Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy by Acemoglu, Daron -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Preface PART ONE. - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Chapter 1 - Paths of Political Development

1. Britain 2. Argentina 3. Singapore 4. South Africa 5. The Agenda

Chapter 2 - Our Argument

1. Democracy versus Nondemocracy 2. Building Blocks of Our Approach 3. Toward Our Basic Story 4. Our Theory of Democratization 5. Democratic Consolidation 6. Determinants of Democracy 7. Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict 8. Democracy in a Picture 9. Overview of the Book

Chapter 3 - What Do We Know about Democracy?

1. Measuring Democracy 2. Patterns of Democracy 3. Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution 4. Crises and Democracy 5. Social Unrest and Democratization 6. The Literature 7. Our Contribution

PART TWO. - MODELING POLITICS Chapter 4 - Democratic Politics

1. Introduction 2. Aggregating Individual Preferences 3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem 4. Our Workhorse Models 5. Democracy and Political Equality 6. Conclusion

Chapter 5 - Nondemocratic Politics

1. Introduction 2. Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics 3. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies 4. Commitment Problems 5. A Simple Game of Promises 6. A Dynamic Model 7. Incentive-Compatible Promises 8. Conclusion

PART THREE. - THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY Chapter 6 - Democratization

1. Introduction 2. The Role of Political Institutions 3. Preferences over Political Institutions 4. Political Power and Institutions 5. A Static Model of Democratization 6. Democratization or Repression? 7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization 8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria 9. Alternative Political Identities 10. Targeted Transfers 11. Power of the Elites in Democracy 12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes 13. Democratization in a Picture 14. Equilibrium Revolutions 15. Conclusion

Chapter 7 - Coups and Consolidation

1. Introduction 2. Incentives for Coups 3. A Static Model of Coups 4. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy 5. Alternative Political Identities 6. Targeted Transfers 7. Power in Democracy and Coups 8. Consolidation in a Picture 9. Defensive Coups 10. Conclusion

PART FOUR. - PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK Chapter 8 - The Role of the Middle Class

1. Introduction 2. The Three-Class Model 3. Emergence of Partial Democracy 4. From Partial to Full Democracy 5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer 6. Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners 7. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy 8. Conclusion

Chapter 9 - Economic Structure and Democracy

1. Introduction 2. Economic Structure and Income Distribution 3. Political Conflict 4. Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy 5. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land 6. Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy 7. Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists 8. Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice 9. Economic Institutions 10. Human Capital 11. Conjectures about Political Development 12. Conclusion

Chapter 10 - Globalization and Democracy

1. Introduction 2. A Model of an Open Economy 3. Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation 4. Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy 5. Financial Integration 6. Increased Political Integration 7. Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade 8. Conclusion

PART FIVE. - CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY Chapter 11 - Conclusions and the Future of Democracy

1. Paths of Political Development Revisited 2. Extensions and Areas for Future Research 3. The Future of Democracy

PART SIX. - APPENDIX 12 Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy

1. Introduction 2. Probabilistic Voting Models 3. Lobbying 4. Partisan Politics and Political Capture

Bibliography Index