Notes

CHAPTER ONE: The Psychology of Evil: Situated Character Transformations

1.	John Milton, Paradise Lost, in John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. M. Y. Hughes (New York: Odyssey Press, 1667/1957) quote in Book 1, p. 254; description of Satan’s Demonic Conference in Book 2, ll. 44–389.
2.	Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan (New York: Random House, 1995), p. xvii.
3.	D. Frankfurter, Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Satanic Abuse in History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 208–9.
4.	Some worthwhile books to examine for other psychological perspectives on evil include: R. F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence (New York: Freeman, 1997); A. G. Miller, ed., The Social Psychology of Good and Evil (New York: Guilford Press, 2004); M. Shermer, The Science of Good & Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share and Follow the Golden Rule (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5.	There is a growing body of literature in cultural psychology comparing behavioral and value differences between societies that can be described as fostering a more independent, individualistic orientation and those that are more interdependent and collectivist. A good starting point on how these different perspectives influence conceptions of the self is found in Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Models of Agency: Sociocultural Diversity in the Construction of Action,” in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. V. Murphy-Berman and J. Berman, Cross-Cultural Differences in Perspectives on Self. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003).
6.	One of the best references on the concept of essentialism as used by psychologists is found in Susan Gelman, The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
	Another valuable source on the ways in which our mind-set about intelligence as essential (fixed) versus incremental (variable) qualities affects success in many domains is found in Carol Dweck’s summary of her decades of original research, Mindset: The New Psychology of Success (New York: Random House, 2006).
7.	A constructive approach for dealing with such school violence is found in the work of my psychological colleague Elliot Aronson. He uses the power of social psychological knowledge to offer a road map for changing a school’s social environment so that compassion and cooperation replace competition and rejection: E. Aronson, Nobody Left to Hate: Teaching Compassion After Columbine (New York: Worth, 2000).
8.	Heinrich Kramer and Jakob Sprenger, The Malleus Maleficarum of Kramer and Sprenger (“The Witches’ Hammer”), edited and translated by Rev. Montague Summers (New York: Dover, 1486/1948). Written by German Dominican monks. An interesting summary is available online in the commentary of Stephanie du Barry (1994), http://users.bigpond.net.au/greywing/Malleus.htm.
9.	We must credit this ill-fated flight of theological fancy for the legacy of violence against women. The historian Anne Barstow traces the systemic use and widespread acceptance of male violence against women to its endorsement by male powers behind church and state that started this “witch craze” in Anne L. Barstow, Witchcraze: A New History of European Witch Hunts (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1995).
10.	C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 3–4.
11.	Sam Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections on the Hostile Imagination (enlarged ed.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1986/2004). Also see the powerful companion DVD produced by Bill Jersey and Sam Keen. Further information is available at www.samkeen.com.
12.	L. W. Simons, “Genocide and the Science of Proof,” National Geographic, January 2006, 28–35. See also the insightful analyses of mass homicides in the chapter by D. G. Dutton, E. O. Doyankowski, and M. H. Bond, “Extreme Mass Homicide: From Military Massacre to Genocide,” Aggression and Violent Behavior, vol. 10 (May–June, 2005): 437–473.
	These psychological scholars argue that political and historical factors shape the selection of a target group in military massacres, genocide, and political slaughter. That selection is based on a belief of prior unfair advantage taken or received in the past by that target group. Violence is then justified as revenge against this “cancerous group.” In turn, that perception justifies killing nonviolent people on the basis of their assumed future risk and danger to the offender group, now the offensive attackers.
13.	Some of the sad story of using rape as a weapon of terror revolves around one woman, who has been called “The Minister of Rape” by the investigator Peter Landesman in his thorough 2003 report in The New York Times Magazine, September 15, 2003, pp. 82–ff. 131. (All the following quotes are from this report.)
14.	Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
15.	R. Dallaire with B. Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2004).
16.	The psychologist Robert Jay Lifton, author of The Nazi Doctors, argues that rape is often a deliberate tool of war to set into motion continuous suffering and extreme humiliation that will affect not just the individual victim but also everyone around her. “A woman is seen as a symbol of purity. The family revolves around that symbol. Then here is the brutal attack on that, stigmatizing them all. All this perpetuates the humiliation, reverberating among survivors and their whole families. In this way, rape is worse than death.” Landesman, p. 125. See also A. Stiglmayer, ed, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
17.	Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 6.
18.	A. Badkhen, “Atrocities Are a Fact of All Wars, Even Ours,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 13, 2006, pp. E1–E6, and D. Nelson and N. Turse, “A Tortured Past,” Los Angeles Times, August 20, 2006, pp. A1, ff.
19.	A. Bandura, B. Underwood, and M. E. Fromson, “Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims,” Journal of Research in Personality 9 (1975): 253–69. Participants believed the other students allegedly in the next room were being shocked by their lever presses; no shocks were given to the fictitious “animals,” or others.
20.	Quoted in a New York Times article on our study of moral disengagement among all those prison personnel associated with death penalty executions. Benedict Casey, “In the Execution Chamber the Moral Compass Wavers,” The New York Times, February 7, 2006.
	See M. J. Osofsky, A. Bandura, & P. G. Zimbardo, “The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process,” Law and Human Behavior, 29 (2005): 371–93.
21.	I recently explored these themes in my acceptance speech for the Havel Foundation Vision 97 Award that I received on October 5, 2005, on the birthday of Václav Havel, former president of the Czech Republic and its heroic revolutionary leader. See Philip G. Zimbardo, “Liberation Psychology in a Time of Terror,” Prague: Havel Foundation, 2005. Online: www.zimbardo.com.havelawardlecture.pdf.
22.	Rabindranath Tagore, Stray Birds (London: Macmillan, 1916), p. 24.

CHAPTER TWO: Sunday’s Surprise Arrests

1.	This early research and theory on deindividuation was summarized in my 1970 chapter “The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos,” 1969 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. W. J. Arnold and D. Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), pp. 237–307. A more recent article on vandalism can be seen in P. G. Zimbardo, “Urban Decay, Vandalism, Crime and Civic Engagement,” in Schrumpfende Städte/Shrinking Cities, ed. F. Bolenius (Berlin: Philipp Oswalt, 2005).
2.	Graduate researcher Scott Fraser led the Bronx research team, and his counterpart, Ebbe Ebbesen, led the Palo Alto research team.
3.	“Diary of an Abandoned Automobile,” Time, October 1, 1968.
4.	We had to get local police approval to do this field study, so they notified me of the neighbors’ concern about the abandoned car now being stolen—by me.
5.	The “Broken Windows Theory” of reducing crime by restoring neighborhood order was first presented in James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, pp. 22–38.
6.	I had helped develop a program to train antiwar activists to create citizen support for peace candidates in upcoming elections, using basic social psychological strategies and tactics of persuasion and compliance. Bob Abelson, my former Yale teacher, and I put these ideas together in an operational manual: R. P. Abelson and P. G. Zimbardo, Canvassing for Peace: A Manual For Volunteers (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1970).
7.	The first of these violent police-campus confrontations took place at the University of Wisconsin in October 1967, when students protested the on-campus recruiting by Dow Chemical, the maker of the infamous napalm firebombs that were scorching the earth and civilians in Vietnam. There too, the university president acted in haste, relying on city police to contain the student demonstrators, who instead inflamed them with tear gas, baton bashing, and all-out mayhem. I recall a particularly vivid media image of a dozen cops beating up a single crawling student, most with their identities concealed by tear gas masks or having removed their identifying jackets. Anonymity plus authority is a recipe for disaster. The spin-off of that event was the mobilization of students across the United States. Most of them were students who had been nonpolitical and uninvolved in such activities—unlike their European counterparts, who had literally gone to the ramparts in defiance of their governments’ restrictions on free access to public education and other complaints of injustice.
	It was May Day 1970 at Kent State University, Ohio, when students began protesting the escalation of the Vietnam War by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger into Cambodia. Some students set the ROTC building on fire. A thousand National Guardsmen, ordered to occupy the campus, fired tear gas at protesters. Ohio Governor James Rhodes said on television, “We are going to eradicate the problem, not treat the symptom.” That unfortunate remark set in place the conceptual groundwork for extreme reactions by the Guardsmen toward the students who were creating the problem—to be “eradicated,” without negotiation or reconciliation.
	When a group of unarmed students gathered on May 4 and was moving toward a group of seventy Guardsmen with bayonets readied on their rifles, one of the soldiers panicked and fired directly at them. In a blind flash, there was a sudden volley by most other Guardsmen shooting at the students. In three seconds, sixty-seven shots were fired! Four students were killed; eight were wounded, some seriously. Included in the dead and injured were some not even near the scene of confrontation, on their way to class, but in the distant line of fire. Some, like Sandra Schewer, who was shot 400 feet away, and, ironically, Bill Schroeder, an ROTC student, were also shot, not protesting, but just victims of “collateral damage.”
	One soldier later said, “My mind was telling me this is not right, but I fired on the individual, he dropped.” No one was ever held responsible for these murders. An iconic photo of this event showed a young woman screaming in horror over the body of a fallen student. It also mobilized further antiwar sentiment in the United States.
	Less well-known than the Kent State massacre was a similar event occurring only ten days later at Jackson State College in Mississippi, where three students were killed and twelve wounded by hundreds of shots fired on black students by National Guardsmen occupying their campus.
	In contrast to these lethal encounters, most of the activities during the nationwide student strikes in May 1970 were relatively peaceful, although there were some cases of disruption and violence. In many cases, state authorities took measures to avert violence. In California, Governor Ronald Reagan shut down all twenty-eight campuses of the university and state college systems for four days. Guardsmen were sent onto the campuses of the universities of Kentucky, South Carolina, Illinois at Urbana, and Wisconsin at Madison. There were confrontations at Berkeley, the University of Maryland at College Park, and other places. At Fresno State College in California, a firebomb destroyed a million-dollar computer center.
8.	This program was started by a Stanford faculty and student group and supported by the Palo Alto City Council, before which I had appeared in a town hall meeting to urge proactive reconciliation efforts.
9.	This description of the preparations for the Sunday arrests by the Palo Alto police is based not on documented recordings of our transactions at that time but rather on my subsequent recall blended with the intention of creating a reasonable story line. My depiction of the experimental procedures and theoretical rationale for our research combines what I had previously explained to Captain Zurcher, to the TV executive at station KRON to engage its cooperation in filming the arrests, and to the cameraman before we got to the police station, in addition to what I recall saying to the arresting officers that morning. It is my attempt to convey this vital information to the reader without engaging in a pedantic time-out to do so formally. The full reason for conducting this study was based on more theoretical grounds, that of testing the relative impact of dispositional, or personality, factors versus situational factors in understanding behavioral transformations in novel behavioral contexts. That will become evident in subsequent chapters.
10.	The following three scenarios were created based on available information on three of our mock prisoners from their initial background information and later interviews, along with observations made at the time of their Sunday arrests. Clearly, I have taken creative license in extending that information to form these imaginative scenarios. However, we will see that there are some parallels with their subsequent behavior as mock prisoners.

