Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation of the American Military

The BMI’s emphasis on deserters gained a new twist in November. On the 11th one of Sharpe’s scouts, I. M. Hatch, returned to report on his two-month special mission. He had been sent into Confederate lines on September 18 in the guise of a deserter to ascertain how the enemy was treating such persons. His was a most revealing tale, one of the strangest in the war. Upon surrendering he was taken through Petersburg to Richmond where he was put into the Castle Thunder POW camp. His interrogation was perfunctory, merely asking what unit he belonged to and some general questions on troop disposition. He was kept there for three weeks until enough prisoners had been collected to send “homeward by the usual route,” as reported in the Richmond Dispatch, in a single party.2

The problem with Union deserters was becoming serious. McEntee reported to Meade on December 11 that one of the BMI’s agents on the north side of the James River had said that “a great number of our men are deserting and seem to have a regular run through Charles City County.” Fifteen men had crossed the long bridge over the Chickahominy River two nights before. About 50 men a week were passing through, guided by a man named Bob Mattox. There was also a mail run following the same path. McEntee stated that “most of those connected with it are known to this department, and measures will be taken to arrest the parties.”4

Grant took a personal interest in just how the Confederates managed getting Union deserters back home. He summoned scout Anson Carney and offered him a $300 bonus if he would desert and go through the system. He agreed and made his way to the Confederate pickets to give himself up. He was gone for seven weeks. After questioning he was sent to Libby Prison, until about two score deserters were collected and then marched west to the mountains and let go to find their way north. Carney found out that other deserters were shipped out through the blockade on British ships. In the mountains Carney was robbed of his clothes three times by “rebels, Union deserters, and bushwhackers, who had formed a sort of robber’s gang in the mountains. The first time I was robbed I was told I wore too good clothes and must exchange. After the third robbery my clothes became too poor to excite the envy of any one, and I was allowed to proceed in peace.”

Comings and Goings

Since his victory at Cedar Creek in October, Sheridan had continued to rely on Sharpe’s agent and scout network in Northern Virginia working under the supervision of Captain Leet in Washington. Sheridan wired Leet on November 17, “Keep your scouts on the alert at Gordonville, or on the railroad in that vicinity. It is very necessary for the next ten days.” Leet responded the next day to inform him that the scouts had been immediately sent out and would be kept active.6

The men of Kershaw’s Division would be arriving in Richmond on November 18–19, as Lee had begun the process of writing off the Valley and withdrawing his forces. Their presence in the city was reported by one of Van Lew’s agents whose market stall was robbed by several of Kershaw’s men on the 19th. The next day McEntee reported that a deserter stated that Kershaw’s Division would soon join Longstreet. Other deserters reported that two brigades were already “encamped at Chaffin’s farm and the rest at Chesterfield,” across from the Army of the James. Rumors also were rife in Richmond that the rest of Early’s force would be arriving because the Virginia Central Railroad had been reserved for only military traffic and that Sheridan had arrived with his army to reinforce Grant. On the 22nd, Sheridan, still in the Valley, knew that Kershaw had returned to Richmond but asked Leet to keep his scouts at Gordonville for the next 10 days to watch the railroads. Early theoretically still had a powerful force, and Sheridan wanted to know its every move. Grant, for his part, was keeping the pressure on Lee to keep him from reinforcing Early again. Patrick wrote in his diary on December 3, “Nothing is going on here, now, excepting a heavy cannonading, much of the time, intended to keep Lee in the belief that we were ready to attack in case he should send off any more men.7

Lee was also keeping track of Sheridan in the Valley as a source of reinforcement for Grant. So it was with apprehension that he informed Davis on December 6 of the departure of the U.S. VI Corps from Sheridan’s command. His own intelligence collection was working well. His agent, Lieutenant Cawood, had provided him with a stage by stage movement of VI Corps and an estimate of its strength at 10,000 men as it steamed by his station at 5:00 p.m. on December 3 in 21 transports. He did not know only two of its three divisions were on the move at this time. Lee had concluded accurately that they were destined to join Grant. He had already ordered Early to release Gordon’s Division, which was scheduled to arrive the next night, and to have Pegram’s Division ready to follow. This was the beginning of the recall of the entire II Corps to Richmond. As an aside to Davis, Lee thought the estimate of VI Corps’ strength too large. Lieutenant Cawood was closer to the mark in estimating the strength of the two divisions steaming past him; the Union return for November showed 16,441 men in VI Corps; the December return showed 19,268 men. Splitting the difference would have had about 12,000 men in the convoy.8

Grant was equally concerned with enemy forces in the Valley. He and Sheridan had hoped that withdrawing VI Corps after Sheridan’s victories in the Valley would cause Lee to also pull forces back to Richmond. As late as the 8th Sheridan was expressing his chagrin to Grant that his transfer of VI Corps had not prompted a return of the enemy’s II Corps to Richmond-Petersburg. “I sent to-morrow morning the remaining division of the Sixth Corps. No troops of the enemy have left the Valley, except Kershaw’s division. I did expect that the movement of the two divisions of the Sixth Corps would cause a movement on the part of the enemy, but to the present time it has not.”

Sheridan was worried because Leet had wired him that same day the BMI’s agent at Orange Court House and Frederick Hall Station on the Virginia Central Railroad had earlier that week seen or heard of no move of troops from Early since Kershaw left. Sheridan had only to bide his patience one more day.9

Sharpe’s organization was fine-tuned to catch any evidence of the return of any part of Early’s command. Almost immediately, the Richmond spy ring chimed in. Babcock reported to Meade on December 9 that he had just received the following information from Sharpe’s office at City Point: “Agents from Richmond report the following: Early’s command arriving in Richmond. Troops were coming in and going to Petersburg all night and day before yesterday evening [the 7th].” Amazingly, the Richmond agents were acquiring this information only later in the same day that Lee had penned his message to Davis. Babcock also stated, “Our latest information of the strength of this corps is 12,000 muskets.” He was not too far off. II Corps’ strength as of the returns of November 30 was 10,188, not a bad estimate for a force operating that far away. It was especially good when compared with Lee’s underestimation of VI Corps, an error of over 50 percent compared with Babcock’s overestimation error of 8 percent.10

Babcock continued to search for confirmation of the information from the BMI’s Richmond agents. He collated more information from this source with information from deserters from Gordon’s Division, two recent conscripts who estimated “the force that left the Valley at 7,000; could see the entire column, trains and all, at points on the way from New Market to Waynesborough, where they took the cars.” Another deserter, Corporal Toohey, from the 6th Louisiana, “is a very intelligent Irishman and is well-posted on the strength of Gordon’s and Pegram’s divisions. He states that Gordon’s division is only 3,000.” The corporal was close; its strength on November 30 was 3,454. He also estimated Pegram’s strength at 4,000, having been strengthened with conscripts and convalescents. That corresponded with Babcock’s estimate. That would have added another thousand men to the November 30 abstract, making Babcock’s 8 percent error about 5 percent instead. It was clear by the 11th that the divisions of both Gordan and Pegram had arrived and been sent directly into the defenses of Petersburg. The BMI’s scouts were able to add a third point of confirmation. All-source intelligence does not get any better. Babcock was also able to accurately discover that both divisions were under Major General Gordon’s command as the probable new II Corps commander.11

