and essentially a flux of continuous “alteration,” and this alteration has the absurd property [das Absurde] that it flows exactly as it flows and can flow neither “more swiftly” nor “more slowly.” Consequently, any Object which is altered is lacking here, and inasmuch as in every process “something” proceeds, it is not a question here of a process. There is nothing here which is altered, and therefore it makes no sense to speak here of something that endures. It is also senseless, therefore, to wish to find anything which in a duration is not once altered.
§ 36. The Temporally Constitutive Flux as Absolute Subjectivity
It is evident, then, that temporally constitutive phenomena are, in principle, objectivities other than those constituted in time. They are not individual Objects, in other words, not individual processes, and terms which can be predicated of such processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them. Therefore, it can also make no sense to say of them (and with the same conceptual meaning) that they are in the now and have been previously, that they succeed one another temporally or are simultaneous with respect to one another, etc. To be sure, one can and must say that a certain continuity of appearance, namely, one which is a phase of the temporally constitutive flux, belongs to a now, namely, to that which it constitutes, and belongs to a before, namely, as that which is (one cannot say was) constitutive of the before. But is not the flux a succession? Does it not, therefore, have a now, an actual phase, and a continuity of pasts of which we are conscious in retentions? We can only say that this flux is something which we name in conformity with what is constituted, but it is nothing temporally “Objective.” It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be denoted metaphorically as “flux,” as a point of actuality, primal source-point, that from which springs the “now,” and so on. In the lived experience of actuality, we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation [Nachhallmomenten]. For all this, names are lacking.
§ 37. Appearances of Transcendent Objects [Objekte] as Constituted Unities
It is further to be noted that when we speak of the “act of perception” and say that it is the point of authentic perceiving to which a continuous sequence of retentions is joined, we have described thereby no immanent temporal unities but precisely moments of the flux. That is, the appearance, let us say, of a house is a temporal being which endures, is altered, etc. This is also the case with the immanent sound which is not an appearance. But the appearance of a house is not the perceptional consciousness and the retentional consciousness [of the house]. These can be understood only as temporally constitutive, as moments of the flux. In precisely the same way, memorial appearance (or the remembered immanent [Immanent], perhaps the remembered immanent primary content) is to be distinguished from memorial consciousness with its retentions of memory. We must distinguish at all times: consciousness (flux), appearance (immanent Object), and transcendent object (if it is not the primary content of an immanent Object). Not all consciousness has reference to the Objectively (i.e., transcendently) temporal, to Objective individuality, as, e.g., that of external perception. In every consciousness we find an “immanent content;” with the content we call “appearance” this is either appearance of the individual (of an external temporal thing) or appearance of the non-temporal. In the act of judgment, for example, I have the appearance “judgment,” namely, as immanent temporal unity, and therein “appears” the judgment in the logical sense.24 The act of judgment always has the character of the flux. At all times, then, that which in Logischen Untersuchungen is termed an “act” or an “intentional lived experience” is a flux in which an immanent temporal unity (a judgment, wish, etc.) is constituted. Such a unity has its immanent duration and perhaps proceeds more or less rapidly. These unities which are constituted in the absolute stream are in immanent time, which is one, and in this time there is a simultaneous element [ein Gleichzeitig] and duration of the same length (or possibly the same duration, that is, for two immanent, simultaneously enduring Objects), also a certain determinability according to before and after.
§ 38. Unity of the Flux of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession25
We have already occupied ourselves with the constitution of such immanent Objects and their growth from ever new primal sensations and modifications.26 In reflection, however, we find a single stream which breaks down into many streams. This plurality, though, still has a unitariness [Einheitlichkeit] which talk of a flux both admits and requires. We find many streams, inasmuch as many series of primal impressions begin and end. However, we also find a connecting form, inasmuch as, for all, not merely does the law of the transformation of the now into the no longer and, on the other side, of the not yet into the now function separately, but also something akin to a common form of the now exists, a likeness generally in the mode of the flux. Several, a great many, primal impressions are “all at once,” and if any one passes away, the plurality passes “at the same time” and in a completely similar way, with completely similar gradations, and in completely the same tempo. The only difference is that the one stops altogether, while the plurality still has its not-yet, i.e., its fresh primal impressions before itself, which impressions still carry on the duration of what is known through them. Or more clearly: the many primal sensations flow and from the first have at their disposal the same modes of running-off. Only the series of primal impressions which are constitutive for immanent enduring Objects is continued in a far different way, corresponding to the different mode of duration of immanent Objects. They do not make use of the formal possibilities all in the same way. Immanent time is constituted as one for all immanent Objects and processes. Correlatively, the consciousness of time of immanent things is single [eine Alleinheit]. The “all-together” [Zusammen], the “all-at-once” [Zugleich], of the actual primal sensations is all-embracing; also all-embracing is the “before,” the “having-gone-before,” of all primal sensations which have just gone before, the regular transformation of this “all-together” of primal sensations into such a before. This before is a continuity and each one of its points is a homogeneous, identical form of running-off for the entire all-together. The law that underlies the entire “all-together” of primal sensations states that the all-together is changed into a stable continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of expiredness [Abgelaufenheit], and that with the same constancy an ever fresh all-together of primal sensations springs forth originarily to again pass continuously over into expiredness. What is an all-together qua all-together of primal sensations remains an all-together in the mode of expiredness. Primal sensations have their continuous “one after the other” in the sense of a continuous running-off, and primal sensations have their all-together, their “all-at-once.” Those which are all at once are real primal sensations; in the mode of succession, however, is a sensation or a group of the all-together, a real primal sensation. The others have expired. But what does this mean? Here, one can say nothing further than: “See.” A primal sensation or a group of primal sensations of which we are aware in an immanent now (a tonal now, in the same now a color, etc.) is continually changed in modes of the before-consciousness [Vorhinbewusstsein] in which we are aware of the immanent Object as past, and “all at once” together therewith, as ever new primal sensation appears. An ever fresh now is established and we are conscious thereby of an ever fresh configurational now [Gestaltjetzt], tonal now, and so on. In a group of primal sensations, one is distinguished from the other through the content. Only the now is the same. According to its form, consciousness as consciousness of primal sensation is identical.
