1. NS: een Staat. OP: Societas.
2. NS: Veiligheid. OP: Libertas. Cf. i, 6; vii, 15.
3. Francès argued (Pléiade 1485–88) that this subtitle, which also appears on the title page, should be attributed to the editors of the OP. Perhaps not all of her arguments are convincing (cf. Dominguez 1986b, 74). But the conclusion seems right. Most of the language of the subtitle is drawn from Letter 84. Since I am persuaded by Akkerman (1980, 272–73) that the unnamed addressee of Letter 84 was probably Jarig Jelles, and that Letter 84 was probably written in Dutch, and translated into Latin for the OP by Meyer, I take the NS version of that letter to be the one to translate, noting places where the OP varies significantly.
4. This title is supplied from Letter 84.
5. This introductory chapter is reminiscent of Machiavelli, with its emphasis on the need for realism about human nature. Cf. the praise at v, 7, and x, 1, with The Prince, xv, or the Discourses I, iii. Spinoza had a copy of More’s Utopia in his library, and no doubt has him in mind as an example of a theoretician. This may be unfair to More, who had served for more than ten years in Parliament before he wrote Utopia, and had a largely successful career in politics, rising to be a Privy Councillor, Speaker of the House, and ultimately Lord Chancellor of England, before his conflict with Henry VIII led to his execution. Some themes in this paragraph repeat the ideas of the Preface to Part III of the Ethics. The reference to the golden age of the poets recalls Ovid’s Metamorphoses (I, 89ff.), among other possibilities. For a close analysis of the first two sections of this chapter, emphasizing its relation to Aquinas, see Matheron 1978.
6. Cf. Tacitus, Histories IV, lxxiv, 2. It’s ironic that Spinoza, so often characterized as an a priori theorist, should put as much emphasis as he does on arguments from experience generally, and history in particular. Cf. vii, 14, 17.
7. Wernham cites a line from Machiavelli which we might translate: “a republic and a people are governed differently than a private citizen.” Contrast Erasmus: “What must be implanted deeply and before all else in the mind of the prince is the best possible understanding of Christ. He should be constantly absorbing his teachings. . . . Let him become convinced of this, that what Christ teaches applies to no one more than to the prince.” Erasmus, Education, 13. As early as Boccaccio (Decameron I, ix), Renaissance authors questioned whether we would want our rulers to act as the gospels seem to dictate (the issue in that case being whether a ruler should patiently suffer wrongs done to himself or to those within his territories).
8. Spinoza has been criticized for assuming that there are only three kinds of state to be considered, but this is an assumption he shares with both Hobbes (Leviathan xix, 1) and Tacitus (Annales IV, xxxiii) (Proietti).
9. Zac compares the similar thought in Aristotle, Politics 1264a1–5.
10. OP: aut, or. NS: en, and. Gebhardt follows the OP, but Wernham and Proietti, rightly, I think, emend on the basis of the NS. Spinoza will reiterate the idea of deducing his conclusions from human nature in i, 7; iii, 18; and vii, 2.
11. Cf. Hobbes: “The science of establishing and preserving commonwealths has definite and infallible rules, no less than arithmetic and geometry.” Leviathan xx, 19. See also Machiavelli, Discourses I, xxxix, for the assumption that because human nature always involves the same affects, we can use our knowledge of the past to predict what problems are apt to arise, and how we can deal with them. But as Zac observes, Spinoza, unlike Machiavelli, has the notion of organizing his theory of human nature into a deductive system. And he finds joy in understanding the truth scientifically, even if the truth is unpleasant.
12. The bracketed references in this paragraph have been suggested by several previous editors. If the first is correct, then Spinoza is somewhat careless of the distinction between affectus and passio. Cf. E IV P37S2, II/237/29. But as Moreau noted, regarding TP i, 1, there is no discussion of active affects in the TP.
13. The OP and Gebhardt read ceu here, but the NS has of (= seu), which most editors agree is right. Gebhardt (V, 134) calls attention to a passage in De la Court’s Polityke Weeg-schaal, which warns in similar terms against assuming, in designing a political system, that the rulers will be virtuous (Van Hove 1661, 138).
14. Perhaps Spinoza is here trying to resolve the tension in the TTP between iii, 20, and xx, 12. It will resurface in TP v, 2 and 5.
15. The OP, Gebhardt, and Proietti all read causas. But Wernham and Bartuschat are surely correct to read causae.
16. Cf. vi, 1.
17. Wernham comments that here Spinoza abandons his “original belief in an historical social contract,” found in TTP xvi, 12–28. The only contract he sees in the TP is a contract of government (iv, 6). See the extended discussion of this topic in Matheron 1969, 307–30, supplemented by Matheron 1990.
2. See TTP xvi, 2–11, 40–42; E IV P37S2, IV PP67–73, V P1–P20S. Spinoza may give the impression that this chapter merely summarizes his previous work with respect to these topics. But on some topics he clearly goes beyond anything he had said earlier (e.g., in his discussion of sin in §6).
3. As elsewhere in Spinoza, producing an argument he conceives as demonstrative does not require the formal apparatus of a Euclidean demonstration.
4. Proietti refers us to E I P24 for the first three sentences of this paragraph. The phrase essentia idealis does not occur there (or anywhere else in the Ethics). In the texts included in Volume I it occurs explicitly only in Letter 17 (IV/77/9–78/14). Zac suggests that Letter 9 may also be helpful in understanding Spinoza’s concept of an ideal essence.
5. This was a recurrent theme in the TTP. Cf. i, 44 and the passages cited there.
6. Cf. Grotius: “natural right is the dictate of right reason, indicating that some act has either moral turpitude or moral necessity in it, arising from its disagreement or agreement with man’s rational and social nature, and hence has been forbidden or commanded by God” (Grotius 1625/2005, I, i, 10). Hobbes’ definition avoids any obviously moral notions: it is “a liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature . . . and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” (Leviathan xiv, 1). Hobbes thinks the striving for self-preservation is necessary (and hence, not reprehensible). Cf. DC i, 7. In Spinoza this is generalized to anything we do in consequence of the laws of nature, i.e., anything we do.
7. The argument of TP ii, 3–4 reprises that of TTP xvi, 3–4, with interesting variations. See Matheron 1985, 1986, both reprinted in Matheron 2011. It’s natural to compare Spinoza’s thought here with that of Hobbes (e.g., in DC i, 14; Leviathan xxxi, 5), though there are notable differences: Hobbes does not make the Spinozistic assumption that the power of natural things is the power of God; he does not extend his conclusions about natural right to everything in nature; he does emphasize that men are by nature so equal in power, that there can be no dominion in the state of nature (Leviathan xiii, 1); and he operates with a different conception of natural law, as a “dictate of right reason” concerning the means to self-preservation (DC ii, 1; Leviathan xiv, 3). Spinoza, by contrast, speaks of the laws of the individual’s nature, presumably thinking of these as following from the more general laws of human nature outlined in E III (in conjunction with facts about the constitution and history of this individual).
8. An allusion to Juvenal X, 351, to be repeated in ii, 6 (Proietti).
9. Ramond notes that this is the only occurrence in the TP of the term passio.
10. Cf. Cicero, De finibus III, 5–6, IV, 7; Diogenes Laertius VII, 85; and Augustine, City of God XI, xxvii.
11. Cf. E IV P4.
12. Cf. E III Pref.; V, Pref.
13. Alluding to Juvenal X, 356.
14. Another allusion to Virgil’s Eclogues ii, 65, also cited in TTP xvi, 22.
15. The doctrines attributed to the Theologians here—that as originally created by God, man had the power, if he chose, to live according to reason, that he lost that power by his disobedience, that he disobeyed because the Devil (through Eve) deceived him, that the Devil was good by nature, but was made evil by his own fault, and that as a result of Adam’s sin, it became impossible for his progeny not to sin—go back at least to Augustine. Gebhardt (V, 134–35) notes that Spinoza owned a sixteenth-century epitome of Augustine’s works, from which his account of Augustine’s teaching was probably derived. Modern readers may find it more convenient to consult Augustine, The City of God, Bks. XI–XIV (included in Augustine 1990). Gebhardt identifies Calvin as a second theologian who held views of the kind Spinoza criticizes. Cf. his Institutes (I, i, 1; xv; II, i, ii). The Dutch Reformed Church embraced these views at the Synod of Dort. See the Canons of the Synod of Dort (Creeds and Confessions of Faith II, 583–88).
16. Spinoza has previously discussed the fall in Letter 19 (Volume I, 357–61), E IV P68S, and TTP ii, 32, iv, 26–27, and 38–39.
