If a phalangite managed to push an opponent’s shield out of the way with his sarissa during combat, or if an opportune target presented itself for some other reason, could he have hit the desired target area? Was phalangite combat a frantic series of ill-aimed shots with most of the fatalities the results of luck, or was it more the result of the skill of the combatant with his primary weapon? Additionally, how long could the actions and physical exertions of pike combat have been maintained by the individual? The examination of these inter-related aspects of infantry warfare in the Hellenistic Age demonstrates that even an inexperienced conscript in the Macedonian army would have possessed enough skill to hit a small opportune target most of the time. This then suggests that with the extensive training that the soldiers of Hellenistic armies underwent from the time of Philip II onwards, seasoned phalangites would have been able to deliver attacks with even more accuracy, and for a considerable length of time. This, in turn, partially accounts for why the Hellenistic pike-phalanx was able to dominate the battlefields of the ancient world for so long.
All modes of combat, whether hand-to-hand, employing missile weapons, or even unarmed, are reliant upon two inter-related and inter-dependent criteria. The first is the ability to strike a desired target area on your opponent with the weapon being employed. The second is to engage in fighting using a method that does not cause undue fatigue so that both the offensive and defensive actions required to gain victory can be carried on for as long as possible (and hopefully longer than your opponent). Once a combatant begins to suffer from the effects of fatigue, the ability to use any weapon with a certain degree of efficiency is dramatically reduced. Thus what will determine the effectiveness of any combative action on the battlefield is a combination of the stamina of the combatant and his proficiency with his weapons.
Due to the dearth of detail in the literary and artistic record relating to the finer points of phalangite combat, modem research into the warfare of the Hellenistic Age has made no attempt to analyse how accurate a phalangite would have been with his primary weapon. This is in part due to techniques such as physical re-creation still being somewhat in their infancy in terms of research methods for the examination of ancient history. Subsequently, it is in areas such as this that physical re-creation and practical testing is able to fill in a gap in the knowledge base by investigating an aspect of ancient warfare that can be explored by no other means in the modern world.
Similarly, the ancient narratives and other texts are of only limited use when examining the levels of endurance that a phalangite was required to have to effectively engage in combat. Yet the idea that stamina played an important role in warfare was a subject well known by the Greeks. As far back as the Archaic Age, the poet Homer espoused that a man is unable to fight beyond the limits of his strength.¹ Pausanias states how a lack of sleep was a deciding factor in the fall of Eira during the Second Messenian War in the early seventh century BC, and Diodorus later recounted how fatigue was a contributing factor in the surrender of the Italian Greeks to Dionysius in 389BC.² Despite such statements, there are no references in the literary record of the Hellenistic Age (or in the Classical Age for that matter) which specifically details how long a warrior of the time could maintain the actions of combat. Rather, what the ancient texts do contain are often vague references to how long a phalangite battle lasted, and it is from these passages that any conclusion about the endurance of the Hellenistic man-at-arms must be drawn.
Diodorus, for example, states that the battle of Chaeronea in 338BC lasted for ‘a long time’ (ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον), as did Alexander’s battle outside the walls of Thebes in 335BC.³ Similarly, the battle of Megalopolis in 330BC is also said to have lasted ‘a long time’.⁴ At Gaugamela in 331BC, Alexander the Great rose late from his sleep, which suggests the battle may have begun in the early afternoon, and ended at dusk.⁵ The clash of the phalanxes at Paraetacene in 317BC is said to have gone on ‘for a considerable time’ (ἱκανὸν μὲν χρόνον) with the fighting continuing at night under a full moon.⁶ Plutarch states that Pyrrhus’ confrontation with the Romans at Asculum in 279BC lasted ‘a long time, or so it is said’.⁷ This suggests that Plutarch was either unaware of accurate accounts of the battle, or was dubious of his sources in regards to the battle’s duration. Plutarch’s account of the battle of Pydna in 168BC states that this engagement lasted for only an hour.⁸ Even if Plutarch’s concerns are founded, what these passages demonstrate is that a Hellenistic commander could not be certain how long a battle he was about to fight would last.
