MANY FACTORS have shaped the development of the American film and television industries: the personalities of moguls, advances in technology, and changing social mores to name a few. One of the most important drivers of the media, however, is too often underemphasized or entirely overlooked by media historians.1 Regulation—government policies, court decisions, and internal company policies—might at first seem to be an impossibly dry or specialized subject. But when put in context, regulatory struggles often reveal some of the most human tales of personal conflicts over power, politics, and art. Regulation has also been vitally important to both the structure of media companies and the art of making movies and television shows. Consider antitrust rulings, First Amendment cases, labor laws, media ownership rules, tax codes, wartime sedition acts, and international trade policy. These forms of regulation touch every aspect of media creation and circulation; they influence who makes films and television shows, what they look like, and ultimately who can see them.
At times, legal regulation has caused the entire film and television industry to turn in one direction or another. After the Supreme Court’s 1948 antitrust ruling,2 for example, the Hollywood studios sold off their theater chains. The entire system for distributing and marketing films changed. Studios stopped churning out weekly B films and short subjects to fill their theaters. They began to make fewer and more expensive films, and this one decision played a pivotal role in leading Hollywood on the path to the blockbuster-driven industry of today. Other forms of regulation affect Hollywood more subtly. Tax credits, for example, have become one of the most important factors that producers consider when they choose locations for a film or television shoot. Shooting in Louisiana instead of California can shave millions of dollars off of a production budget, because that state returns up to one third of the money that production teams spend there.3 Regulation arises at almost every stage of production, distribution, and reception from manufacturing cameras to operating a theater to using a clip from a film in a YouTube parody video.
Copyright law is perhaps the most important form of media regulation. It guides filmmakers’ artistic decisions; it underlies Hollywood’s corporate structure; and it determines how audiences consume media. Since the widespread adoption of the internet in the 1990s, copyright law has begun to affect an ever-expanding range of media producers and consumers, including amateur video makers, file sharers, and internet entrepreneurs. As a result, interest in digital copyright law has moved beyond the realm of scholars and lawyers. Even high school students now hold strong opinions about copy protection, the public domain, and other areas of cultural policy that had previously been the obscure domain of legal experts.
Times have changed, but the issues themselves are not new. Hollywood’s Copyright Wars historicizes the heated debates over copyright and digital media. Starting with Thomas Edison and continuing through the present, I address the long history of antipiracy campaigns, filmmakers’ rights, and the legal environment for new technologies. I demonstrate that the film and television industries have struggled to influence and adapt to copyright law throughout their history. And many of our most valued Hollywood treasures, from Modern Times (1936) to Jaws (1975), we will see, cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of their legal context.
But the legal battles are only half of the story. In contrast to (most) legal scholars who touch on some of the same issues, I focus on the industrial and cultural impact of copyright law. Legal historians often limit themselves to landmark decisions and key policy changes. But sometimes landmark legal decisions have surprisingly little effect. Other times, new copyright policies have revolutionary unintended effects. The most surprising thing that we learn from the history of Hollywood and copyright is that most of the time Hollywood’s leaders have responded to intellectual property skirmishes through self-regulation. Rather than submit to Congress or judges and juries, studio heads and filmmakers have consistently brought copyright regulation “in house,” as it were. Hollywood has a history of responding to other forms of legal regulation in the same way. Most famously, in the 1920s and 1930s Hollywood found itself subject to the whims of state censor boards and facing the potential threat of federal content legislation. The studios reacted by adopting the Production Code and allowing their trade association, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association, to regulate violent, sexual, and political content in movies. Hollywood has, similarly, devised internal methods for controlling intellectual property. In the 1940s, for example, Hollywood’s writers and moguls found themselves frustrated by decades of shifting court decisions about screenwriting credit and compensation. Rather than continue to pursue a legal resolution, they turned to Hollywood’s talent guilds to arbitrate disputes over authorship. Similar stories of self-regulation, we will see, can be told about piracy battles in the 1900s, film studios’ attempts to contain the disruption wrought by the VCR (video cassette recorder), big copyright holders’ strategies for managing amateur and noncommercial uses of their content, and many other pivotal moments in the development of Hollywood. Indeed, much of what constitutes the history of Hollywood’s engagement with copyright law has happened outside courthouses and congressional halls—in the larger theater of copyright—as well as inside them. Hollywood’s Copyright Wars examines in great detail the court cases and policy battles that have shaped American media, but I also consider the often extralegal resolution to these conflicts.