17. For an earlier discussion of the Devil, see KV II, xxv.
18. Cf. Letter 21, to Blijenbergh, IV/130.
19. Cf. E I D7, P17C and S.
20. Concludimus itaque, in potestate uniuscuiusque hominis non esse ratione semper uti, & in summo humanae libertatis fastigio esse. Translations vary. Some take it to say that not everyone has the power to consistently be guided by reason. That would allow that many (perhaps even most people) might have it. I don’t think Spinoza was that optimistic about our capacity for rationality. I take it (in agreement, I think, with Wernham) that Spinoza thinks no one has that power. On my reading, the most he would grant is that some people (probably only a few) are predominantly guided by reason, but that even those people are not consistently rational. Most people most of the time are ruled by their affects. I take this to be Spinoza’s ground for thinking that in every age virtue is extremely rare. See TTP Pref., 14, and xii, 7; and TP ii, 6, and 18, and vi, 6. Cf. E IV, App. vii, xxxii. But this is optimistic by comparison with what some theologians hold. For Spinoza good men may be rare, but they do exist. For Calvin, on the other hand, fallen man is so corrupt that he can do no good. His reason is not so weak that it cannot distinguish between good and evil, but his will is so much a slave to wicked desires that it cannot strive for anything right. All human desires are evil. See Institutes II, i, 8, 9; ii, 12; III, iii, 12. Doctrines of this kind have a long history in the Christian tradition, going back at least to Paul’s letter to the Romans. See particularly 3:9–18 and 7:14–25. The first of these passages consists of numerous quotations from the Hebrew Bible, so the doctrines are not peculiarly Christian. Note, though, that recent interpretations of Paul emphasize more positive aspects of his thought. See Stendahl 1963 or Sanders 1977. It is not obvious that Paul is consistent. In Curley 2015b I’ve argued that he may have evolved, and that Romans may represent a later, more pessimistic view than earlier letters.
21. infinitis aliis. The NS supplies dingen (= rebus, things) here, but it seems that it would be more precise to understand legibus.
22. For an alternate presentation of the argument of this paragraph, cf. TTP xvi, 7–11.
23. Proietti notes a number of allusions in this passage to Terence (particularly to his Brothers). Zac suggests that we should read this passage with Spinoza’s psychological analysis of superstition in mind (TTP Pref., esp. §§1–11), that Spinoza would think rulers (or those who aspired to rule) could enslave their followers by manipulating their willingness to accept superstitious beliefs.
24. Cf. Hobbes, DC I, vii; TTP, ADN. XXXIII, at III/195; and TTP xx, 4.
25. Cf. Hobbes, DCv I, ix, II, vii, xi; Leviathan xiv, 15, 18, xv, 5; TTP xvi, 15–20. On some of the difficulties regarding Spinoza’s treatment of promises, see Garrett 1990.
26. PR compare Leviathan x, 3, and E IV P18S. Both these passages contain the thought that individuals can increase their power by joining forces; neither includes the thought that the right of a collective is proportional to the combined power of its members.
27. Cf. E IV App. x.
28. Cf. Hobbes, DCv I, xii.
29. Cf. Hobbes, DCv I, x–xi; X, i.
30. A theme which will come back, generalized to the state, at iii, 9.
31. Spinoza’s initial discussion of the benefits of forming a social order in TTP iii, 13–14, had emphasized its necessity as a means to living securely. Returning to the topic in TTP v, 18–20, he stressed the economic advantages of living in a social order and its necessity for the cultivation of the arts and sciences, critical means to the perfection of our nature. (This was not sufficient to prevent Steno from criticizing him for making everything about security. See IV/292.)
32. Reading vendicare for the OP’s vindicare at III/281/25, as suggested by Akkerman, Proietti, and Cristofolini.
33. See, for example, various passages in Aquinas: SCG IIIb, 85, 117, 129, 131, 147; ST I-II, Q 61, A 5; Q 72, A 4; Q 95, A 4; Q 109, A 3. The idea apparently originates in Aristotle, Politics I, ii, though Seneca (De clementia I, iii, 2; De beneficiis VII, i, 7) is also an important source for the scholastics. It occurs in Calvin (Institutes II, ii, 13), but is challenged in Hobbes, DCv I, ii; V, v. See also Spinoza’s discussion in E IV P35S.
34. The first occurrence of language which will be central to the political theory of this work. Gebhardt (V, 139) traced its origin back to words attributed to Asinius Gallus in Tacitus (Annals I, xii), where Gallus is supposed to have argued, after Augustus’ death, that Tiberius should assume all the powers Augustus had wielded, because the state needs to be ruled by one mind. Tiberius expressed doubt about his ability to do that. What distinguishes Spinoza’s characteristic formula is the “as if” (veluti). He doesn’t think it desirable, or even possible, for the affairs of the state to be entrusted entirely to one man (vi, 3–7). But he thinks it highly desirable for them to be conducted as if by one mind. Cf. ii, 15–16, 21; iii, 2, 5, 7; iv, 1; vi, 1; viii, 6, 19.
35. As Ramond notes, this paragraph demonstrates the ambiguity of imperium. In its first occurrence, translated “sovereignty,” it designates a kind of right. In its second, translated “state,” it is used to classify the different forms of government.
36. Cf. Hobbes, DCv vi, 18; Leviathan xviii, 16.
37. Cf. Hobbes, DCv xiv, xvi–xvii; Leviathan xiii, 10; E IV P37S2.
38. Cf. TTP xvi, 7–11.
39. Both the OP and the NS have a reference to §18 at this point, though it’s difficult to see the relevance of that paragraph to this sentence, which mentions the laws of the best state for the first time. Wernham (followed by Bartuschat 1994) omits it, suspecting a typesetter’s error in reading an unclear manuscript. The (correct) citation of §18 in the next sentence may have caused some confusion. Proietti conjectures that Spinoza may have intended a reference to iii, 7.
40. Cf. Rom. 9:21, discussed in TTP xvi, 53 (ADN. XXXIV), and Letters 75 and 78.
41. An amplification of the argument of TTP iv, 23–37. See the annotation there.
42. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan xiii, 13; DC xii, 1.
43. OP: vendicandi. Gebhardt would emend to vindicandi, but this is a mistake. On this see the Glossary entry CLAIM.
44. The formula is found in Ulpian (see Justinian, Digest I, i, 10) and Aquinas (ST II-II, lviii, 1), and criticized in Hobbes (Leviathan xv, 3).
45. The definitions of praise and blame which Spinoza gave in E III P29S were in fact different.
2. Zac usefully contrasts this way of distinguishing between citizens and subjects with Rousseau’s (Of the Social Contract I, vi). Spinoza defines the citizen, not by his participation in sovereign authority, but by his participation in the benefits of the civil order.
3. Perhaps it would have been more to the point for Spinoza to cite TP ii, 17 here. In any case, all of §§15–17 of the preceding chapter are relevant.
4. In a letter to Jarig Jelles, dated June 1674 (Letter 50, IV/238–39), Spinoza identified this as the difference between himself and Hobbes. Cf. Leviathan xvii, 13.
5. On the doctrine of this and the following paragraph, cf. Hobbes, Leviathan xxvi, 20–23; xxx, 14.
6. OP: decernendi. NS: onderscheiden. PR would emend the text to discernendi, for reasons I find unconvincing. It’s true that in a parallel passage in the TTP (Pref., §32, III/11/34) the verb is discernere (and the NS there has onderscheiden). But this seems an insufficient reason to alter the text, given the presence of decernere and cognates later in this passage and again in iv, 1, in what is evidently a reference back to this passage. Since they maintain that the two terms have “quasiment le même sens,” the change does not seem necessary for the passage to make sense. And they don’t make it, in similar circumstances, in iv, 1.
7. The OP and NS both read: “so long as men are subject to affects (by ii, 15), i.e. (by i, 5), reason denies that this can happen.” Most editors seem to have accepted this text. But I think Wernham was right to emend the references.
8. Though the general argument of iii, 6, is reminiscent of Hobbes’ Leviathan (xviii, 20), at this point Spinoza takes himself to be disagreeing with Hobbes. Cf. TTP ADN. XXXIII, at III/195/4.
9. Meijer plausibly suspected an allusion to the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist.
10. Cf. Hobbes, DC ii, 18–19; Leviathan xiv, 29, xxi, 11–25. But as Zac observed, though Hobbes granted subjects a right to resist such commandments, he did not deny the sovereign the right to issue them. Cf. also TTP xvii, 2.
11. Wernham suggests that Spinoza may be thinking here of the Mennonites, who objected, on religious grounds, to military service.
12. This phrase does not appear in either the OP or the NS, but PR are surely right to add it to the text on the basis of vi, 1. The pairing of these affects is Spinoza’s standard practice. They cite iii, 3, and v, 6.
13. Madeleine Francès saw this paragraph (with iv, 4) as justifying a right of rebellion against tyranny. It seems unlikely that Spinoza would have wished to put it that way. Cf. v, 7. In the TTP (xvi, 48) he is quite critical of those who try to seize power from their rulers. The subsequent history of Dutch politics would probably not have made him any more comfortable with popular rebellions. But he would also hold, I think, that governments which use their power in ways which alienate large numbers of their citizens cannot legitimately complain if they face violent resistance.
14. I take it that this is a reference to §8, and that the objection arises from Spinoza’s Erastian subordination of the church to the state. Cf. TTP xix.
15. Cf. TTP xix, 3.
16. Referring to Mark 16:14–18.
17. The phrase oleum et opera is proverbial, and occurs in Plautus’ Poenulus 332.
18. Since Latin has no articles, nothing in it calls for either a definite or an indefinite article. The NS translator supplied an indefinite article. Since I understand Spinoza to be a pluralist, who thinks that many existing religions have an equal right to be considered true (because they are equally effective means of achieving salvation), I regard this as reasonable. But I leave the translation ambiguous. “The true religion,” for Spinoza, would be any religion which teaches the fundamental doctrines of the Jewish and Christian scriptures. Cf. TTP xii, 34–37. I’ve discussed these issues in Curley 2010.
