The candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000 was pulling no punches in his “straight talk” assessment of his intraparty opposition. On the campaign trail in Virginia, Arizona Senator John McCain threw down the gauntlet:
The political tactics of division and slander are not our values. They are corrupting influences on religion and politics and those who practice them in the name of religion or in the name of the Republican Party or in the name of America shame our faith, our party and our country. Neither party should be defined by pandering to the outer reaches of American politics and the agents of intolerance whether they be Louis Farrakhan or Al Sharpton on the left, or Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell on the right.1
McCain’s strong statement made headlines, but it failed to win adequate support from Virginia primary voters. McCain lost the state on his way to losing the nomination. Nevertheless, his words appear to echo divisions within the Republican Party in Virginia and elsewhere. Many observers have noted the split between supporters of the Christian Right and “traditional Republicans” who represent a more moderate wing of the party.2
The degree to which political parties have adopted the divisions associated with the “culture wars” of American society tells us much about the present—and possibly the future—of American politics. The South, as a region, has become a key battleground in the debate over religion, culture, and politics. We know that a significant realignment in the electorate has moved the South from a region characterized by Democratic domination to one in which both parties are competitive. To a large degree, this change has drawn on cultural divisions that are imbedded in the region’s deeply religious electorate (Layman 2001). Supporters of Christian Right groups have been active in Republican politics for more than two decades (Wilcox 1996; Oldfield 1996b).
In this chapter, I examine the influence of religion on grassroots party activists in the South. While much scholarship has focused on the Christian Right’s influence in the region, its relative importance depends on both the differences between Republicans and Democrats and possible divisions within the two parties. In addition, the role of the black church in Democratic Party politics cannot be ignored, as it may point to splits over cultural issues in that party (Clawson and Clark 2003).
In the analysis that follows, I first examine patterns of religious attachment among local party officials. Their support for Christian Right groups is of particular interest. Next, the relationship between religious attitudes and policy proposals is analyzed. To what extent does proximity to the Christian Right correspond to attitudes about policy issues? Finally, attention is given to party loyalty. Are the Christian conservative factions in each party more or less supportive of the party’s goals? Do they contribute to the factional splits within the party?
The party system in the United States is not directly based on religious cleavages, yet its history gives numerous examples where religion and parties intertwine (Reichley 1992). The abolitionist movement, late-nineteenth-century populism, and the civil rights movement represent episodes in which religiously based moral divisions led to realignments of the two-party system.
In more recent times, the tension between traditionalists and modernists has forced change in the coalitions of today’s Democrats and Republicans (Layman 2001). The Republican Party increasingly attracts conservative Christians to its cause, while religious liberals and secularists are more likely to find a home in the Democratic Party. The New Deal alignment, based on economic divisions in society, has been altered to absorb this new cleavage.
Major changes in the party system rarely happen on their own. Instead, they result from the strategic actions of ambitious politicians whose short-term calculations often have long-term consequences (Aldrich 1995). The emergence of the Christian Right, largely grassroots in nature, was heavily influenced by activists and entrepreneurs who organized for collective action. From the Moral Majority to the Christian Coalition to a variety of lesser-known groups, organizations were formed to harness the energy of sympathizers in the mass public. They mobilized to win nominations and to control the party apparatus. Often, but not always, they were successful. In some states, and especially in the South, conservative Christians have become dominant players in the state party apparatus. An analyst in the mid-1990s estimated that the Christian Right had a dominant influence in the Republican Party organizations of eight of eleven southern states and a substantial influence in two more; only Tennessee, with a long tradition of mountain Republicanism, seemingly remained immune. In contrast, only nine of the remaining thirty-nine states faced similar levels of conservative Christian influence (Persinos 1994). By 2000, state Republican Party organizations in all eleven southern states were at least moderately influenced by the Christian Right, although the movement may have weakened somewhat across the region (Conger and Green 2002).3
Is the Christian Right “invasion” good or bad for the Republican Party? As with many such questions, where you stand depends on where you sit.4 A new generation of scholarship provides some empirical evidence on which to make judgments. For example, Oldfield (1996b, 192–212) notes that many leaders of the religious right cast their lots with George Bush in 1992. This pragmatic strategy helped them gain considerable influence in the nominating process, but the divisive tone of the Republican convention in Houston set the stage for Bush’s loss to Bill Clinton. Smith (2002) finds that religious right Republicans consistently support Republican candidates; members of the traditional faction are often reluctant to support candidates from the religious right.
