VIII MIND

1   Cf. also Khantipālo 1981: p.37.

2   M I 59.

3   In addition to these eight categories, the Chinese version of this contemplation in the Madhyama Āgama lists the mind “with blemishes”, and “without blemishes”, while the Ekottara Āgama has “craving” and “mastery of the mind” as additional categories (in Minh Chau 1991: p.93; and Nhat Than 1990: pp.162 and 174). Paṭis II 234 includes the six types of consciousness (differentiated according to the six sense doors) in its list for contemplation of the mind.

4   e.g. at M I 495.

5   Bodhi 1984: p.98; and Piatigorski 1984: p.41. C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.8, draws attention to the novelty of this approach in the history of Indian thought.

6   Bullen 1982: p.29.

7   Newman 1996: pp.35 and 46. Cf. also A V 39, which explains that while unwholesome conduct by way of body or speech is to be overcome by adopting more appropriate ways of conduct, the proper approach for overcoming mental defilements is repeated wise observation. A clinical case supporting the ingenuity of this approach is documented by Deatherage 1975: p.140, where a twenty-three-year-old male, hospitalized for extreme periodic aggressiveness and alcohol abuse, was cured within eight weeks simply by being taught to recognize and mentally name the emotions he experienced, without even knowing that what he was doing was related to “meditation”. Another chronic anger case-study involving awareness of mind as cure can be found in Woolfolk 1984: p.551.

8   M I 120.

9   A V 92; the same simile occurs also at D I 80 and M I 100. Cf. also Samararatne 1997: p.141, who recommends maintaining a “mirror-like mind”, especially in regard to unpleasant emotions.

10 M I 120.

11 The other approaches, in addition to the above-mentioned directing of attention to the nature of these thoughts and to the volitional disposition underlying them, are to direct attention to something wholesome instead, or to reflect on the danger of succumbing to these unwholesome thoughts, or to try to forget these thoughts. A similar case can be found at A IV 87, where after an extensive list of different methods for staying awake and countering drowsiness, the final recommendation is to go to sleep mindfully. Clearly, in this case too, the last method is not really helpful for staying awake, but is also the last resort when all other measures had failed.

12 At M I 242.

13 T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.266; on the term citta cf. also page 205, footnote 21.

14 Taking rāga as a synonym for lobha. A detailed exposition of the three roots can be found in Ñāṇapoṇika 1978.

15 Khantipālo 1981: p.38.

16 Dhp 251 poetically points out that there is no fire like lust, no grip like anger, and no net like delusion. Buddhadāsa 1989: p.67, suggests distinguishing between mental tendencies such as “pulling in”, “pushing away”, and “running around in circles”, in order to recognize the three unwholesome roots.

17 Cf. e.g. M I 5, where arahants are said to be free from these three through their eradication; M I 65, which refers to realized ascetics as free from lust, anger, and delusion; M I 236 and S I 220, where the Buddha referred to himself as free from lust, anger, and delusion; and A III 43; A III 336; and A III 347, which associate such freedom to absence of the influxes.

18 Cf. e.g. A IV 404, where awareness of their absence is part of the reviewing knowledge of an arahant.

19 Alternatively, in order to conform with the pattern in this satipaṭṭhāna of presenting a positive state of mind together with its negative counterpart, the contracted (saṅkhitta) state of mind could be taken in a positive sense, as a “concentrated” or “attentive” state of mind (cf. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.665). The corresponding verb saṅkhipati does indeed occur in this positive sense at Ja I 82, when the Buddha radiated loving kindness to his five earlier followers on their first meeting after his awakening. Cf. also Goenka 1999: p.57, who translates saṅkhitta as “collected” and “concentrated.”

20 S V 279. The relation of these two to “internal” and “external” occurs again at A IV 32.

21 Ps I 280. However, in the above mentioned discourse at S V 279 the hindrance restlessness occurs separately, apparently not forming part of “distracted”, whereas according to the commentarial explanation the two should be identical. The relation of “distracted” to the search for sense gratification (as at S V 279) occurs also at M III 225. The consequences of a distracted state of mind are, according to A V 147, that one becomes unable to direct one’s attention skilfully, avoid unwholesome behaviour, or overcome mental inertia.

22 e.g. at M II 207.

23 M III 146. The commentary Ps IV 200 explains this pervasion to be related to kasiṇa meditation. A kasiṇa is a meditation device, for example a coloured disk, used to help develop concentration.

24 Ps I 280.

25 Ps I 280 explains “unsurpassable” to refer to absorption attainment. Sīlananda 1990: p.94, takes “unsurpassable” as a specific reference to the immaterial attainments.

26 The need to abandon lower absorption attainments is described e.g. at M I 455. Nhat Hanh 1990: p.13, renders sa-uttara with the expression: “my mind is capable of reaching a higher state”.

27 e.g. at M I 357. The fourth jhāna as a level of concentration is indeed “unsurpassable”, since the immaterial attainments take place with the same level of concentration, but directed towards progressively more refined objects.

28 e.g. at D II 83; M I 163; M I 303; M II 237; S I 105; S I 124; A I 168; A III 435; and Th 415.

29 Ps I 280.

30 e.g. at M I 141; S III 45; S III 51; Ud 24; and It 33.

31 The standard descriptions of full awakening use the expression “liberated” to describe the arahant’s knowledge of his or her realization (e.g. at D I 84). At times the expression “liberated” is combined with “unsurpassable” as references to full awakening, cf. e.g. M I 235; S I 105; or A IV 106. D III 270 and A V 31 relate the “well liberated mind” to freedom from the three unwholesome roots.

32 Ps I 280. This suggestion by the commentary can claim some support from S V 157, which speaks of a calm and undistracted state of mind, fit for satipaṭṭhāna, as “liberated”.

33 Various types of “freedom of the mind” are listed at M I 296. Similarly, A III 16 refers to the absence of the five hindrances as a mind “liberated” from them.

34 Of the sixty-two grounds for views presented in the Brahmajāla Sutta (D I 12–39), forty-nine appear to be related to concentrative attainments of various types: recollection of past lives [nos 1–3, 5–7, 17]; the divine eye [31–4, 51–7]; kasiṇa meditation [9–11, 19, 23–5, 29–30, 35, 39–41, 43, 47–9]; and jhāna in general [20–2, 27, 36–8, 44–6, 59–62]; (correlations given with the help of the commentary). This ratio (nearly 80%) constitutes an overwhelming testimony to the view-generating propensity of deep concentration experiences. The fact that jhānic experiences can easily lead to the formation of wrong views is also noted by Wijebandara 1993: p.21.

35 Piatigorski 1984: p.44: “in early historical Buddhism some non-Buddhist yogic experiences were realized, analysed and reworked so that they could be used without their previous or actual religious contents”. Premasiri 1987b: p.178: “the distinctive feature of Buddhism is that it described these jhāna states purely in psychological terms, without bringing in mystical or supernatural explanations for them.”

36 M I 350. Cf. also M I 436, which analyses jhānic experience with the help of the aggregate scheme, followed by the consideration that all these phenomena are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self.

37 M I 60: “he abides contemplating the nature of arising … of passing away … of both arising and passing away in regard to the mind.”

IX DHAMMAS: THE HINDRANCES

1   Ṭhānissaro 1996: p.73. Paṭis II 234 simply suggests that whatever is not included in the previous three satipaṭṭhānas is to be understood as dhammas in this context. Sīlananda 1990: p.95, rejects a translation as “mental objects” and suggests leaving dhammas untranslated, a suggestion which I have followed. Alternative translations could be: “facts in general” (in Kalupahana 1992: p.74); “phenomena” (in Bodhi 2000: p.44, and in Jayasuriya 1988: p.161); “patterns of events” (in Harvey 1997: p.354); “conditions” (in Vajirañāṇa 1975: p.59); or “principles” (in Watanabe 1983: p.16).

2   Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1193 n.157 explains: “in this context dhammā can be understood as comprising all phenomena classified by way of the categories of the Dhamma, the Buddha’s teaching”. Gyori 1996: p.24, in regard to contemplation of dhammas suggests that “the exercises … in this section are specifically intended to invest the mind with a soteriological orientation”.

3   In this context it is noticeable that the instruction for contemplation of dhammas employs the locative case twice, once for dhammas and again for the five hindrances, the five aggregates, etc. Thus one is to “contemplate dhammas in regard to dhammas in regard to the five hindrances, (etc.)”, that is, one contemplates phenomena “in terms of” the categories listed as dhammas. This way of introducing each contemplation differs from the earlier three satipaṭṭhānas. Cf. also S V 184, according to which the dhammas contemplated in this satipaṭṭhāna are conditionally related to attention, while body is related to nutriment, feelings to contact, and mind to name-and-form. This suggests that contemplation of dhammas requires the deliberate act of directing attention to its objects, in terms of the dhammas listed, to a stronger degree than the other satipaṭṭhānas. Carrithers 1983: p.229, explains that “the propositions of doctrine are transmuted into immediate perception, here and now”. Similarly Gombrich 1996: p.36, speaks of learning “to see the world through Buddhist spectacles”; while Gyatso 1992: p.8, suggests: “previously learned categories and skills inform present experience without being recollected as such”. Cf. also Collins 1994: p.78.

4   M III 83.

5   M III 84.

6   Ps IV 142.

7   Cf. page 69.

8   Ps-pṭ I 373.

9   At M III 87. Cf. also Paṭis I 191, which relates contemplation of impermanence to experiencing the rise and fall of the aggregates and sense-spheres, thereby providing an additional relation to the satipaṭṭhāna context.

10 Although these two contemplations would not necessarily have to be practised in this order, it seems meaningful to follow an inquiry into subjective personality with an investigation of its relationship to the external world by way of the senses.

11 With this presentation I do not intend to suggest that these contemplations of dhammas necessarily have to be practised in this order and in conjunction, only that they are presented in a progressive order in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

12 Cf. M I 251, where the same four-step sequence, in the context of contemplating feelings, leads directly to realization. Paṭis I 194 explains contemplation of letting go to be of two types: “giving up” (the aggregates) and “leaping forward” (to realization). On “letting go” cf. also Ñāīārāma 1997: pp.85–7; and van Zeyst 1961a: p.3. The Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama has preserved a different sequence for the last four steps of mindfulness of breathing, which proceeds from impermanence to “abandoning”, followed by “fading away” and then culminates with “cessation” (in Choong 2000: p.227).

13 M I 190.

14 Cf. page 111.

15 D III 102 speaks of Nibbāna as the highest of all wholesome dhammas; cf. also A II 34 and Sn 225.

16 M I 60.

17 Cf. e.g. D I 246; S V 96; and S V 97.

18 M II 203; S V 92; S V 127; and A III 63.

19 A III 317 and A III 321.

20 At S V 110 a tenfold presentation is given, by distinguishing between internal sensual desire, aversion, and doubt, and their external counterparts, while the remaining two compounds are separated into sloth, torpor, restlessness, and worry. This presentation supports the notion of seven actual mental qualities. Cf. also Gunaratana 1996: p.32. A variation of the usual fivefold presentation can be found at It 8, which has a single hindrance, the hindrance of ignorance. Another variation occurs at Paṭis I 31, Paṭis I 103, and Paṭis I 163, where enumerations of the hindrances omit worry and give ignorance and dissatisfaction instead.

21 The similarity between sloth and torpor is noted by Vibh 254, according to which both refer to “inability” or “unreadiness”, with the difference that sloth is of a mental type, while torpor represents the bodily variation. Vibh-a 369 understands this explanation in the case of torpor to refer to mental factors, not to the physical body. But if one considers the antidotes listed for torpor at A IV 85 it becomes probable that to speak of “torpor” does refer to physical torpor. The similarity of the other two hindrances is mentioned at Ps-pṭ I 375.