19. Cf. Hobbes, DC xiii, 7, or Leviathan xiii, 12, xxx, 30.
20. Cf. TTP xvi, 15–19, 43–45 with The Prince, ch. xviii. Gebhardt (V, 91, 140) cites similar passages in De la Court and de Witt. The maxim salus populi suprema lex is embraced by Hobbes, DC xiii, 2; Leviathan xxx, 1.
21. Spinoza’s attitude toward promise-keeping seems much more relaxed here than it had been in E IV P72. For a useful discussion, see Garrett 1990.
2. OP: Jus summarum potestatum, quod earum potentia determinatur, in praec. Cap. ostendimus, idque in hoc potissimum consistere vidimus, nempe quòd imperii veluti mens sit. The NS translates the last clause: dat de Heerschappijen gelijk een ziel, of een geest zijn. If that’s correct, we should have sint instead of sit. Wernham emended his text accordingly. But his translation—“it was, so to speak, the mind of the state”—takes the verb to be singular, seeming to agree with the OP. It’s unclear whether his “it” refers to the sovereign (his translation of summae potestates) or the right (jus) of the sovereign. Either answer might get some support from other passages: in vi, 19, the king is said to be, as it were, the mind (mens) of a monarchical commonwealth (civitas); in x, 9, the laws (jura) are said to be the soul (anima) of the state (imperii).
3. OP: decernendi. NS: om t’onderscheiden en t’oordelen. See the note at III/286/5.
4. The enumeration of the rights of the sovereign here and in the following section closely parallels that in Hobbes, DCv vi, 18; Leviathan xviii, 16. The comparison of the sovereign to the mind (or soul) of the state is also in Hobbes, DCv vi, 19.
5. A parallel passage in the TTP (xvi, 51) accuses such a subject of treason. Zac suggests that Spinoza might illustrate this by noting the harmful consequences of the prophets’ interventions in affairs of state. For examples of this concern, see TTP xvii, 37, 55, 71–72, 108–11; TP iii, 4. He would probably also have wished to cite the interventions of Christian clerics, as illustrated in TTP xix, 2.
6. The question was asked (and answered in the negative) by Grotius (see Grotius 1647/2001, vi, 14), who cites Augustine as concurring. Cf. Justinian, Digest I, iii, 31. For a helpful history of the issue, see Pennington 1993. See also Hobbes, DCv vii, 14; Leviathan xxvi, 6.
7. Nero was notorious for such conduct. Cf. Tacitus, Annals xiii, 25; xiv, 14–15; xv, 33–37; xvi, 4–5.
8. Cf. Machiavelli’s advice in The Prince xix.
9. OP: contractûs. NS: het verdrach. Gebhardt follows the OP, making “contract” plural. Wernham, observing that the OP editors were responsible for most of the accents in Spinoza’s text, follows the NS, taking its singular to be obviously correct. (He systematically omits the OP’s accent marks in his texts, as do all subsequent editors I have seen.) He also notes that Spinoza follows Hobbes in making democracy the original form of constitution, but does not follow Hobbes in making the transfer of sovereignty to a monarch unconditional. On the first point, see TP viii, 12; TTP xvii, 33; Hobbes, DCv vii, 5–12; Hobbes, Leviathan xvii, 13, xviii, 1. On the second, TP vii, 1; Hobbes, Leviathan xviii, 4.
10. That is, as Zac suggests, if those who have been given authority do not use it in the deepest interests of the citizens, they risk destroying their authority.
2. Hobbes makes a similar distinction in Leviathan xxx, 20. Cf. also Grotius 1647/2001, vi, 1 (Gebhardt V).
3. Prima facie this conflicts with TTP v, 18–19, which claimed a wider range of ends for the creation of a social order. Spinoza will try to correct this impression in §5.
4. Similarly Hobbes, Leviathan xxx, 7 (Gebhardt V).
5. Zac cites, among other things, Machiavelli, Discourses III, 29.
6. Cf. TTP iii, 16 (Gebhardt V).
7. Gebhardt compares the thought in this paragraph to that in Leviathan xxix, 1.
8. Gebhardt (V, 142) cites Livy xxviii, 12; Machiavelli, The Prince xvii, and Discourses iii, 21. These sources do not unequivocally support Spinoza’s judgment, unless we’re prepared to give the notion of “virtue” the rather special meaning it has in Machiavelli. Livy is amazed that Hannibal was able to keep his army together under very adverse circumstances. But he offers no explanation for this feat. The passages in Machiavelli do attribute Hannibal’s success to his “virtue” (virtù), but only by understanding that concept in a characteristically Machiavellian way: Hannibal’s soldiers knew him to be harsh and cruel. So they regarded him with both admiration and fear. “Without cruelty his other virtues would not have done the job” (Wootton 1994, 53; Machiavelli makes a similar judgment in Discourses iii, 21). In Polybius xi, 19, we find an attribution of Hannibal’s success to his virtue, which does not seem to require the kind of qualifications necessary in Machiavelli.
9. Perhaps aimed at Hobbes, DCv i, 12; Leviathan xiii, 8 (Wernham, Zac).
10. An allusion (as many have noted) to Tacitus, Agricola 30: ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant, where they make a wasteland, they call it a peace. Cf. III/298/19–20, and Curley 1996.
12. Cf. Hobbes, who argues that the rights of the kings of England depended on their possession of power, not on the justice of the wars by which they (or their predecessors) had acquired it. Cf. Leviathan xviii, 1, xx, 1, and in the Review and Conclusion: “there is scarce a commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.”
13. Here Spinoza rejects the argument of Leviathan xx, 2.
14. Wernham thought there was “some slight justification” for Spinoza’s interpretation of Machiavelli in ch. xxiv of The Prince, but that applied to the whole work it was “quite indefensible.” He granted that Rousseau read Machiavelli similarly, calling attention to Social Contract III, 6: “Pretending to give lessons to kings, he gave great lessons to the people. Machiavelli’s Prince is the book of republicans.” (Cf. TTP xvii, 8, 111; xviii, 30–37.) But as Zac notes, Spinoza and Rousseau are hardly alone in their reading. Cf. Diderot’s article on Machiavellism in the Encyclopedia: “Read well this work. If you ever accept a master, he will be as I paint him for you. That’s the ferocious beast to whom you will abandon yourselves” (“Machiavelisme,” Encyclopédie, IX, 793). Diderot in turn cites Bacon: “This man teaches tyrants nothing. They know only too well what they must do. But he instructs the people what they have to dread.” He might also have cited Bayle’s Dictionary article on Machiavelli.
2. Some editors have taken the reference to be to i, 7, but Ramond’s suggestion (i, 5; ii, 14; ii, 18) seems more accurate.
3. Alluding again to Tacitus, Agricola 30. Cf. III/296/8–10. Francès (Pléiade) comments that Spinoza treats the turbulence we find in democratic societies as the price we must pay for a life worth living. Cf. also Machiavelli’s tribute to republics in Discourses II, ii: people acquire a love of political freedom, because they see by experience that states have never been successful or great except when they have been free. Only in republics is the public interest a guiding principle.
4. Some trace this thought back to Aristotle (Politics 1287b8–9), but Aristotle does not seem nearly as critical as Spinoza does of aristocracy-masquerading-as-monarchy. Matheron argues (in PR) that Spinoza thinks an open aristocracy can be good under certain conditions (to be explained in Ch. viii), but that a concealed aristocracy is necessarily bad.
5. See Quintus Curtius X, i, 22–42, for the story of how Bagoas, a eunuch who had won Alexander’s favor by performing sexual services, procured the death of Orsines. Gebhardt suggests that Spinoza may also be thinking of more recent examples: Henry III of France, James I of England, and William III of Orange.
6. A recurrent theme. Cf. below, vii, 14, and in the TTP xvii, 3.
7. Cf. TTP xii, 7, and TP ii, 8. Some translators would render this sentence: “good (or loyal) citizens are rare,” which is certainly possible.
8. Cf. the parallel passage in De la Court, I, vi, 6.
9. Wernham cites De la Court I, i, 10 (p. 40 in the 1661 edition), which in turn cites Tacitus, Annals II, lxxxii.
10. I.e. (as I take it), its citizens will not possess the same civic rights as do those who contribute to the common defense.
11. Cf. TTP xvii, 74–75, on the advantage the Hebrew state derived from relying exclusively on a citizen army, and Machiavelli, who warned against the dangers of relying on mercenaries or “auxiliaries” (troops under the authority of a foreign prince), whose loyalty the prince could not depend on. See The Prince xii–xiii, and Discourses II, 20.
12. Spinoza’s insistence on the duty of all citizens to be prepared for military service (including combat) may to some degree explain his opposition to admitting women to citizenship (xi, 4). Wernham notes that in Athens young men only became full citizens after two years of military training.
13. Siege operations were an important part of warfare in Spinoza’s day. Moreover, the Dutch Republic depended for its defense on a system of dikes whose management required scientific knowledge. (When the French armies invaded in 1672, the Dutch opened the dikes to flood the fields and make them impassable. See Israel 1995, ch. 31.)
14. Appuhn suggests that Spinoza was so concerned to avoid a fortunate general’s achieving political power that he dismissed such military considerations as the need for unity and continuity of command. No doubt Spinoza’s knowledge of Roman history made him acutely aware of the threat successful military commanders could pose to civilian government (a threat the popularity of the House of Orange made very real to supporters of republican government in the Netherlands).