Babcock was aware that there was a third shoe that waited to drop—the location of Rhode’s Division of II Corps. Would it stay in the Valley or join Gordon at Petersburg? Lee ordered it back to Richmond on December 13. In a letter to Davis the next day he explained that cold weather had closed operations in the Valley for the winter and that he had information that Sheridan’s VIII and XIX Corps were moving out of the Valley, probably to reinforce Grant. Under the circumstances, he could not leave even one division of II Corps inactive in the Valley. He hoped that if the “Quartermaster’s Department is active” (always a big “if”), Rodes’s Division would arrive by Friday of that week. He further speculated that “General Grant may now be preparing to break through our center, as the canal at Dutch Gap is reported nearly completed.” He explained to Davis that even with Rodes’s Division, he would still only oppose one Union corps with one Confederate division.12

Lee had dropped the third shoe. How long would it take the BMI to find it? Babcock informed Meade on December 19 that BMI scouts from Richmond had learned that on the preceding Friday and Saturday (for once the Quartermaster’s Department was on the ball) Rodes’s Division passed through the city in the direction of Petersburg. The report had gone directly to Sharpe at City Point and been retransmitted to Babcock. For another three days, there was no further hard information on Rodes’s Division, until December 22, when McEntee, who was working at City Point, informed Babcock that the division’s presence had been confirmed. He also added, “They may have gone south, if they are not in your front.” They were likely going to join the rest of Gordon’s II Corps at Petersburg.13

Lee had little time to appreciate the addition to his strength with the return of his II Corps. Almost immediately he had to send off a force equivalent to more than half that reinforcement. Grant’s plan to take Wilmington in October had foundered over poor planning, lack of army-navy cooperation, and, above all, Butler’s insistence as privilege of rank on commanding the two divisions that would be the assault force to take Fort Fisher, the bastion that protected the great Cape Fear River port. The plan had had plenty of time to be compromised if it had not already leaked like a sieve. Wilmington was never far from Lee’s thoughts; it was the last major port of entry for the blockade runners that brought vital war supplies to the dying Confederacy; it also brought in a great deal of Midwestern bacon purchased in New York by British agents, shipped to Bermuda, and then to Wilmington.

On the 22nd McEntee reported, “Information from Richmond this a.m. to the effect that Hoke’s division is now moving by the Danville Railroad. The last of it will be off to-morrow, and it is supposed that it is bound for Wilmington.” Adding to the suspense, Richmond newspapers brought through the lines stated that “Butler and Porter’s expedition against Wilmington has done nothing as yet…,” according to a diary entry left by Major General John Rawlins, Grant’s chief of staff. Yet again Van Lew’s spy ring had hit a bullseye with an accurate near real-time report. The same day a deserter confirmed Hoke’s departure, saying they went through Richmond, avoiding the more visible pontoon bridge. Sharpe’s all-source system had confounded Lee’s attempts at security. By attempting to avoid visual observation from Union Signal Corps stations, they had marched through the seeming cover of the Richmond urban area only to fall under the direct eyes of Van Lew’s efficient band of Unionist agents. North of the James, the Confederates were trying to conceal the fact that Hoke’s Division was gone by restricting the location of a flag of truce meeting with the Union XXIV Corps. It’s commander, reflecting the rapid spread of Sharpe’s intelligence circulars, commented to one of his officers, “I would suggest that if an officer goes out from the last-named place that he should tell them that they need not be so damned particular, for we know that Hoke is gone.”15

When Sherman had left Atlanta to burn a swath across Georgia, Grant had accepted that he would be out of communication with his favorite general. Sharpe provided him with an alternate way to keep track of Sherman’s march. The Richmond papers regularly reported his progress, and Van Lew was promptly sending them to Sharpe. Grant must have been amused to read in early December that the Confederates were “puzzled to know whether Sherman meant to strike Charleston, Savannah or Beaufort, or join General Grant in front of Richmond.” On December 16 Sharpe was able to tell Grant that Sherman had reached Savannah and invested the city. By the 18th there was a palpable sense of expectation waiting on news of Sherman. To this was added the departure of the fleet for the attack on Wilmington.16

Almost daily Babcock was reporting there was no official news until Christmas Day, when he wrote a number of reports on interrogations, all of which said that it was understood in the Confederate army that Savannah had fallen. On the same day Sharpe wrote to him that the Richmond papers said communications with Savannah had been broken. Then Babcock replied that it was now reported in the enemy army that Savannah had fallen, that Sherman was marching on Charleston, and had broken the Charleston-Savannah railroad in four places. Still, the next day Babcock can only tell Meade that there is nothing definite on Savannah. By the 27th the Richmond Dispatch announced the evacuation of Savannah. That same day Sharpe was reporting from his agents, “On learning the news of the fall of Savannah gold went up in Richmond from 36 & 40 to 50 Dollars for one—and greenbacks advanced from 10 & 12 to 20 for one.”18

Unfortunately, there is often a downside to even the best all-source intelligence work. No apparent use of the intelligence was made by Grant. Neither were operations launched to take advantage of the absence of Hoke’s brigades nor was Butler notified of the reinforcements sent to Wilmington. In defense of Grant, he may have concluded that the absence of 3,000 or so men from the defenses of Richmond was not sufficient grounds for offensive action since Gordon had just reinforced the garrison with almost 12,000 men. Also there simply may not have been time between the confirmation of the departure of Hoke’s brigades on December 22–23 and the failure of the attempt on Fort Fisher on the 25th to notify Butler and Rear Admiral Porter who commanded the naval element of the attack.

Thus the year 1864 ended on a note of failure, appropriate for a year in which opportunity after opportunity was lost to end the war with one mortal blow. Instead, the armies had left a giant blood-trail from the Wilderness to Petersburg. However, if decisive victory was always out of reach, a more gradual one was at work in the form of attrition. While Lee’s army lived hand-to-mouth on an increasingly starvation diet, Grant’s army was getting hot bread every day. On October 25 Patrick was taken on tour of “the Bake Houses just completed—It will turn out 100,000 rations in 24 hours—Every thing is on a grand scale and of the most convenient & economical character—They make the most excellent bread.” Enormous cakes were also baked by someone called “the Ice Cream Man.” On the day before Thanksgiving (November 26), he would record that the first installment of Thanksgiving turkeys had arrived. The scale of support to the American soldier would set the standard for the next century and a half. Where Lee’s horses were dying for lack of fodder as the South was also running out of horseflesh, each day almost 600 tons of grain and hay moved through City Point to supply Grant’s vast herd of animals. As the Southern railroad infrastructure was creaking to a breakdown through a worn-out plant and Union destruction, Grant was reaping the fruits of industrial warfare. He had transformed City Point into one of the busiest ports in the world, the funnel for the industrial outpouring of the North. Trains were regularly shipped into City Point; one fleet of 90 steamers, tugs, and barges brought two dozen locomotives and 275 boxcars. This web of railroad support to the besieging armies was supported by a railroad construction brigade of 2,000 men.19

At the end of November an unusual prisoner fell into Sharpe’s hands. Private Roger A. Pryor was one of Stuart’s scouts. He had more than a private’s past. He was a vociferous secessionist member of Virginia’s Congressional delegation before the Civil War and had entered the Confederate army as the colonel of the 3rd Virginia Infantry, rising to command the Florida Brigade in Richard Anderson’s Division in Longstreet’s Corps. At Antietam he had replaced the wounded Anderson, but was so inept that Jefferson Davis denied him further promotion. In a pique he resigned in 1863. The next year he enlisted as a private and scout in August in Fitzhugh Lee’s command, who worked out of General Lee’s headquarters. He was captured by Union pickets while trying to exchange newspapers against Lee’s orders forbidding any intercourse with the enemy. Sharpe suspected he was a spy, and he was confined to Fort Lafayette in New York. After the war he settled in New York City, established a law firm, and became a power in state Democratic politics and was known as a Confederate Carpetbagger. Remarkably he was appointed as a justice to the New York Supreme Court in 1890. He had intersected with Sharpe the year before when his son published a paper refuting a recent allegation that his father had actually deserted rather than been captured. Sharpe fully supported the story of his capture.20

The war had its own calendar which had nothing to do with the end of man’s year.

