This appendix contains the summaries of the case studies discussed in Chapter 8.1 They appear in alphabetical order. A brief abstract opens each case study. The objective of the cases is to assess the progress achieved over time, trace the responsiveness to the recommendations of monitors, and identify conditions that modify this responsiveness.
The persistent and consistent engagement of international monitors has been quite successful in promoting several legal reforms in Albania, often having a strong and visible hand in the formulation of reforms. However, chronic underdevelopment and a weak state2 have undermined their efforts as politicians continue to find new ways to manipulate elections. The turnover in power in 1997 followed a year of near chaos and a United Nations (UN) resolution authorizing humanitarian assistance and enforcement for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring of the June parliamentary election.3 The presence of monitors may have improved that election and contributed to the turnover in power, yet the election was still very poorly conducted. Whatever progress has been made more recently has come only when international actors with leverage backed the efforts of monitors, such as the European Union (EU) has done in connection with Albania’s membership application. Even this pressure, however, was slow to motivate changes.
International election monitors’ involvement in drafting and reforming electoral laws in Albania has been exceptionally durable, starting in 1991 and continuing with election law reform in 2008. The Council of Europe (COE) and OSCE both pushed for reforms of the electoral laws as they participated in direct consultations with the country’s governments and often headed meetings to assist in the reform efforts. A new electoral law prior to the 1996 election brought several changes related to previously raised concerns: division of media time, the composition and operation of the electoral commissions at the national and sub-national levels, and the division of the voter districts.4 The OSCE praised several aspects of the electoral law.5 However, the electoral commission reforms did not increase the independence of the commission as hoped. The composition of the central election commission (CEC) was to be decided by the president and the prefectures; administrative bodies appointed by the government appointed the nonparty members of the zonal commissions. On both counts, the government maintained control over the CEC personnel.
Crises and war or civil unrest have contributed to poor elections. As a result, the country made significant improvements in the early 1990s, but the situation worsened in the mid-1990s when economic conditions and the Kosovo War destabilized the country. The deterioration of the overall political environment culminated in a complete breakdown of the electoral process in 1996 and an election in 1997 that produced a turnover in power from the Democratic Party of Albania (PDS) to the Socialist Party of Albania (PSS). This followed near anarchy in Albania after the collapse of a Ponzi scheme and a UN Security Council Chapter VII humanitarian operation.
Before the 1997 election, the OSCE initiated a technical advisory group (TAG). The CEC rejected some specific recommendations regarding the work of the electoral commissions.6 However, the OSCE reported that some of the reforms were in line with monitor recommendations. Notably, appointment procedures for the CEC and local electoral commissions were changed.7 The 1997 election was thus in some regards an improvement over the 1996 election. Despite the continuing instability in the country, international monitors, further reinforced by the UN Security Council resolution, considered it “acceptable.”8
Monitoring organizations were also heavily involved in 2000 when Parliament adopted a new Electoral Code, which was further amended in 2001.9 The OSCE hosted a working group consisting of representatives from the coalition parties, the opposition parties, the OSCE, the COE, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).10 The group produced a draft that was passed without major changes,11 and the subsequent 2001 election was deemed poor “due more to insufficient political will than technical deficiencies in the Electoral Code.”12 After the election, the OSCE made further legal recommendations, and “by April 2003 [Albania] had successfully addressed most of the recommendations contained in the ODIHR [Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights] Final Report on the 2001 election.”13 Further rounds of consultations and reforms followed between 2004 and 2008. In 2004, OSCE/ODIHR issued the report “Joint Recommendations on the Electoral Law and the Electoral Administration in Albania.” The main criticisms concerned the influence of major parties on the appointment of officials, compilation and updating of voter registers, party finance legislation, and control of the government over the CEC. Under the OSCE leadership, the political parties once again set out on a process of electoral reform. Albania then reformed its electoral code again twice in 2005. Yet another round of reforms produced a new election law in late 2008, once again under significant guidance by the international institutions. The changes concerned, among other things, the electoral system and voter registration. The OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission assessed these positively in a joint legal opinion.14 After the 2009 parliamentary election, the COE remarked specifically on the “considerable progress thanks to the introduction of new voter registration and identification procedures and the adoption of an improved legal framework.”15 Still, there was room for improvement. Thus, in several cases, Albania continued to make improvements in line with monitors’ recommendations.
Although Albania has followed many of the international monitors’ recommendations on the electoral law, it has still struggled to follow other recommendations and conduct elections that meet international election standards. In each election politicians undermined progress by continuing to find new ways to manipulate the system, thus prompting yet more recommendations to refine the law. Still, although Albania has clearly not “graduated” from the class of countries that hold substandard elections, its efforts to provide access and listen to international organizations have been noticeable. The opportunity that monitors have had to freely criticize and recommend changes has prompted reforms of the electoral laws as well as of electoral institutions. Slowly, but not very surely, administrative improvements have occurred.
Improvements in Albanian elections have coincided with an increased realization that the quality of elections had consequences for EU relations. The OSCE warned before local elections in 2003 that “significant improvement in the conduct and contest of the local government elections will have a major impact on the European Union Stabilization and Association process, which began on 31 January 2003.”16
However, the 2003 local elections proved disappointing and the OSCE reported that “despite some improvements, Albania has not yet been able to move beyond elections being a main focus of attention and source for political tension, particularly when there has been noticeable progress in institutional development elsewhere in the country. Moreover, this is an issue that continues to set Albania apart from the other countries of the region, which have largely left election disputes behind. The political system in Albania is still predominantly characterized by polarization.”17 The OSCE lamented “the lack of credibility in the political system, where the citizens have come to view corruption, criminality, and rule of law problems as ever-present and unchanging constants in their lives, leading to widespread apathy and overall cynicism.”18
Before the 2005 election, the OSCE warned once again of repercussions for Albania’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The EU added to the pressure by explicitly stressing the need for Albania to implement the recommendations it received regarding the electoral process.19 The international monitors were disappointed once again, however. While they continued to note that the elections “marked some progress,” they also complained that they only met international standards in part, and that the major political parties showed lack of political will and responsibility.20 No matter how hard the monitoring organizations urged reforms and worked with the authorities to amend the legal framework, each new election presented new ways that the political parties sought to manipulate the system, and the electoral law had to be continually amended to prevent each and every conceivable misuse of the law.
The election in 2009 was the first to be described as presenting “tangible” progress and meeting “most” international standards. The OSCE praised the fact that the new electoral code had implemented several past OSCE recommendations. The increased effort to improve the quality of the election was tied to Albania’s application to the EU, which clearly stated that the election would be seen as a “litmus test” for Albania’s democracy.21 Monitors praised the CEC’s administration of the election as professional. But, as in elections past, these accomplishments were still marked by politicization and serious violations of the election process,22 leading the OSCE to say Albania still fell short of the highest international standards. Most notably, the vote counting was assessed as bad or very bad in a third of the ballot counting centers. The authorities have followed many of the recommendations of monitors and allowed them to play a visible role in the legal reforms. As a result, some progress has been made, facilitated by monitors and EU leverage, but in the polarized and volatile political environment, it has not been sufficient. Indeed, instability has followed the 2009 election as the Socialists’ eventual refusal to recognize the results led to political stalemate and violent protests in the streets.
Armenia was extensively monitored between 1995 and 2008 and monitors were actively involved in the revision of election laws, thus providing a concrete example of how international monitors directly influence the domestic process. However, although Armenia adopted the recommended legal reforms, the operational quality of elections improved little, primarily because of the delicate security situation and the military and economic dependence on Russia combined with the lack of any serious conditionality from the West. Instead, deficiencies shifted from a complicated and cumbersome electoral process with outdated voter registers and incompetent electoral commissions in the 1990s to unregulated campaign practices, unfair use of state resources, vote buying, business influences over the media, and an unfair and nontransparent appeals process after 2000. Armenia demonstrates most poignantly the adage, “You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink.”
Armenia has invited advice from international monitors and followed several of their legal recommendations, but poor implementation has deprived the reforms of any real effects. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh overshadowed reforms by crippling the Armenian economy in the mid-1990s23 and increasing Armenia’s dependency on Russian military assistance and trade.24
Monitoring started out haltingly. The international groups provided considerable technical assistance for the 1995 election and constitutional referendum, but authorities did not cooperate and the election was highly problematic. The OSCE voiced many serious concerns, but also praised the progress. President Levon Ter-Petrossian, who had been president since 1991, manipulated the voting and was re-elected in 1996. His former colleagues eventually forced him to resign in February 1998.25 The subsequent 1998 election improved slightly, but was still characterized by fraud, intimidation, and some violence. Observers were highly critical. In a landslide victory, the May 1999 election brought to power two charismatic leaders, Karen Demirchian and Vazgen Sarkisian, who co-headed the Unity bloc. But in October 1999, armed gunmen stormed Parliament and killed the prime minister and seven others. In retrospect, Radio Free Europe argued that the event was a real turning point for Armenia, marking the end of democratization efforts and enabling President Robert Kocharian to quickly consolidate power.26 In 1999 and 2003, all the international monitors except the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) once again deemed the elections fraudulent. International monitors may have reduced the incumbent’s vote share in the 2003 presidential election,27 but he nonetheless engaged in sufficient fraud to maintain a firm grip on power. Domestic protest never mobilized sufficiently.
Meanwhile, Western conditionality was weak. The COE did not explicitly use Armenia’s membership application to gain concessions on the electoral law. Instead, the COE hoped that admitting both Armenia and Azerbaijan would promote peace between them. The list of changes that the COE considered as a matter of urgency prior to admission in the organization in 2000 focused primarily on legislation to improve human rights violations.28 Furthermore, despite the flawed 2005 constitutional referendum, Armenia received aid from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account and Armenia’s foreign minister promised Congress that the democracy shortfalls would be addressed.29 In this environment, the international monitors were unable to bring much leverage to bear on the government. Some institutional reform did improve the 2007 parliamentary election.30 However, Armenian parties continued to rely on their leaders’ charisma rather than on ideology or policy,31 and the ruling Armenian Republican Party (HKK) nearly doubled its seats, thereby solidifying its grip on power. After the election, the OSCE made no less than forty-four recommendations, many of them repetitions from previous elections.32 The 2008 election was again problematic, characterized as yet another “failed test,”33 and observers criticized the weak party institutionalization and pervasive clientelism. Violence and unrest broke out after the 2008 presidential election and the situation only stabilized after the government imposed a state of emergency and resorted to heavy-handed suppression.
Over the years, the biggest success for the international monitoring organizations, led by the OSCE and the COE, was the extensive reform of the electoral law over several rounds of amendments. In 1996, the OSCE indicated that election law improvements increased the transparency of the election process. This included setting deadlines for the publication of preliminary and final results, the right for candidates’ proxies to receive copies of the precinct results, and the ability to validate ballot papers at the precinct.34 A modification of the election law in February 1999 also included many recommendations from the 1998 final election report. For example, one of the tiers of election administration—the community election commissions—was abolished and domestic nonpartisan observers were recognized.35 In 2002 and 2005, the law was again amended in a way that reflected the recommendations made by experts on behalf of OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission.36 First, the electoral system was made more proportional. In addition, partially addressing a recommendation made in 1998, the 11 regional electoral committees were replaced by 56 territorial and 1,877 polling station committees. The new rules also removed the rule allowing political parties to withdraw their nominees to electoral commissions. The OSCE argued that this should enhance the independence of the electoral administration by protecting the members during their terms of office.37 However, Armenian authorities failed to make the composition of those commissions representative of the balance of power within Parliament. In addition, the lack of provisions for publishing detailed electoral results by the electoral commission and the transparency of the vote-counting procedures remained major concerns in the 2003 elections.38 Nevertheless, the OSCE was mostly satisfied with the electoral law and berated its implementation more than its content.39
The electoral code was amended once again in 2005 to require training of electoral commissioners, and the Washington-based Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) was hired to implement the training.40 The OSCE reported that the amendments improved the “formation of election commissions, voting procedures and tabulation and publication of voting results.”41 In 2005, the OSCE was also instrumental in a large and relatively successful effort to update the voter registries. For both the 2005 and 2006 round of amendments, Armenia asked the OSCE to comment on the texts and adopted several of the recommendations.42 The report on the subsequent amendments articulated at least twelve areas of improvements, “particularly concerning issues such as distribution of tasks within election commissions, electoral deposits for candidacy, voting and counting procedures, and recall of election commission members.”43 After the code was amended again in 2007, the OSCE again noted that amendments took into account a number of the recommendations from its final report on the May 12, 2007, parliamentary election.44 In sum, between 1995 and 2008 Armenia reformed its electoral code significantly, and most of the changes followed the intense involvement and specific recommendations by international organizations. This is thus a clear case where the influence of monitors can be traced and documented.
