Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker

2 Drew’s contacts with Beaverbrook and his special interest in the views of the Daily Express are noted, for example, in Diefenbaker’s memo of a telephone conversation with Drew on June 10, 1961, and in telegrams from London in November 1961 and April 1962. JGD, “Confidential Memorandum Re: Conversation with Hon. George Drew from London Saturday June 10, 1961 …”; Drew to External, 4042 Emergency, November 11, 1961; Drew to JGD, 1564 Emergency, April 30, 1962, JGDP, XII/111/F/200; XII/81/D/37

3 Diefenbaker gave the same message, in what seemed more sarcastic terms, to the UK high commissioner three days later. The French government confirmed to Canada that it would insist on “stringent” terms for UK entry, which would include the application of the common tariff to “all countries not themselves members of the common market.” JGD, “Confidential Memorandum Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Macmillan, June 9, 1961 …” JGDP, XII/86/D/149; JGD, “Memorandum Re Conversation with Sir Saville Garner … June 12th 1961 …”; NAR, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister: The United Kingdom and the European Common Market,” June 14, 1961, ibid., XIV/8/D/15.2

4 Sunday Telegraph, June 11, 1961, quoted in telegram, Drew to JGD, June 11, 1961, JGDP, XII/54/C/108

5 That point was emphasized in an accompanying “Paper for Mr. Diefenbaker.” The Canadian government was soon awash in documents laying out the details of current Canadian trade with the United Kingdom. In 1960 Canadian exports to the United Kingdom amounted to $915 million. About $300 million of this trade would be unaffected by application of the EEC common tariff, while another $500 million would be “especially vulnerable” through the loss of free entry or preference. But actual estimates of Canadian loss remained highly speculative and subject to exaggeration. As Duncan Sandys told Diefenbaker in July 1961, joining the Common Market “would not change the eating habits of the English people.” Harold Macmillan to JGD, July 3, 1961, JGDP, XII/111/F/200; “Possible British Accession to the EEC-Trade Effects,” nd, 1961, ibid., XII/81/D/37; JGD, “Conversation of the Prime Minister with the Rt. Hon. Duncan Sandys …” July 15, 1961, ibid., XIV/8/D/15.2

6 Harold Macmillan, “Paper for Mr. Diefenbaker,” July 3, 1961, JGDP, XII/11 l/F/200

7 Robertson attended a meeting of the cabinet committee on the subject to express his opposition to the government’s public line at about the same time. RBB, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Re: Sandys’ visit next week,” July 4, 1961, JGDP, XII/81/D/37; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 212-14

8 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 214-15; JGD, “Conversation of the Prime Minister with the Rt. Hon. Duncan Sandys - Ottawa - July 14, 1961,” JGDP, XII/54/C/108; Fleming, Near 2, 387-88

9 “Message from the Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P. to the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, Q.C., M.P.,” July 26, 1961, JGDP, XII/81/D/37

10 “Remarks by the Honourable George Hees at the Commonwealth Conference on the Question of the U.K. Move into the European Common Market,” September 1961, JGDP, XII/111/F/200; Fleming, Near 2, 391

11 “Text of Press Communiqué issued at close of Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council Meeting in Accra, September 15, 1961,” JGDP, XII/81/D/37

14 The press comments were reported in dispatches from the Canadian High Commission in London to Ottawa. High Commission to External, 4042 Emergency, November 11, 1961, JGDP, XII/81/D/37; High Commission to External, Scan No. 46, November 13, 1961, ibid., XII/81/D/39. See also the Globe and Mail, November 11, 1961.

15 Drew instructed a senior officer, Benjamin Rogers, to attend the November meeting “at very short notice” in his place. Two weeks later, in a personal message to the prime minister, Drew reported that he would certainly attend Heath’s next briefing “as I have finally thrown off the severe chest cold which has been bothering me for more than two weeks.” JGD to high commissioner, London, PMO 106/12, November 13, 1961; Drew to JGD, 4043 Emergency, November 12, 1961; Drew to JGD, 4220, November 24, 1961, JGDP, XII/81/D/37; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 216; Benjamin Rogers to author, July 28, 1995

16 Diefenbaker’s notes from an informal meeting of ministers on March 23, 1962, record criticisms of the government’s stance by Churchill, Flemming, Starr, Halpenny, Walker, O’Hurley, Dinsdale, Monteith, Fairclough, and probably Nowlan. After the meeting, Ellen Fairclough wrote Diefenbaker to add her comment that the effects of British entry on Canadian exports would not be felt for ten years, “by which time we surely would have taken action to counteract them. Why knock our own blocks off over a hypothetical situation?” JGD, “Ministers’ Meeting - March 23, 1962, Re Common Market”; Fairclough to JGD, March 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/54/C/108

17 Horne, Macmillan, 1957-1986, 447; CC, 7-63, January 29, 1963; OC 2, 202-06. Diefenbaker later claimed that de Gaulle insisted to him in November 1958 that Britain would not get into the Common Market and that he had reported the conversation to Macmillan, without any response. Diefenbaker said he had repeated de Gaulle’s warning to the Commonwealth prime ministers at their meeting in September 1962, but Edward Heath, “flushed with anticipated success,” would not believe it. Since the formal British application for entry was not made until October 1960, warning of what amounted to a French veto in 1958 seems unlikely. Such a conversation could have occurred when de Gaulle visited Canada in the spring of 1960. JGDI, December 10, 1969; OC 2, 205

19 Leslie Frost to JGD, November 8, 1961, Frost Papers (also quoted in Graham, Frost, 403)

20 He did find his appointment as a member of the Privy Council, which was made formal in December 1961, “very pleasing … more than anything else in fact.” Leslie Frost to JGD, October 7, 1961, JGDP, XII/4/A/89; Graham, Frost, 403-05

22 Dalgleish suggested a royal commission on tax structure; and for the short term, a tax holiday for new businesses, tax incentives for research, added depreciation allowances for new capital assets produced in Canada, and a 50 percent tax reduction on profits of new export businesses. Oakley Dalgleish to JGD, February 13, 1961, JGDP, XII/89/E/23

23 Frost to JGD, February 19, 1962, JGDP, XII/12/F/395. Frost wrote again the next day to point out that the “Liberal brain trust,” including Walter Gordon and Mitchell Sharp, was preparing a platform that would capitalize on the report of Gordon’s royal commission on Canada’s economic prospects, “which no doubt will have its own appeal. I would not underestimate this. He has already committed himself to a book and as well a number of articles and speeches which your advisers should take apart at once and study.” Leslie Frost to JGD, February 20, 1962, JGDP, XII/12/F/395

24 JGD, “Strictly Confidential Memorandum,” February 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/89/E/23; JGD to Leslie Frost, February 25, 1962, Frost Papers

28 Among Diefenbaker’s last-moment acts were references to committee of proposals to end closure and to create an independent electoral boundaries commission. Both were promises from the 1957 campaign that had been neglected for five years; neither could be achieved in the short 1962 session. House of Commons, Debates, January 22, 1962, 57-75; January 23, 1962, 82-90