Not all the focus has been on Christian conservatives in the Republican Party. Others have focused on the role of the African American church in mobilizing Democratic Party supporters (Harris 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1996). While religious blacks often hold conservative religious views, Republicans have made few inroads in their efforts to recruit supporters from this group. Despite shared attitudes on some moral issues, wide divisions persist on other social and economic policies (Calhoun-Brown 1997).
Previous researchers have identified religious-based cleavages between Republicans and Democrats and within each of the two parties. The 2001 Southern Grassroots Party Activists (SGPA) survey contained several items designed to tap the religious orientations of party activists. These items included denominational preference, religiosity (church attendance), religious salience (religious guidance in one’s daily life), and whether the respondent is “born again.” In addition, respondents were asked how close they feel toward Christian Right groups. Where it is appropriate, data from the 2001 SGPA survey will be compared to the results of the original SGPA Project conducted in 1991.5
While both Republicans and Democrats are highly religious, partisan differences emerged on a number of these items (see table 2.1). Nearly all respondents held some religious affiliation, with only 4 percent of Democrats and 1 percent of Republicans indicating that they are “nonbelievers.”6 Substantial majorities of both parties ascribe to Protestant denominations (78 percent of Democrats and 84 percent of Republicans). The modal affiliation for white respondents in both parties was with mainline Protestant churches, followed by evangelical Protestants. Almost one in five Democrats was categorized as a black Protestant, although some likely belong to integrated or largely white congregations; this category contains only 1 percent of GOP activists, due in large measure to the small number of African American Republicans in the sample.7 Slightly more than one in ten activists in both parties are Catholics.
Table 2.1 Religious Characteristics of Grassroots Party Activists, 2001 and 1991
Other measures of religion show that Republicans are only slightly more devout than Democrats, despite some portrayals of the Democratic Party nationally as being hostile to religion. With regard to church attendance, 62 percent of Republicans and 54 percent of Democrats say they attend at least weekly, and roughly the same proportions claim that their religion offers a great deal of guidance in their daily lives. Half of Democrats and 60 percent of Republicans consider themselves to be “born-again” Christians. This term has different meanings for different faith traditions (Jelen, Smidt, and Wilcox 1993), yet the overall high levels and similarity across parties are noteworthy.
Comparisons to 1991 offer mixed results in terms of the religiosity of southern party activists. On one hand, 85 percent of Democrats and 89 percent of Republicans indicated a Protestant affiliation of some sort in 1991, higher percentages than in 2001. More activists in each party belonged to mainline Protestant denominations at the earlier time point (38 percent and 52 percent, respectively), and more Democrats belonged to evangelical Protestant denominations. There were fewer Catholics in both parties and fewer black Protestants among the Democrats. Church attendance, on the other hand, was lower in the earlier sample of grassroots leaders. Only about half of the activists in each party claimed to attend church at least once a week, seven and ten percentage points lower than in 2001. Direct comparisons on the other measures are not possible.8
While small differences across parties exist on the previously discussed measures from the 2001 survey, the interparty differences are substantial on the last item in the battery, “How close do you feel toward Christian Right groups?” Republican activists were much more likely to respond “close” or “very close” (48 percent) than Democrats (18 percent). At the other end of the scale, 44 percent of Democratic activists felt “very far” from Christian Right groups, compared to only 8 percent of Republicans. The wording of this item was crafted to avoid reference to a specific group like the Christian Coalition. Its stimulus refers to a wide range of possible groups that are both Christian on a religious dimension and conservative on a political dimension (Hood and Smith 2002).9 Since membership in any particular group is not required, it is possible for a respondent to feel close to a group’s goals without formally joining it.
My working hypothesis in this chapter is that support for the Christian Right among Republican activists influences political attitudes and shapes internal party cleavages; in other words, support for these religiously based groups has political implications (but see Hood and Smith 2002). Before those relationships can be assessed, however, one might question the validity of the religious nature of the measurement. To test this, I divided Republican and Democratic activists into those who felt “close” or “very close” to Christian Right groups and those who did not (that is, “neutral,” “far,” or “very far”). These groupings were then compared to one another along the other measures of religion in the survey.
