1 Hammond ‘Training in the Use of a Sarissa and its Effects in Battle 359-333 B.C.’ Antichthon 14 (1980) 62) goes as far as to call the sarissa the ‘weapon par excellence’ of the Macedonian phalangite.
2 M.M. Markle, ‘The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear and Related Armour’ AJA 81.3 (1977) 323
3 For example see: P. Connolly, ‘Experiments with the Sarissa – the Macedonian Pike and Cavalry Lance – a Functional View’ JRMES 11 (2000) 109; P. McDonnell-Staff ‘Hypaspists to Peltasts: The Elite Guard Infantry of the Antigonid Macedonian Army’ AncWar 5.6 (2012) 22-23; J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1995) 73; Connolly not only suggests the use of a side-on stance, but also bases his model on Polybius’ description of holding the sarissa 4 cubits from the end which, as outlined previously, seems to be incorrect (see pages 83-88).
4 See: Connolly, ‘Experiments’, 109
5 For example see: Warry, Warfare, 73; strangely, despite having an illustration depicting the use of a side-on posture, Connolly (‘Experiments’, 110), wields the pike in a manner more akin to the oblique posture in a photograph of himself using the replica sarissa that he had made for his own experiments. The phalangite is also depicted in more of an oblique posture in another of Connolly’s works (see: Greece and Rome at War (Greenhill Books, London, 1998) 78). Whether the depiction of a completely side-on stance is an error or not, and why this diagram does not correlate with the stance used in the photograph, is not explained.
6 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.2
7 Plut. Alex. 33
8 Plut. Aem. 18
9 Any style of open-faced helmet like the Boeotian or the pilos would not encounter any limitation to the movement of the head due to a lack of elongated cheek pieces. On styles like the Attic and the Chalcidian, the cheek pieces are not elongated and merely cover the sides of the face. These too would pose no restriction to the rotation of the head.
10 Tyrt. 10, 11
11 Veg. Mil. 1.20
12 Diodorus (16.86.3) describes how the bodies of the fallen piled up at Chaeronea in 338BC. Similarly, Appian (Syr. 36) describes the battlefield of Magnesia (190BC) as being littered with the bodies of men, horses and elephants. Plutarch (Aem. 21) says a great mound of dead and equipment was strewn across the battlefield of Pydna (168BC). Plutarch (Pyrr. 28) additionally describes how freshly-turned earth did not provide a firm footing for combat.
13 Arr. Tact 16.13
14 Diod. Sic. 17.55.4
15 Arrian (Anab. 1.14.7) says that Alexander’s cavalry at the Granicus were carried downstream ‘in the direction that the river took them’ which suggests that the current was quite strong. If the current was strong enough to push horses and riders downstream, then it would have had a major effect on infantry who did not have a secure posture and stable footing.
16 In the diagram accompanying his examination of the phalanx, Connolly (‘Experiments’, 109) has the right leg/foot extending far to the right, beyond being in line with the shoulder and to the rear of the interval that the phalangite is occupying. This would separate the feet by a considerable distance and, while not physically impossible, the further the feet are apart beyond shoulder width, the less stable the posture becomes. Interestingly, in the photograph on the following page of Connolly wielding his replica panoply, the right leg is much closer in – in line with the right shoulder.
17 Asclep. 4.1; for the changes in the size of the cubit from the Classical to the Hellenistic period see the earlier section on ‘the length of the sarissa’
18 Asclep. Tact. 4.3; Ael. Tact. Tact. 11
19 Arr. Tact. 12.4; Polyb. 18.29; Asclep. Tact. 4.3; Ael. Tact. Tact. 11; despite such evidence, Sekunda (The Seleucid Army (Montvert, Stockport, 1994) 9) interprets Asclepiodotus as meaning that the ‘natural interval on the battlefield was six feet’. This equates to the open-order of 4 cubits per man and it is unlikely that such a deployment was ever used by the pike-phalanx to engage in combat.
20 Asclep. Tact. 4.3; Ael. Tact. Tact.11; Arr. Tact. 11.4
21 Ael. Tact. Tact. 32
22 Asclep. Tact. 12.9; Ael. Tact. Tact. 32
23 McDonnell-Staff ‘Hypaspists to Peltasts’, 22-23
24 Warry, Warfare, 73
25 A.M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999) 121
26 P. Sabin, Lost Battles (Continuum, London, 2009) 48
27 Front. Strat. 2.2.1
28 See: Arr. Tact. 12.3; Ael. Tact. Tact.13.3; Polyb. 18.29; Asclep. Tact. 5.1; Sheppard (Alexander the Great at War (Osprey, Oxford, 2008) 54) says the weapons of only the first 3-4 ranks projected ahead of the line. This goes against what most ancient writers tell us about the pike-phalanx.
29 This is basic trigonometry. The person creates a triangle with their body by forming a diagonal line across their interval. The line from shoulder to shoulder represents the hypotenuse of the triangle, while the angle between the hypotenuse and the base of the triangle (basically the rear of the interval) is 45° (the angle of the upper body). Cos45° x 45cm = 32cm
30 A. Smith, ‘The Anatomy of Battle – Testing Polybius’ Formations’ AncWar 5.5 (2011) 43 (41-45)
31 Smith, ‘Anatomy of Battle’ 43, 45; strangely, Smith also states (p.45) that when each man occupied a space 48cm across with his body in an oblique posture, that there was 24cm of ‘fighting space’ to either side of him. While there is clearly a 24cm projection of shield to the phalangite’s left, there cannot be another 24cm of space to his right if, as claimed in the earlier statement, the lateral space the individual occupied was between 78cm and 92cm.
32 See: C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 182-197
33 In reality, the pike held by the foremost phalangite should be on his right (at the front of the image) rather than crossing over his body to be deployed behind his shield and in between the man next to him. Such ‘errors’ were a common feature of depictions of the classical hoplite in the vase paintings of the fifth century BC as well. Whether this was the result of a lack of understanding or skill on the part of the artist, or was a conscious design element meant to show off more of the human physique in the image with the least amount of obstruction, is unknown.
34 Plut. Aem. 19-20
35 Even this amount of space would leave the hands of the phalangite vulnerable to being squashed between the weapons of the phalanx – especially as the formation advanced and the weapons that had been lowered for combat moved and flexed. It is possible, although there is no direct evidence for it, that phalangites wore some form of protection on their hands – something in the way of gloves (χειρίς), the leather thonging wrapped around the hands of boxers (ἱμάντες), or some other form of protective padding. Such coverings would have protected the phalangite’s hands within the massed confines of the pike-phalanx.
36 Connolly, (‘Experiments’, 112) found that the phalanx that he re-created using replica shields and pikes was impossible to move, let alone charge, if each man occupied a space of 69cm and suggested that, if a wider interval was adopted, movement would have been possible, but the men in the front rank ran the risk of being speared by the men in the fifth rank. However, according to the ancient sources, the pike held by the fifth man extended beyond the front of the formation by a distance of 2 cubits. Thus even with a spacing of 96cm per man for the intermediate order, the tip on the weapon held by the man in the fifth rank was ahead of the man in the front by nearly a metre and would have also been located off to the front man’s right-hand side by about 20cm.
37 Arr. Anab. 5.17.7; Brunt translates this passage literally, suggesting that Alexander’s phalanx created a formation ‘with locked shields’.
38 For example see: Plut. Aem. 19-20
39 For example see: J. Pietrykowski, Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 83, 233, who, following Arrian’s and Plutarch’s descriptions, offers that pike-phalanxes fought with interlocked shields at the Hydaspes in 326BC and at Pydna in 168BC.
40 S. English, The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2011) 195, 208
41 W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great Vol.II (Ares, Chicago, 1981) 96, n.3; for a comprehensive discussion of the use of Greek terminology by Roman writers, and Roman terms for the description of Greek formations, for the ‘phalanx’ and a battle-line or a dense formation see: E.L. Wheeler, ‘The Legion as Phalanx in the late Empire (I)’ in Y. le Bohec and C. Wolff (eds.), L’Armée Romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien Ier (De Boccard, Paris, 2004) 309-358; E.L. Wheeler, ‘The Legion as Phalanx in the Late Empire (II)’ RÉMA 1 (2004) 147-175
42 See: Plut. Crass. 24; Front. Strat. 2.3.15
43 Both Caesar (B Gall. 2.6.2, 7.85.5) and Livy (10.29.26, 10.41.4) use the term testudo to describe both formations of Roman infantry and formations of Gallic infantry in what are again likely to be the uses of similes (especially in the case of the Gallic troops) to describe compact-order formations.
44 It is interesting to note that the root of the term synaspismos used to describe the close-order formation is the word aspis, the name of the hoplite shield, rather than the word peltē – further suggesting its correlation with troops armed as hoplites. Aelian, in his description of the different intervals used by infantry formations, states that these were applicable to hoplites (Tact. 11). This is a clear differentiation between the Classical hoplite and the pikeman which is referred to as a peltast by Aelian. The lexicographer Photius (sv. ὑπασπιστής) has the term hypaspists (ὑπασπισταί) synonymous with ‘spear bearer’ (δopυφόροι) – again suggesting that these troops were hoplites rather than pikemen. For further doubts about phalangites employing the close-order formations see: J. Kromayer, and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Geichen und Römer (C.H. Beck, Munich, 1928) 358.
45 N.G.L. Hammond, ‘What May Philip Have Learnt as a Hostage in Thebes?’ GRBS 38.4 (1997) 367; see also: A. Blumberg, ‘Inspired by the Bard: Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Homeric Ethos’ AncWar 3.3 (2009) 20; interestingly, in another work (Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman (Duckworth, London, 1980) 32) Hammond says that each man in the front rank occupied a space of 1m across. This is the intermediate-order interval which, not only prevents phalangites from interlocking their shields, even if no weapon is carried, but is also twice the size of the interval used by Greek hoplites to create a ‘shield wall’.
46 The diagram accompanying Connolly’s examination of the phalanx (‘Experiments’, 109) shows the phalangites covering this exact same distance with their bodies via the use of a scale graduated in cubits.
47 Connolly, ‘Experiments’, 109
48 S. English, The Army of Alexander the Great (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 21
49 Hammond, ‘Philip as Hostage’, 367; see also McDonnell-Staff (‘Hypaspists to Peltasts’, 22-23) who makes a similar claim. McDonnell-Staff further suggests (p.22) that the normal (or open) order of the phalanx was 2m per man and that this was how the phalanx deployed sixteen deep. He then suggests that, as they approached the enemy, the phalanx moved into a ‘close order’ of 1m per man (which is actually the intermediate-order of the manuals) by ‘doubling’ the files to create a formation eight men deep. However, there is no reference in the ancient literature to this manoeuvre being undertaken in such a manner and it is especially unlikely that such movements, if ever carried out, would have been done as the phalanx was about to engage as Mcdonnell-Staff suggests.
50 Polyb. 18.29-30; Worthington (Philip II of Macedonia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008) 27) calls the pyknosis order of deployment ‘close order’. This is a misinterpretation of the ancient literature as Polybius and the writers of the manuals use the term pyknosis to describe the intermediate-order interval for the phalanx.
51 Sheppard (Alexander the Great at War, 80) also states that the close-order formation, of about 45cm per man, was used to receive an enemy charge.
52 Bennett and Roberts (The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281BC Vol.II: Battles and Tactics (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 4) suggest that close-order was a defensive formation. However, they do not outline what sort of attack they think this tight formation was used to resist.
53 The hoplite shield wall was the most dominant formation of the battlefields of the ancient world prior to the creation of the pike-phalanx. In every encounter where a close-order formation was employed, the side that had adopted it was always victorious regardless of whether the opponent was infantry or cavalry (see: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 205-217)
54 The passage of Diodorus cited by English (17.57.5) does not actually say anything about deployment or order and it can only be assumed that this is some form of typographical error.
55 J. Champion, Pyrrhus of Epirus (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 87; Similarly, Morgan (‘Sellasia Revisited’ AJA 85.3 (1981) 328) uses an intermediate-order interval of three feet per man to calculate the frontage of a formation of 10,000 phalangites at the battle of Sellasia, drawn up in a double depth of 32 men per file. McDonnell-Staff (‘Sparta’s Last Hurrah – The Battle of Sellasia (222BC)’ AncWar 2.2 (2008) 27-28) suggests that these troops were deployed in a double-depth close-order of three feet per man with interlocked shields. However, there are several issues with this. Firstly, three feet per man is the intermediate-order outlined in the manuals, not the close-order. Secondly, an interval of three feet per man would prevent men carrying the peltē from interlocking them. Polybius gives clues as to the manner of deployment when he says that it made ‘a hedge of pikes’ (συμφράξαντες τὰς σαρίσας). Thus these troops cannot be in a close-order shield wall which required their weapons to be held vertically. Lastly, McDonnell-staff interprets the word that Polybius uses (2.66) to describe the deployment (epallallos phalaggos – ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος) as meaning ‘interlocked shields’. However, the term simply means ‘united phalanx’ and is not an indication of its order or interval, merely that the troops are in formation.
56 Warry, Warfare, 73
57 English, Army of Alexander, 21; in a similarly confused passage, McDonnell-Staff (‘Hypaspists to Peltasts’, 22) states that the normal (or open) order of the phalanx was 2m per man, and that this was how the phalanx deployed sixteen deep. McDonnell-Staff goes on to suggest that, as they approached an enemy, the phalanx moved into ‘close-order’ (pyknosis) of lm per man by ‘doubling’ the files to create a formation eight deep. However, pyknosis is the term used for the intermediate-order of 96cm per man by the ancient writers, rather than for the ‘close-order’ of 48cm per man as McDonnell-Staff states (even though he says the formation used a 1m interval). Additionally, the use of an 8 deep file seems to have been an improvised formation rather than a standard deployment, which further confuses McDonnell-Staff’s statements. Similarly Sheppard (Alexander the Great at War, 80) states that the close-order pyknosis formation had an interval of around 91cm per man (based upon the smaller Attic cubit of 45cm) which, again, is actually the intermediate-order of the manuals.
58 R. Gabriel, Philip II of Macedonia – Greater than Alexander (Potomac, Washington, 2010) 66
59 Strangely, on a previous page (p.64) Gabriel had suggested that when moving into the ‘compact’ intermediate-order, the phalangites swung their shields across their backs. This would go against the point of carrying them for battle and also would not allow them to interlock into a close-order ‘shield wall’. Despite the fact that phalangites were not physically able to adopt such a formation, any suggestion that they could do so while their shield was slung across their back clearly goes against the terminology used to describe it. See also: Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange (Il Cerchio, Rome, 2011) 61) who also bases his examination of the interval of the phalanx on the wrong size for the cubit.
60 Gabriel, Philip II, 130
61 Smith (‘The Anatomy of Battle’, 41-45) used the Polybian model to try and analyse the spatial requirements of the men within the phalanx. However, many aspects of this examination are confusing and do not correlate with what Polybius himself states. For example, he states (p.42) that 2 cubits equates to a distance of 48cm and that, based upon Polybius, each man occupied a space of 48cm. While a distance of 48cm is correct for a single cubit in the Hellenistic standard (see: The Length of the Sarissa), a single cubit could not have been only 24cm in size as Smith suggests. Strangely, Smith later states that10 cubits equated to 480cm which must assume a single cubit of 48cm – correctly following the Hellenistic standard. Initially this would seem to be a typographical error. However, Smith goes on to state, following the Polybian model for carrying the sarissa, that the rearward section of the weapon projected behind the bearer by only 48cm – which must be based upon a single cubit of 24cm. This incorrect conclusion then influences much of the remainder of the analysis (albeit in a somewhat contradictory fashion). In the diagram accompanying the article (p.42), the phalangites are shown to be occupying a space 96cm across. This would then correlate with the use of a 48cm cubit and the adoption of an intermediate-order spacing of 2 cubits per man. However, the phalangites are only depicted with the pikes held by the first two ranks projecting between the files, contrary to Polybius’ statement that the weapons of the first five ranks extended ahead of the line, with no additional space left for the remaining three pikes. As the shield, with its diameter of 64cm, is portrayed as being positioned across the front of the interval that each man occupies, this leaves the impression that each man’s left fist (holding the sarissa) is over 20cm in size. Additionally, as the pike is shown to only extend behind the bearer by 48cm, the resultant formation has the butt-spike of the forward ranks wedged into the groin of the man behind. Such a deployment seems highly unlikely due to its dangerous nature. Furthermore, when the pike is wielded at waist height, the butt of the sarissa points at the shield of the man behind and so could not be wedged into his groin unless it is assumed that it was somehow positioned to pass under the shield (again unlikely). Such a depiction is even more confusing when, on page 45, Smith states that the Hellenistic phalangite wielded the sarissa in the same manner as the pikemen of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe with the weapon held at shoulder height. It is only at the end that Smith arrives at the true spatial requirements of the phalangite by stating that each man occupied a space of about 48cm with his body while 24cm of extra ‘fighting space’ was on either side – bringing the total to the 96cm of the intermediate-order. This is fundamentally correct. As well as the interval occupied by the individual in an oblique body posture, the shield projected to the left by about 24cm and 24cm on the right would be taken up by the pikes belonging to the first five ranks all levelled beside on another.
62 W. Heckel and R. Jones, Macedonian Warrior: Alexander’s Elite Infantryman (Osprey, Oxford, 2006) 16)
63 For example see: Warry, Warfare, 73; Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 62
64 Connolly, ‘Experiments’, 111
65 Connolly, ‘Experiments’, 112
1 For example, Hammond (Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman (Duckworth, London, 1980) 32) says: ‘strict discipline and precise drill were essential, and the best training of all was provided by experience in battle’ but does not examine this concept of essential drill any further. English (The Army of Alexander the Great (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 22), on the other hand, merely says that the weight and size of the sarissa would make it difficult to handle without any further discussion.
2 Ael. Tact. Tact. 53
3 Asclep. Tact. 12.11; Arr. Tact. 32
4 Ael. Tact. Tact. 32
5 Arr. Anab. 1.6.1-3 – καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐσήμηνεν ὀρθὰ ἀνατεῖναι τὰ δόρατα τοὺς ὁπλίτας, ἔπειτa ἀπò ξυvθήματος ἀποτεῖναι ἐς προβολήν, καὶ νῦν μὲν ἐς τὸ δεξιòν ἐγκλῖναι τῶν δοράτων τὴν σύγκλεισιν, αὖθις δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερά. καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν φάλαγγα ἔς τε τὸ πρόσω ὀξέως ἐκίνησε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ κέρατα ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ παρήγαγε.
6 For the military definitions of these two terms see: Ael. Tact. Tact. 23, 35; Asclep. Tact. 10.1, 11.2-7; Arr. Tact. 20, 28; Rooke’s translation of Arrian’s Anabasis from 1814 is somewhat abbreviated and presents an even more confusing picture: ‘…ordered the armed soldiers to advance first, with their spears erect; and upon a signal given, to reverse them, and sometimes to direct them to the right, and then to the left, as occasion required’.