But “together” with the consciousness of primal sensations are continuous series of modes of passing [Verlaufsmodi] of “earlier” primal sensations, of earlier now-consciousness. This all-together is an all-together of form as regards continuously modified modes of consciousness, while the all-together of primal sensations is an all-together of open modes, identical as to form. In the continuity of modes of running-off we can extract a point; then we shall also find in this point an all-together of modes of running-off which are like in form or, rather, an identical mode of running-off. Both types of all-together must be essentially distinguished from one another. The one is fundamental to the constitution of simultaneity, the other to the constitution of temporal succession; albeit, on the other hand, simultaneity is never without temporal succession and temporal succession never without simultaneity. Consequently, simultaneity and temporal succession must be correlatively and inseparably constituted. Terminologically, we can distinguish between the fluxional before-all-at-once [Vor-Zugleich] and the impressional all-at-once of fluxions. But we cannot refer to either the one or the other mode of being all-at-once as a mode of simultaneity. We can no longer speak of a time of the final constitutive consciousness. Primordially constituted with the primal sensations which initiate the retentional process is the simultaneity, let us say, of a color and a sound, their being in an “actual now,” but the primal sensations themselves are not simultaneous, and we cannot call the phases of the fluxional before-all-at-once simultaneous phases of consciousness any more than we can call the succession of consciousness a temporal succession.
What this before-at-the-same-time is we know from our earlier analysis; it is a continuum of phases which are joined to a primal sensation, and every retentional consciousness of an earlier now (“primordial remembrance” of it) is of this continuum. In view of this, we must take into consideration that when the primal sensation recedes, being continuously modified, we not only have in general a lived experience which is a modification of the earlier one, but also can have so turned our regard toward it that in the modified one we “see,” so to speak, the earlier not-modified one. When a not too rapid succession of sounds runs off we can, after the running-off of the first sound, not only “look at” it as at something “still present” although no longer sensed but also observe that the mode of consciousness which this sound just now has is a “memory” of the mode of consciousness of the primary sensation in which it was given as now. Thereupon, however, a sharp distinction must be made between the consciousness of the past (the retentional and likewise the “re”-presentification) in which we are conscious of an immanent temporal Object as before, and the retention or the recollective “reproduction” (depending on whether it is a question of the primordial flux of the modification of sensation or of its re-presentification of the earlier primal sensation). And so also for every other fluxion.
If any phase of the duration of an immanent Object is a now-phase, therefore, one we are conscious of in a primal sensation, then conjoining retentions are continuously united with this primal sensation in the before-all-at-once. These retentions are characterized in themselves as modifications of primal impressions which belong to all the remaining, expired temporal points of the constituted duration. Each is consciousness of the past of the corresponding earlier now-point and gives this point in the mode of the before corresponding to its position in the expired duration.
§ 39. The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flux of Consciousness27
The duality in the intentionality of retention gives us a clue to the solution of the difficulty of determining how it is possible to have knowledge of a unity of the ultimate constitutive flux of consciousness. There is no doubt that there is a difficulty here. If a complete flux (one belonging to an enduring process or Object) has expired, I can still look back on it. It forms, so it appears, a unity in memory. Obviously, therefore, the flux of consciousness is also constituted in consciousness as a unity. In this flux, for example, the unity of the duration of the sound is constituted. The flux itself, however, as the unity of the consciousness of the duration of the sound, is again constituted. And must we then also not say further that this unity is constituted in a wholly analogous fashion and is just as good a constituted temporal series and that one must still speak, therefore, of a temporal now, before, and after?