CHAPTER THREE: Let Sunday’s Degradation Rituals Begin

1.	Unless otherwise noted, all prisoner and guard dialogue is taken from verbatim transcripts of video footage made during the experiment. The names of prisoners and guards have been modified to conceal their true identities. Stanford Prison Experiment materials referred to in this book, and all original data and analyses, are preseved at the Archives of the History of American Psychology in Akron, Ohio. Future materials will also be donated and permanently housed at the Archives as the Philip Zimbardo Papers. The first installment will be devoted to the Stanford Prison Experiment. Contact information for the Archives is www.uakron.edu or ahap@uakron.edu. The SPE has been the subject of extensive media discussion, and some of the participants have chosen to disclose their identities. However, this is the first time I have written about the experiment in such detail for a general audience. Therefore, I have determined to change the names of all prisoners and guards to conceal their true identities.
2.	These rules were an expansion of those that Jaffe and his fellow students had developed for their project in my Social Psychology in Action course the past spring. In it, they created a mock prison in their dormitory. For that course, students chose from among a set of ten experiential projects that I suggested, each of which would investigate aspects of individuals in institutions, such as elderly entering homes for the aged, people joining cults, and the socialization into the roles of prisoners and guards. Jaffe and a dozen or so other students chose prisons as their topic, and as part of their research, they designed and ran a mock prison in their dormitory over a weekend—with dramatic results that stimulated the present formal experiment.
	In the mock prison arranged by these students, I provided some advice but did not know what they had experienced until they presented their course project in class the day after their prison weekend. I was amazed at the intensity of the feelings, expressed openly before a large lecture class, of anger, frustration, shame, and confusion about their behavior and that of their friends in their new roles. I followed up with a debriefing of all of them, where it became evident that the situation had packed a wallop. But given the self-selection of these students into this topic, it was not clear if there was something unusual about them or about the prisonlike setting. Only a controlled experiment with random assignment to the roles of guards and prisoners could separate dispositions from situational factors. That became one of the instigations for designing this experiment that we did the following summer.
	Jaffe’s final report of the group study on May 15–16, 1971, is entitled simply “A Simulated Prison.” Unpublished report, Stanford University, Spring 1971.
3.	Guard’s Shift Report.
4.	Prisoner’s taped final evaluation.
5.	First week’s planned meals with food services at Stanford’s Tressider Student Union:

1. Sunday	Beef stew
2. Monday	Chili Beans
3. Tuesday	Chicken Pot Pie
4. Wednesday	Turkey a la King
5. Thursday	Corn Fritters with bacon strips
6. Friday	Spaghetti with meatballs

Breakfasts: 5 oz. juice, cereal or hard-boiled eggs, and an apple.

Lunches: 2 slices of bread with one of the following cold cuts—bologna, ham, or liv erwurst. An apple, a cookie, milk or water.

6.	Prisoner’s retrospective dairy.
7.	Prisoner’s retrospective dairy.
8.	Prisoner’s retrospective dairy
9.	Prisoner’s letter in archives.
10.	Guard’s quote from NBC Chronolog interview, aired November 1971.
11.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
12.	Verbatim transcript from video footage of the guards’ meeting. See DVD Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Experiment.

CHAPTER FOUR: Monday’s Prisoner Rebellion

1.	The quotes in this and the other chapters on the Stanford Prison Experiment come from a variety of data sources that I try to identify specifically when pertinent. Among these archival data are verbatim transcripts of video footage filmed during various times of the experiment; Guard Shift Reports, which some guards wrote at the end of their shift; final interviews at the end of the study; final evaluation reports made after the participants went home and returned, usually within a few weeks; retrospective diaries, which some of them sent to us at various times subsequent to the termination of the study; audiotaped interviews; interviews done for an NBC TV program, Chronolog, September 1971 (aired November, 1971); and personal observations, as well as subsequent recollections that Craig Haney, Christina Maslach, and I made in a published chapter. This quote comes from a final evaluation report.
2.	Unless otherwise noted, these and other prisoner and guard dialogues are taken from verbatim transcripts of video footage made during the experiment.
3.	Guard’s Shift Report.
4.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
5.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
6.	This utterance by Prisoner 8612 is one of the most dramatic events in the entire study. In order for this simulation to work, everyone must agree to act as if it were a prison and not an experimental simulation of a prison. In a sense, that involves a communal self-censorship of tacitly agreeing to frame all events in prison metaphors and not experimental ones. It involves everyone knowing it is all just an experiment but all acting as if it were a real prison. 8612 shatters that frame by shouting out that it is not a prison, only a simulated experiment. Amid the chaos surrounding that moment, there was a sudden silence when he added a concrete, but strange, example of why this was not a prison—because in real prisons they don’t take your clothes and bed away. Then another prisoner openly challenges him by simply adding, “They do.” After that exchange, the self-censorship rule is reinforced, and the rest of the prisoners, guards, and staff all go on with the self-imposed limit on expressing the obvious truth. For a full presentation of the operation of self-censorship, see Dale Miller’s recent text, An Invitation to Social Psychology: Expressing and Censoring the Self (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006).
7.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
8.	Prisoner’s taped interview.
9.	Not clear what the “contract” means in this case. See the prison study website information at www.prisonexp.org for the following experimental materials: The description of the research given to the participants; the consent form they signed; and the application to the Human Subjects Research Committee at Stanford.
10.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
11.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
12.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
13.	Quoted from our chapter on our subsequent recollections of the SPE: P. G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in ed. T. Blass, Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999), pp. 193–237.
14.	Ibid., p. 229.
15.	Prisoner’s final interview.

CHAPTER FIVE: Tuesday’s Double Trouble: Visitors and Rioters

1.	Unless otherwise noted, all prisoner and guard dialogue is taken from verbatim transcripts of video footage made during the experiment.
2.	Guard’s Shift Report.
3.	NBC Chronolog interview (November 1971).
4.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
5.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
6.	Spy’s taped final interview with Dr. Zimbardo.
7.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
8.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
9.	This O.N.R. grant funded my deindividuation research (see chapter 13) and was extended to cover the prison experiment. It was O.N.R. grant: N001447-A-0112-0041.
10.	See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). See also my edited volume of research by my NYU students, colleagues, and me, Philip G. Zimbardo, ed., The Cognitive Control of Motivation (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1969).
11.	See Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977).

