Im Folgenden sind nur jene Quellen vollständig angegeben, die nicht in der kommentierten Bibliografie verzeichnet sind.
1 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Berlin 1790/1793, XXII.
2 Vgl. zum Beispiel Strube 1996, 303.
3 Hurley 1998, Kap. 10. Vgl. J. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge (Mass.) 1983, als locus classicus des Sandwichmodells.
4 N. Chomsky, Verbal Behavior, by B. F. Skinner, Language 35 (1959), 26–58. Vgl. auch H. Gardner, The Mind’s New Science, New York 1985.
5 Marr 1982, insb. 24–27.
6 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, London 1651, Kap. 5. G. W. Leibniz, Scientia Generalis – Characteristica [1677–1690], Berlin 1999, VI.4, 450, VI.6, 1030.
7 A. Turing, On Computable Numbers, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1936), 230–265. Vgl. auch J. Kim, Philosophy of Mind, Boulder 1996, 80–85.
8 Turing 1936, 241–242 (s. Anm. 7).
9 C. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, Bell Systems Technical Journal 27 (1948), 379–423, 623–656.
10 A. Newell / H. Simon, The Logic Theory Machine, Santa Monica 1956; A. Newell / J. Shaw / H. Simon, Report on a General Problem-Solving Program, Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Processing, Paris 1959, 256–264; A. Newell / H. Simon, GPS, A Program that Simulates Human Thought, in: E. Feigenbaum / J. Feldman (Hg.), Computers and Thought, New York 1963, 279–296.
11 A. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind 59 (1950), 433–460.
12 J. Weizenbaum, ELIZA – A Computer Program for the Study of Natural Language Communication between Man and Machine, Communications of the ACM 9 (1966), 36–45. T. Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, New York 1972.
13 M. Minsky, A Framework for Representing Knowledge, in: [123] P. Winston (Hg.), The Psychology of Computer Vision, New York 1975, 211–277; R. Schank / R. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding, Hillsdale 1977.
14 D. Lenat / R. Guha, Building Large Knowledge-Based Systems, London 1990.
15 »If you take care of the syntax, the semantics will take care of itself.« (J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge (Mass.) 1985, 106).
16 Newell/Simon 1976, 116.
17 N. Block, The Computer Model of the Mind, in: D. Osherson / E. Smith (Hg.), Thinking: An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Bd. 3, Cambridge (Mass.) 1990, 247–289, insb. 252.
18 E. Tolman, Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men, Psychological Review 55 (1948), 189–208.
19 W. McCulloch / W. Pitts, A Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (1943), 115–133.
20 Vgl. zum Beispiel U. Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, Englewood Cliffs 1967. Vgl. auch G. Miller / E. Galanter / K. Pibram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior, New York 1960.
21 Marr 1982. Vgl. auch Pylyshyn 1986.
22 Haugeland 1985, 112 (s. Anm. 15).
23 J. Fodor, The Language of Thought, Cambridge (Mass.) 1975.
24 Ebd., 27. Vgl. auch Newell/Simon 1976, 120.
25 M. Shanahan, Solving the Frame Problem, Cambridge (Mass.) 1997. Für die ursprüngliche Formulierung des Rahmenproblems vgl. J. McCarthy / P. Hayes, Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Intelligence 4 (1969), 463–502.
26 Zum Beispiel D. Dennett, Cognitive Wheels, in: C. Hookway (Hg.), Minds, Machines, and Evolution, Cambridge (Mass.) 1984, 129–151.
27 Zum Beispiel H. Dreyfus, Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing It Would Require Making It More Heideggerian, in: P. Husbands / O. Holland / M. Wheeler (Hg.), The Mechanical Mind in History, Cambridge (Mass.) 2008, 331–371.
28 H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do, Cambridge (Mass.) 1972. Vgl. auch Dreyfus 1992.
29 Searle 1980 ist der locus classicus. Für einen Überblick über die [124] sich anschließende Debatte vgl. J. Preston / M. Bishop (Hg.), Views into the Chinese Room, Oxford 2002.