A common misconception about copyright is that its primary function is to protect authors and creators. It does protect creators but only as a by-product. At least in the United States, copyright’s goal, as it is stated in the Constitution, is to “promote the progress of science.” (Science, in this instance, retains its eighteenth-century meaning of knowledge or learning.) To serve this goal, copyright gives creators a limited monopoly on their creations before their work enters the public domain and becomes freely available to all. Since 1998, works enter the public domain 70 years after their creator’s death. If the work was created for a corporation, as most films and television shows are, its copyright term expires 95 years after it is published (or 120 years after creation, whichever comes first). This assumes that the copyright term will not be extended, as it has been every time that works from the 1920s—including early Hollywood masterpieces—approach the end of their monopoly. Even before a work enters the public domain, however, there are many limits on a copyright holder’s monopoly. Whole categories of creative work are excluded from copyright protection, including fashion design and culinary creations. Other limitations on copyrighted works exist to protect users, i.e., consumers or creators who need to use work still protected by copyright. A user may be a television writer who wants to remake a basic science fiction plot or an engineer with a brilliant new concept for a video player or a parent who simply wants to show a Warner Bros. cartoon to a group of children. As these examples suggest, copyright is not a watertight monopoly that protects against all forms of copying and reuse. It is designed to leak at the sides, and it has strategically placed holes throughout. As it is often said, copyright strikes a balance between copyright holders and users. It allows copyright holders to profit from and control their work, but only up to the point where society’s needs outweigh those of the copyright holder.4 At that threshold, the public domain, fair use, and other exemptions begin to take over. The ultimate goal of copyright is always to enrich society by encouraging the creation of art and ideas, so they can be consumed and built upon.
Hollywood is caught on both sides of this divide. Studios are in the business of creating and controlling intellectual property, but the creative professionals working in the film and television industries make new works by building on the storehouse of cultural ideas. The Walt Disney Company’s tried-and-true business model is retelling public domain fairy tales, and George Lucas drew on a wide range of myths and allusions in order to create the Star Wars franchise. Yet Disney and Lucasfilm remain some of the most aggressive policers of their intellectual property. Throughout its history, Hollywood has been placed in the often-contradictory position of trying to protect filmmakers’ rights to use copyrighted material as freely as possible while, at the same time, limiting others’ use of the works created by Hollywood. To some extent, studios’ positions on copyright have changed predictably over time. As the industry’s archive of intellectual property has increased, studios have sought greater copyright protection. At least this is their public face. Behind the scenes, we will see, the industry has remained very pragmatic about intellectual property. Both Disney and Lucasfilm, for example, often remain quiet when fans reuse their work. And despite overinflated public rhetoric, studios have regularly been willing to accept compromises and creative solutions when new media—from the VCR to the internet—have challenged their business models.
For close to 300 years, two metaphors have been used dependably to explain the conflict over how to balance copyright law, and I think they are worth retaining. Since the eighteenth-century’s “Battle of the Booksellers,” critics have cast copyright debates as a “war,” and they have referred to the side challenging the status quo as “pirates.” There have been many attempts to abandon these metaphors over the centuries,5 but they persist. And from a historical perspective, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that copyright has been shaped largely by militaristic and piratical thinking.6
The parties invested in copyright wars have changed over time, but copyright has consistently pitted incumbents who have grown too comfortable with the status quo against pirates who are pushing the boundaries of art and technology. To be sure, many pirates push too far and act maliciously. But just about every leading media company from the Edison Manufacturing Company to Fox Studios to YouTube have been labeled pirates at one time or another. Surely many pirates must be doing something that society values. Legal scholar Lawrence Lessig makes the important historical argument that most media technologies began as piratical instruments. Recorded music, radio, and cable television all exist today because copyright law was changed or reinterpreted in order to legalize practices that had previously been labeled piracy. Piracy, history tells us, is often just a name for media practices we have yet to figure out how to regulate.7
Debates about piracy are not only normal, they are actually a healthy aspect of a developing media industry and society. In chapter 1, “Piracy and the Birth of Film,” I show that many forms of copying which we would now consider piracy were central to the emergence of both the art of film and the structure of the film industry. Filmmakers made exact copies of each other’s films and sold them as their own; they remade competitors’ films shot for shot; and Thomas Edison and his Trust built an industry on the unauthorized adaptation of books, plays, and newspaper cartoons. Early filmmakers, in other words, copied from each other and from other media without permission. Courts ultimately put an end to most of these types of copying, but not before the circulation of films and a culture of copying fostered the rapid growth of film as an art form. Moreover, the courts took decades to devise effective methods for regulating the new technology of films. I argue in this chapter that what we now see as piracy in the pre-1911 debates about regulating film were simply a function of society’s attempts to explore, understand, and assimilate the new technology.
