Motivation and the Idea Behind This Book
Approximately two years ago, the idea behind this book was hatched at a conference held in Moscow at the Diplomatic Academy. This was prompted by observing the increasing popular and academic interest being shown in Russian foreign policy and public diplomacy, which produced a flurry of publications on these issues. There has been, at times, highly heated debates on Russian foreign policy, including public diplomacy, where very wide spectra of opinions and views have been expressed by an equally wide variety of academics, journalists, practitioners, policy makers and others. As such, we perceived the need to produce a systematic study of Russian public diplomacy as a concept and as a practice by a team of experienced authors with the requisite knowledge and experience to address several underlying avenues of inquiry.
There are a series of questions behind the logic of the chapters and the larger picture that the sum of the chapters seeks to address. What is Russian public diplomacy exactly? There have been many suppositions and projections by a wide variety of sources, from think tanks to government reports, from media reports to academic research. Some of these publications and assumptions seem to have little to do with the reality on the ground. Many foreign and Russian scholars have researched and published on aspects of Russian public diplomacy, mostly in the form of journal articles or reports. But there has been no definitive book-length volume researched and written by Russian scholars and practitioners to date. Therefore, there is a need for a systematic approach to address the issue comprehensively and broadly.
The next logical question concerns the measure of activity question. What does Russian public diplomacy look like, historically and contemporarily? As noted with the above-mentioned question, there seems to be a lot of guesswork, conjecture and projection as to how Russian public diplomacy manifests itself; it is far from being a homogenous set of activities and measures. In addition, given the current state of international relations that are at the current low ebb, in what some have come to characterise as being a New Cold War. This gives rise to the temptation to demonise or mischaracterise what is not understood or is “feared.” The conflation of Russian public diplomacy as only and simply “propaganda” misses the point of the exercise and purpose of those communications through a system of name calling that is intended to discredit Russian public diplomacy without addressing the questions raised in a systematic and objective manner.
A third and final line of inquiry is the one that is leading to the question on the measure of influence. Just how effective are Russia’s numerous public diplomacy programmes and efforts? This is the hardest question to conclusively and convincingly answer. The task is made more difficult by the presumed “mighty” powers of Russian communications, which have been associated deliberately at times with the communications of the Islamic State (Simons & Sillanpaa, 2016). This has the effect of creating a myth, but one that is based on shaky intellectual and academic grounds. One of the mistakes often made is to equate the measure of activity as being the measure of effect of an information and communication campaign. Because an information operation or an influence activity is conducted, it does not automatically translate into influence and persuasive effect.
The Current State of International Relations
Currently, there is a global crisis in terms of diverging interests in international relations and geopolitical issues, which has witnessed an increase in political tensions around the world as a result of increased competition and conflict between countries and blocks of countries. The reasons given for the development of the current situation vary considerably. The use of a specific story narrative seems to take place, which makes use of very specific norms and values, as well as a dialectic struggle between two extremely opposed political and ideological forces. A result of the situational context is that communications can be used to shut down dialogue and interaction, rather than to promote or encourage it, where emotion-laden values and norms are used in place of “cold” and logical “facts.” The result seems to be these messages are communicated to influence and not to inform global audiences. In addition, the present situation is often juxtaposed against the familiar past. A point of view is that the United States treated the end of the Cold War more as a victory rather than an opportunity.
But the Cold War as an ideological struggle disappeared only in part, despite Communism’s implosion. On the American side, not so much had changed on that day (dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991). The Cold War was over, and the United States had won it. But most Americans still believed that they could only be safe if the world looked more like their own country and of the world’s governments abided by the will of the United States.1
According to the author of the New York Times opinion piece, the United States sought to capitalise on its advantage offered by the Soviet collapse and impose its will upon other countries in a manner that stressed power projection, territorial control and regime change. However, a number of challenges have begun to emerge in the twenty-first century, not least of which is the gradual rise of military and economic power in the East and its decline in Europe. Various challengers to the United States’ role as the global hegemonic power have emerged, such as radical Islam, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, Mike Pompeo, publicly stated that the main threats to US national security and national interests were international terrorism (namely al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—ISIS); North Korea; a resurgent Iran; Russia; and other state and non-state actors that use information to subvert democracies (naming Wikileaks and hostile non-state actor intelligence services).2 However, opinion does diverge on the issue of the assumed and perceived risks, such as the Russian threat, for example, which is matched on the opposing geopolitical side.