30 Zum Beispiel J. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge (Mass.) 1992, Kap. 3.
31 S. Harnad, The Symbol Grounding Problem, Physica D 42 (1990), 335–346.
32 Zum Beispiel J. Fodor, RePresentations, Cambridge (Mass.) 1981.
33 Vgl. zum Beispiel Rumelhart et al. 1986.
34 Vgl. G. Cottrell, Extracting Features from Faces Using Compression Networks, in: D. Touretzky / J. Elman / T. Sejnowski / G. Hinton (Hg.), Connectionist Models, San Mateo 1991, 328–337; D. Rumelhart / J. McClelland, On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs, in: Rumelhart et al. 1986, Bd. 2, 216–271; J. Elman, Representation and Structure in Connectionist Models, in: G. Altman (Hg.), Cognitive Models of Speech Processing, Cambridge (Mass.) 1991, 345–383.
35 McCulloch/Pitts 1943, insb. 129 (s. Anm. 19).
36 F. Rosenblatt, The Perceptron, Psychological Review 65 (1958), 386–408.
37 D. Hebb, The Organization of Behavior, New York 1949. Vgl. auch A. Bain, Mind and Body, New York 1873; W. James, The Principles of Psychology, New York 1890, insb. Kap. 14.
38 M. Minsky / S. Papert, Perceptrons, Cambridge (Mass.) 1969.
39 Vgl. Bechtel/Abrahamsen 2002, Kap. 2.2; P. Churchland, The Engine of Reason, Cambridge (Mass.) 1995, Kap. 4–5.
40 D. Rumelhart / G. Hinton / R. Williams, Learning Internal Representations by Error Propagation, in: Rumelhart et al. 1986, Bd. 2, 318–362.
41 Churchland 1995, 87 (s. Anm. 39); Sejnowski/Rosenberg 1987, insb. 156–158. Für ein Tonbeispiel vgl. http://www.cnl.salk.edu/Media/nettalk.mp3.
42 J. Elman, Finding Structure in Time, Cognitive Science 14 (1990), 179–211.
43 Vgl. G. Hinton / J. McClelland / D. Rumelhart, Distributed Representations, in: Rumelhart et al. 1986, Bd. 1, 77–109; P. Smolensky, On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1988), 1–23.
44 Elman 1991 (s. Anm. 34). Vgl. auch A. Clark, Mindware, Oxford 2001, 72.
[125] 45 J. Feldman / D. Ballard, Connectionist Models and their Properties, Cognitive Science 6 (1982), 205–254. Vgl. auch D. Rumelhart / J. McClelland, PDP Models and General Issues in Cognitive Science, in: Rumelhart et al., Bd. 1, 110–146, insb. 130–135.
46 J. McClelland / D. Rumelhart / G. Hinton, The Appeal of Parallel Distributed Processing, in: Rumelhart et al. 1986, Bd. 2, 3–44, insb. 29–31.
47 J. Searle, Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?, Scientific American 262 (1990), 26–31.
48 Zum Beispiel W. Ramsey / S. Stich / J. Garon, Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology, in: W. Ramsey / S. Stich / D. Rumelhart (Hg.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, Hillsdale 1991, 199–228.
49 Zum Beispiel P. Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 67–90.
50 Zum Beispiel A. Clark, Connectionist Minds, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1990), 83–102.
51 Fodor/Pylyshyn 1988, 51–54.
52 Vgl. auch J. Fodor / B. McLaughlin, Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity, Cognition 35 (1990), 183–204.
53 Vgl. K. Aizawa, Explaining Systematicity, Mind and Language 12 (1997), 115–136; P. Smolensky, Connectionism, Constituency and the Language of Thought, in: B. Loewer / G. Rey (Hg.), Meaning in Mind, Oxford 1991, 201–208.