7 Polyb. 2.69
8 Arr. Anab. 1.6.4
9 Diod. Sic. 17.57.6
10 Plut. Eum. 14
11 M.M. Markle, ‘Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon’ AJA 82.4 (1978) 492
12 Arr. Anab. 1.4.1 – ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἕω Ἀλέξαvδρος διὰ τοῦ ληίου ἦγε, παραγγείλας τοῖς πεζοῖς πλαγίαις ταῖς σαρίσσαις ἐπικλίνοντας τὸν σῖτον οὕτω προάγειν ἐς τὰ οὐκ ἐργάσιμα. Markle gets around this apparently contradictory material by suggesting that these pikes were not intended to be used as combat weapons, but were carried with the army only to be used to flatten grain fields. This seems highly unlikely as there would be no point in an army the size of Alexander’s carrying a different weapon for each man if it was not going to be used in battle and was only meant to flatten crops – an activity for which there would be much better implements. English (The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2011) 29) says that Arrian actually used the word ‘spears’ rather than sarissa and that this may suggest that the troops being described were actually hoplites. This is clearly an incorrect reading of the passage.
13 Polyb. 18.30
14 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.10
15 English, Field Campaigns of Alexander, 175; somewhat confusingly, in his examination of the battle of the Hydaspes in 326BC (pp.207-208), English dismisses Arrian’s use of the term ‘locked shields’ by stating that this would be impossible ‘if the heavy infantry were equipped as we might expect them to have been, with the sarissa and pelta’. A few lines later, he then states that ‘I am not convinced that the sarissa was used at the Hydaspes.’
16 Curt. 8.14.16
17 Arr. Anab. 7.6.9; Diod. Sic. 17.108.1-2; Plut. Alex. 47; Curt. 8.5.1
18 Arr. Anab. 7.12.2; Diod. Sic. 17.110.3; for a discussion of Alexander’s training of local youths to become front-line infantry see: N.G.L. Hammond, ‘Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy’ Historia 39.3 (1990) 261-290. Hammond calculates (p.279) that the number of these trained youths could have been as high as 125,000 across the timeframe of Alexander’s campaign.
19 See: M. Mitchiner, Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian Coinage Vol.I – The Early Indo-Greeks and their Antecedents (Hawkins Publications, Sanderstead, 1975) 21. English (Field Campaigns of Alexander, 208) dismisses this imagery as iconic rather than realistic. See also: A.B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander Vol.II (Oxford University Press, 1995), 301. It is further interesting to note that, if the figure is Alexander, then the weapon in question is more likely to be a cavalry lance than an infantry pike.
20 For the characteristics of the hoplite spear see: C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 1-15
21 For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the sixteenth century training manual for pike and musket armies see: D.R. Lawrence, The Complete Soldier – Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603-1645 (Brill, Leiden, 2009) 135-156; the Hellenistic pike-phalanx was not the only ancient mode of warfare which influenced the pike and musket armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Chapter one of Edward Cooke’s The Character of Warre (Tho. Purfoot, London, 1626) comments on the value of studying the Roman military writer Vegetius, but uses examples from Greek, Macedonian and Roman history, from the fourth century BC to the time of Vegetius, throughout his text.
22 See: J. Smythe, Instructions, Observations and Orders Mylitarie, (R. Johnes, London, 1595) 23: according to Blaise de Monluc (Military Memoirs: Blaise de Monluc: The Valois-Habsburg Wars and the French Wars of Religion (I. Roy (ed.)) (Longman, London, 1971) 188) the Germans were very adept at this style of fighting while the Swiss held their pikes in the middle of the shaft. Many of the woodblock prints of battles from this time period show pikemen holding their weapons either in this elevated position or at waist level in the Macedonian manner.
23 A. Smith, ‘The Anatomy of Battle – Testing Polybius’ Formations’ AncWar 5.5 (2011) 45
24 N.G.L. Hammond, The Genius of Alexander the Great (Duckworth, London, 1997) 14; the same image is found in I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008) 28; this crouched position was one of the ways that the Classical Hoplite could wield his shorter spear with one hand (see: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 15-18).
25 A description of the pike is a common element in the military manuals of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. An anonymous pamphlet from the early seventeenth century (The Exercise of the English, in the Militia of the Kingdome of England (London, 1642) 1-2), for example, states that ‘… the pike of Ashen-wood for the Steale, and at the upper end an iron head, of about a handful long, with cheeks about the length of two foote, and at the butt-end a round strong socket of iron ending in a Pike, that is blunt, yet sharpe enough to fixe to the ground’.
26 See: Diod. Sic. 17.34.1; Asclep. Tact. 3.1-6; Ael. Tact. Tact. 10
27 Polyb. 2.69
28 For example see: Ptolemy’s phalangites at Raphia (217BC): Polyb. 5.85; the Spartans at Mantinea (207BC): Polyb. 11.15; the Achaeans at Mantinea (207BC): Polyb. 11.16; the Macedonians at Cynoscephalae (197BC): Polyb. 18.24
1 R.E. Dickinson, ‘Length Isn’t Everything – Use of the Macedonian Sarissa in the Time of Alexander the Great’ JBT 3.3 (2000) 51
2 J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1995) 68
3 R.D. Milns, ‘The Hypaspists of Alexander III – Some Problems’ Historia 20 (1971) 188
4 J. Pietrykowski, Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 230
5 I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008) 27
6 R. Gabriel, Philip II of Macedonia – Greater than Alexander (Potomac, Washington, 2010) 66
7 A. Smith, ‘The Anatomy of Battle – Testing Polybius’ Formations’ AncWar 5.5 (2011) 43
8 See: Diod. Sic. 17.34.1; Asclep. Tact. 3.1-6; Ael. Tact. Tact. 10
9 Ael. Tact. Tact. 13; Arr. Tact. 12
10 See. C. A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 83-86
11 J. Chananie, ‘The Physics of Karate Strikes’ Journal of How Things Work 1 (1999) 3
12 Chananie, ‘The Physics of Karate Strikes’ 3
13 Sheppard (Alexander the Great at War (Osprey, Oxford, 2008) 54) suggests that the connecting tube used to join a segmented sarissa decreases the bend in the shaft and adds to the overall sturdiness of the weapon. Regardless of how true such an assumption is, both weapons with a single shaft and those with joined shafts possess a certain level of flex due to the length of the weapon and the weight of the amount of shaft that is forward of the left hand – compare Plates 1 and 15.
14 P. Connolly, ‘Experiments with the Sarissa – the Macedonian Pike and Cavalry Lance – a Functional View’ JRMES 11 (2000) 111
15 The only one of the statements issued by modern scholars cited at the beginning of this chapter that does not hold true is that of Warry who suggests that the phalanx was equally prepared to thrust with its pikes or push with its shields. Due to the rows of levelled pikes projecting ahead of the phalanx, it is unlikely that opponents carrying large shields like the hoplite aspis or the Roman scutum were regularly able to move inside this array of presented weapons and physically collide with the shields of the front rank phalangites (See: The Phalanx in Battle).
16 Dickinson, ‘Length Isn’t Everything’ 57; for the duel between Dioxippus and Coragus/Horratus see: Diod. Sic. 17.11.2; Curt. 9.7.19
1 C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 94)
2 The Corinthian style helmet also gave the wearer a natural range of vision (see: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 96-101) so this was not an improvement that had resulted from developments in defensive headgear in the fourth century BC.
3 Alc. Frag. 19
4 Matthew, Storm of Spears, 71-92
5 Plut. Aem. 20
6 Afric. Cest. 1.1.28-29 – γυμνὸν δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ αὺχὴν ἐλεύθεπος ἀκωλυτον τὴν πανταχοῦ περίσκεψιν χωρωῖ
7 Afric. Cest. 1.1.38-39 – σημεῖον δὲ [τὸ] ἐλευθέρας τῶν μαχομένων τὰς ὄψεις υπò πίλῳ Λακωνικῷ ὲν τῇ Μακεδovικῇ γεγενῆσθαι
8 According to Diodorus (17.61.1) the dust kicked up at the battle of Gaugamela (331BC) was used to mask the escape of the Persian king Darius. As if to confirm how limited the vision was, Curtius (4.15.32) says that at Gaugamela the Macedonians ‘wandered around like people in the dark; coming together only when they recognized a voice or heard a signal’. Plutarch (Eum. 16) states how the fine white dust kicked up at the battle of Gabiene (316BC) obscured vision (see also Diod. Sic. 19.42.1). Similarly, Appian (Syr. 33) describes how mist on the battlefield obscured vision during the battle of Magnesia in 190BC. Livy (37.41) says that the light rain (rather than mist) at Magnesia made it impossible for either end of the phalanx to be seen from the centre.
9 See: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 103-104
10 E. Kastorchis, ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΝ ΧΑΙΡΩΝΕΙΑ ΑΕΟΝΤΟΣ’ Athenaion 8 (1879) 486-491
11 C.F. Salazar, The Treatment of War Wounds in Greco-Roman Antiquity (Brill, Leiden, 2000) 233-234; W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War – Part IV (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985) 136; Kastorchis, ‘ΧΑΙΡΩΝΕΙΑ 486-491; L. Phytalis, ‘ΕΡΕΥΝΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΠΟΛΥΑΝΔΡΙΩ ΧΑΙΡΩΝΕΙΑΣ’ Athenaion 9 (1880) 347-352, plate 1
12 T. Everson, Warfare in Ancient Greece (Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 2004) 129
13 Everson, Warfare, 129
14 Plut. Aem. 19; Polybius (18.24) similarly says that the nature of the Macedonian weapons gave them a distinct advantage over the Romans at the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197BC.
15 Plut. Aem. 20
16 Livy 44.42
17 Diod. Sic. 17.84.4 – οἰ γὰρ Μακεδόνες ταῖς σαρίσαις ἀναρρήσσοντες τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων πέλτας τὰς ἀκμὰς τoῦ σιδήρου τοῖς πνεύμοσιν ἐνήρειδον
18 Diod. Sic. 18.34.2
19 Livy, 36.18
20 Polyb. 5.84
21 IG IV2 1.121-122 (# 12 & 40); See also: E.D. Edelstein and L. Edelstein, Asclepius: A Collection and Interpretation of the Testimonies (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1945), #423
22 Curt. 3.11.6
23 Curt. 3.11.5
24 Just. Epit. 9.3.10
25 Diod. Sic. 17.25.4
26 Diod. Sic. 17.63.2-4
27 Diod. Sic. 19.32.1
28 Just. Epit. 28.4.5
29 Plut. Aem. 21
30 Magnesia: Livy 37.44; Pydna: Livy 44.42
31 N. Mashiro, Black Medicine: The Dark Art of Death – The Vital Points of the Human Body in Close Combat (Paladin Press, Boulder, 1978) 16
32 Mashiro, Black Medicine, 28-29
33 Mashiro, Black Medicine, 32
34 Mashiro, Black Medicine, 32
35 Hom. Il. 22.325; Xenophon (Eq. 12) also comments on the vulnerability of this area, and its need for adequate protection, among mounted troops.
36 For a discussion of the casualties suffered in phalangite contests see: P. Sabin, ‘Land Battles’ in P. Sabin, H. van Wees and M. Whitby (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Vol. I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 414-416
37 Diod. Sic. 16.86.3
38 Diod. Sic. 19.30.5
39 Plut. Aem. 21
40 In many battles, the majority of casualties for the losing side were suffered at the hands of cavalry or skirmishers – either during a rout or from a flanking assault on the sides of their formation. For example, while Polybius (5.86) states that Ptolemy’s victory at Raphia in 217BC was a result of the actions of the phalanx, he also states that the majority of the losses suffered by Antiochus were the result of a pursuit by his cavalry and mercenaries, rather than by being slain by the phalangites. Similarly, Appian (Syr. 36) states that most of the Roman infantry killed at Magnesia in 190BC were slain by cavalry rather than phalangites.
41 Diod. Sic. 17.34.8
42 Twisting the weapon also causes more damage to organs and soft tissue before the bayonet is withdrawn.
43 Veg. Mil. 1.12
44 Livy 31.34; Diodorus (28.8.1) has Philip make the off-hand remark that the dead probably do not care what size their wounds are.
45 Livy, 31.34
46 Warfare in Classical Greece seems to have similarly involved strikes directed towards the shield/chest area of an opponent with killing strikes directed against the head when the opportunity presented itself. See: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 93-112
47 It is possible that the ends of the two halves which slotted into the connecting tube were cut at an angle so that they would then slide into each other when the sarissa was assembled. If this was the case, then the complete weapon would be much more rigid and the pike as a whole could be twisted (albeit still with some difficulty) to aid extraction.
1 Hom. Il. 13.785, 19.160; such sentiments are echoed in the later writings of Vegetius (Mil. 3.11) who states that ‘when a man who is tired, or sweating, or has been running, enters battle against a man who is rested, alert and has been standing at his post, the two fight on unequal terms.’
2 Paus. 4.21.8-9; Diod. Sic. 14.105.1-2
3 Diod. Sic. 16.86.2, 17.11.5
4 Diod. Sic. 17.63.2
5 Plut. Alex. 33; see also: Curt. 4.13.17-25, 4.16.18
6 Diod. Sic. 19.30.5, 19.31.1
7 Plut. Pyrr. 21
8 Plut. Aem. 22
9 For a modern examination of the effects of fatigue and environmental conditions on performance see: J. Ramsey, ‘Heat and Cold’ in R. Hockey (ed.), Stress and Fatigue in Human Performance (Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1983) 33-57
10 Front. Strat. 2.1.9; see also: Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.7; Just. Epit. 9.3.9
11 Curt. 4.16.18
12 D. Holding, ‘Fatigue’ in Hockey (ed.), Stress and Fatigue, 145-164; N. Forestier and V. Nougier, ‘The Effects of Muscular Fatigue on the Co-Ordination of Multijoint Movement in Humans’ Neuroscience Letters 252.3 (1998) 187-190; K. Royal, D. Farrow, I. Mujika, S. Hanson, D. Pyne and B. Abernethy, ‘The Effects of Fatigue on Decision Making and Shooting Skill in Water Polo Players’ Journal of Sports Sciences 24.8 (2006) 807-815; P.R. Davey, R.D. Thorpe and C. Williams, ‘Fatigue Decreases Tennis Performance’ Journal of Sports Sciences 20.4 (2002) 311-318
13 G.P. Krueger, ‘Sustained Work, Fatigue, Sleep Loss and Performance: A Review of the Issues’ Work and Stress 3:2 (1989) 129-141
14 Leonis Imp. Strat. 9.4
15 Arist. Eth. Nic. 3.8.7-9
16 Just. Epit. 11.6.4-6
17 Front. Strat. 4.2.4
18 Technical skill/courage: Veg. Mil. 1.1, 1.8, 1.13, 2.23-24, 3.9-10; Vegetius also comments in several places on the value of fitness and recommends that Roman legionaries should be kept in peak physical condition, see: Veg. Mil. 1.1, 1.5-6, 1.9, 1.13, 1.19, 1.27, 2.23, 3.11.
19 Veg. Mil. 1.3
20 Veg. Mil. 3.9
21 Diod. Sic. 16.3.1
22 Front. Strat. 4.1.6; Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.10
23 Dem. 9.49-50; 18.235
24 App. Syr. 3, 7
25 For example see: Curt. 4.9.19-21; for discussions on the march rates of Alexander’s army see: R.D. Milns, ‘Alexander’s Pursuit of Darius through Iran’ Historia 15 (1966) 256; C. Neumann, ‘A Note on Alexander’s March-Rates’ Historia 20 (1971) 196-198; D.W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980) 153-156; F.L. Holt, ‘Imperium Macedonicum and the East: The Problem of Logistics’ Ancient Macedonia V (1989) 585-592
26 Demetrius: Diod. Sic. 19.96.4; Antigonus: Diod. Sic. 20.73.3; Eumenes: Plut. Eum. 9
27 Diod. Sic. 19.41.2
28 Dod. Sic. 17.2.3
29 Diod. Sic. 29.2.1
30 App. Syr. 3, see also: App. Syr. 19
31 For the non-professional nature of the hoplite forces of Athens and other states in Greece see: Arist. Pol. 1256a7; Plut. Mor. 214; Plut. Ages. 26; Polyaenus, Strat. 2.1.7 The one stark contrast to these citizen militias was the army of the Spartans. The culture of the Spartans, with the harsh agoge system of education, simple diet, prohibition on art, luxury and commerce, indoctrinated the boys of Sparta into a military lifestyle from an early age and Spartan society was geared towards only one thing – war (see: Xen. Lac. 2.1-4.7; Plut. Lyc. 13, 16-25). Xenophon (Hell. 6.1.5), in an obvious comparison to the Spartan way of training, states that many citizen-based armies contain many who have either passed, or not yet reached, their prime and that there are few in the city who keep themselves in good physical condition. Vegetius, in comparisons of Athens and Sparta, (Mil. 3.0, 3.10) states that the Athenians cultivated arts other than the practice of war within their state, whereas the only concern of the Spartans was to prepare themselves for conflict. According to Aelian (VH 13.38-37), Alcibaides stated that it was not unexpected that the Spartans died so fearlessly in battle as they used death as a way of escaping from the harsh lifestyle they had left behind in Sparta. Some city-states of Greece fielded units of professional troops to augment their citizen forces. The Theban Sacred Band could be considered ‘professional’ due to their extensive training. A contingent of 1,000 select Argives were also given extensive military training at state expense, and these troops could also be considered ‘professional’ hoplites. For the details of other elite or professional units in ancient Greece see: W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War – Vol.II (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974) 221-224.
32 Thuc. 2.39
33 P Ducrey, Warfare in Ancient Greece (Schocken Books, New York, 1986) 67-70; interestingly, Curtius (4.7.31) says that the Macedonians, despite living under the rule of a king rather than in a democracy, and having a professional army as opposed to a citizen militia, ‘lived in the shadow of liberty more than other races’. This was most likely because, under the stability of the monarchy, Macedonia had not witnessed any of the political turmoil – with its ostracisms, factions, confiscations and executions – which had run rampant through the ‘democracy’ of Athens for decades.
34 Arist. Eth. Nic. 3.8.13
35 Pindar (Frag. 110) states that war is sweet to those who are not familiar with it, but is frightening to those who have experienced it. Vegetius (Mil. 3.12) states that fear in battle is an ordinary reaction for the individual combatant. Yet this fear (and the reactions to it) could manifest itself in varying degrees. For a broad discussion of the forms and effects of different types of fear, courage and experience in battle, see: Arist. Eth. Nic. 3.7.10-3.8.16. In his book On Killing, Grossman outlines how some modern soldiers, unconditioned to the turmoils of war, may demonstrate a resistance to killing another human being in combat while those who have been ‘conditioned’ are more effective killers (see: D. Grossman, On Killing (Back Bay Books, New York, 1996) 3, 13-15, 67-73). If this psychology holds as true for the warriors of the ancient world as it does for the modern, the professional Macedonian phalangite who had been ‘conditioned’ for war through his extensive training may have been more accepting to the notion of killing an enemy he faced than the members of many of the armies that Macedonian troops of the early Hellenistic Period fought against such as Greek hoplite militias or Persian conscripts.