29 CC, 141-61, December 28, 1961; 14-62, February 6, 1962; Debates, February 6, 1962, 573

30 The memo is unsigned. It may have been from John Fisher or Allister Grosart. “Confidential,” January 6, 1962, JGDP, XII/70/C/344

31 Fleming, Near 2, 472-86; Debates, April 10, 1962, 2688-718; CAR 1962, 3-9

32 Those present included Dalton Camp, Finlay MacDonald, George Hogan, Eddie Goodman, Roy Faibish, Bill Wylie, Roy Deyell, and Lowell Murray. Grosart reported the party’s electoral prospects to Diefenbaker after this meeting, estimating that it had 137 safe seats and ten “probables.” This was an optimistic account of what he had heard. Interview with Dalton Camp, February 4, 1969; “Notes of a Meeting -January 22, 1962: Where Do We Stand?” JGDP, XII/40/B/294.2

35 Diefenbaker’s draft reply appears in the same file. Eugene Forsey to JGD, March 21, 1961, JGDP, XII/61/C/185

36 Diefenbaker used it especially when speaking to ethnic audiences and in Quebec. Among those who encouraged him to use the theme were Gordon Chown, MP, and Jack Cauley. Chown wrote that “we can push the Liberal Party out to the extreme left; hold ourselves out as the champions of competitive enterprise; and leave the New Party image in the public mind as ‘left of left,’ thereby implying that their political philosophy will expedite our country to the path of Communism.” The Liberal candidates and advisers Diefenbaker linked to the wartime administration were Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, C.M. Drury, Maurice Lamontagne, and Tom Kent. Only Sharp had actually been a civil servant in that period. Gordon Chown to JGD, May 26, 1961; Jack Cauley to JGD, December 29, 1961, JGDP, VI/93/1434C, VI/60/432; Debates, January 22 and 23, 1962, 73, 85-89; Globe and Mail, January 25, March 9, 1962

37 Hamilton’s committee consisted of Gordon Churchill, Don Johnson, Merril Menzies, Roy Faibish, and John Fisher. Alvin Hamilton to JGD, September 21, 1961, JGDP, OF/1315/Election; Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms, 261-70, 286; CAR 1962, 10-12

38 “Itinerary - Prime Minister John Diefenbaker – 1962,” JGDP, VI/96/1509.1, 82484-97, 82579-93, 82619, 82629-39; ibid., 1509.2, 82786-91, 82861-67

39 The American record of the incident is contained in a seven-page letter from Merchant to the acting secretary of state, George Ball. Merchant delivered the letter by courier to Ball “in the belief that you will want to discuss its contents with the President at the earliest possible opportunity.” Livingston Merchant to George Ball, May 5, 1962, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum 05/16/61 and Related Materials, 05/61-05/63, Mandatory Review Cases NLK-94-9, NLK-94-11

41 Telegram, Merchant to acting secretary of state, May 9, 1962, 1148, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: Rostow Memorandum … Mandatory Review Case NLK-94-11

42 Robinson diary, May 9, 1962, quoted in Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 268-69

43 Merchant to secretary of state, May 13, 1962, 1164, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: Rostow Memorandum … Mandatory Review Case NLK-94-11

44 This was not accurate. At least three others on the prime minister’s staff - the unnamed aide who delivered the memo, his secretary, Marion Wagner, and his foreign affairs adviser, Basil Robinson - knew of it; and Robinson had also discussed the matter confidentially with Norman Robertson, Robert Bryce, and the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Ed Ritchie. Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 267-70

46 Fleming, Near 2, 487-501; OC 3, 117-25; CC, 49-62, 50-62, May 1 and 2, 1962

50 Neil S. Crawford, “Memorandum to the Prime Minister,” May 3, 1962, JGDP, XII/66/C/290.2

52 Diefenbaker responded to the strippers: “I was raised on a homestead in Saskatchewan; that is why I know what those things are.” CAR 1962, 16-17

56 Walter Gray, “The Week That Counts,” Globe and Mail, June 11, 1962; CAR 1962, 19-21

60 For the results, see CAR 1962, 22-27; the reference to Macdonald is in the Globe and Mail, June 22, 1962.

61 “Daily Transactions Affecting Exchange Fund Owned Reserves,” August 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/107/F/147.2; Fleming, Near 2, 516-20; OC 3, 131-34; CC, 57A-62, June 20-24, 1962. There were eight separate meetings of cabinet, plus meetings of the special committee. No secretaries attended, and no records were kept, until Fleming presented Bryce with a brief statement on the emergency program after the last meeting, held at the prime minister’s home on Sunday, June 24, 1962. This statement alone appears in the official record.

63 Ibid., 132-33. Fleming’s view was that the exchange reserves “could not be expected to survive more than a few days.” He reported that the exchange fund reached its lowest point of $1100 million on June 24. Fleming, Near 2, 517

64 CC, 57A-62, June 20-24, 1962; OC 3, 132-36; Fleming, Near 2, 518-24; CAR 1962, 28-29, 184-87

67 On July 2 Macmillan wrote again to express satisfaction that the financial community had acted rapidly to assist Canada, to note that Britain had provided one-third of Canada’s $300 million draw on IMF funds as well as $100 million in bilateral credits, and to offer a gentle reminder that Diefenbaker had said that the import surcharges would be withdrawn as soon as possible. Harold Macmillan to JGD, June 24, July 2, 1962, JGDP, XII/8/A/282.3

70 W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill, 7 July 1970,” 4

71 Churchill was not precise about when Diefenbaker first raised the matter of resignation, although he seemed to place it in the first six weeks after the election. Churchill described this period as “the most difficult of my life,” when the prime minister was still “visibly shattered” by the election results. Churchill recalled that Diefenbaker talked “almost every other day” about resignation, “and several times in cabinet.” W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill …” 4-5

74 Frost also sent a copy of his letter to Dalgleish, noting that he had “endeavoured to put things on the line and I hope it works, particularly for his sake to say nothing of the country.” Leslie Frost to JGD, July 12, 1962, JGDP, XII/61/C/189; Leslie Frost to Oakley Dalgleish, July 12, 1962, Frost Papers

76 Diefenbaker had telephone conversations on July 17 and 19 with Frost and on July 21 with Dalgleish; Frost recorded a summary of his reasons for refusal in a memo headed “Don’t want to!” and dated August 1962. JGD, “Note,” July 21, 1962; “Memorandum,” July 21, 1962, ibid.; Leslie Frost, “Don’t want to!” August 1962, Frost Papers

77 Leslie Frost to JGD, July 18, 1962; JGD, “Note,” July 21, 1962, JGDP, XII/65/C/261; Leslie Frost, “The Diefenbaker Days,” 13-15, Frost Papers; Graham, Frost, 407-08; OC 3, 139-40

80 OC 3, 141. The cabinet met at Sussex Drive from July 25 until it resumed meeting on Parliament Hill on August 29.

82 In particular, Alvin Hamilton had been hospitalized for several weeks after the election. JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, August 11 and 14, 1962, JGDP, V/5, 2596-97, 2598-99

