Chapter One
Why Do People Cooperate?
1. Because it is based upon interviews with individuals about their own behavior, the focus of this volume is on the microlevel. For a macrolevel comparison across societies see Culpepper (2003).
2. The importance of social motivations has been noted within the management literature. See Frey and Osterloh (2002); Meglino and Korsgaard (2004).
3. Government regulatory agencies have developed a variety of strategies for enlisting businesses and other stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of regulatory policy. These include negotiation to reach consensus on administrative regulations (Cogli-anese 1997), cooperative arrangements for delivering social services (Stewart 2003), and joint efforts to manage wildlife and wild lands (Karkkainen 2002; Lin 1996). These policies decentralize power to “enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual circumstances” (Dorf and Sabel 1998, 267). All of these efforts involve procedures for decision making that embody the values of participation, neutrality, and acknowledging the rights, needs, and concerns of people involved in the decision. This does not mean that they involve wide participation, but that they reflect the values inherent in social motivation-based perspectives.
4. Tyler and Blader (2000) focus upon identification as a key mediator between organizational policies and practices and attitudes, values, and cooperative behavior. This analysis simplifies the model by considering attitudes, values, and identity as one cluster of dispositions. It does so because the focus is upon actions that can be taken to motivate cooperation and such actions involve a concern with procedural justice and motive-based trust, not upon dispositions. Procedural justice and motive-based trust influence attitudes, values, and identity.
5. It is important to recognize that the range of goals that people find desirable is distinct from the study of how people pursue those goals. Hence, broadening the range of goals to include social motivations does not invalidate the finding of models of judgment and choice that argue that judgments and choices are linked to a multiplicative combination of likelihood estimates (expectancies about the consequences of actions) and how good or bad different consequences are judged to be (the value people place upon gains and losses). Rather, the same model operates, but it includes more potential gains and losses. What is changed is the range of goals that are considered in contrast to the traditional economic focus upon incentives and sanctions. While some economists have recognized the value of social motivations, the predominant focus of this literature has been upon material gains and losses. In other words, people are still viewed as acting based upon their judgments, as they do with material gains and losses.
6. It is important to acknowledge that prior social psychologists have recognized the importance of motivations of the type studied here. One example is the work of Foa and Foa (1974). However, discussions of motivation in organizational settings have focused largely on issues of incentives and sanctions.
7. They may also engage in behaviors targeted toward harming the group and its goals. However, this analysis is not focused on behaviors that undermine the group. Rather, it focuses on the degree to which people act in ways that help the group. It imagines a continuum from making minimal efforts on behalf of the group to making more extensive efforts. The question of when people actively sabotage or otherwise work against their group is important, but outside the scope of this analysis.
Chapter Two
Motivational Models
1. The difficulty of separating out instrumental and social motivations is illustrated by Podsakoff and colleagues’ review. The authors find that incentives matter, but that a key issue is the justice of the manner in which incentives are delivered.
2. As already noted, other authors also recognize that possibility of nonmaterial motivations; see, e.g., Foa and Foa (1974). More recently this idea has been discussed by Tetlock (2000, 2002). More recent versions of social exchange theory also recognize that people care about more than material gains and losses. And, as with economic theory, a broader range of goals does not invalidate social exchange theory. Rather, it just says that the dynamics of social exchange occur over a broader range of potential gains and losses. Whatever people value from others, their behavior is shaped by their estimate of the gains and losses associated with exchanges.
3. Thibaut and Walker (1975) use a similar instrumental model to explain procedural justice. However, Tyler (1994) argues that procedural justice can best be understood as relational—that is, social—while distributive justice has both instrumental and relational elements. Hence, Tyler suggests that distributive justice is the form of justice most strongly shaped by instrumental concerns.
4. Tyler (1994) suggests that procedural justice is completely social (i.e., relational) in nature.
5. The discussion of attitudes about work should be distinguished from the more complex literature on commitment in the workplace. The multidimensional models of commitment that have been developed include several of the social motivations discussed here; see also Mayer and Allen (1997).
6. The results of this study also show that legitimacy—a social motive considered later—shapes deference.
7. Two arguments frame the suggestion that justice is a social motivation. The first is that procedural justice is distinctly relational. Tyler (1994) distinguishes procedural and distributive justice, arguing that procedural justice is uniquely framed by “relational motivations.” These relational issues include concern about the quality of decision making and the quality of interpersonal treatment (Tyler and Lind 1992).
The original discussion of relational motivations included trust. In this analysis, trust in the motives of authorities will be treated separately in the analysis of policies and practices in chapter 6. Treatment of this issue has not always been the same. Tyler and Blader (2000) include indices of trust in their index of interpersonal treatment to create two factors, decision making and interpersonal treatment. On the other hand, in their analysis of personal experiences with authorities, Tyler and Huo (2002) treated both general procedural justice judgments and assessments of trust as distinct judgments from the justice of decision making and the justice of interpersonal treatment. This analysis follows the lead of Tyler and Huo in treating trust as an issue that is distinct from procedural justice.