CHAPTER SIX: Wednesday Is Spiraling Out of Control

1.	All of the dialogue in these exchanges between guards, prisoners, staff, and the priest is from our verbatim transcripts composed from videos taken at the time, supplemented with log notes and my personal recollections. The priest’s name has been changed to mask his identity, but everything else about him and his interactions with the prisoners and me is as accurate as possible.
2.	We will see the same exact reaction in Chapter 14, when a real guard, Staff Sergeant Frederick at Abu Ghraib, complains about the lack of clear guidelines as to what was permissible to do to the prisoners.
3.	Guard’s Shift Report.
4.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
5.	Spy’s final taped interview with Dr. Zimbardo.
6.	NBC Chronolog interview (November 1971).
7.	As an aside, I note that one person who did see me discussing the issues of prisoner dehumanization and guard power was the lawyer for the famous black radical political prisoner George Jackson. I got a letter from him on Saturday afternoon (August 21, 1971) inviting me to be an expert witness on behalf of his client, who was going to trial soon for the alleged murder of a guard in the Soledad Brothers case. He wanted me to interview his client, who was in lockdown in nearby San Quentin Prison’s solitary confinement, ironically called “The Maximum Adjustment Center” (perhaps borrowing from George Orwell’s 1984). On Saturday, events conspired to prevent me from accepting his invitation, since Jackson was killed in an alleged escape, but I did get heavily involved in several later trials. One federal trial challenged the Adjustment Center as a place of “cruel and unusual punishment.” In addition, I was also an expert witness in a second trial that came to be known as the “San Quentin Six” murder-conspiracy case, held at the Marin County Courthouse—with its elegant lines designed by Frank Lloyd Wright presenting an almost comic contrast to those of the Maximum Adjustment Center.
8.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
9.	We had a Parole Board hearing earlier on Wednesday that will be presented in full detail in the next chapter. However, as no prisoners were actually paroled, I am not sure what Sarge is referring to, other than that two prisoners were released because of extreme stress reactions. Maybe the guards told the rest of the prisoners that they had been paroled to keep their hopes up. “Maximum security” must mean they are in the Hole.
10.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
11.	When I replay the tape of this scene again, I suddenly realize that this guard, who is acting out his version of the role made famous by Strother Martin as the cruel warden in Cool Hand Luke, actually looks and moves more like actor Powers Boothe playing the infamous Rev. Jim Jones in the movie Guyana Tragedy. That monstrous tragedy would occur only six years later. Cool Hand Luke (1967), screenplay by Donn Pearce, directed by Stuart Rosenberg, featuring Paul Newman as Luke Jackson. Guyana Tragedy (1980), directed by William Graham.

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Power to Parole

1.	Carlo Prescott opened the day with the following monologue to the other board members: “Parole boards have been known to turn down ideal candidates for parole, that is guys who have come in to the board having taken school, therapy, counseling. They turn this guy down because he’s poor, because he’s a repeated offender, because the neighborhood he comes from doesn’t give him any support, because his parents are dead, because he doesn’t have any means of income, just because they don’t like his face, or because he shot a cop in the finger. And then they take some guy who’s an ideal prisoner who has never been any trouble . . . an ideal prisoner—and they turn him down three, four, five, and six times. Young kids, who seem most likely to come back to prison, who are most likely to be completely shaped and confused by the prison setting that they will never reenter society, are released a great deal more swiftly than individuals who act naturally, who never get into any trouble, and can manage to thieve or hustle enough to stay out of prison. Now, that sounds crazy, but what it amounts to is this—prison’s a big business. Prisons need prisoners. The people who come into prison and get their heads together are not coming back into prison, there’s too many things they can do. But people who come in on indefinite sentences . . . when you say to them [as a Parole Board], “I have this much leeway to play games,” you’re saying, in effect, that the parole board must not look at the most obvious circumstances, which are . . .”
2.	Unless otherwise noted, all prisoner and guard dialogue is taken from verbatim transcripts of video footage made during the experiment; this includes all the quotes from the Parole Board hearings.
3.	I attended a number of California Parole Board hearings in Vacaville Prison as part of a public defender project headed by the San Francisco law offices of Sidney Wollinsky. The project was designed to assess the function of parole boards in the indeterminate sentencing system that was then in contested operation in the California Department of Corrections. In that system, judges could establish a range of sentence lengths for a conviction, such as five to ten years, instead of a fixed sentence. However, prisoners typically ended up serving the maximum time, not the average of the range times.
	It was chilling and sad for me to observe each prisoner desperately trying to convince the two-man Board that he deserved to be released, and doing so in the few minutes’ time allotted to his appeal. One of the board members was not even paying attention because he was reading the file of the next prisoner in the long line that had to be processed each day, and the other was glancing at his file for perhaps the first time. If parole was denied, as it most often was, the prisoner had to wait another year to come back to the Board. My notes indicated that a major determinant of the probability of parole was in the time dimension framed by the opening question. If it were about the prisoner’s past—details about the crime, the victim, the trial, or troubles in the prison system—there would be no parole. However, if he was questioned about what he was doing now that was constructive to gain early release or his future plans after release, the likelihood of parole was increased. It may be that the parole officer had already made up his mind and unconsciously framed his question to get more evidence of why a prisoner did not deserve parole by his making the past crime more salient. If, on the other hand, he saw some promise in the prisoner’s file, a focus on the future would enable the prisoner a few minutes’ time to elaborate on this optimistic potential.
4.	Jane Elliott’s blue-eyes/brown-eyes demonstration is told in: W. Peters, A Class Divided, Then and Now (Expanded Edition) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971/1985). Peters was involved in the filming of both prizewinning documentaries, the ABC News documentary “The Eye of the Storm” (available from Guidance Associates, New York) and the follow-up PBS Frontline documentary, “A Class Divided” (available online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/divided/etc/view.html).
5.	This extended quote from Carlo is from an NBC Chronolog interview by producer Larry Goldstein, recorded at Stanford in September 1971, typed by my secretary Rosanne Saussotte, but sadly not used in the final program that was aired.
6.	George Jackson, Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 119–20.

CHAPTER EIGHT: Thursday’s Reality Confrontations

1.	Lucid dreaming is a state of semiawareness that the dreamer has of monitoring, and even coming to control, his or her dream as it is unfolding. A good recent reference to this interesting phenomenon is found in my colleague’s book, S. LaBerge, Lucid Dreaming: A Concise Guide to Awakening in Your Dreams and in Your Life (Boulder, CO: Sounds True Press, 2004).
2.	Prisoner’s taped interview with Curt Banks.
3.	Guard’s final evaluation.
4.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
5.	Guard’s final evaluation.
6.	Guard’s final evaluation.
7.	Guard’s final evaluation.
8.	NBC Chronolog interview, November 1971. “Varnish” was a third-year graduate student in economics.
9.	Guard’s final evaluation.
10.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
11.	“Work to rule” (for a basic definition, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Work_to_rule): As a policy, the work to rule was organized labor’s alternative to striking for public servants. Because emergency workers such as police officers and firefighters would be fired immediately or replaced if they were to strike, they had to find other alternatives. Apparently, the first U.S precedent was the famous 1919 Boston Police Strike. The then-governor of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge, dismissed 1,200 men because of the strike and stated, “There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime,” which is now widely quoted. He gained popularity, which helped catapult him into the vice presidency and eventually presidency of the United States. There was a case in 1969 involving the Atlanta Police Department when the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) used a similar “slowdown” tactic, which seems identical to the work to rule. At the time, “hippie” activists were usually not arrested and were given lenient treatment by the police, which was a widely accepted, yet unofficial policy. Protesting for better wages and hours (among other issues), the FOP started a “slowdown” by issuing massive numbers of tickets to “hippies” and other mild transgressors, which jammed the administrative system and made it virtually impossible for the police force to continue working effectively. At the time, there was a scare about an outbreak of crime, and the police eventually bargained for better wages and conditions. See M. Levi, Bureaucratic Insurgency: The Case of Police Unions (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977), and International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Unions and Other Police Organizations (New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1971) (Bulletin no. 4, September 1944).
12.	Prisoner’s final interview.
13.	Prisoner’s postexperiment questionnaire.
14.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
15.	The tactic of using hunger strikes as a political tool is traced by the political historian Sheila Howard to the first-ever hunger striker, Terence MacSwiney, MP (Member of Parliament). He was a newly elected lord mayor of Cork, who died during a hunger strike in 1920 in search of political status as a prisoner. Gerry Adams (the leader of Sinn Fein) notes that MacSwiney directly inspired Mahatma Gandhi (see Foreword in Bobby Sands’s book). Between 1976 and 1981 there were various periods of such hunger strikes among Irish political prisoners, the last of which became the most famous when ten men died as a result. They included seven members of the IRA, notably one of its leaders, Bobby Sands, and three members of the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army). Republican (i.e., IRA/INLA) prisoners went on a hunger strike in Long Kesh Prison (the “Maze” prison), just south of Belfast. Among other protests they conducted during their hunger strike was a “blanket protest”: they refused to wear prison uniforms because they were a symbol of one’s criminal status; instead, they wore blankets to keep them warm during their hunger strike.
	Bobby Sands wrote a series of inspiring poems and other pieces from prison; they have inspired international support for the political cause of occupied peoples, notably in Iran and in Palestine in the Middle East. Likewise, Palestinian flags are flown alongside Irish tricolors in Derry town (predominantly Catholic/nationalist/republican) and in areas of Belfast.
	Some relevant references are Shelia Howard, Britain and Ireland 1914–1923 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983); Gerry Adams, Foreword to Bobby Sands Writings from Prison (Cork: Mercier Press, 1997); and Michael Von Tangen Page, Prisons, Peace, and Terrorism: Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political Violence in Northern Ireland, Italy, and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968–1997 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
16.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
17.	Prisoner’s final interview, also source of next extended quote.
18.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
19.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
20.	Prisoner’s postexperiment questionnaire.
21.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
22.	This extended quote and the following one are from Christina Maslach’s essay in a collection of three, along with those of Craig Haney and myself: P. G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999), pp. 193–237. Quote is on pp. 214–16.
23.	Ibid., pp. 216–17.
24.	Bruno Bettelheim reports on a similar phenomenon among prisoners in the Nazi concentration camp in which he was interned during the early stages of the Holocaust, before the concentration camps became extermination camps. He relates how some inmates gave up trying to survive, becoming like zombies. His moving description of survival and surrender under horrendous conditions is worth including in full. It is from part of his essay “Owners of Their Face,” in his book Surviving and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979):
	My reading of Paul Celan’s poem was informed by what I had learned about survival in the camps from observing others and myself: even the worst mistreatment by the SS failed to extinguish the will to live—that is, as long as one could muster the wish to go on and maintain one’s self-respect. Then tortures could even strengthen one’s resolution not to permit the mortal enemy to break one’s desire to survive, and to remain true to oneself as much as conditions permitted. Then the actions of the SS tended to make one livid with rage, and this gave one the feeling of being very much alive. It made one all the more determined to go on living, so as to be able someday to defeat the enemy.
	. . . All this worked only up to a point. If there was no or only little indication that someone, or the world at large, was deeply concerned about the fate of the prisoner, his ability to give positive meaning to signs from the outside world eventually vanished and he felt forsaken, usually with disastrous consequences for his will and with it his ability to survive. Only a very clear demonstration that one was not abandoned—and the SS saw to it that one received this only very rarely, and not at all in the extermination camps—restored, at least momentarily, hope even to those who otherwise by and large had lost it. But those who had reached the utmost state of depression and disintegration, those who had turned into walking corpses because their life drives had become inoperative—the so-called “Muslims” (Muselmänner) could not believe in what others would have viewed as tokens that they had not been forgotten” (pp. 105–6).

