Overview of Chapter Findings
A number of generalised observations and findings can be derived from the sum of the collective knowledge generated by taking the bigger picture that emerges from the various individual chapters. The chapters of this book reveal a very wide and differentiated understanding and approach to the conceptualisation and practice of public diplomacy (PD). There is also the observation that, even if there is a strong ideological character to all matters pertaining to the state, the underlying reason for initiating acts of interactive international communication is very often practical and pragmatic in nature. Therefore, as and when circumstances and need requires it, public diplomacy evolves and transforms to meet the existing (and future) challenges and attempts to capitalise on the current (and future) opportunities that exist.
Chapter 1 begins setting the scene for the book by engaging in analysing some historical aspects of public diplomacy in Russia’s past, especially in the period of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union was established after the Russian Civil War in 1922, it found itself isolated in the international community as its ideology and foreign policy were viewed negatively. As a result, traditional state-to-state diplomacy did not function as it could or should; alternatives were needed in order to manage international relations through dialogic forms of communication. While its politics and ideology were considered to be contentious, the Soviet Union chose to engage in cultural diplomacy through the establishment of institutions, clubs and societies as a means of proactively engaging foreign publics. The Russian Federation has created a number of different institutions and organisations (including non-governmental organisations—NGOs) to regulate and manage public diplomacy efforts, which is based on the pursuit of pragmatic interests and goals. After Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in Donbas (eastern Ukraine), Russia has found itself to be isolated increasingly from the US-led Western international order as the Soviet Union was back in the early 1920s. Although there are differences, such as the lack of a strategic ideology that is exported globally, the lack of a system of functioning traditional diplomacy is evident. The circumstances and political will determined a search for other means of diplomacy and global communication.
In the following chapter, a realisation of the restraints and constraints imposed by the historical legacy on the contemporary environment is revealed. In addition, what is also discovered by Semedov and Kurbatova is that the resulting sum of a country’s reputational image and brand is not solely based on the communicational work planned and performed by Russia. Other countries, including those that are in competition or conflict with Russia, do have a vested interest in reducing the attractiveness and resonance of Russia’s image. As Russia has gradually sought to take a more active and prominent role in international relations and international affairs, its efforts and creativity in the sphere of public diplomacy have become more creative and active. In an increasingly crowded marketplace of country brands and reputations, Russia seeks to develop a competitive identity in order to facilitate the realisation of foreign policy. Russia has taken a broad approach to the issues of nation branding and public diplomacy via a variety of areas (economic, scientific and cultural for example). As the authors show, success not only depends on a high level of cooperation in all of spheres of the state but also on the ability to successfully break from the negative influences of the past while maintaining a consistent and credible balancing of word and deed in the present.
The lessons of development diplomacy of the Russian Federation repeat a number of the same lessons as above. Before drawing on some of those lessons, a brief point needs to be clarified. In the context of the Russian public diplomacy lexicon, there is a difference in meaning and implication that differs from the Anglo-US world, where the term “humanitarian” refers to the people-to-people form of communication and interaction (hence, when academics apply for a visa to Russia, it is often under the category of “humanitarian visa.”) However, the term and practice of development diplomacy include the delivery of humanitarian aid. Russia’s development diplomacy has been undergoing a significant evolution and revival with the increased global competition and confrontation in a global struggle for hearts and minds. Although it was also present during the Cold War for the same reasons of competition for influence, hearts and minds, these are concrete pragmatic goals and interests that are being pursued—increase global influence and enhance economic potential. There are some threats and challenges, such as the current low level of expert and institutional support of Russian public diplomacy, and the current confrontation that is manifested in the sanctions and counter-sanctions.
Chapter 4 is concerning the challenges and opportunities for soft power through international cooperation. Simultaneously, as there is a global increase in tensions and conflict, Russia is increasing its outreach via her soft power resources of culture, fine arts, literature and so forth. Russia’s conceptualisation and practice of soft power differ from Nye’s original definition and understanding. This demonstrates a certain current tendency to initially borrow some concepts and practices from the United States and the West but then to embark upon developing them for Russia’s specific sets of needs and conditions. Public diplomacy is seen as the potential (as yet inadequately tapped) catalyst that could activate Russia’s soft power potential. Soft power and public diplomacy both concern the use of attraction and the building of relationships between the communicator and their intended audience. The increasingly confrontational and conflictual nature of global affairs means that Russia is looking for innovative and creative ways to reach out and connect with foreign publics.
Following from this topic of soft power via international cooperation, Chap. 5 explores Russia’s digital diplomacy efforts and the search for soft power via this new mechanism of mass communication. The origins of Russia’s digital diplomacy efforts can be traced back to the year 2012. These programmes are not without contention or controversy, especially given the Russian troll narrative that is intended to compromise and undermine such efforts. Russia has been steadily developing and evolving its digital diplomacy efforts in order to reach out to global audiences more efficiently and effectively.
From cyberspace to the Russian education system, Chap. 6 covers the topic of the higher education system being an element of Russia’s public diplomacy efforts. The Russian government has been steadily trying to attract and recruit foreign students and researchers to their colleges and universities. This situation creates a mutually beneficial environment for foreign students/researchers, Russian universities and Russia’s public diplomacy by establishing relationships based on students’ desire for an education, Russian higher education becoming more internationalised, and mutually beneficial interaction between foreign nationals and the Russian higher education sector within the framework of public diplomacy.
