Reflections on the lives of William F. and Victor Hanson Jr.: Hanson, Ripples of Battle, 1–10.
On differing ways of dividing up and envisioning World War II, see Hew Strachan, “Total War: The Conduct of War, 1939–1945,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, 33–35.
Reynolds (From World War to Cold War, 14–18) discusses both the inadequacy of world war to designate the conflict of 1939–1945 and the fact that nations in the war did not employ the term.
1. Lec, Unkempt Thoughts, 21.
1. Doenitz, Memoirs, 307.
2. Raeder, Grand Admiral, 322–323; Overy, Interrogations, 340–341. Cf. Manstein, Lost Victories, 163–165 on the need to invade Great Britain. Blitzkrieg: Hew Strachan, “Total War: The Conduct of War, 1939–1945,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, 45–46. Raeder’s advice against Operation Barbarossa: Raeder, Grand Admiral, 336–337. Operation Sea Lion: McKinstry, Operation Sea Lion. Cf. Prior, When Britain Saved the West, 156–159. Hitler’s strategic fantasies: Weinberg, World at Arms, 28–47, 86–87.
3. For the Meinecke quote (in a letter to Siegfried A. Kaehler dated July, 4, 1940), see Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 694.
4. Ellis, Brute Force, 29.
5. Germany’s rapid conquest of Greece: Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece, 1–8; Beevor, Crete 1941, 3–58. Gibraltar’s strategic and military role during WWII: Jackson, Rock of the Gibraltarians, 270–293; Harvey, Gibraltar, 137–156.
6. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, 166–168; cf. 342–343. Cf. Toll, Pacific Crucible, 275–277. On Tojo’s thinking, Browne, Tojo: The Last Banzai, 210–211.
7. The celebration of the end of the war in Italy—Festa della Liberazione (Liberation Day), April 25, 1945—remains a matter for political dispute: Belco, War, Massacre, and Recovery, 129–132.
8. Cf. Willard C. Frank, Jr, “The Spanish Civil War and the Coming of the Second World War,” in Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War, 381–402; Weinberg, World at Arms, 133–134; 177–178. Franco’s relations with Hitler: Preston, “Spain: Betting on a Nazi Victory,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 327–329.
9. The notion of “world” wars: Weinberg, World at Arms, 3–7. Cf. Bell, First Total War, 302–309. On casualties: Gates, Napoleonic Wars, 271–272; Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Vol. III: The Age of Revolution, 123–134.
10. A “Thirty Years’” war, Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, i, 904–906.
11. Savile, Complete Works, 229.
12. “Koran”: Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 55.
13. Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 125.
14. German rearmament: Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 51. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 190, remarked that even by 1941 German tanks were largely inferior to their Russian counterparts.
15. On the relative resources: Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War II: An Overview,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 2–5.
1. Moorhouse, The Devils’ Alliance, xx.
2. Gorodetsky, ed., Maisky Diaries, 239 (November 15, 1939). Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 301 (February 6, 1942). The quote of Krishna Menon: The New York Times, October 18, 1960.
3. Churchill, Gathering Storm, 484; Cf. Burdick and Jacobsen, eds., Halder War Diary, 31 (August 22, 1939). See in general: Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 676. Churchill on appeasement: James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963, Vol. 7, 1943–1949, 7251.
4. Hitler’s anti-Soviet usefulness to Western conservatism: Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 913.
5. Neutrals: Keegan, Battle for History, 31. Wilsonian idealism that fed neutralism after Versailles: see Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 907–909.
6. War as reflections of relative power: Blainey, Causes of War, 108–124, especially 112–114. Cf. also, Hanson, Father of Us All, 3–49.
7. Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 663–664. On the “blunter wits”: Thucydides 3.83.3.
8. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 245 (November 7, 1939). Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 290, for Goering’s delusional ranting. Cf. Murray, Luftwaffe, 60–61.
9. Western European and British appeasers, cf. Anthony Adamthwaite: “France and the Coming of War,” in Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War, 82–88. On perception of the Depression in Germany and the United States versus facts, cf. Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 65.
10. Eden quote: Gorodetsky, ed., Maisky Dairies, 298 (italics in the original quotation).
11. Luck, Panzer Commander, 187.
12. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 316–317.
13. R. Gerwarth, “The Axis: Germany, Japan and Italy on the Road to War,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 29–30.
14. On the causes of war, cf. Kagan, Origins of War, 566–573; Blainey, Causes of War, 205–223. See Thucydides 1.76.2 (and cf. 6.15; 1.23.6) for his famous trinity of “fear, honor, and interest.”
15. See Norman J. W. Goda, “The Diplomacy of the Axis, 1940–1945,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 287.
16. Weinberg, World at Arms, 70, 86–89. Hitler’s fantasies about the United States: Burdick and Jacobsen, eds., Halder War Diary, 345 (March 30, 1941).
17. Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 723. Deprecating America: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 75. On America’s unused capacity, see Bernd Greiner, “The Spirit of St. Louis: Mobilizing American Politics and Society, 1937–1945,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, especially 246–247.
18. Fermor, A Time of Gifts, 115–116.
19. Compare Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 85; Duhamel, The French Position, 107. Cf. Sowell, Intellectuals and Society, 310–333.
20. Wilson quote: Sidney Aster, “‘Guilty Men’: The Case of Neville Chamberlain,” in Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War, 70–71. For von Papen, see Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 83. Impediments to Allied rearming: Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 19–22, 116–117.
21. Churchill, Gathering Storm, 319. Pessimism of the European intelligentsia: Overy, Twilight Years, 9–49. Cf. Weinberg, World at Arms, 95–97, on the Nazi home front.
22. Freedman, Strategy: A History, 126–128.
23. Raeder, Grand Admiral, 281. Cf. Richard Overy, “Hitler’s War Plans and the German Economy,” in Boyce and Robertson, eds., Paths to War, 114. See also Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, 607.
24. French tanks superiority: Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 54–58.
25. Maurois, Tragedy in France, 126–127.
26. Germany’s whines: Stephen A. Schuker, “The End of Versailles,” in Martel, ed., The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 38–56. See Overy and Wheatcroft, Road to War, 139–141. Foch quote: MacMillan, Paris 1919, 459.
27. Eden, Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, 11. Appeasement of the 1930s: Weinberg, World at Arms, 22–39; Thornton, Wages of Appeasement, 78–88. Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 2–3. On Versailles: Blainey, Causes of War, 15–16, 262–263; Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, 345. On the reactions to appeasement and dogged Allied determination that World War II would end differently from World War I, see Weinberg, Visions of Victory, 149–150, 178–180. Cf. also, O’Connor, Diplomacy for Victory, passim.
28. Cf. Fuller, Second World War, 18–27.
29. A.J. Liebling, “Paris Postscript,” The New Yorker Book of War Pieces, 49 (August 3/10, 1940). Aeschylus quote (fragment no. 394 in Sommerstein, ed., Aeschylus Fragments, 328–329) preserved in Stobaeus, Anthology 3.27.2.
30. See August 22, 1939, in International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. 3, 582. Halifax: A. Roberts, Holy Fox, 406–408. Eden’s anecdote: Eden, Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, 37. Hitler’s assurance: Baynes, ed., Speeches of Adolf Hitler, Vol. II, 1181.
31. Weinberg, World at Arms, 6–20; cf. 536–586. Cf. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 19–22; Kagan, Origins of War, 285–297.
32. Hitler’s quote: Fuller, Second World War, 40–41.
33. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 210–211. On Japan’s strategic dilemmas: Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, 128–129. Raeder’s comments: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 236. Italians and Barbarossa: Ciano, Diary, 590 (December 23, 1943). German unawareness of the Italian invasion of the Balkans: Mellenthin, German Generals, 137.
34. Ismay quote, cf. David Reynolds, “Introduction,” in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 13. First Punic War: Zonaras, Epitome Historian, 8.17, 1.62.1–9, 3.27.2–6; Zonaras 8.17; Lazenby, First Punic War, 156–159, 171; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, 19; Goldsworthy, Punic Wars, 128–129, 149–150.
35. See Barnett, Collapse of British Power, 315–319.
36. Kagan, Origins of War, 252–256.
37. Reassessment of Versailles: MacMillan, Paris 1919, 493–494; Weinberg, World at Arms, 6–16; Thornton, Wages of Appeasement, 70–72; Kagan, Origins of War, 285–297. Cf. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 19–22, 48–50. Cf. Blainey, Causes of War, 17.
38. French defeatism: Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 690; Jackson, Fall of France, 112–116. Fall of France: Manstein, Lost Victories, 149. 1918 versus 1945: Gerhard L. Weinberg, “German Strategy, 1939–1945,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of The Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 130–131. Cf. Williamson Murray: “British Grand Strategy, 1933–1942,” in Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, 157–158.
39. Doyle, World War II in Numbers, 206–209.
40. Racist Axis: Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, 570–571. Hitler and the Westwall: Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 103. Mussolini and the need “to kick ass”: Ciano, Diary, 341 (April 11, 1940).
41. Hitler’s so-called euthanasia program: Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 260–261. Causes of mass death: R. J. Rummel, “War Isn’t This Century’s Biggest Killer,” The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1986.
42. British and American investment in air power: Overy, Bombing War, 609–633.
43. Lord Curzon’s quote: Raeder, Grand Admiral, 209–210.
44. Production figures of transport trucks: Hyde, Arsenal of Democracy: The American Automobile Industry in World War II, 152–160. Germany’s reliance on horses: DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism: Horses and the German Army of World War II, 24–25, 45–46. Goebbels quote: Hitler, Hitler and His Generals, 737.
45. On Raeder: Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 45.
46. For late-war German desperation, see Overy, Bombing War, 122–124.
1. Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 614–615.
2. Invasion of Poland: Weinberg, World at Arms, 55–58.
3. Speer, Spandau, 45. Richard Overy, “Hitler’s War Plans and the German Economy,” in Boyce and Roberston, eds., Paths to War, 111. Cf. Overy, 1939, 6–13. Fall of France: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 26–28, and the same author’s “Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century,” International Affairs 66.2 (1990), 325–350.
4. Japanese strategic confusion: Morton, Strategy and Command, 58–59. Cf. John Lukacs, “No Pearl Harbor? FDR Delays the War” in Cowley, ed., What Ifs? of American History, 179–188; also in the same volume, Antony Beevor, “If Eisenhower Had Gone to Berlin,” 189–204. Conrad Black, “The Japanese Do Not Attack Pearl Harbor,” in Roberts, ed., What Might Have Been, 153–165; also in the same volume, Simon Sebag Montefiore, “Stalin Flees Moscow in 1941,” 134–152. Andrew Roberts, “Prime Minister Halifax: Great Britain Makes Peace with Germany, 1940,” in Cowley, ed., What If? 2, 279–290; also in the same volume, Caleb Carr, “VE Day—November 11, 1944: The Unleashing of Patton and Montgomery,” 333–343; and Richard B. Frank, “No Bomb: No End: The Operation Olympic Disaster, Japan 1945,” 366–381.
5. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 120–121.
6. “Unconditional responsibilities”: Fuller, Second World War, 364. Aims of the various Allied and Axis powers: Rothwell, War Aims in the Second World War, passim; Germany: Weinberg, World at Arms, 43–47; Italy: Knox, Common Destiny, 61–72, Mussolini Unleashed, 102; Japan: Hane and Perez, Modern Japan, chapters 12 (“The Ascendancy of Militarism”) and 13 (“The Road to War”), 257–328. Reactions to World War I: Eric Goldstein, Georges-Henri Soutou, Lawrence E. Gelfand, and the comment of Antony Lentin in Part Two (“The Peacemakers and Their Home Fronts”) of Boemeke, Feldman, and Glaser, eds., Treaty of Versailles. On the problems with Versailles: MacMillan, Paris 1919, 478–483. On idea of waging a war of annihilation against Germany rather than one of exhaustion, see the classical dichotomy in the work of Hans Delbrück: Gordon A Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” Chapter 12 of Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy, 326–354; Niederwerfungsstrategie (the strategy of annihilation) versus Ermattungsstrategie (the strategy of exhaustion), see ibid., 341–344.
7. A war “like no other”: Thucydides 1.23.1; cf. 1.1.1. Hanson, War Like No Other, 10–12. Death tolls in China, Germany, and Russia are discussed in Chapter 19.
8. Megargee, War of Annihilation, 144–148.
9. Genocide: Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 15–29. Cf. Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 233–263, and bibliography, 1250–1251. Cf. Jonathan Rauch, “The Forgotten Millions: Communism Is the Deadliest Fantasy in Human History (But Does Anyone Care?),” The Atlantic Monthly (December 2003), (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/the-forgotten-millions/302849/).
10. On conservative ideas of allowing the Soviet Union and the Third Reich to destroy each other: West, American Betrayal, 111–115,-271. On sitting out World War II in Europe leading to an improved position of Britain and especially the United States: P. Buchanan, Churchill, Hitler, and “The Unnecessary War”: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World (New York: Crown, 2009), especially 413–424. Diplomacy with Hitler: Teddy J. Uldricks, “Debating the Role of Russia in the Origins of the Second World War,” in Martel, ed., The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 146–149.
11. Raeder’s warning: Raeder, Grand Admiral, 336. Soviet geography, weather, logistics, and manpower: Megargee, War of Annihilation, 29–31. On German officer support for Operation Barbarossa, see Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 83.
12. Finland: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 115–118. Russian strength before Barbarossa: Bruce W. Menning and Jonathan House, “Soviet strategy,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of The Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 222–223.
13. Bremer quote: Salisbury, 900 Days, 61; Hitler’s “sandbox” fantasy: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 173. See also Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 305.
14. Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 99–100.
15. Stalin on Hitler: Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 182. Hitler quote: Berthon and Potts, Warlords, 166–167.
16. Jackson, Fall of France, 237. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Weinberg, World at Arms, 34–36; cf. Moorhouse, Devils’ Alliance, 185–186. Cf. Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 33–36. Stalin had read Mein Kampf: Suvorov, Chief Culprit, 19–22, 105–110, 146–152. Soviets’ claims: Gorodetsky, ed., Maisky Dairies, 229.
17. Tensions among Axis and Allies: Earl F. Ziemke, “Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 280–282.
18. Japanese-Russian accord: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 917. Cf. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 145; cf. Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 35.
19. Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: Hane and Perez, Modern Japan, 311–312. Cf. Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 30–42. Keitel’s “Long war”: Overy, Interrogations, 344. Japanese and German calculations: Murray, “The Axis,” in Mansoor and Murray, eds., Grand Strategy and Military Alliances, 334–336.
20. Churchill, Gathering Storm, 449.
21. Soviet Russia’s fears, duplicity, and strategic ambitions: J. Erickson, “Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930–1941,” in Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War, 334–351. Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: Weinberg, World at Arms, 81, 249–250; Paine, Wars for Asia, 177–180. On Soviet reluctance to fight the Japanese: Eden, Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, 303.
22. British government’s assessments and strategies: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 75–98. Imperial resources: David French, “British military strategy,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of The Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 50; Ashley Jackson, “The British Empire, 1939–1945,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 564–566.
23. In general: Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine. See Sidney Aster, “‘Guilty Men’: The Case of Neville Chamberlain,” in Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War, 62–78.
24. Churchill, Gathering Storm, 223–224. See Orwell and Angus, eds., The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. 4, 317.
25. American prewar defense spending: see O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 98–100.
26. Feeble Japanese attacks on the US homeland: Horn, The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K and Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II; Webber, Silent Siege: Japanese Attacks Against North America in World War II; Mikesh, Japan’s World War II Balloon Bomb Attacks on North America, 16–36; Weinberg, World at Arms, 650–651.
27. American defense spending: Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 48–50.
28. America’s first-generation warplanes: Earl F. Ziemke, “Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 285–287. B-17s and B-24s: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 274–275.
29. Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 78. Hitler on Roosevelt: Baynes, Speeches of Adolf Hitler, Vol. II, 1605ff. Ribbentrop’s claims: Overy, Interrogations, 321–322.
30. Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, 130–131. Cf. Jackson, Fall of France, 142. American strategic aims: Thomas G. Mahnken, “US Grand Strategy, 1939–1945,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, especially 207–212.
1. Wells, The War in the Air, 164.
1. For examples of the nature of casualties caused by strategic bombing in Germany: Kassel and Magdeburg: Arnold, Allied Air War and Urban Memory; Berlin: Read and Fisher, Fall of Berlin, 122–129; Dresden: De Bruhl, Firestorm, 210–213.
2. On civilian dead and its military effects: Miller, Masters of the Air, 484–485. Assessments and cost effectiveness of air power: Overy, Bombing War, 398–408; Earl F. Ziemke, “Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 282.
3. See O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 17–66.
4. Importance of air power in World War I: John H. Morrow, Jr., “The War in the Air,” Chapter 20 in Strachan, ed., Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, 265–277.
5. Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 23–24. Cf. Douhet, The Command of the Air (Il dominio dell’aria), 23. Air power in World War I: Buckley, Air Power, 42–69, 74–77; Mitchell, Winged Defense, 3. On manned flight before the airplane: Holmes, Falling Upwards, 122–155.
6. Fighter and bomber performance in the late 1930s: Buckley, Air Power, 108–110; Overy, Bombing War, 26.
7. Stanley Baldwin’s speech of November 10, 1932: Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography, 735–736; Kennett, Strategic Bombing, 68–69. Cf. Buckley, Air Power, 14; Overy, Bombing War, 27. On Baldwin and Chamberlain: Dobson, Why Do the People Hate Me So?, especially 285–297.
8. The prewar prophets: Kennett, Strategic Bombing, 39–57. For the complexity of determining the efficacy of American strategic bombing, see the discussion of the January 18, 1944, report entitled “Germany’s War Potential, December 1943: An Appraisal” in Gentile, How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?, 26–31. Walther Wever: Murray, Luftwaffe, 9–10.
9. Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 36–45.
10. De Seversky, Victory Through Air Power, 130–131; cf. also 24–27; Libbey, Alexander P. de Seversky, chapters 12 (“Prophet of Air Power,” 178–192) and 13 (“Victory Through Air Power,” 193–211). Overy, Bombing War, 609–633.