15. Zac thinks Spinoza is inspired by the example of the tribes of Israel. He may be right. But those groups had a common biological origin, which is not clearly true of Spinoza’s “clans.”
16. Spinoza will defend this position in vii, 19. But common ownership of the land will not be a feature of his aristocracies. Cf. viii, 10.
17. In the war of 1672 the Dutch had to face, not only the threat of invasion by a French army which outnumbered its forces four to one, but also a blockade of its ports by the English navy. The government was severely criticized for not preparing adequately to meet these dangers. The navy’s lack of preparedness was a major issue. See Israel 1995, ch. 31.
18. Wernham observes that in addition to its deputies, each of the eighteen towns of Holland sent a lawyer to the Provincial Estates. Many of the arrangements Spinoza prescribes for monarchies—many designed to limit the powers of the king—were (analogous to) features of the Dutch Republic. Temple 1972, ch. 2, is still very much worth consulting.
19. Zac notes that in the Dutch Republic the stadtholder, as representative of the sovereign in each province, had the right to choose the magistrates from each town from a list presented by the town.
20. Zac argues that in spite of its name this council is not merely advisory, but also exercises legislative and executive functions: “although in cases of disagreement, the king has the last word, the council basically has both legislative and executive functions. . . . Without using the word, Spinoza fundamentally recommends a parliamentary monarchy.”
21. OP, Gebhardt, Proietti: ceu. NS: of. So Gfroerer, Wernham: seu. Akkerman recommends retaining the OP text.
22. Spinoza here takes the republican side in a major controversy in the Dutch politics of his day. William III (1650–1702), Prince of Orange, was born only a few days after the death of his father, William II. He did not succeed to his father’s position of stadtholder until 1672. In his early years he was raised by his mother, Mary Stuart (daughter of Charles I of England). After her death in 1660 Jan de Witt and other leaders of the Republic sought to gain control of the young prince’s education, a move resisted by the family, but eventually successful. De Witt would have preferred to see the office of stadtholder abolished, but at a minimum he wished to see that the prince was brought up with a proper respect for republican values. See Troost 2005.
23. In the States General the chief delegates of the several provinces took turns presiding, for a week at a time (Wernham, Zac).
24. The system described in this paragraph was that of the States General, which met four times a year, and delegated the responsibility for day-to-day operations when it was not in session to a committee known as the Gecommiteerde Raden (Temple 1972, ch. 2).
25. Proietti notes a similar passage in More’s Utopia (More 1995, 122–23). But More’s rules have restrictions which go beyond Spinoza’s. No matter can be debated on the day it is first introduced; none can be decided unless it has been discussed on three separate days; and the highest officials are prohibited from consulting with one another outside the popular assembly, for fear that they’ll conspire to alter the government and enslave the people.
26. In the States General of the United Provinces, each province had only one vote (Temple 1972, 63). By giving each clan a vote, Spinoza’s system gives the provinces larger in population more weight in the council’s deliberations. He will argue for the fairness of this in vii, 18.
27. In opposing torture as an investigative tool, Spinoza is siding with Hobbes (Levia-than xiv, 30) and Montaigne (see his essay “On Conscience” in Montaigne, Essays, II, 5).
28. OP: quadragesimum, forty. NS: vijftig, fifty. Gebhardt declares the NS “obviously erroneous.” This seems not so clear, but Wernham and Proietti, who note the difference, accept the OP text. Though vii, 5, deals with the qualifications for a different kind of council, it does suggest that the NS text might be right.
29. Secret votes were the rule in the Dutch Republic (Zac).
30. I.e., the members of the executive committee mentioned in §24, which provides day-to-day supervision of government functions.
31. OP: sint primo eorum. NS: zijn voorerst de goederen der gener. Recent editors seem to agree that the OP inadvertently omitted bona.
32. There’s a fuller discussion of this, not obviously consistent with the passage here, in vii, 22.
33. Spinoza follows the advice of Machiavelli, Discourses ii, 3, favoring a liberal immigration policy (Zac).
34. One factor contributing to the disaster which befell the Dutch Republic in 1672 was the poor quality of the intelligence the Dutch ambassador in London provided regarding England’s intentions. Although Charles II and Louis XIV had agreed in 1669 to mount a joint attack on the Republic, the ambassador continued to reassure his principals in 1670 that England would adhere to the terms of the Triple Alliance of 1668. See Israel 1995, ch. 30.
35. A view which goes back at least to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1177b9, 1256b23; Politics 1333a35. Similarly (Pseudo-)Sallust, Ad Caesarem . . . Oratio vi, 2.
36. The advice here is that given by Camillus to the Roman Senate, after the conquest of the Latin peoples, as reported by Livy viii, 13 (and repeated by Machiavelli, in Discourses ii, 23).
37. Wernham suggests that Spinoza’s concern with the king’s marrying a foreign wife may be prompted by the close ties between the House of Orange and the Stuart family in England. William II had married the daughter of Charles I, and might for that reason be thought prone to autocracy. In 1676 William III was seeking the hand of Mary, the daughter of the future James II. See vii, 24, and the annotation there.
38. Cf. Hobbes, DCv ix, 1; xii, 5; Leviathan xviii, 16.
39. Spinoza’s bias against female rulers contrasts with Hobbes’ position on the succession in monarchies. See below, at vii, 25, and the passages cited there. Cf. also Leviathan xlii, 78a. Hobbes’ greater receptiveness to female rule may be related to the fact that he was born during the reign of Elizabeth.
40. In the United Provinces the Reformed churches and their ministers were maintained at public expense. Members of other Protestant denominations could apply to the magistrates for permission to build their own church and hire their own ministers, without state support, provided they satisfied the magistrates that they taught nothing “destructive of civil society or prejudicial to the constitutions of their state” (Temple 1972, 104–5). “The question of which churches were allowed in Holland varied from town to town. It was not subject to a general rule either of the States General or of the provincial assemblies” (Jonathan Israel, personal correspondence, 3 March 2014).
Spinoza’s design for a model monarchy excludes a national church, whereas his design for a model aristocracy provides for one. Cf. vii, 26, and viii, 46. It’s unclear why Spinoza makes this distinction. The religion given state sanction and support in Ch. viii will have a very minimal creed, intended to include only principles common to all religions, and subject to restrictions aimed at avoiding sectarianism. Why this would be acceptable in an aristocracy, but not in a monarchy, is puzzling.
2. On the Persians worshipping their kings as gods, see Quintus Curtius VIII, v, 11 (cited also in TTP xvii, 23). The reference to Daniel 6 is to vv. 8 and 15. From these passages (and Esther 1:19, 8:8) it appears that an edict written in the name of the king and signed by him was unalterable. But some have argued that this is “a folkloristic motif, not a Persian custom” (HCSB). The conclusion of the passage (6:25–27) contradicts the idea that the king cannot issue a decree altering one he has previously given.
3. Cf. TTP xvii, 14. Note that although Spinoza is giving what he thinks of as a demonstration of the fundamental principles of a monarchy, he does not hesitate to argue from rough generalizations about human nature and from the practices of those who construct states.
4. OP: jura. The NS, to capture the ambiguity of the Latin, has a double translation: rechten en wetten.
5. The phrase here translated “the weak support of the laws”—invalido legum auxilio—echoes a passage in Tacitus’ Annals (I, ii) describing the deterioration of Roman life under the principate of Augustus, when legal protections were formally maintained, but undermined by force, favoritism, and bribery.
6. OP, Gebhardt: ex communi natura. NS: van de gemene natuur der menschen. So Wernham, Bartuschat, and Proietti all read: ex communi hominum natura. Cf. III/276/3, 357/10, 359/5.
7. I take this to mean that day-to-day policy must always be consistent with the fundamental goals of the state—peace, freedom, and security—not that there can’t be flexibility in the more specific policies adopted as means to those ends, such as the decision to enter into a particular alliance, or to increase or decrease military spending.
8. That is, on all members of the political order whose policies they are giving advice about. (The next sentence implies that the Counselors are not assumed to take into account the interests of the members of other states.)
9. Though the objection considered here is common enough in anti-democratic literature, Hobbes might be the source. Cf. DCv x, 10; Leviathan xix, 9. If so, Spinoza may be using Hobbes to reply to himself. Cf. Leviathan xxv, 13.
10. A slightly inexact quotation from (Pseudo-)Sallust’s “Speech to Caesar on the State,” i, 4. (See Sallust LCL, xviii–xix, 444.) Spinoza will cite this passage again in viii, 12.
11. Spinoza holds that these incentives make monarchies particularly prone to initiate wars. Cf. TTP, xvii, 15, 33; xviii, 18–19; TP vii, 20. Wernham notes that Hobbes defends the view criticized here. Cf. DCv x, 17.
12. Perhaps, as Dominguez suggests, an allusion to the fall of Jan de Witt, whose republican regime was a success in peace, but a failure in war.
13. Cf. TTP xvi, 30.
14. See III Def. Aff. 44 and the propositions cited there. Spinoza returns to this theme in vii, 10. Perhaps there is some tension between depending on and encouraging the desire for glory, which puts people at odds with one another, and creating economic arrangements designed to give people common interests, as in vii, 8.