There is also the issue of threat perception and opinion from countries other than those found in the European Union (EU) and the United States. A Pew Poll conducted across nearly 42,000 respondents from 38 different countries around the globe on perceived threats to their country during February–May 2017 presents a different picture. The most widely perceived threats were from the Islamic State (62%) and global climate change (61%). Threats emanating from countries saw a global average ranked US power and influence (35%), Russian power and influence (31%) and Chinese power and influence (31%) as the three lowest ranked threats.3 Similar polls are conducted in Russia as to perceived threats and enemies of Russia and Russians. A poll conducted by the Levada Centre established these perceptions for 2017:
Identifying the top enemies of Russia, the poll picks on the US, specifically President Donald Trump for the top spot, with Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany occupying the big ‘foes’ spaces. […]. Interestingly, the average Russian identified radical Islamism and Islamic extremism as an important threat/enemy. They consider Trump, Ukraine, Europe, Islamic State terror group and corruption to be the greatest threats to Russia.4
The global information environment is becoming less free and more constrained in the resulting struggle for legitimacy versus demonisation, giving wind to such contemporary fads as “fake” news and supposed actions to fight this projected menace. In this increasing tense geopolitical environment, a number of initiatives have been launched by actors to try and discredit the negative reportage on them from foreign sources. For example, the European Union’s East StratCom and Disinformation Review (https://euvsdisinfo.eu/) and the corresponding initiatives in countries such as China and Russia.5 This has come at a time when public trust and confidence in the mainstream media have been falling.6 In such an increasingly toxic environment, it is difficult to source reliable and accurate news at a point in time when it is needed the most.
A similar trend is observed in Russia and other countries that seek to create a narrative of an official national enemy in order to prime and mobilise their publics. There is a rapidly spiralling decline in relations between Russia and the West in terms of official state-to-state level relations too. Observers on the different geopolitical sides are increasingly warning of the unpredictable direction of the current global crisis. The tit-for-tat sanctions between the United States and EU versus Russia have caused both sides to become increasingly fatigued with each other at a time when the channels of communication between them are becoming increasingly restricted, and political calls for a tougher stance on the other are gaining pace.
If there is one thing that the overwhelming majority of policymakers and experts in Moscow and Washington now agree on is that the current crisis is that the current crisis in US-Russia relations is spiralling in its character, systemic in its nature and lingering in its resolution prospects. The rest of the discourse is ripped between narratives of who’s to blame for what and interpretations on just how reasonable the US sanctions are or asymmetric Russia’s response is.7
There are an increasing number of stories appearing in the media that are documenting the gradually increasing tensions in Europe, which emphasise a narrative of the Cold War. The New York Times ran a headline in August 2017—US Troops Train in Eastern Europe to Echoes of the Cold War8 or in Reuters a headline Russia: Pence Balkans Comments Expose Washington’s Cold War Ideology.9 Warnings have begun to appear in mainstream media headlines, such as the Washington Post’s We’re on the Road to a New Cold War.10 Others have resisted referring to the situation of the confrontation (in particular, originating in the wake of Euromaidan and Crimea) between the West and Russia as a ‘new’ Cold War, yet still categorising Russia and the West as adversaries (Legvold, 2014). There are other voices that say there is no doubt that a “new” Cold War is under way.
Henry Kissinger one of the most prominent geopolitical thinkers from the United States for the last decades states that there is a ‘new’ Cold War and that part of the blame rests with the West and its lack of willingness to take non-Western actors’ security and national interests into account. The result he claims has been an imbalance in international relations, which is exacerbated by the West not being “honest” with itself.11 Zbigniew Brzezinski, another prominent geopolitical thinker, also assessed that a ‘new’ Cold War had begun, referencing the point in time in line with the events in Ukraine and Crimea in particular. Although he did not see the situation as a threat as Kissinger does, but rather a positive sign that the world was “standing up to” Russia.12 However, what has been described here is only one relatively small part of a much larger and more complex series of events and processes in the global crisis.
There are a number of critical and inherent problems concerning researching the question as to whether a ‘new’ Cold War exists or not. One of these is that this is a relatively new and recent phenomenon. Therefore, there has been insufficient time, in some regards, for a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the current situation. The seemingly obvious point where the crisis broke through to popular public attention came with events occurring on the Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014.
However, the greater problem is the very highly politicised nature of the current global crisis, where narratives and knowledge production are used by the competing sides to bestow legitimacy upon their causes and to erode the perceived legitimacy of their opponents. A result of this situation is that there are parallel subjective discussions on the issue, where the participants rarely, if ever, meet face to face. These become echo chambers and forums of confirmation of a pre-determined perspective or point of view rather than a critical investigation and analysis of genuine critical questions on matters that have a great impact upon global society currently, with prospects of a worsening situation in the near future.
