NOTES
Chapter 1
1. Gaddis (1992/1993) once even castigated international relations theory for failing to predict the end of the Cold War. It would be a good story if that scolding led to more explicit analyses of rivalry, but there is no evidence that a cause and effect relationship exists. Still, if we had known more about rivalry termination processes in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War might have come as less of a surprise.
2. Strategic rivalries are defined as relationships between states viewed as threatening competitors and, therefore, as enemies (Thompson 2001a; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). Such rivalries can be identified by consulting diplomatic histories and decision-maker discussions pertaining to their country's primary adversaries. This approach to operationalizing rivalry should not be confused with an alternative approach to identifying rivalries in terms of the frequency of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that occur within specific time periods (see, for instance, Diehl and Goertz 2000). One basic problem in differentiating the two approaches is that only some strategic rivalries participate in a sufficient number of MIDs to qualify as rivalries from a dispute density perspective. At the same time, some dyads with a relatively large number of MIDs do not necessarily qualify as strategic rivalries. Decision makers on one side view the other side as a nuisance or even a problem that falls short of a threatening enemy. Thus, choosing between the two approaches hinges on what one hopes to capture in an analysis.
3. Rivalries were coded for the primary reasons analysts gave for termination outcomes. The multiple types of outcome explanation were then condensed into the three generic types enumerated in Tables 1.1–1.3. In some cases, no explanation was found. These cases have been placed in the negotiation category identified in Table 1.3. In other cases, multiple explanations were given for a single case. When this occurred, an effort was made to focus on the single argument that seemed most prevalent or significant.
4. Any one of the four paths, of course, may well involve negotiations. The fourth category is one in which termination or significant de-escalation occurs after some negotiation but in the absence of the first three types of circumstances. In general, the approach adopted in this study black-boxes or ignores the specific nature and content of negotiations. This decision is not intended to imply that negotiations and negotiators are irrelevant to the outcome but only to suggest that the theory focuses on the context in which negotiations are most likely to ensue. It also seems fair to acknowledge that it is assumed that negotiations alone are insufficient for rivalry termination—that is, they are unlikely to succeed in the wrong context. That does not imply that negotiations will always succeed in the right context. The expectancy theory relied on in this analysis, then, can be said to focus on the most propitious context for successful negotiations.
5. The theory explicitly evades a commitment to any of the more well-known paradigms in international relations (realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism) by combining elements from several different paradigms. There is also little consideration given to mass attitudes that are assumed here to lag elite attitudes toward external rivals. At the same time, it is acknowledged that strong popular hostility toward external rivals can be manipulated by domestic politicians to block or slow accommodative strategies proposed by other domestic politicians.
6. Policy entrepreneurs and third-party pressures, we argue, can be useful but are not absolutely necessary.
Chapter 2
1. We dispense with any conventional review of the literature and move directly to outlining our argument. An extensive review of the literature, however, is offered in the appendix. Readers who want the review can stop at this point and turn to the appendix first before reading Chapter 2. Readers who do not want the literature review can choose to ignore the appendix. Nonetheless, our contention is that the theory described in this chapter overlaps in a number of ways with earlier, often more narrow approaches. Evaluating that claim requires reading the appendix at some point.
2. This theory relies heavily on the argument found in Young 1998 but also overlaps extensively with the literature noted in Rasler 2001b, as well as with earlier and alternative explanations of rivalry termination discussed in the appendix. Obviously, interest in this question of rivalry de-escalation and termination remains quite healthy.
3. A prominent woman conductor was once asked if being a woman caused her problems in leading an orchestra. Her reply was that she couldn't be sure because she had never been a male conductor. This is a sophisticated response suggesting some sensitivity to analysis of variance problems that overlaps with our analytical problem. If we exclude regional variance, then we cannot tell whether it is or is not a factor.
4. Figure 2.3 could, of course, be made to appear more complex. For instance, Charles Armstrong (2004: 44) notes some of the implications of the termination in 1975 of the North/South Vietnamese rivalry for the North/South Korean rivalry.
5. Assessing significant de-escalation versus termination is an inherently subjective exercise. In some rivalry situations, decision makers may be distracted by other concerns, thereby allowing the rivalry to “grow cold” or hibernate for a period of time before it heats up yet again. Even in cases in which the consensus is that a rivalry has ended, there are apt to be lingering doubts among some proportion of the elite and the population in general. Old habits die hard. Moreover, there is frequently some propensity to flirt with re-escalation, as is evident in the contemporary Sino-U.S. and Russo--U.S. cases. Significant de-escalation, therefore, might be defined as approximating termination (rivals no longer view each other as threatening competitors or enemies), but some doubts remain and the potential for the reactivation of tension persists.
Chapter 3
1. Technically, there was no Israeli state at the onset of the war in 1948. In addition, Nasser is considered the leader of the coup effort in 1952, but Neguib served as the official or figurehead leader of the Free Officers until he was removed in 1954.
2. This Greater Syria plan involved the political unification of Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Palestine under Hashemite rule.
3. Thomas Mayer (1983) also agrees that the Egyptian government's involvement in the Palestine problem was largely the result of its concern about playing the dominant role in the region vis-à-vis other Arab states.