As expected, support for the Christian Right corresponds to denominational preference, church attendance, religious guidance, and born-again status. Among Republicans, 62 percent of evangelical Protestants felt close to the Christian Right, compared to 46 percent of mainline Protestants and 34 percent of Catholics. Only a quarter of the Republicans who did not fall into those categories could be classified as Christian Right supporters. Those who attend church at least weekly are more supportive than those who attend less often (60 percent to 28 percent). Sixty-one percent of Republican activists who claim that religion provides a “great deal” of guidance in their lives felt close to the Christian Right, compared to only 25 percent of those who rely less on their religious beliefs. Finally, almost two-thirds of born-again Republicans are Christian Right supporters, compared to less than one-fourth of those who do not consider themselves born again.
The pattern for Democrats clearly shows that both Christianity and conservatism are key components of the Christian Right appeal. Black Protestants form a key basis of support for the Christian Right in the Democratic Party; 37 percent of the Democrats who are both Protestant and African American feel close to the Christian Right. The percentage drops to 27 percent for evangelical Protestants and a mere 9 percent for mainline Protestants and Catholics. Less than 1 percent of the remaining Democratic activists support the Christian Right. As with Republicans, Democrats who attend church weekly were more likely to be Christian Right supporters, but the magnitudes are smaller (29 percent to 8 percent). Virtually identical differences are found for those Democrats who are (or are not) born again and for whom religion provides a great deal (or less) of guidance in their daily lives.
Although religious differences between supporters and nonsupporters of the Christian Right are meaningful and consistent, other demographics were less so. There is no gender gap in support for the Christian Right. Christian Right supporters come from the poorer and less-educated members of their parties, especially among Democrats (regardless of race).
In sum, local party officials in the South have strong religious orientations. Support for the Christian Right is especially strong among Republican activists, with nearly half feeling close to Christian Right groups. A smaller but still substantial portion of Democrats hold similar views. Not all religious party activists support the Christian Right, even among evangelicals, reflecting the complex nature of religious attachments.
Having established the presence of activists with different religious views among grassroots party activists, one might reasonably wonder whether religious differences translate into political differences. The original SGPA survey showed that Republican activists were consistently conservative and Democrats more liberal across a range of policy issues (Steed 1998), and the same general pattern is present in 2001 (see chapter 5 in this volume). Does the consistency within parties mask religious differences? Analysis of policy issues from the 2001 SGPA survey indicates that it does; that is, activists who support the Christian Right are almost always more conservative than other activists in their party, especially on cultural (as opposed to economic) issues. A slightly different pattern emerges for African Americans in the Democratic Party, who will be examined separately.
Respondents were asked about their overall ideology and their attitudes on fourteen specific policy issues. The responses for Republicans are displayed in table 2.2. The first two columns of numbers show the percentages taking the conservative position on the issue. The third column displays the magnitude of the difference across groups using a gamma coefficient. All differences are statistically significant at the .05 level, although the strength of the differences varies dramatically from issue to issue.10
Table 2.2 Issue Orientations of Grassroots Party Activists, Republicans Only
The overall ideology measure indicates that both supporters and nonsupporters of the Christian Right are overwhelmingly conservative. Variation in the degree of conservatism (not shown) is quite large. Nearly three-fourths of Christian Right supporters claim to be very conservative, with another fourth claiming to be somewhat conservative. Less than 2 percent claim to be moderate or liberal. Among those who do not feel close to the Christian Right, only 36 percent identify themselves as very conservative while half identify themselves as somewhat conservative. Slightly more than one in ten adopt a middle-of-the-road stance. Almost none of the Republican activists in the survey consider themselves to be liberal, but the degree to which they are conservative reveals a potential cleavage within the party.
