See Authors page at the back of the book for biographical sketches.
In May 1959, Glennan also appointed Gilruth Assistant Director for Manned Satellites at Goddard. Harry J. Goett was named Director of the new center in September.
Vega and Centaur were upper stages for launch vehicles. The Vega was either one or two stages (depending on the payload to be lifted or moved about in space) and used conventional fuels. Toward the end of 1959, Vega was canceled because it was too similar to the Air Force Agena. NASA continued development of the Centaur upper stage because of its more exotic propellants, hydrogen and oxygen, which promised lifting power far beyond the weight of its fuel load—about 40 percent greater than possible with conventional rocket fuels like kerosene. It was not until 1966 that the agency had some confidence that the vehicle could be trusted for manned flights.
Saturn and Nova were multistage launch vehicles, not clearly defined during NASA’s first three years and often described in ways that made it difficult to tell which was which (see page 47) . Some Apollo program participants contend that the Saturn V, eventually selected, was very close to what would have been a Nova had the agency chosen it.
Goett’s committee consisted of Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. (Ames), Bruce T. Lundin (Lewis), Loftin (Langley), DeElroy E. Beeler (High Speed Flight Station), Harris M. Schurmeier (JPL), Maxime A. Faget (Space Task Group) , and George M. Low, Milton B. Ames, Jr., and Ralph W. May, Jr., secretary (Headquarters) . Ames was a part-time member.
Cryogenic fuels are corrosive and are difficult to store for any length of time because of the low temperatures required to maintain the proper state of the oxidizer—in this case, liquid oxygen. This fuel, moreover, requires the extra complication of an igniter to fire it. A throttleable engine is one that can be started and stopped as needed. Storable propellants are hypergolic fuels that ignite on contact with the oxidizer, demand no special temperature controls, are not corrosive, and can remain in storage indefinitely. The power systems Lundin talked about were fuel (or solar) cells that could generate the electrical energy needed on long flights without the weight penalties attached to the moreconventional batteries used in Mercury.
On the instigation of E. C. Braley and Loftin, Langley had held a conference on 10 July 1959 to study the aspects of placing a manned space laboratory in operation. This project was seen as a step to the eventual landing of a man on the moon in 10 to 15 years.
The members of the Strass group were Alan B. Kehlet, William S. Augerson, Robert G. Chilton, Jack Funk, Caldwell C. Johnson, Jr., Harry H. Ricker, Jr., and Stanley C. White.
By June of 1959 the original Space Task Group complement of 45 had grown to 367. Gilruth anticipated that the personnel requirements for fiscal year 1961 would be 909; most of the new employees would be assigned to a maneuverable manned satellite, a manned orbiting laboratory, and a manned lunar expedition.
From Boeing; Convair/Avco; Cornell/Bell/Raytheon; Douglas; General Electric/Bell; Goodyear ; Grumman/ITT; Guardite; Lockheed; McDonnell; Martin; North American; Republic; and Vought.
Panel members were Malcolm H. Hebb, Lawrence A. Hyland, Donald P. Ling, Brockway McMillan, J. Martin Schwarzschild, and Douglas R. Lord (technical assistant).
Budget estimates drafted in September 1960 placed Apollo costs at $100 000 for FY 1960 and $1 000 000 for 1961; NASA intended to ask for $35 500 000 for the program for FY 1962.
Kennedy and Webb held budgetary discussions on 22 March, in which they covered 11 actions NASA would have to take to accelerate the space program: (I) increase the number of Mercury flights to learn more about man’s behavior in space; (2) initiate possible long-duration Mercury flights with intermediate launch vehicles; (3) accelerate exploration to provide data for manned flights; (4) speed up studies of manned reentries at lunar return velocities; (5) begin development of solid-propellant rockets for first or second stages of Nova; (6) start design work on clustered F-1 engines for Nova; (7) commence design engineering of Nova, using clustered F-1 engines for the first stage; (8) begin developing tankage and engines for Nova’s second stage; (9) expedite supporting technology required for attainment of lunar goal; (10) start construction of launch pads and other facilities; and (11) provide additional vehicles and spacecraft to hasten the Tiros meteorological program. Budget Director David E. Bell later wrote the President that Webb and his associates had presented the case for an accelerated space program very well. But, he warned, the United States might be better advised to concern itself with “men on earth” rather than with putting “men on the moon.”