Claims of piracy did not end in 1911. They have continued throughout the history of the entertainment industries, and there are no doubt new copyright wars on the horizon. These wars take place in the press as well as in courts and congressional hearings, and consumers make themselves heard through purchases. Piracy debates are a form of indirect public negotiation, another part of the theater of copyright. The debates often drag on for decades, as they did with Edison and his rivals, and the ongoing debates about piracy are a necessary part of the regulatory process; they build in a valuable element of deliberation. The length of a particular copyright battle alone can sometimes be the key to determining its outcome. In a telling interview, intellectual property lawyer Fred von Lohmann described his many years’ work for the digital rights advocacy organization the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Von Lohmann suggests that the longer a new consumer media technology remains on the market, the more consumers become accustomed to it and the harder it is for Hollywood studios or other companies to have legal limits placed on its use. As a consumer advocate, von Lohmann saw his job, in part, as prolonging debates until watching your TV remotely via the web, for example, became so routine that it could not be taken away. Conversely, a swift end to a piracy battle can often help incumbents.8 It is easier to deny the importance of new technologies or new artistic practices while they still seem strange and potentially transgressive. From the Battle of the Booksellers to the copyright disputes of Edison and his rivals to the lawsuits against YouTube, piracy battles denote the most innovative periods in media history. And where we see claims of piracy, we are seeing a vital part of the regulatory process.
Each chapter of Hollywood’s Copyright Wars addresses a different technological or institutional transformation that has affected the American film industry: the invention of movies, the development of the studio system, the challenge of airing films on television, the rise of home video, and the impact of the internet. At the same time, each chapter also addresses new challenges to the definition of authorship. The Constitution does not actually provide for the grant of a monopoly to “creators,” as I have been suggesting. The framers of the Constitution used the much narrower term “author.” But conceptions of authorship are constantly changing, and copyright has expanded to protect a much wider group of creators than we think of when we use the term author. “Author” conjures up images of a lone writer sitting at a café, but film editors, producers, and camera operators are all potential authors or coauthors of a film or television show.
In fact, the invention of motion pictures and the development of media industries have posed many new challenges for legislators and judges grappling with the continually evolving idea of the author.
Even before the invention of movies, as we will see in chapter 1, photography proved to be a conundrum for policymakers and courts. Could pushing a button really make someone an author? Or did cameras take humans and art out of the process of representation, making objective images of the world? The question became even more complicated when moving pictures were added to the equation. Were movie camera operators taking multiple photographs, judges wondered, or a single moving picture? Films resemble plays as well as photographs, and judges soon began to struggle with the problem of deciding whom to hold responsible for the public performance of a film when the actors, directors, and producers were not physically present. These issues reveal not only the challenge that film posed for late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century policymakers, they also suggest the difficulty of determining when a new technology can be governed by the regulations already in place and when authorship has been so entirely remade that it requires a new set of rules. It is a question that persists in the regulation of media technology. In the two landmark cases that I examine in this chapter, courts defined film as an extension of photography and theater rather than pushing Congress to create new regulation for the new medium. Because these decisions failed to fully address the changes wrought by the new technology, they left vacuums for film companies to fill. And in both cases, I show, the failure to regulate film as a new medium opened the door for a few large companies to control the entire industry. First the Edison Trust and then the vertically integrated independents, who went on to form the Hollywood studios, erected large oligopolies in the vacuum left by courts.
After the independents moved out west, they developed new storytelling conventions. Filmmakers both built on existing art and literature, and they diverged from them. Chapter 2, “Hollywood’s Golden Age of Plagiarism,” examines filmmakers’ and film studios’ legal battles to protect their right to borrow liberally from literary and dramatic stories. In cases involving Charlie Chaplin, Harold Lloyd, James M. Cain, Billy Wilder, the Marx Brothers, Jack Benny, and many others, U.S. courts addressed filmmakers’ use of old narrative devices and stock characters. Copyright allows creators to use ideas from earlier works, but not their expression. It is a distinction, we will see, that needed to be rethought in the context of Hollywood. In the process, judges helped to define the Hollywood genre system, determining which elements belonged to all westerns, for example, and which were the sole property of a particular novelist, playwright, or filmmaker. In the end, Hollywood studio heads were determined not to let the capricious decisions of judges run their industry. And in a process I have already hinted at, they took over the regulation of originality, credit, and compensation, establishing internal registration, arbitration, and contract systems.