However, multiple legal reforms meant little in an environment of corruption and vote buying. In the conclusion of its 1999 report, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) stated: “It is unfortunate that the improvements in the Election Code were undermined by administrative irregularities and manipulations of the system by those at the national and local levels who ignored these advances and lacked respect for the will of the electorate.”45 And although Armenia decentralized the electoral commission somewhat, the government kept control by not making it representative of the distribution of power between the political parties and by keeping its work nontransparent. The 2003 elections contained a very high level of obvious fraud and the reports of the observers were very specific in recording all the violations. In response, Armenia’s president created a working group to study the reported violations. The working group dismissed all criticisms, but the OSCE stood by its claims.46 In 2007 the European Parliament (EP) complained that lack of punishment for previous election-related violations created an “atmosphere of impunity” on behalf of politicians and disillusionment among voters.47 In 2008, the OSCE stated that the electoral process as a whole suffered from lack of accountability and transparency, which was the result of poor counting procedures and a slow and nontransparent appeals process.48 It praised the organization of the CEC and the improvement in the voter lists, but lamented that widespread vote buying dwarfed these improvements and that Armenia was not seriously attempting to run clean elections.49 It expressed its frustration with the lack of progress in Armenia in its final report, when it listed a whole new set of recommendations, stressing that “these do not repeat all recommendations made in previous OSCE/ODIHR Reports or Assessments, a number of which have not yet been implemented and remain valid. Overall, the conduct of democratic elections requires genuine political will to implement the respective OSCE commitments and other standards that the Republic of Armenia has freely entered into, at all levels of the process” (emphasis added).
Bangladesh demonstrates that highly contentious winner-take-all politics in poor and violent societies are not particularly susceptible to influence by international monitors. The unelected military-backed caretaker government in 2008 was able to implement more reforms than had occurred previously, and although the reforms followed many of the recommendations of the international monitoring organizations over the years, the impetus for these reforms was quite domestic. Some commentators argue that international donors and international election monitors have contributed to better elections in Bangladesh, persuading parties to accept defeat gracefully and helping to institutionalize the caretaker model to improve elections.50 Others have considered Bangladesh a model for other Muslim countries in transition, and seen involvement by the international community as essential for countering extremist trends and ensuring free and fair elections.51 However, this same incentive to keep the situation calm and display a successful Muslim democracy may also have contributed to overly gentle assessments of the quality of elections, which continue to have many shortfalls.
Since its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh has had a history of political turmoil and military rule. Its first two prominent leaders, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman, were both assassinated in military coups. Their regimes were followed by military dictatorships.52 The two major political parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), were formed by these two leaders and later led by their daughter and widow, respectively.
After a bloodless coup in 1982, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad became president and ruled the country under Islamism and autocracy. After both the AL and the BNP boycotted the 1988 election, the international community began to scrutinize Ershad’s Jatiya Party and his military regime, which eventually collapsed in 1990.53 The ensuing 1991 election was the first democratic election ever held, and the NDI and the Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) monitored the election. Seventy-three parties participated, but the AL and the BNP dominated.54 This marked the beginning of a persistent two-party system.
Despite significant differences in political ideology, early contests between the AL and the BNP were fueled mainly by the personal rivalry between their leaders. International monitors have urged election candidates to become more issue-oriented,55 and have encouraged political debates and party involvement with voter education.56 However, the politics have remained focused on political families, party history, and vague promises of economic growth and social stability. Voters are often uneducated and “profound cultural and structural obstacles to democratization”57 persist.
Bangladesh’s winner-take-all politics has produced a recurring pattern where the ruling party refuses a meaningful role for the opposition, the opposition walks out, and society is paralyzed by strikes and boycotts.58 Often, the losing party refuses to participate in government and threatens to withdraw all its MPs. The AL did this in 1996 and 2001, the BNP in 2008. This constant rivalry has paralyzed the ability of Bangladesh to improve the electoral process. To address this core problem, international observers have urged Bangladesh to amend the constitution to allow opposition parties a fairer opportunity to participate in the government,59 but so far the bitter rivalry between the two leading parties has prevented progress.
Monitors have observed elections in Bangladesh since 1991 and made a host of recommendations. However, the preoccupation with interparty conflict left government with little commitment or effort to follow the monitors’ recommendations between the 1991 and 1996 elections. One big change did occur by 1996, however, namely, the institutionalization of the caretaker government. This was something monitors had recommended, but it was clearly also born out of domestic necessity due to the intense distrust between parties. Training for officials had also improved by 1996, and the problem of indelible ink that monitors had criticized earlier appeared fixed. The 1996 election also saw the emergence of the domestic monitoring organization, Fair Election Monitoring Alliance.60 Another election in 2001 saw further improvements, but elections remained highly problematic and many recommendations were unmet.
Had this study been written before 2008, the overall assessment would have been that very few recommendations were ever followed. The events of 2007 and 2008 improved the picture, however. A major confrontation between the BNP and the AL in 2006–7 about the leadership of the caretaker government led to extreme political chaos and to the postponement of the election scheduled for January 2007. Actually, following acute disagreement between the two factions over the impartiality of the electoral commission and other political arrangements, on January 11, 2007, the international monitors suspended their activities, arguing that the conditions for credible elections did not exist. On the same day the military forced President Iajuddin Ahmed to cancel the election and implement a state of emergency.61 Originally intended to last only ninety days, the state of emergency continued until December 2008 and a military-based caretaker government ruled the country during this nearly two-year period. Amnesty International reported ongoing political violence, arbitrary arrests, and excessive use of force against protesters. Although the caretaker government violated many areas of human rights, together with a newly appointed electoral commission it implemented very comprehensive reforms.
Some of the notable improvements concerned the issue of electoral commission independence, the implementation of anti-corruption programs, and redistricting. Already in 1991, the NDI had noted that some districts had double the voting power of neighboring districts and recommended redistricting. This recommendation was one of the longest-standing unaddressed criticisms, and was taken into consideration prior to the 2008 election, when Bangladesh completely overhauled the constituency boundaries for the first time since independence.62 Some of the other reforms followed monitor recommendations, while others did not. Thus, the 2008 election addressed the longstanding concern about voter lists and ID cards. Better tabulation procedures were adopted, security improved, and other practices that monitors had criticized, such as suspending mobile phone service on election day, were curtailed. After repeated criticism, Bangladesh also addressed campaign finance issues. Another major recommendation from the early years concerned the independence of the election commission.63 For the 2008 election, the caretaker government appointed a more balanced and highly regarded electoral commission, which—although the president retained the power to appoint the chief election commissioner and other election commissioners—the NDI described as depoliticized and professional.64 The international election monitors also experienced smaller victories. For example, the NDI sent a pre-election mission that recommended that the electoral commission review and preferably cease the practice of shutting down mobile phone networks as a security measure. The government had planned to shut down mobile networks on polling day, but at the last minute it cancelled this.65
The 2008 election produced a record turnout of 87 percent and international monitors considered it successful and a substantial improvement over prior polls. The NDI noted only “minor” administrative problems, mostly related to voter confusion or waits.66 Thus, Bangladesh has seen considerable improvements, many of which followed the recommendations of international monitors. The caretaker government played a large role in driving the reforms, but was acting partly in response to international recommendations. That said, elections in Bangladesh still leave much to be desired and the monitors made many recommendations after the 2008 election; the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) alone made seventy-nine recommendations.
The situation in Bulgaria was ideal for international monitors: Both domestic and international factors motivated the country to change and it had much to learn. Its performance is similar to that of other highly monitored countries in Eastern Europe that have sought to join European institutions. However, Bulgaria also demonstrates that changes may take a very long time, and that when the incentive structures change backsliding may occur. Nevertheless, Bulgaria did adopt international election standards very quickly and benefited considerably from the socialization efforts by the COE, the OSCE, and other monitoring groups. The NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI) were intensely involved in democracy assistance programs of various kinds, in addition to election monitoring in the early years. Progress has been great, but with the disappearance of the EU membership incentives, some backsliding has occurred.
Bulgaria’s commitment to EU membership and the reorientation of the economy toward the West facilitated the necessary reforms of the electoral process and a fairly high level of responsiveness to international monitors. The transition was characterized by a relative lack of significant economic or military influence from nondemocratic countries. This allowed Bulgaria to engage in both extensive legal reforms and effective implementation of the adopted changes. In addition, Bulgaria enjoyed a peaceful transition process with no significant security threats, despite a serious economic downturn in 1997. As early as 1997, the head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly stated that Bulgaria “has gained excellent experience in organizing elections and that elections were normal and free.”67 However, following EU accession, concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process resurfaced and the OSCE was present in 2006 and in a “limited” capacity in 2009.
Early problems associated with elections in Bulgaria were primarily the result of lack of experience with democratic procedures and restructuring of the balance of power between the competing parties. Allegations of fraud, including fear and intimidation, while present in the early elections and primarily in rural areas, were of a limited nature. After the 1990 election, international monitors recommended changes to the electoral law. The Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights circulated these recommendations to public officials. The draft electoral law included many of the recommendations by international monitors and civil rights groups: precise time tables for preparing the voter registries, time tables for holding elections, voter eligibility provisions, provisions about the handling of complaints, prohibition of distribution of ballots before the election, and procedures for publication of individual polling station results.68 Starting in 1991, the elections were deemed to have been completely free and fair, or with only minor problems. The IRI and the NDI noted Bulgaria had made great efforts to follow the recommendations of monitors from 1990 and stated, “Indeed, the election incorporated many of the specific recommendations made by the international delegation in 1990.”69 Media and media regulations had improved, and Bulgaria had reformed the electoral system and followed recommendations to redraw district boundaries that had dated to the 1940s. In both 1990 and 1991, competent parallel vote tabulations encouraged by international monitors eased tensions while the nation awaited final results.70 The authorities followed the advice on counting and releasing of results by 1994. The OSCE and IRI observation of the 1996 election was cursory, although the IRI had engaged in a two-year program to build up the opposition parties. The 1997 pre-election campaign was so calm that the COE even called it “dull.”71
Thus, in the early years Bulgaria adopted many of the recommendations of international monitors. Furthermore, although it took more than fourteen years for the recommendation to be adopted, Bulgaria eventually improved the ballot design as recommended. Another recommendation first brought up by international monitors in 1994 and repeated many times since concerned campaign finance regulation. This, too, was finally accomplished in 2009.72
In addition to making recommendations about the electoral process, international election monitors also played a major role in ensuring that the young opposition parties were organized and prepared to participate in the political process. The advice given by monitors was targeted not so much at reducing fraud, which was not systematic and rampant, but rather at leveling the playing field and overcoming the significant institutional and organizational advantages of the Socialist Party, which inherited the grassroots network of its predecessor—the Bulgarian Communist Party. The most notable recommendation that was followed in this area concerned the introduction of primary elections for the presidency.73 In a similar vein, international monitors pushed strongly for ensuring that smaller parties had equal access to public media outlets.
Nevertheless, Bulgaria has not addressed all the issues monitors have raised. The accuracy of voter lists remains a concern despite repeated, strong criticisms by multiple organizations. By 2009, the CEC had still not been made a permanent body. Furthermore, on several occasions international monitors criticized the practice of adopting electoral reforms just a few months before elections.
After Bulgaria joined the EU, new criticisms have emerged. Monitors have criticized the introduction of clear ballot boxes. In 2005, 2006, and 2009, problems of vote buying grew, and public confidence in the electoral process declined. Bulgaria did adopt a law to prohibit vote buying, as recommended by monitors, but this did not lessen the problems in the 2009 election. Absentee voting was also a problem in 2006, and the OSCE claimed that the existing regulations lacked safeguards against multiple voting.74 In 2007 the OSCE repeated the criticism, yet in 2009 enough safeguards had still not been implemented to prevent out-of-country voters from voting multiple times.
The strong early efforts combined with the more recent backsliding suggest that EU conditionality played an important role in Bulgaria. This has been true in Bulgaria in general, not only regarding elections. The EU used election assistance to get governments to adhere to institutional reform commitments that were negotiated immediately after transition in 1990.75 The slow pace of reforms in the mid-1990s led the incumbents to lose power in 1997, as opposition parties used progress reports issued by organizations like the European Commission to discredit the government. Thus, in Bulgaria, EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conditionality was a “benign yet effective tool of democracy promotion.”76 The activities of organizations like OSCE and COE were important mechanisms through which the EU sought to influence the political processes in Bulgaria. More problems resurfaced, however, when Bulgaria no longer faced the conditionality incentives derived from the pre-accession criteria that the EU put forward. It remains to be seen whether the robust backlash by Bulgarian media, which extensively covered vote-buying practices, will manage to resolve the problems that surfaced in 2009.
El Salvador has been labeled one of the most successful transformations from conflict to democracy.77 The international community played a considerable role in the transition,78 but it was mostly the United States and the UN that drove the changes toward peace, not international election monitors. The Organization of American States (OAS) engagement prior to 1990 was mostly symbolic. Since then, change has been slow, and fear of conflict has softened pressure by international monitors. Indeed, throughout the 1990s the international community focused more on the success of the peace agreements and the continued holding of passable elections, than on pushing hard for improvements. Thus, the incumbent Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) was able to shrug off most of the monitors’ criticisms and even stop hosting monitors altogether for several elections. Throughout, poverty and lack of capacity have made it difficult to address administrative problems although improvements began with the presidential election in 2004. These changes and the changes in 2009 were brought about by the gradual erosion of support for ARENA domestically as well as by traditional supporters such as the United States. With 2009 bringing both parliamentary and presidential elections, the international community refocused its attention and efforts on addressing longstanding criticisms by the international monitors increased and began to show results. The opposition Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)-backed candidate won for the first time and El Salvador witnessed its first post-conflict transfer of powers. The case clearly demonstrates, however, that international monitors play second fiddle to other major actors.