The first astronauts were military test pilots: from the Navy, Lieutenant Commanders Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and Alan B. Shepard, Jr., and Lieutenant M. Scott Carpenter; from the Air Force, Captains L. Gordon Cooper, Virgil I. Grissom, and Donald K. Slayton; and from the Marines. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Glenn, Jr.
The Fleming Committee, composed of about 20 members from both Headquarters and the field centers, concluded that “it is not unreasonable to achieve the first attempt of a manned lunar landing in 1967 provided there is a truly determined National effort.” Reaching this goal would depend on the development of an adequate launch vehicle.
Lundin’s team consisted of Alfred Eggers (Ames) , Walter J. Downhower (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) , Lieutenant Colonel George W. S. Johnson (Air Force) , Laurence Loftin (Langley) , Harry O. Ruppe (Marshall) , and William J. D. Escher and Ralph May, secretaries (NASA Headquarters) .
Before and during the Apollo feasibility studies, the Ames center had focused on guidance and navigation as the area where it could be most useful to Apollo. Stanley F. Schmidt had looked at midcourse guidance; Dean R. Chapman and Rodney Wingrove had concentrated on reentry guidance; and G. Allan Smith had worked on instrumentation for the astronauts’ onboard operations.
On 10 May 1960, the U.S.S. Triton completed a 66 800-kilometer submerged cruise around the globe.
The 14 firms were Boeing, Chance Vought, Douglas, Astronautics Division of General Dynamics, General Electric, Goodyear Aircraft, Grumman, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Martin, McDonnell, North American, Radio Corporation of America, Republic Aviation, and Space Technology Laboratories (STL) .
General Dynamics/Astronautics with Avco; General Electric, with Douglas, Grumman, and STL; McDonnell, with Lockheed Aircraft, Hughes Aircraft, and Chance Vought; Martin; and North American.
Heaton’s committee was made up of Commander L. E. Baird (Navy) ; Richard B. Canright, Norman Rafel, Joseph E. McGolrick, L. H. Glassman, John L. Hammersmith, Robert D. Briskman, James Nolan, Warren North, and William H. Woodward (NASA Headquarters); Wilson B. Schramm, R. Voss, Paul J. DeFries, Heinz Koelle, and Harry Ruppe (Marsfiall); William H. Phillips and John Houbolt (Langley); Hubert M. Drake (Flight Research Center); and J. Yolles (Air Force Systems Command) .
The steering committee attendance was flexible; the only members who met regularly were Seamans, Don Ostrander, Ray Romatowski, and Fleming (committee secretary) . Less frequent attendees were Silverstein, Ira Abbott, Hyatt, DeMarquis D. Wyatt, Nicholas E. Golovin, Alfred Mayo, G. Dale Smith, John D. Young, Charles H. Roadman, Low, Milton W. Rosen, and Wesley Hjornevik (all of Headquarters) ; Eberhard F. M. Rees and Hans H. Maus (of Marshall) ; and Gilruth (STG) .
Only the three vehicles indicated by an asterisk were actually developed and flown in the Apollo program.
The Golovin Committee originally comprised 14 member and alternate positions, equally divided between DoD and NASA. By the end of the study, these had expanded to 18 and included personnel from Aerospace Corp. (acting as advisers to DoD) . The final roster listed Golovin (chairman) , Eldon Hall, Harvey Hall, Milton W. Rosen, Kurt R. Stehling, and William W. Wolman (NASA Headquarters) ; Laurence Kavanau (cochairman and Director of Office of Defense) ; Warren Amster and Edward J. Barlow (Aerospace) ; Aleck C. Bond (Space Task Group) ; Seymour C. Himmel (Lewis) ; Wilson B. Schramm and Francis L. Williams (Marshall) ; Colonel Mathew R. Collins (Army) ; Rear Admiral Levering Smith and Captain Lewis J. Stecher, Jr. (Navy) ; and Colonel Otto J. Glasser, Lieutenant Colonel David L. Carter, and Heinrich J. Weigand (Air Force). James F. Chalmers, Aerospace, was secretary.
Although the Saturn versus Nova debates continued, the selection of Michoud ended all chances of clustering eight F-I engines in the first stage—unless the plant roof were raised. The fact that only four or five barrels could be put together did not worry Marshall, as this number would be more than enough to support assembly in earth orbit, that center’s favored mode. Proponents of direct flight had essentially lost their vehicle; but they continued to argue for another year, anyway.