22 Vism 141 explains that concentration is incompatible with sensual desire, joy with aversion, initial mental application with sloth-and-torpor, happiness with restlessness-and-worry, and sustained mental application with doubt. (On this correlation cf. also Buddhadasa 1976: p.112; and Upali Karunaratne 1996: p.51.) The point that Vism is trying to make here could be, in the case of the first four correlations, that unification of the mind through concentration is opposed to the mental diversification caused by sensual desire, that the mental bliss and physical ease caused by the arising of joy is incompatible with the mental rigidity and physical tension of aversion, that the clear grasp of the object through initial mental application counteracts the unclarity and mental fogginess of sloth-and-torpor, and that the mental contentment and physical tranquillity engendered by happiness does not leave scope for restlessness or worry to arise (cf. Vism-mhṭ I 165). As for the fifth hindrance, if doubt (vicikicchā) is understood more broadly, implying not only doubt but a generally distracted state of mind (cf. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.615, where the corresponding verb vicikicchati is related to being distracted in thought), this would then find its counterbalance in the mental stability and undistractedness produced by sustained mental application. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that in the discourses a listing of the hindrances and the individual jhāna factors together occurs only at MI 294. This passage does not directly relate each hindrance to an individual jhāna factor, but merely enumerates both, and that in a sequence not corresponding to the commentarial correlation. This passage is moreover absent from the Chinese version of this discourse (cf. Minh Chau 1991: p.100, and Stuart-Fox 1989: p.90), which otherwise corresponds to the Pāli version. For a critical discussion of the jhāna factor analysis cf. also Rahula 1962: p.192.

23 This is especially the case for sloth-and-torpor versus energy; restlessness-and-worry versus tranquillity; and doubt versus investigation-of-dhammas (e.g. at S V 104). In numerous instances throughout the Bojjhaṅga Saṃyutta (S V 63–140) the awakening factors and the hindrances are presented as diametrically opposed mental qualities. Cf. also page 239.

24 A V 195. D II 83; D III 101; and S V 161 stipulate the same conditions for becoming a Buddha.

25 S V 121 and A III 230.

26 Cf. also Fryba 1989: p.202, who suggests the following correlations: sensual desire distorts perception and fragments awareness, aversion creates divisions and cramps the mind, sloth-and-torpor befogs awareness, restlessness-and-worry consumes the mind with no sense of direction, doubt creates irresolute vacillation.

27 D I 71 and M I 275.

28 M III 14.

29 A I 272.

30 A I 282.

31 Gunaratana 1996: p.44; and Ñāṇapoāika 1986b: p.21.

32 This function of satipaṭṭhāna as a middle path between sense indulgence and self-mortification is mentioned at A I 295.

33 Several of these episodes can be found in the Māra and Bhikkhuṇī Saṃyuttas, S I 103–35; cf. also the injunction at Sn 967 to recognize mental defilements as manifestations of Māra, the “dark one”. Goldstein 1994: p.85, illustratively speaks of “wagging the finger at Māra”. Cf. also Marasinghe 1974: p.197.

34 Lily de Silva (n.d.): p.25.

35 A study with the help of Rorschach testing corroborates this, where Brown 1986b: p.189, comes to the conclusion that advanced meditators are not without the experience of conflict, but are remarkably non-defensive in experiencing such conflicts. This observation points to their ability to maintain non-reactive and equanimous awareness.

36 Goldstein 1985: p.57: “often there is a tendency to condemn the hindrances when they arise. The condemning mind is itself the factor of aversion.”

37 Complete eradication of all five hindrances takes place only with full awakening (cf. S V 327). In fact, when commenting on this part of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, Ps I 282 correlates the “future non-arising” of each hindrance with corresponding levels of realization, these being in most cases non-returning or arahantship.

38 e.g. at D I 73. The use of the Pāli verb sam-anupassati in this instruction indicates that a form of contemplation (anupassanā) is intended here.

39 S V 92; A I 10; A I 257; and A III 16. These passages relate the luminosity of the mind to the development of a concentrated state of mind that is free from defilements and ready for realization. Cf. also D III 223, where a form of concentration leads to a mind full of “radiance” (sappabhāsa); M III 243, where “luminous” is related to a high level of equanimity; and S V 283, where even the Buddha’s body is said to be “luminous” as a result of concentration. Upali Karunaratne 1999c: p.219, explains: “what is meant by lustrous and pure mind (pabhassara) is not a state of mind which is absolutely pure, nor the pure mind which is synonymous with emancipation … pure only in the sense, and to the extent, that it is not disturbed or influenced by external stimuli”.

40 A I 10. The commentaries Mp I 60 and As 140 identify the luminous mind with the bhavaṅga (subconscious life-continuum). Here it could, however, be objected that the term bhavaṅga in the context of the commentarial description of mental processes refers to a subconscious moment that occurs between each conscious part of the mental process. (In fact, sleep is referred to as bhavaṅgaṃ otāreti at Ps-pṭ I 364.) In contrast, the luminous state of mind at A I 10 clearly refers to a conscious experience, since it is to be “known” (pajānāti). On bhavaṅga cf. the excellent exposition in Gethin 1994 ; also Harvey 1989: pp.94–8; and Sarachchandra 1994: p.90. The attempt by Wijesekera 1976: p.348, to establish a historically early existence of the term with the help of a passage from the Aṅguttara Nikāya and several occurrences in the Paṭṭhāna is not convincing, as A II 79 in the PTS, the Burmese, and the Sinhalese editions invariably reads bhavagga (best of existences, which also fits the context much better) instead of bhavaṅga, and occurrences in the Paṭṭhāna could also be taken as betraying the comparatively late age of this part of the Abhidhamma; cf. also Ñāṇatiloka 1988: p.246.

41 M I 115.

42 S I 22.

43 S II 151.

44 M I 508.

45 M I 507.

46 M I 508.

47 A IV 57; on this passage cf. Lily de Silva 1978: p.126.

48 e.g. at D III 133. The eradication of sensual desire has already taken place at the level of non-returning.

49 Th 1224–5 explains that a distorted cognition of sensuality can be counterbalanced by avoiding sensually alluring objects, by directing attention to the unattractive aspects of the body, by mindfulness of the body (in general), and by developing disenchantment.

50 A IV 166. At S IV 110 monks are encouraged to look on women as if they are their own mother, sister, or daughter. The same discourse (at S IV 112) documents the particular importance of sense-restraint, since out of the various methods mentioned for countering sensual desire, sense-restraint turned out to be the only acceptable explanation for the ability of even young monks to live in celibacy.

51 A III 186.

52 These come at A III 185 as part of altogether five antidotes: developing loving kindness, compassion, equanimity, inattention, and reflecting on karma.

53 M I 424. According to Fenner 1987: p.226, the divine abodes (brahmavihāras) are based on accurate cognitions and thus counter errant cognitions leading to unwholesome mental qualities. An inspiring description of loving kindness can be found in Ñāṇapoṇika 1993: pp.9–12.

54 S II 264.

55 In fact, at S II 265, non-human beings are apparently set on creating psychological disorders, which can be prevented by developing loving kindness. Katz 1989: p.161, suggests: “one possible interpretation of ‘non-human beings’ could be those psychological functions which endanger spiritual growth”.

56 M I 352 describes in detail how to combine loving kindness with insight: on emergence from an absorption developed through loving kindness, one develops insight into the impermanent and conditioned nature of this attainment. M I 38 and A I 196 describe the transition from loving kindness to insight with the reflection: “there is this, there is what is inferior, there is what is superior, and there is a complete escape from this entire field of cognition”. (Ps I 176 and Mp II 306 explain the last to be a reference to Nibbāna.) Cf. also A IV 150 and It 21, who point out that the development of loving kindness helps to weaken the fetters. According to Aronson 1986: p.51: “the meditation on love is the soil within which concentration and … insight are cultivated”. Meier 1978: p.213, suggests that both vipassanā and loving kindness meditation have a similar aim, namely, to weaken the sense of “I”, so that their different approaches (vipassanā by way of analytical dissection, loving kindness by way of expansion) can be considered complementary (though it should be kept in mind that loving kindness on its own will not be able completely to remove all attachment to a sense of “I”).

57 At S V 119 the Buddha pointed out that this combination formed the distinguishing feature between the Buddhist approach and the way loving kindness was practised by contemporary ascetics. When considering the Buddha’s way of teaching loving kindness meditation it might also be of relevance to point out that what he originally taught was an unspecified pervasion of all directions with an attitude of loving kindness (cf. e. g. M I 38). D I 251, M II 207, and S IV 322 make the spatially pervasive character of radiating loving kindness all the more evident by comparing it to a vigorous trumpeter making himself heard in all four directions. Although such pervasion often indicates absorption, this is not invariably the case, since according to M I 129 this pervasion is to be undertaken when being verbally insulted or even physically maltreated, a situation hardly conducive to entering absorption. Or else at M II 195 a Brahmin on his deathbed, suffering from agonizing headaches, severe stomach cramps, and high fever, soon after being instructed to practise this pervasion, passed away and was reborn in the Brahmā world. This circumstance suggests that he must have been able to put the instructions to good use, even though his physical condition would have made it impossible for him to develop absorption. It is only with the commentaries, possibly because they associated the pervasion exclusively with absorption (cf. Vism 308), that meditation on loving kindness becomes an exercise in conceptual imagination, directed towards oneself, a friend, a neutral person, and an enemy in turn (cf. Vism 296). This method of practice is not found anywhere in the discourses.

58 S V 131 and A V 300. (This is in both instances repeated for the other three brahmavihāras.) Similarly, Sn 143 describes the practice of loving kindness based on “having experienced that state of peace”, with the result that the practitioner will not be born again in a womb (Sn 152). This suggests that the practice of loving kindness can lead one who has experienced the “state of peace”, i.e. one who is a stream-enterer, to transcending rebirth in a womb, i.e. to non-returning. This way of understanding is supported by the commentary, Pj II 193, which explains “state of peace” to refer to Nibbāna. This explanation is also confirmed by Dhp 368, where loving kindness is again related to “state of peace”, the connotation of which is further clarified by the expression “calming of formations”. However, Jayawickrama 1948: vol.2, p.98, argues against taking “state of peace” to refer to a realization of Nibbāna. The Sanskrit fragments from the Turfan discoveries also mention the realization of non-returning as one of the advantages of developing loving kindness (in Schlingloff 1964: p.133). The reason loving kindness is linked to progress from stream-entry to non-returning could be related to the two fetters that are to be removed at this stage: sensual desire and aversion. Loving kindness, especially if developed up to absorption level, can act as an antidote to both, since the intense mental happiness experienced during deep concentration counteracts the search for pleasure through the external senses, while loving kindness, by its very nature, counters aversion.

59 e.g. at D I 71.

60 A IV 86 relates “clarity of cognition” to developing a radiant mind. Vibh 254 explains that “clarity of cognition” refers to bright, clear, and pure cognitions, which Vibh-a 369 explains as cognitions free from the hindrances.

61 Ps I 284 and Ps-pṭ I 375.

62 S V 64; S V 103; and A I 3.

63 S V 105.

64 A IV 85.

65 A III 449; A IV 353; A IV 358; Ud 37; and It 80.

66 D I 71; S V 105; and A III 449.

67 A I 256 and A III 375.

68 A IV 87.

69 Cf. e.g. Vin III 19, where the monk Sudinna experienced worry due to having engaged in sexual intercourse.

70 e.g. at S IV 46 the Buddha, visiting a sick monk, enquired whether that monk had any worries. His question was in the first instance related to “guilt”, but once the sick monk in question reported that he had nothing to reproach himself for, the question was repeated and led to some clarification or specific instruction concerning the Dhamma. Another nuance of “worry” can be found at A I 282, where it indicates excessive worry about realization. Cf. furthermore A II 157, which also relates “restlessness” to the Dhamma.

71 D III 49. Such doubt can occur “internally”, in relation to oneself, or “externally”, in relation to others (cf. S V 110).

72 A V 147. Cf. also D II 283, where a detailed exposition of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness from different perspectives enabled Sakka to fully overcome doubt and realize stream-entry.

73 M III 158, where doubt is mentioned as the first of a particular set of mental obstructions not encountered as such elsewhere in the discourses, and which are specifically related to the development of concentration. It is particularly noticeable that the hindrances of sensual desire and aversion are not mentioned, suggesting that these have been overcome before the stage of practice in question. The mental obstructions listed are doubt, inattention, sloth-and-torpor, consternation, elation, unease, excessive energy, deficient energy, longing, cognition of diversity, and excessive meditation on forms. Their successful removal then leads to the attainment of absorption.