What many of these passages also fail to consider is that, as well as the actual fighting, there was a considerable amount of pre-battle manoeuvring that took place before the first blow was even struck. Troops had to arm themselves, get in formation, march as a unit into position, relay orders and instructions, and then wait for the signal to lower pikes and advance. All of this would take place on a variety of terrains across the Hellenistic Period from alluvial mud flats to desert plains to hills and river valleys, and under all sorts of weather and temperature conditions. All of these factors would tax a soldier’s energy and subsequently his effectiveness on the battlefield.⁹
Even once fighting had started, prolonged exposure to the environment and the traumas and toils of combat would sap a soldier’s reserves of energy. Good commanders, leading well seasoned troops, could use this to their advantage. Frontinus states that at Chaeronea, Philip II intentionally prolonged the engagement as he knew that his men were accustomed to the trials of conflict due to their extensive campaigning while the Athenians, fielding a force of part-time citizen militia, were not. Frontinus goes on to state that when Philip noticed the Athenian forces becoming fatigued, he pressed his attack more vigorously and gained the victory.¹⁰ Good commanders could also recognize when their troops had had enough. At Gaugamela, Alexander the Great put a stop to the fighting because many of their weapons had become blunted, their hands were sore, the troops were exhausted and night was setting in.¹¹
What such passages demonstrate is that a phalangite, and more importantly, a commander of contingents of phalangites, had no way of knowing how long the battle he was about to fight was going to last, nor could he guarantee the conditions that it would be fought under or the terrain it was going to be fought upon. Consequently, for the phalangite way of war to be effective, it had to be possible for those engaged in the fighting to employ their primary weapons in an effective way that did not cause undue fatigue for an undetermined period of time and under all possible conditions.
As a person’s energy decreases, their actions, both physical and mental, begin to slow. With the onset of fatigue, breathing becomes shallower and more rapid, depriving the muscles of much needed oxygen and causing lactic acid to build up in the muscles which, in turn, slows down the biomechanical processes of the body. This effect then begins to compound upon itself. Further action involving these muscle groups weakens them further, making the actions themselves less effective. Cognitive abilities are also impaired by oxygen deprivation and this combines to have a negative impact on the accuracy and efficiency of any form of action (martial or otherwise).¹² Extended periods of physically taxing labour, such as marching or fighting, a lack of sleep and/or minimal periods of rest similarly affect performance.¹³ Any such debilitating effect on performance would mean that a phalangite who became fatigued on the battlefield may not have been able to direct his attacks at targets with the same level of accuracy as someone who was not fatigued. A fatigued phalangite may have also not have had the strength to penetrate the target to an injuring depth even if he did hit it, and if his cognitive abilities were low, may not have even recognized a potential opportune target when it presented itself. Thus the phalangite way of war had to incorporate techniques that were both effective on the battlefield and did not quickly fatigue the combatant. The potentially negative impacts of muscular stress and fatigue on the Hellenistic phalangite would have been partially offset by the extensive training that the infantrymen of the Macedonian army underwent.
Training develops skill, confidence, muscular strength and stamina. These were principles widely known to the professional military commanders of the fourth century BC. Iphicrates, for example, stated that ‘the untrained lack endurance’.¹⁴ For the Greeks and Macedonians, regular exercise and training in the gymnasion would have begun to develop strength and endurance in many who would go on to serve in the military from a young age. Other cultural pursuits, and the manual nature of most labour of the time, would have also resulted in high levels of general physical fitness.
There is little doubt that in the hand-to-hand combat of phalangite warfare both skill and stamina would have played important roles. But was one more important than the other? Aristotle states that mercenaries were better for both offensive and defensive operations due to their experience with their weapons and this resulted in them being like fully armed soldiers fighting against unarmoured opponents if that enemy were non-professionals with lower levels of experience.¹⁵ This would suggest that Aristotle believed that technical skill was an important element in the successful conduct of war. Written around 340BC, not long after he had been hired as the tutor of the young Alexander, it is interesting to ponder just what sort of impact sentiments such as these from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics would have had on the future king and the Macedonian military in general. Justin states that Alexander chose to keep many of the experienced veterans who had served under Philip in his army as he wanted to campaign with the ‘masters of war’.¹⁶ Frontinus similarly states that Alexander conquered the world with only 40,000 men who were accustomed to the discipline that had been taught to them by Philip.¹⁷ This would suggest that Alexander had taken Aristotle’s sentiments very much to heart.