For details of procedures and the criteria on which the decision was based, see Appendix A.
Webb had written Gilruth in June 1961 that he seriously doubted NASA would be permitted to establish any large activity including several thousand more people in the Virginia area. Although no commitment had been made, Webb had learned from Congressman Thomas that Rice University in Houston had set aside 15 square kilometers of land for a research institution. Its location near the Houston ship channel made it highly desirable for NASA. Earlier, Don Ostrander had recommended to Seamans that the Space Task Group be moved to and combined with Marshall in Huntsville.
The committee consisted of Milton Rosen, Richard B. Canright, Eldon Hall, Elliott Mitchell, Norman Rafel, Melvin Savage, Adelbert O. Tischler, and John Disher (from Headquarters) ; William A. Mrasek, Hans H. Maus, and James B. Bramlet (Marshall) ; and David M. Hammock (Manned Spacecraft Center) .
The Management Council comprised Holmes, Low, Rosen, Charles H. Roadman, William E. Lilly, and Joseph F. Shea (Headquarters) ; von Braun and Eberhard F. M. Rees (Marshall) ; and Gilruth and Walter C. Williams (Manned Spacecraft Center) .
The three were Boeing, first stage; North American, second stage; and Douglas, third (S-IVB) stage.
Most deeply engaged in Langley’s rendezvous studies were John Bird, Max C. Kurbjun, Ralph W. Stone, Jr., John M. Eggleston, Roy F. Brissenden, William H. Michael, Jr., Manuel J. Queijo, John A. Dodgen, Arthur Vogeley, William D. Mace, W. Hewitt Phillips, Clinton E. Brown, and John C. Houbolt.
MALLIR embodied lunar-orbit rendezvous and a separate landing craft. Because America had no launch vehicle large enough to send a craft to the moon with only one earth launch, it also required an earth-orbital rendezvous before the spacecraft departed on a lunar trajectory.
Chilton’s board members were Caldwell C. Johnson, Jr., Charles F. Bingman, Arthur E. Garrison, and Carl D. Sword of MSC; Richard C. Henry and Earl E. McGinty of NASA Headquarters; Merrill H. Mead of Ames; and two nonvoting participants, Ralph Ragan of MIT and James T. Koppenhaver of NASA Headquarters.
Companies invited to submit proposals were Lockheed, Boeing, Ling-Temco-Vought, Northrop, Grumman, Douglas, General Dynamics, Republic Aviation, Martin-Marietta, North American, and McDonnell.
At a celebration given on 4 July 1962 by the Houston Chamber of Commerce to welcome Manned Spacecraft Center employees and their families to Texas, Gilruth had intimated that the new control center would be built at the Clear Lake site.
The nine new members of the astronaut corps were Neil A. Armstrong, Frank Borman, Charles Conrad, Jr., James A. Lovell, Jr., James A. McDivitt, Elliot M. See, Jr., Thomas P. Stafford, Edward H. White II, and John W. Young. All except Armstrong and See were members of one of the armed services. See did not attend the launch because he was clearing up some personal business before reporting to the Houston center. The designation “trainee” soon disappeared, except in some official documentation.
Board membership consisted of: from the Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), Deputy Director, Systems, and Deputy Director, Programs; from Marshall (MSFC) , Deputy Director, Research and Development, and two Associate Directors; from the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) , Deputy Director, Development and Programs, and Deputy Director, Mission Requirements and Flight Operations; and from the Launch Operations Center (LOC) , Assistant Director, Plans and Project Management. The authorized panels and their cochairmen were: Crew Safety, Joachim P. Kuettner (MSFC) and Alfred D. Mardel (MSC) ; Electrical Systems Integration, Hans J. Fichtner (MSFC) and Milton G. Kingsley (MSC) ; Flight Mechanics, Rudolf F. Hoelker (MSFC) and Calvin H. Perrine (MSC) ; Launch Operations, Rocco A. Petrone (LOC) and Walter C. Williams (MSC) ; Mechanical Design Integration, Hans R. Palaoro (MSFC) and Lyle M. Jenkins (MSC) ; Mission Control Operations, Fridtjof A. Speer (MSFC) and John D. Hodge (MSC) ; and Onboard Instrumentation, Otto A. Hoberg (MSFC) and Alfred B. Eickmeier (MSC) .
