6

IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM—OR IS IT PART OF THE PROBLEM?

MANY RESEARCHERS, DECISION makers, and statesmen believe that a key step toward eliminating terrorism—if not the solution—is to integrate terrorist organizations into democratic political systems. The underlying assumption is that the more involved a terrorist organization becomes in the political system, the more likely it is to become increasingly moderate, consumed as it will necessarily be with the economic problems and other pressing issues of its electorate. Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed that as a responsible part of a governing body, the terrorist organization will want to avoid “adventures” that are liable to elicit military reprisals from a rival state.

However, as was elucidated in chapter 5, the very fact that a hybrid terrorist organization chooses to engage simultaneously in pseudo-legitimate political activity and in terrorism obviates our ability to see its involvement in the political arena as even a step toward eliminating terrorism, and certainly not as a solution to the problem of terrorism. Quite the contrary, in fact. A hybrid terrorist organization’s political activity constitutes a twofold threat. For one, involvement in democratic political activity increases a terrorist organization’s strength, influence, and ability to recruit new members and supporters. For another, involvement in democratic political processes envelops a terrorist organization in sympathy, which obscures its terrorist acts and misleads other liberal democracies, granting it internal and international legitimacy. How then is it possible for liberal democracies to end the activity of terrorist organizations? To eliminate the entire phenomenon of terrorism?

HOW MIGHT TERRORISM END?

For years, various schools of thought have flourished that have presented differing approaches to ending terrorism. Martha Crenshaw explains that terrorism may end if the terrorists succeed in fulfilling their goals, subsequent to their preliminary success in getting the public to recognize the validity of their cause.¹ Or, she says, terrorism may end when terrorist organizations break down—because they have lost funding, failed to recruit new members, or lost the support of their natural constituency (e.g., a government or population). Last, Crenshaw argues that terrorism may end if terrorists come to prefer alternative modi operandi, resorting to other means of reaching their goals, such as political negotiation or violence that is not terrorism.² Similarly, Audrey Kurth Cronin has identified seven things that may lead to the decline or end of a terrorist organization: “Capture or killing of the leader, failure to transition to the next generation, achievement of the group’s aims, transition to a legitimate political process, undermining of popular support, repression, transition from terrorism to other forms of violence.”³

The schema derived from an aggregate of Crenshaw’s and Cronin’s alternatives suggests that terrorism may end in one of three ways: if its causes or capabilities are eliminated; if terrorist organizations choose an alternative type of violence, such as guerrilla warfare;⁴ or if terrorist organizations choose to replace terrorism with a nonviolent path.

A 2008 study conducted by the RAND Corporation found that, of 648 extant terrorist organizations, 244 were still functioning, 136 had splintered, and 268 had disappeared. Of those that had vanished, 43 percent had dissolved into the political arena or had entered political negotiations with the state they opposed, 40 percent had been policed out of existence, 10 percent had achieved some victories before ceasing to act, and the remaining 7 percent had been “terminated” militarily.⁵ Following is a more detailed review of how terrorist organizations may come to disappear.

ELIMINATING TERRORISM

Terrorism is a function of two interrelated variables: the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks and the operational capability to do so.⁶ Terrorism is likely to end if one of these factors is neutralized—that is, if a terrorist organization’s operational capability is impaired or if its motivation diminishes. As noted in chapter 1, every terrorist organization has political motivations, be they nationalist, socioeconomic, religious, or ideological. Theoretically, when these have been satisfied, the conflict in which the organization was engaged is over, and its terrorist activities become superfluous. Obviously, a terrorist organization’s political claims can be addressed only if the state it opposes is willing and able to address them. A terrorist organization that is unwilling to compromise, and whose demands include eliminating its opponent state or posing an existential or strategic threat to a state or people, may never have its aspirations met.