CHAPTER NINE: Friday’s Fade to Black

1.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
2.	Ceros was an eighteen-year-old freshman who was thinking about becoming a social worker.
3.	Guard’s incident report.
4.	Unless otherwise noted, all prisoner and guard dialogue is taken from verbatim transcripts of video footage made during the experiment.
5.	Public defender’s letter to me, August 29, 1971.
6.	Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) has been the primary treatment in dealing with victims of traumatic stress, such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters, rape, and other abuses. However, recent empirical evidence challenges its therapeutic value, even pointing to instances where it is counterproductive by increasing and prolonging the negative emotional component of the stress. Having people vent their emotions, in some cases, serves to revivify the negative thoughts rather than relieve them.
	Some relevant references include
	B. Litz, M. Gray, R. Bryant, and A. Adler, “Early Intervention for Trauma: Current Status and Future Directions,” Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 9 (2002): 112–34. R. McNally, R. Bryant, and A. Ehlers, “Does Early Psychological Intervention Promote Recovery from Posttraumatic Stress?” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 4 (2003): 45–79.
7.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
8.	Guard’s retrospective diary. The participants were paid for only a full week, not for the second week, which was terminated, at the rate of $15.00 for each day served as prisoners and guards.
9.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
10.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
11.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
12.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
13.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
14.	Prisoner’s final evaluation.
15.	Prisoner’s retrospective diary.
16.	Guard’s final interview.
17.	Guard’s postexperiment questionnaire.
18.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
19.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
20.	Prisoner’s postexperiment questionnaire.
21.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
22.	Guard’s audio interview.
23.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
24.	Transcript of interview for Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Experiment.
25.	NBC Chronolog interview, November 1971.
26.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
27.	Guard’s retrospective diary.
28.	Guard Hellmann’s nickname, “John Wayne,” has an interesting parallel that I learned from my colleague John Steiner. John Steiner, an emeritus professor of sociology at Sonoma State University and a Holocaust survivor, was as a teenager a prisoner in Buchenwald concentration camp for several years. When he learned that our prisoners had nicknamed one of the worst guards “John Wayne,” he recounted a parallel with his own experience: “Well, the guards in the camps were all anonymous to us. We called them ‘Herr Lieutenant’ or ‘Mr. S.S. Officer,’ but they had no name, no identity. However, one of the guards, who was the most vicious of all, we gave him a nickname too. He was shooting the people for no reason, killing them, and pushing them into the electric fence. His violence was like a Wild West cowboy. So we called him ‘Tom Mix,’ but only behind his back.” Tom Mix was the tough movie cowboy of the 1930s and ’40s that John Wayne subsequently became for future generations.
29.	Guard’s final evaluation.
30.	Guard’s postexperiment questionnaire.
31.	Guard’s postexperiment questionnaire.

CHAPTER TEN: The SPE’s Meaning and Messages: The Alchemy of Character Transformations

1.	The concept of learned helplessness originally came from animal research by Martin Seligman and his associates. Dogs in conditioning experiments that were given inescapable shocks that they could do nothing to avoid soon stopped trying to escape, seemed to give up, and took the shocks—even when they then were given the opportunity to escape easily. Later research revealed parallels with humans who, having experienced inescapable noise, did nothing to stop a stressful new noise when they could have done so. Parallels are also evident in clinical depression, abused children and spouses, prisoners of war, and some residents of nursing homes for the aged. Some references include M.E.P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development and Death (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975); D. S. Hiroto, “Loss of Control and Learned Helplessness,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (1974): 187–93; J. Buie, “‘Control’ Studies Bode Better Health in Aging,” APA Monitor, July 1988, p. 20.
2.	The best reference for the data we collected and its statistically analyzed results is the first scientific article we published: Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Philip Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,” International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1 (1973): 69–97. This journal is now defunct and, not being a publication of the American Psychological Association, there is not an available archive. However, a PDF file of that article is available at www.prisonexp.org and www.zimbardo.com. See also P. G. Zimbardo, C. Haney, W. C. Banks, and D. Jaffe, “The Mind is a Formidable Jailer: A Pirandellian Prison.” The New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1973, pp. 36ff; and P. G. Zimbardo, “Pathology of Imprisonment,” Society 6 (1972): 4, 6, 8.
3.	T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).
4.	R. Christie, and F. L. Geis, eds. Studies in Machiavellianism (New York: Academic Press, 1970).
5.	A. I. Comrey, Comrey Personality Scales (San Diego: Educational and Industrial Testing Service, 1970).
6.	Figure 16.1, “Guard and Prisoner Behavior,” in P. G. Zimbardo and R. J. Gerrig, Psychology and Life, 14th ed., (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 587.
7.	B. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
8.	J. Frankel. “Exploring Ferenczi’s Concept of Identification with the Aggressor: Its Role in Trauma, Everyday Life, and the Therapeutic Relationship,” Psychoanalytic Dialogues 12 (2002): 101–39.
9.	E. Aronson, M. Brewer, and J. M. Carlsmith, “Experimentation in Social Psychology,” in Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 1, ed. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum, 1985).
10.	K. Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (New York: Harper, 1951). K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, “Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created ‘Social Climates.’” Journal of Social Psychology 10 (1939): 271–99.
11.	Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 194.
12.	The movie Cool Hand Luke was released in the United States in November 1967.
13.	P. G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999), pp. 193–237; quote on p. 229.
14.	Prisoner’s final interview, August 19, 1971.
15.	R. J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (New York: Harper, 1969).
16.	L. Ross, and R. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
17.	L. Ross, “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 10, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 173–220.
18.	See the fuller account of these role transformations in Sarah Lyall’s description in “To the Manor Acclimated,” The New York Times, May 26, 2002, p. 12.
19.	R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (1986) pp. 196, 206, 210–11.
20.	Zimbardo, Maslach, and Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment,” p. 226.
21.	A. Zarembo, “A Theater of Inquiry and Evil,” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2004, pp. A1, A24–A25.
22.	L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957); P. G. Zimbardo and M. R. Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991); P. G. Zimbardo, The Cognitive Control of Motivation (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1969).
23.	R. Rosenthal and L. F. Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils’ Intellectual Development (New York: Holt, 1968).
24.	V. W. Bernard, P. Ottenberg, and F. Redl, “Dehumanization: A Composite Psychological Defense in Relation to Modern War,” in The Triple Revolution Emerging: Social Problems in Depth, eds. R. Perruci and M. Pilisuck (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 16–30.
25.	H. I. Lief and R. C. Fox, “Training for ‘Detached Concern’ in Medical Students,” in The Psychological Basis of Practice, ed. H. I. Lief, V. F. Lief, and N. R. Lief (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); C. Maslach, “‘Detached Concern’ in Health and Social Service Professions,” paper presented at the American Psychological Association annual meeting, Montreal, Canada, August 30, 1973.
26.	P. G. Zimbardo, “Mind Control in Orwell’s 1984: Fictional Concepts Become Operational Realities in Jim Jones’ Jungle Experiment,” in 1984: Orwell and Our Future, eds. M. Nussbaum, J. Goldsmith, and A. Gleason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 127–54.
27.	Quote from Feynman’s Appendix to the Rogers Commission Report on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. See his discussion of this experience in the second volume of his autobiographical What Do You Care What Other People Think? Further Adventures of a Curious Character (as told to Ralph Leighton) (New York: Norton, 1988).
28.	G. Ziemer, Education for Death: The Making of the Nazi (New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 1972).
29.	E. Kogon, J. Langbein, and A. Ruckerl, eds., Nazi Mass Murder: A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 5, 6.
30.	Lifton, The Nazi Doctors (1986), pp. 212, 213.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: The SPE: Ethics and Extensions