The council, established on 21 December 1961, originally consisted of Holmes, his directors in OMSF (Charles H. Roadman, Aerospace Medicine; Milton W. Rosen, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion; and William E. Lilly, Program Review and Resources Management), and his deputies (Shea, Systems Engineering, and Low, Spacecraft and Flight Missions) ; Wernher von Braun, Director, and Eberhard F. M. Rees, Deputy Director (MSFC) ; and Gilruth, Director, and Walter C. Williams, Associate Director (MSC) . By 27 February 1962, James E. Sloan, Holmes’ Director of Integration and Checkout, and Kurt Debus, Director, LOC, had been added. On 26 and 27 February 1963, three new names appeared on the council rolls; James C. Elms, Deputy Director, Development and Programs (MSC) ; Albert F. Siepert, Deputy Director (LOC) ; and Robert F. Freitag, Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (OMSF—replacing Rosen). During 1963, George M. Knauf took over from Roadman as Director of Aerospace Medicine.
The astronauts in the third group (announced 18 October 1963) were Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., William A. Anders, Charles A. Bassett II. Alan L. Bean, Eugene A. Cernan, Roger B. Chaffee, Michael Collins, R. Walter Cunningham, Donn F. Eisele, Theodore C. Freeman, Richard F. Gordon, Jr., Russell L. Schweickart, David R. Scott, and Clifton C. Williams, Jr. As in the second group, only two (Cunningham and Schweickart) were not members of the military services.
The lunar module nestled inside the adapter (SLA) from launch through separation of the service module from the S-IVB. The honeycomb panels of the adapter were then explosively fired to allow the command and service modules, after turning around and docking with the lunar module, to pull the lander from the booster’s third stage.
Christopher C. Kraft, Donald K. Slayton, Caldcvell C. Johnson, Owen E. Maynard, and Clinton L. Taylor would act for NASA, and H. Gary Osbon and Charles H. Feltz for the contractor.
Board membership had changed considerably. Maynard (Chairman) , Faget, Slayton, Owen G. Morris, Taylor, and Sigurd A. Sjoberg represented NASA, and Norman J. Ryker, Jr., and Kehlet acted for North American.
The first Little Joe II, a qualification test vehicle without a payload, was launched successfully on 28 August 1963.
The descent engine had another possible chore: to act as a backup propulsion system if the service module engine failed to fire on its way to the moon. No special modification to the descent engine was required, but the docking structure on the spacecraft had to be strengthened to withstand the shock of the firing.
An interesting example of pilot preference influencing spacecraft design revolved around including an “eight-ball” (an artificial-horizon instrument used for attitude reference) in the lunar module. Grumman had proposed an eight-ball, assuming that the astronauts would want it. Arnold Whitaker recalled, “The first thing NASA did was to say that there’s no operational requirement for it—take it out. So we took it out. Then the astronauts came along and said, ‘That’s ridiculous. We must have it.’ So we put it [back] in. By this time, we’re late. Dr. Shea had a program review and said, ‘What’s holding you up?’ And we said, ‘This is one of the things....’ And he said, ‘Take it out. I’ll accept the responsibility for it.’ The astronauts found out about it and said, ‘We won’t fly a vehicle until you put it in.’ And NASA put it in, this time with a kit [for easy removal later].”
The rocket engine of the ascent stage developed about 15 500 newtons (3500 pounds) of thrust, which produced a velocity of 2000 meters per second from lunar launch to docking. The descent stage, a throttleable engine, reached a maximum of 43 900 newtons (9870 pounds) and operated at a minimum of 4700 newtons (1050 pounds) for delicate maneuvers. Considerably larger than the two lunar module engines, the service module motor attained 91 200 newtons (20 500 pounds) of thrust.
Committee members were Max Faget (chairman) , Rector, Joseph G. Thibodaux, and C. Harold Lambert (MSC) ; Charles H. King and Adelbert O. Tischler (NASA Headquarters) ; Leland F. Belew (Marshall); Irving A. Johnson (Lewis) ; P. Layton (Princeton University) ; Major W. R. Moe (Edwards Rocket Research Laboratory, USAF) ; and Joseph M. Gavin and M. Dandridge (Grumman).
Members of the Subcontractor Review Board for the LEM Descent Engine were Faget (chairman) , Dave W. Lang (Procurement) , André J. Meyer, Jr. (Gemini) , Joseph G. Thibodaux, Jr. (Propulsion and Power Division) , and Rector.