Even when this is not the case, ending a conflict by fulfilling a terrorist organization’s political demands can be interpreted as conceding to terrorism. Concessions, whether actual or perceived, can increase the motivation of additional terrorist organizations to continue or escalate their terrorist activities or increase their demands. On the other hand, a terrorist organization may be satisfied with a compromise in which some but not all of its aspirations are realized. Unlike concession, compromise can end a conflict by eliminating the motivation to commit acts of terrorism. In other cases, a terrorist organization may change its motivation, due either to external changes in the conflict or to intra-organizational processes. For example, change in a global ideology can influence the fundamental ideology of a terrorist organization: the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communist ideology left Communist terrorist organizations without an ideology to lean on and without material support. Conversely, conflict among or a change in a terrorist organization’s leadership is an internal process that might lead to a change in ideology and affect the organization’s motivation to conduct terrorist attacks. Thus, both external and internal forces may lead to the cessation of terrorism—if they eliminate the motivation for it.

As noted, however, terrorism may also cease when a terrorist organization’s operational capability diminishes. For example, if key figures in the organization are killed, neutralizing a considerable percentage of its manpower, or if its physical infrastructure or arsenal is destroyed, the organization may simply cease to act (or exist). Another way to cause a terrorist organization to wither is to choke the flow of funds that enable it to function and conduct terrorist attacks. Yet another is for a sponsor state to withdraw its economic or military support, its provision of territory in or from which the organization can operate, or its provision of sanctuary to organization members. Still another kind of death blow to a terrorist organization is the cessation of support from its population of origin—the population it purports to represent. A terrorist organization that has lost the support of its constituency will become isolated and hence more vulnerable to counter-terrorist efforts. To paraphrase Mao Tse-tung,⁷ such organizations become fish out of water rather than fish in the sea. Such an eventuality is illustrated by events in the Palestinian arena following the 1967 Six-Day War, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, tried to infiltrate the West Bank and provoke a popular uprising there, which would have included a terrorist campaign against Israel. However, since the opening of Israel’s labor market to Palestinian workers immediately after the war improved their economic situation, many of the Palestinians living in the West Bank resisted the PLO’s efforts and refused to participate in terrorist activities. For several years, this stymied the growth of the PLO.

A terrorist organization will also be stymied if its infrastructure is destroyed when an enemy state gains control of the territory that has served as its main base of operations. The destruction of its arsenals, headquarters, or communications networks or the elimination of its founders, leaders, core members, or administrative staff—whether through arrest or assassination—will slow an organization’s activity, or eradicate it.

All of the above may end terrorism by eliminating a terrorist organization’s operational capabilities or its motivation to take action.

CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE TYPE OF VIOLENCE

Terrorism will also end if terrorist leaders decide to abandon it in favor of using a different method of violence to achieve their political aspirations. Such a decision may be motivated by moral considerations, changes in leadership, international pressure, organizational growth, or concern for the loss of diplomatic and other gains. An organization may decide to exchange terrorism for guerrilla warfare and, instead of targeting civilians, begin directing its attacks against military targets. Or it may shelve terrorist attacks and instead take up violent anti-establishment riots.

CHOOSING TO FOLLOW A NONVIOLENT PATH

Perhaps the most fundamental choice to be made by terrorist leaders wishing to take a new approach to achieving their aims is the choice to abandon terrorist activities and adopt nonviolent methods. For example, a terrorist organization might replace terrorism with acts of civil disobedience, such as refusing to pay taxes, going on hunger strikes, or mounting peaceful demonstrations. The organization’s decision makers can also decide to pursue their political goals by participating in local or national politics while abandoning their terrorist activity—for example, by establishing or joining a political party, lobbying, or forging ties with interest and pressure groups.

HOW CHOOSING NONVIOLENCE PROMOTES LEGITIMACY AND CONFOUNDS COUNTER-TERRORISM

The choice to relinquish terrorism in favor of nonviolent activities, be they anti-establishment acts of civil disobedience or participation in the political system, is a choice to exchange a negative, dangerous, and illegitimate approach to achieving an organization’s goals for a more positive, legitimate one. A terrorist organization’s decision to cease carrying out terrorist attacks and engage in nonviolent political activities is, ostensibly, praiseworthy.