85 JGD, “Memorandum Re: Discussion with Hon. E. Davie Fulton, Tuesday, August 7, 1962,” JGDP, XII/61/C/190; interview with Hon. E.D. Fulton, September 24, 1993; OC 3, 143-44

86 OC 3, 141-48; CAR 1962, 31-33; Fleming, Near 2, 527-31; Conrad, Nowlan, 266-68

90 Robinson was puzzled why, if Diefenbaker was convinced that de Gaulle would veto Britain’s application, he spent so much energy opposing it. OC 2, 92-93, 205; Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, 355-57; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 279-82; CC, 73-62, 73A-62, 74-62, 75-62, 80-62, August 30 and 31, September 3, 5, and 21, 1962

91 JGD, “Memorandum for Wednesday August 8,” August 5, 1962; JGD, “Memorandum to: Hon. M.W. McCutcheon, C.B.E.,” August 25, 1962; MWM, “Memorandum to: The Prime Minister,” September 4, 1962; JGDP, XII/51/C/66; XII/65/C/261

97 Interview with Hon. E.D. Fulton, September 24, 1993; W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill, 7 July 1970”

98 W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill …” Sévigny also commented on this “drinking group,” whose personally labelled bottles were kept in a cupboard and “reserved for the owner’s particular use.” Sévigny, This Game, 227

99 HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister,” October 22, 1962, JGDP, XII/88/D/204; Reeves, President Kennedy, 333-425

104 The words are those of Macmillan’s diary, commenting on the American ambassador’s briefing on Monday morning. The ambassador, David Bruce, had been told by the State Department to carry a revolver that day, which he did. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, 364-65

105 HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister,” October 22, 1962, JGDP, XII/88/D/204

107 Diefenbaker noted in handwriting at the top of the memo: “Seen first at meeting with Mr Merchant and ministers 5.30 pm. Delivered to me at home at 7 pm after broadcast of Pres Kennedy.” Robinson confirms from a confidential source (perhaps Bryce or Robertson) that Diefenbaker did not receive the memo before Merchant’s visit, although Bryce had seen it and did not think the proposal was acceptable. Diefenbaker claims in the memoirs that he talked to the president some time after meeting with Merchant and engaged in an argument over UN onsite inspection, the alert status of NORAD units, and the absence of consultation. But the conversation (if there was one) did not, apparently, occur that day, as Diefenbaker implies. HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister/Cuba,” JGDP, XII/88/D/204; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 286-87; OC 3, 82-83

108 This account is based on reports of the meeting by Douglas Harkness and Livingston Merchant; Merchant spoke later about the meeting with Basil Robinson. D.S. Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and the Political Crisis which Arose from It in January and February, 1963,” August 19-27, 1963, Harkness Papers; Livingston T. Merchant to Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball), memorandum, nd, 441, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1190-91; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 285-86

110 “Memorandum from Livingston T. Merchant to Secretary of State Rusk …” nd, 441, FRUS 1961-1963, 1190-91; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 285-86; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 7-9

111 “Notes used by Prime Minister for address in the House on the Kennedy announcement of the ‘quarantine’ of Cuba - October 22, 1962,” JGDP, XII/56/C/120; Debates, October 22, 1962, 805-07

114 DEF CON 5 was normal; DEF CON 3 indicated “very serious international tension”; DEF CON 1 meant war. The Canadian equivalent of DEF CON 3 was known as READY. Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 9-10; Ghent-Mallet and Munton, “Confronting Kennedy,” 86

115 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 10; Globe and Mail, January 2, 1963

117 The only limitations short of full alert were that no personnel on leave were recalled, but no active personnel were granted leave. Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 11-12

118 Diefenbaker’s memoirs leave the impression that the conversation took place on the evening of October 22, which seems wrong. Robinson places it in the late afternoon of October 23, but confirms the substance of Diefenbaker’s account from notes taken by Diefenbaker’s secretary, Bunny Pound. OC 3, 82-83; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 288

120 Robinson adds that Diefenbaker came to Pearson’s office to seek his advice, and agreed that Pearson should ask questions in the House to elicit the prime minister’s jointly prepared response. Diefenbaker, however, opened the day with a statement that incorporated Pearson’s advice without acknowledgment, and without giving Pearson a chance to speak. Pearson’s secretary told Robinson that he was “angry about being double-crossed and his regard for Diefenbaker sank even further.” Debates, October 23, 1962, 821; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 289, 334

122 Debates, October 25, 1962, 911-13; the draft texts, with Diefenbaker’s revisions, are in JGDP, XII/56/C/120.

124 Reeves, President Kennedy, 410-26; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 290-91

125 Orme Dier to Basil Robinson, January 25, 1987, quoted in Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 291-92

127 “Statement by the Prime Minister, Sunday, October 28, 1962,” JGDP, XII/56/C/120

129 Ibid., 13-14; CC, 96-62, October 30, 1962; OC 3, 90, 93-94; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 297-98. Diefenbaker suggested that the renewed negotiations gave Canada the chance to “raise questions concerning the working of NORAD” and the meaning of consultation in periods of crisis, but there is no indication that these issues were discussed. The standby proposal for storing warheads in the United States was outlined in a memo from Green to Diefenbaker on October 26, and suggested that “nuclear warheads would be brought into Canada only on a finding by Cabinet that an emergency exists and a concomitant request to the United States Government to provide the warheads.” HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister: Provision of Nuclear Warheads,” JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.9

130 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 14-17; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 298-300; OC 3, 106-07

133 George Hogan, “The Conservative Party and the United States,” November 8, 1962, ibid. The confusion of Diefenbaker’s political constituency was illustrated by the (Liberal) Toronto Star’s editorial, “Ready, Aye, Ready,” which congratulated the prime minister for having done none of the “foolish and mischievous” things that Hogan suggested. Toronto Star, November 9, 1962

134 JGD, “Strictly Confidential Memorandum: Re: Telephone Conversation with George Hogan, Friday Nov 9th. 1962 Regarding Speech in Toronto Nov. 8th. - Cuba &C”; unsigned handwritten memos, JGDP, XII/62/C/215; Debates, November 9, 1962, 1451

136 W.W. Butterworth to Department of State, December 17, 1962, 442, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1191-92; O.W. Dier, “Call by Ambassador Butterworth on the Prime Minister,” December 18, 1962, JGDP, XIV/19/F/5

137 OC 3, 94-95; Harold Macmillan to JGD, November 30, 1962; Derick Amory to JGD, December 5, 1962, JGDP, XII/8/A/282.3

139 Diefenbaker said in the memoirs that he told Kennedy he would soon have proposals to discuss with him. The official Canadian minute of the meeting does not mention the subject, but Diefenbaker’s own memorandum for file, written in Nassau, does so. There is no record of any response from the president. OC 3, 98-99; “Bahamas Meetings - December 21-22, 1962, Specific points discussed with President Kennedy at Luncheon Meeting December 21”; JGD, “Memorandum Re: Discussions with President Kennedy, Nassau, Bahamas - December 21, 1962,” December 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/66/C/291

140 Diefenbaker’s own records of the meetings, along with the delegation’s memoranda and draft communiqués, appear in JGDP, XIV/9/D/17, XII/66/C/291, and XII/113/F/222.