During the civil war from 1982 to 1992, Salvadorian elections were heavily criticized as being little more than an attempt to provide a façade of competitiveness and legitimacy for the benefit of the United States, which had its own agenda.79 The elections were problematic and the voter registries highly flawed.80 Subsequently, voter turnout declined significantly,81 as voters became disillusioned with the inability of political parties to provide a nonviolent way to settle differences. The OAS monitored these elections (with an additional observer, the International Human Rights Law Group, also present in 1985), but at that time the OAS monitoring operations were mostly symbolic. The organization had not yet developed a systematic framework for its operations, nor did the unit for the promotion of democracy, in which subsequent OAS monitoring capacities were housed, yet exist.82 Furthermore, despite “Orwellian doubletalk,” these were U.S.-sponsored elections.83
However, positive trends in El Salvador’s electoral environment started with changed global conditions and peace negotiations. The opposition united before the 1988 election,84 and the 1988 and 1989 elections produced a change in power, launching the era of the ARENA.
Following the end of the civil war, El Salvador conducted acceptable but poorly administered elections throughout the 1990s. The United States, Canada, and other developed nations sought to sustain and improve the security situation and were pleased that elections remained peaceful, even if they still suffered from several flaws. The 1991 election was overseen by the Central Electoral Council, were quite calm, and, despite confusion, ran smoothly. The IRI called the election a success, but far from perfect, and stressed that the presence of hundreds of international observers had contributed to the verification of the results and endorsement of the process.85 However, some argue that the leniency of the OAS report made the government complacent about addressing reforms.86
After the 1991 election, the UN, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and several other international actors were heavily involved in resolving issues to facilitate elections to consolidate the peace. A Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) replaced the Central Electoral Council, but for the 1994 elections this body was heavily criticized for its partisanship and ineffectiveness, although it did manage to follow some monitor recommendations for the second round of voting in the presidential election. Despite problems, the historic nature of the 1994 election nevertheless led it to be dubbed as the “elections of the century.”87
For the 1997 election the Salvadoran government had initially decided it no longer needed international monitors. Its reversal just a few weeks before the election permitted the IRI and the OAS to send only small delegations. In 1999, the OAS sent a mission but issued no public report.88 For the next two elections none of the international observer groups returned. Thus, in the decade following the end of the civil war, international actors did not push very hard for further reforms. The IRI and OAS made brief appearances in 2004, but international monitors did not return in full force until 2009, when legislative and presidential elections coincided and the ARENA was losing support.
The main contribution of the international monitors in the 1991 and 1994 elections was to add legitimacy to the process.89 Following the 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2004 elections, international monitors made many recommendations to improve the quality of elections both through administrative and legislative actions. However, over these eighteen years, El Salvador made little progress on the legislative issues that the international monitors identified. A committee came up with a set of recommended reforms after the 1994 election to address the monitors’ criticisms, but these were not implemented.90 Although the institutionalization of the peace agreement and the integration of the FMLN were indeed major legislative and political achievements, election monitors did not drive these.
Indeed, in election after election, El Salvador ignored the recommendations by international monitors to depoliticize the electoral commission, and to regulate the voter registry. Campaign finance regulation, an area focused on more recently, was not adopted either. During every election monitors criticized the voter registry and the system of ID cards, tabulation delays, later opening of polling stations, and other logistical issues, but to no avail. Indeed, conditions persisted or even got worse over the 1990s. Some argue that El Salvador actually regressed and came to exemplify electoral authoritarianism, because the ARENA maintained power by preserving the institutional status quo.91 Thus, the ARENA effectively blocked reforms in the 1990s.92 International monitors had a difficult time pushing for reforms because the peace was still young and the ARENA incumbency suited the political preferences of the international community. The elections were also marked by low voter turnout.
However, by 2004 El Salvador improved the voter registry and use of ID cards. Indeed, the OAS and the IRI were quite positive about the progress, the IRI even saying, “Salvadorans should be proud of holding elections that in many ways could serve as a model for other nations.”93 In 2009, other areas that had been criticized by international monitors also improved: For the presidential election, most polling stations opened on time,94 the tabulation was not excessively delayed, intimidation decreased, and poll workers were better trained. After the January legislative election the electoral code was amended to allow more Salvadorans living abroad to vote, as monitors had recommended.
The improvements between the January legislative and municipal elections and the March presidential election were notable. The EU had been very frustrated after the January election, criticizing the TSE as highly partisan and pointing to serious legislative gaps.95 The EU wrote, “Despite 47 amendments in the past 16 years, the Electoral Code is an incomplete framework since several fundamental areas still lack legislation or adequate regulations. . . . The persisting shortcomings of the electoral legislation after so many elections is a reminder of poor political will of the Legislative Assembly to approve significant changes to the Constitution and the Electoral Code as generally agreed by all political interlocutors and has, as a consequence, originated among the public a certain degree of lack of credibility in the TSE as an institution.”96
The observers were significantly more pleased with the March 2009 presidential election, which led to a peaceful turnover of power after a record 63 percent turnout and a 2 percent margin of victory.97 The EU noted that 97 percent of voting stations opened on time, a vast improvement from January, when three-quarters of stations opened late. With the assistance of the OAS, the election also successfully tested “residential voting” (voting in local neighborhoods, something that monitors had long recommended) in some areas. While access to resources and media was still skewed in the government’s favor, there were no major irregularities. The EU reported great improvement from the January election: “In-between the Legislative and Presidential elections, the TSE introduced a number of measures aimed at improving the election process. . . . All of these initiatives had a positive impact on the process and demonstrated the TSE’s openness to recommendations for improvements and its commitment to ensuring a transparent and efficient election process.”98 The chief of the OAS mission said, “The Salvadorian authorities applied ‘in great part’ the recommendations made by the OAS observers.”99 However, like the EU, he also highlighted that “some things must be corrected” to further improve the Salvadoran electoral system.
Both in 2004 and 2009 reports of international meddling persisted, however. Prior to the 2004 election, the ARENA connected an FMLN victory to potential sanctions by the United States, suggesting that the country would deport the numerous migrant workers from El Salvador working there. Since remittances from the United States by immigrants comprised about 14 percent of the El Salvador GDP, this quickly became a top campaign issue. Two domestic monitoring groups reported the rumor was also fueled by comments made by U.S. officials. During a visit to El Salvador in February 2004, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega commented to the media that he thought it was “fair to note that the FMLN campaign has emphasized its differences with [the United States] concerning CAFTA [the U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement] and other subjects.” He continued, “and we know the history of this political movement, and for this reason it is fair that the Salvadoran people consider what type of relations a new government could have with us.”100 Similarly, White House Special Assistant Otto Reich noted in a March 13 telephone interview with the Salvadoran press that “we are concerned about the impact that an FMLN victory would have on the commercial, economic, and migration-related relations that the United States has with El Salvador.”101 The U.S. government did not refute these statements, and although a few U.S. politicians criticized them, the Salvadoran press did not pick up on this.
U.S. meddling continued in 2009.102 In a letter, thirty-three congressional Republicans denounced the FMLN and warned of repercussion should they gain power.103 From the U.S. House Floor, Republican Representatives Trent Franks, Dan Burton, and Dana Rohrabacher made similar explicit threats of economic repercussions of electing the FMLN, and received front-page press in El Salvador.104 However, in contrast to the administration of George W. Bush, the administration of Barack Obama took a more neutral line. Both the U.S. State Department and the embassy in San Salvador formally declared U.S. neutrality and promised to work with whichever party won the presidency.105
It remains to be seen whether the new FMLN government will work to implement the many new recommendations following the 2009 election. After the election, the EU mission was hopeful that El Salvador finally might have reached a turning point.
Georgia has been marked by two leaders who gained power through extra-constitutional means, and consolidated their mandates through elections that were (sometimes) reasonably free and fair, but not very competitive. The continuing tensions in its two separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia distracted from reform efforts.106 The state crumpled under poverty and corruption.107 Meanwhile Eduard Shevardnadze’s adeptness at balancing between Moscow and the West ensured continued aid from the West, and the serious criticisms by international monitors gained little attention. As the regime weakened and international pressure for reform grew, international monitors helped the domestic opposition call attention to the abuses in the 2003 election that prompted the historic Rose Revolution. However, the so-called revolution disappointed. Its leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, forced the ill-reputed President Shevardnadze to resign prematurely and he was elected president in 2004 with a huge mandate. He used his mandate, however, to increase the power of the presidency. The government failed to address many of the concerns of the international monitors. In 2007, corruption and discontent prompted new street protests and calls for the resignation of the president, early parliamentary election, and revisions to the election law.108 A snap election of questionable quality followed in January 2008. The war with Russia later that year further hampered Georgia’s efforts to democratize. The divisive politics in Georgia and the executive branch dominance over the other state agencies has kept elections highly contentious. International monitors accepted the two elections in 2008, but not without long lists of criticisms and recommendations. The government has initiated a “new wave of democratic reforms,” but several opposition parties are boycotting the process and the results are not yet visible.
With well more than twenty missions from the major organizations between 1992 and 2008, Georgia has been more heavily monitored than most other countries. However, Georgian domestic politics has not been particularly conducive to monitors. Poverty, corruption, and the volatile security situation in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia hampered the influence of monitors from the very beginning.109 Following a political crisis and a vacuum in the presidential office as a result of the departure and then death of Georgia’s first post-independence president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze grained power through extra-constitutional means. He consolidated his mandate through elections that were reasonably free and fair, but not very competitive. The 1992 and 1995 elections were judged reasonably good given the lack of experience. The OSCE said the 1992 election met international standards. The COE said about the 1995 election that “despite the irregularities directly observed by the committee, which were regarded as minor, the election had proceeded calmly and apparently in acceptably normal and lawful conditions.”110 Shevardnadze balanced adeptly between Moscow and the West, and led a regime that mixed crime and corruption with a powerful presidency and a 1995 liberal constitution, as well as “democratic decorations, such as competitive elections and relatively open media, that had the dual effects of dividing the democratic opposition while appeasing the West.”111 When his power began to weaken after the 1998 economic crisis in Russia, he sacked the government and held a new parliamentary election in 1999 and himself won re-election in 2000 in a fraudulent election. The West began to pressure for greater democratic reforms,112 and several elites defected from the ruling party, including Saakashvili.
International monitoring organizations became very active in the years leading up to the 2003 election. The COE criticized Georgia for failing to meet the commitments it made upon accession to the council in 1999 and threatened to review Georgia’s membership. By being present, outspoken, and explicit about their dissatisfactions with the reforms in the country, the international organizations provided additional support for the popular uprising.113 Other international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), especially the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, played crucial roles,114 as did the parallel vote tabulation and the exit polls, which showed a lead for the opposition in contradiction to the official results. Civil society actors, inspired by Serbian groups, also became active domestic monitors leading up to the 2003 election. The fraudulent election led to massive popular protests and the so-called Rose Revolution. This set the stage for the second leadership change through extra-constitutional means. Saakashvili used the large protests after the election to force Shevardnadze to resign. He then won the extraordinary presidential election early the following year by a massive margin, 96 percent of the vote, and, to the concern of the West, effectively consolidated his power through reforms after the election.
Although it was an obvious improvement on the 2003 election, observers still criticized the 2004 election on many accounts such as the composition of the CEC, the election administration, and the voter lists. The 2004 partial rerun of the 2003 parliamentary election was also fraught with problems. Many polling stations reported 95 to 100 percent turnout. Anomalies were abundant. For example, in twenty-eight polling stations with high voter turnout the National Movement–Democrats received 95 to 100 percent of the vote.115 Still, the international monitors noted that “in marked contrast to previous elections, the CEC implemented a number of recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR in previous reports.”116 These included enhanced voter education, a centralized computerized voter database, and improved secrecy of the vote, among other things.
Progress after the 2004 elections has been limited. The reforms to concentrate power in the presidency were presented as efforts to secure swift implementation of pro-democratic initiatives, but instead they slowed them.117 The lack of true political dialogue between the incumbent and the opposition sidelined the preferences of the opposition.118 This concern was most recently voiced following the 2008 constitutional reform plebiscite, when the opposition’s demands for granting more power to Parliament were not considered.119 Furthermore, although the Rose Revolution was taken as evidence of the presence of strong domestic civil society mobilization, later analysis has argued that the revolution failed, because the civil society was not actually that strong, but instead driven by protégés of the old regime and too reliant on external funding and training.120
Thus, following some troublesome years, the fall of 2007 again brought protesters into the streets and forced the president to call an early election for January 2008. In preparation, several legal amendments passed. The OSCE criticized the practice of last-minute revisions to the law, but noted in the needs assessment mission report that the amendments “seem to take into consideration the result of consultations held between the OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (VC/CoE) and the Georgian authorities in 2007. They also appear to address a number of recommendations offered in the 2006 Joint Opinion on the Electoral Code and in the reports of earlier election observation missions.”121
The election campaign was highly problematic. To boost votes in the first round and prevent opposition voters from uniting against him in a runoff, Saakashvili combined the implementation of social welfare programs with campaigning, stacked the CEC with partisan members, and occasionally used intimidation and pressure.122 The international community feared further instability.123 The West was pulling for Saakashvili, Russia for the opposition. Despite the problems in the pre-election period, polling day was fairly organized and peaceful, although some precincts were chaotic and had problems with the ink used to safeguard against multiple voting. The counting was slow and had many “procedural shortcomings.”124 When exit polls showed Saakashvili with around 53 percent, just enough to avoid a second round, the opposition cried foul, leaving the election observers in a difficult and prominent position.125
In its report on Georgia’s commitments to the COE, the COE praised the 2008 presidential election, saying that notwithstanding all its problems, “this was for the first time a genuinely competitive election enabling the Georgian people to express their political choices.”126 However, the list of recommendations was very long, criticizing the biased electoral administration and media, the forceful crackdown on protestors, the voter list, training of electoral officials, lack of transparency in party funding, and the use of intimidation—criticisms that are difficult to reconcile with the phrase “genuinely competitive.” The IRI also said the election met international standards, but had technical problems, but then likewise cited problems with the voter lists, unfair access to government resources, poor administration and checking of the invisible ink to prevent multiple voting, instances of intimidation, and the like.127 The NDI added concerns about abuse of government resources to buy votes, such as the distribution of vouchers for fuel and medicine labeled as a “gift from the president.”128
Before the parliamentary election, the authorities passed several legal amendments and took a number of actions that responded to prior monitoring recommendations. For example, the authorities lowered the threshold for parliamentary representation and extended the time for public scrutiny of the voter list. They also implemented voter education on the process of inking, improved the training of officials and data transparency, and addressed several other issues.129 However, the changes also introduced features that favored the incumbent party, particularly concerning the use of incumbent resources. After the parliamentary election, the COE, EP, and OSCE130 were still positive, but noted that despite a revision to the CEC structure to increase party representation, the CEC once again failed to act independently. The election campaign was highly polarized, the incumbent party abused state resources, and the media lacked balance. Voter registries still were messy, the vote count and tabulation was highly problematic in many instances, and complaints were poorly handled. The districts were still hugely imbalanced, with only 4,000 votes needed in one district to elect one MP, but 140,000 votes in another—a problem that the OSCE first criticized in 1999. In short, the parliamentary election were not much of an improvement on the 2008 presidential election, which had been plagued by similar problems. With strong caveats, however, international monitors endorsed both the presidential and the parliamentary election.