Grant “has confidence in the Judgment of Colonel Sharpe”

Enigmatically, Patrick refers in his diary to tension with Sharpe at Grant’s headquarters in the middle of November. On November 16, he wrote in his diary, “I had a talk with Genl. Grant about Col. Sharpe, and have that matter all fixed right.” Apparently not. On November 18 he wrote that he’d sent Sharpe’s resignation forward. The next day he wrote in his diary that Meade declined to accept the resignation until Grant had returned and he could confer with him. There the matter lay for the next 10 days. On November 29, Patrick wrote to Brigadier General Williams, stating that he wanted to send Sharpe to Washington on business, but that the letter of resignation was still pending and that he understood it was to have been acted upon in a few days. There is no copy of Sharpe’s letter of resignation in his Military Service Record at the National Archives where such documents would have been kept along with their approval or disapproval. But such matters were considered sensitive, and after the matter had been settled and the letter of resignation withdrawn, it would probably have been disposed of. The army then, and now, does not always put everything in the public record. Most likely the matter that had sparked the resignation was the increasingly intolerable difficulty of working for both Grant and Meade at the same time. However, the record is opaque as to the circumstances. Whatever the issue was, the final decision was Grant’s. The fact that Sharpe continued to work for Grant was an indication of his value to the general-in-chief. Grant put great store in the trustworthiness of his subordinates, and had this been the problem, Sharpe would have been gone.21

The visit of two British officers on November 12 would be the cause of an incident that Sharpe would relate 30 years later that would offer “some insight of the true Meade that lay underneath the coat of irritation that he so often wore.” As a member of Meade’s staff, Sharpe relayed the incident:

I came to know full well that at times—in fact, a great deal of the time—he displayed a most peppery disposition to all with whom he came in contact, so that many of the generals of the Army of the Potomac did not personally like their superior…

After the Army of the Potomac had taken up winter quarters … in the latter part of 1864, there appeared at headquarters [of the Armies Operating Against Richmond] one day two Englishmen who were recognized authorities in the British Army. They carried a letter from Lord Lyons, then British minister at Washington. In it the minister explained that its bearers were friends of his, they had come to this country for the special purpose of studying the movements of the Army of the Potomac, and he—Lord Lyons—would take it as a high personal favor if such assistance as was reasonable and proper should be given to them in their study.

General Grant received the two strangers very courteously, told them that he would be glad to do all he could to help them, and then, after pondering a moment or two, turned to me.

“General Sharpe,” he asked, quietly, “Is there any general close at hand who is on good terms with Gen. Meade?”

I replied that no one could be on better terms with him than myself. At that Grant’s face showed the inward relief he undoubtedly felt. “Then,” he said, “I wish you would escort these gentlemen to Gen. Meade’s headquarters, and request him for me to give them such assistance as lies within his power.”

Arrived at Gen. Meade’s headquarters, I requested the Englishmen to remain outside for a few moments, so that I might prepare Gen. Meade for their reception. Then I entered his tent and found him, as I was half afraid I might, in a very irritable mood. Something—possibility something most trivial—had gone wrong, and when I told him what my errand was, he let loose and swore like a trooper. But at least, he said: “Gen. Sharpe, bring your friends to me in about 15 minutes, I will receive them.”

Promptly at the specified time I entered Gen. Meade’s tent with the two visitors, and what do you suppose I saw? Gen. Meade garbed in full dress uniform, ever handsome in appearance, and the acme of dignified and impressive presence. And when I introduced the Englishmen he received them with the utmost graciousness and put them at their ease at once. And this was the same man who had been swayed by passion a short quarter of an hour before.

Well, for nearly an hour, Gen. Meade held those Englishmen in thrall while he discoursed on the strategy of the campaign. His courtesy, his thoughtfulness, his simplicity, his modesty, his patience at questions, completely captivated them, and when finally the interview was over and I rode away with them they could not sound his praises loud enough. You see, he gave those two men a glimpse of the Gen. George C. [G.] Meade that not many men of the Army of the Potomac got.

Sharpe’s perception was reflected more sourly in the contemporary diary of one of Meade’s staff officers, Lt. Col. Cyrus B. Comstock. He was blunt at describing Meade’s temper. “Some talk about Meade’s quarreling with all his subordinates. Rawlins talks wildly. The truth is that Meade is a bear to his subordinates. I have heard him abuse Burnside, Hancock & Warren to their faces. Ingalls is glad to get away from him & under Grant & the Patrick wishes the same & talks about Meade.” What tempered this for Comstock was not Meade’s concealed affection for his subordinates but a grudging high respect for his abilities as a soldier. “Have talked with very different people—all snubbed by Meade. & think that while they all have private grievances, he would be first choice for Cmdg. Genl. Both among his staff officers & the Maj. Gen’s.”23

Grant was determined to keep his intelligence chief, and nothing more was said of the resignation, whatever its cause. The general-in-chief finally resolved the ambiguity over Sharpe’s status in orders published on December 2: “Colonel George H. Sharpe, One hundred and twentieth Regiment New York Volunteers, is announced as assistant provost-marshal-general, Armies operating against Richmond, and will report to Brigadier General M. R. Patrick, provost-marshal-general, for duty.”24

That same day, another set of orders was published by the Office of the Provost Marshal General specifically stating that Sharpe was “assigned to the special charge of the ‘Bureau of Information’ and will, with the least practicable delay, make such arrangements as will insure the utmost efficiency in that branch of the service.” Of course, Sharpe was already doing this, but the order was a way to formally detach Sharpe from Meade and express Grant’s confidence in him.25

An incident shortly before this was revealing for an expression of confidence Grant had in his chief intelligence officer. Sharpe had found that an inventor, Oliver Cox, had approached Grant months before to offer a new cipher system and signaling system. Grant had done nothing, but Sharpe had learned of the offer and asked for an interview. Sharpe endorsed the cipher system by stating that he had successfully employed it. Cox asked Grant for an acknowledgment of his cipher system, but Grant responded through his staff that he had not the time to personally review the system, “but has confidence in the judgment of Col. Sharpe.”26

It was a simple statement but one that was high praise for the laconic Grant. It was indicative of the close professional relationship of the two men that was slowly evolving into a friendship that Grant would make good use of after the war in his presidency. Adam Badeau, one of Grant’s staff that he had brought with him from the west, put his finger on the relationship when he wrote, “To some he gave a character of confidence not necessary to be given to others and not withheld from distrust, but because it had no relation to official duties and might not be interesting otherwise.” Grant just found Sharpe interesting. That he was a storyteller of Lincoln-esque talent also appealed to Grant the man.27