11. Apart from Sun Tzu’s, The Art of War, cf. Whitehead, Aineias the Tactician; Milner, Vegetius; Dennis, Maurice’s Strategikon; Howard and Paret, Clausewitz, On War; Mendell and Craighill, The Art of War.
12. Air accidents: Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 31–33. On the proximity of most sea battles to the coasts: Keegan, Price of Admiralty, 6. For Salamis, see Hale, Lords of the Sea, 55–74; Strauss, Battle of Salamis, passim; for Lepanto: Capponi, Victory of the West, 219–286; for Navarino: Woodhouse, Battle of Navarino, passim.
13. On the air improvements between the wars: Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 66–67; cf. Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 29.
14. Johnson, V1-V2, 21–25.
15. Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 27–59 (Chapter 2: “The Nature of Air Combat During the Combined Bomber Offensive”).
16. Unfamiliarity with Spitfires: Galland, First and Last, 37, 11; Galland’s own promotion to general, 97; condemnation of Goering for denying the realities of Allied production figures and capabilities, 159, 234–235; Goering’s failure to grapple with mechanics of air combat, 217–218, 221–222; Goering’s final acceptance of Galland’s arguments concerning the Me 262: 354.
17. Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 203. Cf. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 75–76.
18. Quoted in Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 30.
19. He who wages war from afar: Plato, Laws, 778d-779b.
20. See Murray, Luftwaffe, 227–231. And in particular concerning Luftwaffe crashes and losses: Williamson Murray, “Attrition and the Luftwaffe,” Air University Review 34.3 (March–April 1983), 66–77.
21. Arthur, Last of the Few, 97. Jarrell, Complete Poems, 144. Wounded and fatality ratios: Miller, Masters of the Air, 205.
22. Memoir of B-29 tail-gunner: Doty, Backwards into Battle, 121–122. Cf. Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 6–22.
23. Buckley, Air Power, 147–153; Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 79–81.
1. For comparative fighter and bomber production: see Ellis, World War II, tables 92–94 (278–280); tables 17–46 (231–244); Angelucci, Matricardi, and Pinto, Complete Book of World War II Combat Aircraft, 414; Angelucci The Rand McNally Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, 1914–1980, Plate 114 (251).
2. Alvin D. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 4–5. Exaggerated Luftwaffe power: Murray, Luftwaffe, 60–61.
3. Murray, Luftwaffe, 28–38. Germany’s medium bombers: Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 44.
4. Yenne, Hap Arnold, 301–303 (Appendix 4: Charles Lindbergh Letter to Hap Arnold, 1938). Cf. also Lindbergh, Autobiography of Values, 180–182. See Olson, Those Angry Days, 14–18, 25–27; also Smith, Berlin Alert.
5. Re-creation of the Luftwaffe: Buckley, Air Power, 118–121; and see 126–128 on the air campaign in Poland.
6. Murray, Luftwaffe, 38–39.
7. Axis fantasy bombers: Horn, The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K and Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II; cf. Frenzel, “Operation Pastorius: Hitler’s Unfulfilled Dream of a New York in Flames,” Der Spiegel, September 16, 2010. Goering’s frustrations with the Heinkel 177: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 495.
8. Failed He-177 program: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 28–29. For Hitler’s dreams: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 307 (February 9, 1942). Cf. Overy, Interrogations, 304–305. Condition of Luftwaffe planes: Murray, War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness, 241. Disrupted German aircraft production: Cairncross, Planning in Wartime, 127–128. Goering: Overy, Interrogations, 300–301.
9. Murray, Luftwaffe, 39–43.
10. For controversies over German intent and the Rotterdam bombing: http://www.rafbombercommand.com/personals_1_earlydays.html#stories_earlydays.html (accessed: February 24, 2014). See Overy, Bombing War, 64–65; van den Doel, “Not a Bridge Too Far: The battle for the Moerdijk bridges, Dordrecht and Rotterdam,” chapter 10 in Amersfoort and Kamphuis, eds., May 1940: The Battle for the Netherlands, 382–392.
11. Jackson, Fall of France, 77–78. British air losses: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 133–134. Cf. Murray, Luftwaffe, 42–43.
12. Sunderman, ed., World War II in the Air: Europe, 8–16. Prior, When Britain Saved the West, 140–141. Cf. F.R. Kirkland, “The French Air Force in 1940—Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics?” Air University Review 36.6 (September–October 1985), (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/kirkland.html). Cf. Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 136–138; 193–195.
13. Battle of Britain production figures: Overy, Bombing War, 66–82. Luftwaffe on the eve of Operation Barbarossa: Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 50–51. Cf. Murray, Luftwaffe; see especially 53–54. Strategic thinking that invading Russia would pressure Britain in a way the Battle of Britain had not: Overy, Bombing War, 73–74, 110–112. See Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 381.
14. Myth of British inferiority: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 98–100, 122–124.
15. Marshal Dowding, see Ray, Battle of Britain, passim; Overy, Bombing War, 103–104; Prior, When Britain Saved the West, 246–249.
16. Goering: Overy, Bombing War, 75; cf. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 444.
17. Buckley, Air Power, 119–120. Failed German blitz: Murray, Luftwaffe, 601.
18. Roberts, Storm of War, 87–118.
19. German bombing of the Soviet Union: Overy, Bombing War, 197–234.
20. Soviet TB-3: Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, 46.
21. Overy, Bombing War, 234.
22. Eastern Front air losses: Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 110–111. Cf. Murray, Luftwaffe, 84–91.
23. On Russian aircraft production: Buckley, Air Power, 144–147.
24. Transferred Luftwaffe units to the west: Murray, Luftwaffe, 214–215. Cf. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 278–282.
25. Kennett, Strategic Bombing, 93–94, 117–120. Overy, Bombing War, 50–51. Bomber Command’s failed offensive during the summer months of 1940: Overy, Bombing War, 251–254; cf. 86–88.
26. For Cologne, see Kennett, Strategic Bombing, 133–135; for Essen, ibid. 142–143. Hitler’s cynicism: Speer, Spandau, 200.
27. Battle of the Ruhr: Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 596–601. And cf. Tami Davis Biddle, “Anglo-American Strategic Bombing, 1940–1945,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 500–504. Cf. Harris, Bomber Offensive, 52. Cf. Evans, Third Reich at War, 438–439.
28. The 1943 Anglo-American raids: Kennett, Strategic Bombing, 146–149. American protestations: Miller, Masters of the Air, 336–337. The history of American bomb-sighting technology: McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910–1945.
29. Chuikov, Fall of Berlin, 20.
30. Losses of the raid: Dugan and Stewart, Ploesti, 222–246. Misplaced optimism of Harris: Murray, Luftwaffe, 201–202.
31. Bendiner, Fall of Fortresses, 174.
32. Mythologies and misconceptions of the bomber campaign: Miller, Masters of the Air, 211–213, 481–482. Substantial damage to the two plants: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 278–282.
33. Spitfire and escort fighter service: D. Stubbs, “A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936–44,” Journal of Military History 78 (April 2014), 673–702.
34. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 76–77. Loss of air parity over Germany: Murray, Luftwaffe, 286–295. See 262–263 for catastrophic Luftwaffe losses.
35. Ellis, Brute Force, 220–221. Cf. Allan R. Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 61–62. Morality of the bombing: Tami Davis Biddle, “Anglo-American Strategic Bombing, 1940–1945,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 525–526.
36. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 681 (Diary, April 7, 1945).
37. Murray quotes in Luftwaffe, 242, and War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness, 254. American bombing strategy: Allan R. Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 46–47. Luftwaffe attrition: Overy, Bombing War, 365–369; cf. 377–409. On losses, see also Buckley, Air Power, 158–162.
38. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 226–228.
39. Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces, Vol. II, 568–569.
40. Ehlers, Mediterranean Air War, 322–355; cf. 397–406.
41. The German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was never completed; nor was the Italian Aquila. On Taranto and the new importance of naval air power, see the Royal Navy’s Admiral Andrew Cunningham quote: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/navy-commemorates-70th-anniversary-of-battle-of-taranto.
42. Comparative carrier strength: See tables in US Strategy Bombing Survey: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/JapansStruggle/index.html#A3; cf. the statistics in Ellis, World War II, 245–249 (Tables 47–50), 293–302 (Table 100).
43. Battleships versus carriers: Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 77–78. Costs of building Yamato: Lengerer and Ahlberg, Yamato Class, 69–73.
44. Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero!, 187. Cf. Alvin D. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 19.
45. On the enormous Japanese investment in top-flight ships and planes: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 66.
46. Cf. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 423.
47. “Dieu n’est pas pour les plus gros bataillons, mais pour ceux qui tirent le mieux”: Voltaire, Complete Works, 547 and cp. 647.
1. On the nature of Japanese air defenses and the aviation industry: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 403–405.
2. The B-29 program: Pace, Boeing B-29 Superfortress, 19–74; Birdsall, Saga of the Superfortress; Kozak, LeMay, 170–172.
3. Kozak, LeMay, 174; cf. Dorr, Mission to Tokyo, 27–29. Cf. Jeffrey Fear, “War of the Factories,” in Geyer and Tooze, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. III: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, 108.
4. B-29 losses: Anderton, B-29 Superfortress at War. Mechanical problems: LeMay and Kantor, Mission with LeMay, 321. Survivability rates of B-29 crews: http://ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/29-losses-4429.html; http://www.econseminars.com/6th_Bombardment_Group_Tinian/Risks.pdf.
5. Hitler’s fear: Hitler, Hitler and His Generals, 610–614. Stalin’s copying of the B-29: Gordon and Rigmant, Tupolev Tu-4: Soviet Superfortress, 24–68. Cf. Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, 348–354.
6. Japanese production figures: Alvin D. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 18–21. See Kozak, LeMay, 230.
7. LeMay’s altering B-29 missions: LeMay and Kantor, Mission with LeMay, 345–351.
8. LeMay’s own flights: LeMay and Kantor, Mission with LeMay, 329–331; LeMay’s order from General Arnold as passed on by Brigadier General Lauris Norstad: ibid., 347. Urbanized Japanese vulnerable to fire attacks: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 504–508.
9. Ethical controversies over the firebombing: Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 316–317.
10. Quoted in Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, 373. Cf. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Number 96), 95.
11. LeMay’s incendiary raids: Wheeler, Bombers Over Japan, 169–171. B-29 mining campaign: United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 382–387.
12. Combustibility of Tokyo: Toll, Pacific Crucible, 178. Kennett, Strategic Bombing, 164.
13. Leaflets and eroding Japanese civilian morale: Kozak, LeMay, 218–225. Cf. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 472–474. “War criminal”: Rhodes, Dark Sun, 20–21.
14. On Japanese observations of B-29 raids: Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero!: 308–309, 334–335.
15. LeMay’s assessment of the raids: LeMay and Kantor, Mission with LeMay, 388. Cf. “Air-Power Philosophers in the Modern Era,” in Boyne, Influence of Air Power, 354–357.
16. German disillusionment with the effectiveness of V-weapons: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 673–674.
17. Widely different numbers about V-weapons productions and launchings, and the nature of the V-weapons’ navigation: Overy, Bombing War, 121–125; Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 273–274. The V-1 was also officially known as FZG (Flakzielgerät [“flak-aiming device”])-76 (Fieseler Fi 103), and the V-2 more loosely as Aggregat 4.
18. Gunston, Rockets & Missiles, 46–47. See Rosenau, Special Operations Forces, 29–34.
19. Allied efforts to destroy the V-weapons, and differences between the V-1 and V-2: in Sunderman, ed., World War II in the Air: Europe, 306–317.
20. On English fears of V-weapons: Campbell, Target London; Gunston, Rockets & Missiles, 48–49. For the quotation, see S.N. Behrman, “The Suspended Drawing Room,” The New Yorker Book of War Pieces, 421.
21. V-weapons: Miller, Masters of the Air, 297–304, 481. V-2: Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 267–280; Baker, Rocket, 37–64. Buckley, Air Power, 142–143, on the USSBS analysis of the costs of the V-weapons program for Germany. Morale at OKW: Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 403. Man-hours for various Reich weapons, especially V-2 versus Fw 190: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 29.
22. Reischauer, Japan, 50–51.
23. The official Japanese name for kamikaze was “special attack unit” (okubetsu Kōgekitai).
24. Kamikaze sorties, losses, and hits on targets: Zaloga, Kamikaze, 12–13.
25. Zeros made up 79 percent of all kamikaze sorties: Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero!, 276–277.
26. Roberts, Storm of War, 565.
27. Buckley, Air Power, 138–169, on the German air war. Mustang: Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, 118–125; O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 320–322. Overy, Interrogations, 349.
28. Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 113–121.
29. Buckley, Air Power, 138–145, 181–186, on air power in the European and Japanese theaters. Cf. also, ibid. 19 and 189–191.
30. Misplaced investments in jet fighters and rockets: Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, 660–661.
31. Overy, Bombing War, 213–216.
32. C-47: Herman, Freedom’s Forge, 20, 227, 203–205. Goering’s crackpot ideas: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 224–225.
33. Sea Eagles: Tillman, Clash of the Carriers, 111–112.
34. American fighter success: Allan R. Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 80–83. Consequences of losing carrier pilots: Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero!, 115–116.
35. See the comments of the veteran naval pilot Masatake Okumiya and the designer of the Zero Jiro Horikoshi: Zero!, 186. Health care and sanitation on Allied versus Axis air bases: 186–187. Overy, Bombing War, 96–97.
36. Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 275; O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 88; Buckley, Air Power, 149–153.
37. Cf. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War). Efficacy of Allied bombing: Overy, Bombing War, 398–409; 450–467. Cf. Murray, Luftwaffe, 276–277 and 282–284.
38. Cost effectiveness of bombing and air defense: Murray, War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness, 231–264. Cf. Overy, Bombing War, 186–196. Conclusions of the strategic bombing survey of the Allied European campaign is accessed at http://www.anesi.com./ussbs02.htm (p. 17).
1. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783, 3.
1. Wilhelm Gustloff: Prince, Death in the Baltic, 35–36; cf. Hastings, Armageddon, 285–288.
2. Ancient sea battles: Strauss, Battle of Salamis; G.K. Tipps, “The Battle of Ecnomus,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 34 (1985), 432–465. Lepanto: Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 233–275. Fatalities listed by service: Ellis, World War II, 254 (Table 52). Casualty figures: see Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 936; Glantz and House, Armageddon in Stalingrad, 714–718.
3. On the HMS Hood: Norman, HMS Hood, 129–141. Compare other single-ship losses during World War II: (Taiho) (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Taiho.htm); USS Indianapolis (CA-35) (http://www.ussindianapolis.org/crew.htm).
4. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 243–245.
5. Drury and Clavin, Halsey’s Typhoon, 297–307. Halsey’s occasional blunders: Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919–1945, 490. Cf. the Navy’s report from the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington DC, April 18, 1947 (http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/aviation_fatal.htm).
6. Tiger I’s cost about 250,000 Reichmarks; the Bismarck about 200 million RM. Hitler’s anger at naval costs: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 27 (August 10–11, 1941, night).
7. Limitations of sea power: Kennedy, “The Influence and Limitations of Sea Power,” International History Review 10 (1988), 2–17; and the same author’s Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 7–8, 18, 169, and (for World War II) 312. Cf. in general Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, and Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy, 123–124. Rise of early Greek sea power: Casson, The Ancient Mariners, 33–43, 75–79. Sparta and Athens: see Hanson, War Like No Other, 271–287.
8. Venice serves as an example of a naturally poor state made rich by its maritime empire: Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, passim; Crowley, City of Fortune, 276–289.
9. Political utility of sea power (particularly the “theory of suasion”): Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, 71–72; Walker, “Sea Power and the Law of the Sea: The Need for a Contextual Approach,” Ocean Development & International Law 7 (1979), 299–326.
10. On US battleship policy: O’Connell, Sacred Vessels, 304–306. Genda’s contempt: Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 24–25. See comments of Vice Admiral Inoue (quoted in Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 184–185). Cf. Howarth, Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun, 211–219. Sinking of majestic battleships: Ireland, Jane’s Naval History of World War II, 232–251. Again, Hitler’s comments on battleships: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 708 (June 19, 1943, at table). Japanese concept of building super-battleships: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 382–383. Oil: Alessio Patalano, “Feigning Grand Strategy: Japan, 1937–1945,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of The Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 179.
11. Venetian Arsenal: Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, 361–364. Athenian naval superiority: Thucydides 2.62.2; also Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, The Athenian Trireme, 62, 94–95, 114–118; Hale, Lords of the Sea, xxiv–xxv, 126–128.
12. Axis and Allied battleship construction: O’Connell, Sacred Vessels, 290–307; Rose, Power at Sea, Vol. 2, 26–30; Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919–1945, 27–34.
13. Hitler’s naval arms race: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 27 (August 10–11, 1941). Cf. Hinsley, Hitler’s Strategy, 1–13, 61–62, 86–89.
14. Naval considerations and Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United States: Doenitz, Memoirs, 195–224. Cf. Shirer, Rise and Fall, 757 (quoting Shulman, Defeat in the West, 50).
15. Germans had a smaller fleet in comparison to the British in 1939 than they did in 1914: Showell, German Navy Handbook, 10–15. Anglo-German Naval Agreement (May 18, 1935): Holger H. Herwig, “The Failure of German Sea Power,” International History Review 10.1 (1988), 68–105.
16. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Reflections on China’s Military Trajectory and the US Pivot,” in Chow, ed., US Strategic Pivot, 207–225; cf. Laird, Timperlake, and Weitz, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific.
17. German naval strategy at the beginning of the war: Keegan, Price of Admiralty, 220–221.
18. Napoleon’s lack of naval prowess: Roberts, Napoleon, 57. A more favorable estimation of his strategy: Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 324. Prewar pessimism of the German Navy: Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 45–47.
19. Weinberg, World at Arms, 70. German naval strategy, Z Plan, and the aim of Hitler’s shipbuilding program: Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, Vol. 1: The Hunters 1939–1942, 29–49; Miller, War at Sea, 29–34.