In conformity with the preceding statements, we can give the following answer: It is the one unique flux of consciousness in which the immanent temporal unity of the sound and also the unity of the flux of consciousness itself are constituted. As startling (if not at first sight even contradictory) as it may appear to assert that the flux of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is still true, nevertheless. And this can be made intelligible through the essential constitution of the flux itself. The regard can on occasion be guided by the phases which “coincide” as intentionalities of sound in the continuous development of the flux. But the regard can also focus on the flow, on a section of the flow, or on the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning to the end of the sound. Every shading off of consciousness which is of the “retentional” kind has a double intentionality: one is auxiliary to the constitution of the immanent Object, of the sound. This is what we term “primary remembrance” of the sound just sensed, or more plainly just retention of the sound. The other is that which is constitutive of the unity of this primary remembrance in the flux. That is, retention is at one with this, that it is further-consciousness [Noch-Bewusstsein]; it is that which holds back, in short, it is precisely retention, retention of the tonal retention which has passed. In its continuous shading-off in the flux, it is continuous retention of the continuously preceding phases. If we keep any phase whatsoever of the flux of consciousness in view (in the phase appears a tonal now and an interval of duration in the mode of just-having-flowed-away [Soeben-Abgeflossenheit]), this phase is concerned with a uniform continuity of retentions in the before-all-at-once. This is retention of the entire momentary continuity of continuously preceding phases of the flux. (In the beginning member it is a new primal sensation; in each leading member that now continuously follows, in the first phase of shading-off, it is immediate retention of the preceding primal sensation. In the next momentary phase it is retention of the retention of the preceding primal sensation, and so on.) If we now let the flux flow away, we then have the flux-continuum as running-off, which allows the continuity just described to be retentionally modified, and thereby every new continuity of phases momentarily existing all-at-once is retention with reference to the total continuity of what is all-at-once in the preceding phase. Hence, a longitudinal intentionality [Längs-intentionalität] goes through the flux, which in the course of the flux is in continuous unity of coincidence with itself. Flowing in absolute transition, the first primal sensation changes into a retention of itself, this retention into a retention of this retention, and so on. Conjointly with the first retention, however, a new “now,” a new primal sensation, is present and is joined continuously but momentarily with the first retention, so that the second phase of the flux is a primal sensation of the new now and a retention of the earlier one. The third phase, again, is a new primal sensation with retention of the second primal sensation and a retention of the retention of the first, and so on. Here we must take into account that retention of a retention has intentionality not only with reference to what is immediately retained but also with reference to what is retained in the retaining of the second level and finally with reference to the primal datum, which here is thoroughly Objectified. Analogous to this is the way in which presentification of the appearance of a thing has intention not only with reference to this appearance but also with reference to the appearing thing itself. A still better analogy can be drawn from the way in which a memory of A not only makes us conscious of the memory but also makes us conscious of A as that which is remembered in the memory.
Accordingly, we believe that these retentions, constituted in the flux of consciousness by means of the continuity of the retentional modifications and conditions, are continuous retentions of the continuously preceding ones; they are the unity of the flux itself as a one-dimensional, quasi-temporal order. If I orient myself on a sound, I enter attentively into “transverse-intentionality” (always experiencing unity in primal sensation as sensation of the actual tonal now, in retentional modifications as primary remembrances of the series of tonal points which have expired and in the flux of retentional modifications of primal sensations and retentions already on hand); then the enduring sound is present there, ever widening in its duration. If I adapt myself to the “longitudinal intentionality” and to what is self-constituting in it, then I turn my reflective regard from the sound (which has endured for such and such a period) to what is new in the primal sensation at a point in the before-all-at-once and to what is retained “conjointly” therewith following a continuous series. What is retained is past consciousness in its series of phases (first of all, its preceding phase). Then, in the constant flowing-forth of consciousness, I grasp the retained series of expired consciousness with the boundary-point of the actual primal sensation and the continuous shoving-back of this series with the fresh onset of retentions and primal sensations.
One can ask here: Can I find and lay hold of at a glance the entire retentional consciousness of the past flow of consciousness, this retentional consciousness being enclosed in a before-all-at-once? Obviously, the necessary process is this: I must first grasp the before-all-at-once, which is retentionally modified; indeed, it is what it is only in flux. Now, the flux, so far as it modifies this before-all-at-once, is intentionally in coincidence with itself. This constitutes unity in the flux and the one and identical element maintains a constant mode of being shoved back. An ever new element is joined on in front only to immerge again immediately in its momentary nexus. During this process, the regard can remain fixed on the momentary all-at-once which sinks down, but the constitution of the retentional unity reaches out beyond this and adds to the ever new. The regard can be directed thereon in the process, and it is always consciousness in flux as constituted unity.