54 Zum Beispiel R. Sun, The Motivational and Metacognitive Control in CLARION, in: W. Gray (Hg.), Modeling Integrated Cognitive Systems, Oxford 2007, 63–75.
55 Zur Synergetik vgl. H. Haken, Synergetik, Berlin 1977.
56 Vgl. van Gelder 1998, insb. Abs. 4.
57 Van Gelder 1995, insb. 351–354.
58 Ebd., 354–355. Vgl. auch T. van Gelder / R. Port, It’s About Time, in: Port / van Gelder 1995, 1–43.
59 Van Gelder 1995, 381.
60 Zum Beispiel Port / van Gelder 1995, ix.
61 Zum Beispiel R. Beer, The Dynamics of Active Categorical Perception in an Evolved Model Agent, Adaptive Behavior 11 (2003), 209–243, insb. 212.
62 Zum Beispiel S. Kelso, Dynamic Patterns, Cambridge (Mass.) 1995.
[126] 63 Thelen/Smith 1994.
64 J. Piaget, Das Weltbild des Kindes [1926], München 1988. Vgl. auch L. Smith / E. Thelen, Development as a Dynamic System, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003), 343–348; E. Thelen / G. Schöner / C. Scheier / L. Smith, The Dynamics of Embodiment, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2001), 1–86.
65 Thelen/Smith 1994, 338.
66 H. Haken / S. Kelso / H. Bunz, A Theoretical Model of Phase Transitions in Human Hand Movements, Biological Cybernetics 51 (1985), 347–356. Für einen Überblick vgl. Chemero 2009, Kap. 5.
67 S. Kelso, Phase Transitions and Critical Behavior in Human Bimanual Coordination, American Journal of Physiology 15 (1984), R1000–R1004. Vgl. Kelso 1995, Kap. 2 (s. Anm. 62).
68 W. Bechtel, Representations and Cognitive Explanations, Cognitive Science 22 (1998), 295–318, insb. 303; van Gelder 1995, 352–353.
69 Zum Beispiel A. Markman / E. Dietrich, In Defense of Representation, Cognitive Psychology 40 (2000), 138–171.
70 Chemero 2009, 72–73.
71 Rodney Brooks spricht von »the bulkiest parts of intelligent systems« (Intelligence Without Representation, Artificial Intelligence 47 (1991), 139–159, 140).
72 Zum Beispiel S. Edelman, But Will It Scale up?, Adaptive Behavior 11 (2003), 273–275.
73 Chemero 2009, Kap. 4.4, spricht von einem »guide to discovery«-Problem.
74 G. Lakoff / M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, Chicago 1999, 78.
75 Wie Wheeler es treffend formuliert: »[C]ognitive science needs to put cognition back in the brain, the brain back in the body, and the body back in the world« (Wheeler 2005, 11). Vgl. auch Clark 2001; Robbins/Aydede 2009; Rowlands 2010; Shapiro 2011.
76 Zum Beispiel Brooks 1991; R. Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, Cambridge 2005; V. Gallese, Embodied Simulation, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005), 23–48; Lakoff/Johnson 1999; Gallagher 2005; Shapiro 2011.
77 Vgl. L. Vygotskij, Mind in Society [1934], Cambridge (Mass.) 1978; A. Luria, The Working Brain, New York 1973.
[127] 78 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927], Tübingen 1953, 69.
79 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung [1945], Berlin 1965, 274–275.
80 R. Held / A. Hein, Movement Produced Stimulation in the Development of Visually Guided Behavior, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 56 (1963), 872–876.
81 Zum Beispiel Shapiro 2011; M. Wilson, Six Views on Embodied Cognition, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (2002), 625–636.