The conceptualisation and practice of Russian science diplomacy is the subject of Chap. 7, where the authors argue that in the context of the West-Russian deterioration in relations the scientific community is one of few areas where there is still some capacity and will to maintain working relations and to search for solutions to common problems via track two diplomacy. Such programmes have also existed historically, between the Soviet Union and the West. There are a number of tangible and intangible aspects in engaging in scientific cooperation, where the result has the potential to bring a great deal of global attention and even prestige (intangible) as well as possible scientific/technological breakthroughs (tangible) within the additional context of attempting to build international trust and relieving some international tension. However, at the same time, such undertakings require sufficient institutional support, human capital and financial resources to sustain in addition to the requisite political will.
Staying with the notion of people-to-people forms of interaction and communication, Chap. 8 addresses the role of civil society in Russian public diplomacy. According to Nye’s original idea of soft power, non-state actors and institutions have a critical role to play in creating and maintaining a country’s soft power potential. Thus, the Russian government understands the need to shape a more positive international image of Russia, and the resulting policy has brought additional actors and institutions to fulfil such a role and task. As a result, there have been attempts to develop the expert community and the institutions that support their work. Specialised institutions as Rossotrudnichestvo and the Alexander Gorchakov Foundation have been established, and a domestic and international expert community has been evolving through the creation of interactive forums and events that discuss key issues of the day.
While the role of civil society and their inclusion into the programmes of Russian public diplomacy are of importance, so is the engagement with international organisations, which is the theme of Chap. 9. Russia and its predecessor states have a long history of engagement in international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN ). The engagement is predicated on the goal of having Russia’s interests and priorities represented in international organisations by having a significant representation through its citizens working in the structures of them. In the 1990s, the political will evaporated, and this policy was discontinued. Seemingly, there has been a desire to return to the policy of influence there, which has been greatly reduced relative to other leading countries in the UN.
Chapter 10 covers the issue of Russian business diplomacy in Southeast Asia, which seeks to build stable and long-term relations between government bodies and the leadership of foreign and international companies. Business diplomacy has played an increasingly important role in the management of interstate relations and in communications between major international integration associations (e.g. ASEAN, Eurasian Union and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). As noted by the authors, there are some differences between business diplomacy as practised by Russia as opposed to Western countries, which can have the potential to create an air of lack of familiarity and therefore trust (through lack of understanding). The Measure of Activity (MOA) and Measure of Influence of Russian versus Western business diplomacy are specially earmarked for the need for further research in order to be better understood.
The human dimension of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region is the issue analysed in Chap. 11. Citizen diplomacy or people’s diplomacy concerns the idea of getting citizens actively involved as representatives of a country or a cause. This has a history in both the Soviet period and currently in the Russian Federation. Such an endeavour can be managed through the creation of task- or issue-specific societies and organisations, such as fighting pollution in the Baltic Sea. The author concludes that this form of diplomacy is essential to maintain during the current tensions, but Russia still has not realised the full potential of people’s diplomacy as yet. This is further hampered by a lack of coordination, financing and a common approach to various issues being engaged in.
In Chap. 12, the area of interest and analysis moves from the Baltic Sea to Latin America. In this chapter, the author stresses the need to pay attention to the quality of strategic communication in fostering long-term and mutual values, interests and goals as an integral part of public diplomacy. This requires the clear and consistent message in the forms of both the word and the deed, careful consideration and attention to the synchronisation of engagement and activities. This requires special attention to the formulation and delivery of key messages, the perception of Russia in the region (past and present) and its current practice of public diplomacy. Russia needs to understand and decide upon its competitive advantage over other potential partners, and the basis and outcome of creating and maintaining mutually beneficial relationships.
The final Chap. 13 shifted attention away from Latin America to the Middle East and North Africa, where there has been a sharp increase in international competition and conflict for geopolitical and economic influence. Russia has been gradually building up its capacity to engage audiences in the region since at least 2008, such as RT Arabic and engaging with regional organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Countries. This came in the wake of a long absence that was precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union along with almost all influence in the region. The absence was a result of not only a lack of financial resources but also a lack of political will. Russia’s re-entry has been the result of the will to become engaged in one of the world’s important transport hubs and energy supply, and also the miscalculations of the United States in the region (especially in wake of the 2003 Iraq War in terms of the Global War On Terrorism and followed by the Arab Spring). Russia has positioned itself as being a counter to what it describes as being the instability caused by US foreign policy, which is openly demonstrated in Syria. Although there is a precarious balancing act performed, given that Russia engages with many “incompatible” states, such as both Israel and Iran, this can have potentially negative consequences if mismanaged.
Three Questions Posed
What is Russian Public Diplomacy Exactly?
This book presents how public diplomacy (PD) is conceptualised and operationalised from a Russian perspective, which differs from the Western one. The theme that connects this book is Russia’s public diplomacy actions are found in various multifaceted domains—scientific, culture, academia and education, business, digital spheres and much more. Its purpose was not to examine how public diplomacy is defined in Russia, but rather to give a comprehensive overview of contemporary Russian public diplomacy. This background leads the authors to search for a framework to analyse Russian PD in terms of its goals, actors and instruments.
Still, coming to the conclusion, we may assume that in Russia PD is viewed as engaging foreign target audience by fostering cooperation in political, economic and cultural spheres for promoting national interests of the own country. This is an interactive engagement between the communicator and the target audience, where the intended audience is actively interacting and not passively consuming the communication, which is understood as not only being words but also deeds.