141 JGD, “Draft statement on meeting in Nassau with President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan,” January 21, 1963, JGDP, XII/66/C/291; OC 3, 105-06; Debates, January 21, 1963, 2898-99

142 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, January 2, 1963, JGDP, V/5, 2724. In mid-January Olive was examined at the Montreal Neurological Institute and provided with a back brace. JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, January 11, 1963, ibid., 2725

144 Transcript of a press conference with General Lauris S. Norstad, January 3, 1963, JGDP, VI/2/108 (Norstad)

148 English, Worldly, 249-51; Pearson, Mike 3, 69-72; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 304

149 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 20. Diefenbaker offered a variation of the point to Finlay Macdonald in a telephone conversation on January 14: “In 1878 Macdonald was in the same position. The Grits announced on a Thursday that they were in favour of free trade. Sir John changed his speech around and went to the country … I am trying to work out a Declaration of National Idealism somewhat as I made at the conclusion of my Bill of Rights speech - ‘I am a Canadian …’ About 8 lines.” On the other hand, Diefenbaker recorded another telephone conversation with John Pallett on the same day in which he blamed Norstad for his indecision: “We would have made an announcement if it had not been for Norstad. There is American domination again. The attitude Kennedy took to Macmillan in the Bahamas was simply to push him.” JGD, “Conversation with Finlay Macdonald,” January 14, 1963; JGD, “Telephone conversation with John Pallett,” January 14, 1963, JGDP, XII/71/C/354; VII/73/A/610.4

150 E.A. Goodman to JGD January 15, 1963, JGDP, XII/71/C/354; Goodman, Life, 94-101; OC 3, 153-55. Diefenbaker had the chutzpah to declare in his memoirs that he was “entirely satisfied” with the defence resolution and that he agreed with Goodman’s approach to it. But he added delphically: “It is of significance that Goodman was John Bassett’s lawyer and George Hees’s principal backer, a powerful man within the Toronto Tory hierarchy with a considerable influence over Ontario’s Premier, John Robarts.”

153 Fleming, Near 2, 581-82; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 26-29. Fleming described it as “a momentous document,” and prided himself that he had “kept the original in a secret place these twenty years.”

154 Fleming, Near 2, 583. Harkness’s account is generally similar, although he adds some personal exchanges not reported by Fleming. Fleming suggests that there was no further discussion of the memo, while Harkness recalls that cabinet discussed it the next morning in the absence of the prime minister and that the “great majority” of ministers accepted it. When that was reported to Diefenbaker by Fleming, he maintained his defiance. Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 29-31

156 Fleming, Near 2, 583-84; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 156; Debates, January 25, 1963, 3125-37

159 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 35-44; Debates, January 28, 29, 1963, 3157-58, 3203-06

161 “United States Information Service Special: United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons,” January 30, 1963, JGDP, VII/75/A/612; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 306-09

162 NAR, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” January 30, 1963, JGDP, XII/104/F/100; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 306-07

165 Debates, January 31, 1963, 3289-305, 3313-28; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 46-47; Fleming, Near 2, 589-90. Under House procedures there was no appeal against Speaker’s rulings, but the three opposition parties combined to defeat the government by 122-104 and to overturn the rule.

166 Debates, January 31, 1963, 3313-28; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 47-48

167 Telegram, Canadian Embassy, Washington, to External Affairs, 351 emergency, February 1, 1963, JGDP, VII/75/A/612; Washington Post, New York Times, January 31, 1963. The Bundy story became the official American line on February 7, when Bundy telephoned the Canadian ambassador, Charles Ritchie, to say that “the President knew nothing in advance about the State Department release of January 30 which triggered the currrent controversy. Bundy said ‘it was a case of stupidity and the stupidity was mine.’ ” A memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy on February 14, 1963, confirms this, speaking of “my obvious error in giving telephone clearance, even under the pressure of time, without giving you a whack at it.” Ross Campbell for NAR, “Memorandum for the Minister,” February 7, 1963, JGDP, XIV/9/D/17; McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the President,” February 14, 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: 02/01/63-02/14/63, Mandatory Review Case NLK-87-215

168 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 48-51. According to Harkness, the nine were Baker, Fleming, Hugh John Flemming, Halpenny, Harkness, Hees, McCutcheon, Nowlan, and Sévigny.

171 The quotation is from a memorandum by Carlyle Allison, recording the events of the weekend, which he sent much later to Diefenbaker. Carlyle Allison to JGD, April 26, 1971, JGDP, XIV/9/D/17

172 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 52-53; OC 3, 5-6. In the memoirs, Diefenbaker mentions only that “a prominent journalist” had baited Harkness. The prime minister’s informant was probably Carlyle Allison, who also provided Diefenbaker with the tip about further resignations. Diefenbaker was “effusively” thankful for the information. Carlyle Allison to JGD, April 26, 1971, JGDP, XIV/9/D/17

174 Peter Newman gave that version of the story from his cabinet sources. Newman, Renegade, 475

175 OC 3, 160-64; JGD, “Meeting, Feb 3/63” (handwritten notes, including Bell’s draft of cabinet resolution), JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.12; “Meeting of Ministers, February 3rd, 1962” (sic) (handwritten notes, unsigned), ibid., XIV/17/E/222.8; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 54-59; Fleming, Near 2, 597-601; Nicholson, Vision, 230-36; Douglas S. Harkness to JGD, February 3, 1963 (and covering “Memorandum to the Prime Minister”), JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.12. Diefenbaker told Fleming that Fulton made a second visit that night (which Fulton denies) to tout his own qualifications as prime minister. Two documents in the prime minister’s files suggest that there was only one visit, by Fulton and Hees together. JGD, “Saturday, February 2, 1963” (sic), February 10, 1963; “Chronology of Events re Crisis,” nd, JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.11; XIV/14/E/143

176 Fleming, Near 2, 601. Fleming’s doubts about who controlled the succession were sound. Once Diefenbaker had resigned, the selection of a new prime minister would lie with the governor general, whose duty would be to find a candidate most likely to command support in the House. He was not obliged to consult Diefenbaker, and would almost certainly have sought advice from other ministers who were opposed to Fleming. The most likely temporary favourite seemed to be Nowlan.

184 Nicholson, Vision, 242-46. Wardell’s account from Robert Thompson was not inconsistent, although Wardell heard it only after the government defeat. Nicholson’s remarkable part in this affair is explained by Diefenbaker as the result of his ambition for a senatorship, which he now hoped to secure from a new prime minister as the reward for his king-making role. The prospect of an appointment under Diefenbaker had certainly been discussed, and Nicholson’s name went before cabinet at the meeting in September 1962 when Grattan O’Leary and Allister Grosart were made senators. Nicholson’s appointment, however, was not confirmed. Diefenbaker wrote that “he would have received this elevation in due course.” His disenchantment may have followed that disappointment. Wardell, “Chateau Laurier,” JGDP, XIV/9/D/17; OC 3, 166; CC, 82-62, September 24, 1962

185 “Chronology of events re crisis,” JGDP, XLV/14/E/143; Nicholson, Vision, 247-49

3 Wallace McCutcheon to JGD, February 6, 1963, JGDP, XIV/E/222.10 Defence (Haslam). The concluding warning proved empty. There were no further negotiations with the United States on warheads during the election campaign. On February 11 George Nowlan established the same position in public, telling the Halifax Chronicle Herald that he would “quit the cabinet immediately if an anti-American election program were presented by his party.”