Gemini manager Charles W. Mathews was having trouble getting reliable engines for his spacecraft from Rocketdyne. In its decision, the board was obviously supporting both his program and Apollo.
Board members were Maynard, Rector, Faget, Kraft, and Donald Slayton from Houston and R. W. Carbee and Kelly from Bethpage.
The two contractors had worked together amicably enough on the Project Christmas Present Report (detailed vehicle test plan) , led by North American, and on the Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, headed by Grumman. Both are discussed in Chapter 5.
See Chapter 5. Members of the review board were Mueller and Phillips (NASA Headquarters), George Low (Houston), Eberhard Rees (Marshall), and Rocco Petrone (Kennedy).
The first DCR had been conducted on Gemini III on a one-time basis; Mueller was so impressed with the results that he continued the practice for all future missions.
Arnold Whitaker described how the fabrication group was caught in the squeeze between manufacturing requirements and schedule pressures. At a program management meeting he said that “one of the fellows in manufacturing came in [with] a light cardboard box.... He said, ‘I’ll show you why everything’s late.’ And he dumped out a whole box of machined parts ... , very complex fittings [too thin to be even] reasonably heavy sheet metal—but it wasn’t any sheet metal, it was a complex machined fitting. And he said ‘Man, we never built parts like this before in any quantity like this and every fitting on the LEM looks like this.’
SA-9 was the last of the eight S-I first stages built by Marshall; SA-8 was the first built by Chrysler at the Michoud facility in Louisiana. Chrysler needed more time to develop its stage, so SA-9 flew first.
Soviet Cosmonaut Aleksey Leonov had taken the world’s first space walk when he left the confines of Voskhod II on 18 March 1965.
Some Apollo engineers did not agree with Tindall. James C. Church thought Apollo might learn something about program control from Gemini, and Calvin H. Perrine wanted some expert advice on ground test programs from the office that had just gone through that experience. Duncan believed the Gemini sextant might be modified for use on Apollo. Rolf W. Lanzkron and Joseph P. Lcftus, Jr., were anxious to learn anything they could from the crews that they might apply to Apollo. And H. B. Graham of North American, who made a comparison of Apollo and Gemini checkout procedures, assumed that further study might show some of the Gemini measures applicable to Apollo.
Glynn S. Lunney had already been assigned to direct AS-201, scheduled to fly 26 February 1966.
The Saturn IB first stage differed from that of the Saturn I in that its eight engines had been uprated from 5.8 million to a total of 7.1 million newtons (from 1.3 million to 1.6 million pounds of thrust) .
Langley Research Center made another study of liquid-hydrogen behavior under zero gravity during 1966. On 7 June, Wallops Island crews launched a two-stage Wasp (Weightless Analysis Sounding Probe) , carrying a 680-kilogram scale model of an S-II fuel tank. For seven minutes of weightless flight, television cameras mounted on a transparent tank transmitted data back to Wallops that added to the confidence of Houston engineers in launching AS-203 the following month.
Dry weight—fully loaded with fuel and oxidizer, it weighed 2 766 000 kilograms.
After attending a lunar module status review at Bethpage on 18 May, Harold G. Russell, Special Assistant to Phillips for Operational Readiness, expressed his mounting concern about Grumman’s chances for meeting the operational readiness dates for facilities at the Cape. The company was reporting delays of two and a half months in support of LM-1, but, Russell told Phillips, “from an analysis of the GAEC internal reporting system (if they really have such a system) , the slippages may be worse than they are reporting. I seriously question the GAEC management visibility into their critical problem areas.”
In 1966, TRW’s Space Technology Laboratories (the familiar “STL”) was renamed TRW Systems Group.
A separate set of thrusters, used to orient the spacecraft for and to control it during reentry. Mission rules required the landing of the craft as soon as possible after they were fired.
The 19 candidates were Vance D. Brand, John S. Bull, Gerald P. Carr, Charles M. Duke, Jr., Joe H. Engle, Ronald E. Evans, Edward G. Givens, Jr., Fred W. Haise, Jr., James B. Irwin, Don L. Lind. John R. Lousma, Thomas K. Mattingly II, Bruce McCandless II, Edgar D. Mitchell, William R. Pogue, Stuart A. Roosa, John L. Swigert, Jr., Paul J. Weitz, and Alfred M. Worden. Actually this fifth set brought the total selected to 55, but the number on active status had been reduced for a variety of reasons: John Glenn had resigned to pursue a political and business career; Scott Carpenter had returned to duty in the Navy; and Charles Bassett, Theodore Freeman, and Elliot See had been killed in aircraft accident.
