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Index
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
I - SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND ITS CONTEMPORARY CRITICS
1 - Principles of Philosophy
1. THE SEEKER AFTER TRUTH MUST, ONCE IN THE COURSE OF HIS LIFE, DOUBT EVERYTHING, AS FAR AS IS POSSIBLE.
2. WHAT IS DOUBTFUL SHOULD EVEN BE CONSIDERED AS FALSE.
3. THIS DOUBT SHOULD NOT MEANWHILE BE APPLIED TO ORDINARY LIFE.
4. THE REASONS FOR DOUBT CONCERNING THE THINGS THAT CAN BE PERCEIVED BY THE SENSES.
5. THE REASONS FOR DOUBTING EVEN MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATIONS.
6. WE HAVE FREE WILL, ENABLING US TO WITHHOLD OUR ASSENT IN DOUBTFUL MATTERS AND HENCE AVOID ERROR.
7. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO DOUBT THAT WE EXIST WHILE WE ARE DOUBTING; AND THIS IS THE FIRST THING WE COME TO KNOW WHEN WE PHILOSOPHIZE IN AN ORDERLY WAY.
8. IN THIS WAY WE DISCOVER THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY, OR BETWEEN A THINKING THING AND A CORPOREAL THING.
9. WHAT IS MEANT BY “THOUGHT”.
10. MATTERS WHICH ARE VERY SIMPLE AND SELF-EVIDENT ARE ONLY RENDERED MORE OBSCURE BY LOGICAL DEFINITIONS, AND SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED AS ITEMS OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH IT TAKES EFFORT TO ACQUIRE.
11. HOW OUR MIND IS BETTER KNOWN THAN OUR BODY.
12. WHY THIS FACT DOES NOT COME TO BE KNOWN TO ALL ALIKE.
189. WHAT SENSATION IS AND HOW IT OPERATES.
196. THE SOUL HAS SENSORY AWARENESS ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT IS IN THE BRAIN.
NOTES
2 - The Concept of Mind
1. THE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE [SELECTIONS FROM CHAPTER 1 OF CONCEPT OF MIND]
2. THE ABSURDITY OF THE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE
3. THE ORIGIN OF THE CATEGORY-MISTAKE
4. HISTORICAL NOTE
3. KNOWING HOW AND KNOWING THAT [SELECTION FROM CHAPTER 2 OF CONCEPT OF MIND]
4. THE MOTIVES OF THE INTELLECTUALIST LEGEND [SELECTION FROM CHAPTER 2 OF CONCEPT OF MIND]
NOTES
3 - Logical Behaviorism [Selection from Language of Thought]
NOTES
II - THREE VIEWS OF THE MIND
Type Identity
4 - Sensations and Brain Processes
Functionalism
5 - Computing Machinery and Intelligence
6 - Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications
7 - The Mind-Body Problem
8 - Troubles with Functionalism
9 - Epiphenomenal Qualia
Eliminativist Materialism
10 - Eliminative Materialism [Selection from Matter and Consciousness]
11 - True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works [Selection from Scientific Explanation]
12 - I am John’s Brain
III - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
13 - Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer?
AXIOM 1. COMPUTER PROGRAMS ARE FORMAL (SYNTACTIC).
AXIOM 2. HUMAN MINDS HAVE MENTAL CONTENTS (SEMANTICS).
AXIOM 3. SYNTAX BY ITSELF IS NEITHER CONSTITUTIVE OF NOR SUFFICIENT FOR SEMANTICS.
CONCLUSION 1. PROGRAMS ARE NEITHER CONSTITUTIVE OF NOR SUFFICIENT FOR MINDS. AND THAT IS JUST ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING THAT STRONG AI IS FALSE.
AXIOM 4. BRAINS CAUSE MINDS.
CONCLUSION 2: ANY OTHER SYSTEM CAPABLE OF CAUSING MINDS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAUSAL POWERS (AT LEAST) EQUIVALENT TO BRAINS.
CONCLUSION 3: ANY ARTIFACT THAT PRODUCED MENTAL PHENOMENA, ANY ARTIFICIAL BRAIN, WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO DUPLICATE THE SPECIFIC CAUSAL POWERS OF BRAINS, AND IT COULD NOT DO JUST THAT BY RUNNING A FORMAL PROGRAM.
CONCLUSION 4: THE WAY THAT HUMAN BRAINS ACTUALLY PRODUCE MENTAL PHENOMENA CANNOT BE SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF RUNNING A COMPUTER PROGRAM.
NOTE
14 - Could a Machine Think?
NOTE
15 - The Practical Requirements for Making a Conscious Robot
1. ARE CONSCIOUS ROBOTS POSSIBLE “IN PRINCIPLE”?
2. THE COG PROJECT: A HUMANOID ROBOT
3. THREE PHILOSOPHICAL THEMES ADDRESSED
NOTE
REFERENCES
IV - CONSCIOUSNESS
Subjectivity/Objectivity
16 - What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
17 - Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities
18 - Knowing What It’s Like
Theories of Consciousness: Materialist and Anti-Reductionist
19 - What is Consciousness?
20 - Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
21 - Rethinking the Mind-Body Problem
Glossary
Index
About the Author
About the Contributors
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