6 Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 80-85; Sévigny, This Game, 284-86. Hees must have been subject to further persuasion during the week. Richard Bell told Stursberg: “I heard that John Bassett threatened to expose him with something that was subsequently exposed. I was told soon afterwards that there was this scandal in the background of which I then knew nothing. This story moved around amongst ministers, idle gossip, no proof, no nothing. Frankly none of us believed that George would have gone out except under very heavy, almost irresistible, pressure.” The reference was to Hees’s involvement with Gerda Munsinger, which was known to the RCMP security service and probably to Diefenbaker and Fulton. Diefenbaker later believed that Bassett also knew the story and had threatened Hees that he would spill it if Hees did not resign. Bassett denied the accusation. Diefenbaker makes only veiled reference to this story in his memoirs.

During the 1963 campaign, I was asked over and over again: “Why did George Hees resign?” “What happened between the Wednesday, when he came out of the caucus and announced to the press, ‘We’re all together,’ and Saturday morning when he resigned?” I could have told the Canadian people, and possibly I should have. I have said it was an error, not of the head but of the heart. Had I revealed what I knew, this would have brought harm to the innocent members of families. Prime Ministers, according to the late Earl Attlee, have to be butchers; I never reached the point where I could do anything that might bring harm or hurt to the innocent. Sir John Macdonald once said, “Be to our faults a little blind, and to our virtues always kind.”

There is nothing in the papers to suggest that Diefenbaker had any proof of his implied accusation. Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 79-80, 86; OC 3, 177

7 JGD, Memorandum, February 18, 1963, JGDP, XIV/E/222.10 Defence (Haslam). Sévigny’s account is consistent with this story. Burt Richardson reports that he had been warned earlier by Hees’s executive assistant, Mel Jack, “that something was going on,” but he may or may not have told the prime minister what to expect. OC 3, 174-75; Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 83-85; Sévigny, This Game, 285

8 Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 83-87. Sévigny had a sarcastic comment about others who had not resigned: “There were a lot of cabinet ministers resigning each night around 11 o’clock, after the tenth whiskey. One of them was McCutcheon. The next morning he would appear with his face red as a beet and carry on. He resigned more often at night than he did in the morning. Many ministers talked about resigning, some of whom denied it since, but I know damn well that they did. One of them was Léon Baker.” Ibid., 87

13 Press release, January 14, 1963; Dalton Camp to JGD, nd, unsigned, JGDP, IX/38/B/87.1; XII/97/F/37

20 Dalton Camp, memo to constituency presidents, February 13, 1963, JGDP, VII/291/F/48

22 “Telegram from the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State,” February 3, 1963, 445, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1196-99

23 W. Walton Butterworth to William R. Tyler, February 2, 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: Rostow Memorandum … Mandatory Review Case NLK-94-11

25 Toronto Star, Telegram, and Winnipeg Tribune, February 25, 1963; Toronto Star, February 26, 1963

26 W. Keith Welsh, MD, and T. Albert Crowther, MB, “To whom it may concern,” February 19, 1963, JGDP, VII/291/F/55; Winnipeg Free Press, March 1, 1963

28 Calgary Herald, February 25, 1963; Montreal Star, March 1, 1963; Prince Albert Herald, March 2, 1963; OC 3, 183-86. In the memoirs Diefenbaker notes that “my message throughout was consistently pro-Canadian; charges that I was on an anti-American rampage were patently false. Indeed, for the reasons earlier explained, I did not give the weight it deserved to United States interference in our affairs.”

29 Globe and Mail, March 4, 1963. The main defence portion of the speech was transmitted to the State Department and the White House from the Ottawa embassy the same day. In his covering letter, Butterworth quoted Diefenbaker’s assertion that “we shall not have Canada used as a storage dump for nuclear weapons.” Telegram, Ottawa to secretary of state, 1124, March 4, 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General

33 In March the State Department told the White House that a Canadian Gallup Poll showed that 54 percent of Canadians believed the prestige of (and respect for) the United States in Canada had grown in the previous year, whereas only 20 percent felt that way in polls conducted in 1957 and 1961. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion explained that they “believed the results are largely a reflection of President Kennedy’s actions regarding Cuba and his personal popularity.” William H. Brubeck, “Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House,” March 15, 1963, S/S 3942, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General

34 In January 1963 Gallup showed the Liberals at 47 percent, the Tories at 32 percent, the NDP at 10 percent, Social Credit and others at 11 percent. By March the standings were Liberals, 41 percent; Tories, 32 percent; NDP, 11 percent; Socred and others, 16 percent. In early April support for the Liberals and the Tories remained as in March, while NDP support had grown to 14 percent and Social Credit/other had fallen to 13 percent. On March 8 Daniel Johnson told Diefenbaker that “Réal’s support is at its highest peak right now; a vote tomorrow would return 50-55 Socreds.” Another poll published by the Telegram on March 30 showed the Liberals and Conservatives in virtually a dead heat nationally (at 38 to 36 percent), with wide regional variations. CAR 1963, 34-35; Daniel Johnson to JGD, March 8, 1963, JGDP, XII/115/F/281

36 Theodore Draper, “McNamara’s Peace,” New York Review of Books, May 11, 1995, 7-11, esp. 8; McNamara and Diefenbaker, quoted in Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 292-93; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 202-07

38 McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara,” April 1, 1963, 446, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1199-1200

39 Department of External Affairs to Embassy of the United States of America, No. 35, March 29, 1963, enclosure No. 3 to Embassy’s A-890, Ottawa embassy to secretary of state, April 2, 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General

42 Telegram, State to Amembassy Ottawa, Amconsul Vancouver, March 27, 1963, 1001, 34, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum…

45 William H. Brubeck, “Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, The White House, Subject: Diefenbaker’s ‘Secret Document,’ ” April 3, 1963, ibid.

46 L.J. Légère (Niccolo), “Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Diefenbaker ‘Secret Document,’ ” April 4, 1963, ibid., Mandatory Review Case NLK-94-9. There was calculation in the proposal that any release should come from the White House rather than the State Department: “We ought to finesse the January 30-associated ‘U.S. State Department’ out of the act and capitalize on the President’s popularity in Canada. Naturally this in no way reflects on State, but is merely tactical in the light of circumstances.”