In 2008, Richard Sakwa published a paper on the debate concerning the dynamics of Russian foreign policy and the “regime question” (concerning Vladimir Putin’s rule). Sakwa contends that Cold War patterns of thinking began to emerge in connection to the discussion of Russia and its role in the world. For example, Richard Shirreff and Maciej Olex-Szczytowski’s report Arming for Deterrence: How Poland and NATO Should Counter a Resurgent Russia from 2015 that assumes Russia’s hostile military intent against the West is based upon notions of opposing sets of norms and values. The report goes as far as to categorically state that “Russia has thus become the most serious geopolitical and military threat to NATO” (page 1). This characterisation very much fits with Buzan’s (2006) characterisation of a possible “new” Cold War based on the premises of the “old” Cold War. The end of the “old” Cold War saw the US military as being put in an awkward position in terms of its assumed opponent, which was understood as a mass army based on the Warsaw Pact. However, it soon found itself on unfamiliar grounds in getting caught in various insurgencies, which it has not proved particularly well suited for in either doctrine or tactics. The possible emergence of a “new” Cold War would place it on much more familiar grounds with a conventional state-based opponent.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Donbas, and continued threats to Ukraine and other European countries not only menace the stability of the post-Cold War order in Europe, but also pose a fundamental challenge to the assumptions about the strategic environment that have undergirded the NATO alliance for the past quarter of a century. (Kroenig, 2015, p. 49)
The logic used to reach such conclusions, by many concerned, is a path of understanding one’s own security and interest objectives. However, this is often done without understanding the other actor’s sets of security and interest objectives, the information and knowledge available to them in reaching the policy and strategy decisions that are made. Therefore, it is critical to understand not only what drives the “us” side but also the equivalent factors that influence the “other.” The main case study used in the “new” Cold War research involves the scenario of Russia against the West (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO and the European Union in particular). However, other Cold War scenarios do exist, such as in the Middle East (Gause, 2014), as a result of Obama’s “Asia Pivot” (Ross, 2012), Latin America and other geopolitical hot spots. Hence, it is hoped that this book may serve as some modest and small step towards an understanding through providing the opportunity for those that seek to understand more completely and comprehensively the complex state of international relations from the perspective of the workings of Russian foreign policy through its public diplomacy.
Public Diplomacy and Soft Power
This section intends to introduce public diplomacy as a concept and a practice in the most generic sense; the intention is to provide the reader with a general introduction in order that they can then contextualise Russia’s definition and practice. These concepts and practices, such as public diplomacy, soft power and branding, will be brought up in the chapters of this book. Public diplomacy is an activity that governments and individuals engaged in long before the actual term was first officially coined. The term came about in the United States during the period of the Cold War in 1965, when the Dean of Diplomacy at Tufts University, Edmund Gullion, launched the Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy. This was at least, in part, an attempt to distance the practice of international information and exchange from the tainting effects of the then dominant term “propaganda” (Cowan & Cull, 2008, p. 6). Cull (2008) argues that there are five components to public diplomacy—listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting. These are all instruments in the creation and facilitation of networks and relationships.
Public diplomacy has been viewed by some scholars as a communicative instrument in a broad understanding of governance in order to manage international relationships, reputations and events within the context of the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. “Public diplomacy operates through actions, relationships, images and words in three time frames: 24/7 news streams, medium-range campaigns on high-value policies, and long-term engagement” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). As to a precisely defined term, there is no universal consensus among the academic community, and it is highly contested. Each academic discipline tends to view public diplomacy from its own perspective, together with the inherent strengths and weaknesses (Sevin, 2017, pp. 20–29). Traditionally, public diplomacy has been about government’s effort to communicate to global publics in an effort to inform, influence and engage them in support of national objectives and foreign policy. However, it has evolved to include “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (Snow, 2009, p. 6). Therefore, there is an element of international competition between states for influence and power in a competitive environment via acts of communication that involve both word and deed.
Although public diplomacy and soft power are not the same thing (Hayden, 2012, p. 286), they are key tools used in the process. There are clear connections and links between branding and soft power with public diplomacy. For example, Nye (2008, p. 97) states that the “soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).” These aspects are open to interpretation, given that global audiences are not homogenous in their held sets of beliefs, values and norms. Hayden notes and acknowledges soft power as being an extremely vague concept, and whether it is a resource or behaviour that is being referred to. However, he provides a means of analysing soft power and public diplomacy. “First, scope represents the idealised audiences to soft power efforts—who matters as important to an agent’s attempts to cultivate some kind of influence, whether through agenda-setting, persuasion, or some other form of attraction” (2012, p. 278). It is also noted by Hayden (ibid.) that scope also refers to the manner in which audiences are engaged as subjects to be influenced, persuaded and convinced.
