Complex Economics by Kirman, Alan -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

The Graz Schumpeter Lectures Contents List of tables List of figures Preface 1 Introduction

Introduction

Markets and coordination

Rationality Equilibrium Stability A simpler world Heterogeneity A simple example of coordination Markets

Networks

Macroeconomics and the need for new models Notes

2 The structure of interaction

Introduction Economics and sociology The economic consequences of networks Given fixed network: stochastic interaction The dynamics of interaction Random graphs and networks Connectivity Emerging networks: the choice of links The strategic formation of networks Emerging random graphs An example: the emergence of buyer–seller networks Preferential graphs Another example: free trade agreements

The identification problem

Conclusion Notes

3 Fish markets

Introduction Fish markets: background Fish markets: previous economic analysis The Marseille fish market (Saumaty) Market properties and individual behaviour The impact of market organisation Price–quantity relations A digression on ‘demand’ A simple model Does this help? Models with less rationality Trading relationships within the market A little formal analysis An even simpler modelling approach Another type of market: the Ancona fish market Description of MERITAN The empirical evidence

Price–quantity relation

Price dynamics Loyalty Buyers and sellers price performance An agent-based model Conclusion Notes

4 Financial markets

Introduction The ‘standard’ approach

The efficient market hypothesis The notion of equilibrium Bubbles and excess volatility The predictability of asset prices

Informational cascades and herd behaviour

The restaurant example Another explanation for herding Agents’ forecasts An example The probability of choosing a rule Demand for foreign currency

The concept of equilibrium

Equilibria in the example

An extension of this approach

Relations with the literature An analytic approach Conclusion Notes

5 Public goods

Introduction The basic public goods problem The model The basic public goods game The Hichri and Kirman (2007) model Different levels of information Learning in games The experimental results

Basic results without promises Results with promises Results with differing information

Testing a learning model

The reinforcement learning model The simple test of reinforcement learning at the aggregate level The EWA learning model Simulating the EWA learning model at the aggregate level The group and the individual level The test of the EWA learning model at the individual level Comparison with the simple learning model

Conclusion Notes

6 Segregation

Introduction The income dimension An extension of the previous model

Results of simulations Other cases A little empirical evidence

Conclusion Note

7 Conclusion Bibliography Index