36 C. Idzikowski and A. Baddeley, ‘Fear and Dangerous Environments’ in Hockey (ed.), Stress and Fatigue, 123-141
37 Idzikowski and Baddeley, ‘Fear and Dangerous Environments’ in Hockey (ed.), Stress and Fatigue, 127
38 Idzikowski and Baddeley, ‘Fear and Dangerous Environments’ in Hockey (ed.), Stress and Fatigue, 125
39 Excerpta Polyaeni, 18.4; Plut. Alex. 33
1 J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1995) 68
2 W. Heckel, The Conquests of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 16
3 R. Gabriel, Philip II of Macedonia – Greater than Alexander (Potomac, Washington, 2010) 65
4 N. Sekunda, The Army of Alexander the Great (Osprey, Oxford, 1999) 27
5 I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008) 27
6 Diod. Sic. 17.25.5
7 Diod. Sic. 17.84.4
8 Paus. 1.21.7; Borza (‘The Royal Macedonian Tombs and the Paraphernalia of Alexander the Great’ Phoenix 41.2 (1987) 112), most likely following the statement of Pausanias, suggests that ‘the linen thorax cannot be considered as a serious and effective device.’ While this may be true of resistance to strong thrusts with weapons like spears or pikes as Pausanias suggests, the linothorax did provide excellent protection against missile fire (see: C.A. Matthew, ‘Testing Herodotus – Using Re-creation to Understand the Battle of Marathon’ AncWar 5.4 (2011) 41-46). Aldrete, Bartell and Aldrete (Reconstructing Ancient Linen Armour – Unraveling the Linothorax Debate (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2013) 92) suggest that as the length of the sarissa could be used to keep an opponent at a safe distance, the wearing of linen armour by the members of the pike-phalanx would have been predominantly for protection from weapons that the sarissa could not defend against such as arrows, javelins and sling bullets.
9 Halicarnassus: Diod. Sic. 17.25.4; Megalopolis: Diod. Sic. 17.63.2-4; Paraetacene: Diod. Sic. 19.32.1; Magnesia: Livy 37.44; Pydna: Livy 44.42
10 R. Gabriel and K. Metz, From Sumer to Rome – The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies (Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1991) xix
11 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, xix
12 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, xix
13 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, xix-xx; brass targets were used as the properties of brass and bronze are almost identical.
14 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, xx; the two inch ‘killing depth’ was based upon Vegetius (Mil. 12) who states that a wound penetrating to this depth, inflicted by the Roman gladius, is generally fatal. In a similar series of tests, Blyth (The Effectiveness of Greek Armour against Arrows in the Persian Wars (490-479B.C.): An Interdisciplinary Enquiry (British Library Lending Division [unpublished thesis – University of Reading], London, 1977) 24) suggests that to cause serious damage to the head, a weapon would only have to penetrate up to 3cm but would have to penetrate deeper to seriously damage the chest.
15 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, xx
16 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, xix, 57, 59-60, 63, 95; for calculations of the penetrative abilities of other pieces of ancient weaponry see: Blyth, The Effectiveness of Greek Armour 15-18, 81-85; C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 130-145; Aldrete, Bartell and Aldrete, Reconstructing Ancient Linen Armour, 91-128
17 Gabriel and Metz, Sumer to Rome, 59
18 See: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 2-4
19 Blyth (Effectiveness of Greek Armour, 71) tabulates the thickness of different parts of the helmet for nine different examples in the collection of Olympia.
20 Matthews (The Battle of Thermopylae – A Campaign in Context (History Press, Stroud, 2008) 55) states that the linen cuirass worn by the Classical Greeks was lighter and provided less protection than the bronze corslet. However, it has been suggested by other scholars that the linen composite cuirass afforded no better protection or advantage in weight than its bronze equivalent (for example see: E. Jarva, Archaiologia on Archaic Greek Body Armour (Studia Archaeologica Septentrionalia 3), (Pohjois-Suomen Historiallinen Yhdistys, Societas Historica Finlandiae Septentrionalis, Rovaniemi, 1995) 135-143; T. Everson, Warfare in Ancient Greece (Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 2004) 111, 147). Some re-created examples of the linothorax certainly agree with this conclusion, at least in terms of weight. Nepos (Iphicrates 1.4) says that the linen corslet was lighter but gave the same protection as bronze. Pausanias (1.21.8), on the other hand, states that the linen corslet would not protect against spears and was only suitable for hunting – although Anderson (Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970) 23) suggests that Pausanias may have had no actual experience with this type of armour. Conversely, Aldrete, Bartell and Aldrete (Reconstructing Ancient Linen Armour, 127-128), based upon their own practical experimentations, conclude that for cloth armour, which deforms with impacts and is made of many individual layers which all offer resistance to penetration, a thickness of 11mm was equivalent to wearing plate metal 1.8mm thick.
21 Taken from A. Williams, The Knight and the Blast Furnace – A History of the Metallurgy of Armour in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period (Brill, Leiden, 2003) 928-929, 936
22 Confirmed through personal correspondence with R. Gabriel, 01 June 07-06 July 07
23 Williams, The Knight and the Blast Furnace, 929-930; for example, if a weapon hits a curved chest-plate ‘square-on’ to the centre of a barrel-shaped torso, it will hit roughly perpendicular to the surface of the armour. However, if the strike lands further around to either side of the centre, the further around the strike lands, the more of the curvature of the armour the thrust would have to overcome.
24 Taken from Williams, The Knight and the Blast Furnace, 937
25 Things such as imperfections in the armour and/or the brittleness of the metal it was made from would also have an impact on how easily a weapon might be able to penetrate it. See: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 140-141
26 Curt. 3.11.5
27 Diod. Sic. 17.84.4
28 Blyth, Effectiveness of Greek Armour, 14
29 A leaning attack would not have a very high velocity and this would reduce the overall amount of energy delivered. If, as an example, a leaning attack was made by a 220lb (100kg) phalangite who could get a quarter of his body weight (55lb/25kg) behind an attack made with an 11.9lb pike at a velocity of only 3.2ft/1m per second, the amount of energy delivered through the tip of the weapon would be approximately 10fpds/13.5j. This would not even be enough to penetrate armour with a thickness of 1mm if the strike was delivered perfectly perpendicular to the surface of the armour. However, it could still knock the person on the receiving end over. In an impromptu ‘test’ done with members of a sixteenth century pike and musket re-enactment group in 2009, I was asked to simply hold onto the extended tip of pike when it was lowered for action and wielded at shoulder height. The wielder of this weapon then simply lent forward and, due to the amount of energy being transferred down the length of the weapon, I was knocked backwards by several feet.
30 Plut. Aem. 20
31 Lucian, Dial. mort. 27
1 Lucian, Dial. mort. 27; Pietrykowski (Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 81) suggests that Alexander’s troops adopted this same position to counter Porus’ elephants at the Hydaspes River in 326BC. However, there is no reference to such an undertaking in any of the accounts of the engagement.
2 Lucian, Dial. mort. 27; 20 cubits, or about 9.6m, seems incredibly big for a cavalry lance when it is considered that the longest infantry pikes only got to 16 cubits or just over 7.6m. However, a long lance would have given the Thracian more opportunity to parry the point and then set the sarissa as Lucian describes.
3 M.M. Markle, ‘The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear and Related Armour’ AA 81.3 (1977) 324; W. Heckel and R. Jones, Macedonian Warrior: Alexander’s Elite Infantryman (Osprey, Oxford, 2006) 14; M. Park, ‘The Fight for Asia – The Battle of Gabiene’ AncWar 3.2 (2009) 35; B. Bennett and M. Roberts, The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281BC Vol.II: Battles and Tactics (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 4
4 C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 146-164
5 Polyb. 11.18; Plutarch (Phil. 10), recounting the same event, states that Philopoemen killed Machanidas with a blow delivered with the front tip of the weapon rather than with the butt.
6 Arr. Anab. 1.15.6; Plut. Alex. 16
7 Diod. Sic. 17.20.4-5; Diodorus also states that, even with the momentum of a charging horse, Alexander’s lance was unable to penetrate the shield carried by the Persian he was attacking and this was why the head was broken off.
8 Xenophon (Eq. 8.10) details the use of the butt, rather than the head, in mock cavalry battles. This suggests that, regardless of its shape, the butt of the Greek lance could not inflict serious injury. It is also possible that the butt of the some Greek lances was more akin to the sauroter of the hoplite spear, and thus considerably more blunt than the head, rather than the large, ‘head-like’ butt of the Macedonian lance.
9 Front. Strat. 2.3.20
10 Diod. Sic. 17.100.6-7
11 Plut. Aem. 20
12 Plut. Pyrrh. 21
13 Hdt. 9.62; see also: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 150-155
14 Plut. Aem. 20 - οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκκρούειν τε τοῖς ξίφεσι τὰς σαρίσας ἐπειρῶντο
15 R. Sheppard (ed.), Alexander the Great at War (Osprey, Oxford, 2008) 82
16 Matthew, Storm of Spears, 151-153
17 Eur. Phoen. 1396-1399
18 Hdt. 7.224
19 Xen.Ages. 2.12-14
20 Diod. Sic. 15.87.1
21 P.H. Blyth, The Effectiveness of Greek Armour against Arrows in the Persian Wars (490-479B.C.): An Interdisciplinary Approach (British Library Lending Division [unpublished thesis – University of Reading], London, 1977)) 22-22e
22 Blyth, Effectiveness of Greek Armour, 22-22e
23 H. Baitinger, Die Angriffswaffen aus Olympia (de Gruyter, Berlin, 2000) plates 14, 17, 19, 20, 40, 41, 42
24 The exact opposite thing happens if the first metre of a hoplite doru is broken off in the same manner, and the point of balance actually shifts closer to the butt rather than away from it as it does with the sarissa (see: Matthew, Storm of Spears, 155-156). This is mainly due to the size, length and weights of the shafts of the two weapons involved. For example, with the doru, the butt weighs 329g, the head 153g and the 200cm shaft about 850g. Thus for an intact weapon, on either side of the mid-point (127cm forward of the tip of the butt), the rearward half weighs 754g (329g butt + 425g of shaft) and the forward half weighs 578g (153g head + 425g of shaft) – a difference of 176g and which gives the doru a point of balance 89cm from the rear tip. When the head and 70cm of shaft are broken off the front of the doru, the remaining weapon (155cm in length) would have, from its mid-point, a rearward half weighing 721g (329g butt + 52cm of shaft weighing 392g) and a forward half weighing 329g (77.5cm of shaft), or a difference of 392g. The increase in the difference between the forward and rear ends of an intact spear (179g) to that of a broken spear (392g) means that, on a broken doru the point of balance moves even further back towards the butt. However, it is different for the sarissa. For an intact sarissa 12 cubits (576cm) long, the rearward half weighs 3,105g (1,070g butt + 2,035g of shaft) while the forward half weighs 2,209g (174g head + 2,035g of shaft) – a difference of 896g. If this weapon then loses its tip and about 1m of shaft, the rearward half would weigh 2,617g (1,070g butt + 192cm of shaft weighing 1,547g), while the forward end would weight 1,918g (238cm of shaft) – a difference of 699g. Thus, unlike for the broken doru, the difference between the rear and forward halves of a broken sarissa decreases in relation to that of an intact weapon (896g (intact) compared to 699g (broken)). This then causes the point of balance for a broken sarissa to move away from the rearward tip and towards the centre – the opposite of what happens to the hoplite spear.
25 Connolly (‘Experiments with the Sarissa – the Macedonian Pike and Cavalry Lance – a Functional View’ JRMES 11 [2000] 109-112) experienced similar problems when trying to wield a replica sarissa which had a copy of the large ‘head’ found at Vergina attached to it.
26 C. Koepfer, ‘The Sarissa’ AncWar 3.2 (2009) 37; Park, ‘The Fight for Asia’, 35
27 Matthew, Storm of Spears, 160-164
28 See: Plut. Aem. 20
29 Polyb. 18.30
1 Tarn (Alexander the Great Vol.II (Ares, Chicago, 1981) 142) states: ‘there was no such formation in Alexander’s army as ‘the phalanx’; in both Greek and English it is only a convenient expression for the sum total of the battalions of the πεζἐταιροι, the heavy infantry of the line…’
2 The Greek word for ‘discipline’ (eutaxia – ευταξία) literally translates as ‘arranged well’ and can be seen as another variant of the generic use of the term taxis to refer to organization. The term ‘phalanx’ itself is also used by some ancient writers to simply refer to a battle formation which could include a variety of troops such as mercenaries and cavalry, and even to Persian formations, rather than just specifically to the Macedonian pike-phalanx. For example see: Arr. Anab. 2.8.2, 2.8.6, 2.8.8, 2.8.10, 2.9.1, 2.9.3-5, 2.10.4-6, 2.11.2, 2.11.7.
3 For the claim that his work analyses the pike-armies of Alexander the Great see: Ael. Tact. Tact. Praef.: despite such claims, it is clear that Aelian’s work contains details relating to Macedonian armies from across the Hellenistic Period such as the varying lengths of the sarissa (chapters 12 and 14) and the use of war elephants (chapters 2 and 23) which did not become a common feature of Hellenistic warfare until the age of the Successors.
4 Ael. Tact. Tact. 1; the work of Stratocles is no longer extant. Frontinus’ work on stratagems survives, but a specific work on tactics does not. Aeneas is mentioned by Polybius (10.44) where he discusses the signals that can be made by a fire-beacon in the case of an enemy attack. This work on ‘How to Withstand a Siege’ by Aeneas is still extant. However, a specific book on tactics or generalship (Polybius calls it ‘A Commentary on the Office of General’, and Aelian calls it ‘Book on the Office of a General’) has not survived. Cyneas is mentioned by Plutarch in his biography of Pyrrhus (Pyrr. 14) and by Cicero (Ad. Fam. 9.25.1). The writings of Pyrrhus are mentioned by both Cicero (Ad. Fam. 9.25.1) and Plutarch (Pyrr. 8) and Pyrrhus was thought to have been one of the greatest generals of all time (see: Plut. Pyrr. 8). Pyrrhus had a son called Alexander (See: Plut. Pyrrh. 1, 6, 9; Just. Epit. 18.1-3; Ath. 3.73) who is the one mentioned by Aelian. A reference to a book on tactics written by Alexander is found nowhere else other than in Aelian. According to Plutarch (Phil. 4), a work on tactics by Evangeleus was one of the texts studied by the Archaean general Philopoemen. The Polybius mentioned by Aelian is the same whose history is, for the most part, still extant. A specific work of his on tactics has not survived. However, there are numerous passages scattered throughout his history which demonstrate a firm understanding of tactics and strategy. The Iphicrates referred to by Aelian was a great Athenian commander and military reformer of the fourth century BC (see: Nepos, Iphicrates, 1.1-4; Diod. Sic. 15.44.1-4; Arr. Anab. 2.15) who had compared the structure of an army to that of a human body (Plut. Pelop. 2). Posidonius was a philosopher, scientist and strategist (see: Cic Tusc. 2.25.61; Plin. (E) HN 7.30). He is credited with inventing a ‘sphere’, or orrery, a mechanical model which correctly calculated the motions of the planets in the 1st century BC (see: Cic. Nat.D. 88). His work on tactics may have been the source of the slightly later work by Asclepiodotus. Sadly few, if any of these works survive, and little is known about the other authors, or their works, that are mentioned by Aelian. The similar work of Asclepiodotus contains no such beginning overview of source material. The beginning of Arrian’s Tactics is fragmentary, but does cite works by Pyrrhus, his son Alexander, Clearchus, Pausanias, Evangeleus, Polybius, Eupolemus, Iphicrates and Poseidonius. It is interesting to note that the sources cited by Arrian are listed in the same order as in the preceding work written by Aelian which suggests that Arrian used Aelian’s work as a source. It is also suggested that Aelian was the true author of Arrian’s Tactics, a revised version of his earlier work, and that Arrian had simply released it under his own name (see: T.F. Didbin, An Introduction to the Knowledge of Rare and Valuable Editions of the Greek and Latin Classics (W. Dwyer, London, 1804) 5
5 Asclepiodotus (Tact. 2.1) says that the lochos was formally called a line (στίχoς), a synomoty (συvωμoτία), or a decury (δεκαvια). Aelian (Tact. 4-5) calls the file a lochos, but states that it is also called a dekad or an enomotia. Arrian (Tact. 6) says the lochos was called a line (στίχoς) by some and a decury (δεκαvια) by those who base their examinations on units of ten. Arrian then goes on to detail the possibility that another name for the file was an enomotia.
6 Arr. Tact. 5
7 For example see: J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1995) 68; N.G.L. Hammond, Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman (Duckworth, London, 1980) 32; Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange (II Cerchio, Rome, 2011) 59) suggest that the file was simply ten deep under Philip II and then later increased to sixteen deep under Alexander the Great.
8 Polyb. 12.19, 12.21
9 Curt. 3.9.12
10 Harpocration, Lexicon s.v. pezhetairoi (Anaximenes – Jacoby FrGrHist. 72 F4)
11 D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 359 BC to 146 BC (Wargames Research Group, Sussex, 1982) 13
12 Arr. Anab. 2.8.4
13 On the process of ‘doubling’ see: Asclep. Tact. 10.17-20; Ael. Tact. Tact. 28; Arr. Tact. 25
14 Polyb. 12.21
15 P. McDonnell-Staff, ‘Hypaspists to Peltasts: The Elite Guard Infantry of the Antigonid Macedonian Army’ Ancient Warfare 5.6 (2012) 22
16 N.G.L. Hammond, The Genius of Alexander the Great (Duckworth, London, 1997) 13-14, 66
17 English (The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2011) 196) suggests that Alexander the Great had adopted an eight deep formation for the battle of the Hydaspes in 326BC in order to allow his line to extend beyond that of his Indian opponents. While possible, none of the narrative accounts of the battle state that this was the case.
18 In his translation, Melville Jones (Testimonia Numaria Vol.II (Spink and Sons, London, 2007) 18) says that the pay of the ‘ten-stater man’ was ‘more than that of the dimoirites, but more than that of those who did not have any supplement’. This is most likely a typographical error as, later in his commentary, Melville Jones correctly follows the Greek by stating that the pay of the ‘ten-stater man’ was ‘less than that of the man on double pay’.
19 Arr. Anab. 7.23.3-4; κατέλεγεν αὑτοὺς ἐς τὰς Μακεδovικὰς τάξας, δεκαδάρχην μὲν τῆς δεκάδος ἡγεῖσθαι Μακεδόνα καὶ ἐπι τούτῳ διμoιpίτην Μακεδόνα καὶ δεκαστάτηpον, oὕτως ὀνομαζόμενον απὸ τῆς μισθοφορᾶς, ἥντινα μείονα μὲν τοῦ διμοιρίτου, πλείονα δε τῶν οὐκ ἐν στρατευομένων ἔφερεν. ἐπὶ τοὺτοις δὲ δώδεκα Πέρσας καὶ τελευτaῖον τῆς Μακεδόνα, δεκαστάτηpον καὶ τoῦτον. ὥστε ἐν τῇδεκάδι τέσσαρας μὲν εἶναι Μακεδόνας. τoὺς μὲν τρεῖς τῇ μισθοφορᾷ προὔχοντας, τὸν δὲ τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς δεκάδος, δώδεκα δὲ Πέρσας.
20 A.J. Heisserer, Alexander the Great and the Greeks: the Epigraphic Evidence (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1980) 21-22
21 In other passages Arrian also seems to have retained earlier titles and terms. At 6.27.6, for example, Arrian describes how pack animals were distributed among the infantry by units of 100 (hekatostyes) and by file (ἐκατοστύας, τοῖς κατά λόχους). Bosworth (‘The Argeads and the Phalanx’ in E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives [Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010] 94-97) convincingly argues that the use of the term hekatostyes is anachronistic, based upon an earlier decimal hierarchy of the phalanx, but applied to an army based upon files of sixteen as Alexander had at this time.
22 For Abreas see: Arr. Anab. 6.9.3
23 In his commentary on the passage, Melville Jones (Testimonia Numaria Vol.II, 18) says the base unit was seventeen men. However, the numbers involved clearly add up to sixteen.