The specific policy issues are arrayed from the most divisive to the most consensual. Consistent with the economic/cultural divide within the Republican Party, the greatest differences are found on social issues, while the highest levels of agreement are found on economic issues. The only exception to this pattern is the support for the death penalty, which falls in the middle of the more consensual economic issues. The positive gamma coefficients indicate that supporters of the Christian Right adopt a more conservative position than nonsupporters on every issue.11
The most divisive issue by far is abortion. More than nine in ten Christian Right supporters disagree with the statement, “By law a woman should be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.” Two-thirds strongly disagree. In contrast, nonsupporters are almost evenly split on the issue, with less than one-fourth taking a strongly pro-life position. Remembering that these respondents are Republican Party officials, the size of the pro-choice bloc—one-fourth of the whole party in the South—is significant. On the other hand, this faction is considerably smaller than it was in 1991 when 42 percent took a pro-choice position. Moreover, only 37 percent of Republican activists strongly disagreed with the statement in the earlier study.12
Evidence of a religious divide in the Republican Party can be seen on the other cultural issues in the survey. They are, in descending order, school prayer, protection of gays from job discrimination, gun control, school vouchers, and the role of women in society. On this last issue, huge majorities of both groups favor an equal role for women. Support is somewhat weaker among those close to the Christian Right, though, as 16 percent oppose women’s equality compared to 6 percent for the other activists.
The differences between supporters and nonsupporters of the Christian Right are smaller on economic issues: a flat tax, aid to women or minorities, government-guaranteed jobs, hiring preferences for minorities, regulation of health care, and cutting services to reduce spending. Both groups take conservative stances on these issues, especially hiring preferences and guaranteed jobs. For example, 41 percent of Christian Right supporters and 35 percent of nonsupporters strongly agree with the statement, “The federal government should adopt a flat tax system to replace the current federal income tax.” Forty-three and 44 percent of the respective groups agree, 16 percent and 12 percent disagree, and 5 percent and 4 percent strongly disagree. In sum, Republican activists who feel close to the Christian Right tend to take conservative positions on almost all the issues in the survey, while those who do not feel close take somewhat less conservative positions on social or cultural issues.
While liberal on the whole, the Democratic activists in our survey are much more ideologically heterogeneous than their Republican counterparts. Virtually all Republicans were united in their conservatism, yet substantial numbers of Democrats fail to abide by a liberal orthodoxy (see table 2.3). Among those close to the Christian Right, 42 percent are liberal, 21 percent moderate, and 37 percent conservative. For nonsupporters, 57 percent of the Democratic activists consider themselves liberal, 30 percent are moderates, and 13 percent are conservative. Supporters of the Christian Right comprise a small segment of the Democratic Party’s activist base, but they move the party in a moderate-to-conservative direction.
Overall, the pattern of disagreement on specific issues between Christian Right supporters and nonsupporters among Democrats is generally similar to that of Republicans. There is greater disagreement on some of the same social issues and more consensus on some economic issues, but there are several items that do not fit this basic pattern. The flat tax, the issue on which there was the least difference in Republican supporters and nonsupporters, is quite divisive for Democrats. Two-thirds of Christian Right Democrats support a flat tax system, compared to slightly more than a third of nonsupporters. Gun control, in contrast, created less of a stir among Democratic activists than Republicans (gamma = .203).
For Republicans, the gamma coefficients were positive and statistically significant for all fourteen issues. Gammas for two issues were not significant for the Democrats, and one was significant and negative. There was much less overall consensus on questions of minority aid and hiring preferences for minorities in the party as a whole, yet there was little systematic disagreement between Christian Right supporters and nonsupporters on these issues. On the question of whether the government should guarantee a good job and standard of living, nonsupporters took a more conservative stance.
For each of these issues, the relatively large bloc of African Americans within the Democratic Party took more liberal positions than did white Democrats. Given the substantial number of African Americans who feel close to the Christian Right, these activists are analyzed separately.
Table 2.3 Issue Orientations of Grassroots Party Activists, Democrats Only
The results, displayed in table 2.4, indicate a different pattern than was found for Republicans and the Democratic Party as a whole. First, there is no meaningful difference in overall ideology between those African American Democrats who support the Christian Right and those who do not. Christian Right supporters are more conservative on six policy issues, more liberal on two, and indistinguishable on the remaining six.
Although there are significant differences on eight of the fourteen issues, there remains substantial agreement among African American Democrats. To take one example, school prayer is the issue with the highest level of disagreement (gamma = .584), yet a full 79 percent of those African Americans who do not support the Christian Right favor allowing prayer in public schools. On none of the issues is a majority of Christian Right supporters opposed by a majority of nonsupporters. Only one issue, support for a flat tax system, shows a lack of consensus among African American Democrats.