8. Of course, trust is not completely distinct from procedural justice; see De Cremer and Tyler (2007).
9. As noted, the general focus of justice research has, until recently, been on negative reactions to injustice. In contrast, the focus of the literature on trust is on whether trust exists. The existence of trust is viewed as a condition that enables productive exchange among people. In law and business, for example, lack of trust is viewed as a barrier to the ability of individuals to engage in cooperative interactions. In contrast to the literature on justice, in which the absence of justice leads to outrage, in the literature on trust the absence of trust leads people to have a greater unwillingness to cooperate with others. In the absence of trust, people have trouble engaging in cooperative interactions in which they exchange resources and work together toward common goals.
10. People focus on their assessment of the motives of authorities for two reasons. The first is that they lack enough information to directly determine what actions the authority has taken. People are usually not in the position to know all that has been done in response to their problem or to understand whether the police or courts are doing everything possible to try to solve the problem in a reasonable way. The second is that they lack enough expertise to decide whether those actions are the most appropriate ones to have taken. Authorities are often in possession of special knowledge and training that allow them to make better professional decisions. Judges and police officers, like doctors, lawyers, and teachers, all spend significant time learning their roles and responsibilities, which allow them to make decisions that cannot easily be explained to an untrained member of the public. We expect a doctor to know, for example, about the appropriate way to treat an illness and we must to some degree trust that the doctor is acting in good faith.
The problem for people is to distinguish between situations in which cooperation with authorities is reasonable and situations in which exploitation is occurring. For example, we should cooperate with our doctor when that doctor is motivated by an interest in protecting our health. However, if our doctor is taking kickbacks from a drug company to prescribe ineffective or harmful drugs, our trust is being exploited, and we should not cooperate. The difficulty lies in determining which situation we are in, when we lack the expertise to independently evaluate the appropriateness of the drug or lack the knowledge of the fact that the doctor prescribes that same drug to all patients, regardless of their illnesses.
Chapter Three
Cooperation with Managerial Authorities in Work Settings
1. The panel used in this study is a sample of respondents who completed online surveys in exchange for free cable services. In addition, those respondents who completed the questionnaires received small cash incentives: $5 for completing the first-wave questionnaires, and $5 for completing the second-wave questionnaires. The sample can be weighted to approximate the demographics of the American population, but such weighting was not used in the analysis presented here. In this study only those members of this panel who work were allowed to participate in the study.
2. The study of employees was conducted with support from the Sloan Foundation Program on Business Institutions (Gail Pesyna, director). I would like to thank the foundation for its support and Gail for her commitment to this project.
3. Those who expressed interest were screened to ensure that they worked at least twenty hours per week, had a primary supervisor, and had worked at their current jobs for at least three months. Respondents meeting these criteria completed the survey in two parts, one week apart. Cooperative behavior was assessed in the first (week one) questionnaire and social motives in the second (week two) questionnaire. Respondents answered structured questions in their homes via the Internet (WebTV). The first wave of interviews yielded 4,430 completed interviews. It includes only those who completed both weeks of the study.
4. In comparison, the weighted first-wave sample was 53 percent male and 82 percent white; 32 percent had a college degree or postgraduate education; and 42 percent had a household income of over $50,000. The mean age was forty-one.
5. A four-item scale was created to measure in-role behavior (alpha = 0.80). Respondents were asked how often they engaged in the behaviors and the response scale ranged from (1) never to (7) always. The items were:
Fulfill the responsibilities specified for someone in your position.
Perform the tasks usually expected by your work organization as part of your job.
Complete your work in a timely, effective manner.
Meet the performance expectations of your supervisor.
6. Six items were used to measure how often respondents engaged in extra-role behavior (alpha = 0.81). Respondents were asked about frequency of behavior, and the response format was (1) never to (7) always. The items were:
Volunteer to do things that are not required in order to help your organization.
Volunteer to orient new employees to help your organization.
Help others with work-related problems as a way of helping your organization.
Put an extra effort into doing your job well, beyond what is normally expected.
Share your knowledge with others even when you will not receive credit.
Work extra hours even when you will not receive credit for doing so.
7. A seven-item scale was created to measure compliance (alpha = 0.86). Respondents were asked how often they engage in different behaviors, and the response format was (1) never to (7) always. The items were
Comply with organizational rules and regulations.
Use company rules to guide what you do on the job.
Seek information about appropriate company policies before acting.
Follow organizational rules about how you should spend your time.
Follow the policies established by your supervisor.
Carefully carry out the instructions of your supervisor.
Adhere to the directives of your supervisor.