82 Lakoff/Johnson 1999. Vgl. auch G. Lakoff / M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 1980.
83 Vgl. M. Anderson, Embodied Cognition, Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003), 91–130.
84 L. Barsalou, Perceptual Symbol Systems, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1999), 577–660, insb. 580; ders., Grounding Cognition, Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2008), 617–645. Vgl. auch A. Damasio, Time-Locked Multiregional Retroactivation, Cognition 33 (1989), 25–62.
85 A. Goldman / F. de Vignemont, Is Social Cognition Embodied?, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (2009), 154–159; A. Goldmann, A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2012), 71–88. Zur aktuellen Diskussion um die Idee einer »Mehrfachverwertung« neuronaler Strukturen vgl. auch M. Anderson, Massive Redeployment, Exaptation, and the Functional Integration of Cognitive Operations, Synthese 159 (2007), 329–345; V. Gallese, Mirror Neurons and the Social Nature of Language, Social Neuroscience 3 (2008), 317–333; S. Dehaene, Reading in the Brain, New York 2009; S. Hurley, The Shared Circuits Model, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2008), 1–58.
86 A. Glenberg / M. Kaschak, Grounding Language in Action, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (2002), 558–565.
87 D. Casanto / K. Dijkstra, Motor Action and Emotional Memory, Cognition 115 (2010), 179–185.
88 M. Bhalla / D. Proffitt, Visual-motor Recalibration in Geographical Slant Perception, Journal of Experimental Psychology 25 (1999), 1076–1096; J. Witt / D. Proffitt, Action-specific Influences on Distance Perception, Journal of Experimental Psychology 34 (2008), 1479–1492.
89 Fodor 1983 (s. Anm. 3).
[128] 90 Brooks 1991, 141. Vgl. auch ders., Cambrian Intelligence, Cambridge (Mass.) 1999.
91 R. Brooks, A Robust Layered Control System for a Mobile Robot, IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation 2 (1985), 14–23.
92 R. Brooks, Elephants Don’t Play Chess, Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6 (1990), 3–15.
93 Brooks 1991.
94 Zum Beispiel S. Collins / M. Wisse / A. Ruina, A Three-dimensional Passive Dynamic Walking Robot, International Journal of Robotics Research 20 (2001), 607–615.
95 Zum Beispiel D. Shaffer / M. McBeath / W. Roy / S. Krauchunas, A Linear Optical Trajectory Informs the Fielder Where to Run to the Side to Catch Fly Balls, Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (2003), 1244–1250; R. Pfeifer / J. Bongard, How the Body Shapes the Way We Think, Cambridge (Mass.) 2007.
96 A. Clark / J. Toribio, Doing Without Representing, Synthese 101 (1994), 401–431.
97 Zum Beispiel Brooks 1991; Suchman 1987; T. Winograd / F. Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition, Norwood 1986; W. Clancey, Situated Cognition, Cambridge 1997.
98 Zum Beispiel Clark 1997, 63.
99 Clark 2001, 141. Vgl. auch K. Beach, Becoming a Bartender, Applied Cognitive Psychology 7 (1993), 191–204.
100 »We use intelligence to structure our environment so that we can succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so that we can be dumb in peace!« (Clark 1997, 180)
101 Vgl. McClelland et al. 1986 (s. Anm. 46).
102 Ballard et al. 1997.
103 Kirsh/Maglio 1994, 541–542. Vgl. auch D. Kirsh / P. Maglio, Some Epistemic Benefits of Action, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Hillsdale 1992, 224–229.
104 A. Clark, Microcognition, Cambridge (Mass.) 1989, 64. Vgl. auch M. Rowlands, The Body in Mind, Cambridge 1999, 80.
105 L. Shapiro, James Bond and the Barking Dog, Philosophy of Science 77 (2010), 400–418, insb. Abs. 6.
106 Brooks spricht von der Welt als »its own best model« (1991, 148).
107 Vgl. Clark 2001, 93; M. Mataric, Navigating with a Rat Brain, in: [129] J.-A. Meyer / S. Wilson (Hg.), From Animals to Animats I, Cambridge (Mass.) 1991, 169–175.