Table 2.4 Issue Orientations of African American Party Activists, Democrats Only
The six issues on which there are no differences between groups of African Americans all deal with issues of particular interest to the black community (see chapter 3 in this volume). Each of these issues—school vouchers, the death penalty, government aid to minorities and women, gun control, and regulation of health care—has a racial dimension. On some, it is explicit (aid to minorities). On others, like the criminal justice items, the racial dimension is implicit. The important point is that, on all six issues, the differences among African American Democrats are not tied to their support for Christian Right groups.
What, then, of white Democrats? In some ways, they mirror Republicans in the effect of Christian Right support. The differences between supporters and nonsupporters reach statistical significance for each policy item (not shown). Still, Christian Right supporters in the Democratic Party are always more liberal than Christian Right supporters among Republicans, indicating the continued importance of party to these activists. The largest differences are again on social issues (school prayer, abortion, and gay job discrimination). If the Republican Party hopes to further splinter the Democratic coalition, these white Democrats appear more likely to defect than African American supporters of the Christian Right.
Are the differences in policy attitudes between supporters and nonsupporters of the Christian Right reflected in the politics of the activists’ states? Respondents were asked about the causes of factionalism in their state parties (see chapter 7 for a more thorough discussion of this topic). For Republicans, the top causes of factionalism were differences in ideological viewpoints, between urban and rural areas of the state, by supporters of different party leaders, and over the issue of abortion. More than half of all Republican activists indicated that these divisions caused a “great deal” or “fair amount” of factionalism in their states. The only important difference across groups comes on the issue of abortion; supporters of the Christian Right were less likely to see the issue as divisive than nonsupporters. Racial and tax issues, government spending, and newcomers to the state were much less likely to be perceived as causes of factional splits.
Democrats were more likely to perceive factionalism in both their state and county parties than Republicans. Democratic activists were split on the roots of the factional divisions in their states. The most frequently mentioned cause was differences between urban and rural areas as the leading cause of factionalism, with 65 percent naming it as the cause of a “great deal” or a “fair amount” of disagreement in their party; between 50 percent and 60 percent named each of the remaining eight possible causes as causing at least a fair amount.13 Christian Right supporters were more likely to attribute factional divisions to policy differences on spending, race, and taxes. Nonsupporters saw urban/rural and regional differences as relatively more important.14 Combining this information with the previous evidence about the Democrats suggests that holding together an ideologically heterogeneous, multiracial coalition will continue to be a difficult task for Democratic Party leaders.
Evidence from the 2001 SGPA Project indicates the continuing—and perhaps even increasing—importance of religion in southern politics. Turning the religious views of its activists and potential supporters into strengths rather than weaknesses presents different challenges for each party.
For Republicans, support for the Christian Right splits the party down the middle on a regionwide basis. Two factions of almost equal size could yield no-holds-barred fights over control of the party and its nominees. As the McCain candidacy illustrated on a national level, some Republicans feel that it isn’t always enough to be conservative on most issues if one holds the wrong positions on certain key issues, notably abortion. The same pattern can be seen in campaigns for state and local offices across the region and the country. Still, those Republican Party activists in our survey who do not feel close to the Christian Right are still a conservative group. It should be possible for some candidates to appeal to members of both factions and to unite the party in their state. Former governors Carroll Campbell in South Carolina, George Allen and Jim Gilmore in Virginia, and George W. Bush in Texas exemplify the ability to combine support from religious conservatives with the probusiness policies characteristic of New South politicians. In each case, they took the harsh edge off of the Christian Right agenda to make it more palatable for the less committed. Bush, of course, was able to translate his “compassionate conservatism” into the presidency.
For Democrats, the important challenges posed by Christian conservatives may have been faced in previous years. White southerners, many of them conservative in both politics and religion, were once an important pillar of the Democratic Party’s New Deal coalition. Many of these people (or their descendants) now fall staunchly into the Republican camp (Stanley and Niemi 1999; Layman 2001). Today’s Democrats find a considerable number of Christian Right supporters among their grassroots activists. The faction is more conservative on most issues than the rest of the party. Will it have success in moving the party to the right? Or will its members become alienated by the party’s liberal stands? Much depends on the way Democratic candidates address issues of concern to this group.
