Absolute (explanatory) gap, 253
Absolute flow, 323–326, 337–338
Accommodation, 125
Acquired traits, 192–193
Action, flow of, and experience, 312–317
Active genesis, 29–30
Activist-pragmatist approach to emotion, 364–366
Activity compared with passivity, 263–264
Adaptation, adaptationism: Di Paolo’s view, 148, 454n9; distinguished from cognition, 159, 455n13; reconsidered by developmental systems theory, 202–205; role in evolution, 171; various views of, 461n24
Affect, affectivity, 263–264, 371–378
Affection, 30
Affective coupling, 393–395
Affective relief, 476n8
Affective salience, 376
Affordances, 247–248
Agency, 260
Aisthesis, 29
Alexander, S., 479n5
Algorithmic processes, 211–213
Alife, minimal autopoiesis in, 107
Allopoiesis, 98
Amovable behavior, 449n2
Analogues, 195–196
Analysis, static vs. constitutional, 28
Analytical isomorphism, 272, 305
Analytical reductionism, 72
Anthropomorphism, 130
Anticipation, 320
Antinomy of teleological judgment, 131–138
Appraisal, 371
Appresentation, 383–384
Archean Aeon, 94
Argument from Design, 210, 460n23
Aristotle, Aristotelians: on the body, 227; on cognition and the body, 462n1; on life and mind, 80, 226
Artifacts: cultural, 409–410; distinguished from natural purpose, 134–135; distinguished from organism, 133, 460n23; natural, 210
Artificial Life, 107
Assimilation, 125
Association, 31–32
Atomism, 479n5
Attention: as a component of reflection, 464n4; and consciousness, 262–264; and the epoché, 19; in heterophenomenology, 306; and preafference, 369; transparency of, 284–285; types of, 287
Attitude, natural vs. phenomenological, 17–18
Attractors, 52
Autocatalytic network, 104–105
Automaton. See tesselation automaton
Autonomous systems: within autonomous systems, 49–51; characterized, 420–421; compared with heteronomous systems, 37, 43; defined, 43–44; emotions in, 365; overview of, 43–51
Autonomy, autonomous: bottom-up, 44, 46; defined, 43, 44; distinguished from autopoiesis, 106–107; under the enactive approach, 13, 15; perspectives on, 52–54, 58–60
Autopoiesis: in autonomous systems, 60; and cognition, 122–127; computer models of, Plates I–V; defined, 44–45, 92, 98, 101; distinguished from autonomy, 106–107; distinguished from reproduction, 167–168; ecological context of, 118–122; and interiority, 79; minimal, 107–118; and natural selection, 212–215; in social systems, 451n3; symbiotic with developmental systems theory, 193; and teleology, 144–149; Turing-compatibility of, 143
Autopoietic machine, 99–100
Autopoietic organization: compared with autocatalytic network, 104–105; criteria of, 101, 103, 126; defined, 100–101; overview of, 97–107
Autopoietic systems: constraints in, 425–426; defined, 451n2; dynamic sensorimotor approach to, 260–261; and mechanistic models of, 144
Awareness: in heterophenomenology, 306; in the intentional arc model, 370; meta-awareness, 19, 445n2, 464n4; perceptual vs. nonperceptual, 258; reflective vs. prereflective, 315; subject-object structure of, 468n14; transparency of, 284–285. See also self-awareness
Awareness-content dualism, 468n13
Backward causation, 130
Barandiaran, X., 79
Baressi, J., 397
Basic autonomy, 46
Bateson, G., 57
Beer, R. D., 12
Befindlichkeit, 455n11
Behavior: and the brain, 83–84; compared with comportment, 450n3; and consciousness, 78–81; of empathy, 396; Merleau-Ponty’s view of, 67, 449n2
Behaviorism compared with cognitivism, 4
Being and having, 246–247
Being-in-the-world, 21, 247, 455n11
Belief, suspension of, 470n24
Benehmen, 450n3
Bermúdez, J. L., 464n3
Berthoz, A., 295–296
Binding problem, 52
Binocular rivalry, 346–347, 351–352
Biological naturalism, 237–242
Biological vs. cultural evolution, 193, 458n13
Biology, 358
Bitbol, M.: applied to Kant, 452n4; on autopoiesis and cognition, 125–126; on emergence in quantum mechanics, 480n6; on transcendental phenomenology, 82–83
Block, N., 262–264
Boden, 35–36
Bodiliness, 258
Bodily activity, three modes of, 243
Bodily feelings, 23
Bodily self-consciousness, 244–252, 464n5
Bodily subjectivity, 245–252
Body: Aristotle vs. Descartes, 227–230; image compared with schema, 249–250; as subject, 250
Body-body problem, 235–237, 244–245, 257
Bonding reaction, 108
Boundaries: in the autopoietic organization of metacellulars, 106–107; as a criterion of autopoietic organization, 103, 126; defining the system, 98–99; in the Gaia theory, 121; in social systems, 451n3
Bourgnine, P.: on 3D tesselation automatons, 110–112; on autopoiesis and cognition, 125–126; in light of Rosen, 144
Brain: and behavior, 83–84; decomposability of, 421–423; organization of, 365–366
Brain-in-a-vat example, 240–241
Brentano, F. C., 26–27
British emergentists, 479n5, 480n8
Brough, J. B., 472n1
Bruner, J., 443n4
Bruzina, R., 475n15
Building block model of consciousness, 350–352
Campbell, D., 424
Cartesian dualism, 6
Cartwright, N., 440
Catalytic closure, 104–105
Catastrophe theory, 72
Causal asymmetry doctrine, 178–179
Causal closure, 439–440
Causal closure of the physical domain, principle of, 435
Causal inheritance principle, 435
Causation: backward, 130; downward, 424–428, 431–441; in Rosen’s theory, 143
Cells: Bénard, 60–61, 433; as a body, 182–183; first, 93–94; minimal, 98, 113; organization of, 97–105; theory, 92–97; Ur-cells, 94, 117
Cellular automaton, 456n16. See also tesselation automaton
Cellular consciousness, 161–162
Chain-based bond inhibition, 109–110, 451n6
Chalmers, D. J.: on a “hard problem of life,” 223–224; on minimal sufficiency, 474n13; on the neural correlates of consciousness, 349