24 Ael. Tact. Tact. 5
25 Arr. Anab. 7.22.3; Arr. Tact. 6.2; see also: Diod. Sic. 17.34.1; Asclepiodotus (Tact. 2.2) calls the halffile a hemilochion, under the command of a hemilochite (if the phalanx is arranged sixteen deep) or a dimoiria, under the commander of a dimoirites (if the phalanx is arranged twelve deep). See also: Ael. Tact. Tact. 9
26 Arr. Tact. 5.4; Asclep. Tact. 2.2; see also: Ael. Tact. Tact. 5
27 For example see: P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (Greenhill Books, London, 1998) 69; see also: S. English, The Army of Alexander the Great (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 22, 25; N. Sekunda, ‘Land Forces’ in P. Sabin, H. Van Wees, and M. Whitby, (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Vol. I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 333; Bosworth (Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 270); states that the four Macedonian officers were positioned ‘at the front and rear’ of the file. It is unclear if Bosworth means at the front and rear of each half-file (which would then correlate with the structure outlined in the manuals), or if he means that the Macedonians occupy positions 1, 2, 15, and 16 with the twelve Persians in between. In another work (‘The Argeads’, 96) Bosworth positions Macedonians in the first three positions in the file with the ouragos at the rear. One of the few who offer an alternative placement for the officers is Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange, 50-51) who has officers positioned at the front and rear of each half-file as is described in the following pages. Arrian continues his description of the new units by stating that the Persians were still armed with bows and javelins. This would seem unlikely as it does not readily create a pike-phalanx. It is more likely that the Persians were armed as phalangites. In 327BC, Alexander had 30,000 Persian youths trained as phalangites to replace parts of his phalanx (Arr. Anab. 8.6.1; Plut. Alex. 71; Diod. Sic. 17.108.1-3; Curt. 7.5.1). This would further suggest that the Persians incorporated into the phalanx in 324BC were armed as phalangites unless it is assumed that the use of mixed-arms within the new units was some form of tactical experiment.
28 See: Diod. Sic. 17.34.1; Asclep. Tact. 3.1-6; Ael. Tact. Tact. 10; Arr. Anab. 7.22.3; Arr. Tact. 6.2
29 Same principle applied to the formations of the earlier Classical hoplite and go back as far as the Archaic Age.
30 Arr. Anab. 7.22.3; Arr. Tact. 6.2; see also: Diod. Sic. 17.34.1
31 Connolly, Greece and Rome, 69
32 Asclep. Tact. 2.3
33 Ael. Tact. Tact. 5; Arr. Tact. 6-7
34 Asclep. Tact. 2.3
35 Cascernio, Tecnica della Falange, 55
36 Morgan ‘Sellasia Revisited’ AJA 85.3 (1981) 328) says that the ‘double depth deployment’ at Sellasia in 222BC referred to by Polybius (2.66) is a reference to a formation thirty-two deep. This is similar to Alexander the Great’s initial deployment at Issus in 333BC and suggests a standard file size of sixteen (see also: J. Pietrykowski, Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 172). Gabriel (Philip II of Macedonia – Greater than Alexander (Potomac, Washington, 2010) 67) suggests that the file was commonly sixteen deep under Alexander and deeper under the Successors.
37 R. Sheppard (ed.), Alexander the Great at War (Osprey, Oxford, 2008) 54, 79
38 Front. Strat. 4.1.6
39 Hammond (‘The Battle of the Granicus River’ JHS 100 (1980) 81, 83-84 (73-88)) suggests that in 334BC the standard file of Alexander’s army was sixteen deep but, because Alexander needed to ensure that his smaller force could not be outflanked at the Granicus, he deployed in half-files of eight to give his formation a wider frontage equal to that of the Persians – the same as the manner in which he deployed for the later battle of Issus.
40 Warry (Warfare, 68) says the depth of the pike-phalanx was originally eight deep and later expanded to sixteen deep. This would also correlate with what some of the manual writers have to say about the early phalanx. See also: Hammond (King, Commander and Statesman, 32) who says that the phalanx was only 8 deep.
41 For standard hoplite deployments of the Classical Age see: C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 172-179
42 Asclep. Tact. 2.1-2
43 Xen. Hell. 6.4.12
44 Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 55-58
45 Connolly, Greece and Rome, 77
46 N. Sekunda, The Seleucid Army (Stockport, Montvert, 1994) 5-6
47 Paraetacene: Diod. Sic. 19.29.1-6; Gabiene: Diod. Sic. 19.27.6
48 Raphia: Polyb. 5.63-65; Pydna: Livy 44.40-43; Plut. Aem. 18-23
49 Bennett and Roberts (The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281BC Vol.II: Battles and Tactics (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) xv) suggest, due to the detail in Diodorus’ account of the battle of Paraetacene, that Diodorus’ source (Hieronymous of Cardia) may have not only seen these formations as they were drawn up on the field of battle, but may have also been present at the pre-battle council where the nature of the deployment was first decided.
50 See: Polyb. 18.18-27; Livy, 33.3-10; Plut. Flam. 8
51 App. Syr. 32; see also: Livy 37.40
52 Cass. Dio 78.7.1-2
53 Harpocration, Lexicon s.v. pezhetairoi (Anaximenes – Jacoby FrGrHist. 72 F4)
54 T. Daniel, ‘The Taxeis of Alexander and the change to Chiliarch, the Companion Cavalry and the change to Hipparchies: A Brief Assessment’ AncW 23.2 (1992) 44
55 Arr. Anab. 1.6
56 Daniel, ‘The Taxeis of Alexander’ 44; Daniel goes on to suggest (p.45) that the regular deployment for a lochos of 120 men was in fifteen files of eight men each – a configuration for which there is no evidence.
57 Sheppard, Alexander the Great at War, 79; Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 51-52
58 English, Army of Alexander, 111; N. Sekunda, The Army of Alexander the Great (Osprey, Oxford, 1999) 25; See also: English, Field Campaigns of Alexander, 10:
59 Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 52
60 For example see: Arr. Anab. 3.9.6 where each file commander (lochagos) encourages the men in his file (lochos), or Anab. 7.24.4 where Alexander distributes wine and sacrificial victims by file (lochos) and by a larger unit of around 100 men known as a ekatostos. Like many passages in ancient literature, Arrian’s description of the units to which these distributions are made begins with the smallest and then moves to the biggest. Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange, 51-52) however, and despite citing this passage, suggests that in the time of Alexander the ekatostos was a unit of 128 men (similar to the taxis of the later manuals) while the lochos was bigger at 256 men (the same as the later syntagma). This interpretation would seem to be incorrect.
61 Unfortunately, many of the models cited are not referenced so it is difficult to determine the author’s line of argument.
62 Sheppard, Alexander the Great at War, 79
63 For example: Connolly, Greece and Rome, 69; M.G. Carey, Operational Art in Classical Warfare: The Campaigns of Alexander the Great (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1997) 14; W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great Vol.II (Ares, Chicago, 1981) 142-148; M. Thompson, Granicus 334BC: Alexander’s First Persian Victory (Osprey, Oxford, 2007) 24; Daniel, ‘The Taxeis of Alexander’, 43; W. Heckel and R. Jones, Macedonian Warrior: Alexander’s Elite Infantryman (Osprey, Oxford, 2006) 30; R.D. Milns, ‘Arrian’s Accuracy in Troop Details: A Note’ Historia 27:2 (1975) 375; Sekunda, Army of Alexander, 28; N. Sekunda, Macedonian Armies after Alexander 323-168BC (Osprey, Oxford, 2012) 21; J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (Wordsworth, Hertfordshire, 1998) 50; W. Heckel, The Conquests of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 26
64 Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange 52-53
65 Diod. Sic. 17.17.3
66 For example see the entries for note 63.
67 For example see: A.M. Devine, ‘Demythologizing the Battle of the Granicus’ Phoenix 40.3 (1986) 268; Hammond, ‘The Battle of the Granicus’, 81-83, 86; it is interesting to note that, while Diodorus is the only source to provide a breakdown of the units under Alexander’s overall command in 334BC, the sum total of the infantry forces whom he says accompanied Alexander into Asia does not agree with many of the other available accounts. Diodorus (17.17.34) states that the 12,000 Macedonians were part of the 32,000 infantry who marched into Asia with Alexander – with the breakdown being given as: 12,000 Macedonians; 7,000 allies; 5,000 mercenaries; 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians: and 1,000 archers and Agrianians. This figure to also given by Justin (Epit. 11.6.2) in his abridgement of the history of Pompeius Trogus. Arrian (Anab. 1.11.3), on the other hand, gives a lesser figure of 30,000 infantry – due to his use of Ptolemy and Aristobulos (who were not used by Diodorus) as source material who both provide the same figure. Anaximenes and Callisthenes, on the other hand, provide the differing figures of 43,000 and 40,000 respectively for the size of Alexander’s infantry which may possibly be including the 10,000 men whom Philip had sent to Asia prior to 336BC to secure a bridgehead (see: Polyaenus, Strat. 5.44.4; Diod. Sic. 16.91.2; Just. Epit. 9.5.8-9). Plutarch (Alex. 15) merely provides a range of between 30,000 and 43,000 for the size of Alexander’s infantry – no doubt using various texts with conflicting troop numbers as his source material. The varying size of Alexander’s army as given in the different texts raises a problem with the division of Alexander’s pike-phalanx into units of 1,500. The main issue is which overall figure for the size of Alexander’s infantry is the correct one and what impact would the dismissal of the other figures have on the even division of his pikemen into units of a set size. If, for example, Arrian’s total figure of 30,000 is taken as the more accurate, there is then a discrepancy of 2,000 men between this figure and that provided by Diodorus. But where should this 2,000 be subtracted from Diodorus’ breakdown of contingents in order to rectify the balance? If it is taken from the number for the pike-phalanx, then instead of being accompanied by 9,000 phalangites as some scholars assert, Alexander may have only had 7,000 with him when he entered Asia. This figure would then not divide by the six named commanders into even units of 1,500 each. Alternatively, if any of the larger totals is taken as accurate, where should the extra men be allocated to Diodorus’ numbers to make up the balance and how does this then impact the divisions of the pike-phalanx under the six named commanders? It is interesting to note that scholars who offer that Alexander’s phalanx was divided into six units of 1,500 each base their conclusions on the troop numbers given by Diodorus and the number of officers provided by Arrian even when the total troop numbers given in both sources are at odds with each other.
68 At the battle of the Granicus (334BC) Arrian (Anab. 1.14.2-3) mentions units under the command of (L-R) Craterus, Meleager, Philip, Amyntas, Coenus and Perdiccas arranged across the front of the line.
69 Tarn (Alexander the Great Vol.II, 136) suggests that Arrian not only does not always use the same word to describe something, but that his use of the word taxis is commonly used in its generic form to mean ‘formation’. Tarn offers that Arrian’s use of various words to mean the same thing was part of his literary style ‘to avoid a jingle of sound…The worst jingle was to use the same word twice running, which he avoided like most…Greek writers’.
70 Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 52-53; see also Tarn, Alexander the Great Vol.II, 136
71 Strategos: for example see Arr. Anab. 1.24.1 where both Coenus and Meleager, the commanders of a ‘taxis’ at Granicus, are referred to as straegoi. However, this should not be seen as an indication that these two men had been promoted; for taxiarch see: Arr. Anab. 3.9.6
72 For example: cavalry – Arr. Anab. 1.15.4; mounted javelineers – Arr. Anab. 3.24.2; skirmishers – Arr. Anab. 4.24.10; archers – Arr. Anab. 5.23.7; Latin writers similarly used the word ordo to mean either a ‘unit’ or a ‘formation’ – for example see Livy 8.8.4, 8.8.7-9
73 For example see: Diod. Sic. 20.53.1
74 Plut. Aem. 17
75 Arr. Anab. 1.29.4
76 Arr. Anab. 2.8.4
77 According to Polybius (12.19), Callisthenes reported that Alexander received another 5,000 reinforcements just prior to the army’s entry into Cilicia. Bosworth (Conquest and Empire, 267) suggests that these troops, who are not reported in any other source, were pikemen and these troops, combined with the 3,000 received at Gordium, increased the size of the pike-phalanx by more than half. However, this does not correlate with the fact that at the battle of Issus not long afterwards there are still only six named senior phalanx commanders. This leaves several possibilities: a) that Polybius’ reporting of Callisthenes is incorrect, b) Callisthenes himself was incorrect (possibly placing the reinforcements from Gordium, numbered differently, into a differnt context, c) that these troops, if ever received, were not pike-men but Greeks and/or mercenaries, d) that there were six senior phalanx commanders each in charge of units of around 3,000 men each – a fifty per cent increase on the size of the merarchia. This last possibility seems unlikely and we are only left to speculate who these troops were (if they existed at all).
78 Bennett and Roberts, Wars of Alexander’s Successors II, 6
79 Polyaenus, Strat. 5.44.4; see also: Diod. Sic. 16.91.2; Just. Epit. 9.5.8-9
80 Arr. Anab. 1.6.1
81 Daniel, ‘The Taxeis of Alexander’, 44
82 N.G.L. Hammond, ‘Alexander’s Campaign in Illyria’ JHS 94 (1974) 82
83 Arr. Anab. 1.5.12
84 Arrian’s use of Ptolemy as a source: Arr. Anab. 1.2.7; Arrian’s use of Aristobulos: Hammond, ‘Illyria’ 77
85 Tarn (Alexander the Great Vol.II, 137) suggests that Arrian, and possibly his source Ptolemy, regularly rounded troop numbers down rather than up. This would then correlate with a unit arranged in 128 ranks being described as ‘120 deep’.
86 Ael. Tact. Tact. 36
87 Arr. Anab. 3.11.10
88 Curt. 5.2.2-3; For a discussion of Alexander’s adoption of the office of ‘court chiliarch’, a ceremonial court position based upon the Persian hazarapatis, see: A.W. Collins, ‘The Office of Chiliarch under Alexander and the Successors’ Phoenix 55.3-4 (2001) 259-283
89 As noted earlier (see page 19), Develin (‘Anaximenes (“F Gr Hist” 72) F 4’ Historia 34.4 (1985) 496) argues that what Anaximenes is describing are these changes to the structure of the Macedonian army under Alexander the Great rather than the invention of something new under an earlier Alexander. Featherstone (Warriors and Warfare in Ancient and Medieval Times (Constable, London, 1997) 58) says that Alexander broke up the phalanx into smaller, more manoeuverable, units. Such a statement has to assume that either the pre-Alexander phalanx was a single rigid line (which goes against much of the available evidence) or that this is a reference to Curtius’ statement regarding the creation of the chiliarchiae. Strangely, the creation of the chiliarchiae is actually an increase in the size of the units (from 500 to 1,000 according to Curtius) so it is not clear what Featherstone’s conclusion is based upon.
90 Arr. Anab. 5.11.3
91 Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, 191-192
92 Arr. Anab. 5.12.2; Perdiccas seems to have retained this more senior command as later in the campaign he leads both cavalry and infantry together (see: Arr. Anab. 5.22.6). Coenus seems to have similarly held both a cavalry and infantry command at the Hydaspes and Arrian states that Antigenes is only put in charge of Coenus’ infantry unit when Coenus leads his cavalry forward (Arr. Anab. 5.16.3). Antigenes’ infantry unit was supported by a contingent of hypaspists under Seleucus (5.13.4) and archers under Tauron (5.14.1).
93 The figures for Alexander’s losses in battle, his garrisons and the numbers of reinforcements received are notoriously conflicted among the ancient texts. Many of the earlier writers do not differentiate between the phalangites and the other types of infantry in Alexander’s army when they provide figures. Furthermore, even the figures provided do not agree among the various writers. However, in many cases, the stated losses are so small that, even if these are assumed to be all phalangites the impact on the overall number of the army is not significant. If these figures are added/subtracted from the most likely figures for other events (when more than one ancient author provides conflicting figures) then an approximate number of Alexander’s phalangites following the battle of Gaugamela in 331BC can be calculated. For example, Alexander crossed into Asia with 12,000 ‘Macedonians’ – 9,000 of whom were pikemen (Diod. Sic. 17.17.3); thirty were lost at the Granicus in 334BC (Arr. Anab. 1.16.4; see also Just 11.6.12; Plut. Alex. 16 who give the figure as nine); fifty-six were lost at Halicarnassus (Arr. Anab. 1.20.10, 1.22.7); 3,000 reinforcements were received at Gordium (Arr. Anab. 1.29.4); 1,000 were lost at Issus (P. Oxy. 1798; see also: Curt. 3.11.27 (32 men); Arr. Anab. 2.10.7 (120 men); Diod. Sic. 17.36.6 (300 men); Just. 11.9.10 (130 men)); 400 were lost at Tyre (Arr. Anab. 2.24.4); 4,000 were left as a garrison in Egypt (Curt. 4.8.4); and 1,000 were lost at Gaugamela (P. Oxy. 1798). This would leave Alexander with a total of 5,514 men following the battle. A little later, Amyntas arrived with 6,000 Macedonian infantry reinforcements among others (Arr. Anab. 3.16.10; Curt. 5.1.40; Diod. Sic. 17.65.1). Arrian (3.16.11) states that these troops were distributed amongst the existing units. Another 3,000 were later received from Antipater while the army was in Artacana (Curt. 6.6.35). This gives a total of 14,514 men in the pike-phalanx by the time Alexander reaches India.
94 Curt. 5.2.5; Bosworth (Conquest and Empire, 268) suggests that the creation of these new positions was to create a sub-level of command which was occupied by men who had been dependent upon royal favour for their appointment – thus becoming totally loyal to Alexander.
95 Bosworth (‘The Argeads and the Phalanx’ in E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives (Oxford University Press, 2010) 92-93) suggests that there were actually nine recipients of the new title of chiliarch – with the last name being lost through manuscript corruption. This is based upon the possible use of the Latin word novum (nine) at the end of section 5.2.2 of Curtius which describes the contest that Alexander initiated – making it read ‘he appointed judges and offered to those who wished to enter a contest of military valour prizes of nine’. As has been conjectured, this is most likely a corruption of the word nova (new) which would make the passage read ‘he appointed judges and offered to those who wished to enter a contest of military valour prizes of a new kind’. This alternate reading would then reconcile this passage with the eight named recipients of the new titles. Bosworth also suggests that the ‘nine’ named recipients of the title of chiliarch were only those who were awarded this position by the acclamation of the troops and that Alexander himself may have appointed another nine (making a total of eighteen new chiliarchs). Bosworth suggests that these new officers were then distributed amongst the new chiliarchiae of the pike-phalanx, which he claims may have numbered 18,000 at this time. However, Bosworth has failed to consider that in a phalanx of such size, every second chiliarchia would actually be commanded by a merarch and so there is no need to assume that there are further recipients of this title other than those whom Curtius details.
96 Nicanor commanding the hypaspists at Granicus: Arr. Anab. 1.14.2; at Issus: Arr. Anab. 2.8.3; Curt. 3.9.7; at Gaugamela: Arr. Anab. 3.11.9; Curt. 4.13.27
97 Diod. Sic. 17.110.1
98 Arr. Anab. 17.11.3; Arrian also mentions a Persian agema. The agema was normally the bodyguard of Alexander. Both Diodorus (18.27.1) and Justin (Epit. 12.12.4) refer to both Persian and Macedonian contingents of bodyguards in 322BC. Bosworth (A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander Vol II (Clarendon Books, Oxford, (1998) 9), on the other hand, argues that the Guards were always only Macedonians.