74 This is suggested by the fact that the nutriment for investigation-of-dhammas is presented in exactly the same terms as the “anti”-nutriment of doubt, cf. S V 104 and S V 106.

75 This simile occurs at M I 453 in relation to dispelling attachment; at M III 300 in relation to dispelling likes and dislikes that have arisen in the mind; and at S IV 190 in relation to dispelling unwholesome thoughts and memories.

76 Ps I 281–6.

X DHAMMAS: THE AGGREGATES

1   M I 61.

2   S III 27.

3   A V 52. Cf. also S III 19–25, where several discourses relate an understanding of the aggregates to full realization.

4   At M III 20, a detailed exposition on the aggregates led sixty monks to full realization. At S III 68, the Buddha’s first five disciples became arahants after an exposition of anattā, again by way of the five aggregates. Cf. also Th 87; Th 90; Th 120; Th 161; Th 369; and Th 440; each relating full awakening to insight into the five aggregates.

5   e.g. at D II 305. The expression “five aggregates” seems to have been easily intelligible in ancient India, since it occurs in the Buddha’s first discourse, at S V 421, apparently without any need for elaboration or explanation. Similarly, at M I 228, the five aggregates form part of a description of the Buddha’s teaching to the disputer Saccaka (who was presumably unfamiliar with Buddhism, but appears to have readily understood what was being said). This suggests that the five-aggregate scheme might have already been in existence at the time of Gotama Buddha. Since the discourses also include contemplation of the five aggregates in their description of the awakening of the ancient Buddha Vipassi (at D II 35), it seems that from their perspective, too, the scheme of the five aggregates was known before the advent of Gotama Buddha. Stcherbatsky 1994: p.71, mentions parallels to the aggregates in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads; and according to Warder 1956: p.49 n.2, the aggregates were a known concept among the Jains and possibly also among the Ājīvikas.

6   e.g. at M III 16. On the term “aggregate” cf. also Boisvert 1997: p.16; Upali Karunaratne 1999b: p.194; and Ñāṇamoli 1978: p.329. C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1937: p.410, suggests that the reason it should be five aggregates in particular could be related to the fact that the number five represents a comprehensive unit in ancient Indian thought, something which in turn is derived from the number of fingers on the human hand. The range of applicability of the five-aggregate scheme is documented at M I 435, which applies the five-aggregate structure to the experience of jhāna. Cf. also M I 190, which analyses the sense-spheres with the help of the five-aggregate scheme. Khanti 1984: p.49, applies the five aggregates to mindfulness of breathing, by distinguishing between breath, sensation of breathing, noting in/out-breath, effort to breathe, and knowing the breath.

7   M I 300; M III 16; S III 47; and S III 167. Cf. also Ayya Khema 1984: p.8; and Bodhi 1976: p.92.

8   As an abridged statement of the first noble truth, e.g. at D II 305: “in short, the five aggregates of clinging are dukkha”. Similarly, S III 7 points out that lust and desire in regard to the five aggregates leads to dukkha; and S III 31 explains that to delight in the five aggregates is to delight in dukkha. Cf. also Gethin 1986: p.41.

9   Stcherbatsky 1994: p.23.

10 e.g. at M III 17. Such definitions in the discourses also speak frequently of the material form “derived” (upādāya) from the four elements (e.g. at M I 53). Judging from M I 421, this expression might simply refer to those bodily parts or processes that are predominantly “derived” (upādiṇṇa) from the respective element, such as the harder bodily parts like hair and bones in the case of the element earth, the liquid bodily parts like blood and urine in the case of the element water, the process of digestion in the case of the element fire, and the breath in the case of the element air. According to the Abhidhamma and the commentaries, however, “derived” material form refers to twenty-three or twenty-four types of secondary matter, in addition to the four elements (twenty-three types at Dhs 134; twenty-four at Vism 444 by adding the heart-base). A detailed survey of these can be found in Bodhi 1993: pp.235–42; and Karunadasa 1989: pp.31–116. According to Kor 1993: p.6, from the viewpoint of practical meditation an understanding of the four elements as exemplifying basic characteristics of matter suffices for the development of insight. Cf. also Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.102, who warns against analysis carried out for its own sake.

11 S III 86. Strictly speaking, ruppati and rūpa are not etymologically related. Nevertheless, this passage offers an illustrative explanation of the term. Kalupahana 1992: p.17, comments: “rūpa … the definition of it provided by the Buddha makes it a function rather than an entity”. Sarachchandra 1994: p.103, explains: “rūpa is not interpreted as mere matter, but as organic sensations” (i.e. as a subjective factor).

12 Padmasiri de Silva 1991: p.17; and W.S. Karunaratne 1988a: p.96.

13 M I 111: “with contact as condition there is feeling, what one feels, that one cognizes”. M I 293 clarifies that feeling and cognition occur as a conjoined pair. M III 17 points out that contact is the condition for the manifestation of the aggregates of feeling and cognition.

14 The standard descriptions (e.g. at D II 309) speak of “eye-contact feeling” and of “cognition of visible form” (the same applies to the other senses); cf. Hamilton 1996: p.15.

15 S III 87. Cf. also Boisvert 1997: p.89; Hamilton 1996: pp.54, 57–9; Harvey 1995: p.141 (whose suggested translation of saññā as “cognition” I have followed); Premasiri 1987a: pp.53–5; and C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1922: p.6 n.4. Cf. also Gruber 1999: p.192, who suggests that the prefix saṃ- of saññā could be taken to refer to the gathering “together” of sense experiences under a conceptual label through the activity of cognition.

16 Cf. D I 93, where “to cognize” (sañjānāti) is used in the sense of “giving a name”; or M III 234 where “cognition” occurs for the various terms used to refer to a bowl. On the relation of cognition to memory cf. Ñāṇapoṇika 1985: p.71.

17 e.g. M I 389 distinguished between afflictive and non-afflictive volitions by way of body, speech, and mind. S III 60 and S III 63 explain “volitions” to comprise intentions related to visible form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and mental objects. Cf. also Padmasiri de Silva 1992a: p.16; and Schumann 1957: p.90.

18 Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.70, aptly brings out the nature of “volition” by providing the following example for the five aggregates: a solid (material form) pleasant (feeling) shady tree (cognition) “for lying under” (volition) visible to me (consciousness).

19 S III 87; (cf. also Vibh 7). Bodhi 2000: p.1071 n.112, comments: “this passage shows the active role of … volition in constructing experienced reality. Not only does volition influence the objective content of the experience, but it also shapes the psychophysical organism within which it has arisen and, via its role as kamma, shapes the future configurations of the five aggregates to be produced by kamma.”

20 Cf. the long list of mental factors given under saṅkhārā in Dhs (e.g. 17–18) each time a state of mind is presented; also at Vism 462–72. Cf. also Bodhi 2000: p.45; W.S. Karunaratne 1988a: p.118; McGovern 1979: p.87; C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.324; and Stcherbatsky 1994: p.20.

21 A typical instance is the expression “this body with consciousness” (saviññāṇake kāye), e.g. at S III 80, where “consciousness” stands for all four mental aggregates. Cf. also D I 21 and S II 94, which use “consciousness” (viññāṇa) on a par with the two Pāli terms citta and mano, all three referring to “mind” in this context. Bodhi 2000: p.769 n.154, aptly clarifies the implications of these three Pāli terms in the discourses: “viññāṇa signifies the particularizing awareness through a sense faculty … as well as the underlying stream of consciousness, which sustains personal continuity through a single life and threads together successive lives.... Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base.... Citta signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition, and emotion.” A detailed survey of differences in the usage of these three terms in the discourses can be found in Johansson 1965: p.208.

22 M I 292 explains that “feeling” just feels, whereas “consciousness” is conscious “of” such a feeling. S III 87 alternatively illustrates the activity of consciousness by it being conscious of various tastes. Cf. also Hamilton 1996: pp.54 and 92; Harvey 1995: p.154; Premasiri 1987a: p.57; Wayman 1976: p.331; and Wijesekera 1994: pp.87,104, and 111. Concerning the difference between cognition and consciousness, Ñāṇamoli 1978: p.338 explains: “a hint of what is referred to may perhaps be got from the prefixes … the prefix vi- might be taken dissociatively as the division and distribution of bare (vi-)ññāṇa over the six bases, while the prefix saṃ- might be taken associatively as the perception of synthesis of the objective fields into ‘things’ and ‘percepts’ in each of the six pairs of bases.”

23 Cf. the wrong view at M I 258 that the same consciousness feels, experiences karmic retribution, and fares on in the round of rebirths.

24 The importance of this conditional interrelation is highlighted at D II 34 and S II 105, where Buddha Vipassī and Buddha Gotama respectively (both still at the bodhisatta stage at this point), on investigating dependent co-arising up to this reciprocal relationship between consciousness and name-and-form, concluded: “I have found the path of insight leading to awakening.”

25 D II 56: “Consciousness conditions name-and-form … name-and-form conditions consciousness.” (“Name”, according to M I 53, comprises feeling, cognition, volition, contact, and attention.)

26 S III 142; with further explanations in Vism 479. On these similes cf. also Mahasi 1996: pp.68–79.

27 On the relevance of the five aggregates as a philosophical refutation of notions of self cf. Kalupahana 1975: p.116; Thiṭṭila 1969: p.xxii; and Wijesekera 1994: p.262.

28 According to Basham 1951: p.270, the Ājīvika soul had the colour of a blue fruit and its size reached the height of five hundred yojanas. (A yojana is the ancient Indian measure for distances and represents the distance that can be covered with one yoke of oxen in a day, approximately seven miles.) Could this description of the soul refer to the sky?

29 Malalasekera 1965: p.569.

30 Pande 1957: p.356.

31 Malalasekera 1965: p.567.

32 Collins 1982: p.80, and Jayatilleke 1980: p.297.

33 Kalupahana 1994: p.13.

34 A typical example is the position taken by Ajita Kesakambalī (at D I 55) that there are no such things as good and evil deeds, since a human being is nothing more than a combination of the four elements. Along similar lines Pakudha Kaccāyana (at D I 56) proposed human beings to be made up of seven immutable principles, which led him to the conclusion that even cutting off someone’s head with a sword should not be considered killing, but should be reckoned only as inserting the blade in the space intervening between these seven principles. Cf. also Jayatilleke 1980: p.444; and Kalupahana 1975: pp.25–32.

35 The importance of considering the anattā teaching in the light of the karma theory is highlighted by Sasaki 1992: pp.32–5.

36 W.S. Karunaratne 1988b: p.72: “the teaching of anattā is an … adaptation of the central truth of causality”.

37 That it is the very absence of permanence that disqualifies phenomena from being considered “self” becomes evident at M III 282. The lack of control over the five aggregates, in addition to their impermanent nature, is, according to S III 66, what disqualifies them from being “I” or “mine”. Cf. also M I 231.

38 Vism 640 explains that to speak of “not-self” implies not being susceptible to the free exercise of control. Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.70, points out that “attā, ‘self’, is fundamentally a notion of mastery over things”.

39 Cf. Epstein 1988: p.65,1989: p.66; and Hanly 1984: p.254. On Buddhist and Western notions of “self” cf. also West 1991: pp.200–4.

40 In fact, as Ps I 251 indicates, even animals are under the influence of self notions, which would certainly not be a philosophical belief.

41 e.g. at S III 68, a consideration to be applied to all possible instances of the five aggregates.

42 Spk II 98 explains that the notion “this is mine” is related to craving, the notion “I am this” to conceit, and the notion “this is my self” to views. S III 105 points out that the self-image “I am” comes about because of the existence of some form of grasping.

43 S IV 197 enjoins thorough investigation of the range of each aggregate, this investigation forming the basis for the insight that no I or mine can be found.

44 A simple device to start this type of practice could be to question oneself: “who?” or “whose?” in regard to any activity or experience. This is in fact suggested by the satipaṭṭhāna commentary at Ps I 251 and Ps I 274; cf. also Khantipālo 1981: p.71.

