1. Ng 2008.
2. Zakaria 1997; Clark 2000; Carothers 2002; Carothers 2007; Lust-Okar 2009.
3. These organizations are commonly known interchangeably as international election observers or monitors. Although some organizations assign different meanings to these terms, no clear standard exists. This book therefore uses the terms interchangeably. However, election supervision usually does imply something unique, namely, that an organization, usually the United Nations (UN), is engaged in organizing and overseeing the elections.
4. Fairbanks 2004; Usupashivili 2004.
5. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a.
6. Olearchyk 2008.
7. Puddington 2011, 2. For a definition of an “electoral democracy,” see the 2010 Freedom House Report (Puddington 2010, 4.)
8. Dahl 1971. Levitsky and Way 2002; As Schedler argues, Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy as civil and political rights plus fair, competitive, and inclusive elections remains widely accepted (2002a, 92).
9. Geisler 1993; Carothers 1997.
10. McIntire and Gettleman 2009.
11. Chand 1997, 559; Clark 2000, 30–31; Levitsky and Way 2005, 55; Calingaert 2006, 147.
12. Chivers 2004.
13. McCoy, Garber, et al. 1991; Anglin 1992; Kumar 1998; McCoy 1998; Pastor 1998; Mulikita 1999; Reilly 2002; Lyons 2004.
14. Beaulieu and Hyde 2009. See also work by Kelley (2012) that argues that monitors actually decrease boycotts.
15. According to the UN, “International election observation is: the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. International election observation should, when possible, offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral and related processes, while not interfering in and thus hindering such processes. International election observation missions are: organized efforts of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations to conduct international election observation.” United Nations 2005, 2.
16. Dai 2006. This exemplifies what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink labeled “information politics,” whereby transnational actors seek to quickly generate politically usable information for the relevant actors. Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16.
17. Kriegler, Aboud, et al. 2008, 67.
18. Zakaria 1997; Schedler 2002a; Carothers 2007.
19. Freedom House, the U.S. State Department, and the European Commission, for example, all pay considerable attention to the information in the official reports from international monitoring organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
20. Levy 2010.
21. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a.
22. In a joint statement the OSCE said the vote was “in essence consistent with most international standards for democratic elections, [though] significant challenges were revealed which need to be addressed urgently” (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a). The head of the Council of Europe (COE) delegation said: “This election, although clearly not perfect, enabled the Georgian people to give a democratic response to the recent political crisis. . . . For the sake of the stability of the country I call upon all actors to conclude this election process in a manner that ensures the legitimacy in the eyes of Georgian people.” The head of the European Parliament (EP) delegation said: “This election is another step forward in strengthening Georgia’s young and still fragile democracy.”
23. Russia’s foreign ministry, weary of Georgia’s pro-Western trajectory and fed up with the role of international observers in recent so-called colored revolutions, criticized the elections, while the deputy U.S. secretary of state said that the vote appeared democratic (Olearchyk, Belton, et al. 2008). The OSCE observer, Dieter Boden, later retracted his statements, claiming they had been misinterpreted.
24. Franck 1992, 50.
25. United Nations 2005, 2.
26. Bob 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Carpenter 2007; Stone 2008.
27. The European Union’s (EU) Human Rights and Democratization Policy website, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ
/index.htm, last accessed on March 24, 2009.
28. The EP notes, “The scrutiny of elections is mainly aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of the electoral process, increasing public confidence in the elections, avoiding electoral fraud, better protecting human rights, and contributing to conflict solution.” European Parliament 2001, 6, Section G. The Carter Center (CC) boldly claims that “experience around the world has shown that credible and impartial observers can strengthen an electoral process by reassuring voters that they can safely and secretly cast their ballots and that any electoral fraud will be detected.” Carter Center 2010b. The Organization of American States (OAS) likewise stresses that “EOMs promote the ability to elect and be elected in an inclusive, free, and transparent fashion, and they help ensure that the popular will expressed by citizens at the ballot box is respected.” General Committee 2008.
29. Asian Network for Free Elections 2001, 45.
30. Levitsky and Way 2002, 55.
31. Calingaert 2006, 147.
32. Chand 1997, 559.
33. For a small selection of the many available case studies, see Bjornlund, Bratton, et al. 1992; Anglin 1995; Schmeets and Exel 1997; McCoy 1998; Montgomory 1998; Kaiser 1999; Soremekun 1999; Brown 2000; Foeken and Dietz 2000; Baker 2002; Laakso 2002; Balian 2003; Dorman 2005; Hart 2006; Hyde 2007; Obi 2008; Teshome-Bahiru 2008. For a sample of regional perspectives, see Anglin 1998; Middlebrook 1998; Abbink and Hesseling 2000; Sives 2001a; Sharon 2004; Gorovoi 2006.
34. Hyde 2007.
35. Bjornlund, Bratton, et al. 1992; Geisler 1993; Anglin 1995; Oquaye 1995; Carothers 1997; Riley 1997; Montgomory 1998; Kaiser 1999; Kew 1999; Foeken and Dietz 2000; Bjornlund 2004; McCoy 2004; Dorman 2005; Santa-Cruz 2005c; Hart 2006; Kriegler, Aboud, et al. 2008; Teshome-Bahiru 2008.
36. Some excellent general studies do exist (Asante 1994; Beigbeder 1994; Santa-Cruz 2005b), but they tend to raise more legal questions or focus on the origins of monitoring. Eric Bjornlund has written an excellent book that does take a global perspective but focuses its analysis exclusively through case studies (Bjornlund 2004).
37. Carter Center 2006b.
38. Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005.
39. Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008.
40. The common theoretical charge is that they are epiphenomenal, meaning that they merely appear causally related to behavior, but in reality they have no effects independent of the states’ initial decisions to participate in them. Strange 1982; Mearsheimer 1994.
41. Crawford 1997; Killick 1997; Hathaway 2002; Knack 2004.
42. Huntington 1991; Whitehead 1996; Levitsky and Way 2005.
43. Lipset 1959; Carothers 1999; Diamond 2006.
44. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006.
45. Hyde 2007, 38.
46. Green and Kohl 2007; Burnell 2008.
47. Lehoucq 2003.
48. European Commission 2007.
49. Davis-Robert and Carroll forthcoming.
50. General Secretariat of the Organization of American States 2007.
51. Elklit and Svensson 1997; Schedler 2002a; Lehoucq 2003; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Calingaert 2006.
52. Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009.
1. This chapter draws partly on Judith Kelley (2008), “Assessing the complex evolution of norms: the rise of international election monitoring,” International Organization 62(2): 221–255. Copyright © 2009 The IO Foundation. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
2. Bachman 1991.
3. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005a.
4. United Nations 1991; Elklit and Svensson 1997; Carter Center 2010b.
5. Wright 1964.
6. Garber 1984. For historical overviews, see Wright 1964; Jason 1991; Beigbeder 1994; Hyde 2006, chap. 2.
7. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1989.
8. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1990.
9. Organization of American States General Assembly 1990.
10. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1990.
