* denotes that full details of the publication quoted appear in the list of sources on page 340.
Chapter 1 (1957–1959)
1. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (20 million tons gross, registered).
2. An apocryphal story, but it was very widespread and popular within naval circles.
3. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident*.
4. Admiral Sir Alan West, introduction to Broadsheet 2001/2002*.
5. Desmond Wettern, The Decline of British Seapower*.
6. Stanley Begg, member of the ship’s company of the Loch class frigate Loch Alvie.
7. Desmond Wettern, The Decline of British Seapower*.
8. The other pilot, Lieutenant de Vaisseau Nicola, was never found. Tragically his widow had just given birth to a daughter, whom he had not seen. The writer met the daughter, Anne-Christine, many years later when she married his wife’s first cousin. The daughter was well aware that the Royal Navy had searched for her father.
9. The USS Nautilus, commanded by Commander Bill Anderson, reached the North Pole on 3 August 1958 and sent a historic signal: ‘For the world, our country and the Navy – the North Pole.’
10. North European and MEDiterranean Route Instructions give details of danger areas, swept routes and buoyage in the North, Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas. They are published by the MoD (Navy), Hydrographic Department.
11. The Sea Cadet Corps encouraged many youngsters to join the Royal Navy, and still does today.
12. Admiralty Fleet Order 1510/58 (June 1958) stated: ‘Through the initiative of distinguished gentlemen who hold responsible financial, industrial and commercial positions, and who have a personal regard for the Royal Navy a new Association called the White Ensign Association Ltd has been formed under the Chairmanship of Admiral Sir John Eccles, for the purpose of assisting and promoting the interests of men and women who are now serving or who have at any time served in the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, any Naval or Royal Marine Reserve or in the Women’s Royal Naval Service or Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service, especially those leaving the Service during the current period of reduction in Service manpower.’
13. Admiralty Fleet Order 1510/58 (June 1958).
Chapter 2 (1960–1964)
1. Denis Healey in the House of Commons on 27 November 1967, referring to the satisfactory conclusion of the campaign in Indonesia and Borneo: ‘When the House thinks of the tragedy that could have fallen on a whole corner of a Continent if we had not been able to hold the situation and bring it to a successful termination, it will appreciate that in history books it will be recorded as one of the most efficient uses of military force in the history of the world.’
2. Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain*.
3. General Sir William Jackson gbe, kcb, mc, official military historian to the Cabinet Office, Withdrawal from Empire*.
4. Naval Historical Branch; Captain Andrew Welch RN, The Royal Navy in the Cod Wars*.
5. Major General Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines*.
6. Captain J A Finnigan RN, closed up at action stations as a junior officer on board the destroyer Caesar in the Lombok Strait in September 1964.
7. Denis Healey, House of Commons, 27 November 1967.
8. Vice Admiral Harold Hickling, Postscript to Voyager*.
9. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
10. General Sir William Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire*.
11. Major General Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines*.
Chapter 3 (1965–1969)
1. NATO Information Service, Brussels, NATO Facts and Figures (NATO Publications, January 1976).
2. Statement of Defence Estimates, 1965 (Cmnd 2592).
3. Statement of Defence Estimates, 1966 (Cmnd 2901).
4. Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie KCB, DSO*, DSC stated: ‘Polaris submarines on QRA (Quick Readiness Alert) were indeed at war with no coming home, and everything that the submarine did on patrol was geared towards the achievement of three clearly defined aims
Remaining undetected
Maintaining constant communications
Being at short notice to fire
Maintenance of the deterrent was the primary aim of the Royal Navy.’
Submitted by Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Submarine Museum.
5. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
6. Ibid.
7. The Commission Book of Albion’s second commission, as a commando carrier, report of 848 Naval Air Commando Squadron RN.
8. Captain Doug Littlejohns CBE, RN, serving as a junior officer on board Albion during her second commission, as a commando carrier, off the coast of Indonesia.
9. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN, serving as a junior officer on board Maryton during the Indonesian Confrontation.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Desmond Wettern, The Decline of British Seapower*.
13. Ibid.
14. Lieutenant Colonel John Owen, commanding 45 Commando Royal Marines in Aden in June 1967. From Robin Neillands, A Fighting Retreat – The British Empire 1947–97*.
15. Stephen Harper, in Major General Julian Thompson (ed), The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare*.
16. The Times, 2 December 1965.
17. The Commission Book of the assault ship Fearless.
18. Randolph and Winston Churchill, The Six Day War*.
19. Stephen Harper, The Imperial War Musuem Book of Modern Warfare*.
Chapter 4 (1970–1974)
1. Statement of Defence Estimates, 1970.
2. ‘The Royal Navy Task Group’ 9/74 (O/N 4303785), the official MoD (Navy) press release for the September 1974 Group Deployment.
3. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
4. Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Royal Naval Submarine Museum.