Overall, between 1992 and 2008, the record on following the international monitors’ specific recommendations was very mixed. Some areas were addressed. This included a reduction in the precinct size, which, after continual criticisms since 1995, was finally reduced to 1500 for the 2008 elections. The 2008 election was also the first since 1995 that monitors did not criticize officials for failing to check identity documents. Several partial improvements have also occurred. The voter lists, while still problematic, have gone from handwritten disasters to computerized databases. Voter education is better, and the threshold for representation in Parliament has been lowered to 5 percent, as recommended. The composition of the CEC has been revised, although it is still criticized as biased. After years of criticism that police were present in polling stations, monitors did not complain about this in 2008. However, there were problems with other unauthorized personnel who asked to check documents. Importantly, several areas of recommendations have never improved despite continual criticisms since 1995 or 1999. Thus, the district sizes are still hugely uneven, abuse of government resources persists, the inking of hands to prevent multiple voting continues to be poorly implemented, and—most glaringly—tabulation of ballots continues to be highly problematic.
Thus, Georgia’s progress in holding free and fair elections is not impressive, but improvements have occurred. After the 2008 elections, the NDI has taken on a role as mediator. In April before the election the NDI published a code of conduct for political parties and nine parties signed the code. After the election the NDI has continued to moderate a “special cross-party working group to reform the electoral system and to draft a new Electoral Code,”131 but several opposition parties that refused to take their seats after the 2008 parliamentary election are also refusing to join the process, because they still consider the election fraudulent and are demanding new elections. Some reforms to strengthen the Parliament have proceeded, but results so far have been lacking.
The international engagement in Guyana’s elections since 1992 has been extraordinary, and has included mediation, logistical assistance, and advice and monitoring. Monitors, particularly the Carter Center (CC), were influential in concrete and visible ways in mediating solutions that facilitated the historic 1992 election. Nevertheless, elections have remained disputed and violent. Some recommendations by monitors have been followed, but many have been ignored and the contested voter lists and tallying systems have triggered repeated protest. Despite their consistent and sizable efforts, the influence of monitors was hampered by violent, winner-take-all politics in an ethnically polarized and poor society. The 2006 election was more peaceful than anticipated given the prevailing level of fear. It provided hope of progress as continued international assistance and domestic efforts boosted confidence in the election and voters tired of continued violence. However, since then, the government has not attempted to address the remaining concerns expressed by monitors.
After Forbes Burnham, Guyana’s leader since 1964, died in 1985, five opposition parties formed the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD) and began to press for electoral reforms, including the presence of international observers of the political process.132 Burnham’s successor, Desmond Hoyte, could not repress the opposition as Guyana’s economy was shrinking and foreign investment and assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was essential.133 Due to these combined internal and external forces, Guyana became the object of intense foreign pressure for instituting free and fair elections. Election monitoring organizations, such as the CC, the OAS, and the CS had a very high level of access to the Guyanese political process and worked closely to achieve progress,134 while the IFES and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided extensive logistical support.
However, democratic transition has been hampered by the country’s history of deep ethnic divisions that solidified into the main cleavage of political competition, accompanied by violence as the primary tool for resolving differences. The country is comprised of ethnic Indians (43 percent) and Africans (30 percent). The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the People’s National Congress (PNC) represent these two major groups, respectively. The former party, which represents the more sizable portion of the population, has unsurprisingly won all four elections in Guyana since the fall of authoritarianism in 1992. Because the constitution gives the winning party the presidency and with it almost unlimited political power, the deeply divided ethnic groups are always ready to challenge elections because the losers fear exclusion from decision making.135 This has led to a series of disputed elections. As a result, Guyana has been stuck in a recurrent pattern of voting along ethnic lines, poor administration of elections, and violent electoral aftermath from 1992 to 2001. Nonetheless, the elections throughout the period managed to stay competitive and relatively free and fair. Some commentators argue that the monitors’ biggest achievement was preventing ethnic conflict from completely jeopardizing the democratization process.136
Although the amount of progress achieved over the fourteen-year period of substantial foreign involvement is modest, the 2006 election indicated the country may have reversed its prior tendencies and is now more open to civilized political dialogue and democratic elections, despite numerous outstanding issues. Still, much work remains to reform the electoral institutions. A 2006 survey found the electoral commission to be the social institution with the least trust among citizens, gaining the confidence of only 45.7 percent.137
The CC (then under the aegis of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government) sent its first mission to Guyana only a month after the adoption of the Elections Law Act of 1990. The organization pointed out two main areas for improvement of the recently adopted legislation, including a provision for compiling new voter lists by performing house-to-house visits and reshuffling the composition of the CEC by replacing its chairman.138 A visit by President Jimmy Carter in October 1990 was heralded as a breakthrough by the newspapers in Guyana when Carter persuaded Hoyte to give in to opposition demands for electoral reforms, including the counting of votes at polling station levels and compilation of a new voter list.139 However, when the voter list was finally published it was found to contain an error rate of nearly 35 percent. President Carter refused to monitor the election unless a revised list was submitted to the CC three weeks before the election, to allow sufficient time to assess the list. The election was subsequently postponed until the list could be improved. The CC sent a mission to audit the list and was satisfied with its accuracy. Hoyte also gave in to demands to reconstitute the electoral commission, again under CC pressure. Initially, the chairman was directly appointed by the government, as were all the members of this body, giving it little independence. This law was partially amended in 1992, transferring the appointment powers of commissioners to the chairman of the CEC, although the chairman remained entirely dependent on the party in power.140 With the crucial support of broad international pressure, the CC thus played a very constructive role leading up to the 1992 election.141
The IFES and the UNDP provided extensive logistical support for the 1992 election. Nevertheless, violence on election day nearly toppled the election. According to the CC, this near disaster was averted partly due to its presence and direct intervention by President Carter himself, who remained at the elections commission with the chairman to assist and ensure police protection, as well as by a CC quick count that helped instill confidence in the process.142 After the 1992 election, the CS and the CC made several recommendations for reforms such as increasing the number of polling stations, improving training for officials, issuing ID cards, improving electoral commission communication with the media and public, and completely overhauling the voter list.
In 1997, the president died of a heart attack. An election was held in late 1997, but the tabulation process was marred by serious irregularities. Aside from slightly increasing the number of polling stations, few of the recommendations from the 1992 election were followed. The CS produced extensive reports on the difficulties associated with implementation of then-existing requirements for voter identification cards and procedures for vote tabulation.143 The PNC rejected the apparent PPP victory and violent protest followed. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mediated the Herdmanston Accord, in which the parties agreed to constitutional reform and a new election within three years. Among the most notable changes the accord introduced was a recommendation first voiced by the OAS in its report from 1997 to make the CEC a permanent standing body. Further improvements included splitting the number of members between the government and the opposition, giving three seats to each rival party. One remaining concern, however, was that the power to appoint the chairman of the CEC still rested with the president.144 Meanwhile, in 2001, a high court decision voided the 1997 election results due to the problems with voter ID cards. A new election was scheduled for March 2001, and the government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)145 with the donor community and invited international observers.146
Unfortunately, given Guyana’s poor social and political development, the tight schedule led to a repeat of the problems with the voter lists, voting cards, training, voter education, and so forth. In response to the problems in 1997, for the 2001 election a national ID card was introduced, as cited in the CS report from that year,147 but issuing those cards in a timely manner turned out to be difficult as well and led to a delay in the polling date. The media was also partial and unprofessional, despite a new media code of conduct.148 For instance, the national TV channel devoted more than 75 percent of its coverage to the governing PPP and the coverage was overwhelmingly positive.
However, the polling day itself went quite smoothly, although some constituents voted without IDs and other were turned away despite being on the voting list.149 Confusion broke out toward the end of the day as some polling stations extended their hours to accommodate complaints. Contrary to 1997, the counting and tabulation was honest but inefficient, the computer system had to be abandoned, and tensions rose over the slow release of preliminary results.150 The final results were further confirmed by the CC quick count and a later audit confirmed that the voter lists had been highly accurate. However, after the election, unrest broke out once again as voters claimed they had been left off the list. Once again the opposition petitioned the high court for an injunction. Tensions rose, posing danger in the streets. After a court-ordered recertification process, the president was sworn in, but the opposition still refused to accept the results. In the end, the international observers declared their satisfaction that that poll had met international standards, but the CC bemoaned the “ ‘winner-take-all’ political system with its recurring patterns of ethnic voting and political polarization.”151 The EU echoed this sentiment: “Elections in deeply divided societies will always be prone to dispute unless there is a broader political determination to reach accommodation across the ethnic and political divide. Guyana, sadly, is no exception to this rule.”152 The CS mediated the efforts to restart negotiations between the government and opposition.153
After the 1997 and 2001 disputed elections, the 2006 elections, which once again had to be delayed in order for adequate preparations to be made, took place in an environment of fear and allegations of anticipated fraud.154 Despite monitor recommendations for a comprehensive review of electoral legislation and processes, the 2006 election proceeded under the same framework as the 2001 election.155 The electoral commission had not been revised nor had term limits been imposed. After 2001 the monitors had also pointed out the need for improved campaign finance and media regulations, and the creation of a body to enforce election-related codes of conduct for political parties and the media.156However, this did not occur, although the media did act considerably more professionally. Still, the state radio was allowed a monopoly. However, Guyana did introduce a continuous registration system, in line with monitor recommendations. Local polling stations’ results were also posted, as monitors had recommended in 2001, and other administrative aspects also improved slightly. Once again, Guyana signed an MOU about technical and financial assistance for the election with the governments of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the EU.157 USAID funded significant technical assistance. However, the voter lists were once again the central contentious issue in the election, and monitors recommended once again that they be entirely revised,158 and that the electoral commission be made more independent. Voter education programs also were still lagging. The count was thorough and transparent, but again slow. However, the 2006 poll was surprisingly peaceful, as the front page of the Guyana Chronicle of August 29 declared.159 The CC, the CS, and the OAS were satisfied with the vote, although the OAS was generally much more positive. The OAS conducted a quick count and met with political leaders during the transmission of results. Contrary to past years, the political leaders accepted the results and committed to promoting peace.160
Several factors likely contributed to the lack of post-election violence. In early 2006, the IFES launched a program to reduce violence through monitoring, called EVER (Election Violence Education and Reduction).161 The final project report explores several reasons that the election was more peaceful than in past. The report gives some credit to international observers, greater election transparency, and fewer irregularities, but it also stresses domestic factors: The political rhetoric by leaders was more peaceful, appealing for acceptance of election outcomes, and civil organizations also urged calm162 and arranged events to promote peace.163 The IFES noted, “The quality of the election and the attitude of the parties both made it easier for supporters to accept the results and these are all factors contributing to the post-election peace.”164 Voters also indicated that they were tired of election violence.165
Over the years, international election monitors thus have had some modest, but identifiable, successes.166 Still, ethnicity remains the most substantial predictor of electoral success. Guyana risks being stuck in a pattern of violent crime that impedes social progress, and civil groups have been calling for a broader consensus-based system of governance to allow democratic progress.167 Electoral engineering and basing the election of Parliament on proportional representation have not succeeded in ending the dominance of ethnic politics that has permeated the country’s most recent history. This has proven to be the biggest challenge for foreign monitors.
The Western press likes to hold Indonesia up as an example that democracy can work in large, poor countries, does not need decades to take hold, and will not be hijacked by Islamic parties.168 Despite huge administrative problems, the 1999 election drew quick praise from the international monitors. Certainly elections in Indonesia are a massive exercise that is far more representative today than under the dictatorship of Suharto and the year 2004 saw the first direct election of a president. International actors, including monitoring organizations, have supported the domestic demands for democracy. Still, the devil is in the details: At least in terms of election quality, progress has not been as solid as enthusiasts proclaim.169 Indeed, an examination of all the election monitoring reports from 1999, 2004, and 2009 shows that Indonesia has repeatedly ignored most of the recommendations by the international monitors. The influence of international monitoring organizations has been reduced by political power struggles, endemic corruption, terrorism, poverty, the impeachment of the president in 2001, the insurgency in Aceh, and the tsunami in December 2004 that claimed 169,000 lives. In nations having little experience with democracy, like Indonesia, such challenges impede speedy progress and modify the influence of international monitoring organizations. Amid excitement about democratization of the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, international election monitoring organizations have been too quick to assume progress and ease their pressure on the authorities to reform.