11. Organization of American States General Assembly 1990.
12. Baker 1990.
13. Franck 1992.
14. Franck 1992, 87.
15. This change was made to appease criticisms by some member states that it unjustly singles out non-Western states for election observation. Thus the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has recently begun to send lighter observation missions labeled “assessment missions” to its established democratic member states. In these “assessment missions,” however, the OSCE typically stresses that no systematic election day observation of polling station procedures takes place. This trend, which began roughly with the mission to the 2004 U.S. presidential election, is not covered in this study.
16. Carter Center 2010b. Norms are “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.” Katzenstein 1996, 5. They can be thought of as “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations.” March and Olsen 1998, 948. In that sense, inviting monitors has become an expected behavior for governments that lack strong democratic institutions and therefore domestic checks and balances on the election process.
17. Nadelmann 1990; Cortell and Davis 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001; Johnston 2001; Simmons and Elkins 2004.
18. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895.
19. Carter Center 2002.
20. Huntington 1991.
21. After the prolonged Florida election recount of 2000, the OSCE monitored the U.S. elections in 2002 and 2004.
22. Carter Center 1992, 16.
23. Santa-Cruz 2005a.
24. Carter Center undated.
25. This argument goes counter to that of Santa-Cruz. Santa-Cruz 2005a; Santa-Cruz 2005b, 686.
26. Franck 1992, 84; Beigbeder 1994, 104.
27. Franck 1992.
28. Klotz 1995; Prize 1997.
29. Franck 1992, 52.
30. Ebersole 1992–93, 94–95.
31. Dahl 1991.
32. Article 19(2).
33. Article 25.
34. Beigbeder 1994, 238.
35. Lyons and Mastanduno 1993; Barkin and Cronin 1994. Even during the earliest United Nations (UN) monitoring in colonial territories, France, Britain, and Portugal had claimed that the activity constituted interference in their internal affairs; see Asante 1994, 273.
36. Asante 1994, 262–63.
37. Luard 1988, 49.
38. Cutler 1985.
39. Kegley, Raymond, et al. 1998, 89.
40. See Asante 1994, 264; Crawford 1993, 14.
41. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 131 (judgment of June 27).
42. Mexican Election Decisions, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828; Inter-Am. C.H.R. 98, OEA/ser. L/V/II.77, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1989–1990), 119–20, cited in Asante 1994, 278.
43. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1991, Preamble.
44. Flynn and Farrell 1999, 511.
45. Fox 1995.
46. McFaul 2004, 153.
47. Even the UN secretary general noted: “The request for United Nations electoral verification in an independent country generated considerable discussion within the organization and one of the issues was whether the request could be reconciled with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter. Opinions differed on the existence of an international dimension in the Haitian case.” United Nations 1991, 14.
48. Boutros-Ghali 1996, 15–16.
49. United Nations 1988, point 2.
50. This article states that “nothing contained in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”
51. United Nations 2001, point 2.
52. United Nations 2003.
53. Kelley 2008.
54. Franck 1992.
55. Powers and Goetz 2006.
56. Finnemore 1996, 160.
57. Odell 1982; Hall 1989.
58. Barkin and Cronin 1994, 114.
59. Franck 1992, 46–47; Powers and Goetz 2006.
60. Baker 1990.
61. Rich 2001, 22–23.
62. Flynn and Farrell 1999; Youngs 2001b, 2.
63. Bush 1990.
64. Huntington 1991.
65. Jason 1991, 1830–36.
66. Garber 1984, ii.
67. Huntington 1991, chap. 2; Franck 1992.
68. Linz and Stepan 1978; Schmitter and Karl 1991. A survey of eight African countries shows that individuals who perceive of election conduct as proper are more likely to consider the regime legitimate. Elklit and Reynolds 2002.
69. Quezada 1998, 16.
70. Chand 1997, 555. Seemingly it worked. In a pre-election poll 35 to 45 percent of those surveyed expected fraud and 65 percent expected violence. In post-election surveys, after international observers extolled the elections as the cleanest in Mexican history (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 29), only 24 percent thought that the elections were fraudulent while 61 percent thought they were clean. Council of Freely Elected Heads of State 1995, 10–11.
71. Lyons 2004.
72. United Nations 1991, Add. 2.
73. Bjornlund, Bratton, et al. 1992; Carter Center 1992, , 17.
74. Kingdon 1984.
75. Franck 1992, 87.
76. McCoy 1995, 18.
77. World Bank 1989, 60–61; EBRD 1990; Nelson and Eglinton 1992; Geisler 1993, 614; Kaiser 1999.
78. Geisler 1993, 614.
79. BBC 1992; Marinov 2005.
80. The difference in means in the log of foreign aid in the year before an election is significant at in a t-test at the 0.001 percent level.
81. Because foreign aid recipients are also likely to be poorer and less democratic—both variables associated strongly with the presence of monitors—the motivation for the monitoring is difficult to separate, but the relationship between foreign aid and monitoring is highly statistically significant and it holds even if established democracies are omitted from the analysis.
82. Marinov 2005; Hyde 2009.
83. See Kelley 2004a; Kelley 2004b; Vachudova 2005.
84. Pastor 1993.
85. Scherlen 1998.
86. See Zak 1987; Carothers 1997.
87. Kelley 2009.
88. Of the 442 monitored elections in this study, only 6 were coded as single-party states: 2 in Uganda in 1996 and 2 in Uganda in 2001 as well as elections in Swaziland in 1998 and 2003. These countries also claim that these elections were not under a single-party system, but a nonparty system.
89. Political Risk Group undated, 32.
90. The analysis uses the measure in the year before the election to avoid any change introduced by the election itself.
91. Political Risk Group undated, 29.
92. National Democratic Institute 2000b.
93. For an overview of the activities of different organizations up until the early 1990s, see Beigbeder 1994.
94. European Commission 2000.
95. European Commission 2007.
96. The Council of Europe (COE) and even the European Parliament (EP) occasionally sends delegations to nonmember states. For example, the COE sent a mission to the 2006 Mexican election.
97. Lean 2007a, 157.
98. These different functions are:
1. Organization and conduct of elections as in Cambodia in 1993.
2. Supervision of elections, as Namibia in 1988.
3. Verification of elections when the UN monitors and verifies its outcome as in South Africa 1994.
4. Coordination and support of international observers.
5. Training of domestic observers as in Mexico in 1994.
6. Technical assistance in preparing and organizing elections.
7. Follow and report, which is an internal procedure.
99. African Union 2009.
100. Anglin 1998; Bittiger 2008.
101. Carter Center 2009b.
102. The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC (ECF) is an independent organization that facilitates cooperation between the electoral authorities of countries in the SADC.
103. United Nations 2005.
104. Garber and Cowen 1994.
1. Africa News 2002.
2. Fauriol 2006, 4.
3. Chivers 2007.
4. The letter first noted the importance of a successful election and then said: “Having been told that you are such a person who does care about the sustained economic and political growth of Kazakhstan, I decided to write to you to ask if you could kindly consider joining the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] observer team through the U.S. quota.” The ambassador included email addresses and telephone extensions and asked recipients to “keep us posted” about the application process. Darby 2007.
5. Gershman and Allen 2006, 44.
6. Gorovoi 2006.
7. Potocki 2008, 1.
8. Potocki 2008, 1.
9. Potocki 2008, 3.
10. Munoz-Pogossian 2008.
11. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 2004a.