Branding a nation is a relatively recent concept, which has gained attention and attraction. How countries represent themselves on the global stage is where brand management (as practised in the commercial world) and public diplomacy meet. “It is public diplomacy, twined with brand management, that underpins the idea of Competitive Identity” (Anholt, 2007, p. 12). One of the questions posed by Peter van Ham (2008, p. 128) is whether a branding campaign launched by a state can induce people to “buy” the “product” offered, which for intents and purposes relates to the goals (real and perceived) of its foreign policy. Further, van Ham argues that “image and reputation may have said to become essential parts of the state’s strategic equity. Similar to commercial brands, image and reputation are built on factors such as trust and customer satisfaction.” Therefore, a brand is a bridge within the practice of public diplomacy as a means of accumulating a reserve of soft power through creating value in the relationship between the communicator and the audience. As noted by van Ham, “place branding, as part of soft power, centres around concepts like values, norms, and rules in international politics” (2008, p. 145). There do, however, exist two conceptual differences between nation-branding and public diplomacy. Firstly, the level of effort required for a nation-(re)branding project far exceeds the scale of that required for most public diplomacy campaigns (by necessity a much more holistic approach). “Second, nation-branding accentuates a country’s identity and reflects its aspirations, but it cannot move much beyond existing social realities” (Melissen, 2005, p. 20). In other words, it is a form of reshaping of a country’s self-image and shaping an identity that is intended to make the rebranded country more unique and noticeable in the global competition for attention and influence.
Russian Communications as a Threat
This section is far from being exhaustive owing to the constraints of space, the topic is worthy of no less than a large article through to a book-length work in order to do the topic justice and it is also not the primary concern of this introduction. But the topic of perceptions and projections of Russian communications needs to be addressed, at least briefly. This follows from, and is influenced by, the strained current state of international relations that in turn influences how politics, mass media and academia react and reflect on the issue. As noted above, Russian communications, including public diplomacy, have associations of deceptive and harmful intent on the target audience. Therefore, not at all involving mutually beneficial exchanges, but more concerns the deliberate subversion of the fabric of ‘democratic’ society.
The term “hybrid warfare” has been used to describe the general intent and framework of Russian communications, although it is a very poorly defined term that has a multitude of meanings. “Evidence” of the existence of Russian hybrid warfare came with the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, an article by the Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov. However, anyone who read the original text (in Russian) understood that this was a call to develop a scientific approach to counteracting Western hybrid warfare against Russia.13 As such, the projections and assumptions are more in line with the practice and intent of information operations. Writings that create a link between information operations and public diplomacy have been published, such as Lord’s (2007) chapter on the need to reorganise US public diplomacy to meet the new needs of the Global War On Terrorism. As the specific term “information operations” (IO) has been mentioned, it is necessary to give a precise definition of the term and practice. The US Department of Defence offers a good definition of IO.
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. (Paul, 2008, p. 2)
This definition reveals the offensive and defensive nature of the operations and intent from the perspective of the US military; it reveals the very broad nature of those operations and certainly many of these have been associated with Russia’s international communications. Paul (2008, p. 10) also notes that IO is subordinate to and supportive of strategic communications and public diplomacy. How does this apply to Russia? A lot of blame has been attributed to Russia as a country and to Vladimir Putin as the President, which includes “meddling” in various elections, threatening various neighbouring countries, “undermining” the West and its institutions and poisoning political opponents abroad. As such, it created anxiety and worry. This situation has also led to increased political, economic and military tensions, hence the gradual invocation of the concept of a “New Cold War.”
While these accusations are worrying, there has also been noted a tendency to make use of association or assertions, which is noted in such critical media as Consortium News or Media Lens. The use of less than transparent organisations as Prop Or Not14 or the more recent Institute of Statecraft’s Integrity Initiative,15 have revealed the role of these organisations in shaping the information and knowledge environment. There are an increasing number of accounts beginning to doubt the depth and scale of Russian “operations,” such as the level of involvement in the US 2016 presidential elections,16 even while the Mueller Investigation continues. This makes the information environment highly contradictory and confusing in an atmosphere of competing subjective and politicised interpretations of “reality.”