Indonesia is often held up as an illustration that democratic transitions can take place quickly, even under challenging circumstances.170 The 1999 election drew quick praise from the international monitors despite huge administrative problems and appeals from domestic groups to wait until the tabulation process was complete.171 It is true that elections in Indonesia are more representative today than under Suharto: the year 2004 saw the first direct presidential election, defeat of the incumbent, and the withdrawal of the military from politics. Still, at least in terms of election quality, progress has not been as rapid or as dramatic as enthusiasts proclaim.172 With a voting age population of nearly 150 million, the Indonesian elections are one of the largest procedural undertakings in the world.
Already by 1996 several international democracy promotion NGOs such as the NDI had become involved in Indonesia, and after Suharto’s resignation they stepped up their involvement, helping domestic monitoring organization to organize. The NDI and later the IFES were also involved in commenting on the draft electoral legislation.173 For the 1999 election, the UNDP authorized U.S.$90 million for voter education, monitoring, and election administration, as the Indonesian government officially asked the UNDP to organize all international activity for the election.174 However, the funding for domestic monitoring was a mixed blessing, leading to a fragmented group of organizations focused on competing for funding and dealing with disbursements.175 The reports of the international monitoring organizations pointed out many flaws in the administration of the 1999 election, and the majority of these were still present ten years later in the 2009 election.
Indeed, an examination of all the election monitoring reports from 1999, 2004, and 2009 shows that most of the recommendations by the international monitors have been repeatedly ignored. In some aspects, in the eyes of the observers and other commentators, election quality actually decreased after 2004.176 Ironically, in 2009 only the ANFREL sent a regular monitoring mission, and it was quite small. The EU only sent observers to report internally to the commission, and the CC sent a “limited mission.” It seems that the decrease in attention may have been partly the product of wishful thinking about Indonesia’s ability to run elections. The 2009 elections had substantial problems with the voter list, the automated tabulation system broke down, and the seat allocation was so confusing that it was later corrected by the constitutional court. The ANFREL did judge that “people have been allowed to have their say.”177 However, the ANFREL also wrote, “The road to consolidation of democracy has not been even and the many problems that plague the political process, such as the prevalence of corruption at all levels of government, vote buying, and other forms of ‘money politics’ and highly personalized political parties with weak platforms, have all contributed to a sense of disillusionment among citizens which may be responsible for a lower voter turnout this year.”178
Tabulation and release of results has been a problem throughout Indonesian elections. During the 1999 election, the NDI and the CC worked closely with domestic monitors and called attention to the quick count by the Rectors Forum, a monitoring organization the NDI had helped train to conduct the quick count.179 However, other donors mistrusted the quick count and instead helped create a Joint Operations and Media Center, which was to release election results in parallel with the official process. As it turned out there was tremendous difficulty getting the results out, and the process was confusing because of the different sources of reporting.180 Official results were not released until about two months after the election. Counting and tabulation remained a problem in 2004, and in the 2009 election the authorities had to abandon an attempt at automatic tabulation due to lack of sufficient testing and preparation. The ANFREL called the counting process “chaotic,” and noted that it opened room for fraud.181
Another persistent problem has been voter lists. After the 1999 election a door-to-door canvassing exercise was undertaken to create a voter database, but the whole issue of voter registration remained problematic. Voter cards were issued too late and many voters were not properly informed about the voting process. After the 2004 legislative election, monitors recommended that registration be reopened in time for more people to register before the presidential election. However, despite some efforts, voter lists remained in poor shape, sometimes containing handwritten updates. Polling officials also often forgot to check hands for inking, a problem that persisted throughout the 2004 and 2009 elections. For the 2009 elections, the voter list was again one of the largest problems. It was so problematic, in fact, that a few days before the presidential election, the court ruled that the lists be abandoned altogether. Unfortunately, many voters never learned about the change. Furthermore, the lack of a voter list made multiple voting easier, especially since polling officials were still lax in checking for inking of fingers despite earlier monitor criticism.
Yet another persistent problem has been the convoluted election laws, which among other things do not provide clear guidelines on seat distribution or presidential election.182 As a result, both the NDI and the IFES called for simplifications and clarifications of the electoral codes after the 1999 election. The 2004 elections occurred after four constitutional amendments to create a new political system and an extensive web of new laws to govern elections. The revisions resulted from public pressure, and most scholars considered them progress.183 The NDI was involved in the legal revisions, working with politicians at all levels and providing advice on several draft laws.184 For the 2004 election, the EU considered the new legal framework adequate and a remarkable achievement in the short time available, but wished for a further consolidation and simplification of the laws in the future. One of the main problems is that under the Indonesian system, a new electoral law precedes each election, and this makes it hard for officials to familiarize themselves with the changing content. For example, before the 2009 election, the election law was promulgated too late to allow time to create all the regulations needed to expand upon articles in the law. It also was very long and seen as creating more problems than it solved.185 Combined with the lack of training for officials, which is common in many young democracies, this created several implementation problems. Still concerned about many weaknesses with the electoral system ranging from dispute resolution to campaign finance, the CC made numerous recommendations for how to improve the law, not least of which was to adopt a permanent election law so that there would be continuity, preparation time, and training time.
The official bodies administrating the elections have also created confusion. In 1999, five different bodies had overlapping authorities to oversee the election.186 Throughout the years, the National Election Commission (KPU) has had predominant authority in overseeing elections.187 The Elections Supervisory Committee (PANWAS) handles election-related complaints.188 It existed in 1999, but lacked a clear mandate and the means to carry out sanctions.189 Electoral law reform in 2003 partially clarified its mandate and helped improve its performance.190 Administratively, the 2004 elections were considered major progress since the 1999 election, especially because of the organization of a KPU secretariat, the enactment of rules and procedures, the enactment of a code of conduct, and the KPU handling of the budget.191 Still, the EU lamented many administrative inefficacies and lack of accountability and transparency. However, the PANWAS has continued to lack real independence from the KPU. After conflicts ensued over complaint resolution in the 2004 legislative election, the KPU curtailed the PANWAS’s power for the subsequent presidential election. The EU thus recommended more sanctioning power and independence for the PANWAS in future elections.192 By the 2009 elections, however, the CC continued to express concerns about dispute resolution and the independence of the dispute resolution bodies. In the 2009 elections, the CC also complained about the new process for constituting the KPU without regard for the need for appropriate skills and experience. Thus, the CC argued that the performance of the KPU deteriorated significantly and that the KPU lacked a sufficient mandate, resources, independence, and experience.193 After several members of the KPU had been arrested on corruption charges in 2005, the commission acted cautiously and lacked the confidence of voters.194 Thus, the criticisms and recommendations of monitors about the system for the bodies administrating elections have led to few improvements.
Throughout elections international monitors have complained of poorly trained poll station workers and of poorly educated voters.195 Such problems are not surprising in such a populous and poor country, but the continually changing laws and procedures, electoral systems, and voting processes have exacerbated these problems. Materials arrived late at polling stations in all election years and delays in opening polling stations persist. Problems with unwieldy and insecure ballots have also persisted. However, after a disaster with double-punched ballots in 2004, the marking process was finally changed to the use of pens rather than nails as the ANFREL and others recommended.
Another persistent problem has been with the lack of oversight of the use of money politics. The KPU limited total party campaign spending to 110 billion rupiah (U.S.$15 million) in 1999. This was about one-tenth of what the Golkar party advocated—reflecting how affluent certain parties were.196 Campaign finance reporting and regulation is particularly important because the prevalence of politik uang (money politics), which is the practice of providing money or goods in exchange for votes. For example, Golkar has been accused of using food or favorable terms on loans to buy votes. The World Bank was so concerned about the incumbent’s use of social safety net funds for vote buying that it delayed disbursement of an approved $1.1 billion loan until after the election.197 Despite criticisms by international monitors, money politics continued in the 2004 election. The EU received a number of reports that participants were receiving money for attending mass rallies. Some people even made it a profession to attend various rallies for payment.198 This problem is particularly hard to correct because it is a widely accepted practice in Indonesia. The PANWAS’s lack of sanctioning mechanisms worsened this problem. The new 2008 election law addressed many of these problems, requiring more stringent reporting. Nevertheless, after the 2009 legislative election the CC still reported many campaign finance problems, particularly with lack of oversight.199 Individual candidates also were not required to file reports.200 The law still did not provide for adequate sanctions for violations of the regulations.
Not all the recommendations by monitors have been ignored, however. In 2004, monitors criticized the processes for political party registration and nomination of candidates as discriminatory.201 They also criticized the limit of the presidential second-round campaign to three days. None of these criticisms resurfaced in 2009, however. As noted, by 2009 ballots were also marked with pens rather than being punched by nails. After the 2004 election, an official with the KPU stated in an interview that foreign agencies not only “provided financial assistance to help us purchase equipment, but also their presence as observers has reduced possible fraud, especially in the vote counting process.”202
Still, although elections are now competitive, progress in the administration and regulation of elections has been very modest. Democracy may be holding on in Indonesia, not because of improved election quality, but despite the lack of it.203 The lackluster showing of monitoring groups for the 2009 elections suggests that international election monitoring organizations have been too quick to assume progress and ease their pressure on the authorities to reform.
Since 1992, international monitors encouraged some reforms and donors were successful at pushing for elections. However, improvements in Kenya’s election conduct were weak and reversals were common. Thus, despite a decent election in 2002, the situation has not improved in the long run, illustrating that, even if monitors may improve a single election, the overall effect on a country may not be profound or lasting. International monitors largely failed in Kenya for several reasons. First, there never was a sustained period of pro-democratic governments. Second, violence has dominated Kenya’s democratization process, and incumbent leaders benefited economically and politically from the continuing unrest and the dysfunctional institutional and political environment. Thus, violent, winner-take-all politics has prevented progress. Third, in this environment, international monitors and other organizations faced a dilemma: If they pushed for reforms, they would destabilize the political environment. Last, monitoring efforts have been blamed for actually undermining the democratization process by being too hesitant in their criticism, and for lack of objectivity and competence.
After gaining independence from Great Britain in 1956, Kenya was dominated by two main parties—the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The former represented the numerous Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups, while the KADU represented a variety of smaller ethnic groups.204 After a brief period under a federalist parliamentary system, in 1963 Kenya adopted a strong presidency and centralized system of governance. The subsequent unequal representation of the various ethnic groups led to continuous tension that culminated in a social movement in 1990 organized by a coalition of intellectuals, lawyers, and church leaders that all opposed the KANU’s continued dominance of the Kenyan political landscape.205
The KANU cracked down on the fledging opposition movement, but after international donors froze planned aid, President Daniel arap Moi agreed to change the constitution to allow for multiparty elections and to organize the first multiparty election in the country since 1996 on December 29, 1992. However, a divided opposition, organizational advantages, electoral fraud, and majoritarian electoral laws gave Moi a sweeping victory. When ethnic clashes erupted during and after the election, international actors tried to calm the violence and urged the opposition to take the seats in Parliament and seek redress through legal channels. Eventually, Moi temporarily suspended the new Parliament and regained control. The international donor group soon resumed aid to Kenya, citing some economic and political progress. The beginning of multiparty elections in Kenya was thus rather dismal.
To gain legitimacy after significant international criticism in the years after the 1992 election, Moi agreed to negotiate with opposition leaders in 1997.206 However, the concessions—a statement in the constitution that Kenya was a multiparty democracy, as well as the provision for an independent electoral commission, a project that never really came to fruition—were cosmetic. The electoral law was improved somewhat, addressing some prior monitor criticisms; it became easier to run for office, and the system for allowing political rallies was fairer. Media conduct even improved. However, these modest improvements, although in line with the recommendations of monitors,207 were overshadowed by violence and other problems. The Donors Democratic Development Group, which had formed to monitor the 1997 election, concluded most ambiguously: “The Election Observation center considers that the outcome of the election can in the main be accepted as a credible expression of the political will of the Kenyan people. We consider, however, that in 5 percent of the Parliamentary contests, the irregularities, in the poll and count were so great as to invalidate the elections in these particular constituencies and, consequently, the legitimacy of the overall KANU majority in the National Assembly.”208
The only decent election, in 2002, which was called after Moi announced his retirement, was also accompanied by the least amount of violence.209 The opposition overcame significant personal and ethnic differences and formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which ultimately removed the KANU from power.210 In the election, several monitor recommendations were followed: Indelible ink was used, ballots were no longer marked with numbers that made it possible to trace voters, voting materials were distributed in time, and registration and tabulation and other issues improved. Although they also had plenty of criticisms,211 international monitors were generally pleased with the election. The hopes quickly vanished, however, as President Mwai Kibaki consolidated his presidential power and increased repression. By 2007, many of these gains were either lost or overwhelmed by other irregularities.212 Furthermore, many recommendations were left unaddressed. In spite of repeated criticisms in 1992, 1997, and 2002, polling stations nearly always opened late, a proper dispute resolution system was absent, the vast imbalances in constituency size and structure were never addressed, campaign finance was not properly regulated, the publication of procedures and results continued to be problematic, and abuse of government resources persisted. Despite a relatively calm polling day, the 2007 election completely disintegrated during the tallying procedure, and deadly violence erupted for months.