45 Engler 1983: p.33; and Epstein 1990: p.30. An interesting point in this context is suggested by Wayman 1984: p.622, according to whom ātman might refer to “embodiment” in certain Vedic contexts, which further supports relating it to the “representational self”.

46 Hamilton 1997: p.281.

47 e.g. at M III 17.

48 Harvey 1995: p.17, illustrates this difference by distinguishing between “Self” (permanent, substantial, etc.) and “self” (empirical and changing). Ñāṇananda 1993: p.10, aptly sums up: “accept yourself – and reject your self.”

49 Lily de Silva 1996: p.4.

50 S I 135. This same simile forms part of the introductory dialogue at Mil 25. A modern version can be found in Claxton 1991: p.27. Cf. also Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.46.

51 “I” and “mine” are then used simply as conventions by an arahant (cf. S I 14).

52 S IV 400.

53 Cf. e.g. the mistaken reasoning at M III 19 that if actions are performed by a not-self, what self could be affected by the result of these actions?

54 M I 299: “the five aggregates of clinging are called personality”; cf. also Hamilton 1995a: p.54; and Kalupahana 1994: pp.70–2.

55 Hamilton 1996: p.xxiv.

56 M II 17. In this passage “consciousness” acts as a representative of mind in its entirety. Cf. also M I 260, which comprehensively refers to the entire set of the five aggregates as something that has “come to be” in conditional dependence on nutriment, a way of developing deep insight leading to freedom from doubt and purified view which does not seem to require analysing them separately. Ps II 307 explains that “come to be” refers to the entire set of the five aggregates in this context.

57 S II 94.

58 This disenchantment is described at M I 511 with the insight that for a long time one has been tricked and cheated by one’s own mind, since when clinging one has been clinging just to these five aggregates.

59 Cf. e.g. S II 28, where contemplating the arising and passing away of the five aggregates is immediately followed by an exposition of dependent co-arising (paṭicca samuppāda).

60 At D II 35 the former Buddha Vipassī realized full awakening by contemplating the impermanence of the five aggregates. The same contemplation and result by a nun is documented at Thi 96. The potential of this contemplation to lead to full awakening is documented also at D III 223; S II 29; S II 253; A II 45; and A IV 153. Gethin 1992: p.56, concludes: “the practice of watching rise and fall with regard to the five aggregates of grasping seems to be particularly associated with the gaining of the insight that leads … directly to awakening”.

61 S III 84.

62 Cf. M I 486; M III 115; and S III 157.

63 S III 4.

64 M I 140 and S III 33.

65 S III 23.

66 S III 62 and S III 59.

67 S III 14.

68 M I 191. Cf. also S IV 188, which relates contemplation of the arising and passing away of the aggregates to understanding the arising and passing away of dukkha.

69 S III 66 points out that each aggregate is not-self, since it is not possible to have them conform to one’s wishes (such as, for example, always having a healthy body, experiencing only pleasant feelings, etc.).

70 S III 160 and S III 193.

71 S III 167.

XI DHAMMAS: THE SENSE-SPHERES

1   Cf. e.g. M III 279 and S IV 106, which directly relate contemplation of the sense-spheres to the aggregate scheme; cf. also S IV 68. On the contemplations of the aggregates and the senses as complementary approaches cf. Bodhi 2000: p.1122; and Gethin 1986: p.50.

2   M I 61.

3   S IV 89 and A V 52 present insight and detachment regarding the six sense-spheres as enabling one to make an end of dukkha.

4   Cf. Johansson 1965: pp.183–7; and T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.520.

5   M I 295 and S V 218.

6   This has found its expression in various passages such as at M I 122, where to develop mastery of the mind means to be able to think only what one wishes to think; or at M I 214, which speaks of gaining control over the mind and thereby being no longer controlled by it; or Dhp 326, which poetically compares controlling one’s wandering mind to a mahout controlling a rutting elephant.

7   e.g. at M I 111.

8   Ñāṇamoli 1980: p.159, aptly expresses this: “ajjhattikāyatana = the organization of experience… bahiddhāyatana= the experience as organized”; van Zeyst 1967b: p.470, explains: “the inner sphere…constitutes the subjective element which is the capacity of reaction, and the outer sphere constitutes the objective element which produces the impact”. In fact, several of the terms used in this satipaṭṭhāna refer exclusively to the senses as faculties of perception (cakkhu, sota, ghāna), while the discourses use a different set of Pāli terms for the corresponding physical organs (akkhi, kaṇṇa, nāsā), a finding which points to an emphasis on the subjective, in the sense of one’s ability to see, hear, etc., underlying the satipaṭṭhāna instructions.

9   Cf. e.g. Bodhi 1995: p.16; Padmasiri de Silva 1991: p.21; Guenther 1991: p.16; and Naranjo 1971: p.189.

10 S IV 163; S IV 164; and S IV 283. Cf. also S IV 89 and S IV 108.

11 M I 361 has eight “fetters” in relation to killing, stealing, false speech, malicious speech, rapacious greed, spiteful scolding, angry despair, and arrogance. D III 254; A IV 7; and A IV 8 list seven: complaisance, irritation, views, doubt, conceit, lust for existence, and ignorance. Single fetters occur at M I 483, which has the fetter of householdership, and at It 8, which speaks of the fetter of craving.

12 Cf. e.g. S V 61. Ps I 287 lists sensual lust, irritation, conceit, view, doubt, clinging to particular rules and observances, lust for existence, envy, avarice, and ignorance as fetters for the satipaṭṭhāna context. Concerning clinging to particular rules and observances, Bodhi 2000: p.727 n.5, explains that the expression “rules and observances” (sīlabbata) can refer to such ascetic practices as, for example, behaving like a dog (cf. M I 387, which speaks of the “dog-rule” and the “dog-observance”). Some ascetics adopted such practices in the hope of gaining purification or rebirth in heaven (cf. M I 102). Cf. also Ud 71, where “rules and observances” replaces the more usual “selfmortification” as one of the two extremes to be avoided. However, at Dhp 271 the Buddha spoke to his own monks about the need to go beyond “rules and observances” in order to reach realization; so this verse indicates that “rules and observances” can also become a problem for Buddhist monks. In fact, the equivalent term sīlavata occurs in several instances as a positive quality of a Buddhist monk (e.g. at A III 47; Sn 212; It 79; and Th 12). This suggests, as in fact expressly stated at A I 225, that “rules and observances” can be either wholesome or unwholesome, so the fettering aspect is to be found in dogmatic clinging (parāmāsa). The absence of such dogmatic clinging is indeed explicitly mentioned in the standard descriptions of the qualities of a stream-enterer (cf. e.g.DII 94; S II 70; or A II 57), which indicate that a stream-enterer is endowed with pure moral conduct, but does not dogmatically cling to it. (The Pāli term used is aparāmaṭṭha, which according to Vism 222 refers in this context to clinging by way of craving and views.)

13 Cf. e.g. D I 156. The dynamics of this progressive eradication of the ten fetters is that with the first direct experience of Nibbāna at stream-entry, belief in a permanent self becomes impossible. Since this experience comes as the successful outcome of following the right path, doubt about what is wholesome and skilful for progress on this path, and also doubt in the more existential sense regarding the whence and whither of oneself, together with dogmatic clinging to particular rules and observances, are left behind. With continued practice, the next two fetters of sensual desire and aversion are diminished at once-returning and then fully overcome with the realization of non-returning. With full awakening, the last remnants of attachment in the form of craving for deep states of concentration (and corresponding forms of existence) are extinguished, together with any traces of the notion “I am” as a manifestation of conceit and its possible repercussions in the form of restlessness, and therewith all ignorance is overcome as well.

14 A I 264 relates the state of being fettered to desire, this in turn being due to thinking and pondering over desirable things of the past, present, or future.

15 M I 111.

16 Cf. Ñāṇananda 1986: p.5.

17 Sn 874 emphasizes the dependence of conceptual proliferation on cognition in particular.

18 M I 108. Cf. also M III 285, which relates a part of the same conditioned perceptual sequence to the activation of the latent tendencies.

19 e.g. at A IV 9. Apart from this standard set one finds the latent tendency to mental standpoints and adherences at S II 17 and S III 135, the latent tendency to lust at S IV 205, and the latent tendency to craving at Dhp 338. To contemplate the effects these underlying tendencies can create in the mind maybe undertaken by directing awareness to the untrained mind’s “tendency” to react to sensory experience with either lust or irritation; to its “tendency” to respond to more theoretical information by either forming views and opinions or else by feeling confused and doubtful; and by contemplating how the sense of “I” underlying subjective experience “tends” to manifest as conceit and moreover “tends” to clamour for eternal continuation (viz. craving for existence). Contemplating in this way will reveal the surprising degree to which the unawakened mind in some way or other “tends” towards ignorance. Ñāṇapoṇika 1977: p.238, points out that “latent tendency” includes both the actually arisen mental defilement and the corresponding mental disposition, this being the result of longtime habits.

20 M I 432; cf. also M II 24.

21 Āsava also means “outflow”, as when a sore festers (cf. A I 124), or “fermentation”, as when liquor is brewed from flowers etc. (cf. Sv III 944).

22 e.g. M I 9 recommends guarding the senses in order to avoid the activation of the influxes.

23 M I 7 relates the arising of the influxes to unwise attention; A III 414 to ignorance.

24 The rationale given by the Buddha for proclaiming a rule (cf. e. g. Vin III 21) was that it should restrain presently arisen influxes and avoid their arising in future (cf. also M I 445). In addition to adherence to the rules, other important methods for countering the influxes are not getting entangled in wrong views; restraining the senses; using requisites properly; enduring heat, cold, hunger, pain, etc.; avoiding dangerous animals and unsuitable intimacy with the opposite sex; removing unwholesome intentions and thoughts; and developing the factors of awakening (at M I 7–11).

25 e.g. at M I 171.

26 e.g. atMI 55. In addition to these three influxes, the influx of views is mentioned in a few instances (e.g. at D II 81); however, according to Ñāṇatiloka 1988: p.27, and T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.115, the set of three influxes is probably the more original version. On the influxes cf. also Johansson 1985: p.178; and Premasiri 1990a: p.58.

27 e.g. at S V 421.

28 This also underlies the fact that descriptions of the actual event of full awakening often apply the scheme of the four noble truths to dukkha and again to the influxes, cf. e.g. D I 84.

29 S V 28.

30 The all-pervasive range of craving is illustrated in the detailed exposition of the second noble truth in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, D II 308, where the various stages of the perceptual process, from the six senses, their respective objects and types of consciousness, via contact, to feeling, cognition, volition, and initial and sustained mental application are all listed as possible instances for the arising of craving. This analysis of sense experience occurs again at S II 109, and also at Vibh 101 (in the Suttanta exposition of the four noble truths).

31 Bodhi 2000: p.1127, explains: “to restrain the senses … involves stopping at the bare sensum, without plastering it over with layers of meaning whose origins are purely subjective”. Upali Karunaratne 1993: p.568, relates restraint of the senses in particular to the stage of the perceptual process when feelings arise.

32 e.g. at S IV 78. Cf. also M I 346, which speaks of the pure happiness (abyāseka sukha) gained through sense-restraint.

33 At M III 298, in answer to a Brahmin who had proposed not seeing with the eyes and not hearing with the ears as a form of meditative development of the faculties. Cf. also Tilakaratne 1993: p.72.

34 e.g. at M I 273. The verb “to flow into”, anvāssavati, is derived from anu + ā + savati (T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.50) and is thus reminiscent of the influxes, the āsavas.

35 e.g. at M I 360 “sign” refers to the outer aspect of being a householder; or at Vin III 15 and M II 62 a slave woman recognized the former son of the house, now a monk and returning after a long absence, by way of the “sign”. In other passages “sign” has a more causal function (cf. e.g. S V 213; A I 82; A II 9; A IV 83; and Th 1100). On “sign” cf. also Harvey 1986: pp.31–3; and page 237, footnote 21.

36 A I 3 relates sensual desire to unwise attention to the “sign of beauty”, and aversion to unwise attention to the “sign of irritation”. M I 298 explains that lust, anger, and delusion are “makers of signs”. Cf. also M III 225, which describes how consciousness, because of following after the sign, becomes tied and shackled by the gratification derived from the sign, and thereby becomes fettered to the sign.