12. Geisler 1993; Abbink 2000; Downie 2000, 44; Foeken and Dietz 2000; Brown 2001.
13. Buijtenhuis 2000.
14. United States State Department 2001, Section 3.
15. Laakso 2002, 457.
16. South African Development Community 2000, 18.
17. Commonwealth Observer Group 2000, 32.
18. European Union Election Observation Mission 2000.
19. Patten 2000.
20. “EU [European Union] behaviour (or at least local perceptions of it) allowed Mugabe to claim European arrogance and an infringement on its sovereignty, bolstering its case that Tsvangirai and the MDC [Movement for Democratic Change] are puppets of European interests. Zimbabwe had ruled out UK participants in the EU monitoring team and later added bans on officials from five other EU members, claiming they were all too pro-MDC. The EU insistence that it could name any monitors it wanted—although apparently accepting the ban on UK participation—was then used by Mugabe and the local pro-government press as an example of neo-imperialism.” Oxford Analytica 2002.
21. R. Mugabe, “Address to the nation marking the 2000 parliamentary election results,” June 27, 2000.
22. Of the 442 monitored elections in the data, 242 were monitored by more than one of the organizations in the data. Of these, 209 have data on the assessment of more than one organization and can therefore be compared. In 76 of these elections, or 36 percent of the time, monitoring organizations disagreed on their overall assessment of the election.
23. Human Rights Watch 1998.
24. Downie 2000; Bjornlund 2004.
25. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1998, 2.
26. Downie 2000.
27. National Democratic Institute 1998.
28. International Republican Institute 1999, 4.
29. Joint International Observer Group 1998, 1–2.
30. Holmquist and Ford 1992, 97.
31. Holmquist and Ford 1992, 108.
32. Mutua 1994, 5. An Africa Watch report details the frequent and fatal incidents in 1993.
33. Mutua 1994, 5.
34. Barkan 1998; Ndegwa 1998; Foeken and Dietz 2000, 139; Howard and Roessler 2006.
35. International Republican Institute 1993.
36. Commonwealth Observer Group 1993b, 62.
37. Foeken and Dietz 2000, 145; Brown 2007.
38. European Commission 2007.
39. Davis-Robert and Carroll forthcoming.
40. McCoy 2004.
41. Lowenhardt 2005.
42. Kriegler, Aboud, et al. (2008), 130–32.
43. The following factors are important to interpreting Figure 3.3. Some highly controversial elections are omitted, such as the election in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, when neither the U.S. State Department nor any monitoring organizations were willing to condemn an election. These omissions mean that the figure overestimates the rate of criticisms, in particular for organizations that tend to agree with the U.S. State Department. Second, assessment reports are disproportionately missing for the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and as a result their rate of criticisms also may be overestimated. The same may be the case for the Organization of American States (OAS), because reports for the OAS before 1990 are not available, and this was a period when the organization tended to be much less critical. Lastly, it is important to note that some organizations have visited few highly problematic missions, either because the organizations are relatively new or because of their unique pattern of activity. For each organization the number of elections is therefore given in the parentheses. Thus, for example, the Carter Center’s (CC) percentages are based on only three missions, Haiti in 1995, Mozambique in 1999, and Zambia in 2001. This is because the CC has largely focused on Latin America, and because the U.S. State Department and other organizations in the area have been less critical of elections in the region.
44. Fawn 2006; Gorovoi 2006.
45. Anglin 1998, 485, 491.
46. Geisler 1993; Sives 2001b.
47. For both the 2007 parliamentary elections and the 2008 presidential elections, the Council of Europe (COE) sent observers to Russia, while the OSCE refrained due to lack of cooperation on the part of the government.
48. Laakso 2002, 445.
49. United States State Department 2001, Section 3.
50. Laakso 2002, 457. A separate mission sent by the Electoral Commission Forum of the SADC countries (ECF) also endorsed the elections.
51. South African Development Community 2000, 18.
52. Commonwealth Observer Group 2000, 32.
53. European Union Election Observation Mission 2000.
54. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Zambia: OAU secretary-general endorses Mugabe’s rejection of foreign observers, February 15, 2002.
55. Solovyov 2008.
56. Solovyov 2008.
57. Anglin 1998; Gorovoi 2006.
58. A Pearson chi2(6) test yields a probability of 0.003. This relationship is also robust in regression analysis. Statistical analysis of countries that invite monitors shows that less democratic countries are less likely to invite high-quality monitors. This is robust to controlling for other factors such as year trends, membership in organizations that conduct monitoring, and the type of the election held, such as whether it was first a multiparty, post-conflict, or post-coup election. For space reasons, the results are not shown. Of course, the absence of more credible monitors does not unequivocally prove that they were not invited—sometimes monitoring organizations simply refuse to go to highly autocratic regimes.
59. United Nations 2005.
1. Lenarčič 2008, 4.
2. This chapter draws partly on Judith Kelley (2009), “D minus Elections: The politics and norms of international election observation,” International Organization 63(4): 765–87. Copyright © 2009 The IO Foundation. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. The chapter also draws partly on Judith Kelley (2010), “Election Observers and Their Biases,” Journal of Democracy 21(July): 158–72.
3. Several observers have been interviewed for this book, although most have preferred to remain anonymous. Several of the interviewees are thanked in the Preface. See also Mair 1997; Keohane, Macedo, et al. 2009.
4. Mair 1997.
5. Herman and Brodhead 1984. See especially Appendix 1 on bias in Freedom House missions to Zimbabwe 1979 and 1980, but also general comments of bias throughout the book.
6. Abrahamyan 2008.
7. Eorsi and de Pourbaix-Lundin 2008, 2.
8. European Parliament, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, et al. 2008.
9. Sikkink 2002, 314. This analysis labels both nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as transnational actors.
10. Kelley 2008.
11. Geisler 1993; Elklit and Svensson 1997.
12. Zakaria 1997.
13. Grant and Keohane 2005; Keohane, Macedo, et al. 2009.
14. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Cooley and Ron 2002.
15. Bob 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Carpenter 2007; Stone 2008.
16. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2000, 11–12.
17. National Democratic Institute 1996a, 1.
18. National Democratic Institute 1996b, 3.
19. Commission of the European Union undated, Section G.
20. Kriegler, Aboud, et al. 2008, 67.
21. Fish 2005, 47.
22. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b.
23. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1999c.
24. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b, 2.
25. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b, 14.
26. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32.
27. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b, 2.
28. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b, 14.
29. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000b, 12, 15–20, 33–34.
30. Fish 2005, 47.
31. Fish 2005, 47–48.
32. Reported in Fish 2005, 47.
33. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1996c, 1.
34. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1996d, 1.
35. International Crisis Group 1996; Riley 1997; Downie 2000, 44.
36. Fawn 2006.
37. Stone 2004, 577.
38. Barnett and Finnemore 2001; Nielson and Tierney 2003.
39. Personal interview with Betilde Munuz-Pogossian, coordinator, Unit for Electoral Studies, Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, D.C., April 10, 2008. Commission of the European Union Undated, Section E.