Although international monitors were able to guide and encourage some reforms and international donors were successful at pushing for elections and negotiations with the opposition, improvements in Kenya’s election conduct were weak and reversals were common. Kenya thus is very much a “one step forward, two steps back” story.
International monitors were unable to improve elections in Kenya for several reasons. First, there never was a sustained period of pro-democratic governments. The initial opening up of the regime, achieved through implementation of aid conditionality measures, did not lead to democratization,213 despite numerous domestically initiated reform movements and a relatively robust civil society. Second, violence has dominated the Kenya democratization process. Politically motivated killings started with the 1992 election, continued in 1997,214 when around 2,000 people were killed, and then subsided in 2002, before increasing again in 2007, when between 700 and 1,200 people were estimated to have died in clashes following the election.215 The incidences of violence were not only motivated by the significant ethnic diversity of the country, but were also bolstered by incumbent leaders, who benefited economically and politically from the continuing unrest in the country.216 Politicians who benefited from the dysfunctional institutional and political environment in the country thus ignored most of the international monitors’ recommendations for reforms. Third, in this environment, international monitors and other organizations faced a dilemma. On the one hand, real reforms required a cessation of violence; yet pushing for reforms further destabilized the political environment and risked continued violence. Finally, the same organizations have not consistently monitored the polls. No organization monitored more than two of the four elections between 1992 and 2007 polls. More consistency and follow-up might be achieved if the same organizations returned.
Several criticisms have been aimed at monitors in Kenya. Kenyan opposition party Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) famously called them “tourists.”217 Some criticize the IRI’s ambiguous assessment in 1992 that although the election was not completely clean the result was not “altogether invalid.”218 In 1997, the monitors concluded that the presidential election was acceptable, but questioned the legitimacy of the parliamentary vote, where winning margins were tighter. Thus, some argued that monitors impeded further democratization by being too generous in their assessment of unfair elections in 1992 and 1997, and that the donor countries—concerned with stability over democratization—interfered with the process.219 Politicians exploited this concern by simply trying to appease foreign donors to not cut off aid. This has led critics of election observers to state that monitors in fact undermined, rather than supported, a process of democratization in this region of the world.220 The assessments of the 2007 election were similarly confusing. For example, the IRI said that the parliamentary vote was considered fair, but the presidential vote was highly problematic.221 As noted in Chapter 5, in spite of an atrocious pre-election campaign, the EU and other organizations initially released positive statements as election day was unfolding calmly, but then quickly revised their assessments as violence erupted. Furthermore, the international press accused the IRI of withholding the results of a poll on election day that favored the opposition. The IRI vehemently denied the charges.222 Even more seriously, the Independent Review Commission that the UN, the Kenyan government, and the African Union (AU) organized after the 2007 election reported that monitors had at times based their claims on misunderstandings. The commission noted that monitors sometimes jumped to conclusions that discrepancies in figures were due to fraud. The reporting of partial results, combined with the unclear methods of communication, gave the appearance of unfounded increases in votes, when in reality, many of these increases were distributed evenly across parties and were merely the result of an update of the partial figures.223
Thus the record of international election monitoring in Kenya has been marked by some specific improvements overshadowed by backsliding in 2007 and by questions about the objectivity and competence of the monitoring organizations themselves. Post-2007 reforms remain to be tested in future elections.
Lesotho remains poor and mired in struggles over its electoral system. The CS and the South African Development Community (SADC) have played a substantial role in the evolution of the electoral system and in providing mediation. The reforms of 2001 were quite remarkable and the SADC was credited greatly. Still, despite electoral reforms, political deadlock continues. The main contention is not about ethnicity or ideology, but about “competition for jobs,”224 because of the “the high premium placed on being in government.”225 Thus distracted, Lesotho has followed some monitor recommendations to improve the administration of elections, but many other recommendations remain unaddressed. Lesotho shows that despite heavy external involvement by South Africa, the UN, and international monitors, in a poor country with little democratic experience domestic power struggles can derail progress.
Despite a homogeneous population, Lesotho was not predisposed to democratization: It had a history of conflict, a strong and politically active military, and a very weak economy that remains almost entirely dependent on South Africa. The population has not enthusiastically supported democracy.226 Furthermore, previous experience with democracy lasted only from 1965 to 1970, when the Basotho National Party (BNP) ruled. Its leader, Chief Leabua Jonathan, resumed authoritarian methods following defeat in the 1970 election, which was most likely won by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). Over the next fifteen years, Jonathan led the country to economic collapse. His rule was divisive and alienated rural, anti-apartheid, and royalist subgroups within the otherwise ethnically homogeneous society.227 His bad leadership resulted in a military coup in 1985.228
However, in 1988, Lesotho authorities invited the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Organisation of African Unity, and the South African government to assist the democratization of the country as the military stepped aside due to growing external pressure, violence, and continued factionalism within the political leadership.229 In the late 1980s, foreign donors helped sponsor the rise of civil society organizations, which have played important roles in elections.230 A National Constituent Assembly was appointed in 1990 to draft a new constitution.
The adoption of a majoritarian system in 1993 was inherited from the British colonial rule.231 It allowed the BCP to sweep all sixty-five seats in a complete rejection of the past authoritarianism of the BNP. This election was seen as an important transition and its flaws were overlooked. A crisis soon followed, however, with the assassination of the deputy prime minister. Diplomacy from SADC, the UN, and the OAU helped restore the BCP government, but the prime minister broke away and formed the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD).232
The electoral system prompted massive riots again after the 1998 election, when the recently formed LCD obtained seventy-nine out of eighty seats despite having won only around 60.5 percent of the vote, thus completely shutting out the two largest traditional parties. The international monitors said the election itself had been acceptable, but a judicial review by a South African judge found that the election documentation was so disarrayed that “legitimacy of the results could not be accurately judged.”233 The complete chaos that ensued was quelled by the South African army, but not without much criticism.234 To appease the malcontents, the SADC pushed hard for the adoption of a mixed member electoral system that would have compensatory seats to prevent absolute losers from feeling sidelined and thereby reducing the probability of violence and unrest.235 After heavy negotiations, this compromise was adopted in 2001.
According to most analysts, the reforms of 2001 were remarkable and the 2002 election contrasted sharply with the parody observed in Zimbabwe, for example.236 The SADC was credited with not only promoting a better electoral law framework, but working closely with local authorities to prepare better voter lists, provide a sufficient number of polling stations, and establish a process for handling election complaints.237 The introduction of the mixed electoral system increased popular support for the state.238 In the 2007 election, however, the formula for allocating seats again created conflict, because the parties circumvented the allocation rules by forming alliances to manipulate the distribution of seats.239 Despite SADC mediation attempts, the parties remain deadlocked.
Administratively, Lesotho has made some progress over the years. Voter lists and the registration process are not perfect, but they have improved considerably. Officials are better trained and logistical aspects of the election are smoother. Still, domestic battles over the fundamental questions of the electoral system have distracted from other essential reforms that monitors have suggested over the years. Abuse of government resources continues, the media still require some regulation, and Lesotho has repeatedly ignored monitors’ recommendations regarding the regulation of campaign finance.
Mexico has successfully transformed itself from authoritarianism to democracy. As with most such transformations, the main credit goes to domestic actors. Election monitors reinforced the pressures of opposition parties, but their role was not decisive. That said, international observers have played at least three roles in Mexico. They have facilitated domestic monitoring through interaction with and exposing domestic actors to election monitoring techniques. They have played an important verification role both domestically and internationally. Finally, echoing opposition demands, they have made recommendations for changes, many of which have been addressed. This constructive interaction was facilitated by the domestic political opening, international pressures, and sustained engagement by mostly U.S. observer groups. However, Mexico also illustrates that change is slow and the closely contested 2006 election revealed that continued involvement is needed.
For seven decades the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) held a hegemonic grip on power in Mexico, making it the longest-reigning political party in the world.240 However, as Mexico grew more urban and incomes rose, cycles of economic crises undermined the regime and pressures for reform increased.241 The 1988 general election marked a turning point in Mexican politics, as massive fraud led to divisions within the political system. Mexico had staunchly denied international monitors access to the election, arguing they would interfere in internal affairs. Early election returns indicated a narrow victory for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who had resigned from the PRI in protest over Carlos Salinas’s nomination and was running as a candidate for the National Democratic Front. However, the computer system collapsed right before the count was completed. After days of delay, incumbent-dominated electoral authorities gave the victory to Salinas. The Congress later voted to burn the ballot papers.242 Opposition parties and other countries widely viewed the election as fraudulent, although the opposition still managed to gather a significant number of seats in both houses.
After the mass protests that accompanied this disputed victory, the PRI government had to implement political reforms to regain public confidence.243 Two opposition parties played important complementary roles in pushing for reforms. The right-wing National Action Party (PAN), which had played a weak but consistent opposition role throughout the PRI’s authoritarianism, kept up protests and negotiations with the PRI for concessions. Meanwhile, claiming that the PRI had stolen his victory in the 1988 election, Cárdenas founded the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and insisted on thorough reforms. As both these parties gained strength over successive elections, winning enough in 1997 to end the PRI’s two-thirds Senate majority and its absolute majority in the lower chamber, these parties facilitated a “ ‘virtuous circle’ of democratization.”244
Several other factors also contributed to this political opening over successive elections throughout the 1990s. Preparations for Mexico’s participation in the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) enabled greater international influence over Mexico’s democratization process, as Mexico needed a reputation as stable to maintain vital international investment.245 Internally, the Zapatista—an indigenous revolutionary group based in Chiapas—engaged in armed conflicts with the government and caused security threats. The PRI government’s inability to pacify the Zapatista drained its popularity and offered opposition parties a chance to gain public support.246 The 1995 economic crises also increased pressure on the government to reform. The international election monitors were thus operating in an environment with several strong pressures on the government.
Domestic observer groups and NGOs also deserve much of the credit for the transformation of Mexican elections during the next fifteen years, but international observers such as the CC were instrumental in building up this domestic capacity.247 Not only did they help form these national groups and train them, but they also facilitated their visits to observe elections in the United States and elsewhere.248 This involvement began before the 1994 election. The CC sent missions, offered advice, and exposed central Mexican civil society activities to experiences overseas to bolster their capacities to build domestic observation.249 The details deserve attention for their discussion of micro-level processes of influence:
The Center encouraged opening the door for international observation of elections and then sent monitoring missions to watch important races and recommend improvement in Mexico’s electoral administration. These missions included the July 13, 1992, state elections in Michoacán and Chihuahua, two pre-election trips before the 1994 national elections. . . . The Center began by inviting leaders from Mexico’s human rights community to participate in Carter Center election observation missions in other countries. In 1990, Sergio Aguayo, the president of Mexico’s nongovernmental Academy of Human Rights, joined a delegation of The Carter Center’s Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas and the NDI in observing the Haiti elections. In Haiti, Aguayo was partnered with Gregorio Atienza, the former secretary-general of NAMFREL [National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections], the election monitoring group in the Philippines that detected and denounced the attempt by Ferdinand Marcos to commit electoral fraud in 1986. Aguayo returned to Mexico and completed his project of organizing eight different grassroots groups to become domestic election observers. Those domestic observers then invited The Carter Center and its Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas to observe state elections in Michoacán and Chihuahua on July 13, 1992. Dr. Pastor, then-executive secretary of the Council, negotiated an arrangement with the Office of the President of Mexico, which permitted the group to be recognized by the government as the first international group to work with Mexicans in observing a Mexican election. . . . As a gesture of reciprocity, The Carter Center invited all the major political parties and civic organizations to observe the U.S. presidential election in November 1992. The group delivered a statement on its observation and recommended ways to improve the electoral process in the United States, which were published in a report. Also in 1992, two other Mexican leaders, Julio Faesler of the Council for Democracy and Miguel Basáñez of the National Accord for Democracy (ACUDE), joined the Center’s observation of elections in Guyana. They used this experience to help build national election observer groups in Mexico.250
Over the years monitors have also made many recommendations that Mexico has followed. Before the 1994 election, the CC sent two missions to study the electoral reforms and make recommendations: “In September 1993, a small team representing three members of the Council visited Mexico to study the electoral reforms being discussed at that time in the Mexican Congress. That team’s report to the Council, Electoral Reform in Mexico, was subsequently published and distributed widely in Mexico and the United States. It was also translated into Spanish and published in Este Pais in January 1994. The 1993 report was controversial, but we are gratified by the positive impact it seems to have had in Mexico. Many of the recommendations in that report were implemented, including the agreement to commission an external audit of the voter registration list, the increased autonomy of Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) from political party influence, greater access for national election observers, and the decision to accredit international visitors to observe the elections.”251
During 1994 pre-election meetings with presidential candidates, the IFES also raised concerns about problems with the IFE’s lack of independence, and after the election it recommended disentanglement of the IFE from the Interior Ministry and more citizen involvement in its board.252
Monitors also played an important verification role in the 1994 election. As the election approached, the government realized that, despite numerous reforms to the election law,253 the election had little chance of being viewed as legitimate without international monitors. As one commentator said, “A fraudulent election could be deadly for the ruling party.”254 Thus, the government eventually decided to invite monitors for the first time in 1994. The late invitation meant that the CC, the IRI, and the NDI had to pool their resources to manage. Despite skepticism, the election, while not perfect, was much better than the 1988 election.255 Together with domestic actors, international observers placed campaign and party finances on the political agenda and encouraged the government to permit a televised debate between the main presidential candidates.256 The widely reported presence of international observers may also have also facilitated the unusually high voter turnout, reduced violence, and increased the acceptance of the election results, as demonstrated in pre- and post-election surveys.257
During the 1990s, international monitors, the CC in particular, continued to engage in the electoral reforms.258 Another key issue in the 1994 election was the lack of regulations on parties’ campaign expenditures.259 In line with opposition demands, observers recommended reasonable expenditure ceilings, auditing party finances, providing public financing, and limiting parties’ ability to purchase media spots independently, recommendations that opposition parties also advocated.260 Subsequently, as part of the 1996 reforms the Mexican government drastically increased the level of public financing to political parties and implemented spending limits.