15. OP: Rex igitur, sive multitudinis metu ductus, vel ut sibi armatae multitudinis majorem partem devinciat, sive animi generositate ductus, ut scilicet utilitati publicae consulat. This might be read as presenting us with a threefold disjunction, and so some translators have treated it. But I think Spinoza meant to offer only two alternatives, with the first ut-clause intended to explain what the king may be led to do by fear of the multitude, as the second explains what he may be led to do from generositas. His insistence that the state rely on a citizen army includes a requirement that all citizens will be armed, and that this is an important constraint on the monarch’s rule. Cf. vi, 10; vii, 2, 17.
16. Spinoza here endorses what Kavka has called “the paradox of perfect tyranny,” i.e., the claim that it’s impossible for there to be a regime in which the ruler is obeyed only from fear of punishment. (Given the approximate equality of power between different people, and their common vulnerability to countermeasures, a tyrant must have at his disposal some who will enforce his punishments for reasons other than the fear of punishment.) For a useful discussion, culminating in the conclusion that while rule by fear alone is possible in principle, it’s likely to be highly unstable, and that real-world tyrants have often recognized this, see Kavka 1986, 254–66.
17. Perhaps the reference is to vi, 5–6, and 10, or to vii, 11.
18. Wernham sees an allusion here Tacitus’ description of Vespasian’s treatment of his soldiers, Histories II, lxxxii.
19. Here the allusion is to Tacitus’ description of Otho’s treatment of his soldiers, Histories I, xxxvi.
20. OP: duci. But Wernham, with reference to the NS, suggests reading conduci. The phrase here translated “mercenaries”—milites auxiliares—might suggest “auxiliary troops” in the Machiavellian sense, that is, troops under the authority of a foreign prince. Cf. above, vi, 10, n. 11. But I think Spinoza has in mind professional soldiers, who hire themselves out to anyone willing to pay their price. Cf. III/315/1.
21. Spinoza also cites this passage—specifically, Histories I, xxv—in ADN. XXXV, added to TTP xvii, 3.
22. Droetto suggests (rightly in my view) that Spinoza is already thinking of Antonio Pérez, whose Relaciones he quotes later in this section to make a different point. Pérez (1540–1611) was secretary of state of Castile under Philip II, and involved in a complex web of intrigue at the Spanish court. He persuaded Philip that his brother, Don John of Austria, the hero of the battle of Lepanto, and Philip’s Governor General in the Netherlands, had been plotting with Juan de Escobedo, Don John’s secretary, to overthrow Philip, and that the best way to thwart the coup would be to eliminate Escobedo. With Philip’s approval, he arranged Escobedo’s murder. It seems that Don John and his secretary had not been engaged in such a plot, and that Pérez had more personal motives for suggesting the assassination. In his role as an intermediary between Philip, Escobedo, and Don John, Pérez had been dealing dishonestly with all the parties, and Escobedo threatened to expose him. After the assassination, Philip learned the truth, and regretted authorizing it. He had Pérez imprisoned on a charge of treason, but hesitated to bring him to trial, because Pérez had documents which would embarrass him. Eventually Pérez escaped, first to Aragon, and then to France, where he spent most of his remaining years. In 1598 he published his Relaciones, where he presents himself a loyal servant of his master, done in by rivals at court, who envied the closeness of his relationship to Philip. This self-serving work was especially popular in Protestant countries, because of the unflattering light in which it portrayed Philip, who had, on anyone’s account, sanctioned the killing of one of his subjects without due process. Pérez was a keen reader of Tacitus, whom he cites frequently. Spinoza owned the edition of the Relaciones published in Geneva in 1644. Extremely useful are Droetto, Méchoulan 1974, and Parker 2014. The Spanish original of Parker 2014, Parker 2012, has an appendix which does not appear in the English version, arguing that historians cannot and should not trust Pérez.
23. The passage Spinoza quotes (translating into Latin with some freedom) is in Pérez’s Relación Sumaria de las Prisiones y Persecuciones de Antonio Pérez, included in Pérez 1644, 207 (pp. 203–4 in Pérez 1715). A more literal translation would read: “the exercise of absolute power is very dangerous for kings, very hateful to his vassals, and very offensive to God and nature, as a thousand examples show.”
24. Cf. above, vi, 9.
25. Cf. above, vi, 10.
26. The Ethics mentions greed (in III P56S) as one of a group of five affects which are particularly noteworthy (the others being gluttony, drunkenness, lust, and ambition), but never, so far as I can see, gives it the prominence Spinoza accords it here. IV App. xxviii comes close.
27. Returning to the theme of the importance of reading history, this time Spinoza makes it clear that the Bible is also a valuable source for our understanding of human behavior.
28. Wernham invites comparison with Machiavelli, Discourses iii, 24, and Tacitus, Agricola 39 (to which we might add his Annals I, ii).
29. Implicitly a criticism of the constitution of the Dutch Republic, which gave equal representation in the States General to each province, independently of their population. Cf. vi, 25.
30. Accepting Wernham’s emendation of the OP text, reading quia for qui.
31. Proietti corrects the OP’s (and Gebhardt’s) vindicare in this passage to vendicare. (It occurs also below in l. 31.)
32. Cf. vi, 12.
33. Cf. vii, 5, and the annotation there.
34. Cf. vi, 26–29.
35. Tacitus, Histories II, lxxxiv. Spinoza has modified the quotation, which in Tacitus begins as a description of the behavior of one particular Roman general, Mucianus, and moves to a generalization about the decline of justice under Vespasian.
36. By the restriction assumed in §8.
37. Not quite what vi, 31, said: in peacetime no regular payments are to be made to soldiers; in wartime those who sustain their life by daily work should receive regular payment; officers receive only the spoils of war.
38. Wernham suggests that this passage “owes something” to Sallust, Bellum Catilinae v. If so, Spinoza generalizes in a way Sallust doesn’t.
39. Wernham takes TP vi, 33, to indicate that the king’s near kinsmen should be made ambassadors to foreign countries. The story of Philip II’s problems with Don John of Austria would be one example of the dangers posed to a king by a near relative who achieves military renown.
40. Cf. 1 Kings 3:1, 14:25–28; 2 Chron. 8:11, 12:9–12.
41. In 1667 Louis invaded the Spanish Netherlands, which he regarded as his wife’s inheritance.
42. The complex history of Henry VIII’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon might also serve to illustrate the dangers involved in such alliances.
43. It’s natural to think Hobbes is the target here, and he certainly did defend some of the views criticized: e.g., that the King can choose anyone he likes as his successor. Cf. DCv ix, 12, 13; Leviathan xix, 18–20. But he does not infer (a non sequitur in my view) that in cases where the King has not named a successor, the King’s son inherits the throne by right. Hobbes thinks that in the absence of an express designation, custom controls. Where custom dictates that the eldest male succeeds, the eldest male succeeds. If custom favors a female, a daughter may succeed. Cf. DC ix, 14–17; Leviathan xix, 21. Where neither express designation nor custom settles the issue, we presume a preference for a child of his own, with sons preferred to daughters, but a daughter preferred to the children of other men (e.g., a brother or sister).
As Matheron observes (PR, 295, nn. 43, 44), Spinoza’s position is that in a monarchy the eldest son does succeed his father by right (vi, 37). He just doesn’t do so by right of inheritance. He does so because the multitude has so willed, once and for all. (It is unclear why the multitude, in instituting a monarchy, must have made that stipulation.)
44. Wernham comments: “This means that the ‘eternal election’ of the king is always to some extent fictitious (cf. viii, 3), and that the original democratic sovereign is always lurking in the background.”
45. Eorum . . . cohaerentiam, sive imperii analogiam. I take Spinoza to be claiming that his foundations for a monarchic state are well-designed in that they give the king enough, but not too much, power—enough to provide security and order, but not so much that it compromises the freedom of the citizens. On this reading the idea of proportion would refer to the balance of power between the king and the multitude (as in the quote from Ferdinand in §30).
46. From Tacitus, Annals I, xxix (where unnamed members of Drusus’ staff advise him to deal harshly with a threatened mutiny among the soldiers). Spinoza has previously cited this passage, without showing any disapproval, at E IV P54S. Here he seems to be criticizing Drusus’ advisors for identifying as vices peculiar to the common people defects Spinoza thinks people in general suffer from.
47. Livy XXIV, xxv. Spinoza abridges and paraphrases a passage interesting enough to expand and translate. The Latin reads: ea natura multitudinis est: aut servit humiliter aut superbe dominatur; libertatem, quae media est, nec struere modice nec habere sciunt; et non ferme desunt irarum indulgentes ministri, qui avidos atque intemperantes suppliciorum animos ad sanguinem et caedes inritent. That is: “This is the nature of the multitude; they either serve humbly or rule proudly, like despots; they don’t know how to moderately find the middle way of freedom, or to keep it. And generally there’s no lack of men to minister indulgently to their anger, who stir up hearts greedy for intemperate punishment to bloody slaughter.” Livy is commenting on a speech by Sopater, a Syracusan politician, who encouraged a mob to condemn to death the wives of two recently assassinated tyrants. Livy’s account does suggest that these women were complicit in their husbands’ crimes. But Sopater’s speech unleashed the mob’s anger against other victims whom Livy clearly regards as innocent.
48. Here Spinoza refers to a passage in Tacitus (Histories I, xxxii), in which Piso’s oratory has incited the plebeians en masse (universa plebs) to call for the death of Otho and the conspirators. His quotation is not exact. In Tacitus (LCL II, 56) the text reads: neque illis iudicium aut veritas, which Moore renders “there was neither sense nor honesty in their demands.” Spinoza’s quote (perhaps relying on memory) reads: nec ei veritas, aut judicium, which is what I have translated. Tacitus offers the following justification for saying that the plebeians showed neither sense nor honesty (to use Moore’s translation): “On this very same day they would have clamoured for the opposite with equal enthusiasm, but they acted according to the traditional custom of flattering the emperor, whoever he might be, with fulsome acclamations and senseless zeal” (LCL Tacitus II, 57).