But what if the terrorist organization adopts legitimate approaches to achieving its goals without completely abandoning its terrorist activity? To gain legitimacy, a terrorist organization must make a strategic decision to halt any terrorist attacks, cease initiating or planning them, relinquish all efforts to acquire weapons or infrastructure, refrain from recruiting or training activists, refuse to support the perpetration of terrorist attacks, and stop using other terrorist organizations as proxies. Of course, all of this necessitates a change in the organization’s rhetoric, and a public declaration of this change in policy. More saliently, the immediate practical, tangible implication of such a decision is the dismantling of the organization’s military arm and its terrorist mechanisms, and the redirection of its energy and resources toward nonviolent activities and legitimate political processes. From the moment a terrorist organization makes such a strategic decision, its legitimacy hinges on the full implementation of that decision. This will not necessarily rehabilitate the organization’s illegitimate past atrocities, nor will it free its members and leaders from responsibility for the terrorist attacks they conducted in the past. However, it must be stressed that a precondition for a terrorist organization’s attaining the status of a legitimate political player is not simply its decision to participate in elections, but rather, first and foremost, its decision to abandon terrorism and involvement in any aspect thereof, and its taking the practical steps necessary to implement this decision. At times, hybrid terrorist organizations that have discovered the advantages of involvement in the political arena try to hold the stick at both ends: Hezbollah and Hamas, for example, exploit the values, beliefs, and apparatuses of liberal democratic society in an attempt to destroy it from the inside.

In recent decades, several terrorist organizations have become involved in the political arena in their home countries. A brief discussion of two of them, the Irish Republican Army and Hezbollah, will illustrate disparate approaches to using the political process, which lie at opposite ends of the spectrum of legitimacy. At the “positive” end of the spectrum lies the terrorist organization that has made a genuine decision—whether for practical or moral reasons—to renounce terrorism: the Irish Republican Army (IRA).⁸ At the other, “negative” end of the spectrum lies a hybrid terrorist organization that has adopted the dual strategy of actively participating in the political process while continuing and even intensifying its terrorist activity: Hezbollah.

As an Iranian proxy, Hezbollah has always had regional and international, as well as local, goals.⁹ One of its chief goals was—and is—to take over Lebanon and transform it from a multiethnic democratic state into a radical Shi’ite Islamic caliphate governed by Islamic law (shari’a).¹⁰ To this end, as befits a hybrid terrorist organization, it wielded terrorism, engaged in da’wa (the provision of social welfare, education, and religious services), and beginning in 1992, participated in general elections, in which its representatives won seats in Lebanon’s parliament. Since that time, Hezbollah’s political power has only increased; in 2011, its gains in national elections culminated in the quiet overthrow of the Lebanese government and the replacement of the prime minister with a Hezbollah puppet.¹¹ Never in all of this time has Hezbollah ceased its terrorist activity; its members, affiliates, and proxies have continued to actively engage in terrorism in Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, Egypt—even Bulgaria.¹² That only six countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Israel—define Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is proof of the sophistication of its hybrid activity.¹³ Hezbollah is therefore a perfect model of the misuses of liberal democratic values and processes.

The simultaneous and intentional use of both politically legitimate activities and terrorist activities exemplified by Hezbollah demands a clear, consensual response from liberal democratic states. That response should stipulate that the ticket to legitimacy is the abandonment of all direct and indirect involvement in terrorism, and the willingness to relinquish all terrorist capabilities.

IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY THE SOLUTION TO TERRORISM?

The discussion in preceding chapters gives rise to the following question: Is entering a democratic political arena sufficient to transform a terrorist organization into a legitimate entity? In effect, this question is part of a broader debate, whose essence is whether liberal democracy is the solution to the problem of modern terrorism, fundamentalism, and extremism—or part of the problem. Differences of opinion and ambivalence regarding the relationship between liberal democratic systems and modern terrorism can be classified into two approaches or schools of thought: the “democratic values” approach and the “democratic efficiency” approach.