4. For more details of these negotiations, see Caplan 1997 and Morris 1993.
5. The CIA had many contacts with the Free Officers Movement and approved the military coup (McNamara 2003; Sachar 1981).
6. The Israeli decision to raid Arab villages was an effort to influence the civilian population to put pressure on the Egyptian government to clamp down on the infiltrators. The Israelis shifted to military targets when the international community criticized these actions (Tal 1996: 65).
7. Shlaim (2001a: 118–120, 128) also documents high-level contacts between Nasser and Moshe Sharett, the Israeli prime minister, from October 1954 until January 1955. The talks covered specific problems dealing with the Egyptian capture of an Israeli ship, the Bat Galim, and the pending trial of Jewish spies who had been caught engaging in sabotage inside Egypt. These talks also covered broader issues dealing with Egypt's blockade of Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, border skirmishes, the Palestinian refugees, and options for economic cooperation. Nasser even agreed to a high-level meeting with Sharett, but Sharett wavered and called off the talks. The Gaza raid in February 1955 ended these talks altogether.
8. As a result of Western pressure and heavy Egyptian casualties, Nasser stopped the Gaza raids. Since he knew that his army was considerably weaker than the Israeli Defense Forces, Nasser decided to de-escalate for fear that Israel's counterattacks could jeopardize his control over Gaza and even the Egyptian army itself (Morris 1993: 352).
9. Morris (1993: 273) and Podeh (2004: 77) maintain that Egypt's seizure of an Israeli ship, the Bat Galem, in the Suez Canal in 1954 and the execution of two Jewish saboteurs in Cairo in January 1955 were critical events that soured Israel's relations with Egypt. Morris (1993: 273) indicates that the executions had an even greater impact when Prime Minister Sharett lobbied intensively for leniency to no avail. For more details on the espionage story, see Morris 1993 and Shlaim 2001a, with its discussion of the “Mishap.”
10. Tal (1996: 64) argues that the Israelis perceived negative consequences from the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in 1954: a) the loss of a British buffer between Egypt and Israel; and b) enhanced military capabilities as the Egyptians took over former British military installations.
11. The arms deal resulted in a commitment by the Czech government to supply $320 million worth of arms to Egypt on an interest free basis in exchange for annual payment in Egyptian cotton. The quality of the war material was the highest yet received by Egypt and included 120 jet fighters, 50 bombers, 200 tanks, 150 artillery pieces, 2 destroyers, and 2 submarines. In addition, Soviet and Czech instructors were sent to train Egyptian soldiers on its new equipment (Sachar 1981: 91; Brecher 1972: 60).
12. The United States turned down Nasser's last request for arms in July 1955 (Morris 1993: 276).
13. In the late 1940s and early 1950s Britain and the United States had attempted to minimize the inflow of arms to the Middle East.
14. The Baghdad Pact was initiated by the United States and Great Britain in order to build a regional defense system that would be a bulwark against the Soviet Union. The pact involved cooperation for security and defense and a pledge of noninterference in the internal policies of member states.
15. One of the key goals for Nasser and the Free Officers was to eradicate the British military presence in the Suez Canal. They had secured that goal with the signing in 1954 of the Anglo-Egyptian Evacuation Agreement, which required British troops to be gone by June 1956. Once Nasser had secured Britain's withdrawal, he focused on destroying the Baghdad Pact, which threatened to prolong Britain's military presence in the region.
16. After the Baghdad Pact, Nasser solidified his ties with other Arabs by forming a military alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia in March 1955. In April 1955, Nasser attended the Bandung conference for nonaligned states. Nasser, along with other leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Tito, advanced concerns outside the confines of the Cold War. After the conference, Nasser was more radical in his policies and more popular than any other Arab leader (McNamara 2003: 43).
17. This interpretation about the effect of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal has been challenged by recent historical evidence that suggests the Israeli officials were not threatened by the arms deal but were willing to use the deal as an opportunity to justify joining the Anglo-French coalition in the Sinai War of 1956 (Golani 1955; Laron 2009). Even so, the arms deal intensified the intensity of the rivalry for both Egypt and Israel.
18. The Tripartite Agreement of 1949 stipulated that Britain, France, and the United States would refrain from selling arms to states in the Middle East.
19. Eisenhower believed that the conflict with Nasser over the Suez Canal could be resolved diplomatically, and he sent clear messages that he opposed war to resolve it. On principle, he believed that Nasser's action was not illegal and that he was in a position to ensure that the canal ran smoothly. He also believed that Egypt was the victim of aggression, and that Britain and France had violated the Tripartite Agreement of nonintervention (Neff 1981).
20. Despite the agreement about the Straits of Tiran, Nasser maintained a blockade of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal.
21. In 1962 and again in 1965 Egypt faced serious balance-of-payments crises, which forced Nasser to rely heavily on foreign assistance provided largely from the Soviet Union. There were five major reasons for the economic crises: 1) the failure of the Egyptian cotton crop in 1961; 2) the costs of involvement in the Yemeni civil war; 3) suspension of U.S. food aid after 1965; 4) military spending; and 5) poor export performance (Waterbury 1983; Barnett 1992; Rivlin 1997).