Change blindness, 276
Chaos theory, 429
Chromatin, 457n5
Chromatin-marking inheritance system, 177
Church, J., 466n10
Church’s Thesis, 448n6
Circular causality: defined, 62; in downward causation, 432; and emergence, 62–64; in emotional self-organization, 371–372; and form, 66–72
Clark, A., 128–129
Classical evolution, 170–173
Clay, E. R., 318
Closure Thesis, 48–49
Co-emergence. See emergence
Cognition: and autopoiesis, 122–127; distinguished from adaptation, 159, 455n13; in emotional self-organization, 371; enactive, 187, 458n11, 460n19; various perspectives on, 10–13
Cognitive domain, 125
Cognitive empathy studies, 396
Cognitive science: Bruner’s view of, 443n4; omissions from, 36; overview of, 3–4
Cognitive systems, 124
Cognitive unconscious, 6
Cognitivism: cellular vs. animal, 453n8; compared with connectionism, 9–10; compared with dynamic systems theory, 41–43; defined, 126; and information, 52; overview of, 4–8. See also computationalism
Cole, J., 390
Collective variable, 41
Comparative (explanatory) gaps, 253–257
Complexity in dynamic systems, 40
Complex systems theory, 69
Comportment, 416, 450n3. See also behavior
Computationalism: compared with dynamic systems theory, 42–43; compared with embodied dynamicism, 12–13; compared with genocentrism, 174. See also cognitivism
Computer, computation, 4–5, 7–8
Connectionism: compared with embodied dynamicism, 10–11; on information, 52; mind as neural network, 4; overview of, 8–10
Conscious experience: characterized, 258–259; and time-consciousness, 317–329
Consciousness: absolute, 324–326; and appearances, 239, 463n8; and attention, 262–264; bodily self-consciousness, 244–252, 464n5; cellular, 161–162; under cognitivism, 5–7; compared with life, 222–225; Descartes’s view of, 226–230, 462n3; distinguished from comportment, 416; egoless, 447n11; egological, 22; higher-order thought theory of, 468n15; imaging, 471n28; and immanent purposiveness, 162; and intersubjective openness, 385–386; irreducibility of, 238–240; lack of, in zombies, 230–235; models of, 350–354; neural correlates of, 349–356; neurodynamical model of, 366–370; primal, 354–355; Searle’s view of, 350–354, 463n9; and the structure of behavior, 78–81; transcendental nature of, 86–87; transitive, 264–265, 468n15; unified field model of, 351–354, 475n14. See also hard problem of consciousness; Husserl, E.; time-consciousness
Consolation behavior, 396
Constancy of matter vs. form, 150–151
Constitutional intentionality, 27
Constitutive concepts, 137, 453n7
Constraint in complex systems, 424
Content NCC, 349–350
Contingent evolution, 216
Continuity thesis of life and mind, strong, 128–129
Control loop of the intentional arc, 367–369
Convergent evolution, 217
Core consciousness, organization of, 354–355
Cornell, J. F., 136–137
Cortical deference, 254
Cortical dominance, 253
Cosmelli, D., 463n11
Crick, F., 181
Cultural evolution, 193, 410–411, 458n13
Culture vs. nature, 193, 403–405, 458n14
Cuvier, G. and G., 200–201, 459n18
Dainton, B., 468n13
Dawkins, R.: on adaptation, 205; on the Gaia theory, 120; on genes, 179–180
Decay in minimal autopoietic systems, 113–116
Decomposability and emergence, 420–421
Deep continuity of life and mind, 128–129, 157–162, 223–224
Deference distinguished from dominance, 253–255
Dennett, D. C.: on adaptationism, 461n24; on the genetic “code,” 183–187; on Goodwin’s structuralism, 461n24; on heterophenomenology, 303–310; on informational dualism, 186–187; on intentionality, 159–160; on introspective reporting, 472n31; on perceptual completion, 275–276; on perceptual experience, 279
Dependency Thesis, 292–293
Depew, D. J., 131, 208–209, 214–215
Depictive representation, 466n1
Depraz, N., 375–376, 378, 476n7
Depth perception, 353–354
Descartes, R.: on consciousness and life, 226–230; “I think,” 249; on mind and life, 80; on recognizing consciousness, 462n3; on self and body, 245; on the zombie argument, 462n2
Descriptionalism compared with pictorialism, 270–275
Design Space, 461n24
Determinism, 430–431
Developmental systems theory: applied to enculturation, 403–411; in enactive cognitive science, 458n11; in enactive evolution, 206; overview of, 187–194; reconsiders adaptationism, 202–205
Diachronic downward causation, 433–434
Dialectical relations, 68–69, 150
Dialectical vs. mechnical thinking, 68
Differential equations, 39–40
Differential reproductive success, 170
Di Paolo, E. A., 147–148, 454n9
Disintegration reaction, 108
Disposition, 455n11
Diversity in developmental systems, 201
DNA example of complex systems, 54–57
DNA methylation, 457n5
Dominance distinguished from deference, 253–255
Doolittle, W. F., 120
Downward causation, 424–428, 431–441
Dreyfus, H.: on Husserl, 414–415; on Husserlian phenomenology, 444n10; on skillful coping, 313–316
Dualism compared with hylozoism, 139–140
Dupuy, J.-P., 26–27
Dynamic co-emergence: in autonomy, 65; defined, 38, 431; of interiority and exteriority, 79. See also emergence; form
Dynamic instability, 40
Dynamic sensorimotor approach, 253–266, 298–299
Dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis, 254
Dynamic singularity, 243
Dynamic stabilization, 208
Dynamic systems: defined, 38–39; overview of, 38–43; and phenomenology, 27; and time-consciousness, 312
Dynamic systems theory: described, 40; isomorphism in, 83–86; reflected in Husserl, 476n8
Dyson, F., 116
Ecological characterization of life, 95–97, 118–122
Ecopoiesis, 118–122
Egological consciousness, 22