40. Bob 2002; Carpenter 2007.
41. Brown and Moore 2001, 572.
42. A Democracy Score was created for each intergovernmental organization based on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset. The score is the average level of democracy in all the member states of the organization in the year before the election. The score is 0 for NGOs, and an indicator variable is created for Western NGOs.
43. Carothers 1997; Elklit and Svensson 1997; McCoy 1998, 84.
44. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2000, 11–12.
45. Kew 1999, 30; Obi 2008, 75.
46. Kew 1999, 30.
47. Alesina and Dollar 2000.
48. As Robert Pastor argues, “foreign governments and funders with a stake in an election want the process approved quickly so that a new government can take hold.” Pastor 1998, 159.
49. Bjornlund 2004.
50. As an aside, larger foreign aid recipients also were more likely to be monitored. For the source of the foreign aid variable, see the Appendix A, Table A.6.
51. Fish 2005, 50.
52. This dilemma is similar to that of other organizations that seek to promote various domestic reforms. Stone 2002; Kelley 2004a.
53. Joint International Observation Group 1998, 1–2.
54. International Republican Institute 1993, Appendix 11.
55. For a definition of first multiparty elections, see the Appendix A. First multiparty elections are defined as the first multiparty general election, the first multiparty legislative election, or the first multiparty executive election. In countries holding separate legislative and executive elections, both the first multiparty executive and the first multiparty legislative elections are coded as first multiparty elections, resulting in these countries having two first multiparty elections. Multiparty elections in newly independent countries are also coded as first multiparty elections. Thus, nearly 10 percent of all the elections in the data, or 127 elections, are first multiparty elections.
56. Bratton 1998.
57. Ward and Gleditsch 1998.
58. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2000, 12; van Kessel 2000.
59. Laakso 2002, 458.
60. Patten 2000.
61. Brown 2007.
62. Oxford Analytica April 2002, 1–2.
63. Reuters, “Kenya Votes in Close Polls,” December 28, 2007.
64. European Union Election Observation Mission 2008, 27.
65. International Republican Institute 2007a.
66. Fish 2005, 49.
67. Galbraith 2009.
68. Donno 2010.
69. McCoy 1993.
70. United Nations 2005, 3.
71. Franck 1992, 51.
72. Franck 1992, 51.
1. For example, Thomas Carothers suggests that “the art of manipulating elections has developed just as rapidly as the art of aiding elections” (1999, 335).” And discussing “a panoply of alternative means of electoral containment” that politicians use, Andreas Schedler argues that “it appears, old dogs do learn new tricks” (Schedler 2002b, 105).” See also Emily Beulieu and Susan Hyde (2009), who suggest that boycotts are increasing because monitors are prompting a strategic shift in cheating.
2. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2006, 3.
3. Schedler 2002b.
4. Schedler 2002b, 106.
5. Ottaway 2003.
6. Schedler 2002a, 40–41.
7. Case 1996, 437.
8. Rupnik 2007.
9. Santa-Cruz 2005c.
10. Huntington 1991; Valenzuela 2004.
11. Linz and Stepan 1996.
12. Geisler 1993; Carothers 1997.
13. Gandhi and Przeworski 2009.
14. For elections with more than one observer mission, the highest level of irregularities reported is used, on the assumption that monitoring organizations are much more likely to underreport irregularities than to manufacture or exaggerate them. Unsupported allegations of irregularities are not given as much weight as documented irregularities.
15. That is, one in three elections has the highest level of irregularities in either election day cheating, or the highest level of pre-election cheating, or the highest level of legal problems. Ninety-three out of 292 monitored elections with sufficient documentation to be coded on these variables contained the highest level of irregularities in at least one of these three categories.
16. They hide some of the detail of the data because they simply show the direction of a shift, not its magnitude. Thus, a decrease from the highest to the middle level appears as the same as a decrease from middle level to the lowest level, for example. However, having examined the more detailed data, this simplification actually represents the general trends well and is much clearer to read.
17. Note that some shift from overt cheating on election day to overt cheating before the election does not count as a decrease in overt cheating; there must be a net decrease in the combined categories (changes in timing are considered later).
18. There are twenty-four cases where the level of safer irregularities was moderate and the level of obvious cheating was low. These could be examined in greater detail too, but it is more compelling to look at the cases where the safer forms of irregularities were higher.
19. Fawn 2006.
20. Puddington 2011, 1.
1. United Nations 2005, 2.
2. Eorsi and de Pourbaix-Lundin 2008, 1.
3. Asian Network for Free Elections 2001, 45. The European Union (EU) argues, “Election observation can . . . help deter fraud (European Union’s Human Rights and Democratization Policy website: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ
/index.htm, last accessed on March 24, 2009).” And the Carter Center (CC) claims that “experience around the world has shown that credible and impartial observers can strengthen an electoral process by reassuring voters that they can safely and secretly cast their ballots and that any electoral fraud will be detected” (Carter Center 2010b).”
4. Diamond 1991, 7.
5. Bjornlund, Bratton, et al. 1992, 429.
6. Carothers 1997, 20.
7. For simplicity this chapter mainly discusses governments as the targets of international monitoring, but opposition parties may also cheat in elections.
8. Monga 1997, 165.
9. Stein 1982; Keohane 1984.
10. Hyde 2007.
11. Ichino and Schundeln 2010.
12. Levitsky and Way 2002, 55.
13. Herman and Brodhead 1984, 7–9; Scranton 1997.
14. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1989, 57.
15. Carter Center 2010a.
16. Carter Center 2010b.
17. United Nations 2005, 1.
18. Donno 2010.
19. Larson and Callahan 1990.
20. Stone 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003.
21. Commission of the European Communities 2000, 16–17.
22. Brown and Moore 2001; Cooley and Ron 2002.
23. Keohane 1982, 346; Simmons 2000; Guzman 2002.
24. For more on the debate, see footnote 58.
25. World Bank 1989, 60–61.
26. Posner 1995, 138.
27. Donno 2010, 594.
28. Huntington 1991; Remmer 1995; Schimmelfennig, Engert, et al. 2003; Jacoby 2004; Schneider and Schmitter 2004; Vachudova 2005.
29. Franck 1992.
30. Schedler 2002b.
31. Kelley 2008.
32. Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Hyde 2007; Tucker 2007.
33. McFaul 2005, 7.
34. Santa-Cruz 2005b, 82.
35. Stepan 1988.
36. Diamond 1991, 7.
37. International Republican Institute. 2004a.
38. European Union Election Observation Mission 2003.
39. Carter Center 1992, 12–13, 40–41.
40. See Figure 2.8 and accompanying discussion.
41. United Nations 2005, 2.
42. Checkel 1998; Johnston 2001; Risse 2003; Kelley 2004a; Checkel 2005.
43. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.
44. Chand 1997, 547.
45. Simmons 2009.
46. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) calls these missions “assessment missions.”