22. Dayan later maintained that at least 80 percent and probably more of the clashes in the demilitarized zones were initiated by the Israelis (Slater 2002: 91).
23. The famous three no's (no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel) associated with the Khartoum Conference were not proposed by Nasser or any other Arab leader. Instead, they emerged from Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), who wanted to prevent King Hussein of Jordan from pursuing a political solution for the West Bank. Although Nasser and the other Arab leaders were not in favor of this extreme stance, they accepted the position because of their unwillingness to look like they were surrendering to Israeli demands after their military defeat in the Six Day War (Shemesh 2008: 242). Yet, the three nays were flexible enough to leave open three options: 1) that Arab states might support a state of peace even if they did not sign a peace treaty; 2) that they might permit third-party negotiations to occur; and 3) that they might accept Israel, although they might not extend de jure recognition (Shlaim 2001a: 258).
24. UN Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories it occupied in the aftermath of the Six Day War, and respect for the sovereignty among all states in the Middle East.
25. The purpose of the Jarring mission, headed by Dr. Gunnar Jarring, was to facilitate the implementation of UN Resolution 242. The mission ended in 1969 in the absence of any progress; it was revived again in 1971 for a short period, again with no success.
26. In the Six Day War of 1967, Egypt lost 80 percent of its military equipment; 10,000 of its soldiers and 1,500 of its officers were killed; 5,000 of its soldiers and 500 of its officers were captured; and 20,000 soldiers were wounded while Israel, in contrast, lost 779 soldiers on all military fronts (Hopwood 1991; Stone 2004). In its appeals to oil rich, Arab countries, Egypt explained that it had lost approximately $324 million annually from the closing of the Suez Canal and the loss of its oil fields (Feiler 2003: 121).
27. In 1967, approximately seventy thousand Egyptian soldiers were deployed in Yemen, constituting roughly half of Nasser's army. Schmidt Adams (1968) and Haddad (1973) maintain that Nasser was spending half a million dollars a day during the five-year war with Yemen—a figure that did not include the indirect costs of arms and supplies to the Yemenite army.
28. The Arab oil countries provided the aid for a myriad of reasons: a) reinforcement of Nasser's shift from an attempt to undermine conservative Arab regimes via a pan-Arab strategy; b) an attempt to refocus Nasser's ambitions toward Israel rather than dominating the Arab region; c) fear of more Soviet encroachment in the area if Egypt became more dependent on the Soviet Union for aid; d) an effort to balance Israeli military strength in the region; and e) securing greater political legitimacy for their regimes against Arab revolutionary states (Feiler 2003: 123–124).
29. The Israelis did not offer to give back the Gaza Strip.
30. Approximately five hundred aircraft shelters were built at twenty airfields around the country with underground operations rooms, pilots' quarters, and maintenance facilities. Sections of the highways between Cairo and the Suez Canal were widened and adjusted for emergency landing strips (Korn 1992: 92).
31. At this point, Nasser convinced the Soviets to supply Egypt with new surface-to-air missiles (SAM-3s) with the capacity to shoot down Israeli aircraft. With the aid of Soviet technicians who operated the missiles, the Egyptians were able to secure more antiaircraft protection from deep penetration raids by the Israelis. Eventually, the Egyptians moved the missiles gradually toward the Suez Canal in an effort to extend the antiaircraft shield to the east bank and provide cover for an eventual Egyptian crossing of the canal. The Israelis in turn attacked these sites without much success (Yaqub 2007: 41).
Chapter 4
1. This episode is referred to as the Corrective Revolution.
2. An opening for peace seemed possible in the early 1970s. For arguments against this view, see Gazit 1997.
3. Several other factors also played a role in the expulsion: a) Soviet reluctance to provide military hardware that Sadat requested; b) tension between Soviet and Egyptian military officers; c) the Soviet Union's failure to meet commitments; and d) Soviet interference in Egyptian internal affairs (Feiler 2003: 131).
4. Isma'il would meet again with Kissinger in May 1973, but by March 1973 Sadat had decided to embark on a limited war with Israel (Beattie 2000: 131; Seale 2000: 47).
5. The United States also built an early-warning station for Egypt and manned it with U.S. soldiers.
6. In 1976, Egypt was late in paying $800 million already in arrears (Karawan 2005: 329).
7. Of this amount, almost 1 billion Egyptian pounds were allocated for food commodities. This is compared with 690 million Egyptian pounds for subsidies in 1978 (480 million pounds for food), 435 million in 1974, and 255 million in 1973 (Rivlin and Even 2004: 42).
8. Barnett (1992: 130) maintains that there were four reasons for the increased national security outlays: 1) Egypt needed to replenish stocks as Israel was doing; 2) Egypt feared threats from Soviets and other regional actors; 3) the supplies of U.S. arms were more expensive; and 4) a strong defense would attract foreign capital and assistance.
Chapter 5
1. The Israeli-Syrian analysis is restricted to the years 1948–2000 to make it more complementary to the Egyptian-Israeli case that preceded it.
2. The British and the French negotiated a deal when they had mandate control over Israel/Palestine and Syria. The British handed over the south Golan area to Syria; the French gave up a slice of territory along Lake Tiberias to Palestine (under British mandate), thus enclosing Lake Tiberias within Palestine territory.