Eidetic features, 357
Embodied dynamicism, 4, 10–13, 71
Embodiment: as a component of affect, 376–377; as a criterion for living systems, 113; in embodied dynamicism, 11–12; facial, of empathy, 390
Emergence: classical British views of, 479n5, 480n8; co-emergence, 59–60; decomposability of, 420–421; defined, 60, 418; described, 38; in describing dynamic systems, 57; and downward causation, 417–441; of emotions, 371–373; in enculturation, 408; in genetic phenomenology, 29; global-to-local, 61–63, 424–427; in the intentional arc model, 369; Kim’s view of, 431–441; local-to-global, 61–63; nonlinear, 138–139, 419–423; ontological, 479n5, 480n6; overview of, 60–64; in quantum mechanics, 480n6; in relational holism, 427–431; terminology, 418–419; through self-organization, 336–337. See also dynamic co-emergence; emergent processes
Emergence base, 439
Emergentists, British, 479n5, 480n8
Emergent processes: defined, 60; identity and sense-making in, 147; overview of, 60–65
Empathy: bodily, 165; cognitive, 396; and enculturation, 402–411; reiterated, 392, 399; sensual, 389–390; typology of, 386–393
Enactive approach: and emergence, 60; to emotion, 362–366; overview of, 13–15; roles of organism and environment, 204–205; Varela’s view of, 444n9
Enactive cognition, 187, 458n11, 460n19
Enactive evolution, 201–208, 217–218
Enculturation through empathy, 402–411
En soi. See in-itself
Epigenesis, 175–177
Epilepsy studies, 62–64, 474n12
Epoché, 19–20
Evo-devo, 195
Evolution: biological vs. cultural, 193, 458n13; characterization of life, 95–97, 123–124; contingent vs. convergent, 216–217; cultural, 193, 410–411, 458n13; defined, 404; and developmental systems theory, 187–194; Kantian analysis of, 130–131; by natural drift, 460n19; and the “necessary” claim, 123–124; received view of, 170–173; unit of, 206
Existentialism, 445n5
Expectancy and preafference, 369
Experience: accessibility of, 466n10; vs. belief about experience, 307–308; conscious, 258–259; diaphanous, 467n7, 467n10; distinguished from knowledge, 456n17; under the enactive approach, 13; and the flow of action, 312–317; and the imagery debate, 269–280; under intentionality, 25; Jonas’s view of, 456n17; kinesthetic, 232; of the lived body, 248–251; of music, 476n7; nature of, 83; prereflective, 250–251, 261; sense-experience, 227–228; sensorimotor, 295–296; subjective character of, 261, 283, 467n8; subject-object structure of, 446n7; and time-consciousness, 317–329; and transparency, 282–287; and visualization, 295–296
Explanatory gap: as the body-body problem, 236–237, 244; under cognitivism, 6–7; under connectionism, 10; under embodied dynamicism, 12; under the enactive approach, 14; etymology of, 443n3; and Kantian teleology, 137–138; in mental imagery analysis, 273; physicality and consciousness, 223; and purpose, 452n1; various views of, 253, 255–256
Exteriority vs. interiority, 78–81, 225
Extrinsic vs. intrinsic purposiveness, 145–146
Eye development, 196
Feedback and nonlinearity, 419
Feeling of existence, 229–230
Feeling-tone, 376–377
Fiction and imagination, 469n22, 470n23
Figure and ground, 84
Finger coordination study, 41–42, 57–58
First cell, 93–94
First-order autopoietic systems, 105–107
First-person methods: in brain-imaging studies, 341–348; distinguished from third-person, 248; and the epoché, 19–20; in experimental neurophenomenology, 338–340, 474n10; in heterophenomenology, 303–311
Fisher, R. A., 172
Fissiparity, 94
Fleischaker, G. R., 214
Flexibility, 194–201
Flow, absolute, 323–326
Flow of action, 312–317
Fontana, W., 212–213
Football example of consciousness, 80–81
Forcible presence, 258–259
Form: and circular causality, 66–72; constancy of, 150–151; defined, 66; and the “insider” perspective, 81; as an integrating agent, 78; phenomenal and physiological, 84–85. See also dynamic co-emergence
Format and content, 271–272, 358
Freedom. See needful freedom
Freeman, W. J.: on emotion, 364–366, 373; on meaning, 53–54; neurodynamical model of, 366–370
Freud, S., 5
Freudian model of the psyche, 5–6
Functionalism, compared with cognitivism, 5
Fusion distinguished from relational holism, 479n3
Gallagher, S.: on Dasein, 380; on emergence, 336–337; on proprioception, 464n3; on protention, 361–362
Gallese, V., 395
Gardner, H., 3
Generation in minimal autopoietic systems, 113–116
Generative passages, 475n16
Generative phenomenology, 17, 33–36
Genes: under autopoietic criteria, 123; in developmental systems theory, 191, 404; in genocentrism, 179–180; homeotic, 198–200; Hox, 199–200; selector, 197–200, 459n17
Gene selectionism. See genocentrism
Genesis, active vs. passive, 29–30
Genetic “code,” 178–187, 457n8
Genetic phenomenology: compared with generative phenomenology, 33–34; defined, 28; overview of, 17, 28–33
Genetic-program metaphor, 180, 457n6
Genocentrism: developmental systems theory response to, 188–194; and evolution, 170–173; the gene as a unit of information, 179–187; overview of, 172–175; problems with, 173–174; and the Weismann Doctrine, 174–179
Germ line, 174–175
Gibson, J. J., 247–248
Gilbert, S. F., 194
Given, 30, 444n1. See also pregiven
Global-to-local emergence, 61–63, 424–427
Goguen, J., 449n12
Gold, I., 467n10
Grabbiness, 258
Gray, R. D.: on nature vs. culture, 404–405; on organism and environment, 204; on standard environment, 457n8
Grice, H. P., 467n7
Griffiths, P. E.: on life cycle, 188; on nature vs. culture, 404–405; on organism and environment, 204; on replicates, 192; on standard environment, 457n8