Centuries later, the military writer Vegetius would outline several military maxims which hold as true for the earlier Macedonians as they do for later Romans in which he states that skill and training produce courage and that those who fight with skill and courage are more likely to secure victory while an untrained force which lacks courage will either be slaughtered or turn in flight.¹⁸ Vegetius further states (1.3) that those nurtured by a life of hard work under the sun, with a lack of acquaintance with luxury and bath houses, toughened by every kind of toil from wielding iron, digging trenches and carrying burdens, and those who are simple souled and content with little are the best in war.¹⁹ Vegetius additionally adds that training and long-term service makes for better soldiers ‘for men who stopped fighting a long time ago should be treated as recruits’.²⁰ These generalizations about what makes the ideal solider find many parallels with the extensive, and grueling, training undertaking by the Macedonian pike-phalanx.
When Philip II ascended the throne of Macedon he had to quickly replace the large portion of the army which had been defeated by the Illyrians in 359BC. Part of the large scale recruitment was to train the new Macedonian army with ‘constant manoeuvres of troops under arms and competitive drills’.²¹ Part of this training involved lengthy marches carrying weapons, armour, rations and equipment.²² Philip’s pike-phalanx also trained regardless of the season. Demosthenes states that the Macedonians were ‘under arms all the time’ in reference to this year-round regime of training and campaigning.²³ This level of training began to accustom the troops (especially the new recruits) to the trials of campaigning, to promote physical fitness, obedience, unit bonding, experience in weapon handling and drill movements, and to shape the army into a combat effective fighting force. This training seems to have been both intensive and rapid as Philip was able to successfully field an army of 10,000 men the following year.
Appian states that Macedonian pikemen became professional due to their long training and their experience in many campaigns.²⁴ This success was in part due to the initiatives put in place by Philip which became standard practice for most Macedonian armies of the Hellenistic Age. The troops of Alexander the Great, for example, carried their own equipment, and spoils, following the practices of Philip.²⁵ Rations were also carried by the troops of Demetrius and Antigonus, and spoils seem to have been individually carried by the troops of Eumenes.²⁶ The elderly Silver Shields, who campaigned with commanders from Philip to Eumenes, are also said to have acquired great skill and courage from their constant campaigning.²⁷ Such passages clearly show the privations of campaigning that soldiers of the Hellenistic Age were subjected to as part of the intensive training to turn them into an effective and cohesive fighting force.
Such intense training had to be maintained if the army was to retain its edge and its combat effectiveness. Alexander is said to have kept his men busy with constant training in the use of their weapons and with tactical exercises.²⁸ If training was not maintained, the result could be disastrous for the army. Diodorus states that the quality of troops degrades if they are kept idle for even a few months.²⁹ Antiochus allowed his troops to remain idle for an entire winter in 196BC with the effect that, when the spring campaigning season arrived, he found them unfit for any kind of duty.³⁰ Such professionalism and constant drill is in stark contrast to the troops fielded by many of the Greek city-states of the time. The military institutions of states such as Athens were based upon part-time militias whose members only came out to fight when required and who possessed only limited training with their weapons and in formations.³¹ Thucydides for example, in the words of the funeral oration ascribed to Pericles, states that the Athenians preferred to rely on the natural courage of the members of the polis than the blind obedience taught by military training.³² Ducrey argues that this was because the Athenians saw compulsory military training as an infringement on the personal liberties of the citizen.³³ Despite such noble sentiments, it seems clear that a reliance on natural courage over skill and discipline imparted some harsh lessons on the Athenians and they reintroduced the institution of the Ephebia (compulsory, two-year, military service for youths) in 335BC following their defeat at the hands of the professional Macedonian army at Chaeronea in 338BC. It is little wonder that Aristotle stated that ‘the sanguine are confident in the face of danger because they have previously won many victories over many foes’.³⁴
Training brought with it many benefits other than just skill at arms. While the lifestyle of the Greeks, with manually based labour and time spent in the gymnasion, would have built up certain levels of fitness and stamina, the training undertaken by the professional Macedonian soldier would have similarly built up strength and a capacity for endurance. Where the difference lay is that the Macedonian phalangite would have built up these attributes in conjunction with their weapon handling skills – and so would have built up the muscular groups required for constant campaigning and efficiency in combat. The Greek hoplite, on the other hand, with the exception of the Spartans and the few professional units of soldiers found in the various city-states of Greece, would have possessed a certain level of fitness, but may not have been as proficient with their weapons.