3. This interpretation is based on Shlaim's (2001a: 30) account.
4. The numbers are found in Ma'oz's (1995: 89–93) discussion.
5. Dayan later admitted that at least 80 percent and probably more of the clashes in the demilitarized zones were initiated by the Israelis (Slater 2002: 91).
6. The constraints are discussed in Shlaim 2001a: 285–289.
7. Meir had opportunities to reevaluate Israeli relations with the Arabs, but she ignored them. For instance, Meir turned down a UN suggestion that Israel return Sinai to Egypt in return for peace—a decision that Israel would make at the end of the 1970s. She also turned down Sadat's offer for an interim settlement (Shlaim 2001a: 324).
8. Asad believed that military parity produced peace, while military imbalances encouraged war as the stronger party would always be tempted to secure its aims by force. Hence, Syria and the rest of the Arab countries should build enough military power to deter Israeli military advances in the future (Seale and Butler 1996: 31–32).
9. Syria eventually deployed SAM sites in Zahla (central Lebanon) after clashing with Israeli aircraft over the Biqa Valley in April 1981. The missile crisis occurred after Maronite forces attempted to secure Zahla, which had been held by the Syrians since 1976. The Maronites' efforts jeopardized Syria's access to the Beirut-Damascus Highway, a key artery linking Syria to Lebanon. The Syrians used their air force to neutralize the Maronites, thus provoking military air strikes from Israel in Lebanese air space. The crisis eventually ended when the United States negotiated a ceasefire (Seale 1988: 371).
10. Ma'oz (1995: 204) documents that Asad's comments were made in public after personal meetings with former president Jimmy Carter and conversations with Senator Arlen Specter.
11. The Soviet action reflected a new global strategy that eschewed Soviet military involvement in Third World conflicts in favor of supporting regional peace settlements.
12. Consequently, Asad chose to join the U.S.-led international coalition against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 with the understanding that the United States would pursue a peace strategy after the war.
13. Radical Arab states and the PLO lost regional and international prestige as a result of their support for Hussein during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, smoothing the way for the moderates to search for a political settlement.
14. Asad formally announced his “full peace for full withdrawal” position in an interview with Patrick Seale that was published in both Arab and Western newspaper outlets (al-Asad and Seale 1993).
15. Full details about these agreements are provided in Slater 2002.
16. Later, the Israeli government would disavow Rabin's commitment, but later still in 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel acknowledged that Rabin had indeed made the agreement in July 1994 and that he considered it binding on the Israeli government. The full details of this story can be found in al-Moualem 1997; Cobban 1999; Hinnebusch 1996; and Seale 2000.
17. According to Hinnebusch (1996: 55), Syria's negotiating strategy was always based on “detailed, comprehensive and iron-clad agreements” with specific timetables for Israeli withdrawals. Moreover, Israel's subsequent interpretations of the Oslo Accords at the PLO's expense only reinforced Asad's determination to avoid a similar trap.
18. Israel and Jordan agreed on a peace agenda one day after the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington, D.C. At that point, the peace negotiations moved through a series of phases, culminating in a peace treaty that was signed on October 26, 1994 (Seale 2000: 68).
19. A public opinion survey in Israel during January 1994 revealed that most respondents were unwilling to give back the Golan in return for full peace and security arrangements (Ma'oz 1995: 242).
20. Operation Grapes of Wrath was targeted primarily at Syria. Israeli military planners decided to bomb southern Lebanon with the idea of routing civilians from southern to northern Lebanon so that Israeli troops could strike more heavily against Hezbollah forces in the south. In addition, the operation was designed to put pressure on the Syrians to rein in Hezbollah's actions (Shlaim 2001a: 560).
21. This quote was found in Cobban 1999: 180.
22. Rabin also argued that Israelis could not digest progress in more than one track involving the Syrians and the Palestinians (Cobban 1999: 186).
23. Asad was particularly adverse to pursuing “Sadat-like acts of diplomacy” since he perceived that Sadat had betrayed Syria and the Arab cause during the Camp David negotiations in 1979 (Kessler Neff 2000: 79).
24. Interfactional competition for power and influence on foreign policy, consequently, tended to translate into free and lively debates, rather than real planning and implementation within both the PLO and Fatah (Groth 1994). Although urgent matters such as the PLO's evacuation from Beirut in 1982 cut across factional lines and made the PLO able to respond quickly to short-term critical problems, such problems involved primarily tactical responses. Planning strategies for the long term were confined to the slower and more politicized bodies of the PLO—and, therefore, were unlikely to be forthcoming.
25. Fatah militants argued that Arafat's moves were illegitimate because they occurred outside the routine PLO decision-making bodies, undermined the strategy of military struggle, and abandoned the goals of an independent Palestinian state (see Sahliyeh 1986: 142–153).
26. In fact, the Palestinian National Council extended Arafat's authority by allowing Arafat and his colleagues within the PLO Executive Committee to decide on the issues of a political settlement in coordination with Jordan and Egypt. Arafat's freedom of maneuver was also enhanced by the appointment of leading moderate figures to key positions within the PLO (Sahliyeh 1986: 180–202).