African Americans, who comprise a substantial portion of the Democratic coalition and an even larger portion of Christian Right Democrats, are a special case. They frequently are targeted by Republican Party leaders who seek to make them welcome in the Republican Party.15 What is the likelihood that such efforts will lead to success? Keeping in mind that our sample consists of party activists rather than the mass public, the chances appear slim. Even when statistically significant differences appear, African American Democrats generally agree with one another. Their views are largely consistent with those of white Democratic activists in the South. When they disagree with their partisan brethren—on issues like the death penalty and minority hiring preferences—they disagree even more vehemently with strongly held Republican views. On the latter issue, African American supporters of the Christian Right are even more supportive than nonsupporters of hiring preferences. Race may continue to trump cultural issues in keeping blacks at home amid the Democrats (Calhoun-Brown 1997; Clawson and Clark 2003).
1. “The 2000 Campaign: Excerpt from McCain’s Speech on Religious Conservatives,” New York Times, February 29, 2000, A16.
2. For a thorough discussion of the Christian Right in Virginia, see Rozell and Wilcox (1996). A recent review of the literature on Republican Party factionalism can be found in Smith (2002).
3. For recent case studies of selected states, see Green, Rozell, and Wilcox (2003).
4. Similar questions have been asked about the change in Democratic Party politics since the McGovern-Frazier reforms went into effect. See, for example, the varied viewpoints presented in Ranney 1975; Kirkpatrick 1976; Polsby 1983; and Baer and Bositis 1988.
5. Many of the items in 2001 replicate questions asked in 1991. Unfortunately, longitudinal comparisons on the religion items are difficult due to a new (and arguably improved) battery of questions.
6. Only 1 percent of respondents failed to answer this question. While it is impossible to gauge the honesty of responses, almost no one avoided the question to cover a socially unacceptable response.
7. Rather than separate out traditionally African American denominations (like the National Baptist Convention or African Methodist Episcopalian church), this category contains all African Americans who affiliate with Protestant churches. The decision rule avoids the difficulty in characterizing denominations as either “mainline” or “evangelical,” as the distinctions are often blurred in predominantly black congregations (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Calhoun-Brown 1997, 120–121).
8. A different question was used in 1991 to see if respondents thought of themselves as born again. Less than a third responded in the affirmative. It is impossible to tell how much of this difference is due to changes in attitudes and how much results from changes in question wording. The questions on religious salience and the Christian Right were not asked in 1991. For a discussion of religion in the original SGPA study, see Baker, Steed, and Moreland (1998).
9. While most respondents seemed to understand our meaning, a few took exception to our word choice. A few comments written into the margins of the survey instrument asked if we were comparing the Christian Right to the “humanist left” or “non-Christian wrong.” That so few such comments appeared in more than 7,000 completed surveys leads me to believe that our wording was both understandable and appropriate.
10. For overall ideology, respondents were asked to place themselves on a five-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. For the issue items, they were given single-stimulus statements about various policies and asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each statement. The percentages in table 2.2 represent the sum of both conservative categories. The gamma coefficients measure the strength of disagreement across the two groups of activists. The larger the coefficient, the greater the difference between groups. Positive scores indicate that Christian Right supporters are more conservative.
11. On one issue, whether “the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living,” it appears that nonsupporters of the Christian Right are slightly more conservative than supporters. When the full four-point scale is taken into account, the opposite conclusion is reached. Sixty percent of Christian Right supporters strongly disagree with the statement compared to only half of nonsupporters. Overall, very few Republican activists agree with the statement.
12. There is some evidence of polarization among Democrats, too. In 1991, 73 percent took a pro-choice position. The figure rose to 81 percent a decade later.
13. These included different ideological viewpoints; different party leaders; longtime residents and newcomers; different regions of the state; and issues of taxes, abortion, race, and government spending.
14. In some states, urban and rural divisions would overlap completely with regions of the state. In others, urban areas might be found in more than one part of the state.
15. The most recent attempts involve President Bush’s faith-based initiative program (see, for example, Edsall and Cooperman 2002).