Ground in generative phenomenology, 35–36
Güzeldere, G., 234
Habit in passive genesis, 32–33
Haldane, J. B. S., 172
Hamiltonian energy function, 429–430
Hard problem of consciousness: compared with the body-body problem, 237; defined, 7; dualistic view of, 222–225; and purpose, 452n1
Harman, G., 283–284
Hebb, D., 447n12
Hebb’s Rule, 447n12
Heidegger, M.: on being-in-the-world, 455n11, 455n14; compared with Merleau-Ponty, 450n3; on empathy, 477n6; Husserl’s influence on, 445n5, 447n13; on the in-being, 225; on moods, 23–24, 379; on transcendence, 21–22, 157
Heredity: in developmental systems theory, 202; distinguished from inheritance, 176; and reproduction, 169–170
Hering, E., 281
Heritable variation in fitness, 170–171
Hermeneutics, 444n9
Heteronomous vs. autonomous systems, 37, 43
Heterophenomenology, 303–311
Heteropoiesis, 98
Higher-order thought theory of consciousness, 468n15
Holism, relational, and emergence, 427–431
Homeotic genes, 198–200
Homologous development, 196–199
Homologues, 195–196
Horizon in generative phenomenology, 35–36
Hox genes, 199–200
Human order, 76
Humphrey, N., 255–256
Hurley, S. L., 253–257, 447n10, 463n2
Husserl, E.: on absolute consciousness, 324–326; on affection, 374; on affective force, 377–378; on affective relief, 476n8; on association, 31–32; on attention, 263; and cognitive science, 413–416; on the concrete ego, 381; on consciousness and attention, 465n9; on drive-intentionality, 364; on empathy, 477n6; on experience, 83; on habit, 32–33; “I can,” 249; on intersubjectivity, 383–386; on Körper and Leib, 462n5; on the life-world, 34–35; on memory, 290; on passive synthesis, 373–374; on perception, 392; on phenomenology, 14; on qualitative discontinuity, 85; on receptivity and affectivity, 30; on static phenomenology, 28; on the structures of consciousness, 356; on temporality, 323, 326–327; on time-consciousness, 318–322, 472n1
Husserlian phenomenology: applied to the zombie argument, 231–232; opinions of, 444n10; overview of, 17–22; and self-othering, 251; terminology in, 462n5
“I can” vs. “I think,” 249, 313–314
Idealism, metaphysical, 82
Identity: in autonomous systems, 60; and pattern of life, 146–148; and sense-making, 152–154
Image. See mental images
Imagery debate: and experience, 269–280; ignores current mind science, 267; overview of, 269–270; review of, 297–303
Imaginary transposition, 393, 395–398
Immanent objectivity, 26–27
Immanent purposiveness, 146–147, 153, 162
Immanent teleology, 152–153, 453n8
Impredicativities, 142
In-being, 225
Individuality: in autopoietic systems, 75; as a characterization of life, 96–97; in minimal autopoietic models, 118; and the “necessary” claim, 123–124
Ineffability, 258–259
I-ness, 251
Information: defined, 57; in developmental systems theory, 191; and meaning, 51–60; in molecular biology, 180–181
Informational dualism, 186–187, 458n10
Information processing, 54–57
Inheritance: defined, 170; in developmental systems theory, 191–193; distinguished from heredity, 176
Inheritance doctrine, 176–178
In-itself, 86
Input/output distinction in autonomous systems, 365
Intentional arc, 247–248, 366–370
Intentionality: and emotions, 364; in heterophenomenology, 305–306; Husserl’s view of, 415, 478n3; of an image, 470n25; in imagination, 471n26; motor, 313–314; and open intersubjectivity, 383–386; operative, 30; overview of, 22–27; and passive synthesis, 30; under phenomenology, 15; saturated, 30; source of, 159–160
Intentional objects, 303–304
Intention compared with protention, 475n1
Interdependency, 103
Intermodal comparative (explanatory) gap, 253
Interoception, 368
Intersubjective interaction, 243
Intersubjectivity: in generative phenomenology, 33, 36; open, and intentionality, 383–386; overview of, 382. See also subjectivity
Intramodal comparative (explanatory) gap, 253
Intransitive consciousness, 468n15
Intrinsic purposiveness: compared with extrinsic purposiveness, 145–146; defined, 133; qualities of, 453n7
Introspective reporting, 310–311, 472n31
Ipseity and alterity, 251
Isomorphism: analytical, 272, 305; content and format of, 358; in dynamic systems theory, 83–86; in Varela’s hypotheses, 357
“I think” vs. “I can,” 249, 313–314
Jack, A. I., 310–311
Jackendoff, R., 6–7
James, W., 4; on association, 31–32; on feeling, 235; on habit, 32; presaging Hebb’s rule, 447n12; on the present, 318; on temporal flow, 325
Jasper, H., 63
Johnson, M., 402
Joint attention, 397–400, 405–408, 409–410
Jonas, H.: on experience, 456n17; on freedom, 152; on knowledge of life, 163; on needful freedom, 150–152; on a philosophy of life, 128–129; on the purpose of life, 362; on self-awareness, 161–162; on selfhood, 149; on self-transcendence of the organism, 154–157
Juarrero, A.: on autopoietic and autocatalytic systems, 479n2; on constraints, 425; on Kantian organization, 136
Kant, I.: Kim’s view of, 481n9; modern reconsideration of, 138–140; on organic nature, 129–140; on purposiveness, 133–137; on self-organization, 210–211
Kauffman, S. A., 104–105, 215–216
Kellert, S. H., 429
Kelso, J. A. S.: on behavior, 71; finger coordination study, 41–42, 57–58; on intention, 475n1; on multistable figure perception, 352; on self-organization, 60
Kim, J.: on complex systems, 480n7; on emergence and downward causation, 431–441; emergent downward causation refuted, 434, 436–438; on Kantian self-organization, 481n9; on the zombie argument, 233–234
Kind, A., 468n11
Kitcher, P., 457n8
Köhler, W., 357–358
Körper distinguished from Leib, 231, 233, 235–237