47. For an overview, see Geddes 1999; Gleditsch and Ward 2006.
48. Carothers 1999, 304.
49. Johnston 2001.
50. Strohal undated.
51. Fox 1994, 110.
52. Monga 1997, 165.
53. Roessler 2005.
54. Rodrik 1997.
55. For example, Haas, Keohane, et al. 1993; Weiss and Jacobson 2000.
56. Checkel 2000; Kelley 2004a; Vachudova 2005; Kelley 2006; Levitsky and Way 2006.
57. Johnston 2001.
58. Research on conditionality is divided on its efficacy. Several scholars have found that linking political reforms to membership in international organizations like the EU has been effective (Schimmelfennig, Engert, et al. 2003; Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004b; Vachudova 2005). However, scholars of economic conditionality are more divided about whether it can achieve positive economic policy changes (Mosley, Harrigan, et al. 1995; Collier 1997; Crawford 1997; Killick 1997). They point to numerous weaknesses in how the international financial institutions have implemented conditionality (Hermes and Lensink 2001). Direct sanctions have also long been criticized not only as impracticable and even harmful, but also as mostly unable to induce change (Hufbauer, Schott, et al. 2001). Some scholars disagree, however, pointing to effective cases such as South Africa. One study suggests that conditionality in preferential trade agreements has been effective at promoting human rights and democracy (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Scholars have also argued that we have underestimated the effects of sanctions by looking only at cases where they were implemented, and not at cases where the mere threats to use sanctions changed government behavior (Drezner 2003).
59. Levitsky and Way 2010, 40–50.
60. Donno 2010.
61. Hufbauer et al. 1990, 12; Levitsky and Way 2010, 41.
62. Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Sasse 2008; Sedelmeier 2008.
1. The variable Election Quality is correlated at 0.75 with the Freedom House variable that codes countries that are “not free” = 0, “partly free” = 1, and “free” = 2. It is correlated at 0.81 with the polity2 variable. The “Problems” variable is correlated at -0.83 with the Freedom House variable and -0.85 with the polity2 variable.
2. Poe, Carey, et al. 2001.
3. Note that first elections in newly independent states, if multiparty, are considered as first multiparty elections as well and therefore also excluded.
4. Rubin and Thomas 1996; Clarke 2005.
5. Ho, Imai, et al. 2007.
6. Sartori 2003; Signorino 2003; Simmons and Hopkins 2005.
7. For an overview and technical aspects, see Mebane and Sekhon 1998; Diamond and Sekhon 2008; Sekhon and Grieve 2008.
8. If a candidate control variable has no observable or theoretical relationship with the outcome variable, its inclusion in a model decreases estimation efficiency and may lead to biased inference if it is correlated with one of the model variables. Achen 2005.
9. The variables 1–7 are all described under “Country variables” in Appendix A, Table A.6. The eighth variable, the quality of the previous election, is the lagged dependent variable.
10. I acknowledge with gratitude the highly professional contribution of Mark Buntaine to the matching analysis in this chapter.
11. The logistic regression techniques used to estimate variables’ effects assumes that each variable has a constant effect on the linear predictor regardless of its level or that of another covariate. Not enough data are available to empirically confirm that monitoring does not influence election outcomes in single-party states, as only six elections were monitored in single-party states in this dataset. With so few observations, matching within the single-party only subset is not possible. Given the high risk of selection bias if single-party observations were to be included and the inability to balance on this variable, it is best excluded from analysis. Likewise, because highly democratic states have so little variation in election quality, modeling the effect of monitoring is not feasible. Furthermore, empirically and theoretically monitoring should not influence highly democratic elections. Thus, the analysis below excludes single-party states and established democracies.
12. For more on logistic regression, see Hilbe 2009.
13. Comparison of the coefficients is not definitive, because they are based on different samples, due to the matching process. Furthermore, the coefficient on monitors in Model 7 is higher than that in Model 6, but they do overlap within 1 standard deviation.
1. Kiljunen 2008.
2. Both elections in Serbia and in Montenegro were counted as national elections.
3. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1997b.
4. International Republican Institute 1996c, 2.
5. For a detailed accounting of which recommendations were followed, see International Republican Institute 1996c, Appendix IX.
6. International Republican Institute 1996c, 2.
7. Carter Center 2006a, 39.
8. International Republican Institute 1992.
9. European Union Election Observation Mission 2001c, 5.
10. National Democratic Institute 2009, 5.
11. Maniruzzaman 1992, 59. See further the case summary in Appendix E.
12. Kabemba 2003, 17.
13. Interview with Denis Kadima, deputy leader of the observer mission sent to Lesotho by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis 2007.
14. Saari 2009.
15. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1996b, 4; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003c, 3.
16. Carothers 1997, 23.
17. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000a, 2.
18. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2008a, 5.
19. Mutua 1994, 5. An Africa Watch report details the frequent and fatal incidents 1993.
20. International Republican Institute 1993.
21. Commonwealth Observer Group 1993b, 62.
22. Foeken and Dietz 2000, 145; Brown 2007.
23. Carter Center 2009a.
24. Lopez-Pintor 1998.
25. Carter Center 2006a, 16.
26. Croissant 1998.
27. Gross 2009.
28. Gordon 1998.
29. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1996c, 1.
30. Dresser 1994, 58.
31. Likmeta 2009.
32. Youngs 2001a, 5.
33. McFaul 2004, 157.
34. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2000b.
35. Lipset 1959; Carothers 1999; Diamond 2006.
36. Henderson 2002.
37. In Afrobarometor Surveys Lesotho citizens consistently recorded the lowest support for democracy in the South African Development Community (SADC) region. Kabemba 2003, 13.
38. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008b, 28–29.
39. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1999b, 29.
40. Quezada 1998, 178.
41. Carter Center 2000, 7.
42. Pastor 2000.
43. Chand 1997, 558.
44. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2006.
45. Fairbanks 2004; Bunce and Wolchik 2009.
46. Peceny 1999; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006.
47. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1989, 57.
48. The measure used here is the election monitors’ overall assessment of the quality of the election as well as measures by Freedom House on the status of political rights in the country.
49. Commencement Address at American University in Washington, June 10, 1963.
50. A similar argument about the substance of reforms is found in work on the influence of European Institutions on ethnic monitory policies in Eastern European and Baltic countries. Kelley 2004a, conclusion.
1. Elklit 1999, 47.
2. Gettleman 2010.
3. Joint International Observation Group 1998, 1–2.
4. Patten 2000.
5. Commission of the European Communities 2000, 16–17.
6. United Nations 2005.
7. European Union Election Observation Mission 2001b, cover page. Such disclaimers remain routine.
8. United Nations 2005, 2, paragraph 4.
9. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1999b, Chapter 14.
10. International Republican Institute 1994, 86–87.
11. See Chapter 4 for this example.
12. Compare, for example, statements in the pre-election delegation report to the 2008 Bangladesh election (National Democratic Institute 2008a, 1) with those in the final report (National Democratic Institute 2009, 1).
13. Kelley 2009, 62.
14. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, European Parliament, et al. 2008.
15. Kelley 2009. See also the opening quote to Chapter 3.
16. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2004, paragraph 30.
17. European Union Election Observation Mission 2002, 7.
18. For more discussion of this, see also Bjornlund 2004, 307.
19. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2000a, paragraphs 28–29.
20. United Nations Development Programme 2000, 24; Kelley 2009, 62.
21. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2007, appended memorandum, paragraph 10. Similarly, in 1994 in Mexico, the Carter Center (CC) recommended the limitation of private purchase of media spots. But in 2006 the European Union (EU) noted that Article 48.13 of the Election Law, which prohibits third persons to campaign through paid advertising in the broadcast media, appears to violate the citizen’s right to freedom of expression as set out in Article 19 of the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such a restriction should therefore be removed from the Law.” European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 53.