108 Zum Beispiel T. Martin / J. Keating / H. Goodkin / A. Bastian / W. Thach, Throwing while Looking through Prisms, Brain 119 (1996), 1199–1211. Vgl. auch Clark 1997, 38.
109 Gibson 1979. Vgl. auch J. Fodor / Z. Pylyshyn, How Direct Is Visual Perception?, Cognition 9 (1981), 139–196.
110 »[P]erceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do.« (Noë 2004, 1). Vgl. auch O’Regan/Noë 2001.
111 Zum Beispiel P. Bach-y-Rita, Tactile Sensory Substitution Studies, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1013 (2004), 83–91.
112 Noë 2004, 12; für die starke Lesart vgl. ebd., 25.
113 Vgl. Kirsh/Maglio 1994, 513–514; Ballard et al. 1997, insb. Abs. 4. Zu den genannten Repräsentationsbegriffen vgl. Clark 1997; R. Millikan, Pushmi-pullyu Representations, Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995), 185–200; R. Grush, The Emulation Theory of Representation, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2004), 377–442.
114 A. Vera / H. Simon, Situated Action, Cognitive Science 17 (1993), 7–48.
115 Clark/Chalmers 1998.
116 Vgl. Hurley 1998; R. Wilson, Wide Computationalism, Mind 103 (1994), 351–372; ders., Boundaries of the Mind, Cambridge 2004; Rowlands 1999 (s. Anm. 104); R. Menary, Attacking the Bounds of Cognition, Philosophical Psychology 19 (2006), 329–344; Chemero 2009; Clark/Chalmers 1998.
117 Clark 2008, insb. 198, vgl. auch 152–156.
118 Vgl. zum Beispiel T. Burge, Individualism and the Mental, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), 73–121; H. Putnam, The Meaning of ›Meaning‹, in: K. Gunderson (Hg.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, 131–193.
119 Zum Beispiel Adams/Aizawa 2008, 47.
120 A. Clark, Spreading the Joy?, Mind 118 (2009), 963–993, insb. 986–987.
121 Zum Beispiel Clark 2008, Kap. 6.7.
122 Vgl. Adams/Aizawa 2008.
123 »If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a [130] process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is [...] part of the cognitive process.« (Clark/Chalmers 1998, 8)
124 S. Walter, Cognitive Extension, Synthese 177 (2010), 285–300.
125 M. Wheeler, In Defense of Extended Functionalism, in: R. Menary (Hg.), The Extended Mind, Cambridge (Mass.) 2010, 245–270.
126 M. Sprevak, Functionalism and Extended Cognition, Journal of Philosophy 106 (2010), 503–527.
127 Zum Beispiel Adams/Aizawa 2008, 61.
128 Zum Beispiel Clark 2008, insb. Kap. 6; S. Hurley, Varieties of Externalism, in: R. Menary (Hg.), The Extended Mind, Cambridge (Mass.) 2010, 101–154.
129 M. Sprevak, Inference to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010), 353–362.
130 F. Adams / K. Aizawa, Defending the Bounds of Cognition, in: R. Menary (Hg.), The Extended Mind, Cambridge (Mass.) 2010, 67–80.
131 Clark 2008, 96.
132 Zum Beispiel M. Rowlands, Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive, Philosophical Psychology 22 (2009), 1–19.
133 Zum Beispiel Adams/Aizawa 2008, insb. Kap. 4.
134 Zum Beispiel Clark 2008, 152–156, 198, 239; Chemero 2009, 212.
135 S. Walter / L. Kästner, The Where and What of Cognition, Cognitive Systems Research 13 (2012), 12–23.
136 A. Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, Oxford 2003; Clark/Chalmers 1998, 17.
137 Vgl. Hutchins 1995.
138 Ebd., insb. Kap. 4.
139 Vgl. E. Hutchins / T. Klausen, Distributed Cognition in an Airline Cockpit, in: D. Middleton / Y. Engeström (Hg.), Cognition and Communication at Work, Cambridge 1996, 15–34; M. Ackerman / C. Halverson, Considering an Organization’s Memory, Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 7 (1998), 39–48; C. Baber / P. Smith / J. Cross / J. Hunter / R. McMaster, Crime Scene Investigation as Distributed Cognition, Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2006), 357–385.