Ideally, Russian public diplomacy (as with other countries) intends to engage in relational communication in order to create and maintain relationships with intended foreign audiences. The communication is intentional and deliberate, even if the outcome may not be what was originally intended by the planners. As such, PD differs from other communicational instruments, such as propaganda. Even though propaganda may be a component of PD, it is not the same thing. PD concerns an active form of interaction between the communicator and the intended audience, where the audience has a chance to give feedback; it is dialogic in nature. Propaganda relies on the manipulation of “truths” and “realities” by the communicator to prime and mobilise an audience emotionally. However, the communication is very often monologic in nature, which gives the audience little chance to give feedback to the system of communications.
Lastly, as many of the chapters demonstrated, PD is not some magic bullet for various policy or issue problems, and should be approached with careful consideration and a long-term vision. Real problems do require real solutions rather than attempting to create a façade to mask the situation. Public diplomacy is not or should not be a stand-alone form of communication, but a supportive informational/communicational component of tangible policy goals.
What Does Russian Public Diplomacy Look Like, Historically and Contemporarily?
Russian public diplomacy has a centuries-long history. Without knowing these roots, it’s impossible to analyse it meaningfully as the wider context is not presented. Its importance cannot be underestimated, especially in times of global confrontation. Although the current deterioration of Russian-Western relations seems to be unprecedented, history proves that it’s not the case. The hazardous image of the “Russian bear” was invented centuries ago. But the work of capable Russians in the sphere that we would now call public diplomacy had laid grounds for cooperation. Tsar Peter the Great took the best European practices to Russia; his late successor Empress Catherine the Great (see Sophie Auguste Friederike von Anhalt-Zerbst-Dornburg) was in correspondence with the philosophers Rousseau and Voltaire. It was under her rule that we may remember eighteenth-century case—Russia-UK “Ochakovo crisis” of 1791.1 The Russian Empire and the UK were then on the verge of war. Then the brilliant use of public diplomacy tools by Russian Ambassador Count Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov, according to Moscow State University Professor Oxana Zakharova, enabled a change of public opinion by the British side2 and to postpone the war for almost 60 years. Russian diplomats under the guidance of the Ambassador were publishing articles in leading British newspapers; the Ambassador was also actively working with British business circles who were interested in trade growth and was doing track II talks with Parliamentary opposition.
If, nowadays, Russian tycoons in the West create a mostly negative reaction towards their home country, then Russian aristocrats were integral part of European elites (Ambassador Vorontsov’s grandson Sidney Herbert was British War Secretary during the Crimean war). During foreign campaigns of the Russian army, its troops helped to restore European towns after the Napoleonic invasion. Through the use of what we would now call “development assistance,” Prince Nikolai Grigoryevich Repnin-Volkonsky Governor-General (Viceroy) in Saxony, until being replaced by the Prussian General Government, was working to stabilise and rebuild Saxony and attempted to turn its capital Dresden into the centre of German art. Such examples are countless; one of the most outstanding is the activity of Russian General Skobelev—to restore Bulgarian infrastructure, he was even criticised at home for being too “Pro-Bulgarian.”
Russian Imperial public diplomacy had various facets. It was gaining crucial importance in the periods of international disarray and post-conflict settlement. But in the periods of peace, it was also very important and included various aspects, including cultural ones. In the Russian Empire, members of foreign Royal families (e.g. a friend of the famous Russian geographer Petr Petrovich Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, the Belgian King Leopold II, Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid, Prince Albert), well-known foreign researchers and geographers (Baron Ferdinand Richthofen, Roald Amundsen, Fridtjof Nansen and others) were elected the honorary members of the Russian Geographical Society, what was positive for the image of the country among foreign decision-makers. Golden and Silver age of Russian culture have also influenced foreign public opinion. Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, Chekhov and Tolstoy were the best Russian public and cultural diplomats.
The period of Revolution and Civil War (1917–1922) has had a very dramatic impact upon Russian history. The best representatives of Russian intelligentsia “white émigré” were forced to leave the country on the “philosophers’ ships.” Such notorious arts figures as Sergei Rachmaninoff, Feodor Chaliapin, Yul Brinner, Serge Diaghilev and George Balanchine; Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine, inventor Alexander P. de Seversky, aviation pioneer Igor Sikorsky and pioneer of television technology Vladimir K. Zworykin; and philosophers Nikolai Berdyaev, Ivan Ilyin and Pitirim Sorokin have become Russians in exile. Although it was tragedy for the country, the first wave of Russian emigrants have unwillingly become public diplomats of Russia. The majority of them were “Russians,” even becoming citizens of other countries. During the Second World War period, they were raising international aid for their fellow countrymen suffering from the Nazi invasion, to help their “mother Russia.”
Analysing public diplomacy of the Soviet Union, it’s necessary to highlight various aspects of the Communist party and Communist International activities, coordinated from Moscow. So, strictly speaking, not all the PD initiatives were Soviet; some of them concerned Eastern bloc countries, but analysed nowadays they may be seen as Soviet. At first, after its creation in 1922, Soviet Union was in international isolation. But the efforts of its leaders and passionate proponents, including in the sphere which we now call public diplomacy, had contributed towards its international recognition.