8. Six items were used to measure voluntary rule adherence (alpha = 0.86). Respondents were asked about frequency with which they engaged in behaviors, and their format was (1) always to (7) never. The items were
Follow company policies even when you do not need to do so because no one will know whether you did.
Follow organizational rules and policies without questioning them.
Follow company rules and policies concerning how to do your job.
Implement your supervisor’s decisions even when he will not know whether you did.
Do what your supervisor expects of you, even when you do not really think it is important.
9. Three items assessed the likelihood of receiving incentives/sanctions for good/bad work-related behavior (alpha = 0.66) on a scale of 1 to 5. The items were
How easy is it for your supervisor to observe whether you follow work rules? (1 = not easy, to 5 = very easy)
How often is your supervisor paying attention to whether you are follow work rules? (1 = never, to 5 = always)
How often do you think that you are closely monitored by your supervisor? (1 = never, to 5 = always)
10. Three items measured the magnitude of the relationship between behavior and rewards/costs. (alpha = 0.72) and the response format was (1) not much to (5) a great deal. The items were
If you do your job poorly, how much does it hurt your pay and benefits?
If you do your job well, how much does that improve your pay and benefits?
If you are caught breaking a work rule, how much does it hurt your pay or your chances for promotion?
11. Probability and strength were combined multiplicatively. The resulting scale was adjusted to range from 1 to 5 to maintain consistency with the range of the two main effects.
12. Four items assessed respondents’ views about their long-term prospects for gain or loss in the organization (alpha = 0.76) on a scale of 1 to 5. The items were
How favorable are your opportunities for promotion? (1 = very unfavorable, to 5 = very favorable)
How favorable will your long-term financial benefits be if you stay with your company?” (1 = very unfavorable, to 5 = very favorable)
How favorable is the job security you have where you work? (1 = very unfavorable, to 5 = very favorable)
My company provides a level of rewards superior to what other companies offer. (1 = disagree strongly, to 5 = agree strongly)
13. Five items were used to assess the favorability of policies (alpha = 0.87). The response scale ranged from (1) favorable to (5) unfavorable. The items were
How favorable are the outcomes and resources you receive from the policies of your work organization?
How favorable are the resources that you are given to do your job?
Compared to what you expect, how favorable is your compensation?
How favorable is your pay?
How favorable are your benefits?
14. Three items measured the extent to which employees indicated working only for money (alpha = 0.69). The response scale was (1) agree strongly to (5) disagree strongly. The items were
How hard I work is directly related to how much I am financially rewarded.
I do not tend to do things at work that I do not think will be rewarded.
I only do what I need to do to earn my pay.
15. Five items measured whether people felt that they had to keep their jobs because they needed the money (alpha = 0.92). The response scale was (1) agree strongly to (5) disagree strongly. The items were
I depend heavily on the money I make where I work.
If I lost even one day’s pay, I would have a difficult time making ends meet.
I really need every dollar I make.
Right now, staying in my company is a matter of necessity as much as desire.
It would be hard for me to leave my job, even if I wanted to.
16. Three items were used to assess organization-level distributive fairness (alpha = 0.82; mean = 2.83 [1.09]). The response scale was (1) agree to (5) disagree. The items were
In general, resources are fairly allocated among employees at my organization.
Employees receive the opportunities they deserve in my company.
The resources people receive are linked to how well they do their jobs.
Three items were used to assess personal outcome fairness (alpha = 0.76; mean = 2.97 [0.97]). The response scale was (1) agree to (5) disagree. The items were
I am fairly paid at work.
I receive the opportunities I deserve.
The resources I receive are linked to how well I do my job.
17. A six- item scale was created to measure instrumental trust (alpha = 0.89). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly for the first five items, which were
I think that the management of my company will keep the company profitable in the future.
I think that management is making competent decisions about how to solve problems in our organization.
I trust management to make an effective plan that will keep our company competitive in the future.
I am generally able to anticipate the decision that management will make.
Management usually makes the policy decisions that I expect.
The response scale ranged from (1) very unfavorable to (5) very favorable for the sixth item:
How favorably would you rate the decisions that management makes about how to keep your company profitable in the future?”
18. Attitudes toward the organization were assessed using four items (alpha = 0.91). The response scale was (1) agree strongly to (5) disagree strongly. The items were
I am very happy where I work now.
I like my current employer.
I cannot think of another company for which I would rather work.
I think I have one of the best of all possible employers.
19. Six items were used to measure intrinsic motivation to work (alpha = 0.98). The response scale was (1) agree strongly to (5) disagree strongly. The items were
Compared to most jobs, mine is a great one to have.
All in all, I am satisfied with my job.
My job is a source of pleasure.
My job provides me with a sense of personal fulfillment.
My job teaches me new skills.
My job gives me the chance to do meaningful work.