This is not to say that Russia does not pursue its interests and opportunities, which may or may not coincide with the West. It is the characterisation of the communications that can be misleading, such as contacts between diplomats and political candidates before or during an elections, which is common practice by most countries and including Western democracies. As seen in the US 2016 election, this was projected as being evidence of Russian interference with Trump, while at the same time ignoring the links and connections Hillary Clinton had with Russia.17 Rather than strictly being a reality, it is concerning a subjective interpretation of the reality for the appearance of political credibility and legitimacy, which is what happens in Russia too.
External Perceptions and Interpretations of Russian Public Diplomacy
Given the above-mentioned context of the poor state of international relations in the contemporary times, the issue of Russia’s international communications is a high-profile topic, where foreign audiences often have a strong opinion. There are divergent views on the quality and quantity of those communications by non-Russian observers, some of the views expressed are deeply negative and suspicious, and others can be more objective, and there are those that take a more positive view. Given that this book is almost entirely the work of Russian academics and practitioners, it is necessary to provide the viewpoints of other observers on Russia’s foreign policy and public diplomacy.
In this informational conflict that is a result of the current New Cold War, there are two primary camps—those that project Russia as a security threat and those that dismiss the threat. Both of these arguments have the potential to influence policy and decision makers for better or worse. Naturally, real enemies pose a challenge and threat in terms of their management. However, the process can be clear and logical. An imagined enemy, on the other hand, can prove to be more dangerous. The reason is that potential real threats can be overlooked or ignored, and resources are wasted on countering something that does not exist.18 A variety of views of Russia’s role in foreign policy and the related implied security dimensions, where the evaluation and interpretation of international communications form a crucial aspect of the narratives.
One of the narratives19 of the information war is that Russia is a threat, not only to its immediate neighbours (Lucas, June 2015; Darczewska, May 2014; Berzins, April 2014) but also to the wider West.20 There are a number of aspects in common to this particular line—Russia is winning an insidious propaganda war against, democracy, freedom and the West. In addition, Russia is dividing the West and shall gradually take (by open military action or subversion) country after country. For the purposes of this book, propaganda is defined as being, in the most neutral sense, “to disseminate or promote particular ideas” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 2). However, the term and practice of propaganda is rarely perceived in a neutral sense. “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 7). Therefore, to counter this given threat, various logic is offered to remedy the situation, such as all countries need to unite under NATO,21 increase military spending, increase a sense of political unity and purpose and to increase funding for counter-propaganda.
The counter-message, which is derived from various sources in Western and Russian media outlets, state that the narrative of the Russian threat is a myth,22 Russia is not an enemy23 and that the threat is in fact Western propaganda against Russia.24 The main argument used by this side is that there is an information war in progress, which is being waged in the global information space. They claim that many of the assertions made by the other side are not supported by clear and objective references. For example, it is cited in Sputnik that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey states that Russia is a threat, yet also simultaneously concludes that he does not know what Russia intends. The weakness of the Russian threat narrative is used to undermine the credibility of those claims.
The above-mentioned dimensions of the information war seem to have created a number of different and not necessarily related conclusions. One of those conclusions, which is related to the side of Russia and those arguing against Russia as a threat is that when Russia plays by the West’s rules, it tends to lose the “game” to those that have established it. Therefore, Russia needs to establish its own rules of the “game” if it hopes to be able to be triumphant.25 By “rules of the game,” it is implied that the actor that establishes the geopolitical rules in engaging in international politics and affairs possesses an advantage over their competitors and rivals. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been holding this position—the actor who determines the rules of the game (i.e. managing and influencing international affairs). A second conclusion, which seems to be increasingly projected by more neutral or non-aligned sides is that there is an increasing risk of inadvertent war as a result of the increasingly dangerous geopolitical games that are being waged through informational and proxy wars.
The standing of the information war between Russia and the West at this point in time, according to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius, Russian messages and narratives fill the information void from the lack of communication by Western counterparts in post-Soviet space.26 A lot of misunderstanding of the Russian effort is generated by blurring distinctions and through the use of popular catch phrases and slogans. An example of the blurring of distinctions can be found in the work of Eellend and Frank (2015) in FOI’s Strategic Outlook 6, where they discuss Russia’s aims on page 17, but then concentrate on tactics rather than any grand strategic objectives that may be behind those tactics. A weakness of this report was the absence of any references, which has the effect of rendering the information to the level of opinion as it is not possible to verify the sources used to generate the information. Without understanding the desired end state, the value of the individual parts is of little knowledge value. There is also the issue of reference to popular catchphrases and slogans, such as “lying 24/7” or that everything is just “propaganda” or to “litter the news with half-truths and quarter truths” (Aron, 2015). This has the effect of obscuring the task and ability of objectively looking at the problem in order to derive an appropriate solution.