A technological upheaval, the advent of television, forced another reappraisal of the idea of film authorship. Chapter 3, “Auteurism on Trial,” turns to the changing nature of film authorship as a result of Hollywood’s grudging embrace of television. The Hollywood studio system created a class of artists who were celebrated as auteurs but who, for the most part, did not hold the copyrights to their work. Ever since studios began to release films to be aired on television in the 1950s, auteurs have consistently sought the right to preserve the integrity of their work. They have fought against the “mutilating” and “emasculating” edited versions (as some court decisions read) created for television. From Douglas Fairbanks and Otto Preminger to George Lucas and Terry Gilliam, auteurs have sued studios and lobbied Congress for greater control over how their films are adapted for new media. Judges and legislators have been surprisingly sympathetic to film directors’ plight, and the law has gradually grown to safeguard a romantic vision of the besieged film director who needs protection from the commercial desires of the studios. Although directors initially fought for control from the studios, the studios have learned to use the image of the defenseless director as leverage in their attempts to control new home video technologies.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the challenges that home video and the internet posed for the regulation of media distribution, consumption, and authorship. Home video and the internet are, in a way, two acts of the same drama. Home video created new tools for amateur and independent media creators; the internet offered film and video makers networks for distributing their work and forming larger communities. Chapter 4 begins with a revisionary history of the rise of the VCR, and it chronicles Hollywood’s slow but ultimate acceptance of the new machine. The cautionary tale of the VCR offers a blueprint for Hollywood’s approach to new technologies—an approach that relies much more on public relations campaigns and licensing deals than on the high-profile legal cases so often covered in the press. The chapter then goes on to show how off-line communities of video artists, fans, and documentary filmmakers forged fair use conventions. They did not read statutes or court decisions. They listened for stories about filmmakers encountering resistance from rights holders, and they were even more attentive when film studios remained silent about brazen demonstrations of fair use. Studios, in turn, learned how to communicate with these fair use communities through alternate shows of strength and tolerance. Mythologies about fair use rather than the law, I suggest, have governed many pockets of media creation.
Once these fair use communities began to move online, however, they became subject to increased surveillance and scrutiny. Chapter 5 examines two aspects of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and how the new law continues to change media production, distribution, and consumption more than a decade after it was passed. First, I examine the impact of the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions, which forbid users to bypass the copy protection—the locks—on DVDs and other digital media. I place the DMCA in the long history of copy protection going back to Edison (and further). In its historical context, we can see why Congress and the courts have historically rejected legally backed copy protection systems. The anticirumvention provisions demonstrate what happens when a watertight and unbalanced copyright system is put in place: it drives media production and use underground, and it bypasses the natural process of assimilating new uses of technology. It also creates the kind of unchecked monopolies that copyright was originally designed to limit.
The second section of the chapter examines the “safe harbor” provision of the DMCA, the part of the statute designed to shield internet service providers from liability for the infringement—the piracy—that takes place on their networks. Through sites like YouTube, video fair use communities stopped being local. Fans, artists, critics, and every other video creator were thrown together in the same venues. At first, they were subject to the capricious moves of film studios. But through recent case law, more subtlety is being built into the system for regulating noncommercial work on the web. This chapter ends by asking whether technology can solve the problems that it created.
Finally, in the conclusion, I chronicle the rise of the copyright reform movement. In the wake of the DMCA and the Napster trial, a grassroots movement has arisen among the ranks of students, activists, and artists. Facilitated by the blogosphere and social networks, this community has emerged as an influential voice in the making of copyright policy. I place the growth of the copyright reform movement in the context of the larger sphere of political activism and online organizing that stretched across the first decade of the twenty-first century, from protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 to the financial crisis of 2008. In the short term, the media reform movement and big content companies, including Hollywood studios, have reached an impasse. The polarization of positions and the volume of the debate have caused most copyright legislation to stall since 1998. But, I suggest, the plurality of voices in copyright debates can only be good in the long run. And there are signs to suggest that widening the sphere of influence over copyright policy will help restore balance to the system, perhaps just as it is time for it to be shaken up again by a major technological, political, or cultural revolution.