20. Based upon a factor analysis of ten work-related affect items, two factors were identified—positive and negative. Positive emotion/affect during work was assessed by a five-item scale (alpha = 0.78). The items asked about the frequency with which employees felt particular affect during work and the response format was (1) never to (7) always. The respondents were asked how often at work during the last several weeks they had felt inspired, enthusiastic, excited, alert, or determined. Negative feelings were also assessed in the same manner, by asking how often employees had felt afraid, upset, nervous, scared, or distressed.
21. Twelve items were used to assess the legitimacy of workplace rules and authorities (alpha = 0.90). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
I feel I should accept the decisions made by my supervisors, even when I think they are wrong.
I think that it hurts my work group when I disagree with my supervisors.
I feel that it is wrong to ignore my supervisors’ instructions, even when I can get away with it.
I feel that I should follow my companies’ rules, even when I think they are wrong.
I think that it hurts my company when I break company rules.
I feel that it is wrong to break my company’s rules, even when I can get away with it.
An employee should accept the decisions made by their supervisors, even when they think that their supervisors are wrong.
Disobeying one’s supervisors is seldom justified.
Someone who disregards their supervisors hurts their work group.
People should follow organizational policies, even when they think that those policies are wrong.
It is wrong to break company rules, even if you can get away with it.
Companies are most successful when employees follow company policies.
22. Five items were used to measure obligation to perform well on the job (alpha = 0.86). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
I feel that any organization for which I work deserves my best work.
It is my responsibility to do a good job for my company.
I feel guilty when I do not do high-quality work on my job.
I respect those coworkers who give my employer their best effort.
I need to do a good job for my company in order to feel good about myself.
23. Four items measured the obligation to remain with the company (alpha = 0.75). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
I think that people move from company to company too often.
I think it is important to remain loyal to one’s work organization.
Things were better in the days when people stayed with one organization for most of their careers.
I feel a moral obligation to keep working for my current company.
24. Five items measured moral value congruence (alpha = 0.88). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
I find that my values and the values where I work are quite similar.
What my company stands for is important to me.
I agree with the values that define the goals of my company.
I think that my employer acts very ethically.
I am seldom asked at work to do anything that goes against my personal moral values.
25. Six items indexed the degree to which respondents indicated that they felt respected by management (alpha = 0.94). The scale ranged from (1) not at all to (7) a great deal. The items asked how much managers
Respect the work you do
Respect your work-related ideas
Think highly of the quality of your work
Appreciate your unique contributions on the job
Think that you have valuable insights and ideas
Think it would be difficult to replace you
26. Five items assessed the degree to which respondents indicated feeling that they worked in a high-status organization (alpha = 0.91). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
My company is one of the best companies in its field.
People are impressed when I tell them where I work.
My company is well respected in its field.
I think that where I work reflects well on me.
I am proud to tell others where I work.
27. Eight items indexed the degree to which respondents indicated merging their own identities with the group (alpha = 0.86). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
Working at my company is important to the way that I think of myself as a person.
When someone praises the accomplishments of my company, it feels like a personal compliment to me.
I feel that the problems of my work group are my own personal problems.
When someone from outside criticizes my company, it feels like a personal insult.
The place I work says a lot about who I am as a person.
I think I am similar to the people who work at my company.
Most of those working at my company want the same things from their work that I do.
I have more in common with the people I work with now than I would at most other workplaces.
28. Tyler and Blader (2000) also identified a third component of pride—pride in shared moral values. In this analysis that variable—moral value congruence—will be treated as a parallel index of values and used together with legitimacy judgments.
29. A six-item emotional identification scale was created (alpha = 0.91). The scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
My company inspires me to do the very best job I can.
I would recommend to a close friend that they work in my company.
I feel emotionally attached to my company.
I feel like part of the family where I work.
I feel that I personally belong in my company.
My concern about what happens to my company goes beyond my just being an employee there.
30. Three items assessed views about the overall fairness or organizational procedures (alpha = 0.94; mean = 3.11 [1.14]). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
Decisions are usually made in fair ways in my company.
My company puts an effort into making decisions in fair ways.
Overall, people are treated fairly where I work.
31. Four items assessed respondents’ views about the fairness of the procedures used with decisions involving them personally (alpha = 0.93; mean = 3.23 [0.99]). The response scale was (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
Decisions that affect me are usually made in fair ways in my company.
My company puts an effort into making decisions that affect me in fair ways.
Overall, I am fairly treated where I work.
Most of the issues involving me are handled in fair ways where I work.
32. Eight items were used to measure the fairness of the procedures used by the employee’s supervisor (alpha = 0.93; mean = 3.36 [s.d. = 0.97]). The response scale was (1) agree to (5) disagree. The items were
Applies rules consistently
Does not act on biases
Uses accurate information
Explains actions
Respects rights
Treats people with dignity
Is polite
Acts ethically
33. The same eight items (see note 32), focused on the company, were used to create a scale indicating the fairness of company procedures (alpha = 0.96; mean = 3.25 [s.d. = 0.94]).