NASA announced 21 March 1966 that these three astronauts would fly the first manned Apollo mission.
More than a week earlier, in an altitude chamber test at the Cape, the crewmen had complained that their eyes had smarted when they plugged the suit circuit into the environmental control unit.
Earlier in January, Douglas Broome of the Apollo office in Houston had recommended using heavier wire in the communications systems. The size North American had installed in spacecraft 012, he said, was too flimsy and too subject to damage.
Both Slayton and Joseph Shea had thought of joining the crew in the spacecraft to participate in the test so they could get more feel for actual operations. This was not an unusual procedure, but the time for the scheduled launch was too near. Instead, Shea had flown back to Houston, and Slayton had elected to sit with the CapCom and watch.
After the loss of Grissom’s spacecraft in Mercury, when a faulty mechanism blew the hatch prematurely, Space Task Group designers had gone from an explosive to a mechanically operated hatch. This practice continued in Gemini and Apollo.
In August 1966, three fire extinguishers, weighing only 5.7 to 6 kilograms, were evaluated for spacecraft 012 and subsequent flights. The extinguisher selected would be stowed on liftoff for the first manned flights. On later missions, it would be mounted in brackets. All three used Freon FE 1301, a most efficient extinguishing agent on the ground. Under space conditions, however, the chemical worked more slowly, required a higher level of saturation of the flammable materials, and, even worse, generated a gas that might, in sufficient quantities, prove fatal to the crew. Other chemicals would of course be tested, but this would take time.
The widows of Grissom, White, and Chaffee sued North American for negligence in spacecraft manufacture. In 1972, out-of-court settlements to the three totaled $650 000.
Members of the tiger team were Douglas Broome, Aaron Cohen, Jerry W. Craig, Richard E. Lindeman, and Scott H. Simpkinson.
During fiscal 1970 budget hearings before the House space committee, Congressman James Fulton asked George Mueller on 11 March 1969 to give a “statement in the record of the actual cost in dollars ... and actual delay caused ... by the Apollo 204 fire....” Mueller’s submitted reply said. “The estimated additional direct cost to Apollo ... resulting from the Apollo 204 accident is $410 million, principally in the area of modifications to the spacecraft. The accident delayed the first manned flight test of the Apollo spacecraft by approximately 18 months.”
Grissom’s crew had received approval for an “Apollo 1” patch in June 1966, but as the time for the launch approached NASA Headquarters was leaning toward calling that mission “AS-204.” After the accident, the widows asked that Apollo 1 be reserved for the flight their husbands would never make. Webb, Seamans, and Mueller agreed. For a time, mission planners in Houston called the next scheduled launch ”Apollo 2.” In March 1967, Low wrote to Mueller, suggesting that, for historic purposes, the flights should be called ”Apollo 1” (AS-204) , “Apollo IA” (AS-201) , “Apollo 2” (AS-202), and ”Apollo 3” (AS-203). In April, Julian Scheer, Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, notified the centers that the NASA Project Designation Committee had approved the Office of Manned Space Flight recommendation of “Apollo 4” for the first Apollo-Saturn V mission (AS-501), but there would be no retroactive renaming of AS-201, -202, or -203. Much correspondence followed, but the sequence of, and reasoning behind, mission designations has never been really clear to anyone.
In May, North American’s Space and Information Systems Division in Downey had been renamed simply the “Space” Division, to reflect its major mission.
On 22 September 1967, North American Aviation and the Rockwell-Standard Corporation had merged into a single company, North American Rockwell Corporation, which was then divided into two major elements -the Commercial Products Group and the Aerospace and Systems Group. For consistency and brevity, this history will refer to the latter as “North American.”
Since they were not as far down the production line as 101, spacecraft 103 through 106 would have their coaxial cables removed and wrapped, which should not take longer than five days. Later spacecraft would be fitted with coaxial cables that met nonmetallic materials guidelines.