20. For details of the Battle of Tsushima: Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada, 267–286.
21. Comparative Pacific fleets at the end of 1941: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 353–390, especially Fig. 10-1 (355) and Table 10-3 (365). Cf. Evans, ed., Japanese Navy, 5–6. Lack of American preparedness: Morton, Strategy and Command, 137–139. Praise of the genius of the Pearl Harbor attack: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 958–959.
22. Okumiya and Horikoshi, Zero!, 118–119. Japan’s early achievement: Alessio Patalano, “Feigning Grand Strategy: Japan, 1937–1945,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 181. Paine, The Wars for Asia, 188.
23. Cf. Loxton and Coulthard-Clark, The Shame of Savo, 254–270.
24. Prewar fleet: Zimm, Attack on Pearl Harbor, 394–400 (which lists the ships in Pearl Harbor and vicinity on the day of the attack.); cf. also 33–35.
25. Japanese failure to exploit fully tactical victories: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 494–495. The Zuikaku had been replenished with planes from the Shokaku: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 1056.
26. Shortage of trained Japanese carrier pilots: Potter, Yamamoto, 163–164; Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, 506–507. For end-of-the-war comparisons of relative American and Japanese naval strength: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, Table 10-4 (366) and Fig. 10-2 (367).
27. Problems of Japan even reaching Pearl Harbor: Evans, ed., Japanese Navy, 8–10.
28. Prewar flawed Japanese strategic assumptions: Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 447–486. The Long Lance: Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, 60–61; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 266–272.
29. Italian naval inferiority in 1935–1936 in relation to the British Navy: Mallett, Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 54–56. Mussolini and the Anglo-French back down over Abyssinia: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 33; Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 10–19. Mussolini’s “wait and see” doctrine: John Gooch, “Mussolini’s Strategy, 1939–1943,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 135–137.
30. Disparities between the Italians and British at sea: Boyne, Clash of Titans, 45–51.
31. Ship-to-ship British-Italian comparisons: Bragadin, Italian Navy, 8. (See also the statistics of ship losses for both belligerents on 359–364.)
32. Regia Marina’s defensive strategies: Salerno, Vital Crossroads, 61–62, 66–67, 86–90, 132–134, 190–191, 209–210. And cf. Hattendorf, ed., Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean, 108–146.
33. See worries about America in Ciano, Diary, 515 (April 29, 30–May 1, 2, 1942).
34. End of Italian fleet as a combat force: Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, 328–329.
35. For some statistics of British losses, see http://www.naval-history.net/WW2aBritishLosses10tables.htm. And on World War I: https://ia800502.us.archive.org/23/items/statisticsofmili00grea/statisticsofmili00grea.pdf.Cf. American naval manpower losses: https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-navy-personnel-in-world-war-ii-service-and-casualty-statistics.html. If escort carriers are included in the aggregate carrier losses, then the Americans lost a total of more aircraft carriers. See also http://www.navsource.org/Naval/losses.htm#ca were greater.
36. British grand naval strategy at the war’s outset: Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 420–436.
37. US Pacific Fleet and Germany-first policy: James Kurth, “The U.S. Navy in World War II,” Foreign Policy Research Institute FootNotes Vol. 14, No. 24 (September 2009), and available at: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/09/us-navy-world-war-ii. Cf. Dennis Showalter, “Global Yet Not Total: The U.S. War Effort and Its Consequences,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, 110–111.
38. Synopses of US naval strategy and War Plan Orange: Miller, War Plan Orange, 347–370.
39. US Atlantic fleet’s efforts against the U-boat threat: Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 1: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939–1943, 400–409.
40. American insight in building carriers: O’Connell, Sacred Vessels, 308–309, Cf. Williamson Murray, “US Naval Strategy and Japan,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 296–297. And on the contribution of Carl Vinson, see Cook, Carl Vinson: Patriarch of the Armed Forces, 78–153; Jones, WWII, 102. American naval buildup: Thomas, Sea of Thunder, 108–110, 151–152. Stalin’s view of Allied superior production: Shtemenko, The Last Six Months, 423–425.
41. Submarine construction and constant improvement during the war: Fontenoy, Submarines, 23–38.
42. Battleship and heavy cruiser support of amphibious landings: Barbara Brooks Tomblin, “Naval Gunfire Support in Operation Neptune: A Reexamination,” Chapter Six in Piehler and Pash, eds., The United States and the Second World War, 150–215. Cf. On D-Day bombardments: Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, 253, 256, 264.
43. Strategies behind Soviet naval construction and strategy: Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, 117–121. Cf. Mark Harrison, “The Volume of Soviet Munitions Output, 1937–1945: A Reevaluation,” Journal of Economic History 50.3 (1990), 569–589.
44. See in general on the Soviet fleet, and the German view of naval strategy in the Baltic and Black Seas: Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents. Cf. Boyne, Clash of Titans, 349–351. Lend-Lease through Vladivostok: Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R., 2–3.
45. Soviet prewar and wartime naval grand strategy: Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, 20–24, 41–42, 43–45, 77–85, 117–119.
46. On battleship gunnery in general: Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War Two.
47. Battleship romance: O’Connell, Sacred Vessels, 277–316.
48. Italy never finished its two carriers Aquila and Sparviero: Bragadin, Italian Navy, 98–99 and 346. On July 12, 2006, the Cypriot research vessel RV St. Barbara discovered the wreck of Graf Zeppelin 55 kilometers off the northern coastline of Poland. On Graf Zeppelin: Showell, German Navy Handbook 1939–1945, 176.
49. Listing of the specifications and dimensions of individual battleships and carriers: Spilling, ed., Weapons of War: Battleships and Aircraft Carriers, passim. Relative costs of carriers vs. battleships: see the text of “The Staggering Burden of Armament,” A League of Nations 4.2 (April 1921), 245, 251–253. Doenitz vs. Raeder: Speer, Spandau, 120.
50. Poirier, “Results of German and American Submarine Campaigns” (Appendix I). Crew losses on both sides and merchant marine deaths: White, Bitter Ocean, 2–6; cf. also 289–298.
51. US submarines against Japanese targets: Paine, Wars for Asia, 195–196. Cf. also, ibid., 218–219 for additional statistics related to shipping losses.
52. Classical definition of a destroyer by displacement and armament: Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, 22–24. Washington Naval Limitation Treaty and subsequent agreements in London: John H. Maurer, “Arms Control and the Washington Conference,” in Goldstein and Maurer, eds., The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor, 267–292. Cf. Williamson Murray, “US Naval Strategy and Japan,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 289–291.
53. French destroyers of Le Fantasque–class: Whitley, Destroyers of World War II, 42–44. The destroyer’s ultimate wartime incarnation was perhaps the American Gearing class that attained nearly 400 feet in length, with displacement of over 2,600 tons, and six 5-inch guns—but was now equipped with an assortment of anti-aircraft batteries, torpedo tubes, and depth-charge throwers. The biggest and most lethal of the war’s destroyers—those of the Japanese Akizuki-class—were oversized at 2,700 tons displacement with eight 3.9-inch anti-aircraft guns in four power-operated turrets, along with four 24-inch torpedo tubes. On the American Gearing class, see Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, 129–130, 473–474; Whitley, Destroyers of World War II, 292–295. For the Japanese Akizuki-class destroyers, see Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 386; Whitley, Destroyers of World War II, 204–205.
54. Destroyer losses: Tucker, ed., World War II at Sea, 233–234.
1. German U-boats in World War I: Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, 287–380. Rivalry between Doenitz and Raeder and ramifications to German naval strategies: Bird, Erich Raeder, 199–201, 221–222.
2. On the relative size, nature, and advantages of the German and British fleets at the war’s outset: Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 299–303. On how the war quickly clarified British prewar advantages, see Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 46 (only 26 U-boats in September were ready for long patrols across the Atlantic).
3. Number of naval and merchant vessels produced respectively by the Axis and Allies from 1939 to 1945: Ellis, World War II, 280 (Table 95). The British and Americans out-built the Germans, Italians, and Japanese in every category of warship (36 fleet carriers vs. 16 carriers of all classes; 13 vs. 7 battleships; 80 vs. 17 cruisers; 589 vs. 115 destroyers)—except one. The Germans deployed nearly twice the number of U-boats as did the British, Americans, and Soviets combined (over 1,100 vs. 568).
4. Cf. Blair, Hitler’s U-boat War, Vol. I: The Hunters, 148–152.
5. Lack of naval coordination between the Axis powers: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 964. Cf. Gerhard L. Weinberg, “World War II,” Chapter 16 in Chickering, Showalter, and Van de Ven, eds., The Cambridge History of War, Vol. IV: War and the Modern World, 379 (citing his entry “Axis Strategy and Co-operation,” in Dear and Foot, eds., The Oxford Companion to World War II, 97–99). Cf. Issraeljan and Kutakov, Diplomacy of Aggression, 184–186, for the Soviet perspective. On World War II coalitions, see in general Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition.
6. British ability to combat the U-boat fleet in 1939: Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919–1945, 52. Cf. Williamson, Kriegsmarine U-boats 1939–45, 6–35, for a survey of German submarine types.
7. On the destroyer deal: Black, Roosevelt, 605–606, 620–623.
8. U-boat numbers in 1939: Blair, Hitler’s U-boat War, Vol. I: The Hunters, 43–47 (including on 43, Plate 4: The Prewar German U-boat Buildup June 1935-September 1939), and 101–104.
9. U-boat sinkings in the North Atlantic: Blair, Hitler’s U-boat War, Vol. I: The Hunters, 709–725 (Appendix 2: U-boat Patrols to the North Pacific August 1939–August 1942).
10. On the number and nature of the new U-boat bases in France, and their effect on the volatile Battle of the Atlantic, see Showell, Hitler’s U-Boat Bases, 85–126 and Bradham, Hitler’s U-Boat Fortresses, 19–28. Total British tonnage sunk by German Condors: Pimlott, Luftwaffe: The Illustrated History of the German Air Force, 52.
11. U-boat losses versus tonnage sunk during the last months of “Happy Time”: Boyne, Clash of Titans, 93–94.
12. Bismarck: Boyne, Clash of Titans, 52–61; Bercuson and Herwig, Destruction of the Bismarck; and cf. in general Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck; Shirer, Sinking of the Bismarck.
13. Enigma codes: Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code, 132–146.
14. King and convoy escorts: Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919–1945, 51. Cf. Borneman, The Admirals, 26–40.
15. Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag): Gannon, Operation Drumbeat; Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, Vol. 1: The Hunters 1939–1942, 440–442; 460–466. On the toll of 1942, see O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 231–232.
16. Deploying long-range four-engine bombers against U-boats: Boyne, Clash of Titans, 102–110; Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, 5–73.
17. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 246–248.
18. Naval communications and the finds from U-boat 559: Kahn, Seizing the Enigma, 218–227. Admiral Horton’s new tactics: Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western Approaches, 158ff.
19. Convoy ONS 5: see in general Seth, Fiercest Battle; Gannon, Black May, 115–240. US merchant ship construction: (accessed March 18, 2016): http://web.archive.org/web/20061023011524/http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/ussbldrs/wwii/merchantsbldg.htm.
20. U-boat losses: Niestlé, German U-Boat Losses, 201–202 (Appendix 2: Tabular Monthly Overview on the Causes of U-boat Losses). Cost/benefit analyses of relative losses, cf. again, Poirier, “Results of German and American Submarine Campaigns” (Appendix I). For Doenitz’s confessions of defeat, see Doenitz, Memoirs, 341.
21. Failed British Aegean campaign: Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, 59–75, 201–212. Cf. Howard, Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, 10–12.
22. Relative initial naval strength in the Mediterranean Sea: Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, 1–44.
23. Battle of Taranto: Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 101–114.
24. Battles off Greek territory: Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 141–173.
25. Axis strategies to win the Mediterranean: Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, 345–349. Cf. Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 479 (May 13, 1942). Franco and Gibraltar: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 165–166.
26. U-boat losses in the Mediterranean: Paterson, U-Boats in the Mediterranean 1941–1944, 19.
27. Mussolini’s imperial dreams: Bosworth, Mussolini, 337–338.
1. Allied naval disaster at the first Battle of the Java Sea: Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942, 292–380. Relative strength of the opposing navies on December 7, 1941: Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942, 58.
2. Anglo-American rivalries and disagreements over naval operations in the Pacific: Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, 236–253.
3. Marines in Europe and North Africa: in general, Edwards, A Different War.
4. The huge American battleship fleet: Friedman, U.S. Battleships, 345–387.
5. Escort carriers: Y’Blood, Little Giants. Cf. Elliot, Allied Escort Ships, 451–479. See in general, Franklin, Buckley-Class; Cross, Shepherds of the Sea.
6. Respective losses of the Japanese first- and second-wave attacks (“29 aircraft with their crews, and five sunken midget submarines”), and total US losses (“2,403 people dead or dying and another 1,178 wounded”): Zimm, Attack on Pearl Harbor, 151–172.
7. Admiral Nagumo cited various reasons why he did not order further attacks: Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 544–548. Japanese strategic thinking: Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942, 48–79. Japanese content with the destruction of US battleships: O’Connell, Sacred Vessels, 315.
8. British and American naval losses, between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of the Coral Sea: Boyne, Clash of Titans, 143–169.
9. How the Yorktown was made ready for Midway, while the Shokaku and Zuikaku, with less damage, were not: Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 373–375; Frank and Harrington, Rendezvous at Midway, 135–137, 143–146.
10. For long descriptions of both the battles at Coral Sea and Midway: Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 4: Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942, 21–64, 69–159.
11. Lapses of Yamamoto at Midway: Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, 166–167.
12. Japanese realizations after the defeat at Midway: Lord, Incredible Victory, 284–286; Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, 260–268.
13. Status of US carrier forces by the end of 1942 and early 1943: Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, 298–309, 355. Criticism of timidity in the use of fleet carriers during 1942–43: Morton, Strategy and Command, 354–356.
14. Cf. the summaries of Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno, 409–430. Savo Island: Loxton and Coulthard-Clark, The Shame of Savo, 254–270.
15. Leyte: Thomas, Sea of Thunder, 151–322; cf. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 12: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945.
16. The toll from American subs: Beach, Submarine!, 21. US submarine cost-benefit ratios: Poirier, “Results of the American Pacific Submarine Campaign.” Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 12: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945, 398–414.
1. On Infantry, 167.
1. Classical views of infantry supremacy: Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 158–162; cf. Keegan, History of Warfare, 282–298.
2. Changing ideas of ground troops in modern warfare: Lt. Col. L. Freeman, “Can the Marines Survive?,” Foreign Policy, March 26, 2013. Western public’s trust in ground troops: “Obama’s Request for Military Action against ISIS Receives Majority Support… Many Americans Say Boots on the Ground Are Needed” (accessed March 23, 2015), at http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/usapolls/us150211/Complete%20NBC%20News%20Marist%20Poll_National_February%202015.pdf. Cf. in general, Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics. On ageless infantry superiority: Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, “In Praise of Infantry,” The Times (London, England), Thursday, April 19, 1945, p. 5.
3. Casualties at Midway: Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 296–297; Hone, ed., Battle of Midway, 192. Kursk: Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, 336–346 (Appendix C: Comparative Strengths and Losses in the Battle of Kursk). Cf. Goralski, World War II Almanac, 424–428.
4. New weapons of World War II: Hogg, Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons, 6. US divisions and firepower: Mansoor, GI Offensive in Europe, 38–39; 257–262, cf. 149. Patton’s praise of the M1: Duff, M1 Garand, 107. Cf. Patton, War As I Knew It, 262; Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 225. And on the Springfield: Coffman, The Regulars, 405. On 47 billion rounds: https://www.nraila.org/articles/20030520/the-great-arsenal-of-democracy.
5. Hand-held semi-automatic and machine guns: Hogg, Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons. Cf. McNab, German Automatic Rifles 1941–45, 26–29, 53–62.
6. Armor versus infantryman’s weapons: Weigley, History of the United States Army, 469–470. See also Walker, Bracketing the Enemy, 8–28.
7. On the loads of World War II infantry: Orr, “History of the Soldier’s Load,” Australian Army Journal, Vol. VII, No. 2 (2010), 67–88.
8. M-1 helmet (accompanied by excellent photographs): Oosterman, M-1 Helmet; and cf. Reynosa, M-1 Helmet.
9. Number of American divisions: Weigley, History of United States Army, 439.
10. The invasion of France versus Operation Barbarossa: Evans, Third Reich at War, 122–127 (France) and 160–166 (Soviet Union). Cf. Kershaw (cited by Evans, op. cit., 160 n. 123), Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 305. See also Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 7–8.
11. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 496.
12. Patriotism and the homeland: Viroli, For Love of Country, 44–51. Viroli quotes Lipsius’s De Constantia (1584) for his discussion of death for the fatherland. In the classical Greek context, see Hanson, Other Greeks, 280–287.
13. Melos, 416 BC: Thucydides 5.84–116.
14. Prewar expectations about airborne troops: Stanley, Evolution of Airborne Operations, 8–33; and the German use of parachute drops: 34–60.
15. Initial German success and confidence in airborne units: Fuller, Second World War, 113–114.
16. British and German orders of battle on Crete: Appendix B of Beevor, Crete 1941, 354–359. The drop and ensuing chaotic battle: ibid., 104–120.
17. Allied airborne experience in Sicily: D’Este, Bitter Victory, 307–309, 378–379. American paratroopers’ reputation, see Gavin, On to Berlin, 32.
18. Market-Garden disaster: in general Ryan, A Bridge Too Far; Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944, 436–444.
19. Operation Varsity and its controversy, Wright, The Last Drop, 287–329.
1. Assessing infantry capability: Van Creveld, Fighting Power, 4–6.
2. Earl F. Ziemke, “Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 286. American combat divisions: Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 235–236. U.S. Army in Europe, see Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 12–16, 727.
3. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 235–236, 243–251.
4. US army numbers: Weigley, History of United States Army, 568–569. Prewar US Army: see ibid., 419–421; cf. also 438–439. Similar size of the Italian and American armies: MacGregor Knox, “The Italian Armed Forces, 1940–3,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 141–142.