27. Later, eighty-four countries extended full recognition to the new state of Palestine and some twenty others offered qualified recognition. In January 1989, the PLO gained the right to address the UN Security Council on an equal footing with other member states (Sayigh 1997: 624).
28. Arafat's support for the Iraqi invasion, in turn, was due at least in part to his efforts to replace the lost Soviet support for the PLO (Rubin 1994: 155).
29. The accords provided for the establishment of a self-governing authority by the PLO in Gaza and Jericho. Palestinian authority would extend eventually to the remaining Palestinian population centers of the West Bank in a second phase, which would coincide with general elections to form a governing council. After these interim arrangements, further negotiations were expected to determine the final status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and other matters as part of a permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
30. Israeli analysts also argue that the large influx of new Soviet immigrants had a significant impact on the outcome of the election of 1992. Surveys indicated that Soviet immigrants were less interested in ideology and foreign policy than the issues of absorption (that is, employment and housing). Labor and other left-wing parties were able to link foreign policy and absorption issues in a way that was more attractive than the Likud Party. Labor argued that if the government spent fewer resources on building projects in the territories, then there would be more monies available for dealing with the problems of unemployment and inadequate housing. This issue increased the trend among the immigrants to support territorial concessions and the Labor Party in the 1992 election (Fein 1995: 168–173). It was readily acknowledged (Reich et al. 1995: 142) that the Soviet vote was not so much a vote in favor of Labor but a protest against a Likud government that had failed to respond adequately to the needs of the new immigrants. It was also a demand for the next government to reorient its domestic spending priorities.
31. Rabin initially rejected the PLO as a negotiating partner because of its insistence on a state encompassing all of the West Bank and Gaza and its claim to represent all of the Palestinians in the diaspora with dreams of return that Israeli decision makers could not accommodate. Rabin believed (Makovsky 1996: 110) that a debilitated PLO would be forced to acquiesce to a deal made by local Palestinians in order to ease the occupation.
Chapter 6
Sumit Ganguly thanks Manjeet Pardesi for his research assistance.
1. A summit had taken place in Agra, outside New Delhi, between President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in July 2001. However, this attempt at de-escalation achieved next to nothing and proved to be mostly an exercise in grandstanding on Musharraf's part. Also, it is believed that L. K. Advani, India's hard-line deputy prime minister and minister of home affairs, played a role in undermining the talks. On this issue, see Jacob 2010 and Noorani 2005.
2. On the significance of credible commitments in strife-ridden polyethnic societies, see Fearon 1998.
3. In recent years a controversy has arisen over the question of the contiguity of Kashmir with India. The controversy stemmed from the allegations of a British historian, Alastair Lamb, about Mountbatten's putative pressure on Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the barrister who had been given the task of dividing the empire. Lamb alleges that Radcliffe, under pressure from Mountbatten, drew the boundaries to favor Kashmir's accession to India. For Lamb's allegation, see Lamb 1992; for a careful and spirited rebuttal, see Ilahi 2003.
4. There was, however, one brief moment of significant cooperation. This was the agreement to share the Indus River waters signed in 1950 under World Bank auspices.
5. For a critical account of the Eisenhower administration's decision to forge a military relationship with Pakistan, see McMahon 1994.
6. The notion that Pakistan, the putative homeland of the Muslims of South Asia, could be a bulwark against Communist expansion was a colonial construct. Sir Francis Tuker, a senior British general, propagated this idea at the time of independence and partition (Tuker 1950).
7. A number of explanations can be adduced for India's unwillingness to increase defense spending. At one level, it would compromise India's ideational commitment to nonalignment. At another, Nehru was acutely concerned about the opportunity costs of defense spending. On Nehru's views, see Cohen 1990; for a discussion of India's defense spending, see Thomas 1986; for a sense of the anxieties, see Dutt 1977. Dutt was a senior foreign policy official and eventually retired as India's foreign secretary, the highest-ranking bureaucrat in the Ministry of External Affairs.
8. For a dispassionate account, see Hoffmann 1990; the oft-quoted, but utterly polemical, version of the war can be found in Maxwell 1970.
9. One of the best accounts of this military debacle remains Palit 1991.
10. Substantial military assistance from the United States was not forthcoming because the United States was most reluctant to alienate Pakistan. The United States was acutely dependent on Pakistan for access to key military bases. These bases served as listening posts on the then Soviet Union and were also used for U-2 flights.
11. This was not a true “security dilemma” for Pakistan; it was not as if India's military modernization program posed any threat to Pakistan's security. Nevertheless, Pakistani rhetoric echoed the concerns of a security dilemma. On the concept of “security dilemma,” see Herz 1950.
12. For details pertaining to this war, see Jackson 1975 and Sisson and Rose 1991.
13. Curiously enough, Pakistani decision makers, on the basis of the most tenuous evidence continued to believe that China would open a second front and thereby tied down Indian troops along the Himalayan border. Recently declassified documents from the U.S. State Department reveal the depth of the delusion of Pakistani decision makers, most notably Yahya Khan. For details, see Smith 2005.
14. His quest was far from chimerical. The initial supply of U.S. assistance was for some $3.2 billion for five years. The subsequent tranche was for $4.02 billion for six years.