Consequently, like two aspects of one and the same thing, there are in the unique flux of consciousness two inseparable, homogeneous intentionalities which require one another and are interwoven with one another. By means of the one, immanent time is constituted, i.e., an Objective time, an authentic time in which there is duration and alteration of that which endures. In the other is constituted the quasi-temporal disposition of the phases of the flux, which ever and necessarily has the flowing now-point, the phase of actuality, and the series of pre-actual and post-actual (of the not yet actual) phases. This pre-phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality is constituted intentionally as the form of temporally constitutive consciousness and in the latter itself. The flux of the immanent, temporally constitutive consciousness not only is, but is so remarkably and yet so intelligibly constituted that a self-appearance of the flux necessarily subsists in it, and hence the flux itself must necessarily be comprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flux does not require a second flux, but qua phenomenon it is constituted in itself.28 The constituting and the constituted coincide, yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect. The phases of the flux of consciousness in which phases of the same flux of consciousness are phenomenally constituted cannot be identical with these constituted phases, and they are not. What is caused to appear in the momentary-actual [Momentan Aktuellen] of the flux of consciousness is the past phase of the flux of consciousness in the series of retentional moments of this flux.
§ 40. The Constituted Immanent Content
Let us now go over to the level of the immanent “content,” whose constitution is the work of the absolute flux of consciousness, and consider it somewhat more closely. This immanent content is made up of lived experiences in the usual sense: the data of sensation (even if unnoticed), for example, a red, a blue, and the like; further, appearances (the appearance of a house, of the environment, etc.), whether or not we pay attention to them and their “objects.” In addition, there are the “acts” of asserting, wishing, willing, and so on, and the reproductive modifications (phantasies, memories) pertaining to them. All are contents of consciousness, contents of primal consciousness which is constitutive of temporal objects. Primal consciousness, it should be noted, is not in this sense again a content, an object in phenomenological time.
The immanent contents are what they are only so far as during their “actual” duration they refer ahead to something futural and back to something past. In this reference thither and back, however, there is still something different to be distinguished. In each primal phase which primordially constitutes the immanent content we have retentions of the preceding and protentions of the coming phases of precisely this content, and these protentions are fulfilled as long as this content endures. These “determinate” retentions and protentions have an obscure horizon. Flowing, they pass over into indeterminate ones with reference to the past and future running-off of the stream. Through these retentions and protentions, the actual content of the stream is joined together. From retentions and protentions, then, we must distinguish those recollections and expectations which are not directed toward the constitutive phases of the immanent content but which presentify past or future immanent contents. The contents endure: they have their time; they are individual Objectivities which are the unities of alteration or constancy [Unveränderung].
§ 41. Self-Evidence of the Immanent Content—Alteration and Constancy
If one speaks of the self-evident givenness of an immanent content, it is obvious that this self-evidence cannot mean indubitable certainty with regard to the temporal existence of a sound at a point. Self-evidence so grasped (as, is admitted by Brentano, for example) I would hold to be a fiction. If to be extended in time belongs to the essence of a content given in perception, then the indubitableness of the perception can mean nothing other than indubitableness with reference to the temporally extended existent.29 And this signifies again that any question directed toward individual existence can find its answer only by means of a regress to perception which gives us individual existence in the strictest sense. To the extent that perception itself is yet mixed with what is not perception, to this extent perception itself is still doubtful. However, if it is a matter of immanent content and not of empirical materialities, then duration and alteration, coexistence and succession are completely and entirely to be realized in perceptions, and often enough are actually realized. It happens that in perceptions those which are purely intuitive are perceptions which in the true sense are constitutive of the enduring or changing contents as such. These are perceptions which in themselves contain nothing further that is questionable. We are led back to these perceptions in all questions regarding origins, but they themselves exclude any further question as to origin. It is clear that the much-talked-of certainty of internal perception, the evidence of the cogito, would lose all meaning and significance if we excluded temporal extension from the sphere of self-evidence and true givenness.
Let us now consider the self-evident consciousness of duration and analyze this consciousness itself. If the note C is perceived (and not merely the quality C, but the entire tonal content, which must remain absolutely unaltered) and given as enduring, then the note C is extended over an interval of the immediate temporal field, i.e., another note does not appear in each now but always and continually the same note. That the same note always appears, that there is this continuity of identity, is an internal characteristic of consciousness. The temporal positions are not separated from one another through divisive acts. The unity of perception is here a breachless unity which dispenses with all interrupting internal differences. On the other hand, differences do exist so far as every temporal point is distinct from every other—only distinct, however, not separated. The indistinguishable likeness of temporal matter and the constancy of the modification of the time-positing consciousness essentially establish the coalescence into unity of the breachless extension, and therewith a concrete unity first comes into being. Only as temporally extended is the note C a concrete individual. The concrete is, at any time, the only given, and obviously included under the concrete are intellective processes of analysis which make possible explications such as the one just attempted. The breachless unity of the note C, which is the primary given, proves to be a divisible unity, a coalescence of moments ideally to be distinguishable therein and, if the occasion should arise, to be found therein—for example, by means of simultaneous succession by which sections in the duration running off parallel are distinguishable, and with reference to which a comparison and identification can then take place.