5. June 6 operations: Goralski, World War II Almanac, 553–559.
6. “Combat fatigue” or “battle fatigue”: Wilbur J. Scott, “PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease,” Social Problems 37.3 (1990), 296–297. Rommel’s view: Liddell Hart, ed., Rommel Papers, 407.
7. Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy, 264.
8. Hastings, Armageddon, 68–9. German kill ratios in Russia: Dupuy, A Genius for War, 290–299; cf. 79–80.
9. Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 40–46. Cf. the discipline of Roman soldiers: Stephan G. Chrissanthos, “Keeping Military Discipline,” in Campbell and Tritle, eds., Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, 320–327.
10. Patton’s colorful pre-battle speeches: D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, 602–605, 622–624; Hanson, Soul of Battle, 351–366, 461 n. 105. Cf. Yellin, Battle Exhortation, 63–65.
11. American organizational genius: Cline, Washington Command Post (available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/001/1–2/CMH_Pub_1–2.pdf).
12. American and Allied combined arms operations: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 374–429. Cf. also Ehlers, Mediterranean Air War, 397–406. On FDR and a second front: Black, Roosevelt, 741–746. German weakness in logistics and intelligence: Condell and Zabecki, eds., German Art of War, 8–9.
13. Army participation in the Pacific: C. Kingseed, “The Pacific War: The U.S. Army’s Forgotten Theater of World War II,” Army Magazine, 63.4 (April 2013), 52–53.
14. Hew Strachan, “Total War: The Conduct of the War, 1939–1945,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, 50–52.
15. US military global reach: Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943. Cf. Shrader, U.S. Military Logistics, 1607–1991. Britain: Morton, Strategy and Command, 80–81. Admiral King’s complaints on resource allotments: 383–385. Europe-first strategies: Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 27.
16. Quality of the American army’s weapons: Allan R. Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 60–62. The dearth of trucks in the German army: Cooper, German Army, 211–213.
17. American artillery: see Weigley, History of United States Army, 472–475. Americans’ greater tendency to cut off offensive salients: Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 258. M1 rifle and the genius of John Garland: Ezell, Great Rifle Controversy, 33–40.
18. Effectiveness of German infantry: Dupuy, A Genius for War, 232–236; Van Creveld, Fighting Power 5–9; cf. 13–14. Mishaps in entering Austria, see Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 141–154, esp. 143–149; H-class, 329. American kill ratios of German aircraft: Allan R. Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 80. American military education: Schifferle, America’s School for War, especially 36–61. See the criticisms of Van Creveld, Fighting Power, 59–60.
19. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 73.
20. Atrocities committed during World War II: Christopher J. M. Safferling, “War Crimes in Europe,” in Zeiler and DuBois, eds., A Companion to World War II, 929–944. Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners: Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 70–78. Eastern Front and the conduct of German and Soviet troops: Kenneth Slepyan, “Battle Fronts and Home Fronts: The War in the East from Stalingrad to Berlin,” in Zeiler and DuBois, eds., A Companion to World War II, 314, 321; Mark Edele and Michael Geyer, “States of Exception: The Nazi-Soviet War as a System of Violence, 1939–1945,” in Fitzpatrick and Geyer, eds., Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, 345–395; Snyder, Bloodlands, 119–154.
21. American Army in World War II: Van Creveld, Fighting Power, 94–95, 100–101, 124–125, 154–155. Psychiatric problems of American soldiers: Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 158–172. American shooting of prisoners: D’Este, Patton, 509–510, 700. Voracious appetites of Allied armies in Europe: Van Creveld, Supplying War, 206–226.
22. Great Depression and the GI: Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 12–13. See Manchester, Goodbye, Darkness, 119–158, for the Depression-era mentality of the US Marines. Cf. Patton, War As I Knew It, 281.
23. Growth, reserves, and losses of the Soviet army: Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, 22–29, 38–39; cf. 48–50. Cf. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 291–307.
24. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 467–468.
25. Remembrances of Unteroffizier Fritz Huebner: Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 265.
26. Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 608.
27. Importance of Anglo-American Lend-Lease: Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 285.
28. For Soviet Union tanks, see the tables in Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945, especially 250. Luftwaffe on the eve of Operation Barbarossa: Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 145–146. Red Army small arms: Chant, Small Arms of World War II, 82–95. Soviet tank, truck, artillery, and aircraft numbers: Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, xvi-xix, 132–133, 148–150, 168–170, 177–178; Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945, 249–250.
29. Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 628.
30. For Stalin’s purges of Soviet generals, see Deutscher, Stalin, 372–385, 425–426; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 9–11. Soviet wartime economy: Mark Harrison, “The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942?” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, especially 155–157. Cf. Jeffrey Fear, “War of the Factories,” in Geyer and Tooze, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. III: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, 109–110. See Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, 43–50, 150–153. Soviet production achievements: Dunn, Stalin’s Keys to Victory, 1–61.
31. British army strategic dilemmas: Roberts, Storm of War, 602–603. Percentages of army troops of the major combatants’ total military strength: Earl F. Ziemke, “Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 286.
32. British losses until El Alamein: Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Part I, 339–340. Fall of Singapore, the threat to Malta, the loss of Burma, the war in the Atlantic, and the defeat in North Africa: Baron Moran, Churchill Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965, 78–79.
33. Combat losses in the British army: Mellor, Casualties and Medical Statistics, 834–839. Total casualties—incorporating statistics from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force as well—come to 264,443 killed, 41,327 missing, 277,077 wounded, and 172,592 prisoners of war.
34. Conservatism of British officers and sometimes mediocre weapons: Williamson Murray, “British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 113–116.
35. Alanbrooke’s worry that Monty had gone too far: War Diaries, 638.
36. British efforts to dissuade Americans on particular strategies: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 121–133 (“Churchill and Allied Grand Strategy in Europe, 1944–1945: The Erosion of Influence”).
37. Prussian-inspired emphasis on the force-multiplying effects of German combat power: Condell and Zabecki, eds., German Art of War, 18.
38. German institutional shortcomings: Condell and Zabecki eds., German Art of War, 9; Kaiser Wilhelm II’s quote of November 1914: Lloyd, Hundred Days, 72.
39. Cf. Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy, 201. German army superiority: Van Creveld, Fighting Power, 6.
40. German armor during the Polish campaign: Cooper, German Army, 171–176. Invasion of Poland: Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 323, 325–326. Inferiority of the Mark I-III German tanks: Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 45–50. 2nd Panzer Army: cf. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 49. Looted German vehicles and horse dependency: Jürgen E. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volkgemeinschaft: The Effectiveness of the German Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 202–203; Phillips Payson O’Brien, “Logistics by Land and Air,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 623.
41. German reliance on horses during Operation Barbarossa: DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut, 33–54. Horses versus motor vehicles: Weinberg, “Some Myths of World War II,” 717–718. See too Condell and Zabecki, eds., German Art of War, 3–7; Zabecki, German 1918 Offensives, 62–63, for the origins of Weisungsführung and Auftragstaktik. Exaggerations surrounding Blitzkrieg: Cooper, German Army, 23–24, 1189.
42. Overy, Interrogations, 249.
43. Halder’s observations of Hitler: Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 95. Dunkirk folly: Karl-Heinz Frieser, “The War in the West, 1939–1940: An Unplanned Blitzkrieg,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 309–312. Arms of a German division: Haskew, The Wehrmacht, 1935–1945, 61–70. Limitations of the German army: see Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, 23–24. Hitler’s unstable leadership: von Mellenthin, German Generals, 29, 59. Relationship between OKW and OKH: Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 56–60.
44. Army inability to meet Hitler’s demands: Jürgen E. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volkgemeinschaft: The Effectiveness of the German Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 186–187.
45. Limitations—and corruption—of German military leaders: Weinberg, “Some Myths of World War II,” 705–706.
46. German army expansion and erosion of quality: Cooper, German Army, 275.
47. On the MG 42: Myrvang, MG-34–MG-42: German Universal Machine Guns; for the StG 44, see Senich, German Assault Rifle, 79–102.
48. Weinberg, “Some Myths of World War II,” 705–706. “Commissar Order”: Jacobsen, “The Kommissarbefehl and Mass Executions of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War,” in Krausnick, Buchheim, Broszat, and Jacobsen, eds., Anatomy of the SS State, 522.
49. Organization of the Imperial Japanese Army: Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army. 190–221. Militarists in Japanese government: see Hane and Perez, Modern Japan, 271–283.
50. Alvin D. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 8–9. Khalkhin Gol: Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 239–242; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 13–15. Cf. Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 878–879.
51. Japanese-Soviet hostilities: Issraeljan and Kutakov, Diplomacy of Aggression, 147–186.
52. Strategic confusion of the Japanese army: Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 146–162, 222–231, 256–257.
53. Japan’s field generals: General Yamashita (Kiamichi Tachikawa, “General Yamashita and His Style of Leadership”) and Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi (Kenichi Arakawa, “Japanese War Leadership in the Burma Theatre”), both in Bond and Tachikawa, eds., British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941–1945, 75–87, 105–122. On General Homma, see Toland, Rising Sun, 317–320.
54. Zealotry of Japanese infantry: see Alvin D. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 34–35, 38–39. On fatality ratios, cf. http://www.japanww2.com/wt14.htm. Sato quote: Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, 19.
55. Japanese army munitions: Forty, Japanese Army Handbook, 1939–1945, 113–158.
56. Size of the Italian army: Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 54–55.
57. Italian economy: Vera Zamagni, “Italy: How to Lose the War and Win the Peace,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 177–223. Italian foreign policy: Peter Jackson, “Europe: the Failure of Diplomacy, 1933–1940,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 227–232.
58. Italy’s military agenda: Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 170–174. Germany vs. Italy: Cloutier, Regio Esercito, 38–39.
59. Inadequate Italian weapons and equipment: Macgregor Knox, “The Italian Armed Forces, 1940–1943,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 140, 154, 159–160.
60. Italian disaster in the Balkans: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 231–285, and cf. Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel, 291–292.
61. Italian losses in Russia: Jowett, Italian Army, 9–11; Cloutier, Regio Esercito, 97–166. See John Gooch, “Mussolini’s Strategy, 1939–1943” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 150–153.
62. Italian ambiguity about fighting the Allies: MacGregor Knox, “The Italian Armed Forces, 1940–3,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 170–172. See John Gooch, “Mussolini’s Strategy, 1939–1943,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 157.
1. Strange French defeat and consequences: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 144–145. French rearmament: Goutard, Battle of France, 19–44. Superiority of French weapons: Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 130–148. Hitler’s sometimes moody expectation of a long war: Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 114–115.
2. Perverse admiration of the Soviet Union: Moorhouse, Devils’ Alliance, 30–31. For Goering’s comment, see Goebbels, Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943, 263.
3. Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 20.
4. Lack of coordination between British and French forces: John C. Cairns, “Great Britain and the Fall of France: A Study in Allied Disunity,” Journal of Modern History 27.4 (1955), 365–409. Comparative number of troops and tanks: see Cooper, German Army, 209–215. General von Thoma’s views: Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 13, 95–96. For the quotation, see Bloch, Strange Defeat, 37. Jackson, Fall of France, 112–116, 222–227.
5. Comparative tanks, artillery, and infantry: Cooper, German Army, 214–215; Maurois, Tragedy in France, 106. For Foch: Recouly, Foch: Le Vainqueur de la Guerre, 121 (“Mon centre cède, ma droite recule, situation excéllente, j’attaque”). French arms and manpower: Jackson, Fall of France, 12–20.
6. German plan of attack: Cooper, German Army, 205–206.
7. Reasons for the French collapse: Cooper, German Army, 240–242; Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 118–126. Cf. Bloch, Strange Defeat, 48. German institutional aggressiveness: Condell and Zabecki, eds., German Art of War, 18. Alan Brooke’s negative view: Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, 185.
8. Poor German production of heavy trucks: Cooper, German Army, 212–214. Hitler’s enormous prestige after the fall of France: Cooper, German Army, 244–245, Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 300. Oil anxieties: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 327–328.
9. German High Command’s supposed worries over invading Russia after the fall of France: Cooper, German Army, 257. On the French irony: Martin S. Alexander, “French Grand Strategy and Defence Preparations,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 106.
10. Prior Soviet military mediocrity: John E. Jessup, “The Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–5,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 256–276, especially 273. Multilateral nature of Hitler’s invading force: Wendy Lower, “Axis Collaboration, Operation Barbarossa, and the Holocaust in Ukraine,” in Kay, Rutherford, and Stahel, eds., Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941, 186–219, esp. 188–189. Hitler’s increasing influence: Cooper, German Army, 181.
11. Clear warnings of the attack: Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 632–639.
12. Hitler’s arguments for invading Russia: Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 53–54; Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, 71; cf. also, 56–57. Goering’s view: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 499. Dire economic straits of the Third Reich by May 1941: Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 430–434.
13. German strategic objectives, and Halder’s famous diary entry: Burdick and Jacobsen, eds., Halder War Diary, 446 (July 3, 1941). False sense of Soviet weakness: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 34–38. See further premature claims of victory in Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 83–84.
14. Tsar Alexander I is quoted in Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 515, drawing on the memoirs of the French ambassador General Armand de Caulaincourt. On French arrogance, see also Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 746–747.
15. General Wagner’s various prognoses: Megargee, War of Annihilation, 101–102, 107–108. “Idiotic word”: see the discussion in Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 43.
16. Hitler’s unwillingness to accept the growth in the size of the Red Army: Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 195. General Marcks’s original visions of Operation Barbarossa: Cooper, German Army, 260–261. Hitler’s apparent realistic lowering of expectations is quoted in Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 43.
17. Relatively small areas of prior operations in Poland: Cooper, German Army, 173. Comparative German and Soviet military expenditures in the period 1939–1941: Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 15. Cf. Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 61.
18. Russian ill-preparedness: Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, 5–6. Relative demographic pools and conscription: Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, 48–55. Goebbels in his many lamentations over failures in Russia notes the numerical disparity: Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943, 185 (April 25, 1942).
19. German sense of foreboding in late 1941: Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 185. Cf. Cooper, Germany Army, 263–264.
20. German emphases on the flanks versus the center: Cooper, German Army, 290–291. Hitler’s attack on Guderian: von Mellenthin, German Generals, 94.
21. Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 640. Hitler’s pretexts for invading the Soviet Union: Olaf Groehler, “Goals and Reason: Hitler and the German Military,” in Wieczynski, ed., Operation Barbarossa, 48–61, esp. 59–61. Notion of a Soviet preemptory attack before Barbarossa: Bruce W. Menning and Jonathan House, “Soviet Strategy,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 226.
22. World War I German occupation of Russia: Herwig, First World War, 384–386; Freund, Unholy Alliance, 1–33.
23. “What-ifs” of Operation Barbarossa: Showalter and Deutsch, eds., If the Allies Had Fallen, 52–65. For mass firings of generals: Keegan, Second World War, 206–207. German army manual on cold weather: Condell and Zabecki, eds., German Art of War, 78–79. Case Blue as proof of failure: Weinberg, World at Arms, 269–270.
24. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 24–26; cf. 292–295, 301, on the diversion of concrete and building materials to civil defense against bombing attacks. Drain on the Eastern Front due to Allied bombing in the West: Evans, Third Reich at War, 460–462.
25. Urals and Transcaucasia factories: Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 101–102. German air losses in the Mediterranean: ibid., 149–150. See also Murray, Luftwaffe, 144 (Table XXX) for German losses by theater January–November 1943. Cf. Air Ministry, Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 219–220, 249–251, for an analysis of the Luftwaffe’s position in the Mediterranean in 1942–1943.
26. Sherman quote: Hanson, Soul of Battle, 208–209. Cf. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 286.
1. Political explanations for Operation Torch: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 55–58. Cf. also, Howard, Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, 69–71. Desirability of the African climate for Panzer operations: Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 98.
2. Conditions of battle in North Africa: Atkinson, Army at Dawn, 1–20.
3. Naval balance in the Mediterranean in 1940–1942: Salerno, Vital Crossroads, 213–220.
4. Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 174.
5. Numerical disparities facing Wavell’s command: Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3 [Part II], 297–312.
6. Change in Italian command: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 135–137.
7. Count Ciano’s various diary entries: Diary, 367, 375. Italian air capability: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 34.
8. Italian losses: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 251–256; Cloutier, Regio Esercito, 46. Anthony Eden’s quote—a parody of Churchill’s “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.” (August 21, 1940): Churchill, Grand Alliance, 12–13; Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 117.
9. Remaining Italian forces after Operation Compass: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 280–282.
10. Criticisms of Operation Lustre: Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, 165–259; Murfett, Naval Warfare, 103.
11. Rommel quote: Fuller, Second World War, 174. Rommel’s original orders: Heckmann, Rommel’s War in Africa, 21–36.
12. Rommel’s so-called “First Offensive”: Heckmann, Rommel’s War in Africa, 37–47.
13. Liddell Hart, ed. Rommel Papers, 134.
14. Liddell Hart, ed., Rommel Papers, 191. Rommel’s sudden strategic impulses: von Mellenthin, German Generals, 64.
15. Disparagement of Rommel by Generals Halder and Paulus, and Hitler’s pipe dreams: Cooper, German Army, 357–359. Cf. also, Liddell Hart, German Generals Talk, 54.
16. Operation Battleaxe (June 15–17, 1941) and the subsequent replacement of Wavell: Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III (Part II), 525–532. Operation Crusader (November 18–December 30, 1941): Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. III (Part I), 219–244.
17. Sherman tank shortcomings: Hastings, Armageddon, 86–87.
18. Afrika Korps after El Alamein: Cooper, German Army, 384–385.
19. Rommel’s plans of logistical support, Cooper, German Army, 364–365.
20. See the balanced assessment of Rommel: von Mellenthin, German Generals, 69–70.
21. For Scipio Africanus: Scullard, Scipio Africanus, Soldier and Politician; John Briscoe, “The Second Punic War,” in Astin, Walbank, Frederiksen, and Ogilvie, eds., CAH 82 59–65, 73–74; for Marius: Sallust, Bellum Iugurthinum 84–114, and Syme, Sallust, 150; for Belisarius: Hanson, Savior Generals, 66–72.