Here, we can remember the first woman ambassador, Alexandra Kollontai, the daughter of Russian military consul in Sofia, General Mikhail Domontovich. She had close connections with the top thinkers of Europe’s socialist movement and was secretary of the International Women Secretariat under the Communist International. Reading her diplomatic diaries, we can find out that she was working hard in the sphere of public diplomacy. It’s interesting to recall here one fact. In 1924, a Norwegian professor of philology had taken a trip to Leningrad and after returning back had written unfavourable book about Soviet Union and had sent it to Norwegian schools. When he was applying for visa in 1928, Alexandra Kollontai had a personal talk with him and finding out that he was going to work in Soviet libraries over philological materials, she had approved him the visa and given him practical advice. Professor Broke’s visit to Moscow had coincided with the visit of Afghani Amanullah Khan. The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin had called Ambassador Kollontai to Moscow to accompany the wife of a Shah. She was trying to provide visits to all the concerts and receptions for Professor Broke and his wife as well. When the Professor went back to Norway, he was delighted with Soviet Union. Alexandra Kollontai remembers that even Norwegian King Haakon was joking: “What have you done to our Professor, he is now a prominent Bolshevik?”3 This anecdote clearly demonstrates that the value of people-to-people relations within the frame of PD was relevant in the past, and remains relevant today in a global atmosphere of intense geopolitical competition and conflict.
Soviet public diplomacy held a serious role during the détente movement. Expert communities had a positive experience when it came to drafting the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), minimising the outcomes of military nuclear programmes in Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, India, Iraq, Pakistan and South Africa. The Dartmouth Conference and the Aspen Security Forum have laid the ground for international cooperation. Détente talks had started in the period of most serious confrontation in the 1970s.4 At this stage, Soviet PD was centred on what it could offer as an alternative to the offer from the US-centric world to the Third World in an ideological struggle for hearts and minds.
A special dimension of Soviet public diplomacy was aimed at Warsaw Pact countries as Albania (until 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (until 1990), Hungary, Poland and Romania. Singers’ contests, film festivals and even championships of friendship armies were arranged within the framework of cultural exchanges. The work was undone by events in Hungary in 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968, where these violent events were met negatively even by loyal supporters of the socialist orientation and had undermined a lot of efforts in the sphere of public diplomacy. Soviet Union had lost “The Kitchen debate”: in the end of the 1980s, young people all over the world wanted to wear jeans, drink Cola and listen to Deep Purple. Hearts and minds of the internal and external youth audiences were won by people who were ignored by the official Soviet cultural establishment: Russian rock singers, such as Vladimir Vysotsky, were becoming the role model for the youth.
Historically, Soviet public diplomacy included strategic communications elements—Soviet propaganda was aimed at engaging and countering elements. The Soviet Union had a strong centralised public diplomacy system aimed at the needs of foreign policy. Regardless of successful initiatives, ideological component was so strong that it was undermining these success stories. Still, being a superpower, Soviet Union was public diplomacy superpower as well. Children of the oppressed leaders were receiving education in Soviet Union. It is enough to mention that in the famous Interdom (Ivanovo International Boarding School)—a school for children of repressed revolutionaries from all over the world were learning, such as the daughter of Spanish Civil War activist Dolores Pasionaria Ibárruri (whose son Ruben had died fighting for Red Army against fascism in 1942), Son of Máo Zédōng and son of Eugene Dennis—the long-time leader of the Communist Party USA—Timur Timofeev—to be corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Or among alumni of The Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) are presidents of Namibia, Angola, Sri Lanka, the South African Republic, Gabon, Guyana and Nigeria; the prime ministers of Bangladesh and Kazakhstan; a UN Chief Executive Officer on Education, Culture and Science; and a Director of the European Centre for Higher Education (CEPES)—a part of UNESCO. If RUDN University was aimed at raising elites for countries who have just acquired their independence, Soviet Union had established another institution for training leaders where communist ideas were oppressed. The Academy of the Social Sciences of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was training political leaders for the non-socialist countries. The most prominent Soviet professors there were critically thinking scholars, preparing their students even to illegally work in their home countries. Atmosphere in the Academy was unique—lecturers were even sometimes wearing jeans, what was outstanding in the 1960s for the Soviet Union.5 Even though this period was marked by a strong ideological guidance, the value of education diplomacy was clearly understood by this time and the notion of building relationships with future leaders.
Historically, Soviet public diplomacy included strategic communications elements—Soviet propaganda was aimed at engaging and countering elements. The Soviet Union had a strong centralised public diplomacy system aimed at the needs of foreign policy. Regardless of successful initiatives, ideological component was so strong that it was undermining these success stories.
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991 until the early 2000s, Russian programmes on involving foreign audience were substantially cut. In Russia, it was seen as a unilateral disarmament in this sphere. The necessity for using PD was only once more realised in Russia during the early 2000s. That is the reason why all mechanisms of its participation in the engagement with foreign audiences and international development assistance have only been recently re-established.
Currently, the key actors within the sphere of PD are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rossotrudnichestvo Federal Agency (part of the MFA body), the Gorchakov Foundation, the Russian International Affairs Council and the Ministry for Emergency Situations (EMERCOM). Also, Russian NGOs (e.g. the Russian Humanitarian Mission, Creative Diplomacy and The Institute for Literary Translation) and think tanks (the Valdai Club,6 PIR-Centre,7 the Russian Committee for BRICS research,8 the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy,9 Network of Eurasian studies,10 Berlek-Centre11) are active participants of Russian PD. Russian academic, cultural and sports diplomacy are also part of this process. But generally we can assume that Russian public diplomacy is state-centric and consists of the mainly state-based PD initiatives.
Just How Effective Are Russia’s Numerous Public Diplomacy Programmes and Efforts?