15. For a discussion of the concept of reciprocity in international relations, see Kydd 2005.
16. It was also inhibited from undertaking a military misadventure because of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
17. It needs to be made clear that Indian and Pakistani interlocutors hold markedly divergent views about the Shimla Accord. For the Indians, the accord enshrined the principle of bilateralism. For the Pakistanis, it did not. It merely affirmed that bilateral negotiations were one possible pathway for the settlement of the dispute. For a strident and forceful exposition of the Pakistani position, see Sattar 1995.
18. It is pertinent to mention that the Soviet collapse was one of the most dramatic shocks for India. India had developed a robust arms transfer relationship with the Soviet Union since 1971. More to the point, India had come to depend on the Soviet Union for a tacit security guarantee against the People's Republic of China. While the Soviet collapse did lead to a dramatic reorientation in Indian foreign policy it had little or no effect on the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. On the evolution of the Indo-Soviet relationship, see Horn 1982; for the reorientation in Indian foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, see Mohan 2004.
19. Throughout the 1990s, the Indian state, through a combination of widespread repression and limited political accommodation managed to contain the insurgency and restore order, if not law, in Kashmir. This counterinsurgency strategy, which had worked well elsewhere in India, continues to be applied with some success in Kashmir.
20. The literature on Kargil, though almost exclusively from the victorious Indian side, is voluminous. See, for example, Krishna and Chari 2001; Swami 1999; Bajpai, Karim, and Mattoo 2001 and Singh 2001. For a set of U.S., Indian, and Pakistani perspectives on the Kargil war, albeit of intellectually uneven perspectives, see Lavoy 2009.
21. Details pertaining to the dialogue remain scanty. For one account, see Coll 2009.
22. In 2005, the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, while willing to improve relations with Pakistan, categorically ruled out any prospect of territorial compromise. See the prime minister's statement in the Lok Sabha (Parliament), April 20, 2005 at http://www.pm.nic.in.
23. See “The ISI Controlled 26/11 Attacks from Beginning to End,” Indian Express, July 17, 2010, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-isi-controlled-coordinated-26-ll-attacks-from-beginning-to-end/647849/0.
24. The desire to hold the Indian state together is the reverse side of the coin vis-à-vis the initial emphasis on a secular state.
Chapter 7
1. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that earlier chapters have not raised the issue of rivalry interdependency—only that they have not stressed it to the extent that we propose to do in this chapter.
2. Dittmer 2011 surveys the long history of the Russo-Chinese relationship.
3. See, for instance, Thompson's (2003) analysis of rivalry interdependence prior to the outbreak of World War I..
4. The Cold War rivalry requires its own book.
5. General sources on the Sino-U.S. rivalry include Shambaugh 1994, Ross 1995, Garver 1997, and Scott 2007.
6. Zhang Baijia (2001) notes that the United States as the world's leading imperial power also made ideological conflict between China and the United States more probable. On this theme, see also Harding 1992: 25–26.
7. Tyler (1999: 9) describes Taiwan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier to contain the Chinese ‘menace.’”
8. Harding (1992: 33) argues that at least some Chinese decision makers considered altering their stance toward the superpowers in the early 1960s in the face of increasing military threat from the Soviet Union and major economic problems at home linked to the earlier attempted Great Leap Forward project. Foot (1995: 97–98) provides a brief overview of U.S. contemplation of creating an opening to China in 1962. This effort was derailed by, among other things, the Sino-Indian War and the increased emphasis given to U.S.-Soviet relations after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
9. Dittmer (2004: 208), for one, argues that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 led to the border clashes initiated by the Chinese in 1969.
10. Between 1969 and 1971 (and continuing into the early 1980s), the Soviet Union greatly increased the number of troops stationed along its border with China (Scott 2007: 80).
11. Domestic turmoil was a problem for the Chinese, but it also made them less threatening to the United States (Schulzinger 2001: 261). The U.S. defense budget planning process of 1969 reduced its worst-case scenario from 2.5 to 1.5 wars. The older conception that the Soviet Union and China might initiate joint attacks was finally abandoned and China's own threat to the United States was viewed as diminished (Ross 1995: 23).
12. Somewhat in parallel, the Chinese were worried that détente between the United States and the Soviet Union might encourage greater Soviet pressure on China (Ross 1995: 25). Garver (1982) stresses that the Chinese were primarily interested in ensuring that the Soviet Union and the United States remained rivals as opposed to the ongoing trend of increased superpower cooperation and agreement that China was a major mutual problem.
13. Nixon is reputed to have been irritated by Vice President Agnew's criticism of the overtures to China and said that he was missing “the big picture in this whole Chinese operation, which is, of course, the Russian game. We're using the Chinese thaw to get the Russians shook” (quoted in Schaller 2001: 373).
14. Decision makers in the United States apparently also sought greater cooperation from Japan with the opening to China (Ross 2001; Schaller 2001).
15. Li Jie (2001: 313) starts the signaling clock in November 1968 with China's proposal to the outgoing Johnson administration to resume ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Gong Li (2001: 332) contends that Mao had read Nixon's article in Foreign Affairs prior to the election; the article suggested the need to reconsider U.S. isolation and containment of China and as a consequence, Mao thought an election victory by Nixon would work in China's diplomatic favor.