34. A two-item scale of motive-based trust was created (alpha = 0.91). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The items were
I trust management to do what is best for employees like myself.
I trust management to think about my needs as well as their own when making decisions.
35. A four-item scale of trust in management was created (alpha = 0.94). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. Items asked the respondent whether or not management
Provides you with honest feedback about why decisions are made
Ensures that your views are considered
Makes sure your needs are taken into consideration
Reflects a desire by the company to do what is best for employees like you
36. A four-item scale was created to measure trust in one’s supervisor (alpha = 0.93). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. The same four items were used (see note 35), but focused on the behavior of the employee’s immediate supervisor.
37. The complete correlation matrix suggests that there is a fairly high correlation within the cluster of social motivations (mean r = 0.64). The correlation across the five areas within the instrumental motivations is considerably weaker (mean r = 0.27). The most striking problem within instrumental motivations is that whether or not people indicate that they are mainly motivated to work by money is generally unrelated to other instrumental indices. This is probably the case because the instrumental indices generally describe the environment in which the employees work, while the motivation for working is external to the particular work environment.
38. In structural equation modeling, the indices of each type of motivation are allowed to load upon underlying factors that reflect each type of motivation. The program adjusts the strength of each link to maximize the ability to predict cooperation.
39. There are five instrumental and five social indices. In this analysis the error terms of each corresponding instrumental and social index were allowed to correlate.
40. The analysis presented up to this point is based upon the argument that instrumental and social motivations shape cooperation separately, as results suggest that they do. It is also possible to compare a model in which instrumental and social motivations are treated as two distinct, but correlated, influences on cooperation to models in which instrumental motivations are viewed as exercising their influence on cooperation through social motivations, or vice versa.
The model used in the analysis reported can be compared to two alternative models. One model argues that instrumental influences on cooperation only occur through an indirect influence on social motivations. The other model argues that social motivations only influence cooperation indirectly, by shaping instrumental motivations. A comparison of the fit of these models suggests that either is a significantly worse fit than a model suggesting that there are two correlated paths.
If the two are treated as distinct influences on cooperation, the model is found to fit better (chi-square [4 d.f.] = 44.8) than it does if instrumental factors are treated as exercising influence on cooperation only through social motivations (chi-square [7 d.f.] = 162.4) or social motivations are treated as exercising influence on cooperation only through instrumental motivations (chi-square [7 d.f.] = 275.9).
41. As has been outlined, the analysis also contains a panel component. This panel data can be used to test the validity of the arguments made by looking at change in the dependent variables. One way to test the validity of the conclusions is to use the panel data to conduct a panel analysis in which measures of cooperation noted in the first wave are controlled upon in an analysis of factors shaping second-wave cooperation. In this panel analysis the dependent variable is measured at the second wave, and is predicted using first-wave measures of the instrumental and social motivations. For each dependent variable, the first-wave measure of the same variable is included as a control.
The panel data shows that for required behaviors the average beta weight for in- strumental factors was 0.06, and for social motivations 0.07. For voluntary behaviors the average beta weight for instrumental motivations was 0.04, and for social motivations 0.12.
42. For privacy purposes, salary information was not collected from respondents to the survey. The salary figures are based upon company records.
43. There were some minor variations in the questions used. For details see Tyler and Blader (2005).
44. And the correlation between social and instrumental motivations was similar to that found with corporate bankers (r = 0.64 for agents of social control).
Chapter Four
Cooperation with Legal Authorities in Local Communities
1. When people deal with legal authorities they could potentially deal with police of-ficers or court officials, such as judges. This study focuses only on the police. It does so because Tyler and Huo (2002) have found that 85 percent of the direct contact that people have with legal authorities is with the police. Hence, the police are a much more direct presence in communities than are courts. Research on the courts suggests that the find-ings concerning the police and the courts are quite similar (Tyler and Huo 2002).
2. Another example of issues linked to deterrence is provided by Ross (1982), who focuses on the problem of drunk driving to outline some of the issues associated with using deterrence to shape law-related behavior. He suggests that raising risk estimates to a level that is high enough to lower the rate of lawbreaking behavior, while not necessarily impossible, involves prohibitively high costs in terms of police personnel and people’s willingness to accept state intrusions into their personal lives. Notably, Ross finds that changes in laws can lead to short-term declines in lawbreaking because the high level of media exposure to police activities leads people to temporarily overestimate the risks of being caught and punished for such behavior. Ross further points out that even the intensive efforts of Scandinavian authorities to create high estimates of risk using random roadblocks and other similarly expensive and intrusive law enforcement measures are insufficient to create and maintain subjective risk estimates that are high enough to deter drunk driving over the long term.