Russian public diplomacy is facing various problems, which can be said for most countries’ efforts in this endeavour. Measurement problem is one of the most important. Sometimes, Russian access to PD success depends on the amount of people involved in the PD programmes (preferably—big forums and costly nation-branding events) rather than on the in-depth definition of the target audience and media coverage of the project.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to emphasise that until recently Russian PD initiatives were focused on intergovernmental relations or projects with cultural intelligentsia neglecting the work and interaction with civil society and expert communities. The problem of people working in this sphere is that it is very politically sensitive. During the 1990s, it seems that Russia forgot how to actively engage with foreign public, and when the Federal Agency became responsible for it Rossotrudnichestvo was created; some people working there had no idea of how to engage a foreign audience. Even now, some Russian public diplomats demonstrate a certain level of disrespect for local culture and languages, not knowing and not even learning it after many years of staying in the country (especially evident in post-Soviet space). Or they are focused on working mainly with the Russian diaspora (“compatriots”), neglecting to work with other citizens of foreign countries. Or instead of organising conferences, they are annually hosting craft doll exhibition, calling it the brightest event of the year.12 They rarely listen to the field experts working in the country—for example, Russian tourist promotion agency “Visit Russia” in one Scandinavian state was opened during summer vacation, and this costly event did not attract its intended target audience. This provides the confirmation that communication, which PD is all about, concerns not only talking but listening too.
Russian PD needs to undergo a thorough audit. It is necessary to attract both well-informed and critical scholars and practitioners capable of making their assessments and suggestions heard by the decision-makers. Maybe because of the Soviet heritage in the sphere of PD, “dissent is often confused with disloyalty.” Personalised approach with the target audience requires a scrupulous understanding of its needs and interests, which is necessary rather than desirable.
Every country is interested in better visibility and good reputation in international community. The recent international events have undermined Russian efforts in this sphere. Even the partial disqualification of the Russian Olympic team and the whole Paralympic team during Rio Olympic Games in 2016 had, to some extent, undermined the positive achievements of sports diplomacy. Not to mention the later diplomatic incidents that have negatively influenced the image of the country.
Ukraine’s case should also be considered. In Ukraine, Russia was working with political elites, but was mistaken in its work with the public opinion. Russia’s PD approach was based on special relationships with Ukrainian elite while neglecting the work with civil society. The Russian efforts were aimed at the stakeholders already interested in cooperation. Russia could therefore hardly attract the audiences and potential “difficult partners” in the Western part of the country that is traditionally viewing Russia with negative stereotypes, unlike Eastern part. In the last two decades, Russia has invested more than US$200 billion in the Ukrainian economy,13 while the United States has invested US$5 billion “in the development of democratic institutions and skills in promoting civil society and a good form of government.”14 Therefore, the Russian donation policy towards Ukraine has proved to be inefficient and ineffective. Besides, Russian NGOs were working mainly with the so-called “young leaders,” neglecting the work with the professional or academic community. Russia’s weak economy and internal problems, such as social injustice, socioeconomic discrepancies, corruption and dysfunctional legal system, all add up significantly to undermine a lot of PD initiatives in the region. Russia is not often the role model of behaviour for its neighbouring countries for the above-mentioned reasons and perceptions.
A country’s image is shaped by attractive lifestyle, a successful welfare system and effective governance. The main potential attractions of Russia are its people and its geography and that is precisely why substate diplomacy would be very timely. More than 190 nationalities of various religions coexist in Russia. According to Professor Irene Wu, while it is well known that the United States has a large immigrant community, it is less widely recognised that Russia is the second largest immigrant country in the world.15 About 12 million immigrants from over 140 countries live in Russia. This multi-ethnicity influences Russian public diplomacy as well. Then and now, public diplomacy is “the gathering of influence of Western Russia, the Far-East, Siberia, and the North Caucasus to their respective neighbourhoods.”16 That’s why the Russian experience is unique to some extent, as far as it is based on the mixture of Western and Asian approaches.
The Bigger Picture
In Russia, as well as throughout the majority of post-Soviet countries, public diplomacy is actively debated and engaged in academic, policy and practitioner circles, but generally, it is viewed as engaging foreign audiences through fostering cooperation in political, economic and cultural spheres with the purpose of promoting country’s national interests. Whereas in Western countries (especially the United States) PD combines two components—engaging allies (mainly through educational and cultural activities) and confronting enemies (such as violent extremism and foreign propaganda through the use of strategic communications) (Tsvetkova, 2016)—in Russia, PD is perceived as aiming to create an objective and favourable image of the country, without undermining the efforts of other actors. The point being made is that it is seen in Russia that public diplomacy can hardly be combined with strategic communications, seen as having influential channels to work with foreign audiences, the necessity of which was realised in Russia in the beginning of the 2000s. This occurred as a result of three reasons: “CNN effect,” in which Russia could not effectively present its position on the NATO airstrikes on Serbia to the international public; the change of neutral political course to the Western one by some neighbouring countries—what was seen in Russia negatively; and acquiring substantial financial opportunities due to the oil boom that had occurred then. Russia developed its own public diplomacy institutions and international broadcasting tools. Russian public diplomacy is facing Western perceptions of it as a propaganda tool, aimed at undermining public diplomacy efforts of other states. Russian information warfare and PD are conflated. The intention of the authors was to demonstrate that this limited way of seeing things can prove to be detrimental to understanding the wider picture and perspective. Still, an analysis of Russia’s international broadcasting tools and digital diplomacy seen in Russia as more a part of the strategic communications narrative, rather than PD, is provided in the book.