For the rest, we operate with descriptions which already are in some respects idealizing fictions. It is a fiction, for example, that a sound endures completely unaltered. In any moment, no matter what, a greater or lesser fluctuation will always take place, and thus the continuous unity with respect to a given moment will be linked to a difference of another moment which provides an indirect separation from the first. The breach of qualitative identity, the spring from one quality to another within the same genus of quality in a temporal position, yields a new lived experience, the lived experience of change, whereby it is evident that a discontinuity is not possible in every temporal point of a temporal interval. Discontinuity presupposes continuity, be it in the form of changeless duration or of continuous alteration. As regards the latter, the continuous alteration, the phases of the consciousness of change also go over into one another without a break, therefore, in the mode of the unity of the consciousness of identity, just as in the case of changeless duration. But the unity does not turn out to be undifferentiated unity. What at first sight goes over, one into the other, without differentiation, exhibits in the development of the continuous synthesis variation and ever greater variation. Thus similarity and difference are mingled and a continuity of increase of the difference is given with increasing extension. Because it is individually preserved, the primordial now-intention appears in the ever new simultaneous consciousness, posited in one with intentions which, the further they stand temporally from the now-intention, the more they throw into relief an ever increasing difference or disparity. What is at first coincident and then nearly coincident becomes ever more widely separated; the old and the new no longer appear to be in essence completely the same but as ever different and strange, despite similarity as to kind. In this way arises the consciousness of the “gradually changed,” of the growing disparity in the flux of continuous identification.
In the case of duration without alteration we have a continuous consciousness of unity which in advancing always remains a homogeneous consciousness of unity. The coincidence is posited throughout the entire series of constantly advancing intentions and the pervading unity is always unity of a coincidence. It allows no consciousness of “being other,” of deviation or disparity to enter. In the consciousness of alteration we also find coincidence, which in certain ways likewise permeates the entire temporal extension. However, in the coincidence as regards the general there also appears an evergrowing divergence with regard to the difference. The way in which the matter of the alteration is distributed over the temporal interval determines the consciousness of the fast or slow alteration and its rate and acceleration. In every case, however, not merely in that of continuous acceleration, the consciousness of otherness, of difference, presupposes a unity. In change, and likewise with alteration, something enduring must be present—something which makes up the identity of that which is altered or undergoes a change. Obviously, this refers back to the essential forms of consciousness of an individual. If the quality of the sound remains unaltered and the intensity or timbre changes, we say that the same sound has changed in timbre or has been altered with respect to intensity. If in the whole phenomenon nothing remains unaltered, if it changes “in every respect,” then even in this case there is always still enough to establish unity, namely, the indistinguishableness with which adjoining phases go over into one another and in so doing produce consciousness of unity. The mode and form of the whole remains the same as to kind. The similar passes over into the similar within a manifold of similarity and conversely. The similar is that which can belong to a unity of continuous transition; or everything which has a difference is —as with the like—such that it can establish the unity of a changeless duration (rest), i.e., that which has no difference. So it is, therefore, everywhere whenever we speak of alteration and change. A consciousness of unity underlies it.
§ 42. Impression and Reproduction
At the same time, we should note that if we follow up, not the constitution of impressional contents in their duration, but, let us say, that of the remembered contents, we cannot speak of primal impressions which conform to the now-point of these contents. At the head of things here stand primary remembrances (as absolute phases), not something inserted, primally engendered-originated [Urgezeugt-Entsprungenes] “from without” “alien to consciousness;” but we could say (at least with memory) something which emerges or reemerges. This moment, although itself not an impression, is still, like an impression, not a product of spontaneity but in certain respects something perceptive. One can also speak here of passive reception, and distinguish the passive reception which gathers in the novel, strange, and originary and the passive reception which merely brings back or presentifies.
Every constituted lived experience is either an impression or a reproduction. As reproduction, it is either re-presentation [Ver-gegenwärtigen] or it is not. In any case it is itself something (immanently) present. But to every present and presenting consciousness there corresponds the ideal possibility of an exactly matching presentification of this consciousness. To impressional perception corresponds the possibility of a presentification of it; to impressional desiring corresponds a presentification of it, and so on. This presentification also concerns every sensible content of sensation. To sensed red corresponds a phantasm of red, presentificational consciousness of impressional red. To what is sensed (i.e., to the perception of hyletic data) there corresponds a presentification of the act of sensing. Every act of presentification, however, is itself actually present through an impressional consciousness. In a certain sense, then, all lived experiences are known through impressions or are impressed. Among them, however, are those which occur as presentifying modifications of consciousness, and to every consciousness there corresponds such a modification. (In view of this, therefore, presentification is not at the same time to be understood as an attentive act of meaning.) An act of perception is consciousness of an object. As consciousness, it is also an impression, something immanently present. To this immanent presentation, to the perception of an A, corresponds the reproductive modification, the presentification of the act of perception, the act of perception in phantasy or memory. Such a “perception in phantasy” is at the same time, however, a phantasy of the perceived Object. In perception, an Object, let us say, a thing or concrete process, stands forth as present. The perception, therefore, is not only present itself, it is also a presentation. In it something actually present stands forth—the thing, the process. In just the same way, a presentificational modification of the perception is also a presentification of the perceived Object; the thing-Object [Dingobjekt] is phantasied, remembered, expected.