1.	The concept of “total situation” as one that exerts a powerful impact on human functioning was used by Erving Goffman in depicting the impact of institutions on mental patients and prisoners, and by Robert Jay Lifton in describing the power of Chinese Communist interrogation settings. Total situations are those in which one is physically and then psychologically confined to the extent that all information and reward structures are contained within its narrow boundaries. Craig Haney and I have extended that conception to cover high schools, which sometimes act as prisons. See E. Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: Doubleday, 1961); R. J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (New York: Norton, 1969); C. Haney and P. G. Zimbardo, “Social Roles, Role-playing and Education: The High School as Prison,” Behavioral and Social Science Teacher, vol. 1 (1973): 24–45.
2.	P. G. Zimbardo, Psychology and Life, 12th ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989), Table “Ways We Can Go Wrong,” p. 689.
3.	L. Ross and D. Shestowsky, “Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice,” Northwestern Law Review 97 (2003): 108–14,
4.	S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
5.	D. Baumrind, “Some Thoughts on Ethics of Research: After Reading Milgram’s ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience,’” American Psychologist 19 (1964): 421–23.
6.	H. B. Savin, “Professors and Psycho-logical Researchers: Conflicting Values in Conflicting Roles,” Cognition 2 (1973): 147–49. My reply to Savin is “On the Ethics of Intervention in Human Psychological Research: With Special Reference to the Stanford Prison Experiment,” Cognition 2 (1973): 213–56.
7.	See copy of the Human Subjects Research Review approval at www.prisonexp.org, under Links.
8.	See L. Ross, M. R. Lepper, and M. Hubbard, “Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975): 880–92.
9.	L. Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).
10.	See Neal Miller’s research on biofeedback and autonomic conditioning and his examples of how basic research can pay applied dividends: N. E. Miller, “The Value of Behavioral Research on Animals,” American Psychologist 40 (1985): 423–40; and N. E. Miller, “Introducing and Teaching Much-Needed Understanding of the Scientific Process,” American Psychologist 47 (1992): 848–50.
11.	P. G. Zimbardo, “Discontinuity Theory: Cognitive and Social Searches for Rationality and Normality—May Lead to Madness,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 31, ed. M. Zanna (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), pp. 345–486.
12.	Details about The Quiet Rage video: P. G. Zimbardo, (writer and producer) and K. Musen, (co-writer and co-producer), Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Experiment (video) (Stanford, CA: Stanford Instructional Television Network, 1989).
13.	Personal communication, e-mail, June 5, 2005.
14.	C. Haney, “Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of a Decade,” Law and Human Behavior 17 (1993): 371–98; C. Haney, “Infamous Punishment: The Psychological Effects of Isolation,” National Prison Project Journal 8 (1993): 3–21; C. Haney, “The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Capital Mitigation,” Santa Clara Law Review 35 (1995): 547–609; C. Haney, Reforming Punishment: Psychological Limits to the Pain of Imprisonment (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2006); C. Haney and P. G. Zimbardo, “The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy: Twenty-five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment,” American Psychologist 53 (1998): 709–27.
15.	P. G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999), quote pp. 221, 225.
16.	Ibid., p. 220.
17.	C. Maslach, “Burned-out,” Human Behavior, September 1976, pp. 16–22; C. Maslach, Burnout: The Cost of Caring (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982); C. Maslach, S. E. Jackson, and M. P. Leiter, The Maslach Burnout Inventory, (3rd ed.) (Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1996); C. Maslach, and M. P. Leiter, The Truth About Burnout (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997).
18.	C. Maslach, J. Stapp, and R. T. Santee, “Individuation: Conceptual Analysis and Assessment,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 (1985): 729–38.
19.	Curtis Banks went on to a distinguished career in academia, obtaining his Stanford Ph.D. in only three years and becoming the first African American to be a tenured professor in Princeton University’s Psychology Department. He then moved on to teach at Howard University and also to perform valuable services at the Educational Testing Service and as founding editor of the Journal of Black Psychology. Sadly, he died prematurely in 1998 from cancer.
	David Jaffe likewise moved on from the SPE to a distinguished career in medicine, now serving as director of the Emergency Medicine Department at the St. Louis Children’s Hospital and associate professor of pediatrics at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
20.	P. G. Zimbardo, “The Stanford Shyness Project,” in Shyness: Perspectives on Research and Treatment, ed. W. H. Jones, J. M. Cheek, and S. R. Briggs, (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), pp. 17–25; P. G. Zimbardo, Shyness: What It Is, What to Do About It (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977); P. G. Zimbardo and S. Radl, The Shy Child (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986); P. G. Zimbardo, P. Pilkonis, and R. Norwood, “The Silent Prison of Shyness,” Psychology Today, May 1975, pp. 69–70, 72; L. Henderson and P. G. Zimbardo, “Shyness as a Clinical Condition: The Stanford Model,” In International Handbook of Social Anxiety, L. Alden and R. Crozier (eds.) (Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons), pp. 431–47.
21.	San Francisco Chronicle, February 14, 1974.
22.	A. Gonzalez and P. G. Zimbardo, “Time in Perspective: The Time Sense We Learn Early Affects How We Do Our Jobs and Enjoy Our Pleasures,” Psychology Today, March 1985, pp. 21–26; P. G. Zimbardo and J. N. Boyd, “Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual-Differences Metric,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (1999): 1271–88.
23.	G. Jackson, Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 111.
24.	P. G. Zimbardo, S. Andersen, and L. G. Kabat, “Induced Hearing Deficit Generates Experimental Paranoia,” Science 212 (1981): 1529–31; P. G. Zimbardo, S. LaBerge, and L. Butler, “Physiological Consequences of Unexplained Arousal: A Posthypnotic Suggestion Paradigm,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 102 (1993): 466–73.
25.	P. G. Zimbardo, “A Passion for Psychology: Teaching It Charismatically, Integrating Teaching and Research Synergistically, and Writing About It Engagingly,” in Teaching Introductory Psychology: Survival Tips from the Experts, ed. R. J. Sternberg (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1997), pp. 7–34.
26.	P. G. Zimbardo, “The Power and Pathology of Imprisonment,” Congressional Record, serial no. 15, October 25, 1971, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session on Corrections, Part II, Prisons, Prison Reform and Prisoner’s Rights: California (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
27.	P. G. Zimbardo, “The Detention and Jailing of Juveniles,” (Hearings Before U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, September 10, 11, and 17, 1973) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 141–61.
28.	P. G. Zimbardo, “Transforming Experimental Research into Advocacy for Social Change,” in Applications of Social Psychology, eds. M. Deutsch and H. A. Hornstein (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1983).
29.	P. G. Zimbardo (consultant and on-screen performer), Larry Goldstein (producer), and Garrick Utley (correspondent); “Prisoner 819 Did a Bad Thing: The Stanford Prison Experiment,” Chronolog, NBC-TV, November 26, 1971.
30.	P. G. Zimbardo (on-screen performer), Jay Kernis (producer), and Lesley Stahl (correspondent), “Experimental Prison: The Zimbardo Effect,” 60 Minutes, NBC-TV, August 30, 1998; P. G. Zimbardo (on-screen performer), “The Stanford Prison Experiment Living Dangerously” series, National Geographic TV, May 2004.
31.	Alex Gibney, writer-director, “The Human Behavior Experiments,” Jigsaw Productions, June 1, 2006, Sundance channel.
32.	J. Newton, and P. G. Zimbardo, “Corrections: Perspectives on Research, Policy, and Impact,” unpublished report, Stanford University, ONR Technical Report Z-13, February 1975. (Also published in Adolescence 23 (76) [Winter 1984]: 911.)
33.	C. Pogash, “Life Behind Bars Turns Sour Quickly for a Few Well-Meaning Napa Citizens,” San Francisco Examiner, March 25, 1976, pp. 10–11.
34.	Personal e-mail communication from Glenn Adams, May 4, 2004 (reprinted with permission).
35.	S. H. Lovibond, X. Mithiran, and W. G. Adams, “The Effects of Three Experimental Prison Environments on the Behaviour of Non-Convict Volunteer Subjects,” Australian Psychologist (1979): 273–87.
36.	A. Banuazizi and S. Movahedi, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison: A Methodological Analysis,” American Psychologist 17 (1975): 152–60.
37.	N. J. Orlando, “The Mock Ward: A Study in Simulation,” in Behavior Disorders: Perspectives and Trends, O. Milton and R. G. Wahlers, eds. (3rd ed., Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973), pp. 162–70.
38.	D. Derbyshire, “When They Played Guards and Prisoners in the US, It Got Nasty. In Britain, They Became Friends,” The Daily Telegraph, May 3, 2002, p. 3.
39.	M. G. Bloche and J. H. Marks, “Doing unto Others as They Did to Us.” The New York Times, November 4, 2005.
40.	J. Mayer, “The Experiment,” The New Yorker, July 11 and 18, 2005, pp. 60–71.
41.	Gerald Gray and Alessandra Zielinski, “Psychology and U.S. Psychologists in Torture and War in the Middle East,” Torture 16 (2006): 128–33, quotes on pp. 130–31.
42.	“The Schlesinger Report,” in The Torture Papers, eds. K. Greenberg and J. Dratel (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 970–71. We will have much more to say about the findings of this independent investigation in chapter 15.
43.	Richard Alvarez, review of Stanford Prison Experiment, Cover, September 1995, p. 34.
44.	Philip French, review of “Das Experiment,” The Observer, online, March 24, 2002.
45.	Peter Bradshaw, review of “Das Experiment,” The Guardian, online, March 22, 2002.
46.	Roger Ebert, review of “Das Experiment,” Chicago Sun-Times, online, October 25, 2002.
47.	Blake Gopnik, “A Cell with the Power to Transform,” The Washington Post, June 16, 2005, pp. C1, C5.
48.	W. Mares, The Marine Machine: The Making of the United States Marine (New York: Double-day, 1971).