Kosslyn, S. M.: on depictive representation, 466n1; map scanning experiments, 300; on pictorialism, 270–277; on visualization and sensorimotor experience, 295–296
Kronz, F. M.: on the British emergentists, 480n8; on chaos, 429; on dynamic emergence, 431
Kuhn, T., 444n1
Ladd, G. T., 4
Language acquisition, 406–408
Language of thought, 52
Large-scale integration problem: described, 330; effect of protention on, 362; three hypotheses of, 331–334
Laying down a path in walking, 180, 217–218
Lebenswelt. See life-world
Leeuwenhoek, A. van, 93
Leib. See lived body
Levins, R., 150
Lewis, M. D., 371–373, 378–381
Life: of animals, 94, 221; characterized, 95–97, 104; compared with consciousness, 222–225; criteria of, 103–104, 116; defined by mode of nourishment, 221; equals cognition, 453n8; as historical phenomenon, 166–167; interior and exterior natures of, 78; knowledge of, 162–165; Merleau-Ponty’s view of, 77–78; multicellular, 105–107; as a planetary phenomenon, 119; as sense-making, 157–159; single-cellular, 97–105
Life, organization of, 97–107. See also autopoiesis
Life and mind, theses of, 128–129
Life cycle, 188
Life-world: in generative phenomenology, 34–36; in genetic phenomenology, 29; Husserl’s view of, 416, 479n4 (App. A)
Linearity, 68. See also entries at nonlinear
Lipps, T., 389
Lived body: distinguished from Körper, 231, 233, 235–237; experiencing itself, 248–251; and intentionality, 478n3; in phenomenology, 16, 21, 28–29; in the zombie argument, 231
Living orders, 72–76
Living present, 326
Living vs. physical structure, 73–75
Local-to-global emergence, 61–63
Locke, J., 31–32
Luisi, P. L., 113–116, 125–126
Lutz, A., 342–346
Mach, E., 280–282, 287–288, 291–292
Machado, A., 13
Machines: defined, 100; and organisms, 141–144; Varela’s use of the word, 453n5
Macroscale of emotion, 371–372, 380–381
Magnetoencephalography (MEG), 346–347
Maine de Biran, M.-F.-P., 229–230
Map scanning experiments, 300
Marbach, E., 469n20
Marcel, G., 246–247
Margulis, L.: on cellular consciousness, 161; on criteria for life, 116; on the Gaia theory, 95, 119–122
Martin, M. G. F., 292–293, 469n21
Matching content doctrine, 349–350
Matter, constancy of, 150–151
Matthews, G. B., 228
Maturana, H. R.: on autopoiesis, 92; on autopoiesis and cognition, 124; on autopoietic organization of a single cell, 97–101; on autopoietic organization of metacellulars, 105–107; defining “autopoietic system,” 451n2; on the enactive approach, 444n9; on living systems, 141; on minimal autopoiesis criteria, 110; on minimal life, 107; on the “necessary and sufficient” claim, 122–127; on the nervous system, 422–423; on norms, 147; on purpose, 144–145; on self-sustenance, 108–110
McGeever, J., 428
McMullin, B.: on autopoietic organization, 101; on chain-based bond inhibition, 109–110, 451n6; on minimal life, 107
Meaning and information, 51–60
Meaning-construction, 54–57, 71
Meaning in living organisms, 74
Mechanical principle, 129–140
Mechanical relations, 68
Mechanical vs. dialectical thinking, 68
Mechanisms: and autopoietic systems, 144; compared with machines, 142; in Kant, 136–137
MEG (magnetoencephalography), 346–347
Memory: role in empathy, 387–388; in time-consciousness, 320; of visual experiences, 289–291
Mental acts, intentionality of, 24
Mental agency and moral perception, 401
Mental images: defined in pictorialism, 272; phenomenal vs. functional, 274; research topics, 301–302; spontaneity of, 468n12
Mental representation, 25
Mental rotation task, 299–300
Mereological supervenience, 479n5
Merleau-Ponty, M.: on attention, 264; on autonomy in living organisms, 47–48; on behavior, 66–72; on bodily self-consciousness, 250–251, 464n5; on bodily subjectivity, 245–251; on body-as-subject, 250; on the brain and behavior, 83–84; on empathy, 477n6; on figure and ground, 84; football example, 80–81; on form, 66–67, 78; on habit-body, 32–33; Husserl’s influence on, 85, 445n5, 478n3; on the “insider” perspective, 81; on living orders, 73; on motor intentionality, 313–314; on the motor loop, 367–368; on objectivism, 86, 165; on otherness, 465n8; on perception, 76–77; on perceptual synthesis, 317–318; on phenomenology, 14; on physical orders, 72; on self and the world, 247; on sense-making, 147; on transcendental phenomenology, 21–22; on von Uexküll, 455n12
Mesoscale of emotion, 371–372, 378–380
Meta-awareness: as a component of reflection, 464n4; and the epoché, 19; and mindfulness, 445n2
Metabolism, continuance in space and time, 151–156
Metabolism-Repair (M, R) systems, 143
Metacellulars, autopoiesis in, 105–107
Metaphysical idealism, 82
Metastability, 40
Metzinger, T., 474n10
Metzler, J., 299–300
Micro-analytic interview, 476n6
Microscale of emotion, 371–378
Mikulecky, D. C., 452n8
Mind-body problem of cognition, 6–7
Mindfulness and meta-awareness, 445n2
Mind-mind problem of cognition, 6–7
Minimal autopoiesis: abstract model of, 110–112; chemical models of, 113–116; computational models of, 107–110; criteria for, 108–110, 116–118
Minimal sufficiency, 474n13
Mirror neurons, 394
Mirror systems studies, 394–395
Modern Synthesis of classical Darwinism, 171, 194
Mohanty, J. N., 445n3
Monera kingdom, 94
Monod, J., 144
Moods, 23–24, 371–372, 378–380
Mooney figures study, 334–335, Plate VI
Moore, C., 397
Moore, G. E., 467n7
Moral perception, 393, 401–402
Morowitz, H. J.: on adaptation and cognition, 455n13; on ecological context of autopoiesis, 118; on the evolution of life, 116–117; on the Urcell, 94
