Escape From Democracy · the Role of Experts and the Public in Economic Policy by Levy, David M. -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Half title Title page Imprints page Epigraph Contents Figures Tables Acknowledgments Part I Introductory Themes

1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction 1.2 Discussion 1.3 Linear versus Cyclical Policy Goals 1.4 Exogenous versus Endogenous Goals 1.5 Transparency 1.6 Sympathetic Bias 1.7 Ideology 1.8 Systems Gone Wrong 1.9 Some Possible Remedies 1.10 Concluding Thoughts

Part II The Discussion Tradition

2 On “Strongly Fortified Minds”

2.1 Introduction 2.2 Discussion, the Self, and Trade: Adam Smith 2.3 Discussion and Learning: J. S. Mill 2.4 Fair Play and Language 2.5 Discussion and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence 2.6 Conclusion

3 The Knightian Moment

3.1 Introduction 3.2 Frank Knight’s Disciple, George Stigler 3.3 Free-Market Experts and Ordinary People 3.4 Milton Friedman’s Consumption Function 3.5 The Thomas Jefferson Center Proposal to the Ford Foundation 3.6 Conclusion

4 The Rise of New Welfare Economics

4.1 Introduction 4.2 Lionel Robbins and Goal Endogeneity 4.3 New Welfare Economics 4.4 Conclusion

Part III When Linear Models Fail

5 Experts and Eugenics

5.1 Introduction 5.2 Experts on Ends: Human Happiness versus Progress 5.3 Charles Bradlaugh, Annie Besant, and Charles Darwin: Competing Experts 5.4 Expert Advice Cascades: Economists Change Course 5.5 Experts Who Pick Results to Support the Ends 5.6 Conclusion

6 Expert Judgment and Soviet Growth

6.1 Introduction 6.2 Soviet Growth in US Economics Textbooks

6.2.1 McConnell 6.2.2 Samuelson 6.2.3 Bach 6.2.4 Tarshis 6.2.5 Heilbroner

6.3 Poor Forecasts: Ideology or Model Failure? 6.4 A Second-Best Test 6.5 Conclusion

Part IV An End to Discussion

7 Experts and the Philosopher’s Stone

7.1 Introduction 7.2 John Law and the Mississippi Bubble 7.3 The Hidden: Alchemy in the Great Mirror of Folly 7.4 Uncovering the Fraud: Desiderius Erasmus on Alchemy in the Great Mirror of Folly 7.5 Conclusion

8 The Consequence of Suppressing Discussion

8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Early Criticism of Rating Agencies in Regulation 8.3 Gilbert Harold’s Prudent Estimator of Investment Quality 8.4 The Corporate Bond Study Responds to a Critic 8.5 The Corporate Bond Project of the National Bureau of Economic Research 8.6 Conclusion

Part V Getting the Best from Experts

9 A Proposal for a Revised Code of Ethics for Experts

9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Expert Economist’s Dilemma, Historically Considered

9.2.1 Frank Knight 9.2.2 A. C. Pigou

9.3 Experts as Truth Seekers: A First-Best Option 9.4 Toward a (Partial) Solution to the Ethical Dilemmas of Expertise 9.5 Conclusion

10 Mitigating the Consequences of Factional Expertise

10.1 Introduction 10.2 Gordon Tullock and the “Racket” 10.3 Karl Popper on Scientific Faction 10.4 Bringing Out the Best of Expertise 10.5 Conclusion

11 Inducing Greater Transparency

11.1 Introduction 11.2 Clients and Experts: The Statisticians’ View 11.3 A Model of Sympathetic Expertise 11.4 Governance by Jury 11.5 Is Transparency Incentive Compatible? 11.6 Making Transparency Incentive Compatible 11.7 Conclusion

Part VI Conclusion

12 Vox Populi?

12.1 Returning to Discussion 12.2 A Radical Proposal

Bibliography

Unpublished Manuscripts Court Decision Published Work

Index