3. The lack of a direct correspondence between objective and subjective risks leads to another problem with the psychology of the deterrence model—namely, its failure to take into account “threshold effects.” That is, to influence people’s behavior at all, risk estimates need to be high enough to exceed some threshold of being psychologically meaningful (Ross 1982). In most situations the objective risk of being caught and punished is quite low. For example, the approximate objective risk of being caught, convicted, and imprisoned for rape is 12 percent; for robbery it is 4 percent; and for assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft the incarceration rate is approximately 1 percent (Rob-inson and Darley 1997). Of course, psychologists know that subjective estimates of risk are stronger determinants of people’s behavior than are objective risks. However, research suggests that subjective risk estimates for infrequent events are, if anything, even lower than are objective risks (see, e.g., Bazerman 2005). Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that people’s estimates of whether or not they will be apprehended by the police are subject to egocentric biases and the “illusion of invulnerability” (Kruger and Dunning 1999; Taylor and Brown 1988).
4. A grant from the National Institute of Justice funded the collection of interview data from the random sample of 1,653 of the residents of New York City. A grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF-0240938) funded the reinterviews. Any opinions, findings, or conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Institute of Justice or the National Science Foundation.
5. To determine the degree to which respondents felt that the police created an effective deterrent to rule-breaking, they were asked how likely they thought it was that they would be caught and punished if they broke each of the seven laws used to determine cooperation (alpha = 0.87). The seven items had a response scale ranging from (1) low to (4) high.
6. A four-item performance scale was created (alpha = 0.65). The items were
How effective are the police in fighting crime in your neighborhood? (1 = very effective, to 4 = not effective at all)
When people in your neighborhood call the police for help, how quickly do they respond? (1 = very quickly, to 4 = not quickly at all)
How effective are the police in your neighborhood at helping the people who ask for help? (1 = very effective, to 4 = not effective at all)
You have confidence that the NYPD can do its job well. (1 = agree strongly, to 4 = disagree strongly)
7. Ten items evaluated the distributive fairness of the delivery of police services (alpha = 0.63). Respondents were asked whether each of the following seven groups received the quality of service and protection they deserved, using a three-point response scale: (1) received the service deserved, (2) received too much, and (3) received too little. The groups were
The people who live in your neighborhood
Minorities in your neighborhood
Whites
African Americans
Latinos
Poor people
Wealthy people
The last three items used a response scale ranging from (1) agree strongly to (4) disagree strongly. The items were
Do the police treat all people equally, regardless of their race?
Do the police provide better service to the wealthy than to the average citizen?
Do the police sometimes give minorities less help than they give to others?
8. Respondents were also asked about the fairness of police service delivery to “people like you.” The response scale ranged from (1) unfair to (4) fair.
9. The attitude scale (alpha = 0.63) contained three items, which were reverse scored:
The law represents the values of the people in power, rather than the values of people like you.
People in power use the law to try to control people like you.
The law does not protect your interests.
10. To assess legitimacy, respondents were first asked whether or not they felt that they ought to obey the police in situations in which the police told them how to behave and/ or when there were relevant laws. There were seven items (alpha = 0.69), with a response scale ranging from (1) agree strongly to (4) disagree strrongly. The items were
Overall, the NYPD is a legitimate authority and people should obey the decisions that NYPD officers make.
You should accept the decisions made by police, even if you think they are wrong.
You should do what the police tell you to do even when you don’t understand the reasons for their decisions.
You should do what the police tell you to do even when you disagree with their decisions.
You should do what the police tell you to do even when you don’t like the way they treat you.
There are times it is okay for you to ignore what the police tell you to do (reverse scored).
Sometimes you have to bend the law for things to come out right (reverse scored).
11. The measure of moral value congruence respondents (alpha = 0.70) employed four items. The response scale ranged from (1) agree strongly to (4) disagree strongly. The items were
Your feelings about what is right and wrong usually agree with the law.
The police usually act in ways that are consistent with your own values about what is right and wrong.
The moral values of most police officers are similar to your own.
The law is generally consistent with the view of people in your neighborhood about what is right and wrong.
12. The identification with the police scale included nine items (alpha = 0.69). The response scale ranged from (1) low to (4) high. The items were
If you talked to most of the police officers who work in your neighborhood, you would find they have similar views to your own on many issues.
Your background is similar to that of many of the police officers who work in your neighborhood.
You can usually understand why the police who work in your neighborhood are acting as they are in a particular situation.
You generally like the police officers who work in your neighborhood.
You are proud of the work of the police department.
You agree with many of the values that define what the police department stands for.
If most of the police officers who work in your neighborhood knew you they would respect your values.
Most of the police officers who work in your neighborhood would value what you contribute to your neighborhood.