47 Montreal Star, Globe and Mail, April 6, 1963; telegram, Butterworth to secretary of state, April 6, 1963, 1292, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum…

49 A second article in the Globe and Mail by George Bain (apparently based on a briefing by Kennedy’s press secretary, Pierre Salinger) on April 12 offered a full and accurate account of the entire story, including the point that it seemed to be the use of the word pushed that had upset Diefenbaker. Bain reported that “although efforts to uncover the actual words of a pencilled notation on the paper in the president’s handwriting have been unsuccessful, it can be reported with assurance that it was not of an offensive nature. When the story became a repeat sensation in the last week of the campaign, there was talk here that the president had pencilled in something like: ‘What do we say to the A.O.B. (sic) about this?’ Because of reluctance here to talk about the document at all, or anything else relating to Canada, during the campaign, this could not be proved or disproved at the time. But it was not so.” No one in Washington could be entirely sure whether there was a handwritten comment, since Diefenbaker had possession of the original document. But Bain and his sources were correct: There was no handwritten comment. Knowlton Nash wrote that Kennedy said to Ben Bradlee: “At the time, I didn’t think Diefenbaker was a son of a bitch. I thought he was a prick”; and to Hugh Sidey of Time. “That’s untrue … I’m not that stupid … And besides, at the time I didn’t know him so well.” After the change of government in April 1963, the US administration discussed whether any effort should be made to retrieve the original document from Diefenbaker, but decided that would be fruitless. When Pearson met Kennedy for the first time as prime minister at Hyannis Port in May 1963, the subject was raised during “an informal group conversation after dinner,” and on Pearson’s inquiry, Basil Robinson asserted that he had seen the document and that it had “no handwritten comment on it.” Telegram, Butterworth to secretary of state, April 12, 1963, 1322, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum…; “Memorandum of Conversation: Subject: Memorandum prepared by Mr. Rostow,” May 10, 1963, ibid., POF: Canada: Security, 1963; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 288-89

50 Vancouver Province, April 6, April 8, 1963; telegram, Butterworth to secretary of state, April 7, 1963, 1294, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum…

51 Telegram, Rusk to Amembassy Ottawa, April 12, 1963, 1033, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum … Mandatory Review Case NLK 94-11; “Telegram from the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State,” April 15, 1963, 447, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1200-01

53 Nash gives a full account of the chain through which the letter passed, and the remaining evidence can be found scattered in Diefenbaker’s own files. Drew’s covering letter to Diefenbaker is in the papers, although its letterhead has been roughly torn from both pages. There are also several of Diefenbaker’s own memos on the affair. No copy of the offending letter can be found in the Diefenbaker Papers. On May 27, 1963, in the face of Liberal protests, Gordon Churchill read the letter in the House of Commons. Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 285-87; George Drew to JGD, date removed; JGD, “Memorandum Re: Phone Conversation with George Drew, March 25, noon, from Nanaimo”; MW to JGD, nd, re telephone call from Bryce; JGD, “Interference of the Americans in Canadian politics in the election,” JGDP, XII/88/D/202; XII/58/C/155; XII/88/D/204; XII/95/E/127; Debates, May 27, 1963, 318-22

57 “A Son Excellence Le Gouverneur Général du Canada,” April 12, 1963, JGDP, XII/41/B/335; OC 3, 192-95

59 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, May 1, June 7, July 27, October 3, 1963, ibid., 2909-10, 2946, 3030, 3126-27

66 CAR 1963, 40-41; JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, July 27, October 22, 25, 1963, JGDP, V/3, 3030, 3146, 3157

67 Dalton K. Camp, “Remarks … to the Executive Officers of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada,” October 26, 1963, JGDP, IX/38/B/87.1

68 OC 3, 204-06; JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, September 10, 18, October 2, 25, 1963, JGDP, V/3, 3090, 3094, 3124, 3157

70 “Renegade in Power,” October 28, 1963; “The Diefenbaker Years: Commentary on Peter Newman’s ‘Renegade in Power …’ ” November 4, 1963, JGDP, IX/16/A/548.1

73 JGD to Brigadier Michael Wardell, November 22, 1963; Michael Wardell, “The Editorial Page … Reply to Newman,” Fredericton Gleaner, November 16, 1963, JGDP, IX/16/A/548.1. Another of Diefenbaker’s friends, Gowan Guest, contributed a measured review of the book to the Commentator in December 1963. Guest noted: “For the author to fail to emphasize the twinkle in the eye, the gesticulations with the anecdotes, and the hearty guffaw is to deprive the man of one of his essential characteristics. For him to pass over as lightly as he does the sympathetic understanding of John Diefenbaker for the private sufferings of people he comes to know is to distort one of his most attractive traits.” Renegade, Guest judged, “has no sympathy for John Diefenbaker … Nevertheless, it is a book which no sophisticated Canadian should fail to read and a book which no politically interested Canadian can fail to find absorbing from dedication to index.” Gowan T. Guest, “Perspicacity without Perspective,” Commentator, December 1963, 17-18

75 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, December 17, 1963, January 4, 1964, JGDP, V/3, 3234; V/6, 3241

77 Diefenbaker told his brother on January 25 that if the motion to hold a secret ballot carried, he would at once announce his resignation as leader since “I do not intend to be the Leader of a Party and be subject to continuing sniping from the minority.” Apparently he thought better of that threat in the ten days that followed. Globe and Mail, Telegram, February 5, 1964; CAR 1964, 9-10; OC 3, 220-21; JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, January 25, 1964, JGDP, V/6, 3278

79 Dalton K. Camp, “Acceptance Speech …” February 4, 1964, JGDP, IX/38/B/87.1; OC 3, 218-20

80 Dalton K. Camp to JGD, March 30, 1964, JGDP, IX/38/B/87.1; Douglas Leiterman, “Television Journalism,” Globe and Mail, June 25, 1964; CAR 1964, 439-40

83 Debates, June 15-17, 1964, 4306-09, 4317-32, 4347-52, 4357-60; CAR 1964, 22-29

84 For accounts of the scandals, see Gwyn, Shape of Scandal, passsim; CAR 1964, 38-44; English, Worldly, 279-83; Nielsen, The House, 133-50.

86 Hutchison, “A conversation with the prime minister,” February 11, 1965, Hutchison Papers

91 Debates, December 11, 14, 1964, 10965, 11075, 11136, 11139; OC 3, 225-26; CAR 1964, 33-38

92 CAR 1964, 90-93; JGD to Dalton K. Camp, October 17, 1964, JGDP, IX/38/B/87.1

93 Léon Balcer to Dalton K. Camp, January 15, 1965; press communiqué, January 14, 1965, JGDP, XII/93/E/98

94 Dalton K. Camp, “Memorandum to: The Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker …” February 1, 1965, JGDP, XIV/16/E/193

95 Dalton K. Camp to executive officers of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, January 19, 1965; Dalton K. Camp, “Memorandum to: The Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker …” February 1, 1965, JGDP, XII/93/E/98; XIV/16/E/193; Toronto Star, January 25, 1965

96 Dalton K. Camp, “Memorandum to: The Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker …” February 1, 1965, JGDP, XIV/16/E/193

97 As leader of the opposition, Diefenbaker had three assistants: Richardson, the former editor of the Telegram; Van Dusen, who had been Michael Starr’s executive assistant from 1957 to 1963; and Greg Guthrie, a former journalist and military officer.