In primordial consciousness are constituted all impressions, primary content such as lived experiences which are “consciousness of.” For all lived experiences divide into these two fundamental classes: the one class of lived experiences consists of acts which are “consciousness of.” These are lived experiences which have “reference to something.” The other lived experiences do not. The sensed color does not have a reference to anything.30 Neither does the content of phantasy, e.g., a phantasm of red as a red floating before the mind (although not taken notice of). To be sure, however, phantasy-consciousness of red, and, indeed, all primitive presentifications do have such a reference. We find, therefore, impressions which are presentifications of impressional consciousness. As impressional consciousness is consciousness of the immanent, so also impressional presentification is presentification of the immanent.
An impression (in the narrower sense, in contrast to presentification) is to be grasped as primary consciousness which has no further consciousness behind it in which we are aware of it. On the other hand, presentification, including the most primitive immanent presentification, is, as such, secondary consciousness. It presupposes primary consciousness in which we are impressionally aware of it.
§ 43. The Constitution of Thing-Appearances [Dingercheinungen] and Things—Constituted Apprehensions and Primal Apprehensions
Let us consider such a primary consciousness, let us say, the perception of this copper ash tray. It stands forth as enduring, material being. On reflection we can distinguish: (1) the perception itself (the concrete perceptual apprehension taken together with the data of apprehension: the perceptual appearance in the mode of certainty, for example), and (2) the perceived (which is to be described in self-evident judgments based on perception). The perceived is also what is meant; the act of meaning “lives” in the act of perception. The perceptual apprehension in its modes is, as reflection teaches, itself something immanently and temporally constituted, standing forth in the unity of presentness [Gegenwärtigkeit] although it is not meant. It is constituted through the multiplicity of now-phases and retentions. The contents of apprehension, as well as the intentions of apprehension to which the mode of certainty belongs, are constituted in this way. The contents of sensation are constituted as unities in sensible impressions, the apprehensions in other act-impressions involved with them. Perception as a constituted phenomenon is, in its turn, perception of the thing.
The thing-appearance is constituted in the primary apprehension of time, the thing-apprehension as an enduring, unaltered phenomenon or as one that is altered. And in the unity of this alteration we are “conscious of” a new unity: the unity of the unaltered or altering thing, unaltered or altering in its time, its duration. In the same impressional consciousness in which the perception is constituted, the perceived is also constituted and in exactly the same way. It belongs to the essence of a consciousness so constructed that it is a consciousness of unity which at the same time is of both a transcendent and an immanent kind. And it also belongs to the essence of this consciousness that an intentional regard can be directed now on the material sensation, now on the appearance, now on the object. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for all “acts.” At all times, it belongs to the essence of these acts to have intentionality of a transcendent kind, an intentionality they are able to have only through something immanently constituted, through “apprehensions.” And at all times, this establishes the possibility of setting the immanent, the apprehension with its immanent content, in relation to the transcendent. And this setting-in-relation again results in an “act,” an act of a higher level.
At the same time, it is well to consider that in perception a complex of contents of sensation, which themselves are constituted unities in the primordial temporal flux, undergoes unity of apprehension. And the unitary apprehension is in its turn a constituted unity in the first sense. We are not conscious of immanent unities in their constitution in the same way that we are conscious of what appears in transcendent appearance or of what is perceived in transcendent perception. On the other hand, they must still have a community of essence. For an immanent impression is an act of presentation just as perception is. In the one case we have an immanent presentation, in the other a transcendent presentation “through” appearances. Therefore, while transcendent appearances are unities constituted in internal consciousness, other unities, namely, the appearing Objects, must again be constituted “in” these unities.
As we saw, the immanent unities are constituted in the flux of multiplicities of temporal shading. We have there, pertaining to every temporal point of the immanent content, following in the flux of consciousness along the longitudinal direction, the diverse, modified contents which are characterized as retentional modifications of the primal content in the now-character. And these primal contents are carriers of primal apprehensions which in their flowing nexus constitute the temporal unity of the immanent content in its moving back into the past. The “contents,” in the case of perceptual appearance, are just these complete appearances as temporal unities. Therefore, perceptual apprehension is also constituted in such a multiplicity of shading which becomes homogeneous through the unity of temporal apprehension. We must, therefore, understand apprehension here in a twofold sense: as that which is immanently constituted, and as that which belongs to the immanent constitution, to the phases of the primordial flux itself, the primal apprehension which is no longer constituted. In the immanent flowing-off of appearances, in the continual succession of apprehensions in phenomenological time which we call perception, there is constituted now a temporal unity, insofar as the continuity of apprehensions yields not only unity of the altering appearances (as, for example, the series of aspects provided by the rotation of a thing which appear as aspects of the same thing) but also the unity of the appearances of an enduring or altering thing.