49. The quote is from Terence, Adelphi 823–25, where it is treated as proverbial.
50. Wernham notes an allusion here to the opening paragraph of Tacitus’ Histories with its complaint that other historians, writing about the empire, did not serve the cause of truth well, for one of two reasons: either they hated the emperor and exaggerated his defects, or they wanted his favor and flattered him. Tacitus himself claimed in his Annals to write sine ira et studio, without anger or partiality.
51. Wernham compares Spinoza with Machiavelli here, noting correctly that Spinoza favors “an inter-state equilibrium,” like that Machiavelli describes as having been key to the stability achieved in both Sparta and Venice. But in the end Machiavelli does not advocate seeking this middle way. He thinks that the vicissitudes of life being what they are, such an equilibrium is impossible to find successfully, and can be pursued only by giving up the ambition to found a great empire. Someone organizing a republic from scratch should follow the Roman model, allowing easy immigration, population increase, and participation of the people in the military (Discourses i, 6).
52. Conceding a point to Hobbes, DCv x, 14. Méchoulan 1974 suggests that in this paragraph Spinoza may have been thinking of Pérez, whose knowledge of Philip II’s secrets made his master tremble when Pérez was no longer in reach of his revenge. In addition to Escobedo’s assassination, there were other killings (though we should probably not include the death of his son, Don Carlos, among them). See Parker 1995a, ch. 5.
53. A paraphrase of a passage in Tacitus (Annals I, lxxxi), which accuses Tiberius of disguising under an appearance of freedom his policies regarding consular elections.
54. In what follows Spinoza relies broadly on Pérez’s Relaciones (139–48, 228, in Pérez 1644; 145–53, 221–22 in Pérez 1715) for an account of the institution of constitutional monarchy in Aragon. Pérez may not be an entirely reliable source, but Dominguez 1986b thinks the text gives a sufficiently precise account of the “General Privilege” Pedro III (r. 1276–1285) agreed to. In that agreement, the king promised to observe the rights of the nobility, to not prosecute anyone in virtue of his office, to convene the Cortes annually, and to allow “the Justice” to judge all cases brought to the Cortes. Droetto provides a detailed and instructive comparison of Spinoza’s account with its source in Pérez. For helpful general background, see Elliott 1970. For an illuminating discussion of Spinoza’s relation to Pérez, see Méchoulan 1974, 1984.
55. Wernham suggested that this pope was Gregory VII (r. 1073–1085). But Dominguez 1986b suggests that it was Alexander II (r. 1061–1073). Droetto notes that the vagueness of this passage about dates and persons indicates that the “history” is largely legendary. Giesey 1968 is a meticulous attempt to sort out fact from fiction.
56. Here Spinoza alludes to 1 Sam. 8 (discussed briefly in TTP xvii, 106), which generated much controversy in the early modern period. Though most naturally taken as an argument against absolute monarchy (as in Milton 1991, 13–14, 85), in Leviathan xx, 16, Hobbes construed it as a statement of the absolute right of kings.
57. When Pérez escaped to Aragon in 1590, he placed himself in the custody of the authorities there, knowing that he would have greater rights under the Aragonian constitution than he had in Castile. Frustrated by this maneuver, Philip had Pérez arrested by the Inquisition, on spurious charges of heresy and sodomy. He expected the Inquisition to be more cooperative (which they were), and to confine Pérez more securely (which they did not). The transfer to the Inquisition led to riots, in which the Aragonians protested the assault on their kingdom’s liberties. This forced the Inquisition to return Pérez to the civil authorities. Philip then mobilized forces on the border of Aragon, threatening an invasion if Pérez was not returned to the Inquisition. The authorities relented and prepared to obey. But further riots allowed Pérez to escape to France. Philip invaded, punished the leaders of the rebellion, and pushed through the Cortes a number of measures increasing his power in Aragon, including legal changes which made it harder for someone charged with treason to be protected by the privileges. See Parker 2014.
58. Pedro IV (r. 1336–1387), who abolished the privileges in 1348, but was forced to reinstate them in 1384. (See Dominguez 1986b and Droetto.)
59. It’s unclear whether Pérez meant to claim that Pedro IV had cut off his hand, or merely that he had cut it.
60. Quoting Pérez 1644, 147 (p. 152 in 1715 ed.). Pérez’s account is quite clear about the contractual nature of the agreement between the king and his subjects.
61. Ferdinand and Isabella were married in 1469. Ferdinand was then heir to the throne of Aragon, but did not become King of Aragon until the death of his father in 1479. Isabella was heir to the throne of Castile, and became Queen of Castile on the death of her half brother in 1474. Ferdinand then became King of Castile, not in his own right, but in the right of his wife. On her death in 1504 their daughter, Joanna, inherited the throne. Ferdinand resigned the throne of Castile, but acted as her regent for most of his remaining life until his death in 1516. Spinoza’s allusion to Ferdinand’s eventual absolutism perhaps refers to his introduction of the Inquisition into Aragon, which the Aragonese bitterly resisted.
62. Spinoza is quoting a passage from Pérez’s Relaciones (1644, 143) which the English translation of 1715 renders somewhat more exactly: “That besides his having inherited them on the same conditions [as] he possessed them, and having sworn to maintain them, on pain of the greatest of censures, which oath whosoever did break would have just cause to dread the judgments of God, and besides the faith due naturally to his word, which the most barbarous nations regard, he always observed it as a rule between king and subjects, that whensoever the balance was even, as to the kingdom’s satisfaction, the kingdom would be permanent, and the king safe in the possession of it, and that when the balance was uneven, both would be always striving, not only to set it even, as it was before, but to rise above the other, and hence would ensue the ruin of one or both of them” (1715, 148–49).
63. Alluding to Terence’s Phormio 77–78.
1. From here on we can’t appeal to Letter 84 to supply chapter titles. This title appears in the OP, but probably comes from Spinoza’s editors, not Spinoza. Whether it fairly summarizes the contents of the chapter is a matter of disagreement. Cf. Wernham, 367, with Pléiade 1502–3.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: §1 defines what an aristocratic state is, and §2 determines the size of the patrician class from which the Supreme Council of the state is to be drawn; §§3–6 compare aristocracies with monarchies and democracies, arguing that aristocracies are more absolute than monarchies, though less absolute than democracies; §§7–19 describe the foundations of an aristocratic state, specifying that the Supreme Council is to be “its own master” (sui juris) as far as possible. This means that it has the unconditional right to make and repeal laws, appoint all public servants, and choose the patricians who are to replace those of its members who die. §§20–28 describe a smaller council, called the Council of Syndics, also drawn from the patrician class, and appointed for life, whose function is to oversee the actions of the Supreme Council, and in particular, to make sure that the laws the Supreme Council has enacted are obeyed. §§29–36 describe a second subordinate council, the Senate, which has executive functions and a regularly rotating, term-limited membership. Though the Senate makes initial decisions about war and peace, these decisions are subject to review by the Supreme Council. §§37–43 describe the judiciary, and §§44–45 the role of certain officials not chosen from the patrician class. The discussion of the foundations of the state concludes in §46 with prescriptions for a national religion which give specificity to the discussion of state-church relations in the TTP.
2. Spinoza will return to this topic in xi, 1. He apparently had not worked out consistent criteria for distinguishing between aristocracies and democracies. See the Glossary entries ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY.
3. The passage from III/323/23 (“I say expressly. . .”) to III/324/1 (“.. among the Patricians”) is in the OP, but not the NS, which suggests that the Dutch translation was made from a Latin manuscript to which Spinoza subsequently made changes. Wernham notes that the town council of Amsterdam was recruited in this way, with new members being chosen by the old, when one of their number died. Cf. Temple 1972, 53–54.
4. Wernham notes that Van Hove cites the danger of factions as a great weakness of aristocracies. See Van Hove 1661, II, ii, 5, p. 286.
5. A number of translators (e.g., Wernham, Shirley, Ramond, Droetto, Dominguez) have specified that the desire leading to this result is ambition (defined in E III Def. Aff. 44 as an excessive desire for esteem). We might also think of it as a desire for power, which is perhaps more fundamental in Spinoza’s psychology. Cf. E III P12. The same expression (more humanae cupidinis) is used in TP ix, 14.
6. Thucydides judged that the government of the Five Thousand at Athens in 411 was “a reasonable and moderate blending of the few and the many,” producing a better government than Athens had ever had in his lifetime. (The Peloponnesian War viii, 97, noted by Van Hove 1661, III, iii, 4, p. 566.)
7. In TP ix Spinoza will discuss aristocracies with several principal cities, which do not take their name from one. (That is his preferred type of aristocracy.)
8. The OP’s vendicat is correct (Proietti, Akkerman). Gebhardt’s “emendation” to vindicat is unnecessary. Similarly below at 326/9 and 13.
9. In antiquity “Lower Germany” (Germania Inferior) was a Roman province on the west bank of the Rhine, which included the Rhine from its mouth up to the mouth of the Obringa (either the Aar or the Moselle). The territory included modern Luxembourg, southern Netherlands, part of Belgium, and part of Germany.