Although Russian public diplomacy is attracting a growing research interest, it is still a much understudied field, even in Russia. Western perspectives usually analyse Russian PD through the lens of strategic communication and hybrid warfare, while in Russia PD is seen as an instrument of dialogue, not containment. So, the practice and terminology of PD are different in Russia, and it is not the same as its Western alternatives, as it includes the elements of engagement, but it does not include the elements of countering (foreign propaganda/terrorist threats17), which are supposed to be the part of the strategic communications narrative. Besides, the term is interpreted in a much narrow sense in Russia in comparison to other countries (Velikaya, 2018); as far as Russia is concerned, there are separate spheres for public and citizen diplomacy. Still, the recent trends demonstrate that maybe in the coming years, there will be some merger of the terms.
Both Russia and post-Soviet countries have unique approaches towards synonymous term of public diplomacy— humanitarian cooperation : it is seen as being broader than public diplomacy, international development cooperation and international aid. Even the key multilateral mechanism for conducting the humanitarian cooperation of Eurasian countries—the Intergovernmental Foundation for Educational, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (IFESCCO) created in 2006—in Russian is called “International Humanitarian foundation.” Meanwhile, it is necessary to empathise that humanitarian cooperation has nothing in common with the Western doctrines of humanitarian interventionism and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Humanitarian cooperation covers cooperation in the sphere of education, science, arts, sports, tourism and mass media. These are the areas that are traditionally seen as part of PD in other countries (Simons, 2018). So, although humanitarian cooperation is a foreign policy instrument, because of the diversity of its actions, it attracts a great variety of activities and actors involved. In this book, humanitarian cooperation is analysed as synonymous to public diplomacy (what is true if we look at the field activities), while we should admit that in Russian academic discourse these terms are seen as separate—humanitarian cooperation being broader than PD.
Target Audience
Russian public diplomacy is targeted at foreign audiences with “international orientation”—present political and economic elites, tomorrow’s future leaders and decision-makers (“movers and shakers”) and potential tourists and investors.
There is one peculiarity of segmentation of target audience for Russia and other post-Soviet states. Due to the demonstrated respect of the state sovereignty of the partner states, usually, they are not attracting critically thinking circles of neighbouring states in PD initiatives. PD events usually attract mainly representatives of official institutions and academia and semi-governmental structures, not those who can be seen as opposition. It brings benefits for the current relationships with the political leaders of neighbouring states, but in case of the regime change, there are no “movers and shakers” to build cooperation with.
Geographically, target audience of Russian public diplomacy may be divided into “top priority” partners (Eurasian formats–Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU ), the Greater Eurasia), “difficult partners” (Euro-Atlantic community), “needing aid” (receivers of the humanitarian aid) and “interested in dialogue” (BRICS, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Vietnam and Singapore).
Message
Russia promotes a message of support for multilateralism (not multipolar, as it may be only two poles, but polycentric world); the central role of the United Nations in international affairs with the role of safeguarding nation state’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,18 and the non-interference in internal affairs. With this message, Russia looks for partners to help promote this message—be it Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU ), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) or other integration formats.
Russia’s public diplomacy is and will continue to work to counter what Kennan called “the legalistic-moralistic approach” to international problems. Russia insists that coercive democratisation can bring nothing but harm to states with a specific way of development, and that the nation state is the only reliable guarantor of world order. Russian approach towards public diplomacy differs from the Western one, appealing to the human rights agenda, democratisation, transparency and the rule of law. Undoubtedly, a set of rights like free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of religion and equality for men and women under the rule of law is universal. But Russia would not agree that values prevail over national interests.
Russia’s position on Syria, Iraq and Libya was translated through PD and strategic communications mechanisms were warmly welcomed by millions of ordinary people all over the world. However, Russia still has much untapped potential in offering its own framework on international engagement through PD methods. Besides monitoring the “free world” by countering coercive democratisation, another Russian message is protecting traditional values. According to Professor Nicholas Cull,19 when analysing these Russian PD efforts, we should admit that they find understanding in many corners of the world.
However, the basic foundational guiding idea of PD as an interactive and mutually beneficial activity that creates relationships between Russia and foreign publics in order to facilitate the realisation of a more favourable image and reputation and policy in exchange for something (based upon culture, education, sport, business, R & D and other spheres) remains central to the aims and goals of the activity. The importance of which is further elevated and heightened during periods of international competition and conflict.
Regional Priorities
Analysing Russian public diplomacy, it is impossible to neglect its regional surrounding, which constitutes its top foreign policy goal,20 and the vast amount of its efforts abroad are focused in close proximity to it. Meanwhile, this is a region of growing importance situated in the crossroads between the “East-West” and “North-South” trade routes in the heart of Eurasia. Located on the historical and modern Silk Road, it is still developing its public diplomacy strategy. Still, the recent trends demonstrate that Eurasian states are about to offer new PD agenda in frames of the Greater Eurasia initiative (flexible integration platform with the involvement of the members of the Eurasian Economic Union—EAEU , the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN21).
Countries of the region brand themselves as platforms for political negotiations (e.g. Minsk summit over Ukraine—2015, Astana and Moscow with the Syria talks—2017–2018, decision of Ashkhabad to host United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia since 2007). Eurasian countries attract tourists through cultural heritage, but at the same time, they are trying to create a unique self-distinctive, modern image by building functioning institutions.
The PD of Russia and other Eurasian countries is closely correlated with nation branding. And there are some common features. These countries organise costly nation-branding events (like Olympic and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Games in Russia, World Expo in Kazakhstan/World Nomad games/World Kokpar Championship in Kyrgyzstan), instead of solving burning internal problems. Also clear communication strategy is only introduced (e.g. Astana Expo 2017 commercials were not very convincing in comparison with Dubai 2020).