22. In the Cameroon in 1997, for example, the Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) thought it important to be present so that La Francophonie would not be the only organization rendering an assessment. Anglin 1998, 485.
23. General Committee 2008, 32; Davis-Robert and Carroll forthcoming.
24. Elklit 1999, 34.
25. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 1995.
26. See, for example, Council of the European Union 2005.
27. Levy 2010.
28. Lipset 1959; Carothers 1999; Diamond 2006.
29. Elklit also notes the need for international experts to first address the many prerequisite legal and operational aspects of the electoral process before sending in international observers. Elklit 1999, 48.
30. Much has been written on this important topic. For a sample of useful studies on election and conflict, see Kumar 1998; Ottaway 1998; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Mulikita 1999; Snyder 2000; Reilly 2002; Lyons 2004.
31. Schimpp and McKernan 2001.
32. Bratton 1998.
33. The declaration notes that “international election observation missions are expected to issue timely, accurate and impartial statements to the public. . . . presenting their findings, conclusions.” United Nations 2005, 3, Article 7.
34. National Democratic Institute 2000a, 2.
35. Author’s personal experience with attempting to obtain the report.
36. Møller and Skanning 2010; Levitsky and Way 2010.
37. Argersinger 1985.
38. Pastor 2004.
39. Kennedy 1963.
40. Carter Center 2000, 7–8.
41. Personal communication with Carter Center staff. Caroll 2010.
42. Lean 2007b.
43. Garber and Cowen 1994; Estok, Nevitte, et al. 2002; Bjornlund 2006.
44. For the 1987 Philippine elections, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) invited nationals of Bangladesh, Haiti, Chile, Korea, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Taiwan to participate in the delegation. Many of the individuals returned to their respective countries inspired by the Philippine experience in election reform and monitoring and, more important, with specific ideas that they sought to implement in their respective countries. For example: Jose Miguel Barros of Chile became a leader of the Committee for Free Elections (CEL), which played a critical role in ensuring the fairness of the October 5, 1988, plebiscite; Jean Claude Roi, in his role as technical advisor to the provisional election committee in Haiti, introduced a voter registration system based on the Philippine model; Aurelio Barria of Panama organized the National Civic Crusade, modeled on the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Barria became its first chairman, before being exiled; Father Fernando Guardi, also of Panama, stimulated church involvement in encouraging fair elections and played a critical role in establishing a church-sponsored quick count operation.
1. More information on the project, including coding books and manuals, can be found online at the website for the Project on International Election Monitoring: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9748.html. Additional discussion of the data can also be found in Kelley and Kolev 2010.
2. For the criteria for what counted as a mission, see the discussion of the “Monitors” variables in the tables below.
3. See footnote 1.
4. Poe, Carey, et al. 2001.
5. Elklit and Svensson 1997; Elklit 1999; Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Schedler 2002a; Lehoucq 2003; Elklit and Reynolds 2005.
6. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 1995; General Secretariat of the Organization of American States 2007; General Committee 2008; Commission of the European Union undated.
7. European Commission 2007.
8. The full coding rules are available online at http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9748.html.
1. Using the level of democracy in the same year yields similar results.
2. Using the clarify method. Tomz, Wittenberg, et al. 2003.
3. The 95 percent confidence interval ranges from 45 to 2 percent. Results not shown.
1. Rubin 1973; Donald 1979.
2. Ho, Imai, et al. 2007, 205.
3. Simmons and Hopkins 2005.
4. Ho, Imai, et al. 2007, 216–24.
5. Rubin and Thomas 1996.
6. For write-up of the software package, see Sekhon 2007.
7. Ho, Imai, et al. 2007.
8. Ho, Imai, et al. 2007, 18.
9. For an overview and technical aspects, see Mebane and Sekhon 1998; Diamond and Sekhon 2008; Sekhon and Grieve 2008.
10. Dehejia and Wahba 1999.
11. King and Zeng 2007.
12. King and Zeng 2007.
1. We are grateful to Valerie Bunce, Jorgen Elklit, Devin Hagerty, Susan Hyde, Jennifer McCoy, and Andreas Schedler, who have offered their country expertise on several of these cases. Any remaining errors naturally remain our own.
2. Levitsky and Way 2005, 33.
3. Halperin and Lomasney 1998, 135.
4. International Republican Institute 1996a, 15.
5. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1996b, 2.
6. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1997a, 7.
7. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1997a, 5.
8. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1997a, 1.
9. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2001, 1.
10. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presence in Albania 2000, 2.
11. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presence in Albania 2000, 3.
12. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2001.
13. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003b, 2–3.
14. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2009a, 5.
15. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2009b, paragraph 9.
16. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003b, 1.
17. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presence in Albania 2004, 1.
18. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presence in Albania 2004, 1.
19. Elbasani 2004, 40.
20. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005b, 1.
21. Likmeta 2009.
22. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2009a, 1.
23. Croissant 1998.
24. Weitz 2008, 1.
25. Astourian 2000.
26. Coalson and Tamrazian 2009.
27. Hyde 2007, 39.
28. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2000b.
29. Nichol 2006, 12.
30. Ruiz-Rufino 2007, 1.
31. Ruiz-Rufino 2007, 2.
32. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2007b, 28–31.
33. Transitions Online 2008.
34. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1996a.
35. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1999a, 3.
36. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2002a, 4.
37. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2002b, 4.
38. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003d.
39. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003a.
40. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
41. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005c, 5.
42. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2007b.
43. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2007, 3.
44. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2007b, 2.
45. National Democratic Institute 1999a.
46. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003a, 23–24.
47. European Parliament 2007, 3.
48. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008b.
49. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008b, 28–29.
50. Ahmed 2003, 59. He notes, “As an example, reference can be made to the attempt by donors and international election observer teams to persuade the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] to accept the results of the seventh parliamentary elections held in 1996. The BNP initially refused to concede defeat, alleging that the BAL [Bangladesh Awami League], in connivance with the Election Commission, snatched away a victory that was due to it. The representatives of important diplomatic missions in Bangladesh met the BNP chief and requested her to accept the election results. Various international election observer teams, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) team, the EEC [European Economic Community] team, and the Japanese team also called upon the BNP to accept the defeat graciously and with dignity. Ultimately, the BNP agreed to join the seventh parliament. It is not argued that other factors were unimportant in influencing the decision of the BNP not to reject the election results outright. What is observed here is that the BNP was aware of the dangers associated with challenging the opinion of the international teams of observers and the opinion of the representatives of major donor agencies; hence it acquiesced.”