99 TVD, “Caucus. 1. Motion to expel Balcer,” nd, JGDP, VII/169/A/1580, 104216-18; Diefenbaker dictated at least six memoranda on the crisis on February 4, in two of which he indicated that he might retire. Erik Nielsen told him “that would be a terrible calamity, we would have no one to lead us in the election. I said I was not going to be used in an election campaign and be thrown out after.” Diefenbaker set two conditions for himself. He would not accept any kind of veto imposed by the Quebec caucus; and he would not continue as leader “if John Robarts and the Organization in Ontario are going to be against me.” These memos are filed in JGDP, XII/93/E/98.

100 “Memorandum, re PC Caucus February 5/PC National Executive February 6,” February 4, 1965, JGDP, XII/93/E/98

103 This account of Diefenbaker’s speech is based on the detailed notes of Davie Fulton. E.D. Fulton, “Executive Meeting, PC Ass’n. 6/2/65,” Fulton Papers

105 The questionnaire was headed: “Letter of advice to the National Leader … intended to serve solely as advice to the National Leader … to be communicated to him by the National President.” JGDP, IX/64/B/630

106 The published accounts differ over whether the vote was on a Nielsen or a Goodman motion, and whether the vote was 55-52, 57-55, 53-52, or 52-50. Toronto Star, February 8, 1965; CAR 1965, 11-12; Goodman, Life, 104-05

108 E.D. Fulton, “Executive Meeting, PC Ass’n,” February 6, 1965, Fulton Papers

115 Gwyn, Shape of Scandal, 222-37; Nielsen, The House, 133-43; OC 3, 231-35

116 Murray had been Davie Fulton’s executive assistant, and was then in the same position with Wallace McCutcheon. He remained close to Fulton, and was thought to be one of Peter Newman’s confidants about the cabinet crisis of 1962-63. For an account of these events in 1965, see Goodman, Life, 106-12.

119 Johnston was an economist who had worked as an editorial writer for the Financial Post, editor of the Stratford Beacon-Herald, and publisher of the Aurora Banner. He joined party headquarters for the 1965 campaign. This account was part of a commentary on the 1965 campaign written for Diefenbaker as he wrote his memoirs in 1974. It seemed intended to persuade Diefenbaker that the jibe was not part of a campaign of subversion which, in retrospect, he perceived among traitors to his cause at national headquarters. Newman and Goodman also tell the story with slight variations. James Johnston to JGD, “Memorandum: Recollections of 1965 General Election Meetings, E.A. Goodman letter and Newman’s ‘Distemper of our Times …’ ” December 3, 1974, JGDP, XIV/1/A/13; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 41-42; Newman, Distemper, 360; Goodman, Life, 116-17

122 Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms, 1867-1968, 320-23; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 42; Johnston to Diefenbaker, “Memorandum …” JGDP, XIV/1/A/13; OC 3, 254-56; CAR 1965, 101

127 English, Worldly, 306-11; CAR 1965, 86-95; Newman, Renegade, 355-57, 365-74

128 Montreal Gazette, October 11, 1965; Globe and Mail, October 30, 1965; CAR 1965, 85-86

129 Debates, January 31, February 23, 28, 1966, 426, 1681-83, 1877-90; OC 3, 270-71

137 CAR 1966, 13-14; Globe and Mail, March 9, 1966; Van Dusen, The Chief, 175-76

138 For discussion of the Spence Commission’s creation and terms of reference, see the Debates, March 14, 1966, 2613-31, 2663-82; March 15, 1966, 2685-702; Nielsen, The House, 54-59; English, Worldly, 350-57; OC 3, 266-73; Globe and Mail, March 16, 1966; Van Dusen, The Chief, 178-82.

140 The inquiry and the Spence report are reported at length in Van Dusen’s The Chief, 165-229. See also CAR 1966, 32-33; OC 3, 272-73. Diefenbaker’s main files on the inquiry are contained in JGDP, VII/214,216/A/1991.2, 1991.10; XII/86/D/141,142; XII/122/F/420; and XIV/14,15/E/145,172. The Fulton Papers contain full files of the inquiry in volumes 108 and 109.

143 “Report of General Caucus of April 20th 1966”; “Report of Special Committee of Caucus,” May 4, 1966; JGD, “Memorandum re: Miss Flora MacDonald,” JGDP, XII/80/D/30, XII/119/F/384; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 82-83

146 Globe and Mail, Telegram, September 22, 1966; Goodman, Life, 124-25; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 110-19; OC 3, 273; CAR 1966, 41-43

148 CAR 1966, 43-44; “A Record of Editorial Opinion Regarding Mr. Camp’s Stand,” nd, JGDP, IX/38/B/87.2

153 Montreal Gazette, November 16, 1966. Nicholson reported that Camp’s organizers had “drilled, rehearsed and positioned an effective commando force” in the hall, with detailed instructions to avoid applause and to heckle and boo frequently. Diefenbaker repeated this account in his memoirs. Orillia Packet-Times, November 24, 1966; OC 3, 276-77

154 Johnston, The Party’s Over, 154-55; OC 3, 276-78. Diefenbaker’s outline notes for the speech were contained in four brief pages, in which he reasserted his commitment to “the fundamentals on which Sir John A. Macdonald laid the cornerstone”: equality of opportunity through public education; medicare; assistance to free enterprise and the elderly; and promotion of agricultural and resource sales. The notes conclude with a promise to “transfer the mantle of leadership and responsibility” to any younger leader who commits himself to fulfil these pledges and fights “to prevent this great Conservative Party from becoming one of reaction and inaction.” Most of the message was never delivered. JGD, “Notes for opening speech,” November 13, 1966, JGDP, XII/119/F/381

157 OC 3, 301; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 162; Winnipeg Free Press, November 26, 1966

158 There are several variations. Diefenbaker identifies the author as “Sir Andrew Barton, an Elizabethan soldier.” The lines appear as “Johnnie Armstrong’s Last Goodnight” in Dryden’s Miscellanies of 1702: “Fight on, my merrie men all,/ I’m a little wounded, but I am not slain;/ I will lay me down for to bleed a while,/ Then I’ll rise and fight with you again.” OC 3, 279-80

159 “Resolution passed - Conservative Party Annual Meeting, November 16th - Carried. 563-186,” JGDP, VII/193/A/1819; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 163-65; CAR 1966, 47-48

4 Goodman, Life, 132-34; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 177-80; CAR 1967, 24-25; James Johnston, Memorandum for executive committee meeting, January 25, 1967, JGDP, VII/193/A/1819, 122386-90

5 Diefenbaker’s threat was that he would refuse to provide a message or a picture for the conference program, and would not attend the convention, unless his demand was met. JGD to E.A. Goodman, June 21, 1967; E.A. Goodman to JGD, July 19, 1967; E.A. Goodman to JGD, August 21, 1967; “Johnston Message Re Leadership Convention Nomination Times Memo,” August 1967, JGDP, XIV/18/E/225, XII/91/E/52, XII/120/F/391; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 180-89

6 Diefenbaker had also made some desultory efforts over the winter to interest the mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, in contesting the leadership as his chosen successor. Drapeau was grateful to Diefenbaker for promoting Expo 67 for Montreal, but he was not interested in the Tory leadership. CAR 1967, 24-32; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 191-216; JGD, “Re Mr Stanfield,” May 16, 1967, JGDP, XIV/16/E/210

7 CAR 1967, 179; Vancouver Province, August 29, 1967; “I am a Canadian,” RCA Victor CC-1027

10 Toronto Star, Globe and Mail, September 7, 1967; Johnston, The Party’s Over, 225-29; CAR 1967, 34-35; Goodman, Life, 136-37

13 In his concentration on the flow of language, Rill missed Diefenbaker’s meaning here. The six million he referred to were not French-speaking Canadians, but Canadians from neither the English- nor French-speaking charter groups.