37 As 400, however, takes the term to refer to the details of the perceived object. On the other hand, in similar passages in the discourses “sign” may be followed by various types of thoughts, which could correspond to “association” (cf. e.g. M I 119). T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.43, translates anuvyañjana as “accompanying attribute”, “supplementary or additional sign or mark”. The corresponding Chinese version (Minh Chau 1991: p.82) speaks of not grasping the general appearance and not “taking delight in it”. On anuvyañjana as “association” cf. Vimalo 1974: p.54.

38 A II 167. Cf. also Sn 779, pointing out that by penetrative insight into cognition one will be able to cross the flood; and Sn 847, according to which one gone beyond cognition has thereby gone beyond bondage.

39 MI 507 speaks of the cognitive distortion (viparītasaññā) to perceive sensual pleasures as happiness. M II 27 identifies cognitions under the influence of sensuality, aversion, and cruelty as the source of all unwholesome thoughts and intentions.

40 These are the four vipallāsas, cf. A II 52; Paṭis II 80; Bodhi 1992b: p.4; and page 25, footnote 27.

41 Fromm 1960: p.127: “man in the state of repressedness … does not see what exists, but he puts his thought image into things, and sees them in the light of his thought images and fantasies, rather than in their reality. It is the thought image ….

42 e.g. at D III 251; D III 253; D III 289; A III 79; A III 83–5; A IV 24; A IV 46; A IV 387; A V 105–7; and A V 109.

43 M II 27. In fact, according to D I 185 cognition temporally precedes knowledge (ñāṇa), a temporal precedence which can lead to a considerable degree of influence exercised by cognition on what is being “known”; cf. also Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.110.

44 D I 180 explains that through training some type of cognitions will arise, others will disappear (this statement occurs in the context of jhāna attainment); cf. also Premasiri 1972: p.12. Claxton 1991: p.25, points out that “the Buddhist position, because it asserts that perception is changeable by psychological practices such as meditation, assumes a ‘constructivist’ view”.

45 A long list of such cognitive trainings is given at A V 107, each time introduced by the expression “accustomed to” or “familiar with” (paricita). Cf. also Paṭis I 32.

46 A V 109.

47 M III 301. A III 169 explains that the purpose of this cognitive training is to counter the arising of lust and anger.

48 D III 113.

49 Cf. S V 295, where an exposition of satipaṭṭhāna is followed by a description of the ability to influence cognition (paṭikkūle appaṭikkūlasaññī). Scientific corroboration of perceptual changes owing to meditation can be found in Brown 1984: p.727. Cf. also Brown 1977: p.248; Deikman 1969: p.204; and Santucci 1979: p.72.

50 Ud 8; for this he was noted among the Buddha’s disciples as pre-eminent in quick understanding (at A I 24). S IV 63 and SV165 report the realization of a monk by the same name, Bāhiya, but based in one case on contemplating the six senses as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self, and in the other case on satipaṭṭhāna. According to Malalasekera 1995: vol.II, pp.281–3, these last two are different from the Bāhiya of the Udāna episode. Another Bāhiya who caused dissension among the monks is mentioned at A II 239. At S IV 73 the monk Māluṅkyaputta received the “Bāhiya” instruction, where it again led to full awakening, although in this case after a period of practice in seclusion. The Bāhiya case also comes up in the Satipaṭṭhāna subcommentary Ps-pṭ I 357, in the context of clear knowledge in regard to bodily activities.

51 Ud 8.

52 This seems to be the implication of several passages in the Sutta Nipāta which employ the same terms (seen, heard, sensed), cf. Sn 793; Sn 798; Sn 802; Sn 812; and Sn 914. Mahasi 1992: p.42, explains: “when one concentrates only on the act of seeing without thinking over what one has seen, visual perception will last only for an instant…in that case defilements will have no time to assert themselves”. Namto 1984: p.15: instructs one to “focus on the split-second between hearing a sound and recognizing it in the conventional manner”. Practical experiences that reflect the above injunctions are described in Shattock 1970: p.68; and Walsh 1984: p.267.

53 Compare the detailed treatment given by Māluṅkyaputta after receiving the “Bāhiya” instructions at S IV 73, where he pointed out how lack of mindfulness leads to giving attention to the sign of affection and thereby to an infatuated state of mind. (Same again in part at Th 98–9 and in full at Th 794–817.)

54 MI 1. Cf. also A II 23, which documents the Buddha’s ability to see through and fully understand whatever is seen, heard, sensed, or cognized.

55 M III 30.

56 M I 136 and M III 261.

57 M I 135. Cf. also Bhattacharya 1980: p.10.

58 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5 states that the self should be seen, heard of, thought about, and meditated upon, since by the seeing, hearing, sensing, and cognizing of the self everything is known; Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.6 then declares that once the self is seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, everything is known.

59 “By that” (tena) in the sense of “thereby”, cf. e.g. Dhp 258, which criticizes much talking by pointing out that “thereby” or “by that” (tena) one does not become a sage. According to Ireland 1977: p.160 n.3, tena and tattha “are the key words in this text”.

60 “Therein”, tattha, is a locative adverb, which can also be translated as “there”, “in that place”, or “to this place” (T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.295). Vimalo 1959: p.27, renders this passage (tena + tattha): “then you will not be influenced by that, if you are not influenced by it, you are not bound to it”. For “subjective participation” in the sense of affective involvement cf. Sn 1086. Bodhi 1992b: p.13, commenting on the Bāhiya instruction, explains: “what is to be eliminated from cognition is precisely the false imputations of subjectivity that distort the incoming data and issue in erroneous judgements and beliefs”.

61 Following Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.435. The commentary Ud-a 92, however, relates these expressions to spheres of rebirth, but points out that in this interpretation “in between” should not be taken to refer to an intermediate existence. In fact, the Pāli commentarial tradition holds that rebirth immediately follows the moment of passing away. A close examination of the discourses, on the other hand, reveals several instances which suggest that from their perspective such a state in between existences did exist, where the being to be reborn (the gandhabba at M I 265 and M II 157), propelled by craving (S IV 399), seeks a new existence (sambhavesi at MI 48 and Sn 147), or can attain full awakening in that intermediate state if the stage of non-returning had earlier been realized (the antarāparinibbāyi e.g. at D III 237; S V 70; S V 201; S V 204; S V 237; S V 285; S V 314; S V 378; A I 233; A II 134; A IV 14; A IV 71; A IV 146; A IV 380; and A V 120). Cf. also Bodhi 2000: p.1902 n.65.

62 A III 400, commenting on Sn 1042. Cf. also Dhp 385, which speaks in praise of going beyond this shore and the other, a passage which according to Daw Mya Tin 1990: p.132, can be interpreted in a similar way. The seamstress (craving) occurs again at Th 663. Cf. also Ñāṇananda 1999: p.19.

XII DHAMMAS: THE AWAKENING FACTORS

1   S V 72; S V 83; and Paṭis II 115. Cf. also D III 97; Dhp 89; and Thī 21. According to Norman 1997: p.29, bodhi is better rendered by “awakening” than by “enlightenment”, a suggestion which I have followed.

2   S V 134.

3   M I 61.

4   M III 85 and S V 68.

5   According to S V 73 and A V 116, the development of the four satipaṭṭhānas fulfils the seven awakening factors.

6   At S V 115 the Buddha emphatically stated that sati is always useful. This usefulness of sati is illustratively compared by the commentary to the need for salt when preparing food (at Ps I 292). The central importance of sati is also brought out at Ps I 243 and Ps-pṭ I 363, according to which sati forms the essential condition for “contemplation” and “knowledge”.

7   S V 112.

8   At S V 68 “investigation-of-dhammas” refers to further reflection on earlier heard explanations by elder monks. In contrast at S V 111 “investigation-of-dhammas” stands for investigating internal and external phenomena.

9   T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.616.

10 S V 66. On investigation-of-dhammas cf. also Jootla 1983: pp.43–8; and Ledi 1983: p.105, who assembles the five higher stages of purification, the three contemplations, and the ten insight knowledges under this particular awakening factor. According to Mil 83, investigation-of-dhammas is a mental quality of crucial importance for realization.

11 Cf. S V 104, which describes the “nutriment” for investigation-of-dhammas in exactly the same terms used by S V 106 to describe the “anti-nutriment” for doubt, namely wise attention in regard to what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. Such clarity is in both cases concerned with “internal” as well as “external” dhammas (cf. S V 110).

12 According to Debes 1994: p.292, the effect of investigation-of-dhammas, by finding out the validity and relevance of the Buddha’s teachings to experienced reality, is to awaken energy (“Tatkraft”).

13 S V 66 recommends endeavour and exertion as nutriments for the awakening factor of energy. The Chinese Āgama version of this discourse mentions the four right efforts as nutriment for the awakening factor of energy (cf. Choong 2000: p.213). This presentation fits well with the distinction between wholesomeness and unwholesomeness gained through cultivating the previous awakening factor, investigation-of-dhammas, since the same distinction underlies the four right efforts.

14 S V 68.

15 S V 111. Spk III 169 mentions the practice of walking meditation as an example for physical “energy”.

16 S V 104 describes the nutriment for the awakening factor of energy in the same terms used at S V 105 for the anti-nutriment for sloth-and-torpor.

17 S V 68 speaks of “unworldly joy”; which S V 111 relates to the presence or absence of initial and sustained mental application, i.e. to the experience of absorption. “Joy” in this context is, however, not confined to jhānic joy only, since non-sensual joy can also be the result of insight meditation, cf. e.g. Dhp 374.

18 e.g. at S II 32; cf. also page 166, footnote 45.

19 S V 104 identifies physical and mental tranquillity as nutriment for the awakening factor of tranquillity, while S V 106 speaks of calmness of the mind (cetaso vūpasamo) as anti-nutriment for restlessness-and-worry. Another noteworthy point is that the discourses analyse both the awakening factor tranquillity and the hindrance sloth-and-torpor into a bodily and a mental aspect, documenting a physical and a psychological component of both.

20 S V 69.

21 S V 105 recommends the “sign of calmness” (samathanimitta) as nutriment for the awakening factor of concentration. This “sign of calmness” is mentioned again at DIII 213 and S V 66. The “sign” (nimitta) occurs also in various other passages, often in apparent relation to the development of concentration. Frequently a “sign of concentration” (samādhinimitta) can be found (at D III 226; D III 242; D III 279; M I 249; M I 301; M III 112; A I 115; A I 256; A II 17; A III 23; and A III 321). Though at M I 301 this sign of concentration is related to the four satipaṭṭhānas, at M III 112 it refers to the practice of samatha meditation, since this passage speaks of internally unifying, quietening, and concentrating the mind on this sign of concentration, which it then explains to refer to attainment of the four jhānas. In some instances one also finds the “sign of the mind” (cittanimitta, e.g. at S V 151; A III 423; and Th 85), which Th 85 relates to nonsensual happiness, an instance reminiscent of the experience of non-sensual happiness during absorption. Similarly, A IV 419 recommends making much of the “sign”, which in this passage too represents jhānic attainment. Another relevant passage is M III 157, where the Buddha spoke of the need to “penetrate” or “acquire” the sign (nimittaṃ paṭivijjhitabbaṃ) in order to overcome various mental obstructions. The set of mental obstructions to be overcome in this discourse form a unique set which does not occur as such elsewhere and is clearly related to samatha meditation (cf. page 199, footnote 73). Ps IV 207 however, possibly having in mind A IV 302, takes this passage to refer to the divine eye. This reading by the commentary does not make much sense, since the above passage clearly deals with a level of practice prior even to the first jhāna, while to develop the divine eye would necessitate attainment of the fourth jhāna. Shwe 1979: p.387, explains: “anything entering into a causal relation, by which its effect is signified, marked or characterized, is a nimitta. An object, image or concept which, on being meditated upon, induces samādhi (jhāna) is a nimitta.” On the “sign” in a different context cf. also page 225, footnote 35.