22. American obsessions with entering Europe from the west: Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 13–35.
23. Operation Torch: Breuer, Operation Torch, 12–30.
24. Goebbels, Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943, 376 (May 12, 1943). Cf. Time, May 10, 1943.
25. Von Luck, Panzer Commander, 121.
26. Plutarch, Elder Cato, 27.1.
27. Rationale of invading Sicily: Atkinson, Day of Battle, 5–9.
28. Operations on Sicily: Zaloga, Sicily 1943: The Debut of Allied Joint Operations, 89–91. Cf. D’Este, Bitter Victory, 552.
29. Slapping incidents and the fate of George Patton: D’Este, Bitter Victory, 483–491, 564–566.
30. General Lucas and the Anzio near disaster: Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed, 197–208, especially on Lucas at 57–61. Cf. the brief synopsis in Laurie, Anzio, 12, 25–26. On the 1946 congressional hearings over the Rapido River disaster and some general remarks on the Monte Cassino mess: Atkinson, Day of Battle, 349–350, 586–587; 463–473.
31. Orphaning of the Italian front: Lamb, War in Italy, 1943–1945, 7–11.
32. Wisdom or folly of invading Sicily: Fuller, Second World War, 325. But cf. Peter R. Mansoor, “US Grand Strategy in the Second World War,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 341–345; Atkinson, Day of Battle, 582–583. Italy’s casualties: Atkinson, Day of Battle, 581. On Italy, Churchill, and Roosevelt, see Hamilton, The Mantle of Command, 386–388; 330–332.
33. Allied damage to French infrastructure and the population: Beevor, D-Day, 519–520.
34. D-Day military innovations: Falconer, D-Day: ‘Neptune’, ‘Overlord’ and the Battle of Normandy.
35. Operation Neptune: Symonds, Neptune, 353–362.
36. Allied tactical air power after Normandy: A. Jacobs, “The Battle for France, 1944,” in Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, especially 249–251. On the methodologies of counting the D-Day dead: http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-challenge-of-counting-d-days-dead/.
37. Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, 347.
38. Hedgerows: Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 36–38; Lewis, ed., D-Day As They Saw It, 165–169.
39. Operation Cobra: D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 351 ff.
40. Stalin’s political stalling outside Warsaw: Khlevniuk, Stalin, 244.
41. Broad versus narrow front: D’Este, Patton, 648–650. Cf. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 291–320.
42. Allied demarcation lines: Weinberg, World at Arms, 792–798. General Jodl on a narrow Allied thrust: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 779.
43. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 316.
44. Allied slogging in the Ardennes and Hürtgen Forests: Beevor, Ardennes 1944, 56–79, 350–370. Backing off from Berlin: Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 399–403.
45. Hürtgen Forest campaign: Astor, The Bloody Forest, 356–366.
46. Wild Japanese expansion after Pearl Harbor: Toll, Pacific Crucible, 232–301.
47. Historical singularity of the Anglo-Americans’ successful two-front war: Williamson Murray, “U.S. Strategy and Leadership in World War II: The Problem of a Two-Front Strategy,” in Murray and Ishizu, eds., Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific, 83.
48. Early bickering over “Europe First”: Morton, Strategy and Command, 334–336.
49. Debate between the MacArthur route and Nimitz’s preference: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 362–364, 493–496; O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 412–429. On the Philippines, see Williamson Murray, “US Naval Strategy and Japan,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 288. Counterproductive effects of two simultaneous advances to Japan: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 398–402.
50. Undue costs of the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns: Astor, Crisis in the Pacific, 600–624. See the assessments of Feifer, Tennozan, 376–409.
1. The Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922: Smith, Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922, 284–336. Fall of Constantinople: Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, 552–572; Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society, 797–803; Philippides and Hanak, The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies, passim. Gibbon’s famous description of the siege and its immediate aftermath: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 6 (chapter 68), 489–514; Constantinople’s last hours, 500–504. Vienna (September 27–October 15, 1529): Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 93. Vienna (July–September, 1683): Stoye, Siege of Vienna and Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent. See also Davies, God’s Playground, 481–487 for Polish sovereign Jan III Sobieski’s role in defending Vienna; and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 213–215, and for the consequences to the Ottomans of the failure to take the Hapsburg capital, 218–219.
2. Rape of German women: Naimark, Russians in Germany, 69–140; fall of BerlBattle, 488–493.
3. Wiping out things Russian: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 4–5 (night of July 5–6, 1941), 400–401 (April 5, 1942).
4. Carthage: Polybius 38.19–22; Jerusalem: Josephus, 6.1–10; Baghdad: Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 1–7, 83–88; Morgan, Mongols, 132–133; Saunders, History of the Mongol Conquests, 109–111; Grenada: Constable, Medieval Iberia, 496–507; Fletcher, Moorish Spain; Hillgarth, Spanish Kingdoms, 366–393; O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, 213–214; Tenochtitlán: Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 170–232. Greek and Roman siegecraft: Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, 135–162; Barry Strauss, “The Experience of Siege Warfare,” in Chapter 7 of Sabin, van Wees, and Whitby, eds., Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol. I, 243–247.
5. Watson, Sieges, 6.
6. On some World War I sieges: Przemys´l: Keegan, First World War, 171–172; Strachan, First World War, 30–31. Kut-al-Amara: Strachan, First World War, 120–124; Watson, Sieges, 83–105; Hammond, Battle in Iraq, 71–109. Cf. Braddon, The Siege, and Crowley, Kut 1916. On Verdun, see Keegan, First World War, 278–286; Strachan, First World War, 180–185.
7. Watson, Sieges, 57–81.
8. Morality of sieges: Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 165–170.
9. Losses at Leningrad: Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, 467–469, Appendices F (“Soviet Military Casualties”), 543–546, and G (“Estimated Civilian Losses in the Siege of Leningrad”), 547.
10. For Directive No. 1a 1601/41, “Concerning the Future Existence of the City of Leningrad,” see Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, 85–86.
11. On the forgotten ordeal in Leningrad, cf. Reid, Leningrad, 313–315.
12. Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, 27–31, and Appendix E (“A Rough Comparison of Red Army and Wehrmacht Forces”), 537–542. See Roberts, Storm of War, 152–154. Planning for Operation Barbarossa: Olaf Groehler, “Goals and Reason: Hitler and the German Military,” in Wieczynski, Operation Barbarossa, 48–61. Bombing Moscow: Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, 64–65.
13. Finnish support for Army Group North: Lunde, Finland’s War of Choice, 183–212.
14. Russian naval disaster: Jones, Leningrad: State of Siege, 110–112. Maritime efforts to supply Army Group North: Askey, Operation Barbarossa, 319–330.
15. Destruction of Tenochtitlán: Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 185–193. Lake Ladoga: Glantz, Battle for Leningrad, 101, 139–145.
16. See Hitler’s demands as paraphrased by Salisbury, 900 Days, 94.
17. Limited strategies of the Finnish: Carrell, Hitler Moves East, 267.
18. Horrific conditions inside Leningrad: chapter 4 (“The Struggle to Survive: The Dying City”) in Bidlack and Lomagin, The Leningrad Blockade, 262–328. The quotation is taken from Document 48, 267–268. The single entry for January 28, 1942, was, “Papa died.” German plans: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 130–136. Reid, Leningrad, 133. Cf. Buttar, Battleground Prussia, 18.
19. Prewar savagery in Stalin’s Soviet Union: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 484–486.
20. Why Leningrad survived: Carrell, Hitler Moves East, 267–269.
21. Stalin’s criminality and Leningrad: Kirschenbaum, Legacy of the Siege, 237–258.
22. Army Group North after withdrawing from Leningrad: Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 248–266.
23. Portions of the directives are quoted in Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 13.
24. Cf. Goebbels, Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943, 136 (March 20, 1942). German perceptions of the United States in World War I: Strachan, First World War, 220–223, 285, and in World War II, see Roberts, Storm of War, 195–200.
25. Hitler on German ill-preparedness during the winter of 1941–1942: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 339–340 (February 26–27, 1942).
26. Ellis, Stalingrad Cauldron, 58–60. Dislike of inept Paulus: Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 192–195. Blaming Hitler: Manstein, Lost Victories, 360.
27. Assessment of Field Marshal Paulus: Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 87; cf., 206–213. Russian views of Stalingrad: Rotundo, Battle for Stalingrad, especially 41–110.
28. See Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad, 234, 251–310 (quote on 303).
29. “Fortress Stalingrad”: Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 42, 79.
30. Russian losses before, and German losses after, 1941: Antill, Stalingrad 1942, 39, 87–88; Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad, 49. Cf. Beevor, Stalingrad, 430–431, for the final prisoner release of 1955; Glantz and House, Armageddon in Stalingrad, 714–718.
31. The Battle of Jena-Auerstedt: Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 479–502. Worst defeat in German history: Beevor, Stalingrad, 398; and the final wretchedness: Wieder’s quote in Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 95.
32. Soviet jubilation after Stalingrad: Beevor, Stalingrad, 404. General German view: see again Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 164. Cf. Galland, The First and the Last, 149.
33. Ellis, Brute Force, 77.
34. Blitzkrieg’s epitaph: paraphrased from the assessment of Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 125. On Soviet industrial output increases, see Mark Harrison, “The Soviet Union: The Defeated Victor,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 272–274, and more generally, the same author’s Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940–1945. Folly of dividing Army Group South: Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad, 73–74; 86–88 (Hitler’s thinking in besieging Stalingrad); cf. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 358–361. Flanks at Stalingrad: Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 35–36. Cf. Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad, 78–80. Huge size and breakdown of Army Group South: Antill, Stalingrad 1942, 23–24.
35. On Goebbels, see Beevor, Stalingrad, 398–399. The Athenian disaster: Thucydides 7.87.6. German assessments of Thermopylae: Wieder, von Einsiedel, and Bogler, Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, 177–178.
36. On Tobruk: Seymour, Great Sieges, 257–277. A diary of events of the successful resistance to Rommel before June 1942: Bowen, Back from Tobruk, 93–134.
37. On the Italian garrison at Tobruk, see Seymour, Great Sieges, 258–259. I visited the site in 2006, and like most of Muammar Gaddafi’s cities, it had extinguished most traces of its colonial past.
38. Dreams of Rommel after the fall of Tobruk: Liddell Hart, ed., Rommel Papers, 513–515; cf. also 191–192. On the German view, see also Fraser, Knight’s Cross, 304–306.
39. See Jackson, Battle for North Africa, 237–238. Cf. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, 401–402.
40. Morale during the battle for Tobruk: Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, 214–215, 281–283.
41. Jackson, Battle for North Africa, 150–151. See Churchill on Rommel, Grand Alliance, 200.
42. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, 401–402. The breakdown of British losses: Mitcham, Rommel’s Greatest Victory, 183–184.
43. German awe at Sevastopol’s defenses: Carrell, Hitler Moves East, 464–466.
44. On “frog pond”: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 301. For the Crimea, see Weinberg, World at Arms, 408–413.
45. Flawed logic of the monster guns: Manstein, Lost Victories, 263. Cf. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 309–310; Weinberg, World at Arms, 537. See also Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Fortress Third Reich, 189–192.
46. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 321. In Manstein’s account (Verlorene Siege, 282), he says “over 90,000” died.
47. On the record German bombardment of Sevastopol, see Melvin, Manstein, 263–264.
48. For the entire questionable Axis strategy of investing in Sevastopol, cf. Melvin, Manstein, 271–273.
49. An analysis, along with an English translation of Riezler’s Septemberprogramm memo, is found in Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 98–113.
50. The huge submarine pen projects are discussed in Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Fortress Third Reich, 182–189.
51. Hitler’s directive: Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Fortress Third Reich, 196.
52. See also Kaufmann, Kaufmann, and Idzikowski, Fortress France, 99–108.
53. On the German strategy for holding the ports and their long-term strategic aims, cf. Kaufmann and Jurga, Fortress Europe, 388–389.
54. Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Fortress Third Reich, 319. Cherbourg: Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 386–449; cf. 441–442.
55. German strategy and the Atlantic Wall: Zaloga, Atlantic Wall, 5–33.
56. Antwerp and the Canadian sacrifice at the Scheldt: Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 442–460.
57. Von Runstedt: Delaforce, Smashing the Atlantic Wall, 112–113. Vassiltchikov, Berlin Diaries, 178–179.
58. S¸ahin, Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman, 149, and n. 66 (citing Setton, Papacy and the Levant, Vol. 4, 853–8580. For “the Ottoman apologetic narrative”: Ísmail Hami Danis¸mend, I·zahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, Vol. 2 M. 1513–1573, H. 919–981 [Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1948], 330–340.
59. Disastrous strategic consequences for Malta following the fall of France: Perowne, Siege Within the Walls, 34–35.
60. Mussolini’s ineptness: Perowne, Siege Within the Walls, 58–59.
61. Weaknesses of a superficially impressive Italian surface navy: Marc’ Antonio Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, 324–325. See also Sadkovich, Italian Navy in World War II, 331–350; Roberts, Storm of War, 149, 284. Allied strategy in the Mediterranean: Howard, Mediterranean Strategy, 1–39.
62. Entry and record of U-boats around Malta: Paterson, U-Boats in the Mediterranean 1941–1944, 158–174.
63. Assessment of German and British military leaders: Shankland and Hunter, Malta Convoy, 34–36. Cf. Perowne, Siege Within the Walls, 54–55.
64. British surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942: Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 175–184; Warren, Singapore 1942, 253–270. Humiliation and the exaggeration of the strategic consequences of losing Singapore: Morton, Strategy and Command, 174–175. Churchill’s characterization of British disasters at both Singapore and Tobruk: Hinge of Fate, 81.
65. Singapore’s naval guns: Hack and Blackburn, Did Singapore Have to Fall?, 102–131. Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 839.
66. Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 51–53; Hack and Blackburn, Did Singapore Have to Fall?, 65–66.
67. For Force Z, see Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 136–145; Hough, The Hunting of Force Z; Middlebrook & Mahoney, The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, 283–314. Cf. Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, 38–41.
68. British losses: Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 270–271. Controversy over number (100,000–130,000?) who surrendered: A. Yoji, “General Yamashita Tomoyuki,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 199–201. Churchill and Singapore: R. Callahan, “Churchill and Singapore,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 156–169. On Churchill’s often quoted reaction, see Warren, Singapore 1942, 77.
69. The massacres: Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 35–36. General Yamashita and the massacres: A. Yoji, “General Yamashita Tomoyuki,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 199–201.
70. Cf. Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 186–187. Loss of British prestige: Warren, Singapore 1942, 137–146. Cf. the assessments of Adolf Hitler: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 274–275 (February 2, 1942, midday). On Percival, cf. C. Kinvig, “General Percival and the Fall of Singapore,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 241–261. Field Marshal Earl Wavell on the surrender of Singapore: Brian P. Farrell, “The Dice Were Rather Heavily Loaded: Wavell and the Fall of Singapore,” in Farrell, ed., Leadership and Responsibility, 182–234.
71. Relative air power: John R. Ferris, “Student and Master: Airpower and the Fall of Singapore,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 104.
72. Flaws of the so-called Singapore Strategy: Malcolm H. Murfett, “Reflections on an Enduring Theme: The ‘Singapore Strategy’ at Sixty,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 16–22. Local Malaysian defenses: Allen, Singapore 1941–1942, 247–263. On Percival’s quote, see C. Kinvig, “General Percival and the Fall of Singapore,” in Farrell and Hunter, eds., Sixty Years On, 261.
73. Warren, Singapore 1942, 290. Churchill’s policy toward Singapore: Hack and Blackburn, Did Singapore Have to Fall?, 186–187.
74. Air and naval defenses on the Philippines: Belote, Corregidor, 36–40.
75. MacArthur and War Plan Orange: Belote, Corregidor, 36–53; see again, Belote, Corregidor, 37–40.
76. Corregidor’s defenses: Flanagan, Corregidor, 32–34. Strength and weakness of Corregidor’s big guns: Belote, Corregidor, 12–13, 15–19.
77. Corregidor’s prewar defenses: Flanagan, Corregidor, 26–33; Devlin, Back to Corregidor, 5–8; its isolation: Morris, Corregidor, 23. Cf. “Washington’s Modification of the Military Strategy,” in Masuda, MacArthur in Asia, 40–41.
78. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 21.
79. Morris, Corregidor, 426–467.
80. Japan’s ascendance: Belote, Corregidor, 32–35.
81. Morris, Corregidor, 426–467.
82. Malise Ruthven, “Hitler’s Monumental Miscalculation,” New York Review of Books (NYR Blog), June 5, 2014 (http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/jun/05/hitlers-mighty-miscalculation/?insrc=hpss). Maginot Line, Atlantic Wall, and Siegfried Line: Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Maginot Imitations, 31–50; Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Fortress Third Reich 182–255; and in general, Kaufmann and Kaufmann, Fortress France.
83. Athens’ walls during the Classical period: David L. Berkey, “Why Fortifications Endure: A Case Study of the Walls of Athens During the Classical Period,” in Hanson, ed., Makers of Ancient Strategy, 58–92.
1. Schopenhauer, Collected Works, 8.
1. King Archidamus’s quote: Plutarch, Moralia 219a. Patton’s observation: Atkinson, Army at Dawn, 442.
2. Elephants in classical antiquity: Scullard, Elephant in the Greek and Roman World; Kistler; War Elephants, 54–57; Philip Sabin, “Battle: A. Land Battle, I. Exotic Weapons,” in Chapter 13 of Sabin, van Wees, and Whitby, eds., Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol. I, 419–421.
3. The testudo: Cassius Dio (49.30). Cf. also Plutarch, Antony 45; Flor. 2.20.6–7. Cf. Reinhold, From Republic to Principate, 62; Catherine M. Gilliver, “Battle: II. Land Battle, 2. Combat Mechanics,” in Chapter 4 of Sabin, van Wees, and Whitby, eds., Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol. II, 130–131, 134. The scorpion and other movable Roman bolt and missile launchers: Gilliver, op. cit. 128 (II. Land Battle, 2. Deployment), 151 (V. Siege Warfare); Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery, 188–190.