There is still work to be done for the successful PD strategy in the region. One of the key elements contributing towards sustainable development of the Eurasian countries is the dialogue of civil societies and expert communities. And in this sense, PD is crucially important, as far as it fosters long-lasting process of regional cooperation. Based on different formats of relationships, it enables not only to listen to the neighbour’s opinion but also to hear it. Still, a lot needs to be done, new tools need to be implemented in order to harmonise the relations, strengthen much-needed trust and mutual understanding between countries of Eurasian region. Neighbourhood worries should be taken into account.
Analysis
Russian public diplomacy is facing various problems. One of the serious problems for Russian PD is that administrative structures have enough resources for international cooperation, while academic institutions are facing the lack of finances. Almost no field studies in the top priority countries are conducted by Russian MA and PhD students. Some Russian initiatives are very disputable. It looks like Russia is fond of establishing monuments rather than going to the universities of its partner states. Russian language is one of the main Russian assets in the region. But the title of the key foundation promoting Russian language “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World/Russia Peace) meets negative connotation in its neighbouring countries (we can imagine how American English-language promoting structure “Pax Ameriсana” would be perceived in Mexico). It was created in addition to the world-recognised The Pushkin State Russian Language Institute (Pushkin Institute) founded by USSR in 1966, having 300,000 alumni only in Cuba.
Measurement problem exists. Sometimes Russian access to PD success depends on the amount of people involved in the PD programmes (preferably big forums and costly nation-branding events) rather than on the in-depth definition of the target audience and media coverage of the project.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to empathise that till recently Russian PD initiatives were focused on intergovernmental relations or projects with cultural intelligentsia neglecting the work with civil society and expert community. The problem of people working in this sphere is very sensitive. During the 1990s, it seems that the Russians forgot how to actively engage with the foreign public, and when the Federal Agency responsible for it, Rossotrudnichestvo, was created, some people working there had no idea of how to engage a foreign target audience. A lot has changed since then. Brilliant professionals like Ambassadors Alexander Axenenok, Leonid Drachevskiy, Igor Ivanov, Igor Khalevinskiy and Eleonora Mitrofanova are contributing greatly towards the realisation of Russian PD.
Unfortunately, Russian civil society is not widely involved in public diplomacy. There are various reasons for this—from the administrative barriers to the misunderstanding of businesses on the importance of nation branding. We are also witnessing the lack of actors, especially of independent ones. Russian civil society involved in international cooperation is legally cut from Western finances, while local resources may be received mainly from administrative institutions.22 As a result, as it is mentioned by Professor Tatiana Zonova, “currently, there are 51 Russian NGOs that enjoy consultative status with the ECOSOC, which amounts to only 1.5% of the total number of NGOs worldwide with such a status.”23 As a result of this situation, people entering into this field can hardly survive in this restrictive atmosphere.
Some General Observations
There are a number of common observations that can be deduced as a result of the information and knowledge of the chapters in the form of conclusions and lessons, some of which were brought up in the Introduction. Across many of the chapters in this book, it is clear that the latest public diplomacy front line is found in social media. This definitely increases the relevance, importance and activity on social media, with different forms of communicative and interactive forms of diplomacy by international actors that include Russia. This form of public diplomacy interaction offers a means to negate the traditional geopolitical constraints of time and space, which limited an actor’s ability to communicate and engage with audiences in order to compete with other competitors for global influence. Digital diplomacy offers an instantaneous means to engage geographically dispersed audiences at a relatively low cost. Given that Russia has positioned itself as being in opposition to what it sees as the negative influence of US-led foreign policy and the US is more powerful in economic and military terms, soft power and public diplomacy offer an asymmetric means of engaging global audiences. This is at a time when there are changes in how geopolitics is waged in an increasingly unstable and volatile system of international relations. Mathew Fraser speaks of geopolitics 2.0; he notes three significant shifts: (1) states to individuals; (2) real world to virtual world mobilisation and power; and (3) old media to new media. He also notes that states have reacted to these changes by either censoring and/or deploying web platforms to achieve their goals and assert their influence (Fraser, 2009). This is an ideal environment for the potential of public diplomacy, especially given the recent lack of progress by traditional government-to-government diplomacy in resolving the existing tensions and issues.
Digital diplomacy offers Russia a potential route around the gatekeepers of mainstream media that tend to emphasise negative news and characteristics. The many-to-many forms of interactive communication that is central to social media facilitates public diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy efforts through enabling direct contact, communication, interaction and collaboration between individuals and groups. These form the basis of mutually beneficial relationships in the sphere of politics, economics, culture and other areas. As noted by the authors, the various programmes have not reached their full potential for various reasons in this demanding and competitive information environment.
One of the issues that was discussed in the Introduction was the characterisation or labelling of Russian communications efforts as being hybrid warfare or propaganda. These concepts and practices were defined, and imply the use of deception, manipulation and subversion of a societal and the governmental structures. In other words, this is not a relational partnership or collaboration, but rather an entirely asymmetric one-way transactional relationship that would only benefit the Russian government. The various chapters demonstrate that the means used to create and maintain relationships through communicational activities within the realm of public diplomacy demonstrate a reciprocal intent and collaborative approach. All five components of public diplomacy that are identified by Cull (2008)—listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting—have been deployed in Russia’s programmes. This has caused controversy in mainstream media and political circles, which tend to assume and project the worst and most sinister of intentions, while conflating measure of activity with measure of effect (MOE). Russia also views many Western activities and intentions with the same lens of cynical and sinister intent. This seems to be connected to the current appalling state of relations at the governmental level between the West and Russia, where a significant trust deficit is clearly evident in a gradually worsening cycle of relations at this level.