Morphodynamics: and emergence, 420; isomorphism in, 86; and the nature of behavior, 71; and phenomenal form, 84–85
Morphogenesis, 84–85
Morphogenetic field, 460n20
Morphospace, 461n24
Moss, L., 179
Motor embodiment, 376–377
Motor intentionality, 247, 313–314
Motor loop of the intentional arc, 367–368
(M, R) systems, 143
Multicellularity, 105–107, 197–198
Mutual self and other understanding, 393, 398–401
Myin, E., 257–265
Nagel, T.: on bodily experience, 235; on the body-body problem, 462n4; on the hard problem of consciousness, 222; on the subjective character of experience, 283; on zombies, 230
Natural artifacts, 210
Natural attitude, 17–18
Naturalism: biological, 237–242; and the “insider” perspective, 81; in neurophenomenology, 356–359; and the phenomenological attitude, 81–87
Natural purpose: autopoietic systems as, 138; Kant’s view of, 133–140; of an organism, 153, 211; overview of, 140–141. See also purpose
Natural science, Kantian principles of, 131–138
Natural selection: in developmental systems theory, 191–192, 202; diverse views of, 209; in enactive evolution, 207–208; enactive view of, 212–213; Kantian analysis of, 130–131; and purposiveness, 453n6; requirements for, 170–171, 457n4; role of autopoiesis in, 214; and self-organization, 208–218
Nature vs. culture, 193, 403–405, 458n14
NCC (neural correlates of consciousness), 349–356
“Necessary and sufficient” claim, 148–149
“Necessary” claim, 122–124
Needful freedom, 149–152. See also freedom
Neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), 349–356
Neural correspondence, 473n3
Neural network, 9
Neurodynamical model of the intentional arc, 366–370
Neurodynamics, emergence in, 62–64
Neurophenomenology: described, 15, 312; informing biology, 358; of mental imagery, 302; and naturalism, 356–359; and the neural correlates of consciousness, 349–356; and time-consciousness, 329–338; “triplebraided,” 357; Varela’s view of, 87; working hypothesis of, 329
Neurophenomenology, experimental: overview of, 338–341; perception experiment, 341–346; temporality experiment, 346–349
Neuroreductionism, 243
Neutralization, 292–295, 469n19
New Synthesis, 195
Noë, A.: on the absolute gap, 257–265; on consciousness and attention, 263; on the explanatory gap, 253–257; sensorimotor contingency theory, 254
Nonlinear differential equations, 40
Nonlinear emergence, 138–139, 419–423
Nonlinearity in dialectical thinking, 68
Nonlinear terms, 39
Norms in living organisms, 74
Nurture. See nature-nurture
Object-directedness, 22–23, 30, 446n9
Objectivity, objectivism: distinguished from transcendental phenomenology, 164–165; of experience, 318; Merleau-Ponty’s view of, 86; of nature, 34; subject-object structure of, 29–30, 446n7
Omnis cellula e cellula, 93
Ongoingness, 258–259
Ontological emergence, 479n5, 480n6
Operational closure, 45, 60, 106
Operative intentionality, 30, 478n3
Opitz, J. M., 194
Order parameter, 61
O’Regan, J. K.: on the absolute gap, 257–265; on consciousness and attention, 263; sensorimotor contingency theory, 254; on subjectivity, 261–262
Organisms: distinguished from artifacts, 133, 460n23; and environment, 204–205; and machines, 141–144; and the milieu, 70; as natural artifacts, 210; as purposes, 132–133; self-transcendence of, 154–157
Organization: of the brain, 365–366; of cells, 97–105; compared with structure, 97; of core consciousness, 354–355; Kantian, 136; of multicell organisms, 105–107; of sentience, 354–355; of single-cell organisms, 97–105. See also autopoiesis; autopoietic organization
Organizational characterization of life, 97
Organizational closure: defined, 45, 448n6; Goguen’s view of, 449n12; in Rosen’s theory, 143; Varela’s view of, 449n12
Original intentionality, 453n8
The other and intentionality, 22
Oyama, S.: on autopoiesis, 458n15; on evolution, 188; on the genetic “code,” 184–185; on genocentrism, 201–202; on inheritance, 178; on neo-Darwinism, 193; response to genocentrism, 188–190
Pacherie, E., 295
Pain and object-directedness, 23
Paley, W.: on the Argument from Design, 460n23; on divine artifacts, 133; mechanical perspective, 211
Panisset, M., 119
Parity thesis, 191
Passive bodily coupling, 392–395
Passivist-cognitivist view of the brain, 366
Patocka, J.: on e-motion, 364, 378; on feeling of existence, 229–230; on mood, 380
Pattee, H. H., 54–56
Pattern dynamics, 58
Penfield, W., 62–63
Perceived situation-work, 76–78
Perception: and empathy, 386–387; Husserl’s view of, 232; moral, 393; simultaneous, by others, 384–385, 477n3
Perception experiment, 341–346
Perceptual completion, 275–276
Perceptual synthesis, 317–318
Peripheral vision, 280–282
Personal vs. subpersonal, 6, 447n10
Perturbation/response distinction in autonomous systems, 365
Petitot, J., 72–73
Phantom limbs: and dominance vs. deference, 255; Merleau-Ponty’s view of, 32–33; Ramachandran’s view of, 253
Phase synchrony, 332–333
Phenomenological analysis, 267–269
Phenomenological attitude, 18–21, 81–87
Phenomenological psychology, 20
Phenomenological reduction, 17–22
Pheno-physics, 85
Phenotypic traits, 192–193, 202
Phenotypic variation, 170
Philosophy distinguished from cognitive science, 3–4
Philosophy of life, 128–129
Phylogeny, 191–192
Phylotypic body plan, 197–201
Physical orders, 72–76
Physical realization principle, 435
Physical-symbol-system model, 8
Physical vs. living structure, 73–75
Physicochemical phenomena, 454n10
Physics of phenomenality, 72–73
Piaget, J., 401
Pictorialism compared with descriptionalism, 270–275