Most of the police officers who work in your neighborhood would approve of how you live your life.
13. The measure of police procedural justice featured two items (alpha = 0.75). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (4) agree strongly. The items were
The police usually use fair procedures to decide how to handle the problems they deal with.
The police usually treat people in fair ways.
14. The fairness of police decision making was assessed using five items (alpha = 0.85; mean = 3.67; s.d. = 1.07). The response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (4) agree strongly. The items asked whether the police
Usually accurately understand and apply the law
Make their decisions based on facts, not their personal biases and opinions
Try to get the facts in a situation before deciding how to act
Give honest explanations for their actions to the people they deal with
Apply the rules consistently to different people
15. Two items measured the quality of interpersonal treatment (alpha = 0.80), asking whether police
Treat people with dignity and respect
Respect people’s rights
16. Motive-based trust (alpha = 0.71; mean = 2.65; s.d. = 1.14) was measured by asking respondents whether the police
Consider the views of people involved
Take account of the needs and concerns of the people they deal with
17. Details of this study are provided in Tyler and Degoey (1995).
18. Seventy-seven percent strongly agreed that they would conserve; 21 percent agreed; 2 percent disagreed; and 2 percent disagreed strongly.
19. The items were, “Government should determine water use” and “There should be mandatory water use rules.”
20. Respondents were asked, “How much of an impact is the water shortage having on you and your family?” and “How much of an impact to you expect it to have in the future?”
21. The questions asked whether the commission made decisions favorable to the respondents, made decisions that gave them a fair amount of water, and allocated them enough water.
22. Procedural justice was measured using ten items (alpha = 0.89). The four-point response scale ranged from (1) disagree strongly to (4) agree strongly, asking about how the water commission made decisions and whether it was
Using fair procedures
Treating people fairly
Giving people an opportunity to be heard
Considering people’s views
Giving people equal consideration
Being honest
Getting accurate information
Respecting people’s rights
Treating people politely
Making decisions fairly
23. Respondents were asked whether the commission could be trusted to make decisions that were good for everyone and whether its rules were good for everyone in the community.
24. The legitimacy survey contained four items (alpha = 0.72). It used a four-point response scale ranging from (1) disagree strongly to (4) agree strongly and asked respondents whether government
Should have the authority to make water-use rules
Should have a great deal of authority to decide what the rules were concerning how much water homes could use, what they could use water for, and how much water should cost
Should be allowed to do whatever it felt was best to handle the problem
Chapter Five
Cooperation with Political Authorities
1. This data set was prepared by Paloma Bauer and Virginia Beard of Michigan State University and is available through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research.
2. While eighteen countries were included in the study, conditions in Zimbabwe prevented many interviews from being conducted in that country.
3. The objective indicator of economic performance in both studies included World Bank indices of gross domestic product and of government consumption. The figures used in Round 1 were for 2002; in Round 2 they were for 2004–5. The quality of governance index for Round 1 included World Bank governance indicators of the rule of law (2002), political stability (2002), voice in government (2002), the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2001), and Freedom House indices of political rights (2002) and civil liberties (2002). Round 3 included the same indices for 2005.
4. Because of the conditions existing in Africa there were missing values on many variables for some respondents and, in some cases, for entire countries. The regression analysis was conducted using pairwise deletion. However, the same analysis was also performed using listwise and mean substitution approaches to ensure that errors did not occur due to the pattern of the missing values. Similar results were found using each approach.
5. In Round 1 the items on this index included attending community meetings, discussing political issues, going to rallies, and getting involved in campaigns.
6. People were asked how frequently they had gone without food, water, health care, electricity, and cash income.
7. There were three questions: “How satisfied are you with the state of the national economy?” “How satisfied are you with the state of the national economy compared to the past?” “How satisfied are you with the state of the national economy compared to the future?”
8. Respondents were asked whether they felt that democracy was preferable to any other form of government.
9. Legitimacy is measured through both institutional legitimacy (“The constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the people”) and the obligation to obey (“The government has the right to make authoritative decisions”).
10. This was measured using two items: “It makes you proud to be called [a citizen of the particular country]” and “You would want your children to think of themselves as [a citizen of the particular country].”
11. There were four items: “How honest are elections?” “Are all citizens treated equally?” “To what extent is your own group treated unfairly?” “Does the government represent all groups in society?”
12. People were asked how much they trusted four specific government institutions to “do what is right”: the president, the police, the courts of law, and the electoral commission.
13. In Round 3 the items on this index included frequency of attending community meetings and joining others to raise issues, as well as how often respondents had contacted a local government councilor, a member of the parliament, an official of the government, a political party official, a religious leader, a traditional tribal leader, or some other influential person.
14. People were asked how frequently they had gone without enough food to eat, enough clean water for home use, medicines or medical treatment, enough fuel to cook with, a cash income, or school expenses for their children.