Regular training and campaigning would have also made the Macedonian phalangite much more accustomed to the traumas of conflict – both physical and psychological.³⁵ This is the essence of many of the ancient passages relating to the professionalism of the Macedonian military. Acclimatisation to a dangerous environment like the ancient battlefield will affect how the body will physically respond to danger. The more accustomed an individual is to a particular situation, the way that their body reacts to the stress of that environment (i.e. the release of adrenaline and hormones, loss of bodily functions and cognitive abilities etc.) is significantly reduced.³⁶ Consequently, a seasoned veteran of constant campaigning would be able to better withstand the physical and psychological stresses of war. As Idzikowski and Baddeley observe, cohesive units of soldiers rarely panic.³⁷ This unit cohesion would have been built through the regular training of the Macedonian phalangite within his unit and the larger formation of the phalanx.
It seems clear that at any one time the Macedonian army would not have been made up totally of experienced soldiers. Right across the Hellenistic Age, from Philip II onwards, positions within the pike-phalanx would have been occupied by new recruits, raw conscripts and others who might not yet have received a ‘baptism of fire’ on the fields of battle. However, this would have made little difference to the offensive abilities of the pike-phalanx as a whole. It was only the members of the front rank of the formation who were capable of thrusting their primary weapon at an opponent, and the front rank was made up entirely of experienced officers. As such, those who constituted the ‘cutting edge’ of the pike-phalanx would have been those who were the most accustomed to the trials of campaigning and who were the most proficient with their weapons.
However, no commander could guarantee that the more inexperienced troops, who would have held positions in the more rearward ranks of the phalanx, would not be called on to engage. All manner of variables might come into play on the battlefield to cause the formation to break up, or to result in the loss of the front ranks, which would then call for the rawer members of the phalanx to use their sarissa in an offensive manner. Yet despite possibly having undergone extensive training in drill and weapon handling prior to his arrival on the battlefield, the question remains: how good would a phalangite have been at engaging a target with his sarissa?
How much difference experience and training had on the offensive abilities of the phalangite is an aspect of Hellenistic warfare not covered in any of the extant sources of evidence. An understanding of just how easily (or not) a phalangite could engage a target in a combat situation is essential for the broader understanding of the conflicts of the age. To gain such an understanding, a series of simple experiments were conducted. A group of ‘non-professional’ phalangites was recruited from among re-enactors and other interested individuals. All of the test participants were kitted out with full phalangite panoplies incorporating different Hellenistic accoutrements ranging from replica plate-metal cuirasses, linen corslets, both open-faced and enclosed helmets, and the peltē. Each participant was then tested individually with the same replica sarissa so that any influence imposed by the configuration of the weapon would be standardized across all of the tests.
Each participant stood before a target dummy of stacked hay bales 2m in height with a life-sized human silhouette attached to it representing a member of an opposing enemy formation. Two distinct target areas were marked on each silhouette – a 10 x 10cm square in the centre of the chest, and a 10 x 10cm square in the area of the throat. This ensured that all of the participants were aiming at the same targets areas in each test so that the data could be standardized across the collected results. All tests were done with the sarissa held in the low position to test the effectiveness of the most likely way the phalangite wielded his primary weapon. Each participant approached the target so that the tip of their pike when held in the ready position was roughly 20cm from the surface of the target. This simulated a phalangite having the tip of his pike pressed up against the shield of an opponent which was presented in a protective position across his front. Each participant then directed five consecutive strikes (hereafter called ‘primary strikes’) towards the target area on the chest of the silhouette (simulating an ‘opportune shot’ when the opponent had moved his shield out of the way). When these primary strikes had been delivered, the participant withdrew his weapon while the locations of the impacts in relation to the target area were recorded. The participant then reapproached the target and, from the low position, redirected five more primary strikes at the target area on the throat of the silhouette. The location of the impact of these strikes was also then recorded.
The participant then moved away and engaged in a period of ‘simulated combat’ (akin to shadow boxing) by ‘engaging’ an upright post with a pike for a period of five minutes or until they could no longer perform a thrusting action with the weapon due to fatigue. When the time had elapsed, or they had ‘fought’ for as long as they could, the participant returned to the target and made another five consecutive thrusts (hereafter referred to as ‘secondary strikes’), first at the chest, and then at the throat. The amount of time that each participant was able to undertake the period of ‘simulated combat’, and the placement of their secondary strikes, was recorded for later comparison. The distance of the impact points of both the primary and secondary strikes from the target areas was then measured and analysed. Any comments that the participant made in relation to the test and/or the offensive actions performed, were also recorded. These tests allowed for several aspects of fighting with the sarissa to be observed: the accuracy of the primary strikes to two different targets on an opponent, the part fatigue played in the accuracy of subsequent attacks, the amount of time that a phalangite could have maintained offensive action.