Picture-viewing, 287–289
Poincaré, H., 40
Pomerantz, J. R., 271
Preafference and expectancy, 369
Precipitating event, 376
Preformation, 175–176
Pregiven, 30, 35–36. See also given
Prereflective experience, 250–251, 261
Prereflective self-awareness, 322–328
Prereflective self-consciousness, 464n3
Prereflective vs. reflective awareness, 315
The present, 318–319
Presentation: and re-presentation, 25–26, 288, 320; in time-consciousness, 320
Presistence, 460n21
Primal consciousness, organization of, 354–355
Primal impression, 319–322
Process distinguished from property, 418–419
Production reaction in a tesselation automaton, 108
Property distinguished from process, 418–419
Proprioception distinguished from prereflective self-consciousness, 464n3
Proprioceptive loop of the intentional arc, 367–368
Protention: compared with intention, 475n1; overview of, 360–362; in time-consciousness, 319–322
Protocells, 94
Protoctist kingdom, 94
Psychology, 3–4
Purpose, 129–133, 141. See also natural purpose
Purposiveness: immanent, 146–147, 153, 162; intrinsic, 133, 145–146, 453n7; Kant’s view of, 133–137; and natural selection, 453n6; relative, 133, 145–146
Pylyshyn, Z. W., 270–273, 299, 471n27
Qualitative differential equations, 40
Qualitative discontinuity, 85
Raff, R. A., 194
Ramachandran, V. S., 253
Rayleigh-Bénard convection rolls, 433
Reactant criterion of autopoietic organization, 101
Reaction network: in autopoietic organization of metacellulars, 106–107; as a criterion of autopoietic organization, 103, 126; in the Gaia theory, 121; in social systems, 451n3
Readiness in the perception experiment, 343–344, Plates VII–VIII
Reafference loop of the intentional arc, 367–369
Received view of evolution, 170–173
Reciprocal constraints, 340
Recursive function, 448n6
Reductionism: distinguished from emergentism, 417; epistemological and ontological compared, 417; in genocentricism, 185; Kim’s view, 438; Kim’s view refuted, 440–441
Reflection, components of, 464n4
Reflective vs. prereflective awareness, 315
Reflexive downward causation, 431–433
Reflexive sympathy, 389
Reflex theory, 450n2
Regulative concepts, 137
Regulatory genes, 458n16
Relational holism, 427–431, 479n3
Relative purposiveness, 133, 145–146
Relativity theory, 130
Relaxation time, 333–334
Remembering. See memory
Replicative molecules, 123, 213–214
Representation, 25–26, 58–59, 288
Re-presentation: in memory, 289–291; and presentation, 25–26, 288; in time-consciousness, 320
Representationalism: described, 282–283; externalist, 467n9; and Husserl, 413–416, 478n2; and the noema, 446n9
Retention, 319–322
Reverse engineering, 210, 460n22
Risk minimization, 460n21
Robustness, 194–201
Rodriguez, E., 473n7
Roepstorff, A., 310–311
Rosch, E., 13–14
Rosen, R.: distinguishing organisms and machines, 141–144; on the Gaia hypothesis, 452n8; on the physical, 238–239
Saint-Hilaire, E. G., 200
Salience, affective, 376
Sartre, J.-P.: on belief, 470n24; on body-as-subject, 250; on ego in consciousness, 447n11; on fiction, 469n22, 470n23; on imaging consciousness, 471n28; on intentionality, 470n25, 471n26; on mental imagery, 300–301; on pain, 23; on spontaneity of mental imagery, 468n12; on visualizing, 293–295; on visual perception, 285, 286
Satisficing, 207
Saturated intentionality, 30
Searle, J. R.: on biological naturalism, 237–241; on consciousness, 463n9; on downward causation, 426; on models of consciousness, 350–354; on presentations, 469n18
Second-order autopoietic systems, 105–107
Segment polarity genes, 198
Segregation doctrine, 175–176
Selector genes, 197–200, 459n17
Self, selfhood: in autonomous systems, 48–49; in autopoietic systems, 75; and body, 245; defined, 448n7; in the dynamic sensorimotor approach, 260; and needful freedom, 149–152; and the other, 393, 398–401
Self-awareness: Jonas’s view of, 161–162; Kriegel’s view of, 468n14; prereflective, 322–328; in skillful coping, 315–317; Zahavi’s view of, 327–328
Self-consciousness. See bodily self-consciousness
Selfish-gene theory, 160
Self-organization: Barandiaran’s view of, 79; and emergence, 64, 336–337; in emergent processes, 61–62; of emotions, 370–381; and intrinsic purposiveness, 145–146; Kantian, 210–211; in Kantian natural purpose, 134–137; Kelso’s view of, 60; Kim on Kantian, 481n9; Moreno’s view of, 64, 79; and natural purpose, 140–141; and natural selection, 208–218; in time-consciousness, 335–336
Self-production: compared with reproduction, 92, 167–168; in the Gaia theory, 120; in Kantian natural purpose, 134–137
Self-regulation, 243
Self-sustenance, 108–110
Self-transcendence, 154–157
Sellars, W., 444n1
Sense-experience, 227–228
Sense-making: and identity, 152–154; living as, 157–159; and original intentionality, 453n8; and pattern of life, 146–148
Sensing-in, 389–390
Sensorimotor contingency theory, 254
Sensorimotor coupling, 243–244, 393–395
Sensorimotor experience, 295–296
Sensual empathy, 389–390
Le sentiment de l’existence, 229–230
Sheets-Johnstone, M., 161–162
Shepard, R., 299–300
Silberstein, M., 428–429
Simon, H., 207
Situation and response, 70–71
Skillful coping, 313–316
Smith, B., 281
Smith, M., 55
Sober, E., 461n24
Social systems, autopoiesis in, 451n3
Somatic embryogenesis, 175–176
Somatic line, 174–175
Sonea, S., 119
Spacetime loop of the intentional arc, 367–369
Spatial differentiation, 197–198
Sperry, R., 433–434
Spontaneous formation, 108, 451n5
Standard environment and genetic “code,” 457n8
State space of dynamic systems, 42
Static analysis, 28