The independence of the IFE, which monitors had stressed in the 1994 election, became one of the central tenets of another round of electoral reforms in 1996. In November 1996, a constitutional amendment made the IFE fully autonomous and included independent citizen counselors on its board.261 Reforms also established the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) as the highest jurisdictional authority in electoral matters and granted it more power.
In the 1997 midterm election, the PRI lost its legislative majority for the first time, setting the stage for further reforms. Observers were generally pleased with the election, praising the election bodies, although concerns about vote buying and fraud in rural areas remained. Observers were even more satisfied with the 2000 election, which saw the first change of presidential power in more than seventy years as the PRI lost. This moment was a culmination of a decade of domestic reform efforts that had ushered in a “veritable electoral revolution.”262 For the 2000 election, the CC applied a novel approach to election monitoring, stationing observers in party headquarters and other central locations.263 Thanks to all the reforms, the electoral institutions functioned well. The election was professionally administrated, and voter registration and turnout was high.
Thus, the Mexico electoral system improved tremendously over the years. Many monitor and opposition concerns have been met. A few concerns do remain. For example, in 2000, the EP noted that Mexicans living abroad could not vote and urged the government to introduce absentee voting.264 Procedures were adopted for the 2006 election, but the EU has recommended further simplification.265 Other problems have been relieved somewhat but not eliminated, such as late opening of polling stations and problems with the special polling stations for persons who are not able to vote in their home station. Both international and domestic organizations have also criticized the misuse of public resources.266 A special congressional commission was established in 2000 to monitor the misuse of public funds, but the public remains skeptical.267 Likewise, international monitors have repeatedly criticized the media.268 Reforms in 1997269 and 2000270 helped, but problems persist.
The 2006 presidential election was very closely contested and there was confusion over the projections during the counting and release of results.271 Because the margin of victory was 0.56 percent, the election was followed by a partial recount and a two-month-long dispute until the Electoral Tribunal finally validated the results. Despite the controversy monitors were largely satisfied,272 and public confidence in the IFE remained as high as 64 percent even after the election.273 Still, the closeness of the election revealed some remaining weaknesses in the election process.274 After monitoring Mexican elections for a decade, the CC did not go to the 2006 election. However, the EU sent a mission. Given the controversy, the mission recommended, among many other things, implementing a second-round runoff between candidates when no candidate receives the majority of vote.275 In December 2009, Mexico’s president proposed a runoff amendment,276 and Mexico has undertaken further reform efforts.277 Although there is room for monitors to continue to engage,278 the cumulative progress in Mexico since 1988 has been impressive.279 By far the most of the credit for this electoral revolution goes to domestic actors: opposition parties, voters, and election bodies such as the IFE and the Electoral Tribunal.
However, international monitors have played a supportive background role. In addition to helping domestic observers and recommending reforms, they have lent credibility to the elections to help Mexico improve its reputation, or, as the CC says, “lend international visibility to Mexico’s changes.”280
That said, concerns remain over Mexico due to the rising drug-related crime that can destabilize the system and thus has prompted Freedom House to downgrade Mexico’s freedom ranking.
International monitors have played an important role in Nicaragua, but their success has been mixed. Their sizable presence in the post-conflict election was notable because, as discussed in Chapter 2, it was the first UN observation in a sovereign state.281 The election was a vital part of the peace negotiations and the crucial role of the monitors helped build their reputation. In general, however, the persistent mistrust and political bias in the Nicaraguan election apparatus has relegated international monitors to serve as validators of election outcomes, rather than as catalysts for reforms. International monitors compensated for the lack of democratic institutions by keeping the general public informed and the politicians in check.282 Given chronic instability, they were crucial in getting Nicaraguans to accept the outcomes of elections in 1996 and 2001. However, monitors were hampered by both domestic conditions and extensive international meddling. They did not succeed in creating long-term electoral reforms to the fundamental political problems of the election system. Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2006 led to regression as he sought to consolidate his power through the courts.
In 1979, the Sandinistas overthrew four decades of Somoza dictatorship and went on to govern during wartime with a very strong executive, but weak legislature and judiciary. The opposition parties remained small, weak, and divided.283 In 1990, exhausted and divided after ten years of war and world record inflation, Nicaragua had an extra incentive for running a respectable election, since doing so was explicitly tied to peace and to ending the U.S. trade embargo.284 The international monitors played a crucial role in facilitating the 1990 election and a peaceful transition. However, the election produced a dual power structure. Although they lost the presidency, the Sandinistas retained control over the military and police and gained thirty-nine of ninety-two National Assembly seats—enough to block reforms. The elections after 1990 were not successful in consolidating electoral quality. Despite proportional electoral laws, Nicaragua evolved into a two-party system after the two main rivals engaged in numerous constitutional reforms that hindered the emergence of other serious, contending parties.
Monitors first visited Nicaragua in 1984, and electoral law reforms preceded every single election since then. The international pressure leading up to the 1990 election helped opposition forces to unite and press for reforms to the composition of the electoral commission. Marked by sharp legislative-executive conflict and economic and institutional crises, the years following the 1990 election were contentious and difficult and gradually eroded the power of Violet Chamorro’s government. The United States and other donors and international financial institutions pressed for resolution of the crisis.285 Subsequently, the year 1994 brought civil-military reform and in 1995 further constitutional reforms reduced the quasi-absolute powers power of the president, who had enjoyed almost full authority over Nicaragua’s political life until then. Most important, the provisions disqualified family members of the sitting president to run for the presidency.286 The reforms also addressed some concerns of monitors, who had criticized the electoral commission by making the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE)—or Supreme Electoral Council—solely responsible for the central register, the citizen identification program, the voter registry, and political party registration. However, the reforms also brought new appointment procedures, and monitors expressed concern about the independence of the CSE. The CC and the OAS argued that the method of choosing Electoral Council members should be based on explicit qualifications and not party affiliation287—a concern that worsened in the 2001 and 2006 elections.
Throughout the years, Nicaragua has made some progress. For example, the administration of election materials improved greatly for the 2001 election, also aiding result transmission and vote tabulation—an area of earlier monitor criticism.
Yet, in general, foreign monitoring organizations have had little success with pushing for and institutionalizing lasting electoral reforms. In 1996, for example, the IFES recommended the introduction of a permanent voter registry to replace the compilation of temporary voter lists before the election—a practice that led to confusion, inefficiencies, and inaccuracies.288 Despite efforts by the CSE, serious problems with registering voters and issuing identity cards have persisted, and remain one of the most contentious issues. Many monitoring organizations have also tirelessly recommended measures to depoliticize the CSE, but the council has only grown more political over time, prompting monitors to repeat their recommendations for reforms. Monitoring organizations have also repeatedly pressed for clarifying the appeal processes, for legislation on political parties, and for greater transparency, among many other things.
The impact of monitors was undercut when two main parties—notably their leaders Manuel Ortego and Arnoldo Alemán—colluded in a 2000 pact and pushed for reforms that decreased political pluralism and increased partisanship throughout the electoral apparatus.289 Meanwhile, recommendations concerning voter registries, campaign finances, and many other areas of concern were ignored or poorly implemented despite heavy criticism by the CC.290 The IRI also criticized a provision for the outgoing president and runner-up to be appointed directly as deputies, as well as reducing the minimal percentage for outright presidential victory to 35 percent, provided that there is at least a 5 percent advantage over the next runner-up.291
Thus, by 2001 the CC, the organization with the most sustained involvement, noted, “Nicaragua has successfully conducted a series of democratic national elections, making alterations in the election law and system before each vote. Unfortunately, the changes have not led to cumulative progress.”292 Surprisingly, the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) President Enrique Bolanos undertook a widespread effort to fight corruption and reform the political system of the country, even though he had benefited from the flawed electoral practices.293 This marginalized politically and resulted in a ten-month-long political crisis, which the OAS, supported by the CC, eventually mediated. The compromise was that the legislature elected in the upcoming 2006 election would decide whether to implement constitutional reform.
Leading up to the 2006 election, the CSE was plagued by political fights. The CC helped mediate a dispute in the CSE about whether voters with ID cards whose names could not be found on the register would be able to vote as provided by law. Given the extensive efforts by the United States and Venezuela, the CC also had to take the unusual step of publicly urging all foreign governments to stay out of the Nicaraguan elections.294
The number of new or unfulfilled recommendations listed by both the CC and the EU in their 2006 reports illustrates the lack of progress in Nicaragua’s elections despite twenty-two years of electoral observation by major groups, some of which have sustained their involvement over many elections. The CC clearly captured the disillusionment of international organizations regarding the electoral process and their role in it: “Election observers can play a vital role in ratifying the legitimacy of a particular election process and even help cement an election system over time. But repeated recourse to international election observation even after national organizations have developed a demonstrated capacity to fulfill their role should be a cause for concern.”295 The 2008 local elections led to an electoral crisis. The elections, won by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), were criticized for violence. The national monitors were not taken seriously and Nicaragua did not host international monitors. Thus, although there have been numerous improvements throughout the years, overall progress has been very limited.
Some argue that the main reason for the ultimately failed Nicaraguan transition lies with United States and other international actors.296 The United States, due to its past involvement of supporting the Contras, the counter-insurgency movement that opposed the Sandinistas, continued to be an active supporter of the liberal PLC party after 1990, while the FSLN drew support and funding primarily from Venezuela. In 1990, the two main parties received large foreign donations, leaving third parties much poorer.297 Foreign involvement in Nicaraguan elections persisted and reached a new high in 2006 with the United States and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez battling for influence.298 The EU report criticized the United States for “blunt intervention . . . discrediting the FSLN candidate in any possible manner.”299 Thus, the ability of monitors to promote meaningful reforms was reduced by other geopolitical processes and strategic interests at a much higher level.
However, the domestic environment likely played a larger role in hindering effective reforms. Plagued by violence, poverty, and inequality, Nicaragua has a historical and cultural legacy of looking to outsiders to solve disputes or support its side, and to produce authoritarian leaders and zero-sum politics. The two powerful parties have stripped state institutions of content.300 The parties, dominated by strong leaders and clientelism, lack the political will for serious institutional reform, and instead rely on “deal making among a few players.”301
Ortega’s 2006 victory was assured by the 2000 pact that made it possible to win the presidency with as little as 35 percent of the vote.
Given the highly politicized election management and distrust thereof, one of the biggest contributions of the international monitors in Nicaragua has been to install confidence in the elections through their presence. Thus, voter turnout has remained high, but domestic political actors have continued to express a need for international observers to counter perceived biases.302
The Panama case highlights how the effectiveness of election observation depends on both domestic and international factors. The main contribution of international monitors in Panama was their role in the 1989 election in assisting the Catholic Church in setting up parallel vote counts, thus legitimizing the claims that the election had been stolen and forcefully bringing international attention to the fraud. The subsequent U.S. invasion in 1989 paved the way for the opposition to take power. Its dependence on the United States, combined with its economic growth, made it both willing and able to follow recommendations from monitors, whose role shifted toward simply verifying an already smooth process of voting and making a few recommendations. However, initially the monitors, led by former President Jimmy Carter, played an essential role in denouncing the fraud and thus bringing about the U.S. invasion that improved the political conditions.
Before 1989, international actors were not willing to pressure the dictatorship in Panama. Consequently, little came of the largely symbolic OAS mission in 1978, and in 1984 the only observers, which were from the United States, were too concerned about causing instability in Panama to be effective. This clearly illustrates the argument made in Chapter 4 about the conflict that monitors sometimes face between stability and truth. The election was close, but the delegation “questioned whether the flaws in the election were sufficiently egregious to merit US condemnation.”303 Thus, early observers were too weak to do much, even if the domestic conditions had been riper than they indeed were. However, by 1989 the capacity of the monitors, the interests of international actors, and the domestic environment had changed.
Following the 1984 election, the rampant corruption and human rights violations under the Noriega regime had spurred public dissent. In 1988, Manuel Noriega was indicted in the United States for drug trafficking and racketeering (after having been on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) payroll as an informant in previous years) and the United States imposed severe economic sanctions on Panama, leaving the economy in tatters leading up to the 1989 election.304 The opposition requested the NDI and the IRI to monitor the election to provide moral support and with hopes that their assistance with a parallel vote tabulation would deter or publicize fraud to the international community. The NDI and the IRI formed a joint mission led by former Presidents Carter and Gerald Ford and other members of the CC’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government. The mission knew the election would likely be rigged, but decided to monitor it regardless. The regime acquiesced to the presence of monitors partly because it underestimated the actual support for the opposition and partly because of the strong foreign and domestic pressure.