It must be noted that there are several aspects of these tests which do not accurately reflect the conditions of the Hellenistic battlefield. The tests were conducted on a hot sunny day of 36°C. However, due to the year-round campaigning of the Macedonian military, Hellenistic battles could have been fought in any temperature. Due to the impact that high temperatures would have on people engaging in strenuous activities and while wearing armour and metal helmets, the day of the testing could be considered a possible ‘worst case scenario’ yet still one that was environmentally similar to some of the engagements of the ancient world.
As the participants were all ‘non-professional phalangites’ with little or no experience of wielding the sarissa, their level of performance would not be representative of the seasoned Hellenistic campaigner who had undergone extensive training and who may have previously fought many engagements. However, as noted, not everyone within the pike-phalanx would have possessed this level of skill and experience. Consequently, the test participants better reflect the abilities of a raw recruit in the Macedonian army, who was just beginning to learn how to use the sarissa, but who suddenly found himself in the front rank of the phalanx during a battle. This would also categorize the results of the tests using these participants under a ‘worst case scenario’ and the results of the tests can be considered as accurate a reflection of phalangite combat as is possible to replicate in the modern world.
The ‘simulated combat’ element of the tests also did not accurately recreate a combative environment. It is highly unlikely that a phalangite in the front rank of the pike-phalanx would have been continuously thrusting with the sarissa over the course of an engagement as the test participants did. Rather the phalangite would have been using his pike to keep an opponent at bay, to probe his defences and, should an opportune target present itself, then deliver a thrusting attack. However, any fatigue experienced by the test participants would have been partially offset by the lack of other combative aspects of the test, such as a lack of jostling within a massed formation, a lack of fatigue brought on by marching into position or engaging in defensive actions, and the lack of a dangerous environment, where the stresses and fear brought on by combat would sap a phalangite’s reserves of energy. The tests were also devoid of other elements of the ancient battlefield such as noise, dust and the detritus of combat underfoot. A testing environment which simulated all of these combative aspects would be impossible to replicate without putting the test participants in real danger. It has been noted that it is impossible to gauge the effects of fear on test participants in controlled, ethical, experiments due to the sheer number of variables involved in such an exercise.³⁸
Even the target that the test participants directed their attacks against did not accurately replicate the characteristics of an ancient battle. The human figure on the target was depicted in a front-on position whereas most opponents in a battle employing a shield and a hand-held weapon would have most likely adopted a more oblique body posture. Nor did the target have any area of the body which was depicted as being protected by a helmet, shield or armour. Due to the adoption of an oblique body posture and the use of a shield and armour, both the chest and throat target areas used in these tests may not have been visible on an enemy depending upon the way in which an opportune target presented itself during the varied nature of combat. The amount of time that such target areas may have been visible, as the opponent moved and defended himself, would have undoubtedly influenced how (if at all) a phalangite could have directed an attack against them during the course of a battle. Consequently, it must be conceded that these tests do not present a truthful re-creation of the accuracy and endurance of phalangite warfare but are an approximation of this style of combat based upon a set of standardized experimental criteria and tests conducted with modern best-practice safety standards. Regardless, the results of these tests do provide baseline data for the accuracy of attacks delivered from the low position with the sarissa and for how long such actions could be maintained.
It was found that even a ‘non-professional phalangite’ with limited weapon handling experience would have been quite accurate. The results of the tests showed that primary strikes directed towards the chest of an opponent would have been more accurate that those directed at the throat (Table 11).
| PRIMARY STRIKES | ||
| Distance from target | At chest | At throat |
| Within target | 54% | 35% |
| 1-3cm outside target | 17% | 14% |
| 4-6cm outside target | 20% | 14% |
| 7-9cm outside target | 3% | 3% |
| 10+ cm outside target | 6% | 34% |
Table 11: The proximity of ‘primary strikes’ to the target area.