5. Captain Andrew Welch RN, The Royal Navy in the Cod Wars*.
6. SOSUS is an acronym for SOund SUrveillance System, which consisted of bottom-mounted hydrophone arrays connected by underwater cables to facilities ashore. The individual arrays were installed primarily on continental slopes and seamounts at locations optimised for undistorted long-range submarine generated acoustic propagation. The combination of location within the ocean and the sensitivity of arrays allowed the system to detect acoustic power of less than a watt at ranges of several hundred kilometres. At the shore-based facilities (NAVFAC) frequency analysis was carried out on the signals from the arrays and paper outputs of lofargrams produced, which were used to detect and classify contacts. This information was disseminated to units at sea and used to protect SSBN anonymity (evasion), and SSN cuing (prosecution), and was a vital tool during the Cold War.
(Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Royal Naval Submarine Museum.)
8. The September 1974 press release (O/N 4303785) stated: ‘Gone is the traditional method of operating single ships over a wide area, and in its place is the Task Force idea – exemplified by the present group of six ships and, normally, a submarine.’
9. General Sir John Akehurst ‘The Unknown War’ in Major General Julian Thompson (ed), The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare*.
10. Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Royal Naval Submarine Museum.
Chapter 5 (1975–1979)
1. Chris Bishop and Chris Chant, Aircraft Carriers*.
2. Alex Hook, Modern War Day by Day*.
3. Statement of Defence Estimates, 1976 (Cmnd 6432).
4. Margaret Thatcher in her ‘Britain Awake’ speech at Kensington Town Hall on 19 January 1976.
5. Rear Admiral Richard Hill, Lewin of Greenwich*.
6. Captain Basil Watson rn, Commander in Chief*.
7. The account of incidents at sea is based on reports from some of the ships involved, and research by Captain Andrew Welch. For a detailed account of all incidents see Andrew Welch, The Royal Navy in the Cod Wars*.
8. David Miller, Commanding Officers*.
9. Peter Elliott, The Cross and the Ensign*.
10. Iain Ballantyne, HMS London*.
11. Ibid. (Able Seaman Eddie Cowling).
12. James D Ladd, SBS: The Invisible Raiders*.
13. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN (SNONI staff).
Chapter 6 (1980–1982)
1. Statement of Defence Estimates, April 1980 (Cmnd 7826–1)
2. Board Bulletin 1981
3. There are a great many good books on the Falklands Campaign but the prime source used is The Royal Navy and the Falklands War* by the late David Brown, Head of the Naval Historical Branch during the Campaign. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (Michael Joseph, 1983) and Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days* also provide first-class accounts from people who were down there at the time.
4. Admiral Sir James Perowne KBE.
5. On 23 April the British had already delivered a statement to the Argentineans stating: ‘In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty’s Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty’s Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response.’ Contributed by Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Submarine Museum.
6. Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Submarine Museum.
7. Legal or not legal? ‘The sinking of Belgrano was justified under international law, as the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status. Furthermore, Hector Bonzo, the captain of Belgrano, has himself testified that the attack was legitimate for this reason. The fact that the ship was outside the British declared Total Exclusion Zone does not affect this analysis, especially since the British had informed Argentina on 23 April that Argentine ships and aircraft outside the Exclusion Zone could be attacked if they posed a threat to the British Task Force, and senior figures in the Argentine Navy have made clear that they understood this message; for example, Argentine Rear-Admiral Allara who commanded the Belgrano’s task group said “After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. We, as professionals, said it was just too bad that we lost Belgrano.’ Finally, in 1994, the Argentine government conceded that the sinking of Belgrano was a “legal act of war”.’ Contributed by Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, Director of the Submarine Museum.
8. Admiral Sir Michael Layard KC KCB, CBE.
9. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War*.
10. The pilot killed was Vice Commodore de la Colina, the most senior Argentine Air Force officer to be killed during the conflict.
Chapter 7 (1983–1985)
1. The Franks Report, 1983 (Cmnd 8787).
2. MoD, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (Cmnd 8758).
3. Broadsheet 1983.
4. Ibid.
6. Neil McCart, Harrier Carriers Volume 1: HMS Invincible (Fan Publications 2004), page 55.
7. Captain Dan Conley OBE, RN.
8. John Lehman, Former Secretary of the US Navy.
Chapter 8 (1986–89)
1. ‘The Maritime Strategy’, unclassified edition issued by the US Naval Institute in January 1986 and précis by Admiral James D Watkins US Navy.
2. John Lehman, Former Secretary of the US Navy, Seas of Glory*.
3. Statement of Defence Estimates, 1986 (Cmnd 9763).
4. Gary Weir and Walter Boyne, Rising Tide*.
5. Desmond Wettern in ‘The Royal Navy in Transition’ (Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, 1988, page 59) stated that Britain provided 70 per cent of the NATO maritime forces for the eastern Atlantic area. He went on to point out ‘There is little doubt that some of the of the new frigates currently joining the fleet are among the most powerful and best equipped of their kind in the world, especially as submarine hunters. But achieving such a level of qualitative excellence in antisubmarine warfare has to be paid for, and with a contracting defence budget over the past three years, the maritime element of local defence of the British Isles has suffered in an either/or situation created by lack of funds.’
6. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
7. Richard Johnstone-Bryden, The Royal Yacht Britannia*.
8. Ibid.
9. John Lehman, Former Secretary of the US Navy.
10. Ivan Rendall, Splash One*.
11. John Lehman, Former Secretary of the US Navy.
12. Ibid.
13. Richard Johnstone-Bryden, The Royal Yacht Britannia*.
14. Gary Weir and Walter Boyne Rising Tide*.
15. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN; Iain Ballantyne, Strike from the Sea*.
16. Captain Dan Conley OBE, RN.
17. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
18. Time-Life Books, Carrier Warfare*..
19. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
20. Ibid.
21. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Ralph D Sawyer (Barnes and Noble Inc by arrangement with West View Press, 1994),
22. John Pina Craven, former Chief Scientist, US Navy Special Projects Office, The Silent War*.
23. Rear Admiral Robert R Fountain US Navy, in Kenneth Sewell and Jerome Preisler, All Hands Down: The True Story of the Soviet Attack on the USS Scorpion (Simon & Schuster, 2008).
24. Gary Weir and Walter Boyne, Rising Tide*.
Chapter 9 (1990–1992)
1. Statement of Defence Estimates, 1991 (Cmnd 1559)
2. Captain T D Elliott RN, A Gulf Record*, Iain Ballantyne, Strike from the Sea*, and General Sir Peter De La Billiere, Storm Command*.
3. Iain Ballantyne, HMS London*.
4. ‘Conventional’ refers to patrol submarines with diesel-electric power units instead of nuclear power.
5. Statement of Defence Estimates 1981 (Cmnd. 8288)
6. The CFS Chicoutimi, sold to Canada, came to prominence in 2004 when she suffered a fire caused by seawater, which appeared to leak through the conning tower hatch. Tragically it resulted in loss of life and a timely reminder of the risk carried by all submariners.
Chapter 10 (1993–1995)
1. ‘Naval Forces in British Defence Policy, Broadsheet 1994/5*, page 9.
2. ‘Report of Proceedings’, Broadsheet 1994/5*, page 19.
3. Captain Terry Loughran RN.
4. Lieutenant Nick Richardson RN, No Escape Zone*.
5. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
6. The Naval Staff (Staff of Rear Admiral Submarines)
7. From the Naval Prayer.
Chapter 11 (1996–1998)
2. The Strategic Defence Review, July 1998 (Cmnd 3999).
3. Ibid.
4. Lieutenant Commander Ken Napier MBE, RN.
5. Admiral Sir Jock Slater GCB, LVO.
Chapter 12 (1999–2001)
1. Admiral Sir Alan West, introduction to Broadsheet 2001/2002.
2. Commander Piers Barker RN, Staff of Rear Admiral Submarines.
3. Admiral Sir Jonathan Band KCB, Commander in Chief Fleet, ‘The Front Line’, Broadsheet 2001/2002*.
4. Ibid.
Chapter 13 (2002–2004)
1. Iain Ballantyne, Strike from the Sea*.
2. James Newton, Armed Action*.
3. Robert Fox, Iraq Campaign 2003*.
4. Navy News, August 2003.
Chapter 14 (2005–2006)
1. An approximate figure based on extrapolation and general information available at that time.
2. Navy News, January 2007, page 2.
3. Navy News, March 2005, page 12, and April 2005, page 15.
Chapter 15 (2007–2008)
1. Admiral Sir Jonathan Band, First Sea Lord, in the Introduction to Paul Beaver (ed), Royal Navy – a Global Force*.
2. ‘Diary of Events – December, Broadsheet 2007, page 11.
3. In fact the record claimed by the nuclear submarine Vengeance had already been achieved by Resolution, commanded by Commander Jeff Tall OBE, RN, when she completed 108 days in 1991 (confirmed by Commander Tall in 2008).
4. Navy News, August 2007.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
10. Navy News, May 2007, page 10.
11. Ibid, page 17.
12. ‘Ocean tackles the Drugs Trade’ Broadsheet 2007*, page 26.
13. ‘Black Duke Goes Global’ Broadsheet 2007*, page 28.
14. Navy News, August 2007.
15. Navy News, May 2008.
16. Commander L Notley RN, Logistics Commander Illustrious.
17. Navy News, September 2007.
18. ‘Changing, but Ever Steady – The Royal Navy Submarine Service in 2007’, Broadsheet 2007*, page 20.
19. Admiral Sir Jonathan Band in a speech at Buckingham Palace on 29 January 2008.
Epilogue
1. Department for Transport, Maritime Statistics, 2005.