22 S V 111. As Vism 126 explains, the jhāna factors already begin to arise during access concentration, although they become fully stable only with the attainment of the first jhāna. Thus the expression “concentration with initial mental application” can also be taken to include levels of concentration bordering on absorption, during which the presence of initial and sustained mental application is responsible for further deepening concentration and thereby leads to attainment of the first jhāna. Understood in this way, levels of concentration close to absorption, corresponding to the commentarial notion of “access concentration”, could also be put into service as awakening factors.

23 S V 69. Aronson 1979: p.2, explains that upekkhā is formed from upa meaning “toward” and a derivative of the verb ikkh meaning “to see”, and thus conveys a “notion of over-looking a situation from a distance”. Gethin 1992: p.160, points out that “upekkhā...is both the balance of the skilful mind and the force which maintains that balance”.

24 e.g. at M III 88. The same awakening dynamics can be related to the noble eightfold path (S I 88; S IV 367; and S V 1–62); and to the five faculties (S IV 365; S V 239; and S V 241); or the five powers (S IV 366; SV249; and SV251); cf. also Gethin 1992: pp.162–8.

25 The discourses express this contrast by calling the awakening factors “anti-hindrances” (anīvaraṇā, e.g. at S V 93). Cf. also page 188, footnote 23. In the Chinese Madhyama Āgama version, contemplation of the awakening factors immediately follows contemplation of the hindrances in the sequence of the dhamma-contemplations, which illustrates how the removal of the latter naturally leads to a development of the former; cf. Minh Chau 1991: p.94; and Nhat Hanh 1990: p.163.

26 S V 128 points out that the awakening factors lead to knowledge and vision, while the hindrances lead to the absence of knowledge and vision.

27 According to S V 121 they constitute the reason why at times what has been well learned can be forgotten, while at other times matters not studied intensively can still be well remembered.

28 The four noble truths occur in neither of the two Āgama versions and in only one of the three other versions of satipaṭṭhāna, this being the Śāriputrābhidharma (cf. Schmithausen 1976: p.248). The six sense-spheres occur in the Chinese Madhyama Āgama version, while the Chinese version found in the Ekottara Āgama has only the awakening factors and, based on removal of the hindrances (mentioned at the outset of the discourse), the development of the four jhānas (cf. Nhat Than 1990: p.176).

29 Warder 1991: p.86.

30 Vibh 199. Ñāṇatiloka 1983: p.39, seems to take this “omission” on the side of the Vibhaṅga as a matter of intentional selection. Cf. also Ṭhānissaro 1996: p.74.

31 D II 83; D III 101; and S V 161.

32 Cf. S V 129–33.

33 S V 71. It is interesting to note that the monk possessing this ability was Sāriputta, who is characterized elsewhere in the discourses for his wisdom (e.g. S I 191, and A I 23) and his ability in mental analysis (M III 25). At M I 215 he used the same simile to illustrate mental mastery.

34 S V 77; cf. also S V 99.

35 Cf. S V 108 and S V 112; and the commentary at Spk III 168; cf. also Gethin 1992: pp.177–80; and Woodward 1979: vol.V p.91 n.1.

36 S V 99 presents both the seven treasures of a Tathāgata, which are the seven awakening factors, and the seven treasures of a universal monarch, which are a wheel, an elephant, a horse, a jewel, a woman, a steward, and a counsellor, each endowed with magical qualities. Spk III 154 then correlates them individually.

37 At S V 79–81, where Kassapa, Moggallāna, and the Buddha were each cured of illness by a recitation of the awakening factors. The effect of thus recalling and probably at the same time also re-establishing the constellation of mental factors that had led each of them to full awakening was apparently powerful enough to effect an abating of their respective diseases. On the curative effect of the awakening factors cf. Dhammananda 1987: p.134; and Piyadassi 1998: pp.2–4. The Chinese Āgamas have only preserved the instance involving the Buddha, not the other two, cf. Akanuma 1990: p.242.

38 Ps I 290–9.

XIII DHAMMAS: THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

1   M I 62.

2   e.g. at S V 421. Gethin 1992: p.18, comments: “understanding the first noble truth involves not so much the revelation that dukkha exists, as the realization of what dukkha is”. Hamilton 1996: p.206, points out that “the first noble truth ... can most accurately be understood if it is borne in mind that this is a truth statement, not a value judgement”.

3   S V 441 and M I 118.

4   Cf. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.324; and Wijesekera 1994: p.75.

5   Monier-Williams 1995: pp.334 (kha) and 483 (duḥkha); cf. also Smith 1959: p.109. The corresponding Pāli terms are the prefix du (difficulty, badness), and akkha (axle of a wheel), cf. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: pp.2 and 324. Vism 494 gives another rather imaginative explanation of the term, by relating kha to space (ākāsa), which is then supposed to represent the absence of permanence, beauty, happiness, and self.

6   Monier-Williams 1995: p.1262.

7   Cf. also Ñāṇamoli 1991: p.823 n.8, who suggests “uneasiness” as a preferable rendering for dukkha when this is used as a characteristic of the whole of experience.

8   S II 53.

9   At D II 66 the Buddha pointed out that when experiencing a pleasant feeling, for example, one will not experience the other two types of feeling. Other passages indicate that according to the Buddha certain kinds of experiences and corresponding realms of existence are pure pleasure or happiness, e.g. M I 76 speaks of the experience of entirely pleasant feelings (by beings reborn in heaven), and M II 37 affirms that there is an entirely pleasant world (this being the Brahmā world corresponding to the attainment of the third jhāna). Cf. also Nanayakkara 1993a: p.538.

10 S IV 216. MIII 208 discusses the same statement. Cf. also Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1340 n.1227; and Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.477.

11 M I 303 points out that whereas the change of pleasurable experiences might be experienced as suffering, in the case of pain, change is experienced as pleasurable.

12 e.g. at S V 421. Cf. also Gruber 1999: pp.94 and 194; and Nanayakkara 1989: p.699.

13 In addition to the eightfold enumeration of path factors, a fivefold presentation can occasionally be found that is applicable to the context of meditation and presupposes the previous fulfilment of right speech, right action, and right livelihood, cf. M III 289; Vibh 238–240; the discussion at Kv 600; and Ñāṇatiloka 1983: p.32. A tenfold enumeration also occurs (e.g. at D II 217 and M III 76), which adds qualities of the arahant: right knowledge and right liberation.

14 Satipaṭṭhāna as the path factor of right mindfulness is in particular closely related to right view, since on the one hand right mindfulness is required to establish right view (cf. M III 72), while on the other hand, right view serves as a basis for all other path factors (cf. D II 217 and M I 71). Cf. also Vibh 242, which speaks of right view as the “root” of the other seven path factors. The need for right view as a foundation for progress on the path is also emphasized by Bodhi 1991: p.3; and Story 1965: p.167.

15 The same also underlies the nuances of sammā as “togetherness” or as being “connected in one”, cf. page 74.

16 S V 422.

17 At S V 435. Another discourse at S V 435 offers the alternative explanation that they are so called because their author is the “Noble One”. This discourse, unlike the preceding one, is missing from the Chinese Āgamas, cf. Akanuma 1990: p.263. According to Norman 1984: p.389, the attribute “noble” might not have been part of the historically earliest formulations of the four (noble) truths.

18 De la Vallée Poussin 1903: p.580; Padmasiri de Silva 1992a: p.166; and Pande 1957: p.398. According to Wezler 1984: pp.312–24, there is no evidence for this scheme having predated the Buddha’s formulation of the four noble truths, therefore it is also possible that it was adopted from his teaching by the medical sciences. Parallels to the four noble truths occur also in the Yoga Sūtra by Patañjali, II 15–26, a detailed discussion of which can be found in Wezler 1984: pp.301–7.

19 e.g. at M II 260; A IV 340; It 101; Sn 560; Sn 562; and Th 1111. A III 238 explains that just as a skilled doctor can quickly dispel one’s disease, so too the Buddha’s teaching will dispel all one’s sorrow and grief. Cf. also Ehara 1995: p.275; and Vism 512.

20 Buswell 1994: p.3, speaks of early Buddhism’s “spiritual pragmatism according to which the truth of a religious proposition consists in its practical utility”.

21 M I 184.

22 S V 452.

23 S V 436.

24 S V 52 and A II 247. S III 159 and S III 191 explain that to “understand” the five aggregates implies the eradication of lust, anger, and delusion.

25 Sn (prose preceding verse 724).

26 The standard formulations of the first noble truth identify “not getting what one wants” as one of the aspects of dukkha, e.g. at S V 421.

27 S I 4 and S I 7 use this expression to illustrate the inner balance and flexibility of arahants.

28 S IV 86 applies the scheme of the four noble truths to an understanding of the six sense-spheres (cf. also S V 426); whileMI 191 and S V 425 do the same in regard to the aggregates. In the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself, the contemplations of the hindrances and of the awakening factors are structured according to an underlying pattern that parallels the diagnostic scheme of the four noble truths, since each observation turns to the presence of the respective mental quality, its absence, and the causes of its presence or absence.

29 The scheme of the four noble truths is applied at Ps I 250 to mindfulness of breathing, at Ps I 252 to the four postures, at Ps I 270 to activities, at Ps I 271 to anatomical parts, at Ps I 272 to the four elements, at Ps I 279 to feelings, at Ps I 280 to the mind, at Ps I 286 to the hindrances, at Ps I 287 to the aggregates, at Ps I 289 to the sense-spheres, and at Ps I 300 to the awakening factors.

30 Vibh 116 points out that the third noble truth is unconditioned. Cf. also S V 442, according to which a distinctive quality of a stream-enterer is full understanding of the four noble truths.

31 S V 437. Cf. also Kv 218; Vism 690–2; Bodhi 1984: p.126; and Cousins 1983: p.103. In fact, according to Sn 884 there is only one truth, which suggests that the scheme of four truths does not imply four separate truths. According to a discourse in the Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama, however, realization of the four noble truths has to take place sequentially, by first coming to fully know the truth of suffering, followed in turn by understanding each of the other noble truths (in Choong 2000: p.239).

XIV REALIZATION

1   M I 62. The prediction concerning the higher two stages of awakening occurs again for satipaṭṭhāna at SV181, and for mindfulness of breathing at S V 314, but also in a variety of other contexts, e.g. at S V 129–33; S V 236; A III 82; A III 143; A V 108; Sn 724–65; and It 39–41.

2   The freedom from sensual desire and aversion envisaged in the prediction echoes to some extent the “definition” part of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (M I 56), which relates the practice of satipaṭṭhāna to freedom from desires and discontent. Horner 1934: p.792, however, understands the expression “if there is a trace of clinging left” literally, as representing the arahant’s awakening as opposed to his or her passing away; cf. also Masefield 1979: p.221.

3   The same occurs in a different context at D III 55, where the Buddha stated that within such a variable time period he could guide a disciple to realization. This could be a reference to satipaṭṭhāna, since the Buddha did not further specify in what he would instruct the disciple.

4   On this passage cf. Knight 1985: p.3; and Solé-Leris 1992: p.103.

5   According to T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.673, the number seven is invested with a “peculiar magic nimbus” in Pāli, which mitlitates against taking this prediction too literally. An example of such symbolic use of the number seven can be found at A IV 89, where the Buddha related a past life of his in which, as a fruit of seven years of loving kindness practice, he was not reborn in this world for seven aeons, for seven times he became a Mahā Brahmā, for many times seven he became a universal monarch, possessed of the seven treasures. Furthermore, in the above prediction at the end of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta it is noticeable that, when counting down, “one year” is not followed by “eleven months”, as should be expected, but by “seven months”, indicating that the sequence does not follow mathematical logic. According to Dumont 1962: p.73: “the number seven ... indicates a totality” (in ancient India).

6   Minh Chau 1991: p.94; and Nhat Than 1990: p.166.

7   Ps I 302.

8   MII 96, however, with the specification that the Buddha himself was to train the practitioner, a specification not stipulated in the satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. This suggests that for realization within a single day the personal presence of the Buddha as the teacher is required. The five factors of striving mentioned in this discourse are confidence, physical health, honesty, energy, and wisdom regarding the arising and disappearance of phenomena. (The last of these could represent the outcome of satipaṭṭhāna practice, especially of contemplating the nature of arising and passing away stipulated in the “refrain”.)