Russia’s approach to the theory and practice has been stated as different, but there are similarities as well. In this regard, Russia’s application and intent of public diplomacy are not differing from other countries’ practice, which is about gaining influence and securing foreign policy goals. The activities of Russia’s public diplomacy programmes that are highlighted in the chapters of this book are intended to generate a more positive image of the country and its people. This is done through focusing on the different competitive advantages that are possessed, for example, cultural attractions, business opportunities or common goals that enhance human security (to mitigate such risks as environmental degradation or reducing the risk of armed conflict). Certainly, the attention paid to such foreign policy tools as soft power and nation branding, although not strictly public diplomacy, is aimed at creating a competitive identity for Russia on the global stage during a period of intense competition and conflict. In comparison to Western approaches, Russia’s approach to public diplomacy is more tactical and operational in nature, seeking relatively modest cultural and/or political and/or economic goals in a particular country or region. These efforts are also characteristically having a more active governmental involvement and less non-governmental involvement. The effectiveness of the public diplomacy efforts is limited by the institutional organisation structure of Russian public diplomacy that is limited by the effects of stove piping as a result of different competing organisations’ lack of coordination and apparent lack of cooperation. There is no one lead organisation that coordinates and directs the resources and efforts of the public diplomacy programmes.
Perspectives
Analysing possible steps to undertake, it becomes clear that fostering PD ties with the top priority partners could help in creating a positive agenda. What is urgently needed for Russian PD is the prioritisation of the target audience. The limited resources spent on the various forums and youth festivals could bring more international dividends if they were also spent on academic exchanges. While Russia organises costly nation-branding events, Russian scholars have no free budget on international projects, and academic diplomacy suffers seriously.
A hallmark feature of Russian public diplomacy is not using “countering” component against foreign propaganda/violent extremism, which is seen as the part of the strategic communications , not a PD narrative. Russian PD is used mainly for attracting partnerships and building dialogue with the difficult partners. Through its public diplomacy, Russia promotes the message that the nation state is the only reliable guarantor of international peace and stable world order.
The importance of international dialogue and empathy during times of confrontation is increasingly important. Public diplomacy, at the moment, is in a state of flux due to the introduction of digital tools, the emergence of global conflicts and paralysis in international/multilateral forums. PD can be used to bring nations closer together even while their delegates go head to head at the UN. Public diplomacy (and even pathways to prosperity—P2P) initiatives would be very timely to de-escalate global disarray. History proves that détente talks had started in the period of most serious confrontation in the 1970s. Similar public diplomacy tools should be implemented. Regardless of the difficulties in Russian-Western relations, according to the latest Foreign Policy concept, strategic priority is to “establish a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific by harmonising and aligning interests of European and Eurasian integration processes, which is expected to prevent the emergence of dividing lines on the European continent.”24 With regard to dialogue on de-weaponising public diplomacy, excluding strategic communications component should be high on the agenda. Even in the Cold War era, there were direct negotiations on influence operations and disinformation campaigns.25 Nowadays, when official diplomacy often becomes deadlocked, public diplomacy could become very timely.
Future Research
During the course of research and writing this volume, a number of issues and aspects of public diplomacy are in obvious need of further academic and intellectual attention. There is a growing amount of work being published on the topic of public diplomacy by non-Western countries, even if there is still a relatively disproportionate amount of attention paid to the likes of the United States, France, the UK and other leading Western international actors. In some regards, this book can be considered as a modest step in “De-Westernising” the research agenda on public diplomacy using the Russian Federation as an example of a non-Western international actor that is seeking to generate influence and a place on the world stage. There are many more countries that make up the non-Western world, which offer a wealth of potential research that can broaden and expand the current focus and knowledge of the conceptualisation and practice of public diplomacy.
Also linked to the subject of this particular book, which covers not only the contemporary period of Russian public diplomacy but also the historical origins provides a “laboratory” and a timeline that enables an examination of its evolution. This enables opportunities for detailed studies on the organisational learning, similarities and differences of historical and contemporary approaches to the conceptualisation and practice of public diplomacy, and the environmental specificities that shape the needs and approaches. Of course, this applies to all countries and not just Russia. It can potentially provoke such lines of inquiry and questioning as looking for the examples of best practice, successes and failures of public diplomacy, whether history has a habit of repeating itself.
This leads on further to exploring the age-old problem and dilemma of measure of activity (MOA) versus measure of effect (MOE). Researchers and practitioners alike have been tempted to equate MOA with MOE, which can produce false or misleading results. Research needs to explore much more stringently and critically how these two measures are and are not related. A much greater in-depth exploration of the presence or absence of connections and influence between these measures could be undertaken, although this is a very tall order to undertake in a conclusive and meaningful manner.
An aspect and product of the current hyper-politicised research environment is the projection and construction of moralised and ethical lenses to human activity. Although this approach may be helpful at times, its subjective overuse will ensure that the object or subject of study will not be objectively understood in terms of the concrete motivations and likely to be subjectively misunderstood via presumed diametrically opposing sets of constructed morally/ethically framed projections. This situation has created a “weaponisation” of the public diplomacy narrative. To “de-weaponise” public diplomacy requires being able to separate it from other forms of political communication, such as the over-conflation with propaganda. This stems from the current global search for actor legitimacy at the expense of the opponent/competitor, but creates confusion and incorrect assumptions. Certainly, public diplomacy may use elements of strategic communication or international broadcasting, but it is a higher order form of mass communication. Therefore, the future research agenda could look at the tactical or operational role of these elements and concepts of mass communication as being part of the communication process and not as the whole of the process.