15. The questions were
How would you describe the economic situation?
How would you describe your own present living conditions?
How are your living conditions compared to those of others in your country?
How do economic conditions today compare to the past?
How are your own economic conditions, compared to the past?
How do you expect economic conditions in the country to change in the future?
How do you expect your own economic conditions to change in the future?
How has the availability of consumer goods changed?
How has the availability of job opportunities changed?
How has the gap between rich and poor changed?
16. Respondents were asked how likely it was that the authorities would enforce the law if a top government official (1) committed a serious crime, or (2) did not pay a tax on some of the income he had earned.
17. Respondents were asked three questions: “How much of a democracy is your country today?” “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?” “How likely is it that your country will remain democratic?”
18. First, institutional legitimacy was measured by responses to one item: “The constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the people.” Second, obligation to obey was measured by three items:
The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.
The police always have the right to make people obey the law.
The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes.
19. Respondents were asked how free they felt they were to to say what they thought, to join any political organization they wanted, to avoid being arrested when they were innocent, to choose whom to vote for without feeling pressured, and to influence what government did. Additionally they were asked if they felt that all groups received equal and fair treatment from government.
20. Respondents were asked how much they trusted the president, the parliament or national assembly, the electoral commission, the local council, the ruling party, the military, the police, and the courts of law.
21. As noted, the analysis was conducted in two stages. First, country dummy codes, objective country level indices, and demographics were entered. The instrumental and social indices were then entered as a second stage. Step-up procedures were used to first test whether the addition of these variables in the second stage significantly raised the degree of variance explained. In Round 1 it did so for both variables. For participation the SS regression increased 36.88 (F [1, 20, 289]), p < .001; and for voting 73,77 (F [1, 18, 655]), p < .001. For Round 3 the participation SS regression increased 31.42 (F [1, 24005]), p < .001; and for voting 94.60 (F [1, 19940]), p < .001.
22. The correlation between the latent indicators of instrumental and social motivation was 0.56 for Round 1 and 0.59 for Round 3.
Chapter Six
The Psychology of Cooperation
1. Most of the models outlined consider trust as linked to procedural justice because trust is a key antecedent to procedural justice. However, it is also possible to view procedural justice and trust as two parallel processes, which is the approach taken by Tyler and Huo (2002).
2. On the other hand, it is important to recognize the possibility that these two motivations might interfere with one another. In particular, it has been argued that the use of instrumental motivations undermines or “crowds out” internal—intrinsic—motivations for behavior.
3. As in the prior analysis, instrumental judgments were treated as indicators of a single latent factor.
Chapter Seven
Implications
1. McCluskey notes that in street stops, “Regardless of police actions obedience to authority is near universal” (2003, 170).
2. McCluskey notes that when the police mention the possibility of arrest, compliance goes up. However, he views this effect as due not to coercion but to the greater legitimacy that the police have when their actions are seen as consistent with the law.
Chapter Eight
Self-regulation as a General Model
1. While legitimacy and morality are similar in many ways, they are also clearly differentiable. Legitimacy is a perceived obligation to societal authorities or to existing social arrangements. Moral values are personal standards to which people attempt to align their behavior. Often moral values and legitimacy work together. For example, with most everyday laws, people obey the law because they feel that they ought to obey legitimate authorities and because they believe that the conduct prohibited by law is also morally wrong (Tyler 2003). However, they do not always work in concert. In their work on obedience to authority Kelman and Hamilton (1989) argue that morality operates as a check against following immoral orders given by legitimate authorities. They find that when people deal with legitimate authorities they authorize those authorities to make decisions about what is right and wrong. Hence, people suspend their normal motivation to keep their behavior in line with their moral values. In settings of this type only legitimacy shapes behavior.
Recent studies suggest that people’s moral values also shape their reactions to rules (Darley, Tyler, and Bilz 2003) and to public authorities such as the police (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Past studies show that people follow rules when they think those rules accord with their moral values (Robinson and Darley 1995). Recent studies indicate that people’s views about appropriate sentencing decisions in criminal cases are driven by their morally based desire to give wrongdoers the punishment they deserve. They are not driven by the instrumental goal of preventing future criminal activity either by the criminal themselves or by others whose actions might be shaped by the punishment the criminal receives. People punish based upon the moral wrong reflected by the level and type of crime committed (Carlsmith, Darley, Robinson 2002; Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson 2000). The story traditionally told by psychologists is that moral values are learned early in life and are, thereafter, resistant to change. Hence, it is important to note that the findings of the studies outlined in this volume suggest that to a striking degree those studied view the authorities in their organization or community as acting in ways congruent with their personal moral values when those authorities use fair procedures and act in trustworthy ways. Hence, by acting in those ways authorities not only gain legitimacy but also engage the power of moral value congruence to support their actions.