9   On “sudden” and “gradual” cf. also Gethin 1992: pp.132 and 246; and Nanayakkara 1993b: p.581. Pensa 1977: p.335, relates this distinction to the difference between peakand plateau-experiences.

10 S III 154 and A IV 127.

11 e.g. at M I 479; M III 2; or A I 162. Cf. also Strenski 1980: pp.4 and 8.

12 Vin II 238; A IV 200; A IV 207; and Ud 54.

13 A I 254. Cf. also Dhp 239.

14 A I 240.

15 M I 104; M I 357; S III 154; and A IV 125. This simile has a slightly humorous undertone, since in a way it relates a meditator engaged in intensive practice to a hen on her eggs, both of whom spend much of their time sitting.

16 In fact Dhammavuddho 1999: p.10, suggests translating sotāpanna as “ear-entry”, being realized upon hearing a discourse. Similarly Masefield 1987: p.134, proposes that sota in the term sotāpanna refers to “hearing” rather than “stream”. However, on considering the discourses one finds that although listening to the Dhamma is mentioned at S V 347 as one of the factors of stream-entry, the same discourse clearly defines “stream” to refer to the noble eightfold path and a “stream-enterer” to be one who is in full possession of this noble eightfold path. In addition it could be pointed out that the Pāli term for receiving the Dhamma by hearing is sotānugata, not sotāpanna (cf. A II 185). The “stream” image comes up also at S V 38, where the noble eightfold path is compared to the Gaṅgā river, since it leads towards Nibbāna just as the Gaṅgā leads towards the sea.

17 Only the realization of arahantship was deemed of sufficient significance to merit being reported to the Buddha (aññā vyākaraṇa).

18 e.g. S III 167 relates realization of stream-entry to contemplation of the impermanent, unsatisfactory, and selfless nature of the five aggregates; A I 44 presents well-developed mindfulness of the body as capable of leading to stream-entry; and A III 442–3 propose the same potential for contemplating all formations as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self. Cf. also D III 241 and A III 21, where listening to the Dhamma constitutes one out of five occasions for awakening, the others being teaching the Dhamma, reciting the Dhamma, reflecting on the Dhamma, and, last but not least, meditation.

19 Cf. e.g. the Buddha’s admonition: “meditate, don’t be negligent!” (e.g. at M I 46; M I 118; M II 266; M III 302; S IV 133; S IV 359; S IV 361; S IV 368; S IV 373; S V 157; A III 87; A III 88; A IV 139; and A IV 392); or the frequent description of a meditator going off into seclusion for intensive practice and retreat (e.g. at D I 71; D I 207; D II 242; D III 49; M I 181; M I 269; M I 274; M I 346; M I 440; M II 162; M II 226; M III 3; M III 35; M III 115; M III 135; A II 210; A III 92; A III 100; A IV 436; and A V 207).

20 A IV 213.

21 S V 375.

22 According to S V 380, Sarakāni completed (paripūrakārī) the training at the time of his death, which indicates that Sarakāni attained stream-entry at that time. Since S V 379 has the same set of terms used in the definitions of the “Dhamma-follower” (dhammānusārī) and the “faith-follower” (saddhānusārī) at M I 479, it seems highly probable that he had been such a “follower” and was thus bound to realize stream-entry latest at death (cf. S III 225, which states that it is impossible for a Dhamma-follower or a faith-follower to pass away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry).

23 Ud 8; cf. page 229.

24 Bāhiya must have developed a high degree of mental purification by whatever type of practice he was following, since, according to the Udāna account, he (mistakenly) deemed himself already fully awakened. The sincerity of his aspiration becomes evident from the fact that, once a doubt about his presumed realization had arisen, he immediately undertook the journey across half the Indian subcontinent to meet the Buddha. His sense of urgency was so strong that he even went to search for the Buddha on his almsround, unable to await his return to the monastery. (The commentary Ud-a 79 gives a rather incredible account of Bāhiya as a shipwrecked hypocrite, wearing bark in order to make an easy living, while his long journey across half of India was, according to Ud-a 86, a feat of supernormal power.)

25 Vin II 285.

26 Thī 80–1 and Th 408–9.

27 Dhp-a IV 63.

28 At A II 163 Sāriputta was asked whether realization was a matter of knowledge or of conduct, to both of which he replied in the negative, explaining that both were necessary, yet not sufficient conditions for realization to take place. (On this passage cf. Jayatilleke 1967: p.456.) Similarly, according to Sn 839 purity is not simply the result of view, learning, knowledge, or conduct, nor can purity be gained in the absence of these.

29 Debes 1994: pp.204 and 208; and Kornfield 1979: p.53.

30 DII 157; S I 159; A I 236; A IV 3; A IV 4; and Th 906. Thī 116 has a slightly different formulation, when Paṭācārā’s experience of Nibbāna actually coincided with the “nibbāna” of her lamp.

31 Cf. M III 245 and S V 319. Collins 1998: p.191, and T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: p.362, point out that Nibbāna refers to the extinction of a fire for lack of fuel, not through active blowing out.

32 Ṭhānissaro 1993: p.41. For parallels in the Upaniṣads employing the imagery of extinguished fire cf. Schrader 1905: p.167.

33 D I 36. The Buddha’s definition of Nibbāna “here and now” can be found at A V 64.

34 M I 509. In the eyes of the Buddha this was clearly a mistaken view of Nibbāna.

35 e.g. at S IV 251; S IV 261; and S IV 371. S V 8 has the same definition for the “deathless”; while S I 39 and Sn 1109 define Nibbāna as the eradication of craving. This parallels a rather imaginative way of deriving the term Nibbāna found in the commentaries that takes Nibbāna to be composed of ni (absence) and vāna (as a metaphorical expression of craving), the entire compound then representing “absence of craving” (e.g. at Vism 293; also in Vajirañāṇa 1984: p.20).

36 This is maintained e.g. by van Zeyst 1961c: p.143.

37 M II 27.

38 e.g. Dhp 39; Dhp 267; Dhp 412; Sn 547; Sn 790; and Sn 900.

39 Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1283 n.775, comments: “this passage shows the arahant, who maintains virtuous conduct but no longer identifies with his virtue”. Wijesekera 1994: p.35, explains that the practitioner should “master morality, but not allow morality to get the better of him”. Cf. also M I 319, where the Buddha pointed out that although he was possessed of a high level of virtue he did not identify with it.

40 According to Carter 1984: p.48, some degree of overlap exists between kusala and puñña in the context of the threefold volition, but a clear distinction between both terms can be drawn in regard to a person’s qualities.

41 In fact, according to D III 102, the realization of Nibbāna is the highest among wholesome phenomena; cf. Premasiri 1976: p.68. Cf. also Collins 1998: p.154; and Nanayakkara 1999: p.258.

42 According to (e.g.) D III 133; D III 235; M I 523; and A IV 370 the ethical perfection of arahants is such that they are incapable of deliberately depriving a living being of life, of stealing, of engaging in any form of sexual intercourse, of lying, and of enjoying sensual pleasures by storing things up as householders do. Cf. also Lily de Silva 1996: p.7.

43 M I 318. Cf. also Premasiri 1990b: p.100.

44 D II 224; D III 135; A II 24; and It 122 point out that the Buddha acted as he spoke and spoke as he acted. This comes up in a different way at A IV 82, where the Buddha clarified that for him there was no need to conceal any of his actions in order to avoid others coming to know of them. The Buddha’s moral perfection is also mentioned at D III 217 and M II 115.

45 M I 464. (On correlating the activities mentioned in this passage with M I 11 or A III 390, the fact that “removing” is also mentioned appears strange and could be due to a textual corruption, as for the Buddha there would be no need to remove unwholesome thoughts, since they will not arise in the first place.)

46 M III 64 lists the following as impossibilities for a stream-enterer: killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arahant, wounding a Buddha, and causing a schism in the monastic community. The inability to commit such serious breaches of ethical conduct comes as one of the four limbs of stream-entry, a topic that occurs frequently in the discourses (e.g. at S V 343). In addition, according to M I 324 and Sn 232, stream-enterers are also unable to hide their wrongdoings.

47 e.g. at M I 486.

48 M I 487.

49 At M I 329 the Nibbānic realization (the “non-manifestative consciousness”) forms part of what almost amounts to a contest in which the Buddha proved that his realization was entirely beyond the ken of Brahmā, demonstrating metaphorically that it went beyond the hitherto known and valued types of realization. (On this passage cf. Jayatilleke 1970: p.115.)

50 M I 167 and S I 136. On the difficulty of describing Nibbāna with ordinary language cf. also Burns 1983: p.20; and Story 1984: p.42.

51 Ud 80. In this context “sphere” (āyatana) could be taken to refer to a “sphere” of experience, since on other occasions the same set of terms forms part of a description of a meditative experience, cf. A V 7; A V 319; A V 353; A V 355; A V 356; and A V 358.Mp V 2 relates these passages to the fruition-attainment of an arahant.

52 The anidassana viññāṇa at D I 223. On this passage cf. also Harvey 1989: p.88; Ñāṇananda 1986: p.66; and Ñāṇamoli 1980: p.178.

53 S II 103, where due to the complete absence of craving for any of the four nutriments, consciousness is “unstationed” (appatiṭṭhita), this in turn resulting in freedom from future becoming.

54 Ud 80 and It 37. On this passage cf. Kalupahana 1994: p.92; and Norman 1991–3: p.220.

55 D III 275 and It 61. On this passage cf. Premasiri 1991: p.49.

56 Cf. e.g. M I 162, where one’s wife, children, and material possessions are defined as phenomena subject to birth, followed by classifying Nibbāna as not subject to birth. On possible implications of the term “birth” cf. also Buddhadāsa 1984: p.26; Govinda 1991: p.50; Harvey 1989: p.90; and Karunadasa 1994: p.11.

57 Tilakaratne 1993: p.74.

58 e.g. S IV 100 speaks of a cessation of all six sense-spheres, an expression which the commentary explains to refer to Nibbāna (Spk II 391). Another relevant reference could be the standard description of stream-entry (e.g. at SV423), which speaks of the insight into the fact that whatever arises will also cease, an expression that may well hint at the subjective experience of Nibbāna, whence all conditionally arisen phenomena cease. Similarly the declarations of realization at M III 265 and S IV 58 point to a cessation experience. Realization as a cessation experience is also reflected in the writings of modern meditation teachers and scholars, cf. e.g. Brown 1986b: p.205; Gṇnka 1994a: p.113, and 1999: p.34; Goleman 1977b: p.31; Griffith 1981: p.610; Kornfield 1993: p.291; Mahasi 1981: p.286; and Ñāṇārāma 1997: p.80. Cf. also footnote 30, page 257 above.

59 M I 38; this “escape” from the whole field of cognition is identified by the commentary with Nibbāna (Ps I 176). Similarly Thī 6 refers to Nibbāna as the stilling of all cognitions.

60 The question “what is the counterpart of Nibbāna?” (at M I 304) was a question which, according to the arahant nun Dhammadinnā, cannot be answered. The commentary Ps II 369 explains that Nibbāna has no counterpart.

61 This much can be deduced from a statement made by the Buddha (M II 229–33) that with the direct experience of Nibbāna all views and standpoints related to an experience of unity are left behind and transcended. Cf. also S II 77, where the Buddha rejected the view “all is one” as one of the extremes to be avoided. Furthermore, according to A IV 40 and A IV 401, in different celestial realms either unitary or diversified experiences prevail, so that a categorical statement like “all is one” would not accord with the early Buddhist description of cosmic reality. Cf. also Ling 1967: p.167.

62 The immaterial attainments are explicitly identified with “unity” at M III 220. In fact the whole series begins with the injunction not to pay attention to diversified cognitions as a basis for developing the sphere of infinite space (e.g. at A IV 306), which clearly indicates the unitary character of these experiences. At M III 106 the four immaterial attainments are again qualified as “unity” (ekatta), each of them forming part of a gradual “descent” into emptiness. The culmination of this gradual descent is reached with the destruction of the influxes (M III 108), at which point the qualification “unity” is no longer used. This passage clearly demonstrates that full awakening gṇs beyond even the most refined experiences of oneness. This discourse also indicates that there may be various types of “emptiness” experience, but that it is the complete destruction of the influxes that determines whether (or not) an experience of emptiness does indeed constitute full awakening.