Immanent time is Objectified to a time of Objects constituted in immanent appearances by this means: that in the multiplicity of shading of the contents of sensation as unities of phenomenological time—in other words, in the phenomenological-temporal multiplicity of shading of apprehensions of these contents—appears an identical materiality [Dinglichkeit] which continually manifests itself in all phases in multiplicities of shading.31 The thing is constituted in the flowing-off of its appearances, which are themselves constituted as immanent unities in the flux of primordial impressions and necessarily constituted one with the other. The appearing thing is constituted because unities of sensation and homogeneous apprehensions are constituted in the primordial flux; therefore, there is always consciousness of something, exhibition [Darstellung], more precisely, presentation of something and, in the continuing succession, exhibition of the same. The streams of exhibition [Darstellungsfluenten] have such flow and cohesion that what appears in them diverges in multiplicities, formed just so and in just such a way, of shadings of exhibition like the content of sensations in shadings of sensation. Precisely for this reason the multiplicity of apprehension is characterized as presentative, just as immanent impressions are so characterized.
One sees at once that if the primally presented sensible data, outside of primal presentations and the primal retentions and pretentions essentially correlated with them, continuously sustain the apprehensional characters of the spatio-material constitution, then phenomenological time, to which the data of sensation and apprehensions of things pertain, and the spacetime of things must coincide point for point. With every point of phenomenal time that is filled, a point of Objective time also filled manifests itself (by means of the content of sensation and the apprehensions which are found in it).
In view of this, in the vertical lines of the diagram not only do we have the pervasive vertical coincidence which belongs to the phenomenological constitution of time (according to which the primal datum E2 and the retentional modification O′ and E1′ are united in a moment), but also the retentional shadings (which belong to each vertical line) of the apprehensions of things as such stand in pervasive coincidence. There are two coincidences, therefore. The line of apprehensions of things coincides, not only so far as it co-constitutes a continuous succession but also so far as it constitutes the same thing. The former is a coincidence of connecting essential similarity, the latter a coincidence of identity, because in the continuous identifying of the succession we are conscious of what endures as identical. Naturally, also pertaining to this is the continuous, successive identifying of vertical line with vertical line by the fulfillment of protentions which now also have Objective-spatial sense.
The analogy between the constitution of immanent and transcendent unities has already been indicated. As “shadings of sensation” [Empfindungs-Abschattungen] (primal data of exhibition for unities of sensation in phenomenological time) have their law, their essential character, in the primal succession, and, through the modification reproduced in the diagram, they constitute the unity of sensation, so do matters also stand with shadings of things or with “appearances,” which now function as primal data of the primal succession. The primal succession of moments of appearance, by virtue of the time-founding retentions, and the like, constitutes appearance (altered or unaltered) as phenomenological-temporal unity. In addition, however, appearances from the multiplicity of appearances which belong to the same unaltered thing have an ontic essence (the essence of the appearing thing) which is completely the same—just as the momentary data belonging to an unaltered red are of completely the same essence. Like the lines of alteration of red, the lines of alteration of a thing are also governed by a fixed law. Thus, in one something twofold is intentionally constituted: the appearance and the appearing thing, and in different appearances, either unaltered or altered appearing things.
Now, the question naturally arises: what sort of properties have thing-appearances which are appearances of the same thing? This is the question of the constitution of spatial things, which presupposes, therefore, the constitution of time.
§ 44. Internal and External Perception32
Now we shall speak of an enduring perception, i.e., of the perception of things as well as of immanent perception. Along with the perception of things, one also includes under perception continuous perceptual appearance, the continuity of the now-appearance of things, apart from protentional and retentional interweavings. The thing-appearance, the “thing in its orientation,” in its determinate exhibition, and so forth, is something that endures just as much as the thing as such which appears. Even a merely apparent surface is something that endures and in its duration is altered. Properly speaking, I may not speak of “the thing in its orientation” but of the occurrence of the thing-appearance which, if the orientation remains unaltered, continues to endure and otherwise is a continuous flow of alteration of appearances but within a duration.
Even with the perception of an immanent Object, we can take together what is immanent in the now in its continuity; then, however, we have the duration of the Object itself. The Object does not appear in the sense that it does in external perception. Therefore, while in the case of the consciousness of an external Object, “perception” can denote the external appearance of an immanent Object (perception and the perceived being then obviously different), if we speak of internal perception, and at the same time also hold that perception and the perceived are to remain distinct, then the immanent, i.e., the Object itself, cannot be understood under perception. If we speak of internal perception, then we must understand by this either (1) the internal consciousness of the homogeneous immanent Object which is present as constituting the temporal even without a directed glance of attention [ohne Zuwendung]; or (2) internal consciousness with the directed glance of attention. In view of this, it is easy to see that the act of directing our attention is the apprehending of an immanent process which has its immanent duration, which coincides with the duration of the immanent sound during the directed glance of attention to it.
In the case of external Objects we have, therefore:
(1) The external appearance.
(2) The constitutive consciousness in which the external appearance as immanent is constituted.
(3) The directed glance of attention, which can just as well be a directed glance of attention toward the appearance and its components as a directed glance of attention toward the appearing thing. Only the latter comes into question when we speak of external perception.