The greater accuracy of attacks directed at the chest compared to those directed at the throat can be accounted for by a number of factors. When the pike is held in its low ‘ready position’, the weapon naturally points at the chest of an opponent standing directly opposite. In order to effectively engage the target, all that is needed is to swing the weapon forward while using the flex of the wrists to keep it level. Due to the small amount of distance that the pike needs to travel to connect with the target, the upward swinging trajectory of a low strike has only a marginal influence on the overall path that the tip of the weapon follows and this makes it quite easy for the shot to land on or very near to the target area. As the test results show, 91 per cent of all of the strikes delivered by the various test participants either hit the target or landed within 6cm of the target area. On the torso of an opponent, this means that almost every attack made with the sarissa from a ‘pike length’ of about 5m distance would have hit that opponent in the chest.
Attacks aimed at the throat of an opponent, on the other hand, were found to be a less accurate action. In order to engage a more elevated target such as the throat, a pike held in the low ‘ready position’ either has to first have its pitch altered so that it will point at the throat (which may potentially alert an enemy to what is coming and give him time to react), or have the pitch altered as the strike is committed. However, due to the length of the sarissa and the effect of the rearward point of balance of the weapon, even a slight variation of the angle of the wrists translates to a considerable movement of the forward tip. If the adjustment of the pitch is too great or too small, and if the upward swinging trajectory of the strike (which is more pronounced when aiming at an elevated target from the low position) is not taken into consideration, this makes it much harder to strike at any target area other than the chest.
Due to the smaller overall size of the throat and head compared to the torso, any attack which missed the designated throat target area by more than 6cm ran the risk of missing the target completely. There was found to be a much greater disparity between those whose strikes landed some 10cm outside of the target area for the chest than there were for the throat. In some cases the participant, not adjusting their weapon appropriately, missed the silhouette completely when their attacks were aimed at the throat and their strikes landed above the outline’s head. This was the result of the alterations that were required to adjust the pitch of the weapon to point at the throat which then compounded through the actions of the strike with the result that the participant missed. Many of the strikes that landed 7-9cm from the throat target area, hit the silhouette in the ear or grazed the side of the head. While there is little doubt that such injuries would have caused considerable pain and damage in a real contest, they can hardly be regarded as a ‘kill shot’. Other strikes which missed the throat target area still struck the head or the chest. While these would have resulted in serious injury, for the purposes of this test, they cannot be considered accurate.
Furthermore, the amount of flex inherent within the lengthy sarissa impacted on the overall accuracy of attacks which required the pitch of the weapon to be adjusted. When the weapon was moved as the strike was committed, the tip of the weapon would ‘bounce’ and this made it harder to land the strike on target. Attacks aimed at the chest, on the other hand, require no adjustment of the pitch of the weapon and so the amount of the flex in the weapon is limited to only that caused by the actions of the strike itself. As this is simply a forward extension of the weapon with minimal rise along the trajectory of the attack, there is little ‘bounce’ along the shaft and this contributed to making the chest attacks more accurate overall.
This amount of flex in the weapon would have had benefits for a formation of phalangites. As the members of the pike-phalanx moved into action with the pikes of the front ranks lowered and those of the rearward ranks angled over their heads, the simple act of advancing would cause the pikes to flex and bounce. Anyone witnessing this formation coming at them would see thousands of weapons all moving individually. This would add to the psychological impact of seeing the pike-phalanx in action as the entire formation, weapons included, would seem alive. It is no coincidence that some ancient writers ascribed the characteristics of highly animated objects to the phalanx – with Polyaenus referring to the formation as a ‘beast’, and Plutarch saying it advanced like the waters of a flood.³⁹ Additionally, as the two sides closed with each other, the flexing pikes levelled at an enemy would make it harder for the opponent to judge where an attack was coming from – thus making it harder to defend against. Thus the very bounce of the sarissa acted as a probing action which may have momentarily opened an enemy’s defences.
Once engaged, the flex of the sarissa also provided benefits. The shaft of the weapon could bend with any pressure exerted against it if the tip was thrust into the shield of an opponent and the two sides continued to push against each other as occurred at the battle of Pydna in 168BC. This would have helped prevent the shaft of the weapon from breaking. If an opponent attempted to hack through the front of the weapon, the flex in the shaft and the rearward point of balance of the sarissa would mean that any impact against the forward end would simply force the front of the weapon downwards, negating much of the impact energy of the blow and reducing the likelihood of the attack severing the tip from the weapon.