CHAPTER TWELVE: Investigating Social Dynamics: Power, Conformity, and Obedience

1.	C. S. Lewis (1898–1963), professor of medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge University, was also a novelist, a writer of children’s books, and a popular speaker on moral and religious issues. In his best-known book, The Screwtape Letters (1944), he impersonated a veteran devil in Hell that writes letters encouraging the efforts of a novice devil hard at work on Earth. “The Inner Ring” was the Memorial Lecture at King’s College, University of London, delivered to the students in 1944.
2.	R. F. Baumeister and M. R. Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation,” Psychological Bulletin 117 (1995): 427–529.
3.	R. B. Cialdini, M. R. Trost, and J. T. Newsome, “Preference for Consistency: The Development of a Valid Measure and the Discovery of Surprising Behavioral Implications,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69 (1995): 318–28; Also see L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
4.	P. G. Zimbardo and S. A. Andersen, “Understanding Mind Control: Exotic and Mundane Mental Manipulations,” in Recovery from Cults, ed. M. Langone, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); see also A. W. Scheflin and E. M. Opton, Jr., The Mind Manipulators: A Non-Fiction Account (New York: Paddington Press, 1978).
5.	In addition to normative, social pressures to go along with others’ views, there are rational forces at work because people can serve to provide valuable information and wisdom. M. Deutsch and H. B. Gerard, “A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influence upon Individual Judgement,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51 (1955): 629–36.
6.	Associated Press (July 26, 2005), “‘Cool Mom’ Guilty of Sex with Schoolboys: She Said She Felt Like ‘One of the Group.’” The report is of her sex and drug parties from October 2003 to October 2004 in the rural town of Golden, Colorado.
7.	Self-serving, egocentric, and above-average biases have been investigated extensively. For a summary of the main effects across many different domains of application, see D. Myers, Social Psychology, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), pp. 66–77.
8.	E. Pronin, J. Kruger, K. Savitsky, and L. Ross, “You Don’t Know Me, but I Know You: The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (2001): 639–56.
9.	M. Sherif, “A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception,” Archives of Psychology 27 (1935): pp. 210–11.
10.	S. E. Asch, “Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority,” Psychological Monographs 70 (1951): whole no. 416; S. E. Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” Scientific American, November 1955, pp. 31–35.
11.	M. Deutsch and H. B. Gerard (1955).
12.	G. S. Berns, J. Chappelow, C. F. Zin, G. Pagnoni, M. E. Martin-Skurski, and J. Richards, “Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation,” Biological Psychiatry 58 (August 1, 2005): 245–53; Sandra Blakeslee, “What Other People Say May Change What You See,” New York Times, online: www.nytimes.com/2005 /06/28/science/28brai.html, June 28, 2005.
13.	S. Moscovici and C. Faucheux, “Social Influence, Conformity Bias, and the Study of Active Minorities,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 6, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 149–202.
14.	E. Langer, Mindfulness. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1989).
15.	C. J. Nemeth, “Differential Contributions to Majority and Minority Influence,” Psychological Review 93 (1986): 23–32.
16.	S. Moscovici, “Social Influence and Conformity,” in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 3rd. ed., eds. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 347–412.
17.	T. Blass, Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Miligram Paradigm (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999), p. 62.
18.	In 1949, seated next to me in senior class at James Monroe High School in the Bronx, New York, was my classmate Stanley Milgram. We were both skinny kids full of ambition and a desire to make something of ourselves so that we might escape from life in the confines of our ghetto. Stanley was the little smart one whom we went to for authoritative answers. I was the tall popular one, the smiling guy other kids would go to for social advice. Even then we were budding situationists. I had just returned to Monroe High from a horrible year at North Hollywood High School, where I had been shunned and friendless (because, as I later learned, there was a rumor circulating that I was from a New York Sicilian Mafia family), to be chosen “Jimmy Monroe,” the most popular boy in Monroe High School’s senior class. Stanley and I discussed once how that transformation could have happened. We agreed that I had not changed but the situation was what had mattered. When we met years later, at Yale University in 1960, as beginning assistant professors, him starting out at Yale and me at NYU, it turned out that Stanley really wanted to be popular and I really wanted to be smart. So much for unfulfilled desires.
	I should also mention a recent discovery I made about another commonality that I shared with Stanley. I was the one who initially constructed a basement laboratory that was later modified to be the site in which Milgram’s Yale obedience experiments were conducted (after he could no longer use the elegant interaction laboratory of sociologist O. K. Moore). I had done so a few years earlier for a study I did with Irving Sarnoff to test Freudian predictions about the differences between fear and anxiety in their effects on social affiliation. I fabricated a little lab in the basement of the building where we taught Introductory Psychology courses. It had the delightfully British name Linsly-Chittenden Hall. It is also interesting that both his experiments and the SPE were conducted in basements.
19.	T. Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 116.
20.	See R. Cialdini, Influence. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001).
21.	J. L. Freedman and S. C. Fraser, “Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4 (1966): 195–202; also see S. J. Gilbert, “Another Look at the Milgram Obedience Studies: The Role of the Graduated Series of Shocks,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 4 (1981): 690–95.
22.	E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941). In the United States, the fear of threats to national security posed by terrorists, amplified by government officials, has led many citizens, the Pentagon, and national leaders to accept the torture of prisoners as a necessary method of eliciting information that could prevent further attacks. That reasoning, I will argue in chapter 15, contributed to the abuses by American guards at Abu Ghraib prison.
23.	H. C. Kelman and V. L. Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
24.	Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World, Appendix C, “The Stability of Obedience Across Time and Place.”
25.	C. L. Sheridan and R. G. King, “Obedience to Authority with an Authentic Victim,” Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, vol. 7 (Part 1), 1972, pp. 165–66.
26.	M. T. Orne and C. H. Holland, “On the Ecological Validity of Laboratory Deceptions,” International Journal of Psychiatry 6 (1968) 282–93.
27.	C. K. Hofling, E. Brotzman, S. Dalrymple, N. Graves, and C. M. Pierce, “An Experimental Study in Nurse-Physician Relationships,” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 143 (1966): 171–80.
28.	A. Krackow and T. Blass, “When Nurses Obey or Defy Inappropriate Physician Orders: Attributional Differences,” Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 10 (1995): 585–94.
29.	E. Tarnow, “Self-Destructive Obedience in the Airplane Cockpit and the Concept of Obedience Optimization,” in Obedience to Authority, ed. T. Blass, pp. 111–23.
30.	W. Meeus and Q. A. W. Raaijmakers, “Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht Studies,” Journal of Social Issues 51 (1995): 155–76.
31.	From The Human Behavior Experiments, transcript: Sundance Lock, May 9, 2006, Jig Saw Productions, p. 20. Transcript available on www.prisonexp.org/pdf/HBE-transcript.pdf.
32.	These quotes and information about the strip-search hoaxes come from an informative article by Andrew Wolfson, “A Hoax Most Cruel,” in The Courier-Journal, October 9, 2004, available online at: www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051009/NEWS01/510090392/1008Hoax.
33.	Quoted from a 1979 television interview in Robert V. Levine, “Milgram’s Progress,” American Scientist Online, July–August 2004. Originally in Blass, Obedience to Authority, pp. 35–36.
34.	R. Jones, “The Third Wave,” in Experiencing Social Psychology, ed. A. Pines and C. Maslach (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 144–52; also see the article that Ron Jones wrote about his Third Wave class exercise, available at: www.vaniercollege.qc.ca/Auxilliary/Psychology/Frank/Thirdwave.html.
35.	“The Wave,” television docudrama, directed by Alexander Grasshoff, 1981.
36.	W. Peters, A Class Divided Then and Now (expanded ed.) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985 [1971]). Peters was involved in the filming of both prizewinning documentaries, the ABC News documentary “The Eye of the Storm” (available from Guidance Associates, New York) and the follow-up PBS Frontline documentary “A Class Divided” (available online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/divided/etc/view.html).
37.	H. H. Mansson, “Justifying the Final Solution,” Omega: The Journal of Death and Dying 3 (1972): 79–87.
38.	J. Carlson, “Extending the Final Solution to One’s Family,” unpublished report, University of Hawaii, Manoa, 1974.
39.	C. R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. xvi.
40.	E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 126, 127.
41.	J. M. Steiner, “The SS Yesterday and Today: A Sociopsychological View,” in Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust, ed. J. E. Dinsdale (Washington, DC: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1980), pp. 405–56; quotes on p. 433. Also see A. G. Miller, The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science (New York: Praeger, 1986).
42.	D. J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (New York: Knopf, 1999). Also see the review by Christopher Reed, “Ordinary German Killers,” in Harvard Magazine, March–April 1999, p. 23.
43.	H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), pp. 25, 26, 252, 276. Following quotes are from this source.
44.	M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murders Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: University of Califrornia Press, 2002).
45.	M. Haritos-Fatouros, The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture (London: Routledge, 2003).
45.	Archdiocese of São Paulo, Torture in Brazil (New York: Vintage, 1998).
47.	Official site for School of the Americas is www.ciponline.org/facts/soa.htm/; also see a critical site: www.soaw.org/new/.
48.	F. Morales, “The Militarization of the Police,” Covert Action Quarterly 67 (Spring–Summer 1999): 67.
49.	See the body of literature on suicide bombers; among the sources recommended are: Ariel Merari, “Suicide Terrorism in the Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Institute of Justice Conference, Washington, DC, October 2004; Ariel Merari, “Israel Facing Terrorism,” Israel Affairs 11 (2005): 223–37; Ariel Merari, “Suicidal Terrorism,” in Assessment, Treatment and Prevention of Suicidal Behavior, eds. R. I. Yufit and D. Lester (New York: Wiley, 2005).
50.	M. Sageman, “Understanding Terrorist Networks,” November 1, 2004, available at www.fpri.org/enotes/20041101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html. Also see M. Shermer, “Murdercide: Science Unravels the Myth of Suicide Bombers,” Scientific American, January 2006, p. 33; A. B. Krueger, “Poverty Doesn’t Create Terrorists,” The New York Times, May 29, 2003.
51.	T. Joiner, Why People Die by Suicide. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299 (2003): 1534–39; Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004): 61–88; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005): 573–98; Shaul Kimi and Shemuel Even, “Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?” Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2005): 814–40; Ami Pedhahzur, “Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism—A Comment,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2004): 841–44. Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 343–61; Christopher Reuter, My Life as a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Andrew Silke, “The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006): 35–46; Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42.
52.	A. Merari, “Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism,” in Psychology of Terrorism, eds. B. Bongar, L. M. Brown, L. Beutler, and P. G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
53.	Jonathan Curiel, “The Mind of a Suicide Bomber,” San Francisco Chronicle (October 22, 2006): p. E1, 6; quote on p. E6.
54.	T. McDermott, Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).
55.	M. Kakutani, “Ordinary but for the Evil They Wrought,” The New York Times, May 20, 2005, p. B32.
56.	Z. Coile, “‘Ordinary British Lads,’” San Francisco Chronicle, July 14, 2005, pp. A1, A10.
57.	A. Silke, “Analysis: Ultimate Outrage,” The Times (London), May 5, 2003.
58.	I became connected to this experience through my acquaintance with the brother of one of the few people who had escaped the massacre, his sister, Diane Louie, and her boyfriend, Richard Clark. I offered them counseling when they returned to San Francisco and learned much from their firsthand horror accounts. Later, I became an expert witness for Larry Layton, accused of conspiracy to murder Congressman Ryan, and through him I became friends with his sister, Debbie Layton, another heroic resistor of Jim Jones’s domination. We will learn more about them in our final chapter, where their heroism is discussed.
59.	The transcript of Jones’s last-hour speech on November 18, 1978, is known as the “Death Tape” (FBI no. Q042), and is available online free, courtesy of the Jonestown Institute in Oakland, California, as transcribed by Mary McCormick Maaga: http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/Aboutjonestown/Tapes/Tapes/Deathtape/Q042.maaga.html.
60.	M. Banaji, “Ordinary Prejudice,” Psychological Science Agenda 8 (2001): 8–16; quote on p. 15.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Investigating Social Dynamics: Deindividuation, Dehumanization, and the Evil of Inaction