In the 1989 election, the incumbent Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) blatantly manipulated the vote-counting process with help from the military. Meanwhile, the parallel vote count conducted by the opposition and the Catholic Church in conjunction with the international observers indicated a clear victory for the opposition. This was central in identifying the extent to which the central government manipulated the electoral process and it provided key international officials, such as President Carter, who was working with the NDI/IRI joint mission, with enough support to publicly denounce the official voting results.305 It was also at the core of official statements made by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and spurred the OAS to denounce the election, to no avail. Seven months after the Panama Defense Force (PDF) annulled the election results and Noriega declared himself “president for life,” the United States invaded and installed the opposition in power in 1990.306
Later elections improved significantly and the role of monitors shifted toward simply verifying an already smooth process of voting and making a few recommendations. The NDI/IRI/Council mission’s main recommendation in 1989 had been to reform the composition of the Electoral Tribunal. The Tribunal consisted of three magistrates appointed by pro-government groups and was the source of fraud and manipulation.307 After the U.S. invasion brought the opposition to power in 1990, the new government changed the nomination process and allowed the magistrates to come from the three branches of the government.308
In 1994, CC observers conducted extensive pre-election meetings with incumbent President Guillermo Endara and his challengers.309 After the election, the CC criticized the lack of media regulation, particularly the use of many anonymous TV advertisements. This problem was fully resolved in 1997, when a media law set prohibitions and sanctions against the publication and printing of materials from anonymous sources. The law also introduced regulations on censorship, taxes, and fees.310
The OAS observation mission of 1999 criticized the fact that people could register to vote in districts where they did not reside. The IFES recommended that the electoral tribunal review this policy. A 2002 reform required “change or update of electoral domicile to facilitate local suffrage,”311 although complaints to the electoral tribunal regarding “fraudulent change of domicile” continued.312
Starting in 1999, Panama’s electoral process was deemed to be of very good quality.313 The country’s fast economic recovery and large service-based industry have enabled the government to react to administrative recommendations and implement sophisticated computerized vote-counting systems. In 2004 and 2009, changes primarily concerned further procedural improvements in efficiency.
Thus, most of the serious problems observed by the monitors in Panama were related to the corrupt practices of the Noriega regime and its desperate attempt to maintain power. Once the opposition gained power, it was careful to avoid the previous regime’s downfalls, and, owing much of its authority to assistance from the United States, it was receptive to the monitors and their recommendations.
International monitors played a significant role in pushing through several legislative and administrative reforms in the 1990s. However, these efforts could not withstand the worsening political climate, which moved toward greater centralization and concentration of power in the Kremlin. As a result, monitors had little lasting or substantial impact on improving the real competitive nature of elections in Russia. Their effectiveness was further reduced by their timidity. They were useful and welcomed by Russian politicians in the first years after transition when they brought legitimacy and were still fairly hesitant to criticize Russia. Over time, Russia actively combated their efforts and undermined their influence. Russia demonstrates the ability of international monitors to socialize countries when domestic conditions are favorable. However, it also shows the dangers of regression when these conditions fail, suggesting that some socialization is not particularly deep, and that it is possible for countries to comply with many recommendations, yet still deprive voters of free and fair elections by manipulating the media and abusing incumbent resources. Furthermore, it shows just how difficult it is for monitors to influence great powers and that monitors are sometimes too cautious in their criticisms.
International monitors had significant influence on the electoral framework and administration of Russian elections during the 1990s, when the Russian authorities were favorably inclined toward reform. Thus, Russia reformed its institutional framework substantially after the 1993 election and followed many of the legal recommendations of the international monitoring organizations, most notably the IRI, the COE, and the OSCE. As the OSCE noted in 2003, “The legal framework for elections in the Russian Federation has generally improved with each successive election and has been found to be generally consistent with commonly recognized democratic principles and international commitments, including those in the Copenhagen Document.”314
In the 1990s, many of the international monitoring reports recounted how Russia responded to their recommendations. In its 1995 report, the COE stated, “In our talks on this occasion with the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Mr. Nikolai Ryabov, we were assured that our previous observations had been taken into account. The reports of our observer teams (and of other international observers) suggest that this indeed has been the case.”315 The IRI noted that after the 1993 referendum, “a number of IRI’s suggested improvements were adopted by the time of the December 12, 1993 parliamentary elections,”316 and that the vice chairman of Russia’s Central Election Commission said IRI’s report “served as the roadmap for the CEC in making improvements in the election law.”317 Eighteen of the twenty recommendations related directly to election law were partially or substantially adopted.318 The COE also noted that the amendments passed before the 1999 election “respond to a certain degree to the recommendations of our report on the 1995 parliamentary elections (doc. 7430, Addendum V),”319 and after further amendments in 2002, the OSCE noted that “several recommendations contained in the OSCE/ODIHR Final Report on the 1999 State Duma Elections have been implemented in the new laws.”320
Thus, Russia responded to recommendations in several areas such as campaign finance reform, ballot counting procedures, publication of results, removal of the “against all” option, and the independence of the CEC. However, some areas deteriorated, such as the independence of the CEC, voter lists,321 registration procedures, and the like. Recommendations regarding open and family voting, abuse of media, and incumbent resources were never addressed.
Initially, international monitors were willing to give Russia the benefit of the doubt and to encourage the transition despite difficulties. Furthermore, they were hesitant to criticize Russia too much. Russia’s vast size and commensurate influence made it harder to exert leverage and develop issue linkage. The greatest opening was between 1994 and 1999, when Russia received substantial IMF loans, which peaked in 1998, when the country received more than $12 billion.322 This period also saw the greatest improvements in the electoral framework and administration of elections in Russia. This period coincided with Russia’s efforts to join the COE. Indeed, the “generally positive” evaluation of the 1995 election led to the recommendation for Russia’s admission.323 International monitors remained optimistic until and including the 2000 presidential election, arguing that “it marked the conclusion of a transitional period forged by President [Boris] Yeltsin since 1991.”324
However, electoral conditions deteriorated further after the election of Vladimir Putin, who, despite numerous legal and procedural reforms, benefited from a weakly consolidated party system and a weak Parliament, which enabled him to control the media and oppress the opposition. At this stage, monitors became explicit about the lack of effort to follow their recommendations. For example, the OSCE 2004 report notes, “As voter lists were subsequently updated, the CEC did not periodically announce a revised total of registered voters, as it had been recommended to do by the OSCE/ODIHR following the 2003 State Duma elections.”325 Later the report notes: “The persistence of open voting and group voting, which are breaches of paragraph 7.4 of the Copenhagen Document, are particularly regrettable as, in response to an OSCE/ODIHR recommendation following the 2003 State Duma elections, the CEC had assured the EOM [Election Observation Mission] that revised instructions had been issued to all electoral commissions to prevent such practices.”326 By 2007 and 2008, the elections were widely criticized by Western monitors as procedurally correct, but flawed due to the incumbent party’s extreme dominance of the media and government powers to shut out any real competition.327
Throughout, both Russian government officials and Western experts criticized the international monitors, albeit for different reasons. The government initially benefited from the added legitimacy that came with allowing foreign monitors to observe elections, but was later dissatisfied and claimed that monitors were meddling in the country’s internal affairs. These criticisms became especially sharp toward the OSCE and eventually led to active attempts by Russia to curtail the power of the organization by seeking to push for reforms of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.328 In 2006, Putin signed a bill that restricted foreign NGOs’ activities in the country following the “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, where the NDI, the IRI, and others claimed to have played behind-the-scenes roles in stimulating those upheavals. For the 2007 parliamentary election, invitations to international monitors were issued late and restricted the number of observers. In 2007 and 2008, the OSCE decided, as a result of the obstacles put forward by the Russian government, to send no observers to monitor the presidential election.
Meanwhile, international experts were dissatisfied with the lack of firmness in monitoring evaluations and the overall lack of efficiency displayed by the observers.329 For example, monitors were rather hesitant in their criticisms of the 1996 Russian election although Yeltsin abused state resources, manipulated the media, and repressed the opposition.330 Even after the 2008 election, the COE, which was the only Western organization to observe the election, concluded that the election was “a reflection of the will of an electorate whose democratic potential was, unfortunately, not tapped.”331 The report then went on to explain why the election was neither really free nor fair.
Given the historical significance of the 1994 election in South Africa and the immense role the international community played in bringing this election about, it is remarkable how seemingly minor a role international election monitors have played in South Africa since then. International monitors from the EU, the IRI, the UN, and the CS pointed out numerous serious weaknesses in the 1994 election. Nearly all the weaknesses had been addressed by the 1999 election, however, and the presence of international observers remained mostly African for the next three elections. Although South Africa still struggles with many political and practical problems, the transition to proper elections occurred with remarkable ease, with the major concern being not the legitimacy of the elections, but—in the face of African National Congress (ANC) popularity—the tendency toward a dominant party system.332 The credit due to international election monitors after 1994 is likely minor.333
South Africa’s historic 1994 election was one of the most monitored elections ever. Observers from the EU, the CS, the UN, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) were sent to observe both the violence and the political processes in the year and half leading up to the election and they cooperated greatly.334 For political reasons the time schedule of the election was extremely short and preparation time for such a vast undertaking was therefore strained to the maximum. The fact that many voters had destroyed their identity documents during the apartheid era greatly complicated the voting. Tensions led to much violence. The IRI talked about a “bloody campaign field strewn with sacrificial victims,” and said that the campaign period was so dominated by fear that a free and fair campaign was impossible in many areas.335 Computer hacking delayed the count, which in turn gave rise to rumors and suspicions in the media. Local media and international observer groups alleged that the results were eventually settled behind closed doors in political deal making to avoid a further post-election violence.336 However, Jørgen Elklit, who served as an international member of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and followed the entire centralized tallying process closely and was in charge of the seat allocation, says that although the results did end up satisfying the different parties, no such deal making occurred.337 In the end, 86 percent of South Africans turned out to vote, and international monitors also acknowledged that despite various problems, the election was ultimately a historic success. For example, the IRI called the election “politically masterful and administratively calamitous; however, despite daunting challenges and crises the results finally reflected the will of a majority of voters.”338
The international monitors had some concrete effects on the voting process. For example, after they issued a demarche in early March 1994, the IEC reorganized some of its operations to address the weaknesses.339 In general, however, international monitors may have contributed to the peace, but they were not really able to fulfill their mandate of assessing the election. Thus, one commentator concluded “International observers are entitled to share in the reflected glory of the South Africa’s success, but their share of the credit is less than many expected it to be.”340
The activities of international monitors declined sharply after 1994; despite their heavy involvement in 1994 and an open invitation to return, the EU341 and the IRI did not return, and only African organizations remained active. The CS and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) monitored the 1999 election, joined by the Electoral Commission Forum of SADC (ECF). The AU, the SDAC, and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) monitored the 2004 and 2009 elections, but they had no long-term presence.
A new constitution and revisions to several electoral laws preceded the 1999 election. Most of the legal problems from the 1994 election were addressed and indeed the majority of the logistical issues were resolved as well. This involved specifying clearer divisions between the various electoral institutions, including a dispute-settling process, and making the IEC truly separate from the government by stopping direct funding by Parliament.342 Remaining concerns in 1999 were the voter list, insufficient polling stations, and training of polling staff. The improvements in the 1999 election were enormous, but most likely not due to the presence of international monitors, but more likely due to the IEC. The problems of the 1994 election were very apparent and fixing them was a priority before the 1999 election. With the ANC holding a secure position in society, the government had every incentive to strive for proper and clean elections.
Few changes in the legal framework were made prior to the 2004 election, as indeed the issues had already been resolved by 1999.343 The biggest concern in 1999, the voter list, was much improved by 2004, as was voter education. Compared to 1994, the level of violence in the election was again quite low, much as in 1999. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) had published new regulations in 2003, to ensure equal coverage. However, there were complaints about the public broadcaster covering the ninety-minute launch of the ANC manifesto in Durban without covering similar launches by other parties. The complaint was dismissed, however, because the event occurred before the formal campaign started.344 Following advice from monitors after the 1999 election, special voting was reduced to one day. The official voting day went smoothly with only minor problems. Further in line with comments by monitors after the 1999 election, the IEC increased the number of voting stations, and the staff was well trained. The staff was tired after the long polling and counting exercises, but the credibility of the counting was boosted by the introduction of independent auditing teams. After the election, EISA had only a few minor recommendations pertaining to the positioning of the voting booths and making ballots easier to tell apart. Finally, the mission urged the use of separate ballot boxes for the provincial and national elections to speed up counting. The mission also urged domestic monitoring organizations to become more active.345 The SADC was equally positive.346 The AU was concerned that polling agents sometimes helped voters to fold or mark their ballots, thus seeing their vote,347 and that late at night some voting stations operated by candlelight. In general, however, the 2004 election went extremely well.348 As one commentator noted, despite fears to the contrary, “South Africa’s first decade of democracy will be remembered for the surprising ease with which seemingly intractable conflict was subjected to the routine functioning of democratic institutions.”349
The 2009 election also went off very smoothly and was praised by the EISA, the SADC Parliamentary Forum. and the AU alike. Polling stations were still using the same ballot boxes for the national and provincial elections, and some officials were not properly trained in the counting procedures, which slowed up the count. The organizations did recommend a change in the electoral law to prohibit party activities near polling stations, and expressed concern that some stations had run out of voting materials.350 These, however, were all minor issues. The main concern now is not with the quality of elections, but that a dominant-party regime has emerged.