Interestingly, the results for the secondary strikes showed that there was an overall increase in the level of accuracy following the period of simulated combat (Table 12).
| SECONDARY STRIKES | ||
| Distance from target | At chest | At throat |
| Within target | 60% | 42% |
| 1-3cm outside target | 22% | 26% |
| 4-6cm outside target | 9% | 9% |
| 7-9cm outside target | 3% | 3% |
| 10+ cm outside target | 6% | 20% |
Table 12: The proximity of’secondary strikes’ to the target area.
For both target areas the number of strikes that landed either on target or within 3cm of the target increased – from 71 per cent to 82 per cent for attacks aimed at the chest, and from 49 per cent to 68 per cent for attacks aimed at the throat. The number of strikes which missed by more than 10cm for the throat also decreased following the period of simulated combat (from 34 per cent to 20 per cent), while the number of strikes greater than 10cm from the target for attacks aimed at the chest, while not improving, did not increase either. This suggests that the low posture used to wield the sarissa that was employed by the test participants in their sessions of simulated combat did not cause a significant level of fatigue and that during even the brief period of simulated combat the participants quickly learned how to compensate for the flex and angle of the sarissa, and develop sufficient muscle memory of the action, to make their secondary strikes more accurate.
The results of the sessions of simulated combat showed that attacks made with a sarissa wielded at waist height could be maintained quite easily. Most participants lasted the five minute period of the testing session with very little discomfort. This was due to the action of attacks delivered from a low position simply involving a forward swinging of the arms, with only a minor flex of the wrists if it was attempted to keep the pike level, to the impact point of the strike and back again. This resulted in very little muscular fatigue on the arms as most of the action and power of the strike comes from the rotation of the shoulders. Some participants observed that their hands had begun to ache by the end of the testing period due to gripping the weapon tightly, but this was not enough to prevent the participant from then executing their secondary strikes against the target, and it was further observed that when all participants returned to the targets following the period of simulated combat there was no reduction in the speed of their secondary strikes compared to their primary attacks (some even became more determined to try and thrust the sarissa right through the hay bales). Some participants may have grasped the weapon tightly due to their unfamiliarity with it. However, to effectively use the sarissa the shaft does not need to be gripped as tightly as possible, but only with enough force to keep it stable and to prevent it being knocked out of the hands if an enemy attempted to parry it. The increased level of accuracy demonstrated by the test participants even after only five minutes of simulated combat shows how the level of effectiveness with a weapon increases as the bearer becomes more used to wielding it and this kind of familiarity with the sarissa would have been another result of the extensive training undertaken by the Macedonian phalangite.
It was observed that some participants also made small steps forward and back with each of their attacks during their period of simulated combat or, if they did not step, rocked forward and back with the motion of the strike. This resulted in a natural rhythm being created which allowed the participants to work through any minor levels of fatigue that they may have experienced. Importantly, such motions could only have been undertaken by members of the front rank of a pike-phalanx whose movements were not inhibited by the presence of a man standing in front of them. This again suggests that if any pike fighting was undertaken during a phalangite battle, it was only done by the experienced officers in the front rank of the formation. If the engagment did not require a thrusting action, but simply involved the phalgite holding his pike in a lowered position in order to keep an opponent at bay, then the support for the weapon gained through the use of the ochane would mean that phalangites could maintain a defensive combative posture almost indefinately with very little stress placed on the muscles of the arms. Furthermore, a rocking or stepping action is not easily accomplished if the side-on posture to wield the pike that is suggested by some scholars is adopted which also suggests that this posture was not used to wield the sarissa (see Bearing the Phalangite Panoply from page 133).
The levels of discomfort experienced by the test participants when the reach of attacks made from either the couched or high positions was tested suggests that such postures, and particularly thrusting actions made from them, could not have been maintained for very long (see The Reach and Trajectory of Attacks made with the Sarissa). The amount of muscular stress placed on the arms by simply holding the weighty sarissa aloft quickly tires the arms and a phalangite wielding his pike in this manner would have found himself fatigued simply advancing on the enemy with his weapon deployed (let alone doing any fighting). This suggests that both of these postures were not used. Additionally, even the easier motions of attacks made from the low position were found to be taxing on the muscles of the arms due to the weight of the sarissa if the actions were performed continuously as they were in the sessions of simulated combat. While many of the test participants were able to perform through these levels of discomfort and fatigue, two of the test participants failed to complete the five minute test period. This would further suggest that the more taxing couched and high positions were not used to wield the sarissa, and that phalangite combat was not a series of continuous thrusting actions but was a method of fighting where the pike was simply held in place, holding an enemy at bay, with only occasional attacks directed at opportune target areas being made.