Colonel Theodore Lyman, one of Meade’s aides, recorded a postscript to the visit of the two British officers. Left unsaid by Meade was the common knowledge that it had been the output of British factories and mills that had supplied the weapons, munitions, and supplies, without which the Confederacy would have collapsed in the first year of the war if left to its own resources. Meade’s aide, Colonel Rosenkrantz—a Swedish immigrant—was the escort for these officers and less reticent. When asked by them what was the opinion among the Americans of the British, he said, “Vell, I can tell you that, so far as I have observed, some Americans do just care nothing about you, and many others do say, that, when this war is over, they will immediately very soon kick you out of Canada.” The incredulous British asked why. “Rosie” replied, “Be-cause they say you have made for the Rebs very many bullets.” More to the point, in March of the next year Grant forwarded to Stanton a captured ammunition box stamped, “Royal Arsenal Woolwich.” Whether Sharpe had anything to do with this is unknown.28

Supporting the Navy—The Battle of Trent’s Reach

The quiet of a winter siege was broken from an unsuspected quarter—the Confederate navy. The James River Squadron of rams and gunships lurked in the river to prevent a naval attack on Richmond. The low level of the river had prevented the ships from issuing out to attack the U.S. Navy protecting the vast logistics base at City Point. Heavy rain offered them a chance as the river rose. On January 21 Sharpe reported simultaneously to Grant and Meade:

Our friends in Richmond send us word that the late freshet in the James River had so weakened and partially removed the obstructions placed therein that it was considered possible for the rebel gun-boats to pass them. An order was issued on Tuesday last that their fleet should go down the river, either pass or attack our iron-clads, and attempt the destruction of City Point. It was known in Richmond that we had two monitors up the river, but it was supposed that their vessels be numerous or strong enough for the attempt, it being claimed that now, in the absence of the larger part of our iron fleet, was the opportunity for their own; that upon the return of our iron-clads theirs would be permanently shut up in the upper James, and that even if the movement resulted in the loss of their vessels it could be no worse than what would eventually be the case, and might inflict incalculable damage upon us.29

This was actionable intelligence of the first order. The same day his report to Grant’s headquarters transmitted the facts to Willian A. Parker, commander of the 5th Division, North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, defending City Point; he received it on the 22nd. “We have information from Richmond that on Tuesday last an order was issued that the rebel fleet should come down the river, either pass or attack our ironclads, and attempt the destruction of City Point.” The letter recommended, “It would be well that you exercise more than the usual vigilance to defeat any plan the rebels may have in contemplation in the river.” Unfortunately, the navy failed to make the most of it.30

Grant was not going to rely solely on the navy. He ordered Major General Gibbon to offer whatever assistance he could. In response to Gibbon’s query on the 23rd Parker replied that the state of river obstructions was bad and that he did not consider his naval forces sufficient to prevent the descent of the enemy. He recommended that Gibbon strengthen the batteries at Trent’s Reach, commanding the route the enemy must take with more heavy guns, to sink more vessels as obstructions, and plant more torpedoes (mines). At the same time he pulled most of his own vessels except for the Onondaga down river below City Point.31

On the night of the 23rd–24th the Confederate squadron slipped out, and almost immediately two of its ships went aground. One ship was sunk and the rest severely damaged by the army batteries and the heavy guns of the Onondaga in what was called the battle of Trent’s Reach. The Confederate ships withdrew, and Parker withdrew Onondaga as well, even though another attack was expected. Grant was incensed at Parker’s timidity and requested and received permission to give direct orders to the navy in the James. He tartly informed Parker, “The delay of the last few days in preparing for a visit from the enemy … was providentially prevented from proving fatal to us.” He had every right to be incensed. His man Sharpe had given ample warning of the breakout of the James River Squadron. Parker’s failure to respond energetically could have resulted in a catastrophe had those ships closed on the vast assembly of ships and stores at City Point. But by the time he wrote this, the crisis had passed. The heavily damaged James River Squadron had withdrawn back up river and would never emerge again.32

Departures and Promotions

Whatever problems Sharpe may have been having in November, it was a good month for John McEntee. Colonel Gates of the 20th NYSM had resigned effective the 22nd to run for Congress, which resulted in the elevation to command of the regiment’s lieutenant colonel, Jacob H. Hardenburgh. That left the position of the regiment’s lieutenant colonel open. On the evening of the 25th the officers of the 20th met to elect replacements for vacancies. While the rest of the volunteer regiments had long since dropped the election of officers, it seems the 20th had retained this old policy dating to its militia days. Captain John R. Leslie had been in line for the position, but the officers evidently preferred McEntee who, despite his detached service since April 1863, was the more popular and respected. McEntee had not allowed absence to let ties with his regiment fray, especially since they were in close proximity as the provost guard. Patrick noted in his diary of the next day that the officers referred the decision to him, but he told them to “make their own selection.” They elected McEntee, and on December 19 both Hardenburgh and he received their respective promotions to lieutenant colonel and colonel of the 20th NYSM. McEntee, of course, stayed on detached service with Sharpe’s Bureau. Sharpe’s obvious trust in McEntee may well have weighed in as a factor in the election. He probably was not above some electioneering on behalf of his deputy.33

About the same time, Captain Manning was also promoted to lieutenant colonel.34 That would be followed by his transfer to the Army of the James as provost marshal general on February 1, where he would continue to serve as an unofficial member of the BMI, reporting on intelligence matters to Sharpe. That transfer, however, left Sharpe’s original BMI short and he sought and received a replacement in Capt. Paul A. Oliver, who was serving on the V Corps staff. Oliver had been wounded twice in the Seven Days battles in 1862, serving with the 12th New York, and later served as aide-de-camp to Hooker and Meade. He had then followed Hooker when he was transferred to the West. At the battle of Resaca in Georgia he had won the Medal of Honor. He requested transfer back to the Army of the Potomac, and Meade thought so well of him that he requested the governor of New York to promote him to captain. Following him was an extraordinary letter of recommendation from Major General Hooker dated February 7 of that same year, with whom he had served in both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Cumberland. Hooker is at pains to state that he had the opportunity to closely observe Oliver during both periods, adding force to the following:

Captain Oliver is an officer of uncommon merit. His services have been great and often brilliant. He is faithful and fearless in execution, sound in judgment, and quick in forming it. He rendered me invaluable service at Fredericksburg, at Chancellorsville, at Wauhatchie, and Lookout Mountain, and repeatedly on the Atlanta campaign. Without doing injustice to any I can say that I know of no officer of his rank who can point to a prouder record. He is qualified to exercise the rank of Brigadier General, and were I in the field I know of no officer that I would be more rejoiced to have at the head of a brigade.35

The letter had its intended effect. It was probably a subject of Hooker’s cordial visit to Meade on February 27. Oliver was promoted from captain to brevet brigadier general on March 8, an extraordinary leap across the ranks even during the Civil War. That promotion would prove to be entirely justified. The modern U.S. Army would do well to accelerate the rise of talent rather than forcing everyone, from genius to mediocrity, through the same promotion sequence.36

McEntee and Manning were not the only ones to celebrate a promotion that winter. On February 7 Sharpe was promoted to brevet brigadier general. The brevet was, in effect, an honorary promotion and not one reflected in permanent rank or pay. It did entitle the bearer to all the dignities, privileges, and authority of that rank. Socially, the brevet rank was that which a man would carry for the rest of his life as a mark of honor. It was also a mark of Grant’s favor.