4. Heavy knights: Parker, The Military Revolution, 69–70; Bernard S. Bachrach (“The Myth of the Mounted Knight”) in Parker, ed., The Cambridge History of Warfare, 82–83; Brauer and Van Tuyll, Castles, Battles, & Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History, 49, 63.
5. For fantasy tanks, see H. G. Wells, Complete Short Stories, 603–620, especially 610.
6. Development of the tank and its use in World War I: Wright, Tank, 23–80. Cambrai: Macksey, Tank Versus Tank, 30; cf. 38–39; Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives, 59–60.
7. Cf. Steiner, Lights That Failed, 372–383.
8. Prewar armor theorists in Britain, France, and Germany: Macksey, Tank Versus Tank, 24, 60; Boot, War Made New, 216–224. Cf. Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences,” in Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 6–49. Cf. Wright, Tank, 70–71, 220–228.
9. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 8.
10. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 80.
11. Michael Wittmann: Agte, Michael Wittmann, Vol. I, 265–284; II: 17–90. Cf. Hart, Sherman Firefly vs. Tiger, 52–69.
12. Prewar tank experiences and lessons: Habeck, Storm of Steel, 247–287.
13. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 72–73.
14. Tank gun performance: Macksey, Tank Versus Tank, 106–114.
15. Russian diesel engines: Carius, Tigers in the Mud, 23. Panther tank craftsmanship in comparison to T-34s: Forczyk, “T-34 vs. Panther,” in Zaloga, ed., Battleground, 80–85. Forty, World War Two Tanks, 168–170.
16. Mayo, Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, 328.
17. On the specifications of the plethora of British, German, American, Soviet, French, Italian, and Japanese tanks, see Forty, World War Two Tanks, especially 64–107 (Germany) and 156–173 (the Soviet Union).
18. Pimlott, ed., Rommel, 147–148.
19. “Like rats”: Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, 177.
20. Theories of tanks as tank-destroyers: Roberts, Storm of War, 525 (citing Guderian, Achtung! Panzer!). Battle of Kursk: Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, with figures of “Comparative Strengths and Losses” in Appendix C (336–346). See Raus, Panzer Operations, 347. Pyrrhus: Plutarch, Pyrrhus 21.9.
21. German reluctance to build tanks in World War I: Gudmundsson, On Armor, 66–67. Supposed superiority of German tank crews: Keegan, Second World War, 399.
22. German tank specifications: Forty, World War Two Tanks, 64–107.
23. Shortcomings of the Panzers during the 1939–1940 victories: von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 155 n. 3; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 138. Inadequacies of Luftwaffe’s ground support: Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 80–82.
24. End of blitzkrieg in Russia: Steiger, Armour Tactics, 53.
25. Hitler’s remarks: Guderian, Panzer Leader, 190; cf. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 78.
26. Livy’s (31.34.3) description of the strange cavalry encounter before the battle of Cynoscephalae in Thessaly (197 BC). Unimpressive German tank force that entered the Soviet Union in June 1941: see Stahel, Operation Barbarossa, 110–114.
27. The Russian “monster”: see Steiger, Armour Tactics, 79; and cf. 82. “Peashooter”: Schäufler, Panzer Warfare, 54. German tank production figures: Guderian, Panzer Leader, 143. See also Roberts, Storm of War, 425.
28. On the impossibility of reverse engineering the T-34: Guderian, Panzer Leader, 276–277; Keegan, Second World War, 399–402. See Steiger, Armour Tactics, 83–85. On Guderian’s appointment to inspector-general of armoured troops on March 1, 1943, see Guderian, Panzer Leader, 284–300.
29. Cf. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 301. Standardization in military production: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 415–416 (April 9, 1942, midday).
30. The Tiger: Carius, Tigers in the Mud, 26. Cf. Weinberg, World at Arms, 539. The envisioned super-Yamato battleship class: Lengerer and Ahlberg, Yamato Class, 553–555.
31. Three options that confronted the Germans in their efforts to match the T-34: Showalter, Armor and Blood, 46–47. Speer’s assessment of the V-2: Inside the Third Reich, 366.
32. Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 181.
33. Hitler’s disgust with the initially unreliable Panther: Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Generals, 415.
34. Differing notions of industrial production: Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945, 186–188. The Maus tank: Guderian, Panzer Leader, 278; Forty, World War Two Tanks, 107; Senger und Etterlin, German Tanks of World War II, 75–77. Misplaced German munitions priorities: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 333–335. Speer’s abilities: Evans, Third Reich at War, 328–329.
35. Cf. Wright, Tank, 298.
36. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 83–86.
37. German hubris prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union: Roberts, Storm of War, 137–145. Underestimation of the strength of the Red Army: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa, 143–145; Raus, Panzer Operations, 1–2.
38. Burdick and Jacobsen, eds., Halder War Diary, 345. On Russian-German joint research on prewar tanks: Habeck, Storm of Steel, 71–124. British contributions: Gat, British Armour Theory, 43–67. Crécy: Ormrod, Edward III, 271–321; Curry, Hundred Years’ War, 14–15; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 155–175; Russell Mitchell, “The Longbow-Crossbow Shootout at Crécy (1346): Has the ‘Rate of Fire Commonplace’ Been Overrated?” in Villalon and Kagay, eds., The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, 233–257. Cf. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 4–6. Cf. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 143. Prewar Soviet armored experience against the Japanese at Lake Khasan (1938) and Khalkhin Gol (1939), and against the Finns: Habeck, Storm of Steel, 247, 277–279, 285–287, 289–291.
39. Schäufler, Panzer Warfare, 38. Cf. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 84–85. On more firsthand German experiences: Schäufler, Panzer Warfare, 68.
40. For the T-34’s specifications, see Forty, World War Two Tanks, 168–170.
41. Kliment Voroshilov I tanks: Macksey, Tank Versus Tank, 85–87.
42. T-34 battle losses in Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, 253–254. Cf. Schäufler, Panzer Warfare, 69. For the figures from Kursk, see Showalter, Armor and Blood, 269–270. Cf. Raus, Panzer Operations, 212. German tanks and armored vehicles before and after Stalingrad: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 308–310. For more German testimonies on the T-34’s superiority, see Steiger, Armour Tactics, 82, 265–266; Raus, Panzer Operations, 32–33; Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 153.
43. See Hastings, Armageddon, 86.
44. Balanced final assessment of the Sherman: Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 327–330. On the manner in which Shermans were destroyed: Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 236–238.
45. American automobile industry mobilization for war production: Baime, Arsenal of Democracy, 65–85, and Arthur Herman’s review in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/book-review-the-arsenal-of-democracy-by-a-j-baime-1402693102).
46. Sherman superiority in 1942 and early 1943 in North Africa: Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 49–54. Total tank production of the United States and the Soviet Union: Forty, World War Two Tanks, 108–173.
47. Shermans and burning: Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 55–56; Forty, World War Two Tanks, 142. Survivability of Sherman crews: Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 238.
48. The tank destroyer: Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 10–11.
49. Patton, War As I Knew It, 138. Cf. Nicholas D. Molnar, “General George S. Patton and the War-Winning Sherman Tank Myth,” in Piehler and Pash, eds., The United States and the Second World War, 129–149.
50. McAleer, Dueling, 12–23; Mayo, Ordnance Department, 322.
51. “Deathtrap”: Mayo, Ordnance Department, 334; Patton, War As I Knew It, 243. See Showalter, Hitler’s Panzers, 334–335. On various schemes to upgrade the Sherman, see Mayo, Ordnance Department, 329.
52. Tank fighting and the Abrams: Murray and Scales, Iraq War, 88–128.
53. British adaptations of the Sherman tanks, and General Hobart’s “funnies”: Forty, World War Two Tanks, 142–149.
54. Macksey, Tank Force, 79.
55. British tank production and models: Forty, World War Two Tanks, 9; cf. 8–56. Tank production was often lumped together with other armored vehicle output, which makes distinct statistics sometimes problematic.
56. Matildas: Forty, World War Two Tanks, 39–43.
57. Coombs, British Tank Production, 122–123.
58. Zaloga, “Tiger vs. Sherman Firefly” in Zaloga, ed., Battleground, 148–153. Percentages of Russian tank losses: Gudmundsson, On Armor, 130.
59. Blitzkrieg in France: Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Pilote de Guerre, 94–95, quoted in Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” in Knox and Murray, eds., Dynamics of Military Revolution, 155: Cf. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 67, quoting Bauer, Der Panzer-krieg, 9.
60. German losses in 1942: Overmans, Deutsche Militärische Verluste, 276–284; Luftwaffe losses: Murray, Luftwaffe, 112–142; for tank losses: Showalter, Armor and Blood, 38.
61. Operation Cobra: Yenne, Operation Cobra, 36–71; especially 38–39; Zaloga, Operation Cobra 1944, 18–31; cf. 25–26.
62. Curtailment of German Blitzkrieg due to shortages of fuel, supplies, and spare parts: Steiger, Armour Tactics, 126–128. Von Rundstedt: Goldensohn, Nuremberg Interviews, 167.
63. On the fear instilled by Panzers: Steiger, Armour Tactics, 25.
64. Allied fuel consumption: D’Este, Patton, 649–650.
65. Comparative fuel consumption of Tigers and Shermans: Green, Anderson, and Schulz, German Tanks, 73–74; Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 331–338, cf. 331. Russian roads: Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 322–323. Cf. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 155. Hitler on roads: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk (June 27, 1942, at dinner), 537–538.
66. Cf. Steiger, Armour Tactics, 13. Mayo, Ordnance Department, 333.
67. For tables of artillery production in World War II: http://ww2-weapons.com/german-arms-production/; http://ww2-weapons.com/russian-arms-production/; http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/wartime-production.html; http://ww2-weapons.com/u-s-arms-production/.
68. US artillery shell production in World War II: “History of the Ammunition Industrial Base,” (www.jmc.army.mil/Docs/History/Ammunition%20Industrial%20Base%20v2%20%202010%update.pdf), Joint Munitions Command, JMC History Office, ASMSJM-HI DSN: 793–0392, page 15; Cf. Hogg, German Artillery, 162–170. Inadequacy of German tanks in Russia: Steiger, Armour Tactics, 53. A Bismarck or Tirpitz probably cost around 250 million Reichsmarks, an 88 mm perhaps 33,600 RM.
69. Gudmundsson, On Armor, 122–124. Cf. Senger und Etterlin, German Tanks of World War II, 39–40.
70. See Gavin, On to Berlin, 205: Americans preferred captured Panzerfausts to their own bazookas.
71. Raus, Panzer Operations, 337. Hellbeck, Stalingrad, 159.
72. Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 472, 482; Olive, Steel Thunder on the Eastern Front, 137–155. Cf. Dunn, Stalin’s Keys to Victory, 23–42; Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, 148.
73. On rockets vs. artillery in World War II, and Katyushas and their copies, see Baker, Rocket, 81–83; Weinberg, World at Arms, 538. Gunston, Rockets & Missiles, 24, includes discussion of the Type 212 and 212A missiles, calling the later “potentially the most formidable tactical missile in the world prior to World War 2.”
74. Cf. Baldwin, Deadly Fuze, 85–89, 302–304. Buderi, The Invention That Changed the World, 221–228. On technological questions, see in general: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, The World War II Proximity Fuze.
75. Fear of Japanese mortars: Sledge, With the Old Breed, 72–74. Concept of “shell shock”: Tracey Loughran, “Shell Shock, Trauma, and the First World War: The Making of a Diagnosis and Its Histories,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Science 67 (2012), 94–119; cf. also Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, 258–259; Watson, Enduring the Great War, 25–37, 238–240.
1. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 7.77.7.
1. Difference in the style of supreme leadership: Keegan, Mask of Command, 311–352. See Weinberg, “Reflections on Running a War: Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Tojo,” in Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, 287–306.
2. Qualities of the great generals and statesmen: Cohen, Supreme Command, 1–14, 208–224.
3. Generalship seen when the odds are unfavorable: Hanson, Savior Generals, 3–5.
4. Thucydides on Pericles: 2.65.9. Cf. Plutarch, Pericles, 15. See Kagan, Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, 62–64, and cf. 230–231. Democracies at war: Hanson, “Ferocious Warmakers: How Democracies Win Wars,” Claremont Review of Books, 2.2 (2002). (http://www.claremontinstitute.org/crb/article/ferocious-warmakers-how-democracies-win-wars/). See Thucydides (8.1.4), for an assessment of democratic warfare and Sicily (415–413 BC).
5. United States enjoying the advantages of democracy during World War II: O’Neill, A Democracy at War, 429–434. Cf. also Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, 193. Mussolini’s “deep-seated distrust of his subordinates”: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 7.
6. Manstein on Hitler: Lost Victories, 284 ff.
7. Stalin’s move away from his earlier micromanaging of the war: Roberts, Storm of War, 601–602. For a contrasting view, cf. Deutscher, Stalin, 466–467; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 159–162. Zhukov’s brilliance: Hastings, Armageddon, 232.
8. Axis mistrust: Ciano’s diary entry for July 20, 1941 (Diary, 1937–1943, 446) on the “treacherous” Germans.
9. Cf. the fierce criticisms of Roosevelt by General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff: Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 272–273; 590. On plots against Hitler: Stone, Shattered Genius, 265–310; Weinberg, “July 20, 1944: The German Resistance to Hitler,” in Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, 245–253. See Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 230–236, for a contrasting view on the complicity between Hitler and his generals. For opposition to Nazi rule: Hansen, Disobeying Hitler, 324–332.
10. For Churchill’s unique prewar experiences: Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, Preface, xix.
11. Raeder’s postwar doubts about Hitler: Raeder, Grand Admiral, 241–242. The Allied rhetoric of Churchill and Roosevelt: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 49–71. German discontent with Hitler: Hastings, Armageddon, 327.
12. Cf. Weinberg’s introduction in Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Generals, xxxiii. Over forty (?) vague plans to kill Hitler of which twenty were more serious: Moorhouse, Killing Hitler: The Plots, the Assassins, and the Dictator Who Cheated Death, 2–3.
13. German war aims in World War I: Rothwell, War Aims, 9–12.
14. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 145. See also Keegan, First World War, 341–343; Strachan, First World War, 261–262.
15. Hitler’s false assurances: Baynes, Speeches of Adolf Hitler, Volume II, 1181, 1211, 1304, 1425, 1517. Cf. Williamson Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 359–360.
16. Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Generals, xxxii. Hitler’s self-assessment of his strategic acumen: Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, 50–54. Cf. Schramm, Hitler, 184–191. Thucydides’s aphorism: 4.4.108.
17. Inefficient use of European industry under Nazi control: Murray, Luftwaffe, 99–100. Hitler’s frequent panics and temporizing: Karl-Heinz Frieser, “The War in the West, 1939–1940: An Unplanned Blitzkrieg,” in Ferris and Mawdsley, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. I: Fighting the War, 306. Flaws in Hitler’s grand strategy: Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” in Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, 8–9 and n. 26. Napoleon quote: DeLiancourt, Political Aphorisms, Moral and Philosophical Thoughts of the Emperor Napoleon, 10.
18. Alexander’s decision to halt his advance into India: see Arrian, Anabasis 5.26–29.1; Diodorus 17.93.3–94.5; Quintus Curtius 9.2.9–11; Plutarch, Alexander 62. Roman defeat at the Teutoburg Wald: Dio 56.19.1–22.2; Valleius Paterculus 2.119.1–5, Tacitus, Annals 1.61–62. Augustus’s response to Varus’s defeat: Suetonius, Divus Augustus 23. Cf. Goldsworthy, Augustus, 447–457.
19. Relationship between Hitler’s strengths and weaknesses, and his conduct of the war: Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 372–410; Schramm, Hitler, passim; Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, 222–246.
20. Hitler’s triumphalism: Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 300–301.
21. Hitler and the masses: Hugh Trevor-Roper in Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, especially xxxix.
22. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 35–36. Hitler’s ramblings: see the survey by Hugh Trevor-Roper in Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, especially xxxvi–ix.
23. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 208–209.
24. Germany’s proposals to Mexico in World War I: Boghardt, Zimmermann Telegram, 33–47.
25. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 209. Decision to declare war on the United States: Roberts, Storm of War, 193–197. See Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, 148.
26. Counterfactuals of a German Mediterranean strategy in place of Barbarossa: David M. Glantz, “What If the Germans Had Delayed Barbarossa Until After Dealing with Great Britain (in 1942 or 1943)?,” in Showalter and Deutsch, eds., If the Allies Had Fallen, 52–53. Cf. Fuller, Second World War, 84–87. See also Howard, Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, 12–13.
27. Hitler’s strategic disasters following 1942: Lewin, Hitler’s Mistakes. Lübeck and the Baedeker Raids: Evans, Third Reich at War, 438–440. Hitler’s strategic shortcomings: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 84–85. Warning against Case Blue: Schramm, Hitler, 203.
28. Hitler’s reversals of decisions: Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, 92–93, 108–122. Hitler’s palace: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 156; cf. 483, on Hitler’s admissions about Goering. Hitler’s profits from the public purse: Speer, Spandau, 104–105. Cf. Stratigakos, Hitler at Home, 24–46. On Goering, see Murray, Luftwaffe, 13–14.
29. Hitler’s poor health as exaggerated: Neumann and Eberle, Was Hitler Ill?, 186–190. Cf. Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 638–639, and Hitler’s downturn by September (726–727). See also Goering’s assessment: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 587. Hitler’s self-pity: Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 756.
30. Hitler’s parochialism, populism, and distrust of intellectuals: Evans, Third Reich in Power, 298–299, 498.
31. Hitler’s esteem for Mussolini: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 437 (April 23, 1942, at dinner).
32. Italy’s colonial dreams: Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 39–40.
33. Italy’s dearth of capital and key natural resources: Vera Zamagni, “Italy: How to Lose the War and Win the Peace,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 177–223, especially 178–189. Italian aims and means in the war are surveyed in Rothwell, War Aims in the Second World War, 52–58.