1.	Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels and Other Works (London: Routledge, 1906 [1727]). Swift’s condemnation of his fellow human beings comes indirectly by verbal attacks to his alter ego, Lemuel Gulliver, from various notables whom Gulliver encounters on his travels to Brobdingnag and elsewhere. We human Yahoos are described as “deformed creatures at their most base.” We also learn that our inadequacies are beyond remedial redemption, since “there is not enough time to correct the vices and follies to which Yahoos are subject, even if their natures had been capable of the least disposition toward virtue and wisdom.”
2.	R. Weiss, “Skin Cells Converted to Stem Cells,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2005, p. A01.
3.	W. Golding, Lord of the Flies (New York: Capricorn Books, 1954), pp. 58, 63.
4.	P. G. Zimbardo, “The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos,” in 1969 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, eds. W. J. Arnold and D. Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).
5.	M. H. Bond and D. G. Dutton, “The Effect of Interaction Anticipation and Experience as a Victim on Aggressive Behavior,” Journal of Personality 43 (1975): 515–27.
6.	R. J. Kiernan and R. M. Kaplan, “Deindividuation, Anonymity, and Pilfering,” paper presented at the Western Psychological Association Convention, San Francisco, April 1971.
7.	S. C. Fraser, “Deindividuation: Effects of Anonymity on Aggression in Children,” unpublished report, University of Southern California, 1974, reported in P. G. Zimbardo, Psychology and Life, 10th ed. (Glenview IL: Scott, Foresman, 1974). Unfortunately, this fine study was never published because the data set and procedural materials were destroyed in the fire that swept through many homes in California’s Malibu Hills (October 1996), where these materials were being temporarily stored.
8.	E. Diener, S. C. Fraser, A. L. Beaman, and R. T. Kelem, “Effects of Deindividuation Variables on Stealing Among Halloween Trick-or-Treaters,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 33 (1976): 178–83.
9.	R. J. Watson, Jr., “Investigation into Deindividuation Using a Cross-Cultural Survey Technique,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25 (1973): 342–45.
10.	Some relevant references on deindividuation include: E. Diener, “Deindividuation: Causes and Consequences,” Social Behavior and Personality 5 (1977): 143–56; E. Diener, “Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation in Group Members, in Psychology of Group Influence, ed. P. B. Paulus (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980), pp. 209–42; L. Festinger, A. Pepitone, and T. Newcomb, “Some Consequences of De-individuation in a Group,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47 (1952): 382–89; G. Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (London: Transaction, 1995 [1895]); T. Postmes and R. Spears, “Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 123 (1998): 238–59; S. Prentice-Dunn and R. W. Rogers, “Deindividuation in Aggression,” in Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews, eds. R. G. Geen and E. I. Donnerstein (New York: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 155–72; S. Reicher and M. Levine, “On the Consequences of Deindividuation Manipulations for the Strategic Communication of Self: Identifiability and the Presentation of Social Identity,” European Journal of Social Psychology 24 (1994): 511–24; J. E. Singer, C. E. Brush and S. C. Lublin, “Some Aspects of Deindividuation: Identification and Conformity,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1 (1965): 356–78; C. B. Spivey and S. Prentice-Dunn, “Assessing the Directionality of Deindividuated Behavior: Effects of Deindividuation, Modeling, and Private Self-Consciousness on Aggressive and Prosocial Responses,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 4 (1990): 387–403.
11.	E. Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
12.	See C. Maslach and P. G. Zimbardo, “Dehumanization in Institutional Settings: ‘Detached Concern’ in Health and Social Service Professions; The Dehumanization of Imprisonment,” paper presented at the American Psychological Association Convention, Montreal, Canada, August 30, 1973.
13.	R. Ginzburg, 100 Years of Lynching (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1988). Also see the photographs of lynchings that were distributed on postcards in J. Allen, H. Ali, J. Lewis, and L. F. Litwack, Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America (Santa Fe, NM: Twin Palms Publishers, 2004).
14.	See H. C. Kelman, “Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers,” Journal of Social Issues 29 (1973): 25–61.
15.	B. Herbert, “‘Gooks’ to ‘Hajis.’” The New York Times, May 21, 2004.
16.	A. Bandura, B. Underwood, and M. E. Fromson, “Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims,” Journal of Research in Personality 9 (1975): 253–69.
17.	See the extensive writings of Albert Bandura on moral disengagement, among them: A. Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986); A. Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. W. Reich (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 161–91; A. Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” Personality and Social Psychology Review (Special Issue on Evil and Violence) 3 (1999): 193–209; A. Bandura. “The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism,” in Psychosocial Aspects of Terrorism: Issues, Concepts and Directions, ed. F. M. Mogahaddam and A. J. Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2004), pp. 121–50; A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1996): 364–74; M. Osofsky, A. Bandura, and P. G. Zimbardo, “The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process,” Law and Human Behavior 29 (2005): 371–93.
18.	J. P. Leyens et al., “The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to In-groups and Out-groups,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 4 (2000): 186–97.
19.	N. Haslam, P. Bain, L. Douge, M. Lee, and B. Bastian, “More Human Than You: Attributing Humanness to Self and Others,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89 (2005): 937–50; quote, p. 950.
20.	In one account from Reuters news service, a thirty-five-year-old Hutu mother named Mukankwaya said that she and other Hutu women had rounded up the children of their Tutsi neighbors whom they had come to perceive as their “enemies.” With gruesome resolve, they bludgeoned the stunned youngsters to death with their large sticks. “They didn’t cry because they knew us,” she reported. “They just made big eyes. We killed too many to count.” Her moral disengagement involved believing that she and the other women murderers were “doing the children a favor”: it was better that they die now because they would be orphans, given that their fathers had been butchered with the machetes the government had given to Hutu men, and their mothers had been raped and killed by them. The children would have had a difficult life ahead, she and other Hutu mothers reasoned, so they beat them to death so they would avoid that bleak future.
21.	See S. Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections on the Hostile Imagination (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004 [1991]). Also well worth watching is his companion DVD (2004).
22.	From Harry Bruinius, Better for All the World: The Secret History of Forced Sterilization and America’s Quest for Racial Purity (New York: Knopf, 2006).
23.	See: F. Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1892; Watts and Co. 1950); R. A. Soloway, Democracy and Denigration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in England, 1877–1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Race Betterment Foundation, Proceedings of the Third Race Betterment Conference (Battle Creek, MI: Race Betterment Foundation, 1928); E. Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003); E. Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation (New York: Crown, 2001).
24.	M. L. King, Jr., Strength to Love (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 18.
25.	B. Latané and J. M. Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).
26.	J. M. Darley and B. Latané, “Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibilities,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 (1968): 377–83.
27.	T. Moriarity, “Crime, Commitment, and the Responsive Bystander: Two Field Experiments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31 (1975): 370–76.
28.	D. A. Schroeder, L. A. Penner, J. F. Dovidio, and J. A. Pilliavan, The Psychology of Helping and Altruism: Problems and Puzzles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995). Also see C. D. Batson, “Prosocial Motivation: Why Do We Help Others?” in Advanced Social Psychology, ed. A. Tesser (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), pp. 333–81; E. Straub, “Helping a Distressed Person: Social, Personality, and Stimulus Determinants,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 7, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 293–341.
29.	J. M. Darley and C. D. Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational Variables in Helping Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1973): 100–8.
30.	C. D. Batson et al. “Failure to Help in a Hurry: Callousness or Conflict?,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 4 (1978): 97–101.
31.	“Abuse Scandal to Cost Catholic Church at Least $2 Billion, Predicts Lay Leader,” Associated Press, July 10, 2005. See also the documentary film Deliver Us from Evil, which is about father Oliver O’Grady, convicted of serial child molestation of young boys and girls over a period of two decades in Northern California. Cardinal Roger Mahoney, who knew of the many complaints against him, did not remove O’Grady, but instead periodically relocated this sex addict to other parishes, where he would continue to pry on fresh crops of child victims. (The film was directed by Amy Berg; distributed by Lionsgate Films, October 2006).
32.	D. Baum, “Letter from New Orleans: The Lost Year,” The New Yorker, August 21, 2006: 44–59; D. Wiegand, “When the Levees Broke: Review of Spike Lee’s Documentary” (When the Levees Broke: A Requiem in Four Acts, HBO-TV, August 21, 22, 2006), San Francisco Chronicle, August 21, 2006, pp. F1–F4.
33.	J. Lipman-Blumen, The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians—and How We Can Survive Them (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Quote p. ix.
34.	L. Ross and R. E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).
35.	A. Bandura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (New York: Freeman, 1997).
36.	R. Kueter, The State of Human Nature (New York: iUniverse, 2005). For a review of culture’s psychological effects, see R. Brislin, Understanding Culture’s Influence on Behavior (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993). Also see H. Markus and S. Kitayama, “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation,” Psychological Review 98 (1991): 224–53.
37.	L. Ross and D. Shestowsky, “Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice,” Northwestern University Law Review 97 (2003): 1081–1114; quote p. 1114. It is also valuable to read the extensive review and analysis of the place of the situation in law and economics by two legal scholars, Jon Hanson and David Yosifon, “The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 129 (2003): 152–346. In addition, my research collaborator Craig Haney has written extensively on the need for greater inclusion of contextual factors in legal justice; see, e. g., C. Haney, “Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice,” Psychology, Public Policy and Law 8 (2002): 3–63.
38.	M. Snyder, “When Belief Creates Reality,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 18, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1984), pp. 247–305.
39.	D. L. Rosenhan, “On Being Sane in Insane Places,” Science 179 (1973): 250–58.
40.	F. D. Richard, D. F. Bond, Jr., and J. J. Stokes-Zoota, “One Hundred Years of Social Psychology Quantitatively Described,” Review of General Psychology 7 (2003): 331–63.
41.	S. T. Fiske, L. T. Harris, and A.J.C. Cudy, “Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners,” Science (Policy Forum) 306 (2004): 1482–83; quote, p. 1482. Also see Susan Fiske’s analyses in Social Beings (New York: Wiley, 2003).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Abu Ghraib’s Abuses and Tortures: Understanding and Personalizing Its Horrors