The Confederates had been clearly keeping track of Sharpe. On January 24, the Richmond Dispatch reproduced a telegram from “Grant’s army” that can only have been a BMI product, describing news brought by Confederate deserters on the Danville Railroad. It appears to be a BMI product; however, although there is no copy of it in the BMI files at NARA or in the Official Records, the information in it appears to be correct. It should be noted that not all of the BMI reports made it into the National Archives. It was no accident that the article closed by printing, “Colonel Sharpe so long connected with the army in the capacity of deputy provost-marshal, and lately acting as deputy provost-marshal-general of the armies operating against Richmond, has been promoted to brigadier-general.” The Confederates were thumbing their nose at Sharpe, in effect showing they had intercepted an intelligence report and then congratulating him on his promotion. That the enemy knew of his promotion two weeks before it became public should have given him pause. If he had a network inside Richmond, the Confederates had one in City Point.38

Despite his heavy workload, Sharpe always seem to find time to show concern for those in distress, as he had during the Overland Campaign, when he retrieved a soldier from the bullpen who had been accidently arrested and provided for his discharge and transportation home. In late November he approached Meade in the case of Charles McCandlish, a Scottish immigrant and Unionist who had come through the lines in August desiring to take the oath of allegiance. He was such a skilled mechanic that he immediately found employment at the blacksmithing repair shop at City Point. He requested permission to slip back through the picket lines to retrieve his family, who had moved to a house nearby. Sharpe fully supported the request to Meade who approved it promptly the next day.40

The news of the fall of Wilmington had heartened the army as had the news of Sherman’s continuing successes. Yet, Sharpe was not optimistic about a sudden end to the war; he had been impressed too many times with the resilience of the Army of Northern Virginia under the command of “Lee the Incomparable.” He offered this assessment:

If we begin fighting, I shall not leave as I have never suggested such a thing at any such time. “The end draweth nigh”—but I am not one of those who believe that the catastrophe is to be immediate. Lee’s ability will not be denied now that he has been “tackled” by Grant & he has considerable resources yet at his command. When he takes a brigade of infantry and leads it in a desperate charge into the thickest of the volley firing—then, he will have given up and not before—and he will die on the field, with the reputation of being one of the ablest soldier the world has ever seen.41

Pay Problems and Bonuses

The next day Captain Leet was reporting to Grant that the scouts based in Washington and operating south of Fredericksburg had not been paid for some time. “I would respectfully recommend that positive orders be given to the proper officer to forward at once … funds for the payment of the men, who are sadly in need of money.” He also requested more Confederate currency of the latest issue for the use of his scouts behind the line.43

Regular funding would remain a problem and not just for pay but was interfering with the conduct of operations. On December 15 Sharpe reported to Patrick, “General Ingalls’ requisitions on the Treasury Department were honored yesterday. I respectfully ask that a messenger may be sent to me immediately with a portion of the money Captain Clinton may get as I am forced to admit that some our failures here have been owing to want of funds.” The failures he refers to were no doubt associated with collection efforts in Richmond.44

In contrast to interruptions of BMI funding were the special awards for Judson Knight directed by Grant himself. So important had Knight become in the coordination of intelligence collection in Richmond, despite any interruption in operational funding, that Grant was rewarding him with handsome bonuses beginning in December. One cannot help but see Sharpe’s recommendations in this unprecedented liberality.45

Despite the funding problems, Babcock had not neglected his own accommodations. They were enviously described by one of Meade’s staff officers, Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman, who noted that “Babcock and the Captain [presumably Capt. John McEntee] have artistic cottages nicely papered within.”46

The Siege Takes its Toll

The amount and quality of information coming out of Van Lew’s network in Richmond kept getting better and better as the new year began. In a series of reports in the first two weeks of January, Sharpe painted a picture of the wasting effects of the siege both upon the Confederate war effort and the population of Richmond and Petersburg.

On January 9 he wrote, “We have information this morning from three of our agents in Richmond, coming by different sources,” effective as of the previous morning. He repeated that the information “was derived from different and independent sources” which cross-checked each other. The picture painted was one of war industry grinding to a halt as vital machinery was being moved south and as the remaining shops and factories simply ran out of raw materials. One source reported that “At the Tredegar works there has not been a large gun cast for a month or more.” The Tredegar works were the South’s largest—and by this time last—major foundry.

On the 13th Sharpe reported his agent had had a very difficult time getting out of Richmond. “It would seem that these extraordinary regulations were made for the purpose of preventing information going out of the real condition of the city, which is daily becoming worse. Gold has risen to seventy for one. Flour, according to the grade, is sold at from $600 to $800 a barrel; beef, salt, and all other articles steadily advancing [in price].” Sharpe could have been reading Lee’s mail, which was reporting the same thing. Two days earlier he had written the Secretary of War, “There is nothing within reach of the army to be impressed. The country has been swept clear. Our only reliance is upon the railroads. We have but two day’s supplies.”48

While Lee was placing such reliance on the railroads, Sharpe was emphasizing collection on them. His January 13 report bore the result. His agent on the Danville Railroad, an engineer, reported that transportation over the last two weeks was provided for 16,000 of Lee’s men and that it was intended to convey Hoke’s and Kershaw’s Divisions and Early’s brigades to Wilmington. Sharpe was careful to state the man based his calculations on the number of men that could be loaded in a car and the number of cars. He had not actually seen the troop movement. The man also reported that one-third of the Danville line’s 45 locomotives were out of use and had to be replaced by engines from other lines. Whatever the Danville was transporting, it was not any significant number of troops. The engineer was more accurate when he reported that heavy rains had seriously damaged the Piedmont Railroad between Danville and Greensborough, and it would take 15 days to repair. Two days before, Confederate Secretary of War Seddon had written Lee to tell him that the line had been washed out and was unusable for 20 miles and could not be used for several days to a week.

Sharpe’s network in Richmond was supplying more than strictly military information. It was reporting Confederate economic ties with northern business interests. On the 13th Sharpe reported for the second time, and this time from a second source, that the Confederate railroad companies had “contracted for block tin, zinc, and other necessaries of like nature to be sent to them in some way through Norfolk; it is understood that the supplies are to come from a firm or firms in Philadelphia; that the negotiation is to be perfected by the exchange of cotton, which is to go down the Blackwater in small boats.”

On the 18th, Sharpe also reported, “Our friends tell us that they know well that the principal men in the Government and at Richmond are employing agents to go North, via the Northern Neck, for the purpose of changing everything they have into gold.”50

Confederate Counterintelligence Gets Lucky

Sharpe did not confine his duties to City Point. When necessary he was in the field with his scouts. On several occasions he met with his Richmond agents at their meeting places with his scouts in order to directly discuss their operations. On at least one other occasion, on January 18, he personally accompanied the scouts because they had been interfered with by Union troops in passing through the lines. His presence set that problem right. He personally resolved this issue because of the sensitive nature of the expedition. He wrote Meade:

We believe that the enemy have a line of communication with the James River by substantially the same route as our own, of which we hope to give more complete information by the end of the week, in order that it may be broken up. Our scouts do not desire to interfere with it, as thereby their own business would be apparent.51

Sharpe was sensitive to the survival of his agents within Richmond and did everything he could to protect their covers. He noted on January 21 that one of his agents had been arrested on suspicion for using Union greenbacks. Sharpe noted that the agent had been released and would be back at work for him, but the arrest had shown once again the danger of supplying Union currency to support operations in Richmond. He requested Confederate bills.52