Coming more strictly and directly to the subject of academic assessment and interpretation of public diplomacy reveals a diverse understanding and evaluation. Although the framing of Russia’s public diplomacy is not vastly different in terms of the earlier-mentioned categories. Saari (2014) notes the rising importance and use of public diplomacy in Russian foreign policy; she also notes that global publics tend to be segmented between countries associated with the Near Abroad (former Soviet republics of the USSR) and those countries that are beyond. In her analysis, Saari notes the use of key narratives of public diplomacy that are intended as the basis of a mutual relationship, such as the presence of mutual interest and the respect for national sovereignty. Post-Soviet Russian public diplomacy is evaluated as being more akin to the Soviet-era “active measures” rather than with the association of soft power.
Russia’s interests and goals with its public diplomacy programmes are acknowledged by Rawnsley (2015), who focuses upon the aspect of international broadcasting. He compares China and Russia, together with their ambition “to correct” what are perceived as being distorted information about these countries in the mainstream global information space and to convey the intentions of foreign policy, concluding that this approach runs the “risk” of blurring the line between public diplomacy and propaganda. Propaganda and public diplomacy have been linked together in previous research beyond the strictly Russian context, such as the communications surrounding the war on terrorism and the mediatisation of international politics (Brown, 2003). Other scholars seek to equate Russian public diplomacy with “propaganda” and “active measures,” such as Kragh and Åsberg (2017). However, they fail to even define public diplomacy as either a concept or a practice, thereby rendering the exercise as one where the content is massaged to fit a pre-determined conclusion (i.e. that all Russian communications and foreign policy are harmful and deceitful). However, they fail to provide clear and hard evidence to support the claims. Van Herpen (2016) also builds the logic and argument based on dismissing Russian notions of soft power and public diplomacy as being “propaganda” and of a harmful nature.
A blog on the University of Southern California’s Centre on Public Diplomacy seeks to answer the questions, what is Russian public diplomacy and how does it function. It begins with a warning as to how the issue should not be approached. “‘Russian public diplomacy’ may sound like an oxymoron to many in the West these days. But dismissing the entire effort of an increasingly well-oiled state and media machinery as ‘futile propaganda’ does not do Russia justice and, perhaps more importantly, increases the risk that Western governments (and allies) will continue making the same mistakes that have contributed to the rapid escalation of the current international crisis.”27 Osipova goes on to say that initially Russian public diplomacy sought to imitate Western models of the practice, but in the wake of various conflicts and crises most notably 2008 Georgian-Russian War and the current Ukraine crisis have prompted a re-evaluation of the model of communication that serves them best and have begun “de-Westernising” their approach and tailor it to suit Russia’s specific needs and approach. The Russian approach to creating its unique conceptualisation and application of public diplomacy and even soft power has been noted by Just (2016), who also notes the contradictions in words and deed, such as the current Ukrainian conflict, have a tendency to create limitations on the effectiveness of the communications owing to the contradictions that are seen.
Others take a more pragmatic and goal-oriented approach to understanding Russian public diplomacy. For example, there is the assertion that the primary goal being to project a more positive and attractive image of Russia among the international community, through such mechanisms as issue management. The end goals being diverse, from gaining greater leeway in foreign policy, counter negative stereotypes and images of Russia, attract foreign direct investment to Russian business and industry and much more.28 Russia’s ability to communicate with international audiences has improved considerably in recent years. Russian international communications and especially their public diplomacy are pragmatically based, on specific interests and concrete goals.
Russian public diplomacy attempts to influence foreign publics through relational marketing techniques. The means is related to persuasion, rather than propaganda, owing to the approach and outcomes. Persuasion “is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuade” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 1). This may include politically indirect means, such as discussing or promoting cultural or economic relationships, advantages and opportunities. It can also take the form of a direct political appeal through the use of values and norms, such as Russia being a challenger to US global hegemony (Simons, 2013, 2014, 2015). The message type and format have the potential to appeal to different publics, quite often as a result of resonance to dissatisfied or marginalised individuals and groups present in Western societies (the exact nature of those publics shall be discussed further on in this chapter). There is some aspect of soft power present, but this can also be mixed with hard power and forms of coercion at times (Simons, 2015). These demonstrate a relative sense of flexibility in practice and approach to different publics, different situational contexts and different goals. The flip side is that such flexibility can also lead to perceived contradictions in the message in an increasingly interconnected global network of people and ideas.