99 W. Heckel, Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great (West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) sv. Atarrihias, Antigenes, Philotas [3], Amyntas [6], Antigonus [3], Amyntas [7], Theodotus, Hellanicus
100 Heckel suggests that Atarrihias, Antigenes, Philotas the Augaean and Hellanicus were made chiliarchs, Antigonus and Theodotus were made pentacosiarchs, and Amyntas and Amyntas Lyncestes were made either chiliarchs or pentacosiarchs. If it is assumed that both Amyntas and Amyntas Lyncestes were pentacosiarchs, this would then make four chiliarchs and four pentacosiarchs. While this number of officers would allocate across an even phalangarchia of 4,000, the hypaspists did not reach this number until 324BC. Furthermore, such an allocation would ignore the fact that at least one of the units would be under command of a phalangarch who was the overall leader of the hypaspists contingent. Heckel’s theory can only be seen as a manipulation of the available evidence to conform with a preconceived idea that all of the men were assigned to the hypaspists.
101 Arr. Anab. 5.16.3; Curt. 8.14.16
102 Antigenes was later discharged from service at Opis in 324BC (see Just. Epit. 12.12.8). In a note to their translation of Curtius (Penguin p.282), Yardley and Heckel suggest that Antigenes was a member of the hypaspists. This seems unlikely as it goes against his command of pike-infantry at the Hydaspes (see following). Berve (Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage Vol.II (Beck, München, 1926) 41-42) suggests that Antigenes was given command of a phalanx unit and this more closely fits with the available evidence.
103 Arr. Anab. 3.29.1; an otherwise unidentified Philotas is also mentioned as an infantry commander earlier in Arrian’s text during the siege of Halicarnassus (1.21.5) but the ambiguity of the text makes it difficult to determine exactly who is being referred to. Brunt, in a note to his translation of the passage, suggests that this is the son of Parmenion rather than Philotas the Augaean.
104 Arr. Anab. 1.21.5
105 Curt. 5.2.5, 8.1.36
106 Arr. Anab. 1.22.7; Arrian rarely uses the terms chiliarch and chiliarchie in his text and, when he does, it is usually in relation to either hypaspists or light troops (for example see: 3.29.7, 4.24.10, 4.30.5-6, 5.23.7, 7.14.10, 7.25.6). However, Adaeus is listed (1.22.4) as commanding a taxis (i.e. unit) which was ‘supported by light troops’. This suggests that Adaeus was a chiliarch of 1,000 regularly infantry.
107 Arr. Anab. 1.22.4; in this passage Arrian uses the term taxis in its generic form to mean ‘unit’.
108 Arr. Anab. 1.22.7
109 Tarn, Alexander the Great Vol. II, 148
110 Berve, Das Alexanderreich, 12
111 R.D. Milns, ‘The Hypaspists of Alexander III – Some Problems’ Historia 20.2-3 (1971) 189-190
112 Bosworth (‘The Argeads’, 93-94) also dismisses the idea that Adaeus was commanding mercenaries and suggests that Arrian was being ‘inadvertently misleading’ in his passage. Bosworth (as per Berve) also suggests that Adaeus was in command of two pentacosiarchiae and that Arrian had loosely called him a chiliarch.
113 Arr. Anab. 4.30.5, 5.23.7
114 Heckel (Who’s Who, sv. Adaeus) suggests that Adeaus is ‘apparently’ a commander of the hypaspists and that the term chiliarch is anachronistic.
115 Units of 1,000 continued to be used across the Hellenistic period and beyond. A fragment of Poseidonius’ book 34, preserved by Athenaeus (4.153b) refers to the Seleucid general Herakleon ordering his troops to eat in their units of 1,000. Similarly, the Bible (1Macc. 6.35) records the Seleucid army at the battle of Beth-Zacharia in 162BC as being arranged into thirty-two units of 1,000 men each.
116 Ptolemy’s rank: Arr. Anab. 2.8.4; Ptolemy’s death: Arr. Anab. 2.10.7
117 Arr. Anab. 2.10.4-5
118 Arr. Anab. 3.9.4
119 Sekunda (Seleucid Army, 8) suggests that the standard-bearer and other supernumeraries, equivalent to modem day non-commissioned officers, were attached to the syntagma, rather than the taxis, as this would have otherwise created an ineffective ratio of staff to combatants. Sekunda also suggests that the attachment of the supernumeraries to the units of the phalanx was a later development in the structure of the pike-phalanx. However, the evidence shows that at least some of these additional men was also part of the army of Alexander the Great (see following).
120 For example see: Polyb. 6.24
121 Asclep. Tact. 2.8-10; Ael. Tact. Tact. 9; Arr. Tact. 10; the Suda (sv. Σύνταγμα) states ‘some people [call this unit] a parataxis. Two taxeis, 256 men, [constitute it]; and the commander [is called a] syntagmatarch. But some people also call this a xenagia and the commander a xenagosThis last definition also agrees with the military manuals. Under the entry for the xenagia (sv. Ξεvαγία) the Suda states: ‘this is a unit of 1,024 men and usually called a chilarchie’.
122 Curt. 3.10.3; Curtius (4.6.19) also says that there were standards in use during Alexander’s siege of Gaza.
123 Curt. 5.2.2-3
124 Asclep. Tact. 2.8-10; Ael. Tact. Tact. 9; Arr. Tact. 10
125 Ael. Tact. Tact. 9, 16; see also: Asclep. Tact. 2.8-10; Arr. Tact. 10
126 Suda sv. Ἔκτακτοι: Ἔκτακτοι ἢ Ἔκτατοι: τούτους τὸ μὲν παλαιòν ἡ τάξις εἶχεν, ὡς καὶ τοὔνομa δηλοῖ, διότι τῆς τάξεως ἐξάριθμοι ἦσαν. εἰσὶ δὲ ε’: στρατοκῆρυξ, σαλπιγκτής, σημειοφόρος, ὑπηρέτης, ουραγός. νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῦ συντάγματος λέγονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔχειν δὲ δεῖ τοῦτους τὴν τάξιν ἢ καὶ τὸ σύνταγμα, τὸν μὲν ὅπως τῇ φωνῇ σημαίνῃ τὸ προσταττόμενον, τὸν δὲ ὅπως τῷ σημείῳ, εἰ μὴ ἡ φωνὴ κατακούοιτο διὰ θόρυβον, τὸν δὲ σαλπιγκτήν, ὁπότε μηδὲ σημεῖον βλέποιεν διὰ κονιορτόν, καὶ τὸν ὑπηρέτην, ὥστε τι τῶν εἰς τὴν χρείαν παρακομίσαι: τὸν γε μὴν ἔκτατον οὐραγὸν πρὸς τὸ ἐπανάγειν τὸν λειπόμενον ἐπὶ τὴν τάξιν: ὅς τῶν τεσσάρων ἄνω τυπoυμένων κατὰ μέτωπον κάτω τάσσεται.
127 Connolly, Greece and Rome, 76; G. Wrightson, ‘The Nature of Command of the Macedonian Sarissa Phalanx’ AHB 24.3-4 (2010) 73-94. Wrightson also suggests that the unit commander was stationed behind the unit. However, if supernumeraries such as the standard-bearer and trumpeter were part of the commander’s means of controlling the unit and issuing orders, and these supernumeraries were positioned at the front of the formation as the ancient sources suggest, then the unit commander hand to be positioned at the front of the line as well – just as is outlined in the narrative histories and military manuals.
128 C. Nylander, ‘The Standard of the Great King: A Problem with the Alexander Mosaic’ OpRom 14.2 (1983) 19-37; interestingly, while Nylander uses many visual and literary descriptions of Persian standards to support his claim, he does not engage with similar literary and visual evidence for the use of banners by the Macedonians.
129 Nylander (‘Standard of the Great King’, 29-32) suggests that the colours and details of the standard bearer are not clear enough to positively identify him as either a Macedonian or a Persian. However, a close inspection of the mosaic shows the bearer to be wearing the more rounded headwear, which is grey in colour, of the other Macedonian troops depicted elsewhere in the image. Some have suggested that the banner is actually held by the figure to the right (as one views the image) of the somewhat ambiguous Macedonian. This more right-hand figure is clearly identifiable as a Persian due to the higher level of detail of his depiction. However, the placement of the hand that is actually holding the staff of the banner would suggest otherwise unless an extreme level of bodily contortion is assumed. Some of the early line drawings of the Mosaic from when it was first excavated (reproduced in Nylander’s article) even omit the ambiguous Macedonian standard bearer entirely – clearly showing that the illustrator believed the standard was held by the more right-hand Persian.
130 J. Serrati, ‘The Hellenistic World at War – Stagnation or Development?’ in B. Campbell and L.A. Tritle (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World (Oxford University Press, 2013) 183
131 Connolly, Greece and Rome, 77; see also, for example, Polyb. 11.23
132 M. Feyel, ‘Un nouveau fragment du règlement militaire trouvé à Amphipolis’ Revue archéologique (1935) 47
133 Sekunda (‘Land Forces’, 336) likens the speira to the early lochos which he incorrectly claims is a unit of 512 men.
134 Plut. Phil. 9
135 SEG 40.524; the inscription also refers to strategoi and tetrarachs. The configuration of the passage ([στpατηγοὶ] καὶ οἱ σπειράρχαι καὶ τετράρχαι) seems to list these officers in descending order according to the size of respective units. Thus the strategos, in command of a phalangarchia/strategia of 4,096 men according to the manuals, appears first while the tetrarch, commanding sixty four men, appears last. This would suggest that the speira was larger than the tetrarchia and smaller than the phalangarchia. This would correlate with the speira being synonymous with the syntagma.
136 Sekunda (Seleucid Army, 7), who examines the use of the word semaia (rather than speira) by Polybius questions why Asclepiodotus, whom he says was writing about the Seleucid Army of the second century BC in his manual, would use the term syntagma rather than semaia. He concludes, based upon Polybius’ account of Antiochus the Great’s Bactrian campaign (10.49.7), in which the cavalry are arranged in semaiai, that the term syntagama was adopted as a Seleucid term to distinguish infantry formations from those of cavalry.
137 Connolly, Greece and Rome, 69
138 App. Syr. 32
139 Sekunda, Seleucid Army, 10
140 Connolly, Greece and Rome, 75-77
141 Sekunda (Seleucid Army, 7) suggests that the two file dilochia and the four file tetrarchia were simply additions made by Asclepiodotus (and possibly by his potential source Poseidonius) ‘to provide a complete binary organizational structure to their ‘perfect’ army’. Sekunda also suggests that the tetrarchia, if it did exist, was not a unit of ‘four files’, but was a quarter of a syntagma. This again is an exercise in semantics as a quarter of a syntagma (sixteen files)isa unit of four files.
142 Arr. Anab. 3.18.5; see also: Curt. 5.2.5 for a Latin variant of the term.
143 Diodorus (17.34.1) states that the officers of each unit in Alexander’s army were positioned at the head of their men.
144 Ael. Tact. Tact. 10; See also: Asclep. Tact. 3.1-6
145 The US Army employs a similar, albeit varied, method for the distribution of command among its armoured platoons. Within an armoured platoon, consisting of four tanks, the platoon commander is located in tank #1, the second in command, the platoon sergeant, is in tank #4, and tanks #2 and #3 are commanded by lower ranks – referred to as ‘wingmen’ (see: US Army, FM7-5 Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad [US Dept. Of the Army, Washington, 1992] 2.44 Combined Operations with Armored Vehicles). This means that, when the tank platoon is deployed in an extended line in numerical order, the distribution of the officers would be the platoon commander, one wingman, the other wingman, the platoon sergeant. Thus both wings of a modern American tank platoon would be held by the most senior officers of the unit – the same as the Macedonian pike-phalanx of more than two millennia earlier.
146 Ael. Tact. Tact. 10
147 Ael. Tact. Tact. 10
148 C.B. Wells, ‘New Texts from the Chancery of Philip V of Macedonia and the problem of the Diagramma’, AJA 42 (1938) 249
149 This is one of the weaknesses of many modern reconstructions of units such as the syntagma and its associated officers, as many illustrations accompanying modem examinations only focus on one unit (usually that on the very right hand side of a larger formation) and do not account for the symmetrical distribution of officers outlined in the manuals. For example see: Connolly, Greece and Rome, 76; Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 57; this also means that the exact identity of the phalangite depicted on the Pergamon Plaque can not accurately be ascertained. Due to the presence of the standard in the image, it can be assumed that the unit being depicted is a syntagma at the very least. Yet the combined pentacosarchia would also have a standard at its right hand side (depending upon where it was in a larger formation) and the officer standing next to the banner in that instance would be a pentacosiarch rather than a syntagmatarch. The only thing that can be said with any level of certainty about the plumed officer in the Pergamon Plaque is that the lowest rank that he can be is that of syntagmatarch.
150 Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange, 53), in a series of confusing calculations, concludes that within a 1,500 man ‘taxis’ in Alexander’s army there were the following officers: 1 x taxiarch, 3 x pentacosiarch, 6 x lochargoi, 12 x hemilochites, 24 x tetrarchs, 96 x dekadarkes, and 1,152 x lochites – a total of 1,294 front rank officers (plus 96 dimoirites and 192 dekastateroi). There are a number of issues with such conclusions. For example, even if the ‘taxis’ was three combined pentacosiarchiae as Cascarino assumes, in their standard deployment of thirty-two files of sixteen men per pentacosiarchia, there should only be a maximum of ninety-six officers across the front of the whole formation (the same number as there is for the half-file leading dimorites) not 1,294. A number of factors have contributed to this miscalculation of numbers and misnaming of the ranks of the associated officers. Firstly, it assumes that the lochos was a unit of 256 men rather than a file of the phalanx. Secondly, it is based upon the assumption that a 1,500-man ‘taxis’ was a standard unit of Alexander’s army. Finally, it fails to take into account the symmetrical nature of the positioning of the officers and how the command of a particular unit was taken by a more superior officer when that unit was combined into a larger one. This accounts for why there are far too many officers given in Cascarino’s conclusion than there would need to be even if Alexander’s army was based upon a 1,500 man ‘taxis’. For similar miscalculations of the number of officers in the phalanx see: English, Army of Alexander, 111; Milns, ‘Hypaspists’ 195
151 In my earlier translation of Aelian’s Tactics (C.A. Matthew, The Tactics of Aelian (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 146-147), I suggested that there were another four merarchs which Aelian had failed to provide details or positions for. However, in this model I failed to consider that the positions where I placed the four lowest grade merarchs would actually be occupied by officers holding the ranks of chiliarch – and so this model cannot be considered correct. It is only the method of positioning the officers outlined above which correlates with the descriptions of the placement of officers in the ancient texts and conforms, mathematically, with the correct number of men positioned at the head of the files of the phalanx.
152 Sekunda (Seleucid Army, 10) suggests that the division of the phalanx into left and right wings is ‘late Hellenistic reality’. While Alexander’s pike infantry cannot easily be divided into two wings with symmetrical command qualities, Alexander’s army as a whole was divided into wings – with Alexander commanding the right and Parmenion the left (see following). In regards to the pike-phalanx alone, the even division into wings must post-date the campaign of Alexander, but whether it is actually a ‘late Hellenistic’ development as Sekunda suggests, of whether it occurred under the Successors, is far from certain.
153 Arr. Anab. 1.14.2-3; Arrian actually lists the commanders in a somewhat confusing order stating: ‘beside [the hypaspists] was the unit of Perdiccas…then that of Coenus, then that of Craterus, then that of Amyntas…then the troops under Philip…on the right were the units of Craterus, of Meleager and of Philip up to the centre of the whole line’. It seems that Arrian lists the units from right to left, beginning with that of Perdiccas, up to the unit of Philip in the centre. He then lists them from left to right, beginning with the unit of Craterus, also up to Philip’s in the centre which accounts for why Philip is listed twice – although some have argued that there were, in fact seven units, with two of them commanded by different officers with the name of Philip, but this seems unlikely due to the organizational aspects of the pike-phalanx. It is also argued that the first reference to the unit of Craterus, which places it on the right wing, is either an error or interpolation (scribal or otherwise) or indicative that Arrian had based his account of two different sources – most likely those of Ptolemy and Aristobulos (see: D. Campbell, ‘Alexander’s Great Cavalry Battle: What Really Happened at the River Granicus?’ AncWar 7.2 (2013) 51)
154 Arr. Anab. 2.8.4; There have been various interpretations of Alexander’s deployment at Issus. Most scholars agree that the right of the line had Coenus’ unit next to the hypaspists and then the unit of Perdiccas next to that. The arrangement of the left wing, on the other hand, is a lot more problematic. Fuller (Generalship of Alexander, 157-159), for example, says that (from right to left) Alexander’s line was the pike-units of Coenus, Perdiccas, Craterus, Meleager, Ptolemaeus and Amyntas. Warry (Alexander 334-323BC (Osprey, Oxford, 1991) 31) states ‘the infantry line (right to left was:…phalanx units under Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas respectively; left-wing infantry was commanded by Craterus’. Due to the passage, it is uncertain whether Warry suggests that Craterus commanded a unit on the far left, as well as overall command of the left-wing infantry, or whether he was just in command of the left-wing infantry (which would then assume that one of the pike-units was either under the command of someone else (unnamed) or was missing). English (Field Campaigns, 87, 104) lists Alexander’s deployment as (right to left) Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Ptolemy, Amyntas, Craterus. All of these interpretations seem incorrect. Arrian begins his description of Alexander’s deployment by stating that ‘from the right’ (ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ) were the units of Coenus and the Perdiccas. Arrian then states that ‘on the left [of these units]’ (ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ εὑωνύμου) came the units of Amyntas, Ptolemaeus, Meleager and Craterus. Thus the entire line, from right to left according to Arrian, was Coenus, Perdiccas, Amyntas, Ptolemaeus, Meleager and Craterus. Warry and English seem to have misinterpreted Arrian’s description of the left hand units to mean ‘from the left’ rather than ‘on the left’ and so their order for the four units on the left of the line is reversed. Fuller not only also seems to have reversed the order of the right hand units, but also places Craterus on the right side of the left wing rather than at the very left-hand end of the line. This confusion may partially be due to how Curtius’ account of the battle (4.13.28) similarly orders the units (from right to left) as Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Ptolemy, Amyntas and Craterus. This is most likely a transcription error, possibly from using a similar source as Arrian but misinterpreting the Greek. What suggests that the order outlined above is correct is that it then makes Alexander’s deployment at Issus almost the same as his previous deployment at Granicus, and almost exactly the same for the subsequent battle at Gaugamela (see following).
155 Arr. Anab. 1.28.3; this also occurred at the battle of the Hydaspes in 326BC; see: Arr. Anab. 5.13.4.
156 English, Army of Alexander, 111-112. English cites two passages of Arrian (Anab. 1.28.4 and 4.13.4) as support for this claim. However, as will be shown, 1.28.4 only indicates that the position of the commanders on the right of the line swapped at different engagements, and 4.13.4 refers to those in command of the night watch rather than a deployment for battle.
157 Arr. Anab. 3.11.10
158 Diod. Sic. 17.53.7; Curt. 4.13.28
159 Arr. Anab. 3.11.10; Craterus also held this position of authority at Issus in 333BC see: Arr. Anab. 2.8.4
160 For a discussion of some of the changes of command that took place in the pike-phalanx across Alexander’s campaign see: Tarn, Alexander the Great Vol.II, 142-148
161 Arr. Anab. 2.8.4
162 See: Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 60
163 Curt. 3.9.12
164 A. R. Burn, ‘The Generalship of Alexander’ Greece and Rome Second Series 12.2 (1965) 145; see also: Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, 157
165 Arr. Anab. 2.8.3
166 Polyb. 12.19
167 Arr. Anab. 1.6.6
168 Livy, 33.8
169 Cascarino, Tecnica della Falange, 149
170 Curt. 3.8.22
171 Curt. 3.8.24
172 Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, 157
173 Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, 157
174 Asclep. Tact. 10.13-16; Ael. Tact. Tact. 26-27; Arr. Tact. 22-24
175 Aelian (Tact. 27) states that this manoeuvre has the effect of appearing as if the formation is fleeing from an enemy that has appeared behind it only to then suddenly about face to engage.