Two or three times a week scouts are sent from here into Richmond. The only funds the provost-marshal has for defraying their expenses is U.S. currency. These funds naturally would attract suspicion, and have therefore to be converted for their use. If, therefore, you have any rebel currency, I would respectfully request that from $20,000 to $50,000 be sent to Col. George H. Sharpe, assistant provost-marshal-general, at City Point.53

On February 8 Grant directed that $10,000 in Confederate money be turned over to Sharpe. The currency issue, as sensitive as it was, was only part of Sharpe’s concern for his network at that time. The day before he reported the currency problem, the Confederates had dealt the Van Lew and Ruth rings in Richmond and Leet’s agents in Northern Virginia a hard blow. On a tip, they had intercepted a group of refugees fleeing the Richmond area. Under interrogation, the refugees revealed the names of those who had helped them. It was a considerable counterintelligence coup and netted Ruth, F. W. E. Lohmann, John Hancock, and James Duke and his three sons in Richmond, and John H. Timberlake and old Isaac Silver in Spotsylvania County. Ruth stood his ground, proclaiming his innocence, and employed every ounce of his social prestige to have the charges dropped. Timberlake was acquitted, but the rest languished in Confederate jails until Richmond finally fell. Tellingly, none of them betrayed Van Lew.54

Unsafe and Unfit—Double Agent Benjamin C. Pole

On the heels of this blow to his agent rings in Richmond, Sharpe would inadvertently help inflict another. Picking agents has always been a tricky business, and on this occasion Sharpe erred badly. There was a long trail of events that led to this. The Confederates had penetrated the U.S. Government and were able to receive a steady stream of sensitive information within 48 hours. That conduit alerted Davis and his cabinet that was a constant source of intelligence in Richmond for Grant’s armies. Efforts to ferret out the source were unavailing.

The frustration was the subject of diplomatic communications with James W. Mason, the Confederate representative in Great Britain. Mason had been pestered by a 19-year-old British mechanic and inventor named Benjamin C. Pole (misspelled as Pool or Poole subsequently) to obtain a contract for the manufacture of torpedoes. Pole may have been young, but he was “unusually bright and plausible,” was a good-looking blue-eyed blonde, and appeared to be trustworthy. The most important thing he was to sell was himself and his promises.

It occurred to Mason that such a man of Confederate sympathies could be employed as a double agent to penetrate the Union spy ring. He offered to send Pole through the blockade, but in the end he simply sailed for New York to make his way south. Much of what happened subsequently is based on Pole’s statements, which are not entirely reliable. Upon his arrival in New York, he wrote a long letter dated July 29 to Secretary of State Seward, giving an extensive review of “rebel privateers in European waters” from the perspective of an engineer who had worked for the Confederates. Pole gave the letter to the U.S. Marshal, who promptly sent it to Seward. Given that the Union merchant marine was being crippled by these commerce raiders, such a letter was bound to arouse Seward’s interest.56

On August 6, the assistant secretary of state wrote to the U.S. vice-counsel in Liverpool, enclosing Pole’s letter and asking to be acquainted with him. Thomas Dudley, the U.S. consul, responded on September 22 and bluntly stated, “Mr. Pole is quite unfit and unsafe to be trusted with any important business.” He further wrote that Pole had worked for them to gather information but had caused more harm than good. He talked a good game about providing information on the building commerce raider Pompero, but when pressed could provide nothing. As to the content of Pole’s letter, “the information it contains was known to Mr. Moore and myself before Pole left, and was probably obtained from us.”57

One would think that would be the end of any interest Seward had in Pole. The young engineer, however, would write a letter to Seward almost two years later, in which he refers to meeting the Secretary at the Astor House in New York, where he “presented to you certain plans and which you approved of.” At the same time he wrote a series of demands in which he again referred to the meeting with Seward and intimated that the Secretary had been paying him at the rate of an engineer. He would also later intimate that Seward had recommended him to Assistant Secretary of War Dana.58

A month later Pole made his way to Washington where he would claim he met Dana. The first step was to join a regiment that was at Petersburg. He enlisted with the 11th U.S. Infantry at its recruiting station across the Potomac in Alexandria. He claimed to be broke, having spent the last three weeks vainly trying to get a government clerkship.59

These Plans are known to the Hon. Secretary of State W. H. Seward and he is willing for them to be carried into effect and recommends me to the Hon. Secretary of War. However the mode of action I only communicated to the Assistant Secretary of War Dana…

I have testimonials as to being an Englishman and an engineer. And for the truth of the rest I would refer to the Hon. Assistant Secretary of War. However delay is always bad in such undertakings and I am ready to proceed at one and would first like to make you acquainted with the secret correspondence.60

One can only imagine Sharpe’s reaction to Pole’s letter. It certainly must have triggered an interview with Pole and a review of the “secret correspondence.” Sharpe was a very good judge of character and a skilled interrogator. It is hardly likely that he would have taken Pole seriously had he not had proofs of support from the highest levels of the government. Yet none of these proofs have survived in the official records of the government. Nevertheless, Pole was able to convince Sharpe of his good faith. Sharpe decided to employ him in the scheme to gather information about the Confederate rams in the James River Flotilla. Special orders were cut, detailing him for “special service in the Department of the Provost Marshal General.”61

In February, Judson Knight visited Van Lew to tell her, “I am directed to tell you that that there will be an Englishman sent through the lines, whose duty it will be to oblige and bring you information to send through.” He would be picked up, to be brought into Richmond by one of Van Lew’s Union loyalists, Lemuel Babcock, to be later assisted by another Unionist, William White, who also was an English immigrant. Van Lew was instantly suspicious. “My heart sank for here was another avenue of danger,” she wrote and rightly so. She had been careful to ensure that he not be brought to meet her at her home. She never had meetings at her home. Instead she used the shop of an English immigrant and Unionist named Clark for such meetings.62

The night of the 23nd Pole was given a message in cipher for a lady to whom he would be guided. He was taken to a point where he could easily reach Lemuel Babcock’s farm. He presented Babcock a letter that confirmed his having been sent by Sharpe. That night Babcock took Pole into Richmond where they checked into a hotel and spent the night.

The next morning Babcock left Pole in their hotel to hastily arrange a meeting with Van Lew at Clark’s shop, where he left the enciphered message. While he was gone, Pole rushed to the Confederate provost marshal and betrayed both Babcock and White. They were promptly arrested. A Confederate detective demanded of White, “tell all you know or I’ll blow your brains out.” This Englishman was made of cooler stuff than Pole and replied, “Blow away.” Babcock was equally defiant. Both White and he were thrown into Castle Thunder prison where they were found after the fall of Richmond only a few days before their scheduled execution.63

That he came from England to N. Y. from there to Washington DC. Desired to go south, where his sympathies were. That he conceived the plan of joining the U.S. army for the purpose of deserting to the rebel lines, and joined the 11th U.S. Infantry. That he was selected by Col. Sharp [sic] to perform some confidential service and a plan was arranged that he should desert to the rebel lines, and return with what information he could gather.