Physiologically speaking, modern humans are little different from those of the ancient world. The main difference between modern and ancient people is that many inhabitants of the modern world are not accustomed to the harsher and more manual lifestyle of the past. As a result it is unlikely that the levels of fitness and stamina in the test participants would be similar to that of a Hellenistic phalangite. Consequently, the results of these tests cannot be regarded as accurate representations of the levels of strength and endurance that would have been found in the soldiers of a Hellenistic army. However, by using the data gathered from these tests, and then viewing them on a comparative basis, it seems that even an inexperienced phalangite wielding the sarissa at waist height and aiming his weapon at the chest of an opponent would have been able to engage in combat for a considerable period of time. For any mode of combat to be effective, it has to be maintained for the duration of the battle while causing the least amount of fatigue on those fighting it. This would correlate with the low method of offensive action, one that could be maintained for an indeterminate length of time, with the varied durations of engagements outlined in the ancient literary sources.
It seems that the simulated combat, while not overly taxing on the arms when done from the low position, allowed participants to get used to the feel of the weapon, get their eye in, be able to judge distances to targets and to adjust for the flex of the weapon better when they made their secondary strikes. This would suggest that with further training and exercise as the professional Macedonian phalangite would have undergone, the level of accuracy would have correspondingly increased further. From these test results a number of conclusions can be made:
• If a new recruit with little or no experience at handling the sarissa could hit a small target with at least half of his attacks delivered from the low position, and many of those that missed would still impact an opponent’s body, a more seasoned phalangite would have had a very high probability of hitting an opportune target if it presented itself on the battlefield and the phalangite had the time to exploit it. This would be particularly so if the targeted area was the chest of the opponent.
• Attacks aimed at areas other than the chest require the pitch of the lengthy sarissa to be altered. While this does not discount the possibility that areas such as the throat and head were intentionally targeted in phalangite combat, the required movement of the sarissa to attack an area other than the chest of an opponent make this method of attack less accurate.
• Despite any problems with aiming at an area on an opponent other than the chest, it is interesting to note that the majority of strikes that missed the designated target areas in the tests still fell within an area smaller in size than the phalangite shield or the chest on an individual of average size. This, coupled with the ease of using the sarissa when held at waist height, suggests that the upper body of an opponent was the commonly targeted area in Hellenistic pike combat.
• It is unlikely that phalangite combat was a series of frenzied and random attacks made with the sarissa. Rather it seems to have been a mode of combat incorporating the best uses of the lengthy pike – to hold an enemy at bay and to occasionally engage him offensively by directing attacks at exploitable opportune targets if they presented themselves.
It is also interesting to consider just how often such thrusting attacks would have occurred over the course of a phalangite battle. If the objective of the pike-phalanx for a particular engagement was to simply present their pikes, press the tips of their weapons into the shields of an opponent, and hold them off until a flanking attack by light troops or cavalry could be executed, then attempting to exploit any opportune target with a thrusting attack would have been something of a secondary consideration. Under such circumstances, as were seen at the battle of Pydna in 168BC, the phalangites of the phalanx simply needed to hold their ground with their pikes lowered and due to the way that the sarissa was pressed into an enemy’s shield, little thrusting with the weapon could have taken place. Undoubtedly, if a chance to slay the enemy facing him arose, a phalangite in the front rank of the phalanx would have tried to do so. However, if he was unable to kill his opponent this did not matter as, from the perspective of the phalanx, such combats were not encounters of attrition. Consequently, under such circumstances, even an inexperienced phalangite could have functioned effectively within the phalanx as all he was required to do was lower his sarissa and keep the enemy at a safe distance. This then raises the question as to how much of the training that is referred to in the ancient texts was the practice of drill and moving in formation, and exercises to build up stamina and endurance, and how much of it was actually learning how to fight with a lengthy pike. From the test results it seems that phalangite combat (and most likely the training for it as well) was a combative system that was very adaptable – not only to the tactical requirements of the situation, but to the skill level of the combatants as well.