An analogous study must be carried out for memory, the difference being that memory has its own intentionality, namely, that of presentification. Memory has its unity as a process in internal consciousness and has in the unity of immanent time its position and duration. This is true whether the memory is of the immanent or the transcendent. And every remembrance is (if we disregard the directed glance of attention) also remembrance of the immanent. Therefore, while the consciousness of an immanent sound as originary internal consciousness can have no immanent temporality, the presentificational consciousness of an immanent sound (which in an appropriately altered sense is presentificational consciousness of the internal consciousness of the sound) is an immanent Object belonging to immanent temporality.
§ 45. The Constitution of Non-Temporal Transcendencies
We must further observe that every consciousness in a unitary sense (as a constituted immanent unity) is at the same time necessarily also unity of consciousness of the objective to which it “refers.” But not every consciousness is itself time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of something temporal, something constituting intentional time. Thus, a judicative consciousness of a mathematical state of affairs is an impression, but the mathematical state of affairs which in its unity “is there” undivided is nothing temporal; the act of judgment is not an act of presentation (or of presentification).33 Accordingly, one can say of a thing, an event, or a temporal being that it is represented in phantasy, that it appears according to the mode of phantasy, memory, expectation, or that it appears retentionally: and, likewise, one can say that the thing appears as actually present, that it is perceived. But one cannot say that a mathematical state of affairs appears as present or as presentified. The act of judgment can be of long or short duration, has its extensity in subjective time, and can be actually present or presentified. What is judged, however, is not long or short, enduring or less enduring. And so also with regard to what is quasi-judged in the presentification of the judgment. What is presentified is the judgment and not the judged. If one says that he “merely imagines” a state of affairs, this does not mean that the state of affairs is presentified but that it subsists in the character of a modification of neutrality rather than in the character of belief. The modalities of belief in no way coincide with those of the present-not present but cut across them. With regard to an individual state of affairs, one can still speak—unauthentically—of temporal characters so far as the matter which in the state of affairs is logico-analytically articulated and grasped synthetically can be present according to the mode of perception or presentified according to the mode of phantasy. But for a non-temporal state of affairs, i.e., for one that does not in any way deal with the temporal, it makes no sense. To phantasy oneself making a mathematical judgment does not mean to cause the mathematical state of affairs to become an idea of phantasy, as if the state of affairs could be something exhibited which is presenting or presentifying.
Appearance in the pregnant sense of presentation [Präsentation] also pertains to the sphere of actual presentation [Gegenwärtigung] and its modifications. It pertains to the constitution of the appearing, or, better, to the real givenness of individual being that it is given in the form of a continuity of appearances as exhibitions. That states of affairs can also “merely appear” and demand proof in a real givenness is obvious. This also changes nothing concerning what has been said, namely, that states of affairs (“facts of nature”) grounded in individual appearances (natural appearances) attain givenness on the basis of the underlying data of appearance, therefore, in a similar way through infinities of “exhibitions.” It spite of this, it must be said that the “exhibition” (appearance) of the state of affairs is not exhibition in the true sense, but rather in a derived sense. The state of affairs is not really something temporal. It subsists for a determinate time but is itself not something in time like a thing or an occurrence. The act of exhibition [Darstellen] and the consciousness of time belong not to the state of affairs as such but to the matter of the state.
The same also holds of all other secondary acts and their correlates. A value has no position in time. A temporal Object may be beautiful, pleasant, useful, etc., and may be all this in a determinate time. But the beauty, pleasantness, and so on, have no place in nature and in time. These qualities are not what appears in presentations and presentifications.
22. Compare to this and the following sections Appendix VI: Comprehension of the Absolute Flux—Perception in the Fourfold Sense, pp. 149ff.
23. Cf. pp. 152ff.
24. “Appearance” is used here in the wider sense.
25. Cf. Appendix VII, The Constitution of Simultaneity, pp. 155ff.
26. Cf. § 11, pp. 50ff.
27. Cf. Appendix VIII. The Double Intentionality of the Stream of Consciousness, pp. 157ff.
28. Cf. Appendix IX: Primal Consciousness and the Possibility of Reflection, pp. 161ff.
29. Concerning internal perception, cf. § 44, pp. 122ff.
30. Insofar as one has the right to characterize primal consciousness—the flux which constitutes immanent time and the lived experiences which pertain to it—as being itself an act, or to reduce it to unities and acts, then one can and indeed must say: a primal act or nexus of primal acts constitutes unities which themselves are either acts or not. This, however, leads to difficulties.
31. Cf. Appendix X: The Objectivation [Objektivation] of Time and of the Material in Time, pp. 164ff.
32. Cf. Appendix XI: Adequate and Inadequate Perception, pp. 170ff., and Appendix XII: Internal Consciousness and the Comprehension of Lived Experience, pp. 175ff.
33. Cf. Appendix XIII: The Constitution of Spontaneous Unities as Immanent Temporal Objects [Zeitobjekte]—Judgment as a Temporal Form and Absolute Time-Constituting Consciousness, pp. 182ff.