That he was sent by Col. Sharpe [sic] to Mr. Babcock’s house, near the rebel picket line, with whom a plan had been arranged to take him into Richmond, and deliver him up as a deserter to the rebels.64

Pole also added that while at Sharpe’s headquarters he had seen “several large boxes filled with Confederate (new issue) money, which was being freely distributed for similar objects which he had in view.”65

His perfidy did Pole little good. According to Van Lew, “He offered to act in any way the Rebel Govt. had use, he had plans for torpedoes and gun boats, the highest commendation of self—but alas! For him, the days for Torpedoes and gun boats had well nigh passed the winter of 1865… His advent was late in the day for his own glory. His coming upon our sinking ship was suspicious…”

Unlike Sharpe, the Confederates did not trust him. They actually believed his story up to the point of his sympathies and charged him with “attempting to palm himself off as a Yankee deserter, in order to obtain his parole, give information of our situation, and communicate the same to the enemy.” He was immediately consigned to Castle Thunder, though not in the solitary confinement of the men he had betrayed.66

Van Lew first heard of the arrests and of Pole’s betrayal in the Richmond Dispatch of February 27. She would have ensured that Sharpe had a copy by the next day. She wrote in her diary that when Babcock had left the hotel on the morning of the 24th, Pole was afraid he had gone to betray him. In a panic, he had betrayed Babcock and White. She wrote in her diary:

His regrets now were deep and vain that he had not apparently entered into the service of the U.S. Govt., and then betrayed the prisoners he was sent to. “There are eight or ten of them,” he would say, “Oh, I could so easily have given them all up. What a fool I was.” A paper Pole has written addressed to the Confederate Govt., on its way, was shown to me. I commenced in this manner: “When a man gives up principal, family, friends, country, everything for a cause you may know this, he is in earnest this one.”67

Clearly, Benjamin Pole was no James Bond. Consul Dudley’s appraisal of Pole had been spot on if not downright prophetic. He had indeed been “quite unfit and unsafe to be trusted with any important business” and had indeed done more harm than good. Eccentric and flighty, Pole was entirely out of his depth. He consistently made promises he could not fulfill. If Van Lew was correct in stating that he had betrayed Babcock before Babcock could betray him, it shows massive poor judgment coupled with an impulse to panic. He acted before he had had his meeting with Van Lew, who would have been the prize of prizes. Once caught, he was filled with remorse that he had not honestly worked for the U.S. Government in the first place. It was a remorse based on getting caught, not on his failure of judgment. This would not be the end, however, in Sharpe’s dealing with Pole.

Despite this setback, Sharpe’s network in Richmond was resilient enough to recover and continue to provide vital information. Key to this success was the critical role of Judson Knight, not only in establishing the connection with Van Lew but in maintaining and improving it. On a number of occasions Knight met with Van Lew to coordinate operations.

Knight’s successes were well thought of enough to award him for special services with cash grants of $300 in December 1864, $520 in January 1965, and $393.58 in February, a total of $1,213 or a little less than the yearly pay of a first lieutenant ($1,386). His monthly pay was already equivalent to a first lieutenant ($1,480). This would all be small change. The April 1865 payroll shows him receiving an astounding $6,000! That was more than the pay of a major general ($5,489). Only Grant as the Army’s only lieutenant general, made more ($9,776). In June he authorized another payment of $2,500 for Knight. The BMI payrolls identify only two other men to receive cash grants. They were Ebenezer Halleck and Alexander Myers (one of Van Lew’s Richmond couriers), both of whom were awarded $500.68

Nothing spoke louder of Grant’s appreciation for the value of the intelligence derived from the Van Lew ring and others than cold, hard cash.

Patrick to the Rescue Again

Although Patrick would consistently defend Sharpe, he felt no hesitation in putting his free-wheeling subordinate in his place, even when the chain of command between the two had become tenuous. On the night of March 15, he wrote, “I have had to talk to … Sharpe very unpleasantly, for meddling in matters that do not belong at all to him.” Just what those matters were, Patrick did not say.70 Given that Sharpe was functioning as the equivalent of the modern DIA as well as executing many of the functions of the CIA and FBI, in addition to being a political agent for Grant, it is not surprising that he would upset Patrick’s strict sense of order.

Southern Hemorrhage

In February and March the rate of desertion had opened even wider another wound that the Army of Northern Virginia could not afford to suffer. Lieutenant Colonel Lyman was impressed enough to write home that in February—what can only be Sharpe’s figures—almost 900 men had deserted to the Army of the Potomac and a proportional number from the Army of the James. On one day alone 134 came over with four commissioned officers, their NCOs, and arms. The startling fact is that they were Lee’s formidable veterans.

The remarkable point, also, is that these are old men—nearly all of them—and not the raw conscripts… Of course many more desert to the rear than to the enemy; so that I doubt not that Lee’s losses from this cause during February were something between a large brigade and a small division. General Meade, after reviewing Lee’s position and prospects, said: “I do not see what he is to do!”71

Lee was forced to remind the army that the ultimate sanction “for advising or persuading a soldier to desert is death,” and that even those engaging in such advice in jest would find it difficult to prove at court martial. He ordered that this order and “the 23rd Article of War will be forthwith read to every company in the army once a day for three days, and to every regiment at dress parade once a week for a month; and at such other times … as commanding officers may deem proper.”73

Indicative of the withering away of morale was an incredible story Babcock reported after the penultimate military operation of the siege, initiated by Grant’s attempt to extend the front to the Boydton Plank Road and Hatcher’s Run with his II and V Corps on February 5. Lee struck back that afternoon with Heth’s Division of III Corps. The battle whipped back and forth for two days as part of Gordon’s II Corps joined he fight. It ended with the Union giving up attempts to cut the Boydton Plank Road but now firmly entrenched on Hatcher’s Run. On the 9th Babcock interrogated “two very intelligent” deserters:

[They were] from the 42nd and 26th Mississippi, Davis’ Brigade, Heth’s Division. One of them left camp, the other the picket line… On Sunday last General Lee addressed the three divisions of Gordon, Mahone, and Heth, which were drawn up in their lines of battle in front of the Second Army Corps. Informants state that the orders to charge were repeatedly refused, and that “General Lee wept like a child.” Heth’s Division afterwards made the charges, with two lines of two brigades each.74

The South was not only hemorrhaging information from deserters such as this but from the newspapers Sharpe was collecting from his agents and from the picket line exchanges, which were brought to headquarters “as regularly as if they had been subscribed to,” according to Grant’s aide, Adam Badeau. Even more damaging was the increasing effectiveness of Sharpe’s scouts, a field of contest in which the Confederates were worthy opponents.76

Confederate Lt. Gen. John B. Gordon in early February sent out his own “superb scout, young George of Virginia,” on a mission to get as close as he could to Grant’s headquarters and waylay someone carrying dispatches. Although wearing a Union pale blue overcoat, he always wore his gray uniform underneath to avoid the death penalty for impersonating the enemy if captured. He crept close to the headquarters when he saw two men in Confederate uniform passing by. He immediately made himself known, only to be surprised when they drew their pistols on him. He realized instantly they were Sheridan’s “Jesse Scouts,” so notorious had his scouts become in the Confederacy. He may have been mistaken since Sheridan did not join Grant until the middle of the next month, and Sharpe’s scouts never hesitated to wear Confederate uniforms. The two marched him to the headquarters, where he was questioned by Grant himself. His gray uniform saved his life as he coolly maintained his cover story.