176 Aelian (Tact. 27) states that this manoeuvre has the effect of appearing as if the formation is advancing towards an enemy that has appeared behind it.
177 Turning to face the right, or ‘to the [side of the] pike/spear’ (ἐπὶ δόρυ κλῖνον), and turning to the left, or ‘to the [side of the] shield’ (ἐπ’ ἀσπίδα κλῖνον) are common drill movements outlined in the military manuals. For example see: Asclep. Tact. 12.11; Ael. Tact. Tact. 53; Arr. Tact. 32
178 Polyb. 11.12
179 See: Asclep. Tact. 10.2-12, 12.1-8; Ael. Tact. Tact. 24, 31; Arr. Tact. 21
180 See: Asclep. Tact. 11.2-7; Ael. Tact. Tact. 35-36; Arr. Tact. 28
1 F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1957) 26
2 J. Pietrykowski, Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 198, 235
3 E.M. Anson, ‘The Introduction of the Sarisa in Macedonian Warfare’ AncSoc 40 (2010) 64-65
4 A.R. Burn, ‘The Generalship of Alexander’ Greece & Rome Second Series 12.2 (1965) 145
5 D. Featherstone, Warriors and Warfare in Ancient and Medieval Times (Constable, London, 1988) 58-59
6 J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1980) 73
7 A.B. Bosworth, ‘The Argeads and the Phalanx’ in E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives (Oxford University Press, 2010) 9
8 R. Gabriel, Philip II of Macedonia – Greater than Alexander (Potomac, Washington, 2010) 67-68
9 W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments (Cambridge University Press, 1930) 28
10 J. Pietrykowski, ‘In the School of Alexander – Armies and Tactics in the Age of the Successors’ AncWar 3.2 (2009) 24; Pietrykowski, Great Battles, 169
11 Diod. Sic. 16.86.1
12 Diod. Sic. 17.11.1, 17.12.1-2
13 For a discussion of the idea that some of Alexander’s units fought in ‘relays’ see: R.K. Sinclair, ‘Diodorus Siculus and Fighting in Relays’ CQ 16.2 (1966) 249-255
14 At Miletus: Diod. Sic. 17.22.1; at Halicarnassus: Diod. Sic. 17.24.4, 17.26.4; in Uxianē: Diod. Sic. 17.67.5; at Aornus: Diod. Sic. 17.85.6
15 Arr. Anab. 3.13.1; Diod. Sic. 17.57.6
16 Curt. 4.15.1
17 Arr. Anab. 3.14.2
18 Arr. Anab. 3.14.4
19 Dion. Hal. 20.1; Polyb. 18.28
20 Polyb. 2.66
21 Livy, 37.37; App. Syr. 32
22 Polyb. 11.12
23 Polyb. 11.11
24 Polyb. 11.15
25 Diod. Sic. 31.16.2
26 Crescent formations: Ael. Tact. Tact. 43, 46; open-ended square: Ael. Tact. Tact. 45; wedge formations: Ael. Tact. Tact. 47; hollow square formations: Ael. Tact. Tact. 48
27 Illyria: Arr. Anab. 1.6.3; Gabiene: Diod. Sic. 19.43.5; Magnesia: App. Syr. 35
28 Arr. Anab. 2.11.1
29 R.E. Dickinson, ‘Length Isn’t Everything – Use of the Macedonian Sarissa in the Time of Alexander the Great’ JBT 3.3 (2000) 58
30 Anson, ‘Introduction of the Sarisa’, 65
31 A.M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999) 121
32 M.M. Markle, ‘Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon’ AJA 82.4 (1978) 488
33 S. English, The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2011) 29; interestingly, Arrian (1.4.2) states that Alexander’s men advanced beyond this tilled land to form up for battle. As such, the fighting which ensued did not take place on the flattened grain field which throws English’s conclusion into question. It is more likely that the grain was flattened merely to facilitate the advance of the army into position.
34 G.T. Griffith, ‘Philip as a General and the Macedonian Army’ in M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (eds.), Philip of Macedon (Ekdotike Athenon, Athens, 1980) 59
35 Polyb. 18.31 – καὶ μὴν ὅτι χρείαν ἔχει τόπωv ἐπιπέδων καὶ ψιλῶν ἡ φάλαγξ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἐχόντων, λέγω δ’ oἷον τάφρους, ἐκρήγματα, συναγκείας, ὀφρῦς, ρεῖθρα ποταμῶν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι.
36 Livy. 44.37.11 – quam imtilern vel mediocris iniquitas loci efficeret
37 Plut. Aem. 16 - ὁ δὲ τόπος καὶ πεδίον ἦν τῇ φάλαγγι βάσεως ἐπιπέδου
38 See: J.D. Morgan, ‘Sellasia Revisited’ AJA 85.3 (1981) 330
39 N.G.L. Hammond, Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman (Duckworth, London, 1980) 33
40 Plut. Phoc. 13
41 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.2; for other accounts of the battle see: Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.7; Diod. Sic. 16.86.1-6; Plut. Pel. 18; Plut. Alex. 9
42 Markle (‘Use of the Sarissa’, 488-489) questions Polyaenus’ description of the battle by suggesting that the length of the sarissa would make it impossible for the members of the phalanx to about face as described. However, Markle does not seem to have considered the use of the countermarch manoeuvre as a means of reversing the phalanx’s facing – which would have been conducted with the pikes raised vertically. If, as the Athenians advanced, Philip had his troops conduct a countermarch using the ‘Macedonian Method’ (see page 318) not only would this have his troops face to the rear and so be able to march up the slope of the high ground but, according to Aelian (Tact. 27) the advantage of use of the Macedonian method of countermarching (as opposed to either the Lacedaemonian or Cretan/Choral/Persian methods) is that the Macedonian countermarch has the appearance of withdrawing from the enemy – the exact thing that Philip would have wanted in order to draw the Athenian left wing forward. Once on the heights, Philip’s troops could have then simply conducted another countermarch, employing any method, to face the Athenians, lower their pikes and advance back down the slope to engage.
43 N.G.L. Hammond, ‘Training in the Use of a Sarissa and its Effects in Battle 359-333 B.C.’ Antichthon 14 (1980) 62
44 Polyb. 2.65
45 Polyb. 2.65
46 Polyb. 2.66
47 For a description of the topography see: P McDonnell-Staff, ‘Sparta’s Last Hurrah – The Battle of Sellasia (222BC)’ AncWar 2.2 (2008) 27
48 See: Pietrykowski, Great Battles, 173
49 Polyb. 2.66
50 Polyb. 2.68
51 Polyb. 2.68
52 Polyb. 2.69
53 Polyb. 2.69
54 Polybius (2.69) says ‘for a considerable distance’ while Plutarch (Cleo. 28) says for a distance of five stades or just under one kilometre.
55 Plut. Cleo. 28; Polybius (2.69), on the other hand, says that Antigonus’ beleaguered left wings reformed and counter-attacked the Spartans to gain victory.
56 Plut. Phil. 6
57 Plut. Flam. 8
58 Polyb. 18.22
59 Pietrykowski, Great Battles, 198
60 Morgan, ‘Sellasia Revisited’, 330
61 For Philip’s view of the ground see: Polyb. 18.22; Livy, 33.8.2
62 Polyb. 18.24; Livy, 33.8.7
63 Livy, 33.8.13-14; see also: Polyb. 18.24
64 Polyb. 18.24; Plut, Flam, 8
65 Livy, 33.9.7-9; see also: Polyb. 18.26; Plutarch (Flam. 8) says that the phalanx was attacked in the flank.
66 Livy, 33.10.3; see also: Polyb. 18.26
67 Plut. Flam. 8; see also: Polyb. 18.25
68 Polyb. 18.25; Plut. Flam. 8
69 For the whole account of the battle see: Arr. Anab. 1.31.1-1.16.7; for the description of the banks see: Arr. Anab. 1.13.4-5; for examinations of the site as it is today, coupled with re-examinations of the battle, see: E. Badian, ‘The Battle of the Granicus: A New Look’ Ancient Macedonia II (1977) 271-293; N.G.L. Hammond, ‘The Battle of the Granicus River’ JHS 100 (1980) 73-88; A.M. Devine, ‘Demythologizing the Battle of the Granicus’ Phoenix 40.3 (1986) 265-278; D. Campbell, ‘Alexander’s Great Cavalry Battle: What Really Happened at the River Granicus?’ AncWar 7.2 (2013) 48-53
70 Arr. Anab. 1.14.7; Plut. Alex. 16; Badian (‘Battle of the Granicus’, 279-280) suggests that the topographical features described in such passages should be ignored and offers that they are literary exaggerations to highlight the boldness of Alexander’s actions.
71 Diod. Sic. 17.19.2; in an irreconcilable passage, Diodorus then states (17.19.3) that the Macedonians crossed the river and formed up in good order before the Persians had a chance to stop them. Diodorus’ account of the battle, which conflicts with the other ancient accounts, had caused considerable controversy over the years among those attempting to understand the engagement. Bosworth (A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander Vol I (Clarendon Books, Oxford, 1998) 114-116: Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 40-41), for example, doubts Arrian’s account and favours that of Diodorus in which the Macedonians cross the river, the Persian position is further back, and the battle is fought on the plain to the east of the watercourse. Campbell (‘Alexander’s Great Cavalry Battle’ 50), on the other hand, finds nothing illogical in Arrian’s account that the Persians had drawn up their cavalry along the river’s edge and posted their Greek mercenary infantry to the rear. Hammond (The Genius of Alexander the Great (Duckworth, London, 1997) 69) calls Diodorus’ account of the battle ‘worthless’ and Heckel (The Conquests of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 48) calls it ‘implausible’. Campbell supports Bosworth’s position by stating that the strength of the Persian cavalry was in their role as missile troops and that their deployment on the bank of the river was to ‘ensure that the slow moving Macedonian infantry were deluged in a storm of javelins, as they cross the riverbed’. Such operational tactics would make sense. By acting as skirmishers, the Persian cavalry could disrupt part of the Macedonian phalanx with its missiles as the formation crossed and then, once the phalanx had reached the far back, wheel backwards into the open ground behind them to allow the Greek mercenaries to advance and engage (which for some reason does not happen). As such, the role of the Persian cavalry would have been little different from infantry skirmishers except that they would have been more mobile. For other discussions on the possible course of the battles see: n.69
72 Plut. Alex. 16
73 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.3.16
74 Arrian (Anab. 1.16.5) = 30; Plutarch (Alex. 16) and Justin (Epit. 11.6.12) = 9;
75 Arr. Anab. 2.10.1, 2.10.5; Curtius’ account (3.8.24-3.11.20) contains few details of the terrain or the actions of the infantry, while Diodorus’ brief account (17.33.1-17.34.9) only mentions that the Macedonian phalanx and the Persian infantry were engaged for a short time.
76 Arr. Anab. 2.10.4-5; it was during this fragmentation of the line that Ptolemaeus and his taxis of 120 men were killed (Arr. Anab. 10.2.7)
77 Arr. Anab. 2.11.1
78 Markle, ‘Use of the Sarissa’, 494
79 Markle (‘Use of the Sarissa’, 494) suggests that Alexander’s infantry did not use the sarissa until their more open field engagement at Gaugamela in 331BC. See also: S. English, The Army of Alexander the Great (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 19-22.
80 Polyb. 12.22
81 Polyb. 12.20; Markle (‘Use of the Sarissa’ 494) uses these passages as the basis for an argument that the Macedonians did not use the sarissa until the battle of Gaugamela in 331 (see also: English, The Army of Alexander, 22). However, while commentaries on the description of the terrain and how it may, or may not, have impeded the phalanx, they nowhere state that Alexander’s army was not using the sarissa because of the terrain and seems to ignore all of the other evidence for pike-phalanxes fighting on difficult ground both before and after the engagement at Issus. Interestingly, in his critique, Polybius (citing Callisthenes) himself says that Alexander’s Phalanx was ‘sarissa-armed’ (12.20) which would go against what Markle suggests based upon another comment made by the same writer.
82 Plut. Alex. 20
83 Polyb. 11.15-16
84 Plut. Eum. 14
85 Plut. Pyrr. 27
86 Plut. Pyrr. 28
87 Plut. Pyrr. 27
88 Plut. Aem. 16
89 Plut. Aem. 16
90 See: N.G.L. Hammond, ‘The Battle of Pydna’ JHS 104 (1984) 31-47
91 Plut. Aem. 17
92 Plut. Aem. 17
93 Plut. Aem. 18
94 Plut. Aem. 20
95 Plut. Aem. 20
96 Plut. Aem 21
97 Strangely Pietrykowski, despite calling the ridge at Cynoscephalae a ‘liability’ to the functionality of the phalanx, says that the plain of Pydna, crossed by two rivers, ‘was almost perfect for the smooth operation of the…phalanx’ (Great Battles, 225).
98 Livy, 44.41
99 For example see: Polyb. 18.29; Plut. Aem. 20; Plut. Flam. 8; Excerpta Polyaeni, 18.4
100 Polyb. 18.32
101 Plut. Aem. 20
102 Plut. Aem. 20
103 Arr. Anab. 3.9.5
104 G. Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange (II Cerchio, Rome, 2011) 65) says that the benefit of the phalanx was that it was easy to control so long as the line was maintained. However, it was the very lack of control at the small unit level which meant that phalangites had trouble maintaining the line.
105 Arr. Anab. 3.14.4
106 M.M. Markle, ‘The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear and Related Armour’ AJA 81.3 (1977) 331
107 Plut. Aem. 20; Polybius (18.26) and Livy (33.9) also state that it was almost impossible for a phalangite to fight man-to-man.
108 Plut. Pyrr. 21
109 Plut. Pyrr. 21; for another account of the battle see: Dion. Hal. 20.1-3. Similarly, Polybius (4.64.3-11) describes how, in 219BC, three units of Macedonian peltasts (by which he means pikemen) were able to cross the river Achelous against Achaean cavalry holding the far bank. The phalangites were able to maintain such good order of their lines that the opposing cavalry simply abandoned the position and withdrew. What is strange is that Polybius recounts such events which clearly show that units of phalangites could effectively fight across water-courses, yet later in his work suggests that the phalanx could only operate on unbroken terrain.
110 Polyb. 18.28
111 Polyb. 18.31
112 Livy, 36.14; Appian (Syr. 17) says the name of the Roman commander was Acilius Manius Glabrio.
113 Livy, 36.18
114 App. Syr. 19
115 Livy, 36.18
116 Livy, 36.18
117 Livy, 36.19; App. Syr. 20
118 Front. Strat. 2.2.1
119 N.G.L. Hammond, ‘What May Philip Have Learnt as a Hostage in Thebes?’ GRBS 38.4 (1997) 368
120 This also assumes that, in urban areas, a unit in the streets was not attacked through windows or doorways as it passed either. The vulnerability of troops in built-up areas was a lesson harshly learnt by Pyrrhus of Epirus who was struck on the base of the neck by a roof-tile, hurled by an angry female defender, when he invaded Argos in 272BC (see: Plut. Pyrr. 34). Diodorus also notes (19.35.2) that when the Aetolians occupied the Thermopylae pass against Cassander in 317BC, Cassander recognized the strength of the position due to the terrain and so chose to ferry his troops around it rather than engage. When the two sides met at Thermopylae again the following year, the Macedonians managed to dislodge the Aetolians with great difficulty (Diod. Sic. 19.53.1) and Cassander then chose to ferry his troops from Megara to Epidaurus rather than try and fight his way across the Isthmus of Corinth (Diod. Sic. 19.54.3). This shows that in some cases even commanders of pike-phalanxes would not fight on narrow fronted fields, regardless of how the opposing side was armed, if an easier means of overcoming or circumventing a position was available.
121 Plut, Pyrr. 33
122 Tyre: Arr. Anab. 2.24.3; Gaza: Arr. Anab. 2.27.5
123 Markle, ‘Use of the Sarissa’, 495
124 J.K. Anderson, ‘Shields of Eight Palms Width’ CSCA 9 (1976) 4
125 Arr. Anab. 1.13.2
126 Arr. Anab. 1.13.3-7; Badian (‘The Battle of the Granicus’, 290) suggests that Alexander dismissed Parmenion’s advice to wait and attack the next day as, had they done so, the Macedonians would have been advancing into the rising sun while, by attacking immediately in the afternoon, the setting sun would have been shining in the eyes of the Persians on the far bank (see also: Campbell, ‘Alexander’s Great Cavalry Battle’ 48).
127 For the rotating roster of command see: Arr. Anab. 1.28.3
128 Curt. 3.8.22, 3.8.24
129 Arr. Anab. 2.16.8
130 Polyb. 11.2
131 Arr. Anab. 3.9.3-4
132 Hammond, Genius of Alexander, 66
133 Alexander issued such orders at Gaugamela. See: Arr. Anab. 3.10.1
134 Arr. Anab. 3.9.5-8
135 Arr. Anab. 3.10.1-2
136 Arr. Anab. 5.11.4
137 For examples of the command to ‘lower pikes’ see: Polyb. 2.67, 5.85, 11.15, 11.16, 18.24.
138 Suda sv. Ἔκτακτοι
139 Arr. Anab. 3.9.5; for a discussion on the level of discipline in the Macedonian army, in respect to following orders and instructions, in the time of Alexander see: E. Carney, ‘Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander’ CP 91.1 (1996) 19-44
140 Sabin (‘Land Battles’ in P. Sabin, H. Van Wees and M. Whitby [eds.]), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Vol. I: Greece the Hellenistic World and the rise of Rome (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 406-407) suggests that ‘battlefield communications were so primitive and ancient armies so unwieldy, most forces could do little more in battle than to put into practice what had been planned and ordered beforehand…’and that ‘it is hard to see how complex grand tactical plans…could have been improvised on the spur of the moment’. Such a conclusion clearly ignores all of the evidence for the various methods of relaying information across the battlefield employed by Hellenistic armies, and the descriptions of phalanxes changing their direction or altering their formation during the course of an engagement.