16 JGD, press statement, September 8, 1967, JGDP, XII/121/F/392. Diefenbaker’s assistant Tom Van Dusen had prompted the Youth for Dief organizers to obtain nomination papers for him in August, and found the necessary twenty-five delegate signatories before Diefenbaker himself indicated his willingness to stand. Van Dusen, The Chief, 244-52

17 “The Charade Is Recognized,” Globe and Mail, September 9, 1967. After his Thursday speech, Diefenbaker had received a telegram of support for his “two nations” stance from the Social Credit premier of Alberta, Ernest Manning, and a similar telephone call from the Social Credit attorney general of British Columbia, Robert Bonner. Van Dusen, The Chief, 251

23 Quoted in Stevens, Stanfield, 195. Diefenbaker remembered the words as “I think I can get along with this fellow, Camp.”

24 JGD, “Memorandum Re: Conversation with Premier Stanfield, Royal York Hotel, Monday, September 11, 12.00 noon to 12.30 noon,” JGDP, XII/121/F/392

25 JGD, “Memorandum Re: Phone conversation with Hon. Gordon Churchill, Winnipeg, Monday, September 11, 1.25 P.M.,” ibid.

38 Harold Macmillan to John Gray, October 9, 1969, enclosing JGD to Harold Macmillan, October 2, 1969, and Harold Macmillan to JGD, October 9, 1969 (copies in the author’s possession). The two academics were W.F.W. Neville and the author, assisted by John O. Stubbs and Colin Wright. The interviews are those referred to in this text as JGDI, 1969 and 1970.

39 Van Dusen, The Chief, Coates, The Night of the Knives; Johnston, The Party’s Over

41 The reporter was Stewart McLeod, who told this story at the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the Diefenbaker funeral train, held in August 1994 in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons.

42 Hayden, Seeking a Balance, 249. In cooperation with the National Archives, a major project of reorganizing and classifying the Diefenbaker Papers for public use was begun in 1980. It was completed, after a series of financial vicissitudes, in 1994. The centre’s initial financing by governments and university did not survive the economy drives of the 1980s, and by 1995 it was being funded by a private foundation, the Diefenbaker Society. The society raises a substantial part of its annual income from participation in the Western Canada Lottery, which would have shaken - or tickled -John Diefenbaker’s Baptist soul.

47 Toronto Star, March 30, 1976. Diefenbaker’s annoyance with Trudeau for suggesting a Canadian role in the affair may have reflected embarrassment over a distant incident. In 1959, when Vincent Massey retired as governor general, Diefenbaker was consulted by the queen about awarding Massey a retirement honour. Diefenbaker replied that during his prime ministership, as had been the custom since 1939, no Canadians should receive United Kingdom honours. Massey did not receive his reward. In the second volume of the memoirs, which he was completing at the time of his award, Diefenbaker commented that he had been “obliged to advise the Queen” not to honour Massey, and added somewhat curiously: “I personally was in the position where I might have received high and prestigious honours, but I made it clear I could not accept them. For example, in 1958 when I was in Malaya, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman offered me his country’s highest decoration. I automatically turned it down.” If Trudeau had graciously suspended Canadian policy to recommend or concur in Diefenbaker’s Companion of Honour, Diefenbaker might not have wished to be reminded of his own decision. OC 2, 59

52 Quoted in Stephen Smith, “Interview with Graham Glockling,” March 1995, in author’s possession.

54 Ottawa Citizen, December 24, 1976; Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, December 23, 1976

55 “Memo to Mr. Diefenbaker: Re Burial - in Saskatoon,” September 11, 1978; “Rough Notes re Funeral of Mr. Diefenbaker,” November 24, 1978; “Re Funeral arrangements,” November 30, 1978, JGDP, XII/82/D/56; Smith, “Interview with Graham Glockling,” March 1995. The reference to the order of precedence in heaven for two wives is from Spencer, Trumpets, 175.

60 Flora MacDonald, Goodman Lecture, University of Western Ontario, September 28, 1994

61 JGD to Keith Martin; JGD to Senator David Walker, August 1, 1979, JGDP, XII/82/D/56

1 Ottawa Citizen, August 16, 1979; Globe and Mail, August 18, 1979; Brian McGarry, “Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker Funeral,” Hulse, Playfair & McGarry files

2 “Order of Service, State Funeral, John G. Diefenbaker, 1895-1979,” August 19, 1979

6 Diefenbaker first raised the question of a gravestone modelled on that of Churchill in a memorandum about his will written in March 1969, and he repeated his preference when he met the director of special events in the mid-1970s. JGD, “Confidential Memorandum,” March 13, 1969, JGDP, XIV/8/D/13.2; Smith, “Interview with Graham Glockling,” March 1995

7 Sean O’Sullivan put the total cost of the funeral at $1 million; and Robert Sheppard, writing on the occasion of Richard Nixon’s funeral in 1994, used the same figure. The Diefenbaker funeral, he commented, was more elaborate than Nixon’s. O’Sullivan, Both My Houses, 163; Globe and Mail, April 27, 1994; McGarry, “Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker Funeral”

8 “The last will and testament of the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, made this 7th day of August, 1979,” JGDP, XII/83/D/67

11 For early correspondence on the trust fund, see Henry Langford to Dr D.M. Baltzan, August 9, 1962; Dr D.M. Baltzan to Henry Langford, August 11, 1962, JGDP, XIV/18/E/232.3; Henry Langford to JGD, November 8, 1962; Dr D.M. Baltzan to JGD, January 11, 1963; K. Burn to JGD, September 15, 1967; JGD, “Note,” September 20, 1967; JGD, “Re Senator Brunt Fund,” nd, JGDP, XII/83/D/66, XII/29/B/11. In his 1970 interview with Michael Wardell, John Bassett mentioned occasions in 1957, 1958, and 1962 when he approached Diefenbaker with donations he had raised for Diefenbaker trust funds (the latter two each involving a cheque for $100,000 from Garfield Weston). Diefenbaker vehemently refused the gifts, and suggested that any donations should go directly into the party’s accounts for its general use. Bassett said that Diefenbaker was “a man of incontestable probity” in financial matters, which seems to be true. Michael Wardell, “John Bassett at Toronto, Friday & Saturday, November 20/21, 1970,” JGDP, XIV/16/E/219; Globe and Mail, May 16, 1981