During Apollo 6 activities, a small intercenter irritation surfaced. Although almost everyone referred to the whole Florida launch layout as “the Cape,” Albert Siepert, Deputy Director for Kennedy Space Center Management, wrote Wesley Hjornevik in Houston to point out that Launch Complex 39 was situated entirely within the geographical boundaries of the entity known as the “Kennedy Space Center, NASA.” Noting that the widespread use of “the Cape” was a nostalgic hearkening back to Mercury and Cape Canaveral, Siepert nevertheless maintained that “NASA report writers ought not to confuse geographic proximity to the Cape as the same thing as being on it.” However that may have been, the terminology “launched from the Cape ...” continued to be used by the news media—and the present authors.
The camera photographed sections of the United States, the Atlantic Ocean, Africa, and the western Pacific Ocean. This camera had a haze-penetrating film and filter combination that provided better color balance and higher resolution than any photographs obtained during the Mercury and Gemini flights.
If the S-IVB had made its second burn, the service module engine would have fired for only 280 seconds.
The Gemini launch vehicle engines were hypergolic, that is, its oxidizer and fuel burned on contact to produce thrust. Since the Saturn first stage (S-IC) engines were cryogenic, the propellant and oxidizer needed an igniter to produce burning—and no one expected a similar pogo problem with the larger booster.
The stack comprised an S-IVB forward skirt, launch vehicle instrument unit, spacecraft-lunar module adapter, LM-2, a service module, a Block I command module, and the launch escape system from boilerplate 30.
Morale problems among agency workers arose at different points in the Mercury and Gemini programs. Mercury ended abruptly in June 1963 (after six manned flights). Most of the personnel simply moved on into Gemini or Apollo positions. Gemini suffered its morale drop after eight of its ten manned flights, and the scramble for new jobs in mid-1966 was more frantic than it had been three years earlier. The problems of hiring and firing in industry for short-term programs such as space and weapon system projects have never really been resolved. And the same is essentially true for federal agencies.
After being first Associate and then Deputy Administrator of NASA for more than seven years, Robert Seamans (who originally intended to stay only two years) resigned on 2 October 1967 and left the agency on 5 January 1968. On 31 January, President Lyndon Johnson announced the nomination of Paine, a General Electric official, to replace Seamans. Paine was confirmed by the Senate on 5 February and sworn into office on 25 March.
There had been other names for the crew positions. In 1966, for example, when the Grissom and Schirra crews were in training, the terminology was command pilot, senior pilot, and pilot.
An innovation for Apollo manned flights was the support crew. For Apollo 7, this would be John Swigert, Ronald Evans, and William Pogue. Perhaps their most important duty was coordinating and maintaining the Flight Data File, which included the flight plan, checklists, and mission ground rules, making sure that these were kept up to date and that the other crews were informed of changes. The support crews used the simulators to work out procedures, especially for emergency situations. Thus, when the prime and backup teams trained on the simulators, procedures were ready and they could devote their time to mastering them. In countdown tests, the support crews set up the cockpit, making sure that all switches were in the proper positions. Swigert, Evans, and Pogue also stood by during spacecraft tests on the pad, to assist the prime or backup crew to get out in case of emergency.
Clifton Williams, the third member of McDivitt’s backup crew, had been killed in a T-38 aircraft crash on 5 October 1967 and was replaced by Bean.
Producer of the Bill Dana “Jose Jimenez in Orbit” record album in the 1960s and provider of many of the music tapes broadcast to the Gemini crews from mission control.
The team members were Maxime A. Faget, Engineering and Development; Joseph N. Kotanchik, Structures and Mechanics; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Flight Operations; Raines, Reliability and Quality Assurance; Donald K. Slayton, Flight Crew Operations; and Harmon L. Brendle (secretary) , the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office.
And this despite elaborate precautions taken to isolate the crewmen and protect them from whatever virus might be making the rounds during the last few days before launch. This launch was the first to be delayed by crew illness. Since the mission simulators had been able to provide training for only the prime crew the last month before Apollo 9 was scheduled for launch, the backup crew was not ready to fly on 28 February.
Hage had replaced William Schneider when Schneider was named to head the Apollo Applications Program (later Skylab) after the death of its director, Harold T. Luskin.
John Young and Michael Collins aboard Gemini X and Conrad and Richard Gordon in Gemini XI had boosted their spacecraft to higher altitudes with the help of the Agena.
For the first time in an Apollo mission, all three crewmen slept at the same time.
Since it had been over so quickly, leaving no aftereffects, Schweickart’s first sickness had not been reported to the ground. When it happened again, four hours later, McDivitt asked for medical advice, which started the controversy.