51. Karim and Fair 2007, 1.
52. National Democratic Institute 1991, 7.
53. National Democratic Institute 1991, 7–8.
54. National Democratic Institute 1991, 10.
55. Carter Center and National Democratic Institute 2001; European Union Election Observation Mission 2001a.
56. National Democratic Institute 1991; Commonwealth Observer Group 1996; National Democratic Institute 1996b.
57. Asian Network for Free Elections 2001, 7.
58. National Democratic Institute 2009, 5.
59. National Democratic Institute 1996b.
60. Nevitte and Canton 1997, 55.
61. Commonwealth Observer Group 2008.
62. National Democratic Institute 2008b.
63. National Democratic Institute 1991, 23.
64. National Democratic Institute 2008b, 8.
65. National Democratic Institute 2009, 19.
66. National Democratic Institute 2009, 9.
67. Bulgarian Radio 1997, 9.
68. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1991, 33.
69. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1990, 2.
70. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1991.
71. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1997.
72. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2009b, 12.
73. International Republican Institute 1996b.
74. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005d, 6.
75. Youngs 2001a, 29.
76. McFaul 2004, 157.
77. Forsythe and Rieffer 2000, 1003.
78. Call 2002.
79. Herman and Brodhead 1984; Munck 1993.
80. Baloyra 1993.
81. Baloyra-Herp 1995, 52.
82. Kelley 2008. See also Chapter 2.
83. Herman and Bello 1984; Stahler-Sholk 1994.
84. Munck 1993.
85. International Republican Institute 1991, 28.
86. Montgomery 1998.
87. Stahler-Sholk 1994, 9.
88. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 2000.
89. International Republican Institute 1991, 28; Hartlyn, McCoy, et al. 2008, 90.
90. Call 2002, 582–83.
91. Wolf 2009.
92. Barnes 1998, 69.
93. International Republican Institute 2004b. Curiously, the International Republican Institute (IRI) never publicly issued anything beyond a two-page preliminary statement.
94. This was a big improvement over the January local and legislative elections when three-quarters of all polling stations opened at least half an hour late.
95. European Union Election Observation Mission 2009a.
96. European Union Election Observation Mission 2009a, 4.
97. Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation 2009.
98. European Union Election Observation Mission 2009b, 2.
99. Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation 2009.
100. CommonBorders 2004, 15; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 2009. CommonBorders states that “Many people believed that the U.S. government could and would prohibit the over two billion U.S. dollars in family remittances (equaling 14 percent of El Salvador’s GDP) from even entering the country. Many people, especially in the poorest and most rural regions, told us that fear of losing family remittances was their major rationale for supporting the ARENA [Alianza Republicana Nacionalista] candidate. Fear surrounding the impact of an FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] victory on U.S.-El Salvador relations was further incited by the public statements made by prominent U.S.-government representatives in the months and weeks leading up to the election. . . . Many in El Salvador and abroad felt these comments were not respectful of the autonomy of the Salvadoran people or their rights to a free and fair democratic process.” CommonBorders 2004, 15.
101. CommonBorders 2004, 15; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 2009.
102. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 2009, 6.
103. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 2009, 5.
104. For the front page of the newspaper Diario de Hoy, see http://www.borev.net/assets_c/2009/03/DiarioDeHoy1.html. Last accessed on April 10. 2010.
105. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 2009, 6.
106. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1996a.
107. Tudoroiu 2007.
108. Freedom House 2008.
109. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1992.
110. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1996a, paragraph 61.
111. Bunce and Wolchik 2011, chapter 6 (pages not yet known).
112. Mitchell 2009.
113. Fairbanks 2004; Bunce and Wolchik 2009.
114. On Soros funding, some Liberty Institute associates from Georgia traveled to Serbia to study how Slobodan Milosevic had been ousted. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2004, 4.
115. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2004b, 21.
116. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2004b, 9.
117. Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008, 155.
118. Mitchell and Sidamon-Eristoff 2009.
119. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a.
120. Jones 2006; Tudoroiu 2007.
121. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2007a, 3.
122. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a.
123. Olearchyk 2008.
124. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a.
125. Olearchyk 2008.
126. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2008b, paragraph 1.
127. International Republican Institute 2008a.
128. National Democratic Institute 2008c, 3.
129. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2004b, 9.
130. Now also cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly.
131. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2009a, 5.
132. Carter Center 1992, 17.
133. Carter Center 1992, 18.
134. Carroll and Pastor 1993, 10.
135. European Union Election Observation Mission 2001c, 5.
136. Carroll and Pastor 1993.
137. Bynoe, Thomas, et al. 2007, 102.
138. Carter Center 1992, 19.
139. Kahn 1990.
140. Carter Center 1992, 25.
141. Carroll and Pastor 1993, 10.
142. Carter Center 1992, 12–13.
143. Commonwealth Observer Group 1998.
144. Commonwealth Observer Group 2001, 11.
145. Under the memorandum of understanding (MOU), funding was secured from the European Union (EU), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Kingdom Department for International Development (UKDFID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). See http://www.gecom.org.gy/pdf/elections_MOU.pdf.
146. Carter Center 2001a, 9.
147. Commonwealth Observer Group 2001.
148. Carter Center 2001a, 7.
149. Carter Center 2001a, 37.
150. Carter Center 2001a.
151. Carter Center 2001a, 13.
152. European Union Election Observation Mission 2001c, 3.
153. BBC 2002.
154. Commonwealth Observer Group 2006, 42.
155. Commonwealth Observer Group 2006, 16.
156. Carter Center 2001a, 49.
157. Government of Guyana 2005.
158. Commonwealth Observer Group 2006, 25.
159. Commonwealth Observer Group 2006, 55.
160. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 2006, iv.
161. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2009.
162. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2009, 9–10.
163. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2009, 20–21.
164. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2009, 10.
165. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2009, 21.
166. Chand 1997, 547.
167. Commonwealth Observer Group 2006, 14.
168. Beech 2009; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Sukma 2009; The Economist 2009.
169. Diamond 2009.
170. Beech 2009; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Sukma 2009; The Economist 2009.
171. Bjornlund 2004, 277.
172. Diamond 2009.
173. Ellis 1998; National Democratic Institute 1999b.
174. Bjornlund 2004, 256–57.
175. Bjornlund 2004, 257. Eric Bjornlund further details the unintended consequences of the foreign support for domestic monitoring groups. Bjornlund 2004, chap. 12.
176. Sukma 2009.
177. Asian Network for Free Elections 2009, 6.
178. Asian Network for Free Elections 2009, 22.
179. Bjornlund 2004, 274–76.
180. Bjornlund 2004, 290–93.
181. Asian Network for Free Elections 2009, 46.
182. National Democratic Institute and Carter Center 1999, 3.
183. Dagg 2007.
184. National Democratic Institute 2005, 18.
185. Carter Center 2009a, 14.
186. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1999a, 2.