[131] 140 R. Giere, Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition, in: P. Carruthers / S. Stich / M. Siegal (Hg.), The Cognitive Basis of Science, Cambridge 2002, 285–299; C. List, Distributed Cognition, in: M. Albert / D. Schmidtchen / S. Voigt (Hg.), Scientific Competition, Tübingen 2008, 285–308; B. Huebner, Genuinely Collective Emotions, European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (2011), 89–118.
141 Zum Beispiel J. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, Cambridge 2002. Zum Begriff des Kollektivgedächtnisses vgl. M. Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Paris 1925.
142 Vgl. Barnier et al. 2008.
143 D. Wegner, Transactive Memory, in: B. Mullen / G. Goethals (Hg.), Theories of Group Behavior, New York 1986, 185–208.
144 Barnier et al. 2008, insb. 40–41.
145 Vgl. jedoch List/Pettit 2011.
146 D. Tollefsen, From Extended Mind to Collective Mind, Cognitive Systems Research 7 (2006), 140–150.
147 Zum Beispiel Wilson 2004, Kap. 12 (s. Anm. 116); R. Rupert, Empirical Arguments for Group Minds, Philosophy Compass 6 (2011), 630–639.
148 Wilson 2005. Vgl. aber List/Pettit 2011; G. Theiner / T. O’Connor, The Emergence of Group Cognition, in: A. Corradini / T. O’Connor (Hg.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy, London 2010, 78–117; R. Goldstone / T. Gureckis, Collective Behavior, Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2009), 412–438.
149 Zum Antiindividualismus vgl. zum Beispiel S. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism, Cambridge 2007; zur sozialen Erkenntnistheorie vgl. zum Beispiel A. Goldman / D. Whitcomb (Hg.), Social Epistemology, Oxford 2011; zur theory of mind vgl. zum Beispiel I. Apperly, Mindreaders, New York 2011.
150 H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York 1963; H. Maturana / F. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, Dordrecht 1980; F. Varela, Principles of Biological Autonomy, New York 1979; Merleau-Ponty 1945 (s. Anm. 79).
151 Stewart et al. 2010.
152 Varela et al. 1991, Kap. 7.
153 Maturana/Varela 1980, 13 (s. Anm. 150).
154 F. Varela, Patterns of Life, Brain and Cognition 34 (1997), 72–84, insb. 75.
[132] 155 H. Maturana, The Organization of the Living, International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 7 (1975), 313–332.
156 »[C]ognition is not representation but embodied action and [...] the world we cognize is not pregiven but enacted through our history of structural coupling.« (Varela et al. 1991, 200) Vgl. auch A. Weber / F. Varela, Life after Kant, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2002), 97–125, insb. 116–118.
157 Thompson 2007, 44. Vgl. auch Varela 1979 (s. Anm. 150).
158 Zum Beispiel P. Bourgine / J. Stewart, Autopoiesis and Cognition, Artificial Life 20 (2004), 327–345; Thompson 2007, 97–107.
159 E. Thompson, Reply to Commentaries, Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2011), 176–223, insb. 215–216.
160 Zum Beispiel E. Di Paolo, Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005), 429–452; Thompson 2007, 122–127.
161 Di Paolo 2005, 437 (s. Anm. 160); Weber/Varela 2002, 117 (s. Anm. 156).
162 E. Di Paolo, Extended Life, Topoi 28 (2009), 9–21, insb. 15.
163 E. Di Paolo / M. Rohde / H. De Jaegher, Horizons for the Enactive Mind, in: Stewart et al. 2010, 33–88, insb. 40–42. Vgl. auch E. Thompson / F. Varela, Radical Embodiment, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (2001), 418–425.