For operations outside the spacecraft, Apollo astronauts wore an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) , consisting of a pressure-garment assembly with helmet and integrated thermal garment; gloves; visor assembly; boots; liquid-cooled undergarment; portable life support system (PLSS, or backpack) , with communicators and remote control unit; and oxygen purge system. Total cost of the EMU was $400 000.
CSM-105 had been assigned as a ground test spacecraft in May 1968.
During all phases of Apollo—seven more lunar flights, three Skylab missions, and one Apollo-Soyuz Test Project flight—there was only one other all-veteran crew: Neil Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin, and Michael Collins on Apollo 11.
These names—of a small boy and a beagle—were borrowed from the popular comic strip “Peanuts,” created by Charles L. Schultz. Schultz’ drawings were also used by NASA to promote manned space flight safety awareness. Persons making notable contributions in this field were given “Silver Snoopy Award” pins by the astronauts.
King Baudoin and Queen Fabiola of the Belgians flew to KSC on Air Force One two hours before liftoff.
Getting into and out of the suits in the small lunar module would be difficult, the crewmen realized, although they found that putting them on was not too great a chore. Simpler procedures would have to be worked out for crews that would remain in the lander for longer periods.
Mission planner Carl Huss had talked with the astronauts (especially Russell Schweickart) during the early days about manual control. At that time, however, his group thought the lander had enough redundancy and backup systems to do the job. As the landing flight drew near, astronaut interest in manual control naturally heightened.
Paine was no longer “Acting” head of the agency. On 5 March 1969, President Nixon had nominated him as Administrator, and on 3 April Vice-President Agnew had sworn him into office.
Low informed the Public Affairs Officer in Houston that “the basic decision was made by my Configuration Control Board ... based on a recommendation by the Flight Crew Operations Directorate. I am sure that Armstrong had made an input to this recommendation, but he, by no means, had the final say. The CCB decision was final.”
The committee comprised Homer Newell, Mueller, Lieutenant General Frank A. Bogart (alternate) , Phillip, Thomas E. Jenkins (alternate) , Gilruth, Johnston (alternate) , von Braun, Debus, Paul G. Dembling, Scheer, Arnold W. Frutkin, and James L. Daniels, Jr. (secretary).
Hodge’s team consisted of Peter J. Armitage, Aleck C. Bond, John W. Conlon, D. Owen Coons, Joseph Kerwin, Paul H. Vavra, an(1 Earle B. Young (MSC) ; E. Barton Geer (Langley) ; A. G. Wedum (Fort Detrick) ; and Donald U. Wise (NASA Headquarters).
The panel consisted of Johnston (chairman) , Walter W. Kemmerer, Jr., Persa R. Bell, R. Bryan Erb, Bennie C. Wooley, John C. Stonesifer, James H. Chappee, and Herbert L. Tash (secretary).
Site 2 was on the east central part of the moon in southwestern Mare Tranquillitatis. It was about 100 kilometers east of the rim of Crater Sabine and 190 west southwest of Crater Maskelyne—latitude 0° 43’ 56” north, longitude 23° 38’ 51” east.
Dr. Ralph D. Abernathy.
Luna 15 entered lunar orbit 17 July and made 52 revolutions of the moon before hard-landing on the surface. Unmanned Luna 16, launched by the U.S.S.R. on 12 Sept. 1970, soft-landed with an earth-operated drill and returned a recovery capsule containing a cylinder of lunar soil to the earth on 24 Sept. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, Staff Report prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, vol. 1, 30 Aug. 1976, pp. 145—49.
The lunar module, which weighed more than the command and service modules combined, was feeling the pull of the moon’s gravity.
Whether he actually uttered the article or not later caused considerable discussion. Armstrong, himself, later wrote: “I thought it had been included. Although it is technically possible that the VOX didn’t pick it up and transmit it, my listening to the recording indicates it is more likely that it was just omitted.”
Armstrong even tried jumping straight up. When he noticed a tendency to pitch backward, he stopped.
China, Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
According to the command module computer, Columbia landed at 13°19’ north latitude and 169°9’ west longitude.
Onboard computer target point was 27°37.8’N, 64°10.2’W; onboard computer landing point was 27°37.8’N, 64°10.8’W. Recovery ship landing point was 27°32.5’N, 64°04.0’W; indications are that the recovery ship may have been as much as ±13 kilometers in error and that the spacecraft may actually have landed very close to the target point.