10. This was the practice in Venice, which, as Machiavelli points out, did not end well (Discourses i, 6).
11. Proietti notes an allusion to Sallust, Bellum Catilinae lix, 5.
12. OP, Gebhardt: omnis gloriae et honores adipiscendi spes. NS: alle hoop, om eer en ampten te verkrijgen. So Wernham: gloriam.
13. Contrast Spinoza’s disapproval of hiring mercenaries in a monarchy, at vi, 10. Wernham notes that the Dutch regents had hired mercenaries in times of crisis.
14. The best-known example being the overthrow of the republic by Caesar. Cf. III/289/7–8 for a similar expression in a different context.
15. Alluding again to (Pseudo-)Sallust’s “Speech to Caesar on the State,” i, 4. Cf. TP vii, 5.
16. The situation of the immigrants Spinoza describes in this paragraph would have been, roughly, that of the Amsterdam Jewish community in which he grew up. They had come there in search of religious liberty, and were content to be left alone to practice their religion. But in Spinoza’s lifetime they had not generally assimilated in the way he describes. On this issue, see Bodian 1997.
17. Van Hove excludes the same classes. Van Hove 1661, III, iii, 4 (Wernham).
18. In Venice a noble became a member of the Grand Council at age twenty-five (Wernham).
19. OP: a reliquis. But NS: boven d’anderen, suggesting prae reliquis, above everyone else (Wernham).
20. In Venice the refusal to accept certain magistracies was punishable by a fine (Wernham).
21. OP: accusatores, si res postulat, asservandos. A puzzling passage. Asservare can mean either “to arrest” or “to keep safe, protect.” In the only other place where it occurs in Spinoza’s writings, III/265/6 (i.e., in ADN. XXXVI, attached to xvii, 37), it clearly means the former. At III/428 Gebhardt says that that’s what asservare means in Spinoza, which seems a hasty generalization, given that we have only two occurrences, and only one where the meaning is clear. But why would the presiding officer want to arrest the accusatores (accusers)?
The NS translator has: de beschuldigden te beschutten, “to protect the accused,” also puzzling, for different reasons. Why protect the accused? Gebhardt conjectured that the NS translator was looking at a text which read accusatos asservandos, and mistranslated asservandos. This seems possible. But if an editor believes that it’s right, why not emend the text? In the end, Gebhardt did. But at III/335 he retains the OP reading, and his Textgestaltung (III/428) says that if we do that, we must interpret asservare as meaning “to protect.” His theory at that point was that the Syndics might need to provide protective custody for commoners so that they would feel free to make accusations against patricians (even though they could make those accusations anonymously).
Wernham argued that there would be no need to protect the accusers if their identities were kept secret. So he corrected to accusatos, and translated asservandos as “take into custody.” Shirley and PR make the same emendation and translate similarly. Bartuschat (1994) follows the OP, without comment. Cristofolini (1985) also follows the OP in his text, but notes the controversy. Dominguez (1986b) points out that in his Corrigenda Gebhardt changed his mind, recommending (III/432) that we read accusatos for accusatores. He does not explain the change at that point, but in V, 175–76, he appeals to a passage from Van Hove as speaking decisively for the emendation. Dominguez’ translation (1986b) assumes that what is at issue is the protection of accusers.
It seems not too difficult to imagine circumstances which would require the protection even of secret accusers. Their knowledge of certain facts might enable the accused to identify them, even if the Syndics tried diligently to keep their identity secret. But it also seems not too difficult to imagine circumstances which would require the protection of the accused. Accusations of having committed a serious crime might put them at risk of extra-legal punishment from unruly citizens. (Americans might think of the assassination of Oswald; the Dutch, of Cornelis de Witt.) In the end I think it’s best to emend the text to accusatos, but to acknowledge its uncertainty.
22. The extra text which Gebhardt adds from the NS is probably, as Wernham suggested, a clarification of continuari. Proietti reaches the same conclusion, apparently independently. My translation assumes that the clarification is correct.
23. OP: appellabimus. The NS agrees with the use the future tense. Wernham suggested emending to appellavimus, “we have called,” noting the prior introduction of the term Senatus at III/333/25, and observing that Spinoza’s handwriting would make this kind of corruption of the text very easy. But subsequent editors have not followed Wernham here, and the change does not seem necessary. This is the sort of mistake we might expect to find in a manuscript whose author has not given it a final review.
24. OP, Gebhardt: una circiter duodecima pars. NS: omtrent een vierde deel. Wernham thought sense required the NS reading, and emended the Latin accordingly: una circiter quarta pars, “roughly a fourth.” He argued that in practice senatorial rank would be confined to 1,200 men, who would “serve in groups of 400, each group resuming office after an interval of two years.” Translators have been sharply divided. Ramond argues at length for retaining the OP reading. Though I find the question quite obscure, I accept that recommendation. Cf. ix, 6.
25. Wernham calls attention to Hobbes, DCv x, 2, which argues that the ruler’s interests and his subjects’ interests are necessarily aligned: it’s in the ruler’s interest for his subjects to prosper, and contrary to his interest for them to be poor. (There’s a similar passage in Leviathan xix, 4.) Wernham comments that rulers don’t always see what is in their interest, which is no doubt true. But Spinoza perhaps wants to make a less obvious point: that the ruler’s interests and his subjects’ interests are necessarily in conflict.
26. I.e., Pieter van Hove, apparently the principal author of Van Hove 1661. Wernham suggests that the intended reference is to I, i, 10–34, pp. 39–136, of that work, which argue for republics as preferable to monarchies.
27. Wernham notes that it’s probably the representatives of the Syndics to the Senate, not the Syndics themselves, who are said to be chosen by the supreme council here. (All the Syndics are chosen by the supreme council, so it hardly seems worth saying, at this point, that the syndics are so chosen.)
28. Accepting Wernham’s suggestion that a word like indicabit has probably been omitted inadvertently after statum.
29. Wernham notes that the procedure up to this point is similar to that of the Venetian Senate, as described in Van Hove 1661 II, iv, 5, pp. 329–30.
30. Which granted as much sovereignty as possible to the supreme council.
31. The NS (beginning from the asterisk) has a fuller text, which reads: die de gerechtigheid bemint, en voor de welk zy ontsach zullen hebben, which we might translate: “who love justice and for whom [the unjust] will have respect/awe.” Proietti suggests that those who will in the first instance have respect for the judges who love justice will be the other judges, and that as a result, the unjust will fear them.
32. The Syndics thus have a role analogous to that of the tribunes of the people in the Roman republic. Cf. x, 3 (Wernham).
33. This is commonly taken to be a reference to two leading figures in the Dutch Republic, whose ability and industry gave them an influence far beyond the official powers of their positions: Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619) and Johan de Witt (1625–1672). See Wernham, n. 409; Gebhardt V, 182–83; Dominguez 1986b, n. 196; Bartuschat 1994, n. 239. For the historical background, see Israel 1995, chs. 18, 19, and 29–31. Oldenbarnevelt served first as Pensionary of Rotterdam (a legal advisor to the town council, without a vote in its proceedings) and then, for thirty-two years, as Advocate of Holland, a similar position in a more powerful body. De Witt was first Pensionary of Dordrecht, and then Grand Pensionary of the States of Holland. During the crisis over the direction of the state church in the 1610s, Oldenbarnevelt sided with the Remonstrants, persuading the States of Holland not to agree to convene a national church synod. In the period when there was no stadtholder (from William II’s death in 1650 till the coming of age of his son, William III, in 1672), De Witt was the leader of the Republic through two wars with England. Neither was a member of the nobility. Some have raised questions about this interpretation: see Zac 1987, 265, nn. 44, 46.
34. This may be a reference either to the crisis leading up to the Synod of Dort or to the events of 1672, “the year of disaster.” See Israel 1995, chs. 18, 19, and 31.
35. In 1618 Maurice of Nassau, the Prince of Orange and stadtholder in five provinces, seized power. Oldenbarnevelt was tried by a special court and executed. In 1672, when the Republic was threatened by an invasion from the armies of Louis XIV, for which it was ill-prepared, DeWitt was brutally murdered by a mob in The Hague, perhaps at the instigation of his successor, the stadtholder William III.
36. I construe the phrase here translated “these are the two things” (quae duo) to refer back to considerations discussed earlier in this section, and not to the foundations about to be enumerated. I do not see a way of counting those foundations which makes their number come out two. The two considerations I take to be the tendency of ambitious commoners to seek (and acquire) more power than they should have in an aristocracy and the tendency of patricians to resent their assumption of such power. These motivate the decisions about the foundations necessary for a stable aristocracy. Most other translators seem to read this passage differently (e.g., Wernham, Shirley, Zac). But some, I think, agree (Ramond, Cristofolini).
37. OP: et jus denique Senatum convocandi, resque, ad communem salutem pertinentes penes Consules, ex ipso Senatu electos, esset. Clearly something has been omitted from the Latin. The Dutch text permits a reasonable, if approximate, conjecture about what’s missing. NS: en eindelijk het recht van de Staatsraat te beroepen, en van de zaken, tot de gemene welstant behorende, daar in voor te stellen, en daar af te spreken en te handelen by de Hoofden van de Staatsraat, uit de Staatsraat zelf verkozen, zou wezen. Gebhardt inserted some of the Dutch version into his Latin text; Wernham and Proietti both attempt to reconstruct the missing Latin, with different results. My translation blends their suggestions, making use also of the description of the consuls’ powers in viii, 36. The brackets indicate the language I’ve added.