141 Ael. Tact. Tact. 52; Arr. Tact. 31
142 Arr. Anab. 3.9.5
143 App. Syr. 33
144 Suda sv. Ἔκτακτοι
145 Arr. Anab. 5.12.1
146 Arr. Anab. 5.14.1
147 Arr. Anab. 5.16.3
148 Arr. Anab. 3.15.1; Curt. 4.16.1; Diod. Sic. 17.60.7; Plut. Alex. 33; for a discussion of this event see: G.T Griffith, ‘Alexander’s Generalship at Gaugamela’ JHS 67 (1947) 87-88
149 For the standards across the front of Alexander’s phalanx at Gaugamela see: Curt. 3.10.3
150 Suda sv. Ἔκτακτοι
151 Dion. Hal. 20.2
152 Philip at Athens: Livy, 31.24; Antiochus at Thermopylae: Livy, 36.18
153 Polyb. 2.66; Plutarch (Phil. 6) says that the scarlet flag was a cloak suspended from the tip of a spear.
154 Polyb. 2.67
155 Suda sv. Ἔκτακτοι
156 Polyb. 2.69
157 Halicarnassus: Diod. Sic. 17.26.5, 17.27.4; Issus: Diod. Sic. 17.33.4; Gaugamela: Diod. Sic. 17.58.1; Hydaspes: Diod. Sic. 17.89.1
158 Hellespont: Diod. Sic. 18.32.2; Megalopolis: Diod. Sic. 18.71.1
159 Diod. Sic. 19.97.2
160 1 Macc. 6.38
161 R. Sheppard (ed.), Alexander the Great at War (Osprey, Oxford, 2008) 80
162 Adcock, Greek and Macedonian Art of War, 26
163 Pietrykowski, Great Battles, 204
164 The drill manual for the Australian Army (Land Warfare Procedures – General LWP-G 7-7-5 Drill, (Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Army, 2005) 3A-1) for example defines the quick march as 116 paces per minute with each step being 75cm in length. The US Army Drill Manual (FM 22-5 Drill and Parades (US Dept, of the Army, Washington, 1986) 3.6f) defines the ‘quicktime’ march as 120 steps per minute with each pace being 30 inches (75cm) in length from heel to toe. The exact pace and distance of the step is often dictated by the nationality of the military institution, and even the particular regiment, and can also vary based upon the style of marching employed, such as the ‘goose-stepping’ method of march employed by many former Soviet-bloc and Asian countries.
165 While many modern armies march at the ‘quick step’ while on parade, soldiers do not generally march at this pace while burdened with their combat equipment except when conducting a ‘forced march’. Yet even here the soldiers are not required to remain in step or maintain a very close formation.
166 Polyb. 18.24; Livy, 33.8.7
167 Arr. Anab. 3.14.2
168 Arr. Anab. 4.26.4
169 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.2
170 Plut. Alex. 33
171 Plut. Aem. 18
172 Arr. Anab. 2.10.3
173 For an examination of the ‘charge’ of hoplite formations see: C.A. Matthew. A Storm of Spears (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2012) 225-230
174 Afric. Cest. 1.1.13-15 – σπάνιος τῇ ὁπλίσaι τούτῃ δρόμος, οὐ πολὺς μών, ὀξὺς δὲ καὶ τoσoῦτος ὅσος ἂv γὲνοὶτο τοῦ σπεύδοντος ἐντὸς βέλους γενέσθαι φθάσαι. This is most likely a reference to the Greek charge at the battle of Marathon in 490BC (see: Hdt. 6.112).
175 For Philip’s feigned retreat see: Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.2
176 Arr. Anab. 4.26.2; Tarn (Military and Naval Developments, 13) states that feigned retreats such as those of the pike-phalanx at Chaeronea demonstrate the professionalism and training of the Macedonian army in the time of Philip and Alexander as, had such manoeuvres been attempted with ill-trained troops, a pretend rout would have ended in a real one.
177 App. Syr. 35
178 App. Syr. 35
179 For example see: Aesch. Pers. 393; Thuc. 1.50, 4.43, 4.96, 5.70, 7.44, 7.83; Xen. Hell 2.4.17, 4.2.19; Xen. An. 1.8.17, 1.10.20, 4.3.19-31, 4.8.16, 5.2.14, 6.5.27; Plut. Lyc. 21-22; Plut. Mor. 238a-b
180 For example see: Thuc. 5.70; Plut. Mor. 210f; Ath. Deip. 14.627D; Pausanias, 3.17.5; Xen.An. 6.1.11; Polyaenus, Strat. 1.10.1; Excerpta Polyaeni, 18.1
181 Dickinson, ‘Length Isn’t Everything’, 58
182 Polyb. 2.69, 5.85, 11.15, 11.16, 18.24
183 Asclep. Tact. 12.11; Ael. Tact. Tact. 53; Arr. Tact. 32; In his experiments with pike-formations, Connolly (‘Experiments with the Sarissa – The Macedonian Pike and Cavalry Lance – A Functional View’ JRMES (2000) 111) found it difficult to have the members of the phalanx lower their pikes unless it was conducted one rank at a time beginning with the front rank (Connolly states that starting from the back just caused entanglement). While working one rank at a time from the front does work, if the members of the first five ranks all lowered their weapons at the same time, the same result would be accomplished.
184 Asclep. Tact. 5.1; Ael. Tact. Tact. 13.3; Arr. Tact. 12.3; Polyb. 18.29
185 Polyb. 2.69
186 Livy, 44.41
187 Plut. Aem. 19
188 J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (Wordsworth, Hertfordshire, 1998) 106
189 In a diagram accompanying his discussion of the phalanx, Hammond (Genius of Alexander, 14) has each file, which he has arranged to a depth of eight, is angled obliquely to the right-rear so that the pikes of the first ranks can be deployed. However, as the whole unit is depicted as rectangular in shape, this angled arrangement of the files has resulted in the two right-hand files containing less than eight men. The second file from the right, for example, contains only six men, while the most right-hand file only contains two men. Such an arrangement seems unlikely for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is unlikely that any file formed up with a depth of two or six when the rest of the file was configured differently. Secondly, due to the angled nature of the whole file, the lateral (i.e. left-to-right) interval that the whole file occupies – that is from the left-hand side of the man in the front rank to the right-hand side of the man in the rear rank – equates to the open-order of 192cm with a depth of only eight men rather than the standard intermediate-order of 96cm which could accommodate a file of sixteen. It is therefore more likely that the first five ranks were arranged in a slightly offset manner, occupying the intermediate-order spacing, while the remaining ranks simply stood in a line directly behind the man in the fifth rank. This would then mean that, no matter that depth of the file, it would always conform with the intermediate-order interval.
190 This idea is outlined by Wheeler (‘The Legion as Phalanx in the Late Empire (I)’ in Y. le Bohec and C. Wolff (eds.), L’Armée Romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien Ier (Paris, De Boccard, 2004) 329). As Connolly observed in his experiments (‘Experiments’, 111) there is a natural flex in the length of the sarissa which does allow the weapon of the more rearward ranks to arc over those held by the more forward members of the phalanx. However, for weapons to overlap each other in such a way, the members of the phalanx would have to be standing front-on (which is physically impossible while carrying a heavy pike) in order for the file to take up most of the 96cm interval allocated to it. It seems more likely that, even with the flex of the sarissa taken into account, the phalangites were deployed in such a manner that both they and their weapons occupied their full interval.
191 Curt. 6.1.10
192 Arr. Tact. 11
193 Arr. Anab. 2.8.3-4; Campbell (‘Alexander’s Great Cavalry Battle’51) suggests that Alexander also deployed his phalanx in a half-depth of eight for the battle at the Granicus River in 334BC so that his forces could occupy a frontage equal to that of the opposing Persians. This is not recorded in any of the ancient accounts of the engagement.
194 Polyb. 12.21; Polybius continues to say that ‘even if they had, as the poet says, ‘laid shield against shield and leaned on each other’ [i.e. adopted the close-order formation of 48cm per man] ground twenty stades [3.6km] wide would still have been needed while he [i.e. Callisthenes] says the ground was no more than fourteen [stades wide]. The terminology used by Polybius, ‘even if they had’, in reference to the close-order deployment suggests that this was not normally used by pike-wielding phalangites.
195 Polybius, in his examination of Callisthenes’ description of the battlefield at Issus (12.19), states ‘…the distances which must be kept on the march…each man covering six feet’ (…ἄνδρας ἐν τοῖς πορευτικοῖς διαστήμασιν…ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἕξ πόδας ἐπέχοντος). Six Greek feet, or 192cm, is the open-order interval.
196 Ael. Tact. Tact. 49; see also: Arr. Tact. 29
197 Front. Strat. 2.3.2
198 English (Army of Alexander, 124), citing a passage of Arrian (Anab. 1.2.2), suggests that Alexander marched against the Triballians in 335BC with his army arranged in column to hide their number. Arrian, however, does not actually detail how the phalanx was arranged in this passage.
199 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.19
200 Arr. Strat. 17
201 Arr. Tact. 11 – τάσσεται δὲ ἡ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ μῆκος μὲν ὅπου ἀραιoτέρα, εἰ ἥ τε χώρα παρέχοι καὶ ὠφελιμώτερον εἴη, κατὰ βάθος δὲ ὅπου πυκvοτέρα, εἰ αὐτῇ τῇ πυκνότητι καὶ τῇ ῥύμῃ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξῶσαι δέοι…ἢ aὖ εἰ δέοι τοὺς ἐπελαύνοντας ἀποκρούσασθαι…χρὴ τάσσειν.
202 Polyb. 18.30
203 Ael. Tact. Tact. 14; see also: Asclep. Tact. 5.2
204 Arr. Tact. 12
205 For example see: G. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (Faber &Faber, London, 1978) 154-155; Adcock, Art of War, 4; J. Champion, Pyrrhus of Epirus (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 68
206 Warry, Warfare, 68
207 Asclep. Tact. 5.2; Ael. Tact. Tact. 14; Arr. Tact. 12
208 The exact nature of the othismos in Classical Greek warfare has been a long debated topic amongst scholars. However what is clear is that, from a review of the literary evidence, a battle which involved a physical pushing of ‘shield against shield’ only occurred at three major engagements across the whole Classical Age – Delium (424BC), Coronea (394BC) and at Leuctra (371BC). The remainder of the battles fought during this time seem to have been conducted with both sides ‘at spear length’ from each other where they could effectively use their weapons. See. C. A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 205-217, 222-225
209 The term othismos has numerous meanings. Under ωθεω in the Liddell and Scott Greek-English Lexicon the following definitions are given: thrust, push (mostly of human force), throw down, push (with weapons), force out, stuff into, force open, non-human forces (e.g. streams or wind), force back in battle, banish, push matters on (i.e. hurry them along), push off from land, throw (as a horse throws a rider), press forward, to fall violently, a crowd, a throng, tojostle. Under ωθiσμός specifically are the following definitions: thrusting, pushing (as of shield against shield), jostling, struggling (as of combatants in a melee). For the pike-phalanx, the most appropriate definition for any such action is to ‘push with weapons’.
210 Connolly, ‘Experiments’, 111
211 Plut. Cleom. 28
212 B. Bennett and M. Roberts, The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281 BC Vol.II: Battles and Tactics (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2009) 10
213 This accounts for the numerous descriptions found in the ancient texts which describe the pike-phalanx as ‘invincible’ or something similar. For example see: Polyaenus, Excepts, 18.4; Livy, 44.41; Plut. Alex. 33; Plut. Aem. 19; Polyb. 18.29
214 Arr. Anab. 1.6.10
215 Gabriel, Philip, 63; Cascarino (Tecnica della Falange, 65) similarly states that the formation was easy to control so long as it was maintained.
216 Gabriel, Philip, 63
217 Asclep. Tact. 10.2-12; Ael. Tact. Tact. 24; Arr. Tact. 21
218 Asclep. Tact. 10.1, 11.2-7; Ael. Tact. Tact. 23, 35, 36; Arr. Tact. 20, 28
219 Basically, using the layout in Fig. 41 as an example, syntagmae #1 and #4 would advance to a point where their file closing ouragoi were just past the front rank of syntagmae #2 and #3. The men of syntagmae #1 and #4 would then turn to face the left and both formations would march to take up position in front of syntagmae #2 and #3. Once in position, the men of syntagmae #1 and #4 would then turn to face the front – resulting in a square formation, thirty-two deep, with the officers in their correct locations, and with every man facing forward. Alternatively, if the ground ahead of the line did not permit such a move, the same result could be accomplished by having syntagmae #2 and #3 move back and behind syntagmae #1 and #4 following a similar, but mirrored, series of steps.
220 Arr. Anab. 3.12.1; see also: Curt. 4.13.30; Front. Strat. 2.3.19
221 See: P.A. Brunt’s note to this passage in the Loeb edition of the text. Other scholars have also followed this line of argument – for example see: Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 81; J. Warry, Alexander 334-323BC (Osprey, Oxford, 1998) 59,61; Warry, Warfare, 81, 83; Pietrykowski, Great Battles, 63; English, Field Campaigns, 123; D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 259BC to 146BC (Wargames Research Group, Sussex, 1982) 65; Hammond, Genius of Alexander, 109. Fuller (Generalship of Alexander, 169) just calls this line a ‘second phalanx…deployed at an unspecified distance behind the front line’. Connolly (Greece and Rome, 82) simply calls it ‘second line inf[antry]’.
222 Arrian provides no details of which units made up this second line. Diodorus (17.52.5) does not even mention the second line deployment at all, but only states that the wings of the formation were refused to counter any encirclement. The conclusion that Alexander’s second line was composed of allies and mercenaries seems to be based upon a passage of Curtius (4.3.31) who says that contingents of Illyrian, mercenary and Thracian light troops were positioned behind Alexander’s line. However, according to Arrian, the Paeonians and the troops of Balacrus (who were probably Balkan in origin) were positioned towards the front (Anab. 3.12.3), the so-called ‘old mercenaries’ were positioned on the right wing – refused at an angle from the front (Anab. 3.12.2), and the Thracian infantry partially guarded the pack animals and formed part of the refused line on the left (Anab. 3.12.4-5). While mainly on the wings, both the Thracian and mercenary units, due to their refused deployment, were still ‘behind Alexander’s line’ as Curtius states. However, this does not necessarily mean that they formed a second line behind the pike-phalanx and their refused deployment would actually suggest otherwise, and would additionally correlate the accounts of Arrian and Diodorus. As Devine (‘Grand Tactics at Gaugamela’ Phoenix 29.4 (1975) 375) points out, the refused wings of the Macedonian formation, regardless of the arrangement of the main line, would have resulted in a roughly trapezoid shape if there was a second line running across the rear. If, however, the second line units were Greek allies and mercenaries, there would not have been enough troops to cover this rearward frontage. This would have resulted in large gaps being present in the rear line which encircling cavalry could exploit – the very thing that Arrian says this second line was guarding against. However, had the second line merely been rearward chiliarchiae of a pike-phalanx drawn up in double depth, the overall formation would more closely resemble a flattened wedge, rather than a trapezoid, and the second line units would cover the same frontage as the front-centre of the line. These units, if required, could simply about face, and the refused wings move inward, to form a hollow square if the position was encircled. Additionally, later in the battle, when the right wing of the Macedonian line advanced, gaps formed between this wing and the left. Arrian (Anab. 3.14.5-6) tells us that Indian and Persian cavalry were able to penetrate through this gap and attack the Macedonian camp (see also: Diod. Sic. 17.59.5-8; Curt. 4.15.5; Plut. Alex. 32). Interestingly, this cavalry never seems to encounter the troops forming the second line of the Macedonian formation. This leaves several possibilities: a) the second line was made up of Greeks and mercenaries and that, due to their smaller number, the Persian cavalry was simply able to avoid them, b) that the units of the second line were positioned just behind the front of the formation and moved with it and, as such, the gaps between the right and left wings fragmented the second line as well. As noted, the first possibility seems unlikely as using small numbers of men to hold the rear of the line would seem tactically unsound. This leaves only the second option for the deployment of the second line. Consequently, the use of a double-depth pike-phalanx to create the second line in Alexander’s centre at Gaugamela cannot be discounted.
223 Arr. Anab. 1.13.1
224 Arr. Anab. 3.12.1
225 Ael. Tact. Tact. 37, 38; Arr. Tact. 29; in his military manual Arrian, and seemingly in his Alexander narrative as well, actually confuses the antistomos formation in which the phalanx is divided laterally with the front half facing forward and the rear half facing backwards, and the amphistomos formation where the phalanx is divided down the centre of the line and one side faces left while the other faces to the right. Thus Alexander’s double-line at Gaugamela should have been described as being an antistomos deployment. Asclepiodotus (Tact. 11.3) says that the antistomos formation was when an army marched in two parallel columns, but with the file leaders on the inside. This is called the antistomos diphalangarchia by Aelian (Tact. 39). Aelian seems to be the only one who gets the descriptions of these basic antistomos and amphistomos formations correct.
226 Ael. Tact. Tact. 37
227 Arr. Anab. 3.12.1; Curt. 4.13.30
228 Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, 48
229 Some scholars merely outline the dominant role of the cavalry, and/or the immobilising function of the pike-phalanx, in Hellenistic warfare. For example see: Gabriel, Philip, 65, 69; Pietrykowski, ‘In the School of Alexander’ 24; W.W. How, ‘Arms, Tactics and Strategy in the Persian Wars’ JHS 43.2 (1923) 119; Warry, Warfare, 104; Anson, ‘Introduction of the Sarisa’ 65; Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, 155, 158: Featherstone, Warriors and Warfare, 59; S. Skarmintzos, ‘Phalanx versus Legion: Greco-Roman Conflict in the Hellenistic Era’ AncWar 2.2 (2008) 30; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 266. Other scholars go as far as to use the terminology of the ‘hammer and anvil’ analogy in their examinations. Snodgrass (Arms & Armour, 115), for example, specifically calls the phalanx an ‘anvil’, while Cummings (Alexander the Great (Riverside Press, Boston, 1940) 208) says that the result of Alexander’s deployment at Gaugamela was to ‘catch Darius…between the hammer of the Macedonian cavalry and the anvil of the phalanx’. Tarn (Military and Naval Developments, 1, 11) calls the Hellenistic Period the ‘Age of Cavalry’ and says (p.26) that at Heraclea in 280BC Pyrrhus’ phalanx defeated the Romans ‘in a battle of sheer hammering’.
230 Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, 292-293; see also: C. von Clausewitz, On War (Penguin, London, 1982) 1.2
231 English, Field Campaigns of Alexander, 140; English, Army of Alexander, 22-23, 36. Interestingly, despite such claims English (Army of Alexander, 22) still calls the cavalry ‘the main strike force’ of a Hellenistic army.