Static phenomenology: analysis of the imagery debate, 297–303; compared with genetic phenomenology, 28–29; defined, 268; overview of, 16–17; specified, 471n30
Stawarska, B., 469n22
Steady-state inheritance system, 176
Stearns, S. C.: on constraints, 461n25; on regulatory genes, 458n16; on risk minimization, 460n21
Stein, E., 386–393
Sterelny, K.: on life cycle, 188; on replicates, 192; on standard environment, 457n8
Stern, D. N., 476n6
Stewart, J.: on 3D tesselation automaton, 110–112; on autopoiesis and cognition, 125–126; in light of Rosen, 144
Stimulus and reaction, 70–71
Strong continuity thesis of life and mind, 128–129
Structural coupling, 45–46, 206–207
Structural inheritance system, 177
Structuralism, 461n24
Structure, 67, 97. See also form
Subjective character of experience, 283, 467n8
Subjectivity: and bodily self-consciousness, 244–252; in the body-body problem, 261–262; under cognitivism, 5–7; under connectionism, 10; defined, 258–259; under embodied dynamicism, 12; as intersubjectivity, 409; and life-world, 34; and phenomenology, 87, 268; in transcendental phenomenology, 22. See also intersubjectivity
Subject-object structure, 29–30, 446n7
Subpersonal routines: in cognitive systems, 472n31; defined, 6; in imagery tasks, 270–275
Subpersonal vs. personal perspective, 6, 447n10
“Sufficient” claim of autopoiesis, 124–127
Superorganism, 119–122
Supervenience, mereological, 479n5
Surfactants, 113–116
Symbiosis and inheritance, 177
Symbolic behavior, 449n2
Symbolism in the human order, 76
Sympathy, reflexive, 389
Synchrony: defined, 473n4; in downward causation, 431–433; in emotional self-organization, 374–375; generalized, 473n6; in the large-scale integration problem, 332–335, 337–338; in the perception experiment, 345–346, Plates VII–VIII; in the unified field model, 354
Syncretive behavior, 449n2
Synthesis. See Modern Synthesis of classical Darwinism; New Synthesis
Tactile-vision substitution systems (TVSS), 255
Tailored-helping behavior, 396
Teleology: antinomy of teleological judgment, 131–132; and autopoiesis, 144–149; of intentionality, 24; in Kant, 129–140; traditional components of, 130; Varela’s view of, 453n8
Temporality: experiment, 346–349; intentional structure of, 475n15; in unity vs. object, 472n2
Terminus genes, 198
Tesselation automaton: 3D models of, 110–112, 125–126; cellular, 456n16; as a model of minimal autopoiesis, 107–110; “necessary and sufficient” claim of, 126; spontaneous formation of, 451n5
Third-person methods, 248, 303–311
Thom, R., 72
Thomas, L., 121
Thompson, E., 13–14
Time-consciousness: and dynamic systems approach, 312; in genetic phenomenology, 28; and neurophenomenology, 329–338; and prereflective self-awareness, 322–328; and the present, 318–319; structure of, 319–322
Time scales, 371–373
Token-token neural correspondence, 473n3
Tomasello, M.: on cultural evolution, 410–411; on joint attention, 397–400, 405–408; on language acquisition, 406–410; on moral perception, 401
Top-down autonomy, 44–46
Transcendence-within-immanence, 26–27
Transcendency, 129
Transcendental consciousness, 86–87
Transcendental phenomenology: Bitbol’s view of, 82–83; and knowledge of life, 164; Merleau-Ponty’s view of, 81; overview of, 20–22
Transcription in cellular reproduction, 181–182
Transitive consciousness, 264–265, 468n15
Translation in cellular reproduction, 181–182
Turing, A. M., 7–8
TVSS (tactile-vision substitution systems), 255
Two-dimensional cellular automaton. See tesselation automaton
Type-type neural correspondence, 473n3
Ultra-Darwinists, 211
Unified field model of consciousness, 351–354, 475n14
Unity of life, 92
Universal ancestor. See common ancestor
Uribe, R., 107–110
Use-objects, 76–78
Van Gelder, T., 42
Varela, F. J.: on affect, 375–376, 378; on autopoiesis, 92, 101; on autopoiesis and cognition, 124; on autopoietic organization of a single cell, 97–101; on autopoietic organization of metacellulars, 105–107; on chain-based bond inhibition, 451n6; on closure, 448n4; Closure Thesis, 48–49; on describing complex systems, 56–57; on emergence, 336–337; on the enactive approach, 13–14, 444n9; on experiencing music, 476n7; on feedback loops, 449n8; on generative passages, 475n16; on global-to-local emergence in epilepsy, 63–64; on Husserlian phenomenology, 444n10; on identity and sense-making, 146–148; immanent teleology, 453n8; on isomorphism, 86; on living as sense-making, 157–159; on living systems, 141; on machines and systems, 453n5; on minimal autopoiesis criteria, 110; on minimal life, 107; on naturalism, 357; “necessary and sufficient” claim, 122–127; on the nervous system, 422–423; on neural correspondence, 473n3; on organism and environment, 154; on organizational closure, 449n12; on original intentionality, 453n8; on protention, 362; on purpose, 144–145; on self-sustenance, 108–110; on switches in synchrony, 374–375; on time-consciousness, 329–338; on top-down autonomy, 44–46
Verhalten, 450n3
Virchow, R., 92–94
Virtual conditions of living organisms, 74
Visceral-interoceptive embodiment, 376–377
Visual field, 280–282, 287–288, 291–292
Visualizing, 291–297
Visual perception research critiqued, 275–280
Vital orders. See living orders
Von Uexküll, J., 59
Wagner, G., 212–213
Walking, laying down a path in, 180, 217–218
Wallace, A. R., 170
Watt, D. F., 362–363
Weber, B. H., 131, 208–209, 214–215
Weismann, A. F. L., 174
Weismann Doctrine, 174–179
Welton, D., 24
Wexler, M., 295–296
Wittgenstein, L. J. J., 466n6
Work, 77
Wright, S., 172
Zombies, 230–235