34. Mussolini’s efforts to persuade Hitler to adopt a southern strategy: Ansel, Hitler and the Middle Sea, especially 33–39.
35. Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War II: An Overview,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 1–42; cf. Tables 1.6 and 1.7, 15–17. Italian shortage of vehicles: Knox, Common Destiny, 150–151.
36. See Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 89–91; 100–101. On Nazi Germany’s furor at a crumbling Italy and what followed after 1943, see Roberts, Storm of War, 384. Using the province of Arezzo as a local example of a national phenomenon, Victoria C. Belco, War, Massacre, and Recovery in Central Italy, 1943–1948, examines German retribution against Italy and the challenges faced by the Italian people in response to Italy’s change in alliance from Axis to Allies, and the subsequent battles for Italian territory.
37. General Armellino: Steinberg, All or Nothing, 16.
38. Mussolini’s character and mood swings: Hibbert, Mussolini, especially 101–113; Mussolini’s journalistic career: Ridley, Mussolini, 47–55. “Energetic without being industrious”: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 133–134, 169.
39. Inadequacy of the Italian military to meet Mussolini’s agendas: MacGregor Knox, “The Italian Armed Forces, 1940–3” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 170–172.
40. Tojo’s ascendance and the basis of his power: Weinberg, Visions of Victory, 59–62. Cf. Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, 29–43.
41. Alternate Japanese plans of focusing on China: Hane and Perez, Modern Japan, 312–327; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor; Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War; Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, 188–190.
42. Tojo demoted: Toland, Rising Sun, 523–530; the nature of his successors: Craig, Fall of Japan, 27–29. Cf. Toll, Conquering Tide, 533–534.
43. U.S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations prior to Pearl Harbor: Schroeder, Axis Alliance, 73–107, 168–199. Japanese shipbuilding: Alvin D. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 6–7. Yuko Tojo’s praise of her grandfather: The Japan Times, July 4, 2007 (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/07/04/national/candidate-tojo-seeks-resolution-against-a-bombings/#.VwsMwiQbCYV).
44. Japan’s prewar investment for a Pacific War: Keegan, History of Warfare, 375. What the Japanese might have done at Pearl Harbor: Zimm, Attack on Pearl Harbor, especially “Appendix D: The Perfect Attack,” 401–412. Cf. Williamson Murray, “US Naval Strategy and Japan,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 283.
45. Japanese militarism as an aberration from traditional Japanese history: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 768–794. Japanese racial propaganda: Dower, War Without Mercy, 203–233.
46. Rumors of conciliation between Hitler and British grandees after the fall of France: Black, Roosevelt, 576. On the miserable World War II years of Lloyd George, see Lukacs, Five Days in London, 128; Cross, ed., Life With Lloyd George, 281. Shortly after the German invasion of France, Lloyd George also purportedly told Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador to Britain, “the Allies cannot win the war. The most we can think about now is how to hold the Germans back till autumn and then see” (Gorodetsky, ed., Maisky Dairies, 278). Megan Lloyd George’s quote: 304. For British Tory acquiescence, see Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 42–44; and cf. 80–83 for Churchill’s occasional pessimism.
47. Churchill’s speech before Congress on December 26, 1941, Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 671–672.
48. For Themistocles’s pronoia, see Hanson, “The Strategic Thought of Themistocles,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 17. Cf. Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 209, on Churchill and US entry into the war.
49. Churchill’s “Finest Hour” speech before Commons on June 18, 1940: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/233–1940-the-finest-hour/122-their-finest-hour.
50. See Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 215–216. Churchill’s strategy: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 80–88.
51. Britain’s diminished postwar international influence: “British Grand Strategy, 1933–1942,” in Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, 147–181, esp. 167–181. Cf. Talbot Imlay, “Western Allied Ideology, 1939–1945,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 47–48.
52. Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 468–471. Monty’s feuding with Eisenhower: Weidner, Eisenhower and Montgomery, 370–376. Churchill and the Allies at Yalta: David Reynolds, “The Diplomacy of the Grand Alliance,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, especially 319–322.
53. Mobilization of the economy and Churchill’s input: Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, “The United Kingdom: ‘Victory at All Costs’,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 43–80; Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, 645–648. British war strategists: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 157–168.
54. Churchill’s strategic acumen: Hastings, Finest Years, 178–179, 478–479. The German view: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 493.
55. Churchill’s suspicions of Stalinist Russia: Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 483–484 (on Tehran Conference, November 28, 1943).
56. Churchillian rhetoric: Cannadine, In Churchill’s Shadow, 85–113.
57. Von Luck, Panzer Commander, 109. Churchill’s health problems: Hastings, Finest Years, 352–355, 362–363. Churchill’s personal risks during the war: Jablonsky, Churchill and Hitler, 40–41.
58. Roberts, History of the English-Speaking Peoples, 147. Isolationism of the 1930s: the website of the United States Department of State (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937–1945/american-isolationism); Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 484–537.
59. Roosevelt’s bipartisan support for the war: Fullilove, Rendezvous with Destiny, 332–356.
60. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, 9–33, for the private-sector preponderance of the US war economy. Cf. Herman, Freedom’s Forge, 335–336.
61. Roosevelt’s toughness toward his wartime domestic opponents in his January 11, 1944, State of the Union address, delivered as a fireside chat (accessed at http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.HTML).
62. Roosevelt’s method of decision-making: James Lacey, “Toward a Strategy: Creating an American Strategy for Global War, 1940–1943,” in Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, 182–209, esp. 207–209. Roosevelt’s keen strategic sense: Peter R. Mansoor, “US Grand Strategy in the Second World War,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, 333–338.
63. Roosevelt and his generals: Black, Roosevelt, 1124–1126. Cf. Persico, Roosevelt’s Centurions, especially 528–539.
64. Roosevelt’s hyper-criticism of British help for the Soviets: Berthon and Potts, Warlords, 139, quoting from Blum, Roosevelt and Morgenthau (March 11, 1942).
65. Roosevelt’s sometimes snubbing of Churchill and courting of Stalin: Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, Vol. 1, 421–422. See Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 481–482, 864–865.
66. Roosevelt’s assurances to the British on American complementary strategy: Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 124–125. Cf. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 84–102. “Europe first” as simplistic description: O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 206–207.
67. Stalin’s disastrous first two weeks of silence: Ulam, Stalin, 538–543. Cf. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, especially 98–112, on Stalin’s mismanagement at the outbreak of war. Hitler’s quote: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 114.
68. Stalin’s disingenuousness at the Tehran Conference about a second front: Ulam, Stalin, 589–590. Hitler’s admiration of Stalin: Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 628, 844, and cf. 898.
69. Stalin’s atrocities: Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin, 123–124 and passim.
70. The Soviet Union’s productive losses after June 1941: Mark Harrison, “The Soviet Union: The Defeated Victor,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 282–284. Soviet increased war production in 1939: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 112–113; Soviet war industries in the Urals: ibid., 117–118.
71. Remarkable record of Soviet production after the Germans invaded in June 1941: Dunn, Stalin’s Keys to Victory, 23–41.
1. Cf. Cray, General of the Army, 90. The “little black book”: Cole Kingseed, “Marshall’s Men,” Army Magazine (December 2009), 52–55. Cf. Fuller, Generalship, 41–44.
2. Von Blücher’s loyalty and dedication: Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 1068–1069.
3. Genius and shortcomings of Manstein: Melvin, Manstein, 504–510.
4. Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 74–75.
5. Cf. Maclean, German General Officer Casualties, 5.
6. Moral dilemmas of German generals: Melvin, Manstein, 506; Hansen, Disobeying Hitler, 55–58 (on Rommel and von Kluge).
7. American successful and mediocre generals: Ricks, The Generals, 17–134.
8. Training of German officers: Dennis E. Showalter, “‘No Officer Rather Than a Bad Officer’: Officer Selection and Education in the Prussian/German Army, 1715–1945,” in Kennedy and Neilson, Military Education, 53–56. German generals’ special pleading about Operation Barbarossa: Williamson Murray, “British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 96–97.
9. Model and Rommel: Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals, 293–317 (Martin Blumenson on Rommel), and 319–334 (Carlo D’Este on Model). Praise of Rommel: Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 375. Letter of February 26, 1943: Liddell Hart, ed., Rommel Papers, 410–411. Hitler’s plans following the envisioned victory in Russia: Weinberg, World at Arms, 266–268.
10. Dupuy, A Genius for War, 253–254.
11. American experiences of Yamamoto and Matsuoka: Potter, Yamamoto, 14–26; Lu, Agony of Choice, 6–16.
12. Yamamoto’s simultaneous doubts and enthusiasm for war: Potter, Yamamoto, 312–313; Thomas, Sea of Thunder, 15–19. Cf. Weinberg, “Some Myths of World War II,” 715–716. Yamamoto versus the generals: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 172.
13. Battle of Savo Island (August 9, 1942): D’Albas, Death of a Navy, 161–170, esp. 169–170, note 5 (added by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald); Loxton and Coulthard-Clark, The Shame of Savo, 237–240; Warner and Warner, Disaster in the Pacific, 244–259; Toshikazu Ohmae, “The Battle of Savo Island,” in O’Connor, ed. The Japanese Navy in World War II, 74–85; Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, 187–194. Defense of the Japanese admirals: see again Dull, 193–194; cf. 322–323; D’Albas, Death of a Navy, 312–335, esp. 329–331, note 4 (added by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald); Tomiki Koyangi, “The Battle of Leyte Gulf,” in O’Connor, ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II, 106–118, esp. 112.
14. Skill of Japanese generals between 1944 and 1945: Okinawa (Ushijima), Sloan, The Ultimate Battle, 14–18; Iwo Jima (Kuribayashi), Newcomb and Schmidt, Iwo Jima, 8–20; Manila (Yamashita), Connaughton, Pimlott, and Anderson, Battle for Manila, 66–70; and Singapore (Yamashita), Hack and Blackburn, Did Singapore Have to Fall?, 87–91.
15. Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 20, 25. Captured and killed Soviet generals: Maslov, Captured Soviet Generals; Maslov and Glantz, Fallen Soviet Generals, 245–269.
16. Dunkirk: Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 143–145.
17. Comparisons between British and American generals: Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 33–38; Overy, Why the Allies Won, 268–274.
18. Supposed British English brains guiding American brawn: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 129–133.
19. Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, 224–228. King’s quote and rambunctiousness nature of American commander: Williamson Murray, “U.S. Strategy and Leadership in World War II: The Problem of a Two-Front Strategy,” in Murray and Ishizu, eds., Conflicting Currents, 89.
20. Bradley’s dismissal of the Pacific (“bush league”): Williamson Murray, “U.S. Strategy and Leadership in World War II: The Problem of a Two-Front Strategy,” in Murray and Ishizu, eds., Conflicting Currents, 94.
21. Criticism of American doctrine in Europe between 1944 and 1945: Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 728–729. Various traditions of American generalship: Ricks, The Generals, 17–19.
22. Berlin, U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders, especially 9–13; Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, particularly 249–268.
1. Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War II: An Overview,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 7–10, Tables 1.2–3.
2. Holger H. Herwig, “Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, 78–79. Attacks on V-2 facilities: Miller, Masters of the Air, 201–202, 418.
3. Relative air superiority based on aircraft quality and quantity: Van Creveld, Age of Airpower, 128–129.
4. Germany’s failure to mass-produce munitions before 1943: Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 212–213; cf. Weinberg, World at Arms, 76–78.
5. Changing nature of the respective assets and production of the Allies and Axis: Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War II: An Overview,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 6–27.
6. Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine, 181–194. On the Third Reich’s oil dilemmas, see Becker, “The Role of Synthetic Fuel in World War II Germany,” Air University Review (July–August 1981), (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm). Cf. Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 52. For the Dutch East Indies and Japan, see O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 72–74.
7. Cf. Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine, 12–13, 31–46. See especially Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 140–141.
8. Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine, 172–178; Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, “The United Kingdom: ‘Victory at All Costs,’” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 61–63. On British rationing, see Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, 438–439. Aviation gas: Carew, Becoming the Arsenal, 279–280.
9. Hugh Rockoff, “The United States: From Plowshares to Swords,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 81–121; cf. 23–24. Myth of large-scale consumer sacrifices: Lacey, Keep from All Thoughtful Men, 49. Bribes: Overy, Interrogations, 274–275. And cf. Evans, Third Reich at War, 493–495. On MacArthur, see the allegations in Masuda, MacArthur in Asia, 83–85.
10. For Hitler’s dependency on Soviet imports, cf. Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 42–43.
11. America’s economic involvement during World War I: Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War I,” in Broadberry and Harrison, eds., Economics of World War I, 5–13. Cf. also in the same edited volume, Hugh Rockoff, “Until It’s Over, Over There: The US Economy in World War I,” 310–343.
12. America’s astounding productive gains: Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 448–450.
13. Eden, Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, 93.
14. British aircraft statistics: Millett and Murray, A War to Be Won, 535 (Table 2: Major Weapons Produced by Allies and Axis Powers, 1940–1945).
15. For Liberty ship construction, cf. Herman, Freedom’s Forge, 176–191. A detailed account of all aspects of the program—including design, materials, and labor—is found in Lane, Ships for Victory. For the remarkable advances in American aviation production, see Cairncross, Planning in Wartime, 178. On America’s ability to have produced even more munitions, see Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 500–501. On the radical decrease in cost of the proximity fuze as an example of American productivity, cf. Baldwin, Deadly Fuze, 217–220.
16. For the changing workforce in Germany between 1943 and 1945, see Evans, Third Reich at War, 350–352.
17. See Cairncross, Planning in Wartime, 176–177; for German and Soviet comparisons, see Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 514–515.
18. For the German use of Czech military equipment, especially tanks, as well as confiscated French armor, see Green, Anderson, and Schulz, German Tanks of World War II, 28–30; Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth, 46–47.
19. Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, “The United Kingdom: ‘Victory at All Costs,’” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 58.
20. Cf. Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War II: An Overview,” in Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II, 22–23; Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine, 12–13, 79–81; cf. 279–280. Lend-Lease to Russia: Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver, 115–127.
21. Hitler’s technological follies: Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists, 21–37; Lewin, Hitler’s Mistakes, 81–100. Cf. the contrast among Allied planners: Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, 5–74; see the review of Kennedy by Michael Beschloss in The New York Times Book Review (February 10, 2013), 15. Hitler’s big talk: Hechler, Goering and His Gang, 57.
22. Herman, Freedom’s Forge, 335–336. Brilliant British planners: Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine, 86–112. Cf. Patterson, Arming the Nation for War, 46.
1. Aggregate dead: Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. I, xxxiii–iv; for the more conservative figure of 40 million, cf. Vol. II, 954.
2. Black Death: Rosen, The Third Horseman, 254–259. Parker, Global Crisis, explores the devastation brought on by climate changes during the seventeenth century.
3. Population reaching largest size on the eve of World War II, and for the number of mobilized soldiers: Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. II, 956.
4. Rate of fire and distance of matchlock musket: Parker, The Military Revolution, 17–19. Fatality ratios between winners and losers: Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. I, xxxi–xxxii.
5. Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 503.
6. Khan, Shallow Graves of Rwanda, 7, 9; cf. also, Odom, Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, 75–77.
7. Mortality statistics including and excluding the Eastern Front: Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. II, 838.
8. Hoplite battle in Classical Greece: Hanson, Western Way of War, passim; protection offered by hoplite armor: ibid., 81–83; on 10 percent battle casualty rates, see ibid., 209. Advantages of castles: Brauer and van Tuyll, Castles, Battles, & Bombs, 59–66.
9. Hypotheses about body armor and the reduction of fatalities: Michael Vlahos, “Could Body Armor Have Saved Millions in World War I?,” The Atlantic (April 30, 2013), online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/could-body-armor-have-saved-millions-in-world-war-i/275417/.
10. Approximating the average number of flak rounds needed to down an Allied aircraft: Westermann, Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914–1945, 292–295.
11. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. II, 952.
12. Russian vengeance when the Red Army entered Berlin: Ryan, Last Battle, 459–465.
13. Historical ratios between soldiers lost to disease versus combat, cf. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. I, xxxii–xxxiii.
14. Dutch during the harsh winter of 1944–1945: Van der Zee, The Hunger Winter, 304–310.
15. Famine in China and the millions of its war dead: Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 178ff.
16. Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 23–24. How the Soviet Union coped with food shortages: Moskoff, Bread of Affliction, 42–69. German Hungerplan: Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 477–485, 513–551; Alex J. Kay, “‘The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million’: The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941,” Chapter 4 of Kay, Rutherford, and Stahel, eds., Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941, 101–129; and 110 for the “Economic Policy.” Snyder, Bloodlands, 411; Gesine Gerhard, “Food and Genocide: Nazi Agrarian Politics in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union,” Contemporary European History 18.1 (2009), 45–65, esp. 54ff. Anecdotes from German soldiers on treatment of Russians: Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 53, quoted also in Collingham, Taste of War, 39.
17. For a brief review of Japanese atrocities and starvation of occupied peoples, see Russell A. Hart, “Asia and the Pacific: Japanese Occupation, 1931–1945,” in Ciment, ed., World Terrorism, Vol. 1, 49–51. Starvation and deaths to disease in occupied Europe and during the Nazi invasions and retreats: Hitchcock, Bitter Road to Freedom, 121–122, 227–238; Hastings, Armageddon, 407–417. On Greece, see Hionidou, Famine and Death in Occupied Greece, 1941–1944, 158.
18. Monthly loss rates of the German and Soviet armies: http://www.feldgrau.com/stats.html; cf. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, 85–97. For discussion of Soviet exaggerations of German losses and false information concerning Russian casualties, see Mosier, Deathride, 338–340; 421.
19. Nature of the German death squads: Browning, Ordinary Men, 159–189. Cf. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 97–153; Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 715. Non-Germans’ roles in the Holocaust: Jochen Böhler, “Race, Genocide, and Holocaust,” Chapter 39 of Zeiler and DuBois, eds., A Companion to World War II, 669–673.
20. In general on the Armenian genocide: Kévorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History; Cambodian “killing fields”: Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime; Etcheson, After the Killing Fields; Rwandan tribal bloodletting: Khan, Shallow Graves of Rwanda; Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder.