232 See: US Army, FM7-8 Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (US Dept. of the Army, Washington, 1992) 2.12: Movement to Contact, 4.2: Battle Drill 1 – Platoon Attack, Battle Drill 1a – Squad Attack
233 Prior to the offensive to liberate Kuwait in 1991, more than 17,000 US Marines, supported by the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin, conducted near continuous drills in rehearsal for an amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. This ruse, designed to make the occupying Iraqis think that the main offensive was going to come from the sea, forced the Iraqis to deploy considerable resources to their left wing to meet this threat. This finds parallels with Darius sending Bessus and his cavalry to shadow Alexander’s oblique movement to the right with his cavalry at the battle of Gaugamela. Then, on 24 February 1991, more than 200,000 French, British, American and Arab forces poured across the desert frontier (Saddam Hussein’s so called ‘line of death’) through vacated ‘penetration zones’ – similar to the gap that opened in the Persian line at Gaugamela, but on a much larger scale. By moving troops into these gaps, the Iraqis in Kuwait were essentially pinned in place – threatened with amphibious forces from the east, from two Egyptian-led tank divisions crossing into Kuwait from the south, and by the US Marine Second Division and the US Army Eighteenth Airborne Corp who had pushed into Kuwait from the west. Other coalition forces operated further to the west, striking northward into Iraq, along a front extending more than 600km. The strategy was to cut Iraqi supply lines running into Kuwait and to use the flanking forces to encircle the now immobilised Iraqi troops in Kuwait. An anonymous US Defence official summed up the strategy as: ‘what we want to do is put them in a bag, tie the top of the bag, seal it, and then punch the bag!’ For a summary of this first day of the ground offensive of Operation Desert Storm see: I. Bickerton and M. Pearson, 43 Days – The Gulf War (The Text Publishing Company, East Melbourne, 1991) 154-157
234 Paraetacene: Diod. Sic. 19.27-32; Gabiene: Diod. Sic. 19.39-43; Gaza: Diod. Sic. 19.80-85; Ipsus: Diod. Sic. 20.113-21.2; Plut. Dem. 28-29; Heraclea: Plut. Pyrr. 16-17; Asculum: Plut. Pyrr. 21; Dion. Hal. 20.1-3; Raphia: Polyb. 5.63-65, 5.79-86; Mantinea: Polyb. 11.11-18; Plut. Phil. 10; Magnesia: Livy, 37.39-44; App. Syr. 30-36
235 Chaeronea: Diod. Sic. 16.86; Plut. Pel. 18; Plut. Alex. 9; Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.2; Sellasia: Polyb. 2.65-69; Plut. Cleom. 28; Plut. Phil. 6
236 Plut. Phoc. 13
237 Plut. Eum. 5
1 Polyb. 18.28
2 Plut. Aem. 19
3 See. C.A. Matthew, A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) 71-92
4 Polyb. 18.30
5 For details of the use of intermediate-order by hoplite armies see: Matthew, A Storm of Spears, 179-197
6 Diod. Sic. 16.86.1-6; Plut. Pel. 18; Plut. Alex. 9
7 Plut. Alex. 16; there are many similar references to hoplites apparently engaging phalangites effectively from across the Hellenistic Period such as Phocion’s troops driving the forces of Philip II out of Boeotia in 348BC (Plut. Phoc. 13-14), and the Greeks defeating the Macedonians again in 322BC (Plut. Phoc. 25; Diod. Sic. 18.12.4). The elderly Silver Shields, Alexander’s former hypaspists, are also said to have so effectively engaged the opposing phalangites of Antigonus at the battle of Gabiene that they did not lose a single man while reportedly killing 5,000 of their enemy (Diod. Sic. 19.43.1). The armament of the hypaspists/Silver Shields is a strongly contested issue. However, possible literary exaggerations aside, it would seems unlikely that the Silver Shields would have been able to so effectively engage phalangites if they were equipped as hoplites unless it is assumed that Antigonus’ line had fragmented – for which there is no evidence. This suggests that, even if they had been initially armed as hoplites in the time of Alexander, by the Successor period the equipment of the Silver Shields was more akin to that of the phalangite.
8 For example see: M.M. Markle, ‘The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear and Related Armour’ AJA 81.3 (1977) 338-339; P.A. Rahe, ‘The Annihilation of the Sacred Band at Chaeronea’ AJA 85.1 (1981) 84-87; J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1995) 68: I. Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008) 147-151
9 Plut. Pel. 18
10 N. Sekunda, The Persian Army 560-330BC (Osprey, Oxford, 2005) 27
11 For an overview of the depth of the Classical hoplite phalanx see: Matthew, A Storm of Spears, 172-179
12 Diodorus (17.38.4) states that some of the Persian dead at Issus were not wearing any armour while others were in a full panoply. Classical Greek writers never seem to have tired of emphasising the superiority of the Greek hoplite against the Persians. For example see: For example see: Hdt. 5.49, 5.97, 7.63-80, 7.211, 9.62; Diod. Sic. 11.7.3; Aesch. Pers. 26-51, 85-86, 239-240, 269, 278, 817, 926; Xen. Hell. 7.6.1; Pind. Pyth. 1.72-80. In his comparison of Greek, Macedonian, Persian and Roman fighting styles, Julius Africanus (Cest. 7.1.22-23) flatly states that ‘because the [Persian] infantry were lightly armed, they could not endure the onslaught of [the Greeks]’. Livy, in his vitriolic critique of the abilities of Alexander the Great (9.17-19), says that the Persian king Darius whom Alexander faced had ‘dragging after him a train of women and eunuchs, wrapped in gold and purple, and encumbered with all the trappings of state’, that Alexander was able to defeat the Persians ‘without loss, without being called to do anything more daring than to show a just contempt for the idle [Persian] display of power’, and that, had Alexander chosen to fight a campaign against Rome, ‘he would have been tempted to wish the Persians, Indians and effeminate Asiatics were his enemies [rather than Romans], and would have confessed that his former wars had been waged against women’.
13 Afric. Cest. 7.1.43-44
14 Diod. Sic. 17.53.1
15 Arr. Anab. 3.14.1; Diodorus (17.58.1) says the troops charged each other with a loud shout. Curtius (4.15.19) says ‘then, raising a shout as victors do, the Persians made a ferocious rush at the enemy…’. All of these passages suggest a massed charge.
16 Plut. Mor. 180b; see also: Afric. Cest. 1.1.40-44
17 Plut. Mor. 339b-c
18 Plut. Aem. 20
19 Polyaenus, Strat. 2.29.2
20 Plut. Aem. 18
21 Arr. Anab. 3.13.5; Diod. Sic. 17.58.2; Curt. 4.15.14
22 Arrian (Anab. 3.13.6) says the chariots passed right through the lines and the drivers were then slain by the hypaspists. This seems unlikely as, at 3.11.9 Arrian states that the hypaspists were positioned on the right wing between the pike-phalanx and the cavalry. Diodorus (17.58.3-4) says that some of the chariots were scared off by the Macedonians clashing their pikes on their shields, while others continued forward to either be picked off with javelins, to pass right through the Macedonian lines (which had been ordered to open) and flee, or to crash into the phalanx and inflict serious injury.
23 P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, Greenhill Books, 1998) 69
24 Heckel, Willekes and Wrightson (‘Scythed Chariots at Gaugamela – A Case Study’ in E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.) Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives (Oxford University Press, 2010) 104-105) outline several practical reasons why the rapid creation of lanes by a pike-phalanx facing the chariot charge at Gaugamela is unlikely. These include: a) the phalangite is not very nimble due to his equipment; b) the phalanx would have begun to compress at this time of the battle; c) densely packed formations have little room to move and cannot react quickly; d) the lowering of the pikes to engage inhibits lateral movement; and e) once lowered, a sarissa can only be used to engage directly ahead, rather than against a passing chariot.
25 App. Syr. 19 – τὰς σαρίσσας ἐν τάξει πυκνὰς προὐβάλοντο
26 Curt. 4.15.14-15
27 Lucian, Dial. mort. 27
28 Pietrykowski (Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 81) suggests that Alexander’s troops adopted Lucian’s kneeling position to counter Porus’ elephants at the Hydaspes River in 326BC. However, there is no reference to such an undertaking in any of the accounts of the engagement.
29 Arr. Anab. 3.15.1; Diod. Sic. 17.59.5, 17.60.5-7
30 Hdt. 9.18; although the Macedonians had 2,000 cavalry at the battle of Chaeronea in 338BC (Diod. Sic. 16.85.5), the reluctance of cavalry to frontally charge hoplite formations throws a question mark over any model of the battle which suggests that a young Alexander led a charge of cavalry against the Theban Sacred Band (for example see; Markle, ‘Spear’, 338-339; Rahe, ‘The Annihilation of the Sacred Band’ 84-87; Warry, Warfare, 68; Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia, 147-151).
31 Afric. Cest. 7.1.30-31
32 Diod. Sic. 17.60.4, 17.61.1; see also: Curt. 4.15.32
33 Arrian’s and Diodorus’ accounts of the opening of the Macedonian lines and the failure of the Persian chariot charge at Gaugamela bear striking similarities to Xenophon’s account of the battle of Cunaxa in 401BC (see: Xen.Anab. 1.8.18-20). It is possible that there was clear knowledge that the charge of the Persian chariots resulted in failure and that this earlier account was drawn upon for inspiration by Arrian and Diodorus (or their sources) to account for it. Lucian (Zeux. 8-11) also describes how the phalanx of Antiochus I opened its ranks to allow enemy scythe-bearing chariots to pass through at the so-called ‘elephant victory’ in 273BC. However, half of Antiochus’ army was light-infantry which would have been much more mobile and able to open its lines quickly to avoid the attacking chariots.
34 Heckel, Willekes and Wrightson, ‘Scythed Chariots at Gaugamela’, 107-109; for the separation of the phalanx see: Arr. Anab. 3.14.4
35 Arrian (Anab. 3.8.6, 3.11.6), supposedly reporting the disposition of the enemy army from written plans captured after the battle (3.11.3), states that there was a unit of fifteen Indian elephants in the Persian army at the battle of Gaugamela in 331BC. Aristobulos (FrGrHist 139 F17), also referring to captured battle plans, states that these elephants were positioned directly in front of the position of Darius. Hammond (The Genius of Alexander the Great (Duckworth, London, 1997) 106), despite what Arrian and Aristobulos states, claims that the elephants were left in the Persian camp as only the horses of the Indian cavalry would have been accustomed to them. If these beasts were present, they seem to have played no part in the battle as they are not mentioned again in any source. A contingent of Indian ‘cavalry’ is reported to have broken through the Macedonian left wing – although this may not be the elephant unit which is said to have been positioned in the centre of the Persian line ‘opposite the phalanx’ (Arr. Anab. 3.11.6). Curtius (4.12.9) says that the Indians (as well as troops from the region of the Red Sea) provided only nominal, as opposed to real, support – an odd claim to make if these troops involved a contingent of pachyderms. As Bosworth (Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 128) notes, the Macedonians may have encountered elephants in smaller engagements in the months prior to the battle of the Hydaspes. However, the Hydaspes was the first large set-piece battle in which the Macedonians fought a large contingent of these beasts.
36 Arr. Anab. 5.15.2; Curt. 8.14.4, 8.14.19; Arrian (Anab. 5.15.4) states that the Indian king Porus selected ground for the deployment of his main force that was ‘sandy and level’. Due to this being the sand on an alluvial plain following a period of rainfall, there would have been very little dist kicked up by either side.
37 Arr. Anab. 5.15.1-2; Curt. 8.14.2; Plut. Alex. 60
38 Plut. Alex. 60
39 Arr. Anab. 5.14.2
40 Curt. 8.14.5
41 Arr. Anab. 5.14.5-7; Diod. Sic. 17.87.4; Curt. 8.14.9
42 Arr. Anab. 5.16.3
43 For the trumpeting of the elephants: Curt. 8.14.23; for Alexander’s confidence: Curt. 8.14.16
44 Plut. Alex. 60
45 Diod. Sic. 17.88.1
46 Diod. Sic. 17.88.2
47 Arr. Anab. 5.17.3; 5.17.6; Diod. Sic. 17.88.3, 17.88.5; Curt. 8.14.24-29
48 Curt. 8.14.18
49 For example see: Ael. Tact. Tact. 43, 44, 45, 47
50 Figures taken from A.M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999) 122
51 Afric. Cest. 7.18.1-20
52 Diod. Sic. 18.70.3
53 Plut. Alex. 62; Curt. 9.2.1-9.3.19; Diod. Sic. 17.93.2; Arr. Anab. 5.25.1-5.27.9
54 Diod. Sic. 18.71.2-6
55 Diod. Sic. 19.83.2
56 Diod. Sic. 19.84.1-5
57 Afric. Cest. 7.18.43-46
58 Dion. Hal. 20.1
59 Dion. Hal. 20.2
60 Aelian (Tact. 22) even outlines the arrangement of elephant contingents into standardized units and subunits, each with their own commanding officer, just as he does for all of the other arms of a Hellenistic army (see also: Asclep. Tact. 9.1; Arr. Tact. 19).
61 Livy (30.26) also states that 4,000 Macedonians served in the army of the Carthaginian general Hannibal which fought at the battle of Zama in 202BC (see also: Front. Strat. 2.3.16). Livy states that these troops had been sent by the Macedonian king in support of Carthage while he made inroads into Greece. This would have been mostly likely to bolster the threat to Rome posed by Carthage and to keep Roman troops, who could have been used in a war against Macedon, occupied elsewhere. Livy goes on to say that the Romans sent delegations to the Macedonian court to express their displeasure at this act and that the view of the Romans was that their current treaty with Macedon had been broken. Many scholars, however, see Livy’s record of this event as mere Roman propaganda and dispute the presence of any Macedonian troops in Hannibal’s army (see: B.T. Carey, Hannibal’s Last Battle: Zama and the Fall of Carthage (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2007) 116). If there were Macedonian troops at Zama, on the other hand, this then would be another instance of phalangites being defeated by the maniples of Rome.
62 Polyb. 18.30
63 Polyb. 18.30; see also Smith (‘The Anatomy of Battle – Testing Polybius’ Formations’ AncWar 5.5 (2011) 44-45) who, by examining the amount of room required to accommodate a person in the combative posture to wield the gladius and scutum, also arrives at a figure of 192cm per man. Wheeler (‘The Legion as Phalanx in the Late Empire (I)’ in Y. le Bohec and C. Wolff (eds.), L’Armée Romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien Ier (Paris, De Boccard, 2004) 331), on the other hand, rejects this idea and says that Polybius’ suggestion that ‘each legionary had to face ten sarissae offers another example of his exaggeration in an excursus of propagandistic intent’.
64 Plut. Aem. 19
65 Plutarch (Pyrr. 17) says that the outcome of the battle swung back and forth seven times at Heraclea.
66 Polyb. 18.32; similarly Appian (Syr. 37) claims that many people had not expected the Romans to defeat the Macedonians at Magnesia in 190BC as the pike-phalanx was, at that time, renowned for its discipline and valour, and was reported to be invincible. Champion (Pyrrhus of Epirus [Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009] 68) suggests that references to the pike-phalanx being unbeatable are simply literary motifs to make victories over them seem more impressive. However, such a conclusion fails to consider the narratives of battles like Heraclea, Asculum, Cynoscephalae, Magnesia and Pydna which show that the pike-phalanx could effectively engage the legions of Rome, nor consider the motive behind Polybius’ discussion of the Roman and Macedonian ways of fighting.
67 Polyb. 18.32
68 Afric. Cest. 7.1.52-57
69 Polyb. 18.31-32
70 Livy 9.19
71 Afric. Cest. 7.1.49-50
72 Livy 9.19
73 Plut. Aem. 20
74 Afric. Cest. 7.1.53-55
75 Livy (31.34) states that the Greeks ‘had seen wounds caused by spears, arrows and, occasionally, lances since they were accustomed to fighting against other Greeks and Illyrians. But now they saw bodies dismembered with the “Spanish sword” [i.e. the gladius], arms cut off with the shoulder attached, or heads severed from bodies – with the necks completely cut through, internal organs exposed, and other horrible wounds, and a general sense of panic ensued when they discovered the kind of weapons, and the kind of men, they would have to contend with.’
76 Polyb. 18.32
77 Afric. Cest. 7.1.68-70
78 Polyb. 6.23
79 Livy 9.19
80 Polyb. 18.30
81 Caes. BG 1.25
82 S. Skarmintzos, ‘Phalanx versus Legion: Greco-Roman Conflict in the Hellenistic Era’ AncWar 2.2 (2008) 34
83 W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments (Cambridge University Press, 1930) 28
1 Diod. Sic. 21.2.2 – Μακεδόνων τῶν τὴν Ἀσιαν καὶ τὴν Ευρῶπην πεποιημένων δορίκτητον. Didodorus makes this statement in the section of his work for the year 299BC. This is not long after the battle of Ipsus in 301BC – one of the last major battles between the Successors of Alexander the Great and one of the last times two opposing pike-phalanxes would face off against each other.
2 Plut. Sull. 18-19
3 Plut. Sull. 18; for other accounts of the battle see: App. Mith. 42-43; Front. Strat. 2.3.17
4 For example see: J. Pietrykowski, Great Battles of the Hellenistic World (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 235
5 Suet. Ner. 19
6 B. Bennett and M. Roberts, The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281BC Vol.II: Battles and Tactics (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009) 3
7 Seut. Ner. 19
8 Webster (The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D. (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1988) 45, 106) claims that the creation of ‘Alexander’s Phalanx’ was ‘the product of a disordered mind’ and part of Nero’s ‘strange romantic delusions’.
9 Cass. Dio 78.7.1-2; for Caracalla and Alexander see also: S.H.A. M. Ant. 2.1
10 Herodian 4.8.2
11 R. Cowan, ‘The Battle of Nisibis, AD217 – The Last Battle of the Parthian Wars’ AncWar 3.5 (2009) 34; for a discussion of the description of Caracalla’s phalangites see also: D. Karunanithy, ‘Of Ox-Hide Helmets and Three-Ply Armour: The Equipment of Macedonian Phalangites as Described through a Roman Source’ Slingshot 213 (2001) 33-40; G. Sumner, Roman Military Clothing (2) AD200-400 (Osprey, Oxford, 2003) 39,45, pl.C3; R. Cowan, Imperial Roman Legionary AD161--284 (Osprey, Oxford, 2003) 27-28
12 Curt. 9.7.19; Diod. Sic. 17.100.2
13 Ael. Tact. Tact. 9; see also: Asclep. Tact. 2.8-10; Arr. Tact. 10
14 Cass. Dio 78.18.1
15 Cowan, ‘The Battle of Nisibis’ 34
16 For example see: Arr. Alan. 5-6, 15
17 Vitr. De arch. 10.3.7
18 Plut. Mar. 13; Front. Str. 4.1.7; Festus, De Verhorum Signification s.v. ‘muli Mariani’; Josephus (BJ 3.87) describes troops carrying equipment in the manner of the Marian Mules in the first century AD and the frieze on Trajan’s Column depicts Marian Mules crossing the Danube into Dacia in the second.
19 Cowan, ‘The Battle of Nisibis’ 34; for the triarii of the later empire see: Veg. Mil. 3.14; see also: E.L. Wheeler, ‘The Legion as Phalanx in the Late Empire (II)’ RÉMA 1 (2004) 170-173
20 Herodian 4.15.2; Afric. Cest. 1.1.55-56
21 S.H.A. Alex. Sev. 50.4-5
22 For a discussion of other early editions of Aelian’s Tactica and other military manuals see: C. A. Matthew, The Tactics of Aelian (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2012) xiv-xv
1 Author’s photos
2 Image courtesy of the Great North Museum, Newcastle upon Tyne.
3 Images taken from: K.F. Kinch, ‘Le tombeau de Naiusta. Tombeau Macédonien’ Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter – Historisk og Filosofisk Afdeling 7.4 (1917-1937) pl.2-3. Sadly, this unique tomb painting is now lost and only the images made for the original report on the find, shown above, remain.
4 Image courtesy of Kate Matthew
5 Images courtesy of Kate Matthew
6 Image courtesy of the Allard Pierson Museum, Amsterdam
7 Image taken from A. Conze, Stadt und Landschaft – Altertümer von Pergamon 1.2 (Verlag von Georg Reimer, Berlin, 1913) 250-251; see also: Liampi, Schild, 81-82; in personal correspondence (10-Sept-2012), Martin Maischberger of the Staatliche Museen zu Berlin has confirmed that this plaque was inventoried into the museum’s collection early in the twentieth century with an inventory number of P50. However, the plaque has been missing since the fall of Berlin at the end of World War II and recent investigations with the Pushkin Museum, Moscow, have not located it among the ‘Russian war booty’ that was taken out of Germany in the last months of the war. The plaque, the only visual reference of the phalangite in action of its kind, is now regarded as ‘completely lost’. Fortunately, we still have the line drawing from the work of Conze (reproduced here) which is the only visual representation of this unique and valuable missing artefact.
8 Image courtesy of the 16th Ephorate of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities, Greece
9 Author’s photos
10 Author’s photo
11 Author’s photo – coin in the author’s personal collection
12 Author’s photos
13 Author’s photos
14 Author’s photo
15 Authors’ photos
16 Authors’ photos
17 Authors’ photos
18 Author’s photo
19 Author’s photo
20 Author’s photo