38. Referring to the doctrines of the universal faith in TTP xiv, 13–34.
39. Here Spinoza endorses the policy of Tiberius, who held that because nobles needed to have wealth, the state might reasonably make good the losses of impoverished nobles, provided they had not brought their poverty on themselves by their vices. Cf. Tacitus, Annals II, 48.
40. The point seems to be that if a man is required to swear by a god in whom he does not believe, he will not fear divine punishment for lying. Wernham notes a similar thought in Hobbes, DCv ii, 21.
1. This editorial addition does not occur in either the OP or the NS, but is suggested by the first paragraph.
2. Wernham notes that Spinoza’s model for this kind of state is the province of Holland, though some features are taken from the Dutch Republic as a whole.
3. Wernham notes that originally the States of Holland and the States General met in different places at different times, but that after 1593 both bodies met in The Hague, which lacked political rights.
4. Implicitly a criticism of the distribution of power in the Dutch Republic. As Wernham notes (following Temple 1972, ch. 2), each city represented in the States of Holland, and each province represented in the States General, had only one vote. This gave the smaller cities a voice equal to that of Amsterdam in the States of Holland, and the smaller provinces a voice equal to that of Holland in the States General.
5. Although there were courts for each province in the Dutch Republic, as Wernham points out, there was no court for the Republic as a whole. That’s why a special court had to be created to try Oldenbarnevelt, whose offense was deemed a crime against the whole state.
6. Wernham points out that the Dutch Republic sought to deal with this problem in 1588 by giving the Council of State the power to settle disputes between the provinces, on the theory that that body would be better suited to deal with such issues than the States General, whose members would be bound to assert the interests of the provinces they represented, citing De la Bassecour Caan 1866, 170.
7. The analogue of Spinoza’s supreme council in the Dutch Republic would be what Temple called “the Assembly of the States-General,” which because of its cumbersome size rarely met, its decision-making power being delegated to the Council of State, whose analogue in Spinoza’s constitution would be the Senate (Wernham, citing Temple 1972, 61–62).
8. As Wernham points out, the different provinces in the Dutch Republic were represented in the Council of State to some degree in proportion to their size, giving Holland a position which gave some recognition to its greater power.
9. Accepting Proietti’s emendation, which seems clearly right.
10. OP: At urbes jure belli captae, & quae imperio accesserunt, veluti imperii Sociae habendae, & beneficio victae obligandae, vel Coloniae, quae jure Civitatis gaudeant, eo mittendae, & gens alio ducenda, vel omnino delenda est. If this text is correct, it says that it’s the conquered people who, on the third option, are to be completely destroyed, a view Gebhardt thought too monstrously genocidal for Spinoza to have held, even in the age of the Thirty Years War. The NS renders the concluding clauses of this sentence en het volk enders zenden, of de plaatsen gantschelijke uitroejen. So the Dutch translator thought it was the cities which were to be destroyed, not their inhabitants. It’s unclear what Latin text he had in front of him, but that policy would be more consistent both with an earlier passage in the TP (vi, 35), and with various passages in Machiavelli dealing with this issue. Cf. The Prince iii and v, and the Discourses ii, 23. So I follow Wernham’s emendation, which makes the last phrase vel omnino delendae sunt, with the implicit subject taken to be urbes. PR reach the same conclusion.
11. A proverbial expression, going back to Livy XXI, vii, where it refers to the Romans’ loss of Saguntum to Hannibal in the First Punic War, attributed to their indecision about how to respond to the threat he posed. Wernham notes that Van Hove frequently cites this maxim: e.g., in Van Hove 1661, I, i, 9, p. 38—where it occurs in a list of advantages monarchies are supposed to have over other forms of government—and in Van Hove 1661, II, i, 3, p. 271.
12. This sentence appears in the NS, but is omitted in the OP.
13. “Count of Holland” was one of Philip II’s titles, inherited from his father, Charles V. See Van Gelderen 1992, 1. The representative(s) of the Count are perhaps the provincial governors, or the stadtholders, chosen from among the principal nobles, who were the Hapsburg ruler’s chief representatives in the provinces. Cf. Israel 1995, 37. That seems to have been the view of the NS translator, who renders vicarius by stadhouder here. But perhaps Spinoza is thinking of the various governors-general Philip appointed to govern in his name when he returned to Spain in 1559. Cf. Van Gelderen 1992, 19–20.
14. Wernham has “gain” for obtinere here, but I think Shirley is right to translate “maintain.” Linguistically either is possible, but Matheron argues persuasively for a version of this reading in a note in PR, 307. In favor of “maintain” is the fact that when he succeeded Charles, Philip took the traditional oath promising to preserve the liberties of the people, and that Dutch political protests characteristically cast their struggle as an attempt to preserve their liberties, not to acquire liberty. Cf. Van Gelderen 1992, passim, and in the TTP xviii, 36, and the document cited there.
15. OP: Hollandiae. NS: Hollant (= Hollandia). Proietti and Cristofolini retain the OP reading, but Wernham, Shirley, and Bartuschat follow the NS, correctly in my view.
16. This seems difficult to reconcile with TTP xviii, 36, which claims that it was generally known that sovereignty in the Netherlands resided in the states of the several provinces.
17. Van Hove had been concerned about the small size of the aristocracy, and predicted a revolution because of the disproportion between rulers and subjects (Wernham). He strongly opposed the dominatio paucorum. Cf. Van Hove 1661, II, ii, 6, p. 291.
18. Van Hove had argued that an enemy who captured the assembly-place of a republic had that republic in his power (Wernham). See Van Hove 1661, II, i, 3, p. 267.
1. Neither the OP nor the NS gives this chapter a title. I have supplied this title from the first paragraph.
2. Spinoza applied the same epithet, acutissimus, to Machiavelli in v, 7.
3. Machiavelli presents this as the proverbial wisdom of doctors, but apparently his editors have not yet been able to find a source for the maxim. Cf. Machiavelli, Discourses 209.
4. OP, Gebhardt, Wernham: in mensem unum aut duos, for a month or two. NS: voor een maant, voor een jaar, of voor twee jaren, for a month, or a year, or two years. Wernham conjectured that the Dutch translator had misread unum as annum. This seems possible, but makes the time a bit shorter than it normally was in the Roman Republic, where the dictator’s term of office was typically set at six months. (It was customary for the dictator to lay down his powers before the end of that period, if the situation did not require him to hold them that long. See “dictator” in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online Academic Edition, May 2014.) Van Hove (1661, II, vi, 2) gives six months as the normal maximum time. PR propose: in unum annum, for a year. But their reasoning (pp. 307–8) seems unconvincing. Machiavelli argued (Discourses I, xxxiv–xxxv) that the dictatorship was a beneficial institution, provided its authority was not granted for a long time, by which he meant a year or two. He was no doubt mindful of the case of Caesar, who at the time of his assassination had been appointed dictator for life, a previous one-year term of having been extended indefinitely. This was highly unusual, and one reason Caesar was thought to be turning the republic into a monarchy.
5. Letters to Quintus III, viii, 4. OP, Gebhardt, read the quote from Cicero: tumor dictatoris . . . bonis injucundus fuit, a reading supported by the NS: opgeblazenheit, swollen state. V-L, noting that the passage in Cicero reads rumor, instead of tumor, emended. Subsequent editors have been divided: Wernham, Proietti, and Cristofolini accept the emendation. Droetto, Dominguez, and Shirley retain the OP text. I find the case for emending most persuasive.
6. On the role of the tribunes in the Roman Republic, see Machiavelli’s Discourses I, iii, and III, i; and Van Hove 1661, II, vi, 2 (Wernham). It’s not clear that the reference to Scipio is pertinent. It’s true that Scipio successfully defended himself and his brother against the tribunes’ charges that they had misappropriated funds. But this did not involve the office of dictator, which Scipio declined after his triumph in Africa.
7. It was also, Wernham notes, what happened during the panic of 1672, when William III was appointed stadtholder, in spite of the Perpetual Edict of 1667.
8. I.e., I take it, the two chapters on aristocracies, viii and ix.
1. Neither the OP nor the NS gives this chapter a title. The title supplied is suggested by the first paragraph.
2. See the Glossary entries ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY.
3. OP, G: subeunda. Wernham, Cristofolini: subeundi (as in III/358/19).
4. Cf. vi, 11, 21; viii, 14.
5. Wernham notes that the quote properly begins with qui (as in the NS), not solis (as in the OP and Gebhardt). Several translators agree (Droetto, Dominguez, Shirley, Bartuschat, and Proietti). There’s a similar issue in the next quote.
6. Quintus Curtius (VI, v, 24–32) is one likely source for Spinoza’s account of the Amazons, though the stories occur in many ancient authors (e.g., Herodotus, Histories IV, 110–17). Spinoza’s language does not clearly commit him to a view about the historicity of the traditional stories. In DCv ix, 3, Hobbes had argued that in his day there were a number of matriarchal societies, in which men and women lived together, but the women, by natural right, had the supreme authority. Tacitus also reports this arrangement among the Sitones, though he disapproves of it (Germania 45). The most thorough attempt to separate fact from fiction is now probably Mayor 2014, which argues that the legends had a substantial basis in fact.
7. Reminiscent of E III P35S.