Brief Chapter Descriptions
This edited book contains some 13 chapters (in addition to the Introduction and the Conclusion) by different authors on the nature and the role of Russian public diplomacy. These chapters are mostly written by Russian authors who possess a significant amount of academic and practical experience and knowledge on a very broad range of aspects, both historically and contemporarily, of Russian public diplomacy practice and thinking. They manage to not only bring their views, knowledge and experience but also make available Russian language knowledge and thinking on these topics and thereby make them more accessible to a wider audience. The chapters authors take the more neutral approach (i.e. less symbolically loaded) by emphasising Russia’s public diplomacy efforts are about realising the goals of Russian foreign policy through creating functional and mutually beneficial political and economic relationships through creating a more positive image and reputation of Russia on the international stage.
Olga Lebedeva in Chap. 2, “Russian Public Diplomacy: Historical Aspects” considers public diplomacy actors in Russia, including not only states and diplomats but also individuals, groups and institutions involved in intercultural and inter-communal exchange, which influence international relations within the framework of relations between two or more states. This reflects the broad understanding and approach that has been played by public diplomacy, from a Russian point of view, over time. Public diplomacy evolves with time, space and circumstance, but there are also some continuities as well as differences by Russian actors in the foreign policy arena when observing from a longer-term perspective. This chapter begins with the history of the emergence of public diplomacy from the beginning of the formation of the Soviet Union and the creation of Union Society for Cultural Relations up to the present time, even though the practice of Russian public diplomacy stretches far further back in time than this point.
In Chap. 3, Semed A. Semedov and Anastasiya G. Kurbatova on “Russian Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding” deal with discovering the connection between the country’s public diplomacy and nation-branding efforts. The issues of defining target audience, key regions and main instruments of these efforts are identified and analysed. In terms of generating a national brand, the stereotypes, images and reputation not only stem from the efforts of Russia to project a positive brand. There are also the efforts of other countries in projecting a negative brand image of Russia in a zero-sum global game of competitive reputation and brand, where a good brand can offer advantages over one’s rivals in international relations and affairs.
Chapter 4, “Development Diplomacy of the Russian Federation” by Stanislav L. Tkachenko reveals that development assistance recently became a major asset for Russia’s public diplomacy. The aim of development diplomacy (DD) is to accelerate the other state’s social and economic development and to create mutually beneficial international relationships in international affairs, and increase Russia’s influence and reputation. A newly observed trend for Russian diplomacy is the drift towards 3D (Diplomacy, Defense, Development), which is a side-effect of the growing conflict between Russia and Western powers. In the case of Russian Federation, contemporary development diplomacy and public diplomacy (PD) are closely interrelated since key targets of DD is the same as of PD—political elites and public opinion of targeted states. The relationship between DD and PD, especially since beginning of current conflict in spring 2014, is the focus of this chapter.
Natalia Bubnova tackles the topic of “Russia’s Policy and International Cooperation: The Challenges and Opportunities of Soft Power” in Chap. 5. The role of soft power in international relations is steadily increasing from a non-Western centric point of view. A common Russian understanding, of what soft power is exactly and how it should be approached operationally, still is currently lacking. The potential and expectations of what international cooperation and the pursuit of the accumulation of soft power make these topics popular in Russia after a relatively slow start in recognising them. This is very much an aspect under rapid theoretical and operational development and consideration.
In Chap. 6, Natalia Tsvetkova discusses “Russian Digital Diplomacy: A Rising Cyber Soft Power?” The chapter engages in Russia’s digital diplomacy with its political goals, examples and its contribution to Russia’s development of public diplomacy. Russia’s digital diplomacy has evolved through two stages of development so far, with its origins in the early 2000s. Russia redefined its foreign policy aims and goals significantly in 2013, and consequently Russia’s digital diplomacy efforts reflected this change. As noted, initially, the digital diplomacy efforts were influenced by the thinking and efforts of the experience of the United States in this field. However, Russia has moved on from this starting point and has been developing a “native” approach. In spite of the alarm sounded by some Western commentators, the efforts of Russia’s digital diplomacy seem to have some signs of success.
The topic of Alexey Fominykh’s Chap. 7 is “Russian Public Diplomacy Through Higher Education.” Russian governmental initiatives to attract foreign nationals to study in Russian colleges and universities, and the outreach practices of Russian universities abroad as a part of the public diplomacy effort, are the focus of this chapter. Significance is attached to the role of higher education in Russia’s public diplomacy efforts, which is evidenced by the increase in the number of government scholarships for international students, for example. This is a measure of the increasing competition for foreign students in the race to influence young hearts and minds by those countries seeking influence in the current geopolitical environment. There is a clear interdependence between educational and diplomatic entities that constructs a distinct style of international education practices in Russian universities and Russia’s public diplomacy.