The first approach, “democratic values,” considers liberal democracy to be an effective response to extremism, fundamentalism, and terrorism. According to this approach, democratic systems naturally have the ability to assuage political dissent, rivalry, and dispute, and prevent them from deteriorating into political violence and terrorism simply by providing them with a nonviolent outlet through which to manifest themselves. Some advocates of this approach claim that terrorist organizations that have operated within stable liberal democratic regimes have failed to realize their political objectives through terrorism, have forsaken terrorism entirely, or have been eradicated.¹⁴ Other proponents of this approach claim that, since 2003, the majority of terrorist incidents have occurred in regions where there is no democracy.¹⁵ They add that participation in democratic processes reduces the rate of terrorist incidents because it “increases satisfaction and political efficacy of citizens, reduces their grievances, thwarts terrorist recruitment, and raises public tolerance of counterterrorist policies.”¹⁶

The second approach, “democratic efficiency,” views liberal democracies not only as less than effective in preventing terrorism but in fact as enabling the growth, strengthening, and spread of terrorism. Firm adherents of this approach do not see efforts to introduce democratic systems of government into non-democratic regimes, regions, and states as a solution to the problem of terrorism, but rather as only a means of exacerbating that problem. For example, Paul Wilkinson argues that although the legal legitimacy of liberal democracies may seem resistant to extremist political terrorism, the internal freedoms they offer actually make terrorists’ work easier by allowing them to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, and organize and perpetrate attacks. Paradoxically, this means that liberal democratic values and processes must sometimes be suspended in order to defend democracy.¹⁷

Which approach is preferable? As Martha Crenshaw notes, although liberal democracy possesses advantages for dealing with terrorism, it would be wise to avoid making a simplistic judgment of its virtues in this regard.¹⁸ A brief review of recent counter-terrorism policy in the United States may help to illustrate her position.

A CASE IN POINT: RECENT AMERICAN COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

When considering the relative merits of the democratic values and democratic efficiency approaches, it is interesting to note that on the surface, and despite fundamental differences, the doctrines of both former U.S. president George W. Bush and current president Barack Obama seem to originate in the democratic values approach. In other words, both doctrines are grounded in an almost mythic faith in liberal democracy’s virtue and power to both shield society against terrorism and proactively cope with it. This faith is common to the two administrations despite their major differences, and despite the tension in their foreign policy doctrines and counter-terrorism policies, which marked the transition between them in 2008. At that time, it was even speculated that the Obama administration would investigate crimes—including torture and warrantless wiretapping—allegedly committed by the Bush administration during its war on terrorism.¹⁹

The Obama Doctrine, which the president expressed in his first inaugural speech, rejects the idea that there is a liberal-democratic dilemma in counter-terrorism—that is, that there is a contradiction between preserving America’s liberal democratic values and ensuring the security of America’s citizens. On the contrary, Obama expressed the belief that democratic values constitute the true shield of liberal, open societies. Calling them the “ideals [that] still light the world,” he stated that any infringement on, or reduction or limitation of, these values would not only endanger the moral essence of the democratic form of government, but might also undermine the country’s security and that of its citizens.²⁰

Obama emphasized that military force alone would not help the United States achieve its foreign policy goals, including that of extinguishing terrorism. Instead, he insisted, the United States must build diplomatic ties and encourage international cooperation. Liberal democratic values should be naturally disseminated, not imposed. The United States, he claimed, leads by example, essentially “practicing what it preaches”:

 

I feel very strongly that when we are at our best, the United States represents a set of universal values and ideals—the idea of democratic practices, the idea of freedom of speech and religion, the idea of a civil society where people are free to pursue their dreams and not be imposed upon constantly by their government. So we’ve got a set of ideas that I think have broad applicability. But what I also believe is that other countries have different cultures, different perspectives, and are coming out of different histories, and that we do our best to promote our ideals and our values by our example.²¹

 

Similarly, the Bush Doctrine contended that liberal democracy is the best antidote to the virus of terrorism. However, unlike Obama, former president Bush emphasized the importance of directly exporting democracy abroad.²² Inspired by former Israeli government minister Natan Sharansky’s The Case for Democracy,²³ which he has said reflects his worldview,²⁴ Bush maintained that “the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world…. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”²⁵

The Bush Doctrine thus placed democracy at the core of any approach to countering terrorism. It espoused the belief that proactively imparting liberal democracy to weak, non-democratic regimes would win public favor and neutralize public support for terrorism. The Bush Doctrine further argued that introducing democracy into non-democratic regimes would channel the public’s desires and divisiveness into legitimate political mechanisms, in the framework of an established system. Thus, Bush claimed, democracy would reduce both the motivation to engage in terrorism-related violence and the incentive to support and aid such violence.