16. Demonstrating some appreciation for evolutionary conceptualization in rivalry termination processes, Mao is said to have commented that monkeys required some time to evolve into humans. He compared the U.S. position after one of Kissinger's preliminary talks with Zhou to that of an ape with a tail that was in the process of becoming shorter (Schaller 2002: 175).
17. General sources on the Sino-Soviet rivalry include Dittmer 1992, Zhao 1996, and Rozman 2010.
18. Nelson (1989: 139) says the downgrading came later.
19. This seems to remain true, although probably less so, with the resumption of the rivalries between China and the Unites States and China and Russia.
20. General sources on the Sino-Vietnamese rivalry include Ross 1988, Hood 1992, Amer 1999, Westad 2006, Womack 2006 and 2011, and Rozman 2010.
21. The Chinese may also have been attempting to reassure their Thai allies as well as warning the Soviet Union how intense their unhappiness with Vietnamese behavior was (see, for instance, Stuart-Fox 2003: 201).
22. Information on the Thai-Vietnamese rivalry is scarce. See Sar Desai 1994, Duiker 1995, and Wyatt 2003.
23. On the Chinese-Taiwanese rivalry, see Gu 1995, Myers and Zhang 2006, Kastner 2007, Wachman 2007, R. Sutter 2008, and Zhao and Liu 2010.
24. See, for instance, Huang, Kim, and Wu 1995: 36.
25. Useful sources on the rivalry between the two Koreas include Kim 1994 and 2011, Gu 1995, Oberdorfer 2001, Heo and Roehrig 2010, and Snyder 2010.
26. Kim Jong Un succeeded Kim Jong Il in December 2011. No doubt, it will take the new ruler some time to consolidate his leadership position. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that such a leadership consolidation must be successful. But it is reasonable to assume that a strong leadership position would be essential to bringing about major revisions in North Korean foreign policy strategies.
27. Gu (1995: 189) characterizes the military conflict periodicity of the Korean rivalry as hot war (1948–1953), standoff/cold war (1953–1965), low-intensity hot war (1965–1971), standoff/cold war (1972–1992), and disengagement from 1992 onward. Yet it would be difficult to argue that the degree of disengagement has been constant since 1992. See Hoare and Pares 1999: 231–40; Oberdorfer 2001; Mauryin 2002; Nanto 2003; and Kim 2011. Cumings (2004: 56), parenthetically, also argues that western observers are more familiar with northern incursions into the south and less familiar than they should be about southern incursions into the north.
28. Porter (1993: 207) argues that Vietnam was looking for a Cambodian “exit strategy” as early as 1984.
29. The irony here is that domestic political reforms were initiated for the purpose of ensuring the security of the domestic regime (Cliff 1998) yet may have increased insecurity at the external national level. As Kahn (2004) suggests, however, electoral politics in Taiwan need not lead to greater interstate hostility.
30. Domestic economic conditions, short of crisis, can also interact with domestic politics toward external rivalry processes. For example, Taiwanese businessmen responded to the economic recession in the late 1990s with stronger demands for a relaxation of restrictions on investments and trade with the Chinese mainland (S. Goldstein 2002; Sheng 2002).
31. See Cabestan (2002) for some speculation on scenarios that might lead to greater integration without formal reunification.
32. Oberdorfer (2001: 273) notes that the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise in 1992 was considered the “most tangible evidence of an improved relationship” between the two Koreas. Thus, the loss of this tangible evidence would also seem to indicate the end of an improved relationship.
33. China and Vietnam still do not agree on the resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute and occasional temptations to take more hard-line stances toward China still surface (see, for example, Ninh 1998).
34. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to improved inter-Korean relations is the conflict relationship between the United States and North Korea. It is difficult for inter-Korean relations to remain cooperative as U.S.–North Korean relations deteriorate. Seoul's location and its consequent vulnerability to an attack is simply too convenient a bargaining chip for North Korea not to use it when its other options are quite limited.
35. Third-party encouragement for de-escalation seems just as likely to be rebuffed if local decision makers do not have local incentives to pursue rivalry de-escalation for their own reasons. See, for example, Wishnick's (2004: 121–122) discussion of Russia's encouragement of North Korea to cooperate with South Korea in 2001.
36. Several authors have noted in this respect that Chinese-Vietnamese territorial disputes along their mutual border reflect more general tensions between the two states than they do the intensity with which decision makers value the specific territorial boundaries (see Sutter 1993: 45; Wang 2003: 401).
37. That is not quite the same thing as saying that all personnel must remain in power. A Vietnamese foreign minister was sacrificed to mollify the Chinese.
38. Christensen (2004: 66) argues that the issue of Taiwan is linked in part to the fear of a national territorial disintegration on the mainland. An independent Taiwan could encourage other areas to attempt to break away.
39. See, for instance, the discussions in Chun 1997 and Noland 1997. It is not inconceivable, however, that the North Korean regime might be overthrown from within, thereby removing one major obstacle to rivalry termination. See, for instance, the speculative discussion (Brooke 2004: A3) pertaining to some 10 percent of the North Korean army's generals who have allegedly defected in recent years.