Elena Kharitonova and Irina Prokhorenko cover the topic of “Russian Science Diplomacy” in Chap. 8. The international community is facing many common global challenges that require collaborative decisions and responses based on scientific evidence. However, relations between Russia and the West have seriously deteriorated in the past several years, with some observers referring to the emergence of a “New Cold war.” Science diplomacy has become an increasingly popular form of communication and interaction in the last decade. Russia’s approach to science diplomacy, in terms of conceptual development, organisational structure and operational approach, is very much a work in progress. As such, this creates a sense of uncertainty and limits the full potential that can be realised in Russia’s science diplomacy efforts.
“The Role of Civil Society in Russian Public Diplomacy” by Elena Stetsko is the issue of Chap. 9. Civil society as a concept and its institutions required ideological and practical adaptation to Russian realities rather than an imitation of leading Western countries such as the United States. Currently, the place and role of NGOs have been determined by the structure of society and public administration with some NGOs acquiring the status of institutes and/or instruments of public diplomacy. These organisations have been somewhat successful in terms of their public diplomacy role in pursuing Russian foreign policy goals. However, this has been not a problem-free experience as the notion of civil society’s role in public diplomacy is very much a concept and practice under development. Not to mention the daunting role they have before them in trying to develop a positive international image of Russia. A number of differences can also be noted in the practice and approach of Western NGOs’ role in public diplomacy.
Chapter 10, “Multiple Facets of Russian Public Diplomacy in International Organizations: A Case Study,” by Maria Chepurina and Evgeny Kuznetsov covers the role of international organisations, and especially the United Nations system. Russia has since the Soviet times attempted to maintain a strong presence within key bodies of the United Nations system, by nominating its top diplomats and experts to serve in various leading roles in the organisation. This is seen as a possible investment in influence and a means of increasing Russia’s say in key global issues and events. Yet there are a number of problems in Russia’s renewed interest in gaining influence via certain international organisations. One of the responses is the creation of other international organisations with international partners and other countries to compete with US-led international organisations in order to pursue Russian foreign policy goals through this branch of public diplomacy.
“Russian Business Diplomacy in Southeast Asia” by Andrey Bykov and Kirill Solntsev is the subject of Chap. 11. An analysis of the trade and economic relations between Russia and South and Southeast Asia is the focus of this chapter, and the “Turn to the East” policy trend. Business diplomacy has been playing an increasingly important and significant role within Russian foreign policy and the goals it pursues. This is seen within the context of both interstate relations and major international integration associations. The chapter notes crucial differences in the practice of business diplomacy from the Western countries’ approach.
The topic for Chap. 12 by Daria Akhutina is “The Baltic Sea Region: Cooperation in Human Dimension.” The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) has been an area of significance and importance to Russia for centuries owing to different political, economic, trade, military and geopolitical reasons. Recently, the BSR-Russia cooperation moved into the plane of relations on a people-to-people level, which is influenced, in part, due to the poor level of state-state relations. The role of cooperation at the civil society level includes a wide range of different actors. There is a great deal of potential for people-to-people diplomacy as an integral part of soft power and its positive impact, but it remains underestimated and not adequately applied. There is a distinct lack of holistic and systematic approach, which is often consisting of poorly planned activities with no tangible long-lasting results.
Evgeny N. Pashentsev tackles the increased global conflict and competition in Chap. 13 titled “Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America.” Aspects of the Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America are analysed. Attention is paid to the key messages of the leadership of Russia to the countries of the region, the current practice of public diplomacy and the perception of Russia in Latin America. With the apparent winding down of the Global War On Terrorism, which diverted US attention away from Latin America, the situation permitted a number of foreign countries including Russia to gain influence in the region. Russia sought to develop relations in the region for political and economic reasons, which, in the case of economic motivation, has increased with Western economic sanctions on Russia. However, in spite of intentions, Russia’s efforts have faced a number of problems and obstacles.
The final Chap. 14 by Vladimir Morozov and Greg Simons moves to another region of the globe of increased geopolitical competition in “Russia’s Public Diplomacy in the Middle East”. Russia has been steadily regaining a presence and influence in the Middle East and North Africa after a long absence precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Political, economic, transport and trade, energy, geopolitical and military/security interests and goals are pursued by Russia in the region. This chapter delves into the broad nature and types of programmes and goals pursued by Russia in the region with an equally diverse host of different countries and audiences. Russia has been able to capitalise on various mistakes made by the United States in the region. Russia is far from being the largest external actor in the region, but is making progress with its varied public diplomacy approaches.