164 J. von Uexküll, Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen, Frankfurt a. M. 1934, 28–29. Vgl. auch ders., Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, Berlin 1909.
165 Di Paolo 2009, 19 (s. Anm. 162). Vgl. auch Thompson 2007, 126 sowie Varela et al. 1991, 173.
166 Di Paolo et al. 2010, 42 (s. Anm. 163).
167 Varela et al. 1991. Vgl. auch Thompson 2007, Kap. 1.
168 Zum Beispiel Varela et al. 1991, xvi. Vgl. auch Merleau-Ponty 1945 (s. Anm. 79); Weber/Varela 2002 (s. Anm. 156).
169 Vgl. F. Varela, Neurophenomenology, Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996), 330–350; A. Lutz, Toward a Neurophenomenology as an Account of Generative Passages, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2002), 133–167; A. Lutz / E. Thompson, Neurophenomenology, Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2003), 31–52.
170 J. Petitot / F. Varela / B. Pachoud / J.-M. Roy (Hg.), Naturalizing Phenomenology, Stanford 1999.
[133] 171 Zum Beispiel M. Rowlands, Enactivism and the Extended Mind, Topoi 28 (2009), 53–62.
172 E. Thompson, Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005), 407–427.
173 D. Ward / M. Stapleton, Es Are Good, in: F. Paglieri / C. Castelfranchi (Hg.), Consciousness in Interaction, Amsterdam 2012, 89–104; Thompson 2007, 36.
174 Thompson/Varela 2001, 418 (s. Anm. 163).
175 M. Wheeler, Minds, Things, and Materiality, in: L. Malafouris / C. Renfrew (Hg.), The Cognitive Life of Things, Cambridge 2010, 29–38.
176 Di Paolo 2009, 19 (s. Anm. 162). Vgl. auch E. Thompson / M. Stapleton, Making Sense of Sense-making, Topoi 28 (2009), 23–30, insb. 26. Vgl. auch S. Walter, Situated Cognition: A Field Guide to Some Open Conceptual and Ontological Issues, Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2014).
177 Für eine Übersicht vgl. Wilutzky et al. 2011.
178 P. Niedenthal / P. Winkielman / L. Mondillon / N. Vermeulen, Embodiment of Emotion Concepts, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (2009), 1120–1136; D. Effron / P. Niedenthal / S. Gil / S. Droit-Volet, Embodied Temporal Perception of Emotion, Emotion 6 (2006), 1–9.
179 Zum Beispiel K. Scherer, What Are Emotions?, Social Science Information 44 (2005), 695–729.
180 Zum Beispiel R. Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation, Oxford 1991.
181 J. Prinz, Embodied Emotions, in: R. Solomon (Hg.), Thinking About Feeling, Oxford 2004, 44–61, insb. 57.
182 Griffiths/Scarantino 2009, 444 und 448.
183 Vgl. G. Colombetti / E. Thompson, The Feeling Body, in: W. Overton / U. Muller / Jenny Newman (Hg.), Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness, New York 2007, 45–68.
184 Vgl. A. Stephan / S. Walter / W. Wilutzky, Emotions Beyond Brain and Body, Philosophical Psychology 36 (2014).
185 Vgl. G. Keil, Willensfreiheit, Berlin 2012; P. Bieri, Das Handwerk der Freiheit, München 2001.
186 Vgl. Ross et al. 2007.
187 Zum Beispiel D. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, New [134] York 1991. Für die Idee von Selbstregulation als begrenzter kognitiver Ressource vgl. zum Beispiel R. Baumeister / N. De Wall / N. Ciarocco / J. Twenge, Social Exclusion Impairs Self-regulation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88 (2005), 589–604.