21. Differences between Western European and transatlantic notions of human rights and the German concept of the citizen: Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 887–888. Cf. Browning, Ordinary Men, 170: “In the past forty-five years no defense attorney or defendant in any of the hundreds of postwar trials has been able to document a single case in which the refusal to obey an order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the allegedly inevitable dire punishment.” Desire for Jewish loot: Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, 212–224; Overy, Interrogations, 196–198.
22. Conflation of Bolshevism and anti-Semitism: Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–45: Nemesis, 389.
23. For the effect of Operation Barbarossa on the Final Solution, see Evans, Third Reich at War, 247–248.
24. Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 23–24. Wannsee Conference, where the Final Solution was finalized: C. Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler’s Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews,” in Bartov, ed., The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath, 106–161.
25. Hitler’s influence on Franco, see in general Casanova, The Spanish Republic and Civil War; Payne, Franco and Hitler; and Whealey, Hitler and Spain. Hitler’s anti-Semitism: Hitler, Mein Kampf, 640; Domarus, Hitler, Speeches and Proclamations 1932–1945, Vol. 3, 1449. “Jewish virus”: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 332 (February 22, 1942). Hitler’s March 1921 essay is quoted in Wünschmann, Before Auschwitz, 76.
26. Nazi deceptions: Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, 341. German public opinion: Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 186, cf. also, 120, 142. Cf. Mengele’s dissertation, see Lifton, Nazi Doctors, 339; cf. also Helena Kubica, “The Crimes of Josef Mengele,” in Gutman and Berenbaum, eds., Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, 318; Martin Klettner’s patent application for crematoria: Jean-Claude Pressac with Robert-Jan van Pelt, “The Machinery of Mass Murder at Auschwitz,” in the same edited volume, 240. Krupp: Buruma, Year Zero, 183.
27. Doenitz, Memoirs, 467. German public opinion: Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 186, cf. also, 142–148; Hitler’s unique role, see 110–116, especially 111.
28. IG Farben: in general, Jeffreys, Hell’s Cartel. Involvement of thugs and criminals: Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, 51–74. Cf. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 27–37, on the legal and administrative contortions necessary to define Jewishness under the Third Reich. Cf. 244–246 for the conveyor belts of death.
29. “Jewish Question”: Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 62–64, and cf. 73–74. Death tolls: Browning, Ordinary Men, xv. Prewar Nazi abuse and killing: Wünschmann, Before Auschwitz, 58–99. Transition from mass shootings to gassing: Jürgen Matthäus, “Nazi Genocides,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 177–178.
30. Holocaust seen by Nazis as one of their lasting achievements: Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 226–230, 658–660. German indifference during the war: Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 220–223. Hitler’s decision about the Final Solution, cf. ibid., 262–265. Cf. Richard Bessel, “Murder Amidst Collapse: Explaining the Violence of the Last Months of the Third Reich,” in Weise and Betts, eds., Years of Persecution, Years of Extermination, 255–268.
31. 1936 Olympic Games and Avery Brundage’s anti-Semitism: Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, 62–95. Cf. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 233–249.
32. Quotes from Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 159. Why did Jews not leave the Third Reich earlier?: Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 9–11.
33. Mengele’s horror lab at Auschwitz: Kubica, “The Crimes of Josef Mengele,” in Gutman and Berenbaum, eds., Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, 324. American indifference: Winik, 1944, 466–476. On making the Holocaust possible: Browning, Ordinary Men, 186. Bombing and the Holocaust: Wyman, “Why Auschwitz Wasn’t Bombed,” in Gutman and Berenbaum, eds., Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp, especially 579–583; Overy, Bombing War, 583–596; Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, 307–341. See also Fleming, Auschwitz, the Allies and Censorship, 275.
34. Allies’ obstacles to emigration from Third Reich: Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 88–95.
35. Rebatet quote and further reflections on the yellow star: Jacoby, Bloodlust, 101–102.
36. Five-week toll: Gilbert, Holocaust, 175. Cf. Goebbels, Goebbels Diaries, 1939–1941, 183 (November 2, 1940). Differences in Jewish life between Eastern and Western Europe and the Nazi stereotyped perception of such: Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 16–18, 84–86. Jews’ greater prewar fears of Russia than Germany: Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 123, and De Bruhl, Firestorm, 140–144.
37. Difference in rounding up Jews in the West in comparison to the East, and the mystery of the East: Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, 81–87.
38. Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese, 171–185. Nazi nihilism: Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 806–807.
39. Number of those subject to Japanese control by mid-1942: Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese, 31–32.
40. British casualties as a result of bombing raids in World War I: Overy, Bombing War, 20–23 (1,239 dead). Cf. also Arnold, Allied Air War and Urban Memory, 72–73. On World War II dead from bombing on both sides, see Overy, Bombers and the Bombed, 306–307. Keegan, Second World War, 432–433; Evans, Third Reich at War, 42–43. For Japan, Frank, Downfall, 334; cf. USSBS’s Morale Division’s report of 900,000 killed and 1.3 million injured.
41. Cf. Kozak, LeMay, 220; Coffey, Iron Eagle, 146–165. LeMay’s decision to launch incendiary raids against Japan: Maj. Gene Gurney, “The Giant Pays Its Way,” in Sunderman, ed., World War II in the Air: The Pacific, 247–265. US official casualty estimates from the firebombing of Tokyo and the two nuclear attacks: United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War), 16. For revised estimates, see Mark Selden, “A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities and the American Way of War from World War II to Iraq,” The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, (http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/2414/article.html) posted May 2, 2007; cf. also Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, Vol. II, 952–953.
42. Trade-offs in bomber design and use: Mosier, Blitzkrieg Myth: 196–200.
43. Ian Krshaw, “Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler’s ‘Programme’ or ‘Expansion Without Object’?,” in Finney, ed., Origins of the Second World War, 140–142.
44. Expulsions of Japanese: Watt, When Empire Comes Home, 19–55, and for statistics, see 39 (Table 1: Estimates of Japanese Nationals Abroad at the End of World War II). Japanese ordeal in Manchuria: in general, Maruyama, Escape from Manchuria. Experiences of soldiers returning to Japan from former empire: Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Soldier’s Home: War, Migration, and Delayed Return in Postwar Japan,” Chapter 2 of Biao, Yeoh, and Toyota, eds., Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia, 39–62.
45. German expulsion from the East: Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 15–24; Hitchcock, Bitter Road to Freedom, 164–169. Mass dislocations of Germans in the East: de Zayas, Terrible Revenge, 82, and cf. 152, where he conjectures that there were over 14 million German-speaking refugees, and 2 million deaths. Operation Hannibal (and “nobody cares”): Hastings, Armageddon, 285, 294, 497.
46. Civilians caught in war zones, see Hastings, Armageddon, 478, cf. 477–495. Chuikov, Fall of Berlin, 40–42. If 40 million civilians perished, the daily death rate was somewhere around 18,000; if 50 million, perhaps 23,000.
47. Earlier famines of 1921–1922: Kotkin, Stalin, 447–449. Hunger of 1931–1933: Khlevniuk, Stalin, 117–122. Famine struck again in 1936: Khlevniuk, Stalin, 124. On the so-called Great Terror of 1937–1938: Khlevniuk, Stalin, 150–182. In general, see Rutherford, Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front. Veterans of all fronts conceded the singular brutality of the Eastern theater: Bartov, Eastern Front, 106–141.
48. German POWs on the Eastern Front: Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 286–289. On the encirclements: Megargee, War of Annihilation, 82–83, 100–101.
49. Scorched-earth policies of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht: Rutherford, Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 357–373. Soviet productive capacity under Nazi control: Keegan, Second World War, 222.
50. Tsar Alexander’s scorched-earth tactics during Napoleon’s 1812 campaign: Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 757–758, 855–856. See the remarks of Tsar Alexander to Narbonne in May 1812: ibid., 765. Cf. Roberts, Napoleon, 584–585.
51. Second Sino-Japanese War, Japanese occupation of China, and the ongoing Chinese civil wars: Paine, Wars for Asia, 122–169: 95 million Chinese citizens became refugees (133), and the Three Alls Campaign as the Three Prohibitions Campaign, “admonishing the Chinese not to burn, commit crimes, or kill” (155).
52. Controversies over German losses: Müller and Ueberschär, Hitler’s War in the East, 1941–1945, 345–376. German losses in Eastern Europe: Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, 555. On little sympathy for vast German relocations in 1945–1946: Weinberg, World at Arms, 895.
53. Red Army’s offensive into East Prussia: Hastings, Armageddon, 261–297.
54. Monthly losses of the Wehrmacht: Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 237–240.
55. Role of geography in Polish history: Davies, God’s Playground, 23–60.
56. Holocaust in Poland, and Nazi views of Poland: Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 64–96; for Heydrich: 65.
57. Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy, 262–282. On the Polish underground movement: in general, Ney-Krwawicz, Polish Resistance Home Army.
58. Breakdown of the Polish dead: Dear and Foot (Oxford Companion to World War II, 290 [Demography, Table 1]) cite as total war-related deaths 123,000 military and 4,000,000 civilian losses.
59. Japanese population: Dear and Foot, eds., Oxford Companion to World War II, 605. Losses: Paine, Wars for Asia, 214.
60. Japanese losses: Toland, Rising Sun, 726. Paine, Wars for Asia, 216. On Japanese naval losses, and comparisons to both Japan’s allies and enemies: Ellis, World War II, 254 (Table 52).
61. Italy’s World War II losses: Dear and Foot, eds., Oxford Companion to World War II, 290 (Demography, Table 1). Cf. Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini’s Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa, 26.
62. Germany’s treatment of Italians: Evans, Third Reich at War, 471.
63. Harsh reprisals against Italians by the Germans: Lamb, War in Italy, 1943–1945, 129–135; Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 115. Cf. also Belco, War, Massacre, and Recovery in Central Italy, 57–79. And see Evans, Third Reich at War, 471.
64. Italian forced laborers in the Third Reich: Dear and Foot, eds., Oxford Companion to World War II, 384 (Forced labour, Table 2).
65. Browning, United States Merchant Marine Casualties of World War II, for all US Merchant Marine casualties from 1940 to 1946.
66. Losses suffered and inflicted by the Army Air Forces: Correll, “The US Army Air Forces at War: a Statistical Portrait of USAAF in World War II,” Air Force Magazine, 78.6 (June 1995), 33–36. Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), “Battle Casualties by Type of Casualty and Disposition, and Duty Branch: 7 December 1941–31 December 1946,” Army Battle Casualties and Non-battle Deaths in World War II: Final Report, 73–77 (http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll8/id/128/filename/117).
67. Allan R. Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, 52–53.
68. Hobart’s “funnies”: Delaforce, Churchill’s Secret Weapons, 49–82. Numbers and nature of the British war dead: Mellor, Casualties and Medical Statistics, 834–839. On the advantages and disadvantages of British armored flight decks: S. Slade and R. Worth, “Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?,” http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm (June 14, 2002).
1. Sartre, The Devil & the Good Lord, 4. “Une victoire racontée en détail, on ne sait plus ce qui la distingue d’une défaite.” Le Diable et le Bon Dieu (Act I, Scene I) (Paris: Éditions Gaillimard, 1951).
1. Lord, Proconsuls, 91–108, 109–132.
2. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 111–117; cf. 289–296, 319–322.
3. Prussians: von Mellenthin, German Generals, 145.
4. Ellis, Brute Force, 538; cf. 349.
5. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 479–488. General Kojiro Sato’s fantasies (“My idea is that if bands of such death-daring men should be thrown in upon San Francisco it would be very interesting indeed”): Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, 19.
6. Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 319.
7. Pasher, Holocaust versus Wehrmacht, 275–290. Transportation to the camps: R. Hilberg, “German Railroads/Jewish Souls,” Society 14.1 (1976), 60–74. Effects of the Holocaust later in Russia: D. Acemoglu, T. Hassan, and J. Robinson, “Social Structure and Development: A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126.2 (2011), 895–946. On the increase in American scientific patents granted to Jewish emigres, see Petra Mosher, Alessandra Voena, and Fabian Waldinger, “German-Jewish Emigrés and U.S. Invention,” (December 21, 2013), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910247.
8. “The Atlantic Charter” (August 14, 1941): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16912.htm.
9. De Bruhl, Firestorm, 180–181, 212–213, 280–282.
10. German ignorance of Pearl Harbor: Weinberg, “Pearl Harbor: The German Perspective,” in Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, 194–204. Cf. Roberts, Masters and Commanders, 71–73.
11. von Mellenthin, German Generals, 235.
12. American postwar confidence in the United Nations: Dennis Showalter, “Global Yet Not Total: The U.S. War Effort and Its Consequences,” in Chickering, Förster, and Greiner, eds., A World at Total War, 132–133. Roosevelt’s confusion over American postwar objectives: James Lacey, “Toward a Strategy: Creating an American Strategy for Global War, 1940–1943,” in Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, 208–209.
13. Naimark, Russians in Germany, 1–9. Loss of West Prussia, Posen, and Upper Silesia to Poland, Hultschiner Ländchen to Czechoslovakia, Memel to Lithuania, North Schleswig to Denmark, Malmedy-Eupen to Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine to France; fate of East Prussia: Egremont, Forgotten Land, 316–322.
14. Doyle, World War II in Numbers, 206–208. On total losses: Germany—4,450,000 military, 1,050,000 civilian; Austria—260,000 military, 120,000 civilian; ethnic Germans—600,000 military, 50,000 civilian. As a percentage of the population, Germany lost 7.9 percent, Austria 5.7 percent, and ethnic Germans suffered losses of 9.7 percent.
15. Time (January 29, 1945). War crime trials, and the defense of German military officials: Hébert, Hitler’s Generals on Trial, especially 8–36, 57–98, 99–128. Cf. edited volume of Mettraux, ed., Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, beginning with R. Jackson, “The Challenge of International Lawlessness,” 5–12.
16. Pew poll at http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/1-americas-global-image/ International Poll. For an example of German revisionist history, see Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945.
17. Paine, Wars for Asia, 171–221. On 2015/16 world GDP see the figures of the International Monetary Fund accessed from http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm.
18. On the new Kaga: Sam LaGrone, “Japan Launches Latest Helicopter Carrier,” USNI News (August, 27, 2015) accessed at https://news.usni.org/2015/08/27/japan-launches-second-helicopter-carrier; for Japan’s withdrawal from abroad to mainland after defeat in 1945: Watt, When Empire Comes Home, 2–7, 190–210.
19. Anticipated aims and real ends of the war: Rothwell, War Aims in the Second World War, 221–226.
20. Greek victories against the Italian army: Carr, Defence and Fall of Greece, 100–138. Cf. Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece, 219–234.
21. Lamb, War in Italy, 1943–1945: A Brutal Story, 56–79. Germans committing 165 murders a day against Italians: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/war-crimes-report-explores-world-war-ii-nazi-brutality-in-italy-a-874024.html.
22. Postwar ambitions of the Soviet Union and China: Naimark and Gibianskii, eds., Establishment of Communist Regimes; 1–17; B. McLoughlin and K. McDermott, “Rethinking Stalinist Terror,” in McDermott and Stibbe, eds., Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe, 1–18. Cf. Gatrell and Baron, eds., Warlands, 1–22.
23. On the controversies over Mao’s body count (45–70 million dead?) as a result of his various failed policies, see the account of Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Knopf, 2005), 3: “responsible for well over 70 million deaths in peacetime”—and, in general, the reactions of the academic community to such staggering death tolls, collected and edited in Benton and Chun, eds., Was Mao Really a Monster?
24. Hitler on the Allies’ problematic triad: Cameron and Stevens, eds., Hitler’s Table Talk, 538–539 (June 27, 1942).
25. Winkler, Age of Catastrophe, 913–915; Orwell: “Revenge is sour,” Tribune (November 9, 1945); cf. Bloom, ed., George Orwell, Updated Edition, 115. American criticism of British imperialism: Hamilton, The Mantle of Command, 244–245.
26. Stalin, Yalta, and the Allied agendas: David Reynolds, “The Diplomacy of the Grand Alliance,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 319–322.
27. Collapse of the Churchill government and the conservatives: Butler, Britain and Empire; 28–62. British withdrawals from overseas: Childs, Britain Since 1945, 28–53. Promotion of social equity and greater government spending: C. Pierson, “Social Policy,” in Marquand and Seldon, eds., The Ideas That Shaped Post-War Britain, 139–164.
28. For George Marshall’s flexibility on the timing of the cross-Channel invasion, see James Lacey, “Toward a Strategy: Creating an American Strategy for Global War, 1940–1943,” in Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, 201–204.
29. Marshall Plan aid: see Sanford, “The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation,” 11–14; Mee, Marshall Plan, 246–263; Gerard Bossuat, “The Marshall Plan: History and Legacy,” Chapter 1 in Sorel and Padoan, eds., The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century, 13–23; Imanuel Wexler, “The Marshall Plan in Economic Perspective: Goals and Accomplishments,” Chapter 7 in Schain, ed., The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After, 147–152; Hogan, Marshall Plan, 54–87. Relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt: Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 99–120. Ormsby-Gore’s comment: cf. The New York Times, October 28, 1962. Lend-Lease to Britain: Adam Tooze and Jamie Martin, “The Economics of the War with Nazi Germany,” in Geyer and Tooze, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. III: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, 42. Katyn Forest: Gorodetsky, ed., Maisky Dairies, 507–511. Allied duplicity in hushing up the Soviet murdering in the Katyn Forest: Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940, 1–2, 144, 158–165. Roosevelt’s suspicions of British designs: Hamilton, The Mantle of Command, 236–237, 242–245. Show trials: see Jo Fox, “The Propaganda War,” in Bosworth and Maiolo, eds., The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Vol. II: Politics and Ideology, 108–109. French censoring of the Nazis: Weber, Hollow Years, 126.
30. Churchill’s influence on America’s hardening attitudes toward the Soviet Union: Harbutt, The Iron Curtain, 117–150.
31. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 544 (September 7, 1944).