40. At times South Koreans have worried that North Korea and the United States might make a separate peace that ignored South Korean preferences (Moon 1997). The strong, if intermittent, role of the United States in North–South Korean relations must be considered a complication for de-escalation purposes. Cha (2004) contends that the United States is not a permanent impediment to better inter-Korean relations. But, in the long run, the strong U.S. role in the Korean peninsula may also demonstrate the reverse effect of usual expectations about third-party pressures; that is, that third-party pressures may be as likely to impede de-escalation as they are to facilitate it. If cooperation and accommodation must be achieved simultaneously in two dyads, as opposed to one (as in South and North Korea and the United States and North Korea), then the odds against successful de-escalation are greater (see Armstrong 2004: 51). For that matter, it is unlikely that there would have been a North–South Korean rivalry without U.S. intervention early on. The same could be said of the rivalry between China and Taiwan.
41. We also need to know more about triangular rivalry relations. See, for starting points, Dittmer 1981 and Goldstein and Freeman 1990.
Chapter 8
1. At the same time, we do not regard the coerced/subordinated category of terminations to be either noncomparable or beyond the modeling pale. They frequently involve shocks, especially war defeats, and certainly encompass expectancy revisions about who is competitive with whom. The difference is that the change in circumstances is so stark that there tends not to be anything more to negotiate about. Often, the victor can dictate the resolution of any outstanding disputes.
2. In this volume, we engage in qualitative case studies of instances with varying outcomes. Rasler (2001b) demonstrates, however, that the model can also be tested quantitatively.
3. For instance, Sadat, Gorbachev, and Rabin have all been depicted as absolutely necessary to the de-escalations of the Egyptian-Israeli, U.S.-Soviet, and Israeli-Palestinian rivalries, respectively. The problem is that it is impossible to rerun the processes in the real world with different people to see whether the outcome was indeed dependent on the personalities involved. This might be a puzzle that could be explored, however inconclusively, with experimentation.
4. We regard the first Chinese-U.S. rivalry as Eurasian in nature because its focus was placed on East and Southeast Asian issues. The ongoing, second Chinese-U.S. rivalry has been Eurasian in nature but it has some potential for breaking out of that mould eventually.
Appendix
1. One model that we do not include is the one developed by Long and Brecke (2003) to explain postwar reconciliation. To our minds, their approach is not designed to deal with interstate rivalry termination processes per se. Reconciliation is something that may follow rivalry termination, but there may be a considerable lag. The stress on reconciliation works better for civil wars, as they note, than it does for interstate wars. Symbolism about forgiveness is more likely to be needed after internal combat than it is after fighting between two states. Unfortunately, we became aware of Mani 2011 too late to include it.
2. One of the ironies of this exercise is that our own model preceded many of these arguments. Hence, we did not really construct a synthesis based on earlier works but, rather, have developed a model that appears to serve as a selective synthesis of various other arguments that have been put forward on kindred topics.
3. See as well the oyster shell model imagery discussed in Rasler and Thompson 1989, 16–17.
4. It should be noted that Legro's argument is not focused on rivalries but, rather, on major power grand strategies. We see no reason, however, that the argument can apply only to grand strategies or, for that matter, major powers.
5. Maoz and Mor (2002) focus primarily on the Egyptian-Israeli and Israeli-Syrian rivalries.
6. This observation is not part of Maoz and Mor's theory but helps to explain how some rivalries have experienced a series of war iterations without necessarily influencing perceptions of the status quo or of capabilities.
7. Maoz's more recent work has departed significantly from an insistence on dyadic structures. See Maoz 2011 for an emphasis on situating states within systemic networks.
8. The main exception is that decision makers can manipulate the salience of geopo litical objectives.
9. See Leng 1983 and Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007 on the problem of serial crises in rivalry relations.
10. The classic case is Britain's de-escalation of its French, U.S., and Russian rivalries to better cope with the German threat prior to World War I.
11. Tony Armstrong's (1993) case focus is placed primarily on East and West Germany.
12. These preference schedules can be constructed at the individual level and it is not unusual to find some considerable variance exhibited within any given decision-making group. To aggregate at the national level, therefore, involves considerable reduction.
13. Pervin's treatment is fairly brief and, given more space, it is likely that more than one Arab preference schedule would have been constructed. One schedule cannot encompass equally well Jordanian, Syrian, and PLO preferences.
14. In certain chapters we also emphasized the compounded effects of multiple shocks as manifested in the ending of the Cold War, the intifada, and the first Gulf War.
15. The inflexibility of decision makers is sufficiently frequent to cast doubt on assuming that all decision makers seek to remain in power above all else.
16. We agree with Pervin on the variable impact of third-party pressures as another part of the agency process.
17. Goertz and Diehl (1997) and Diehl and Goertz (2000) have been most responsible for injecting the concept of shock into rivalry analyses. While we acknowledge the significance of shocks, we have a much different take on what actually qualifies as a shock. See, for instance, the critique in Colaresi 2001. The basic points are that some types of shocks are much more important than others and that, even so, the effects of shocks are difficult to predict in isolation. Sometimes they open up windows for de-escalation, sometimes they intensify the rivalry, and sometimes they seem to have little effect.