In contrast, the democratic efficiency approach, which, as noted, maintains that the attributes and values of liberal democracy cushion the development and activities of modern terrorism, recognizes liberal democracy’s merits even as it stresses the need to be aware of its disadvantages and limitations for countering terrorism. Overcoming the liberal-democratic dilemma of counter-terrorism is made all the more difficult when, as this school of thought argues, liberal-democratic values and freedoms are exploited by terrorist groups and used as a convenient springboard—or even an impetus—for terrorist attacks.

In fact, what the doctrines of both Bush and Obama missed, according to those who favor the democratic efficiency approach, is that terrorist groups exploit certain of liberal democracy’s tendencies. A lack of consensus on a definition of terrorism; the (mis)use of the concept “freedom fighters” to describe (and justify) terrorists; the tendency to support the perceived underdog; anachronisms in international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, which cannot provide suitable moral and operational guidelines for multidimensional modern warfare; the moral confusion that grips the West in the face of hybrid terrorist organizations that simultaneously engage in terrorism, da’wa, and politics—all are glossed over by proponents of the democratic values approach. This oversight is dangerous because these factors are “force multipliers,” which help terrorist organizations proliferate and grow stronger around the world—and particularly in liberal democratic states.

MOTIVATION AND CAPABILITY

The dispute between the democratic values and the democratic efficiency approaches reflects, in part, the existing tension between the two components of the counter-terrorism equation: motivation and capability.²⁶ As described earlier and in chapter 7, this equation posits that a terrorist attack or campaign can occur only when both variables exist. That is, for terrorism to succeed, terrorists must have both motivation and means. If either of these variables is weak or absent, no significant terrorist activity can take place.

When a group of people—an organization, network, or non-state entity—has the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks but lacks the capability to do so—whether that be the necessary knowledge, intelligence, training, resources, weapons, funding, or access—no terrorist attacks will occur. If that same group has the capability to perpetrate terrorist attacks but lacks the motivation to do so—whether because of local, regional, or international circumstances, internal or external pressures, effective deterrence, moral or other considerations, or even because alternatives have proven to be more effective—no terrorist attacks will occur.

These fundamental variables of terrorism shape counter-terrorism efforts, which focus either on reducing terrorists’ motivation—or the fundamental causes or temporary interests that form it—or on reducing their operational capability. From this perspective, the democratic values approach, which views liberal democracy as capable of defending against and resisting outbreaks of terrorism, fights terrorism by neutralizing the motivations behind it. Conversely, the democratic efficiency approach would argue that because democracy’s moral characteristics and liberal freedoms expose its soft underbelly to the exploitation of terrorists, what must be fought are their operational capabilities.

Consequently, an effective struggle against terrorism would seem to require the use of both approaches. Just as it is impossible to fight terrorism as a whole by tackling only one variable in the equation, it is impossible to engage in effective counter-terrorism by adhering to only one of these approaches. This necessitates finding a balance between the two.

However, this view presupposes an understanding of the inherent tension between these approaches, amply reflected in the liberal-democratic dilemma of counter-terrorism. Ignoring this dilemma is foolhardy, as it can have serious consequences, the escalation of terrorism among them. Conversely, acknowledging its existence can facilitate the formulation of an effective policy of counter-terrorism, which will do the minimum or no significant harm to liberal democratic values.

In accordance with the democratic values approach, it is necessary to recognize the power of liberal democracy to defuse conflict and disagreement, and use this power to resolve the conflicts underlying terrorism. At the same time, in accordance with the democratic efficiency approach, it is necessary to admit that terrorists can and do exploit liberal democracy’s values, principles, and mechanisms, and use this realization to take away their ability to do so.

Even when a liberal democratic society faces a significant campaign of terrorism, it should not abandon its values or suspend the democratic process. Rather, it should seek the golden mean of safeguarding fundamental liberal democratic values while efficiently thwarting terrorist attacks and those who perpetrate them. To do this, it must first understand the rationale behind terrorists’ decision-making process. It is this rationale that chapter 7 will address.