63 Cf.MI 165, where the Buddha remarked about Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta that their teaching was not conducive to complete disenchantment and therefore not sufficient to realize Nibbāna.

64 e.g. at M I 455–6, where the Buddha commented on each of the meditative absorptions in turn: “this is not enough, abandon it, I say, surmount it!”

65 These were the arahants “freed by wisdom”, who according to their canonical definition (e.g. at M I 477) had destroyed the influxes without having experienced the immaterial attainments.

66 Vin III 2; A IV 174; and A IV 183. Cf. also Vin I 234; Vin III 3; M I 140; and A V 190; where the Buddha is called a “nihilist”.

67 Bodhi 1996: p.171; Ñāṇapoṇika 1986a: p.25; and Sobti 1985: p.134.

68 S IV 368–73 gives a long list of such epithets. A similar but shorter list occurs at A IV 453.

69 Nibbāna as the highest happiness occurs e.g. at M I 508; Dhp 203; Dhp 204; and Thī 476. These expressions refer to the arahant’s experience of the happiness of liberation, cf. e.g. M II 104; S I 196; Ud 1; Ud 10; and Ud 32. The superiority of this happiness over all other types of happiness is stated at Ud 11. However, it should be pointed out that Nibbāna itself is not a felt type of happiness, since with Nibbāna all feelings cease. This is documented at A IV 414, where Sāriputta stated that Nibbāna is happiness. When questioned how there could possibly be happiness in the absence of any feeling, he explained that for him it was precisely the absence of feeling that constituted happiness. Similarly at MI 400 the Buddha explained that he considered even the cessation of feelings and cognitions to constitute happiness, since he did not limit the concept of “happiness” to happy feelings only. Johansson 1969: p.25, explains that Nibbāna is “’a source of happiness’ and not ’a state of happiness’”.

70 M II 232.

71 Since it is one of the forms of craving included in the second noble truth (cf. e.g. S V 421).

72 M III 246.

73 At S IV 383, the destiny of an arahant after death posed a dilemma for the monk Anurādha, which he attempted to resolve by stating that it could be described in a way other than the four standard propositions used in ancient India in such discussions. After dismissing this (according to Indian logic impossible) fifth alternative, the Buddha led Anurādha to the conclusion that even while still alive an arahant cannot be identified with any of the five aggregates, or with anything outside of them. The same reasoning can be found at S III 112, where Sāriputta rebuked the monk Yamaka for presuming that arahants are annihilated at death.

74 Sn 1074 compares the arahant to a flame which, once gone out, can no longer be reckoned in terms of “flame”. Sn 1076 explains that there is no measuring of one who has thus gone out, since with all phenomena removed, all pathways of language are also removed. The only acceptable declaration to be made about arahants at death (cf. D II 109 and D III 135) is that they “enter the Nibbāna element without remainder”. This declaration is further explained at It 38 to imply that in the case of an arahant passing away, all that is felt and experienced, because it is no longer delighted in, will simply become cool.

75 Dhp 93 and Th 92.

XV CONCLUSION

1   M I 82. The commentary on this passage, Ps II 52, has each of the four questioners specialize in one of the four satipaṭṭhānas.

2   M III 221 (cf. also page 30).

3   SV144. That different levels of disciples should practise satipaṭṭhāna comes up again at S V 299. (Woodward 1979: vol.V p.265, translates this passage as if the practice of satipaṭṭhāna “should be abandoned”. This rendering is not convincing, since in the present context the Pāli term vihātabba is better translated as a future passive form of viharati, not of vijahati.)

4   The need for a basis in ethical conduct before embarking on satipaṭṭhāna is stated e.g. at S V 143; S V 165; S V 187; and S V 188. Cf. also S V 171, according to which the very purpose of ethical conduct is to lead up to the practice of satipaṭṭhāna. S V 143 and 165 add “straight view” (diṭṭhi ca ujukā) to the necessary conditions for satipaṭṭhāna.

5   A IV 457.

6   S III 51 and S IV 142 present the direct experience of the impermanent nature of the aggregates or the sense-spheres as “right view”, a form of right view that is clearly an outcome of insight meditation.

7   A III 450.

8   It should be pointed out, however, that there is a clear qualitative difference between satipaṭṭhāna practised by a beginner and by an arahant. S V 144 describes this qualitative progression, which leads from the initial insight of the beginner, via the penetrative comprehension of the advanced practitioner, to the full freedom from any attachment during the contemplation undertaken by an arahant. Even for the beginner’s initial insight, this discourse stipulates that satipaṭṭhāna is to be undertaken with a calm and concentrated mind for true insight to arise, a requirement not easily met by those who have just started to practise.

9   S III 168 explains that although arahants have nothing more to do, they continue to contemplate the five aggregates as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self, because for them this is a pleasant form of abiding here and now and a source of mindfulness and clear knowledge. At S I 48 the Buddha explained again that arahants, although meditating, have nothing more to do since they have “gone beyond”. Cf. also Ray 1994: p.87.

10 S V 175 defines an arahant as one who has perfected the cultivation of satipaṭṭhāna. According to S V 302, arahants often dwell established in satipaṭṭhāna. The arahant‘s delight in seclusion is documented at D III 283; A IV 224; and A V 175. The arahant‘s proficiency in satipaṭṭhāna comes up again at A IV 224 and at A V 175. Katz 1989: p.67, concludes: “satipaṭṭhāna...arahants enjoy this practice, which would mean...that it is a natural expression of their attainment”.

11 According to D II 223, Nibbāna and the path coalesce, just as the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā rivers coalesce. Malalasekera 1995: vol.I p.734, explains that “the junction of the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā ... is used as a simile for perfect union”.

12 MI 56: “mindfulness...is established in him to the extent necessary for...continuous mindfulness”.

13 e.g. S V 326 reports the Buddha and some arahants engaged in the practice of mindfulness of breathing. From among the arahant disciples, Anuruddha was known for his frequent practice of satipaṭṭhāna (cf. S V 294–306). Sn 157 stresses again that the Buddha did not neglect meditation. Cf. also M III 13, where the Buddha is characterized as one who practised meditation and followed the conduct of a meditator.

14 e.g. at D I 179;D III 37;MI 514;MII 2;MII 23;MII 30; A V 185; and A V 190; the Buddha and his followers are characterized as being “in favour of silence, practising silence, praising silence”. Cf. also S III 15 and S IV 80, where the Buddha emphatically exhorted his disciples to make an effort at living in seclusion. According to A III 422, seclusion is in fact a necessary requirement for gaining real control over the mind. Cf. also It 39 and Sn 822, where the Buddha spoke again in praise of seclusion. At Vin I 92 the Buddha even exempted junior monks from the need to live in dependence on a teacher if they were meditating in seclusion. Living in community almost appears to be a second-rate alternative, since at S I 154 such community life is recommended to those monks who are unable to find delight in seclusion (cf. also Ray 1994: p.96). The importance of seclusion in the historically early stages of the Buddhist monastic community is also noted by Panabokke 1993: p.14. To live in seclusion, however, requires some degree of meditative proficiency, as the Buddha pointed out at M I 17 and A V 202. If such meditative proficiency was lacking, the Buddha would advise monks against going off into seclusion (cf. the cases of Upāli at AV202 and Meghiya at Ud 34).

15 D I 50.

16 AtMI 457 a newly-ordained group of monks was dismissed by the Buddha for being too noisy. The same happened again at Ud 25. At A III 31 (= A III 342 and A IV 341), the Buddha was disinclined to accept food brought by a group of householders because they were creating a lot of noise. On the other hand, however, merely to observe silence for its own sake was criticized by the Buddha. At Vin I 157 he rebuked a group of monks who had spent a rainy season together in complete silence, apparently in order to avoid communal discord. This case needs to be considered in the light ofMI 207, where the silent cohabitation of a group of monks is described in the same terms, but met with the Buddha’s approval. Here the decisive difference was that every fifth day this group of monks would interrupt their silence and discuss the Dhamma, i.e. in this case silence was not observed to avoid dissension, but was employed as a means to create a suitable meditative atmosphere and at the same time wisely balanced with regular discussions about the Dhamma. In fact these two activities, either discussing the Dhamma or observing silence, were often recommended by the Buddha as the two appropriate ways of spending time with others (e.g. at M I 161).

17 Ud 41. A similar action was undertaken at A V 133 by a group of senior monks who departed without even taking their leave of the Buddha in order to avoid the noise created by some visitors, an action which the Buddha, on being told later, approved.

18 Vin II 259 and A IV 280.

19 Vin III 68; S V 12; and S V 320 report the Buddha spending two weeks in complete seclusion on a silent retreat, while Vin III 229; S V 13; and S V 325 report the same for a three-month period.

20 e.g. atDI 151. According toDII 270, even Sakka, king of gods, had once to depart without being able to meet the Buddha, because he was not allowed to disturb the Buddha’s meditation.

21 M III 111.

22 D I 175 and D III 38.

23 AtDIII 54 the Buddha pointed out that all Awakened Ones of past times had similarly been dedicated to seclusion and silence.MI 23 and A I 60 explain his reasons for living in seclusion to be a pleasant abiding here and now and out of compassion for future generations. Cf. also Mil 138.

24 DII 83;DIII 101; and S V 161. At S I 103 the Buddha explicitly stated that his awakening took place based on sati.

25 A V 195. This statement appears to be of such crucial importance that in the satipaṭṭhāna version preserved in the Chinese Madhyama Āgama it has become part of the introductory part of the discourse itself, cf. Nhat Hanh 1990: p.151.

26 In fact, according to A V 153, mindfulness is essential for growth in the Dhamma. The usefulness of satipaṭṭhāna is further corroborated by the substantial list of its possible benefits at A IV 457–60.

27 S V 179.

28 S V 155.

29 e.g. according to M I 340 the lay disciple Pessa engaged from time to time in satipaṭṭhāna. Pessa’s practice is qualified in this discourse with the expression “well established” (supatiṭṭhita), which clearly indicates that it must have been of a rather advanced level. S V 177 and S V 178 report the laymen Sirivaḍḍha and Mānadinna both engaged in the practice of satipaṭṭhāna. Both were then declared by the Buddha to have achieved non-returning.

30 Ps I 241 explains that in the present context “monk” includes whṇver engages in the practice.

31 D II 77; D II 79; S V 172; S V 173; and S V 174.

32 S V 301. It is revealing to contrast this statement with A III 396, according to which even a fourth jhāna attainer is still liable to disrobing and returning to a worldly lifestyle.

33 D II 100; D III 58; D III 77; S V 154; S V 163; and S V 164 speak of those engaging in satipaṭṭhāna as becoming like an island and thereby a refuge to themselves. Commenting on this statement, Sv II 549 emphasizes that it is the practice of satipaṭṭhānas that will lead to the highest.

34 SV189. It is a little surprising that this discourse has not made its way into the Chinese Āgamas (cf. Akanuma 1990: 247).

35 S V 169. On this passage cf. also Ñāṇapoṇika 1990: p.3; Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.211; Piyadassi 1972: p.475; and Ṭhānissaro 1996: p.81.

36 MI 45. Likewise Dhp 158 recommends being well established oneself before teaching others. Cf. also A II 95–9, where the Buddha distinguished between four possibilities of practice: for one’s own benefit only, or for others’ benefit only, or for the benefit of neither, or for the benefit of both. His perhaps surprising position was that to practise for one’s own benefit only is superior to practising for the benefit of others only (cf. also Dhp 166). The underlying rationale is that unless one is established oneself in overcoming unwholesomeness (A II 96) or in ethical restraint (A II 99), one will be unable to benefit others. Cf. also Premasiri 1990c: p.160, who points out the need for a basis of internal peace before proceeding to serve others.

37 Sn 320.

38 Nibbāna is referred to as the “perfection of wisdom” at M III 245 and Th 1015; as the highest happiness at Dhp 204; and as unsurpassable freedom at M I 235.