187. European Parliament 2004, 6.
188. European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 24.
189. European Union Election Observation Mission 1999, Sec 8.
190. European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 25.
191. European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 23–24.
192. European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 25.
193. Carter Center 2009a, 15.
194. Carter Center 2009a, 18–19.
195. European Union Election Observation Mission 1999, Sec 5.2.
196. National Democratic Institute and Carter Center 1999, 22.
197. National Democratic Institute and Carter Center 1999, 15.
198. European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 40.
199. Carter Center 2009a, 5.
200. Carter Center 2009a, 30.
201. European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 33.
202. Quoted in Croissant and Martin 2006, 138.
203. Sukma 2009.
204. International Republican Institute 1992.
205. International Republican Institute 1992, 6.
206. Barkan and Ng’ethe 1998.
207. Ajulu 1998.
208. Election Observation Centre 1998, Executive summary.
209. Commonwealth Observer Group 2002.
210. Howard and Roessler 2006.
211. European Union Election Observation Mission 2002.
212. Gibson and Long 2009.
213. Holmquist and Ford 1992.
214. Carter Center 2003.
215. Bosire 2008.
216. Africa Watch 1993.
217. Geisler 1993.
218. Holmquist and Ford 1994, 8.
219. Brown 2001, 95; Nasong’o 2007.
220. Geisler 1993.
221. International Republican Institute 2008b, 30.
222. International Republican Institute 2007b.
223. Kriegler, Aboud, et al. 2008, 70–71. “The various domestic and international observer groups experienced problems in general with understanding the counting, tallying and transmission processes and the possibilities for them not being conducted strictly according to the various sets of instructions and guidelines issued. This might have led to assessments based on insufficient understanding of these processes, their regulatory foundation and the actual impact of problematic recruitment procedures, unclear rules and insufficient training. The main consequence of this incomplete comprehension of the entire counting, tallying, reporting and announcement process has been a tendency to deliver verdicts on the process which do not give a fully reliable picture of what actually happened after the original counting of votes at the polling station level. . . . These problems and the lack of proper understanding of the process reduce the usefulness of the observer reports The problems at KICC [the Kenyatta International Conference Center] and in the transmission of election results from constituency tallying centres to the national tallying centre must, however, be seen within the context of the other key factors in the entire electoral process: only this will allow a reliable and comprehensive assessment of the quality of the entire electoral process.” Kriegler, Aboud, et al. 2008, 130–32.
224. Kabemba 2003, 17.
225. Interview with Denis Kadima, deputy leader of the observer mission sent to Lesotho by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis 2007.
226. In Afrobarometer Surveys Lesotho citizens consistently recorded the lowest support for democracy in the SADC region. Kabemba 2003, 13.
227. Gumbi 1995.
228. Commonwealth Observer Group 1993a.
229. Kabemba 2003, 6.
230. Kabemba 2003, 37–40.
231. Cho and Bratton 2006.
232. Kabemba 2003, 6.
233. Kabemba 2003, 6–7.
234. Fox and Southall 2004.
235. Southall 2003, 271.
236. Venter 2003.
237. Venter 2003, 28.
238. Cho and Bratton 2006.
239. Elklit 2008.
240. The Industrial Revolutionary Party (PRI) was the successor party to the National Revolutionary Party.
241. Schedler 2010.
242. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 5.
243. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 6.
244. Schedler 2000, 7.
245. Dresser 1994, 58.
246. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 3.
247. Quezada 1998, 178.
248. Carter Center 2000, 7.
249. Pastor 2000.
250. Carter Center 2000, 9–10.
251. Carter Center 1994b, 5.
252. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 29.
253. Scherlen 1998, 23.
254. Dresser 1994, 68.
255. Cornelius 1994, 70.
256. Chand 1997, 558.
257. “According to post-election surveys, about 61 percent of those asked thought that the elections were clean while 24 percent did not and 15 percent did not know. In addition, 64 percent felt that the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) had performed very well. This contrasted sharply with pre-election polls taken in June 1994 when 35 ± 45 percent of those surveyed expected fraud while 65 percent expected violence.” Chand 1997, 557.
258. Carter Center 2000, 7.
259. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 29.
260. Carter Center 1994a, 15; International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 30.
261. Carter Center 1997, 4.
262. Schedler 2000, 8.
263. Pastor 2000, 23.
264. European Parliament 2000, 3.
265. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 19.
266. Carter Center 1994a, 9; International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1994, 9.
267. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 24.
268. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 30.
269. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1997, 8.
270. Carter Center 2000, 18.
271. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 14.
272. The Council of Europe (COE) even declared that the federal elections in Mexico on July 2, 2006, were about “the best organised and conducted elections the Assembly has ever observed.” Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006 5.
273. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 12.
274. For a thorough discussion of the 2006 election, see Schedler 2007.
275. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006a, 52.
276. Rodriguez 2009.
277. Carrillo and Navarro undated.
278. National Democratic Institute 2006, 1.
279. Pastor 2006.
280. Carter Center 2000, 9.
281. Lopez-Pintor 1998.
282. Anderson and Dodd 2002, 93.
283. Dye, Butler, et al. 1995.
284. Carter Center 1990, 12.
285. Dye, Butler, et al. 1995.
286. International Republican Institute 1997.
287. Carter Center 1996, 38; Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 2002.
288. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1996.
289. The pact primarily served the interests of Manuel Ortego and Arnoldo Alemán in consolidating their power and acquiring immunity from prosecuting Dye. Spence et al. 2000, 7–10.
290. Carter Center 2001b.
291. International Republican Institute 2002.
292. Carter Center 2001b, 29.
293. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006b.
294. Carter Center 2006a, 20.
295. Carter Center 2006a, 39.
296. O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999.
297. Lopez-Pintor 1998.
298. Carter Center 2006a, 16.
299. European Union Election Observation Mission 2006b, 14.
300. McConnell 2007, 88.
301. Dye, Spence, et al. 2000, 2.
302. Carter Center 2006a, 39.
303. Scranton 1998, 217.
304. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1989, 19–20.
305. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1989, 57. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1989, 61.
306. Carter Center 1994c, 2.
307. National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute 1989, 2.
308. Carter Center 1994c, 3.
309. Carter Center 1994c, 8.
310. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1999b, 8.
311. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 2004b, 4.
312. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 2004b, 18.
313. International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1999b, 29.
314. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2003c, 3.
315. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1996b, 4.
316. International Republican Institute 1996c, 2.
317. International Republican Institute 1996c, 2.
318. For a detailed accounting of which recommendations were followed, see International Republican Institute 1996c, Appendix IX.
319. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2000a, paragraph 8.
320. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2004a, 4.
321. Association of European Election Officials, 13.
322. Gordon 1998.
323. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1996b, 1.
324. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000a, 2.
325. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2004c, 7.
326. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2004c, 21–22.
327. The fact that the president ran as for the parliamentary elections as head of the United Russia list without stepping down from his office as president was unprecedented within the member states of the COE.
328. Fawn 2006.
329. Saari 2009.
330. Carothers 1997, 23.
331. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2008a, 5.
332. Alence 2004, 79.
333. Anglin 1995, 541.
334. Anglin 1995, 521.
335. International Republican Institute 1994, 85.
336. European Union Election Unit 1994, 6; International Republican Institute 1994, 120.
337. Personal interview, May 20, 2010, Aarhus University, Denmark.
338. International Republican Institute 1994, 1.
339. Anglin 1995, 539.
340. Anglin 1995, 541.
341. For the 1999 election, there was a small delegation of European Parliamentarians for Africa, but they did not issue a formal report.
342. Commonwealth Observer Group 1999.
343. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2004, 6.
344. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2004, 17.
345. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2004, 28–29.
346. South African Development Community Parliamentary Observer Mission 2004.
347. African Union 2004, paragraph 92.
348. Lemon 2005.
349. Alence 2004, 79.
350. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2009.