His opportunity for escape came late one night, when he found a new recruit on guard at his prison door. This newly enlisted soldier was a foreigner, and had very little knowledge of the English language; but he knew what a twenty-dollar gold piece was. The Confederacy did not have much gold, but our scouts were kept supplied with it. George pulled out of his lining of his jacket the gold piece, placed it in the foreigner’s hand, turned the fellow’s back to the door, and walked quickly out of the guard house. George would not have dared to attempt such a programme with an American on guard.77

Apparently “George of Virginia” was not the only prisoner scout to escape. Patrick had already investigated the escape of two Rebel scouts who had cut through the floor of the Guard House in middle December. Even in captivity, scouts, both Union and Confederate, showed the most ingenuity and determination to escape which should not be surprising given the self-reliant and bold nature of the men who volunteered for such duty.78

You will examine all deserters from the enemy, and all refugees, and telegraph a summary of as much of their information as may seem to be immediately important, transmitting the other by correspondence. In so doing, you will be careful to see that no deserters from the United States forces pass through your hands purporting to be deserters from the enemy. Whenever you are convinced that such a case is brought before you, you will make a detailed report of the statement of the person thus falsely representing himself, and you will, in every case, proceed with the investigation as far as you possibly can in order to determine the status and regiment of the deserter. Every such person, with statement, will be forwarded to this headquarters.79

As Sherman burned his way through the interior of South Carolina with avenging zeal, he was out of communications with Grant, who worried that his brilliant subordinate might bite off more than he could chew. Sharpe, therefore, also gave McEntee the mission of tracking the progress of Sherman up through the Carolinas, for which Norfolk was “a proper base from which to send scouts southward,” better suited than City Point. Southern newspapers, although a steady source of information on Sherman’s scorching progress, were not enough to calm Grant’s apprehensions, and Sharpe directed McEntee to select and direct a band of scouts to penetrate into the Carolinas to find more reliable information.80

Besides McEntee at Norfolk, three more officers were detailed to work for Sharpe as “examining officers” (interrogators) at subsidiary locations, although their duties were listed as provost marshal. Captain Alexander J. Dallas (12th U.S. Inf.) was sent to Washington to support Leet’s intelligence operations. Captains J. S. Conrad (2nd U.S. Inf.) and Edson M. Misner (80th NY Vol. Inf.) were sent to Fortress Monroe. These are the only other officers known to work for Sharpe.81

Black Confederates

Early in 1863 Confederate agents in Europe were discussing countering Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation by taking blacks into the Confederate forces and granting them freedom. A rumor at the time to the effect that the South would free 500,000 slaves to serve in the army swept through London. Although the idea was circulating in influential Southern circles, no hint became public at home. In January 1864, the South’s Stonewall of the West, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne, was the first prominent Southern figure to openly call for the incorporation of black men into the Confederate armed forces, with the explicit granting of freedom as a prerequisite. As an Irish immigrant, he saw this country with different eyes and was open to possibilities that escaped those who had grown up in the system of slavery. He had presented this to the other senior officers in his corps in the Army of Tennessee in January 1864. Most had supported it; he read his manifesto to the assembled general officers of the army where it met with some approval as well. One hostile officer sent a copy to Jefferson Davis, who ordered the manifesto suppressed and forbade all further discussion.83

By November, the manpower crisis had become so severe that Davis himself put Cleburne’s idea forward to the Confederate Congress. Sharpe, who perused every newspaper page printed in Richmond, would have been aware of Davis’s move from the moment he proposed legislation. Luckily for the Union, the matter moved slowly through the legislative branch, but that did not lessen Sharpe’s concern. He reported every mention of the subject obtained from his agents. “Our agent says he was present at the great meeting on the evening of the 6th instant [February 6th], and that in his speech, Jeff. Davis made use of an expression that every negro would be armed, which has been suppressed in the published accounts.” Grant forwarded the message immediately to Washington.84 Three days later there was another enthusiastic public meeting, this time at Richmond’s First African Baptist Church of all places, in which whites crowded in to hear speakers on both sides of the issue. Secretary of State Judah Benjamin told the crowd that there were 680,000 black men capable of bearing arms. “Let us say to every negro who wants to go into the ranks, go and fight, and you are free… Fight for your masters and you shall have your freedom.” He was met with cheers and cries of support. He boasted that the Army of Northern Virginia could be reinforced with enough black recruits to resume the offensive in twenty days. The opinion of the slaves does not appear to have been sought.85

The issue was so uppermost in Sharpe’s mind that the next day he commented on it in a letter to his Uncle Jansen.

Now take the map and look at Gordonville, Richmond, Danville & Lynchburgh [sic] & see what a stretch of country they cover. Negro troops in intrenchments [sic] around each of these places, with a few white troops to hold them up to their work, will give Lee really the whole of his white forces for movable column—& all that is very formidable.87

As anxious as Lee for the arrival of black troops were the rank and file of Lee’s army. Major General Gordon reported to Lee the reaction of his own II Corps troops to the measure deadlocked in Congress:

I have the honor to report that the officers and men of this corps are decidedly in favor of the voluntary enlistment of the negroes as soldiers. But few have been found to oppose it. The aversion to the measure has in no instance been found strong. The opposition to it is now confined to a very few, and I am satisfied will soon cease to exist in any regiment of the corps. I respectfully suggest that these reports be immediately forwarded to the authorities at Richmond.88

On the 26th he was writing to a friend, sensing that the South had passed the point of no return.

We have many desertions—caused I think by the despondency in our ranks. It is a terrible blow—the defeat of the negro bill in congress—troops all in favor of it—would have greatly encouraged the army—they are much disappointed in its defeat. What mean the national legislators? We shall be compelled to have them or be defeated—with them as volunteers & fighting for their freedom we shall be successful—But I presume we can hope for any assistance now from this class of our population—If authority were granted to raise 200,000 of them it would greatly encourage the men & do so much stop desertions. I can find excellent officers to take command.89

The matter continued to loom large in the minds of Grant and Sharpe as would anything that would promise to prolong the war past the endurance of Northern public support. They could not know that the Confederacy had less than a month to live after the measure passed the Confederate Congress. Sharpe continued to give priority to reporting on this subject. Deserters on March 15 insisted that there were five regiments of black troops in training near Petersburg and that black troops had been put into the line that week. Sharpe reported on March 22 that “our friends” informed him that three companies of black troops were drilling in Richmond and were certain that no more were in training. The imminent collapse of the Confederacy was to hide the actual extent of such preparations in the ensuing chaos.91

Inaugural Interlude

With the weather still keeping active operations in abeyance, Sharpe found the opportunity to attend the inauguration of President Lincoln and Vice-President Andrew Johnson in Washington on March 4. It was a plum opportunity for Sharpe, who relished being in the center of great events.

His recent promotion gave him a pass for the swearing in of Johnson in the Senate chambers. It was not an edifying experience. Johnson was seriously drunk. He had come to Washington the evening before with typhoid fever and had drunk heavily that night at a party. The morning of the inauguration, he drank three straight shots of whiskey before proceeding to the chamber. Sharpe observed:

After [outgoing Vice-President] Hamlin delivered a brief and stately valedictory, Johnson rose unsteadily to harangue the distinguished crowd about his humble origins and his triumph over the rebel aristocracy. In the shocked and silent audience, President Abraham Lincoln showed an expression of “unutterable sorrow,” while Senator Charles Sumner covered his face with his hands. Former Vice President Hamlin tugged vainly at Johnson’s coattails, trying to cut short his remarks. After Johnson finally quieted, took the oath of office, and kissed the Bible, he tried to swear in the new senators, but became so confused that he had to turn the job over to a Senate clerk.92

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Winter Hiatus

November 1864–March 1865

Deserters in Blue