1.	Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations. The full report is available on the Stanford Prison Experiment website at www.prisonexp.org/pdf/SchlesingerReport.pdf/. It was issued on November 8, 2004.
2.	Report on CBS’s 60 Minutes II website at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml.
3.	Evidence exists that General Myers personally called Dan Rather eight days before the Abu Ghraib abuse report was scheduled to air on 60 Minutes II to request that CBS delay broadcasting the segment. His justification for this delay was to avoid danger to “our troops” and to the “war effort.” CBS complied with Myers’s request and put off showing the piece for two weeks. It finally decided to air it only when the network discovered that The New Yorker magazine was preparing to publish a detailed report by the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh. The request showed that the military brass was well aware of the “image problems” that would be created by the upcoming media revelations.
4.	Congressional Testimony: Donald Rumsfeld, Federal Document Clearing House, 2004, available at www.highbeam.com/library/wordDoc.doc?docid=1P1:94441824; Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, May 7, 2004; available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040507secdef1042.html.
5.	Quoted in Adam Hochschild, “What’s in a Word? Torture,” The New York Times, May 23, 2004. Susan Sontag offered an elegant challenge to the notion that these deeds were merely “abuse” and not “torture” in her essay “Regarding the Torture of Others,” The New York Times Magazine, May 23, 2004, pp. 25 ff.
6.	The foreign minister of the Vatican, Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, had a different perspective; “The torture? A more serious blow to the United States than September 11. Except that the blow was not inflicted by terrorists but by Americans against themselves.” The editor of the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi, proclaimed, “The liberators are worse than the dictators. This is the straw that broke the camel’s back for America.”
7.	“It’s Not About Us; This Is War!” The Rush Limbaugh Show, May 4, 2004. See www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Rush_Limbaugh.
8.	Senator James Inhofe’s remarks come from the transcript of a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, May 11, 2004, in which Major General Taguba addressed the committee on the issue of Iraqi prisoner abuse, his first publicly delivered testimony to the committee, based on his six-thousand-page investigation (which took one month to conduct in nine volumes). The entire transcript (five Internet pages) is online at The Washington Post website at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17812–2004May11.html.
9.	Joseph Darby gave his first interview about his role in exposing the abuses to Wil S. Hylton, in GQ magazine, September 2006, entitled “Prisoner of Conscience.” (Darby quotes are from this source.) Available online at http://men.style.com/gq/features/landing?id=content_4785/.
10.	There is an interesting parallel here with another soldier, Ronald Ridenhour, who blew the whistle on the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam. He too was a bit of an outsider who came on the scene the day after some of his buddies had brutally slaughtered hundreds of Vietnamese civilians. Distressed both by their cavalier account of the atrocity and its violation of what he considered the fundamental principles of morality that America stood for, Ridenhour decided to go public. His repeated requests to superior officers, to President Nixon, and congressmen that this massacre be investigated were ignored or suppressed for more than a year. Finally, Ridenhour’s persistence paid off. A young investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, became involved and broke the story in his 1970 book, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath. It was perhaps no accident that the same, now older, Seymour Hersh broke the story of the Abu Ghraib abuses in his New Yorker article (April 2004) and his book Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (2004).
	The sad aftermath of Darby’s daring deed was that he had to be placed in protective custody for several years because many people wanted to kill him for humiliating the military. His wife and mother also had to go into hiding with him because of threats to their lives as well.
11.	I wanted to start a Joe Darby Hero Fund, to collect donations nationwide that would be given to Darby once he was out of protective custody. A reporter for USA Today, Marilyn Elias, said her paper would run a story about this “hero in hiding” and mention the Hero Fund if I could provide a source where people could send donations. For months, I tried in vain to convince various organizations to be the public conduit for such funds, including Amnesty International, Darby’s hometown bank, my Union Bank in Palo Alto, and a torture victims’ association. Each gave various reasons that seemed spurious. I was able to encourage the then-president of the American Psychological Association, Diane Halperin, to give Darby a Presidential Citation at APA’s annual convention, but against much opposition by members of its Board of Directors. It was all too political for too many people.
12.	Quoted from “A Question of Torture,” PBS News Frontline, October 18, 2005.
13.	CBS, 60 Minutes II, April 28, 2004.
14.	An Army criminal investigative officer, Marci Drewry, was my informant about the conditions that existed at Abu Ghraib from the time the military took it over through the time of the investigations of abuse in Tier 1A. In a series of e-mails (September 16, 18, and 20, 2005) and a phone interview (September 8, 2005) she offered firsthand accounts of the “deplorable, miserable conditions facing the MPs as well as the prisoners. She served as assistant operations officer for the CID (Criminal Investigation Division) investigating crimes by U.S. soldiers in theater of war. Chief Warrant Officer Drewry was one of the first to see the images on the CD that Darby turned in. Her unit started the first internal investigation and completed it by February 2004. She told me that she wants the truth to come out about the conditions in the prison that might have influenced the MPs to behave as they did.
15.	“80 Acres of Hell,” History Channel program about Camp Douglas, June 3, 2006.
16.	Reported in “Iraq Prison Abuse Stains Entire Brigade,” The Washington Times (www.washingtontimes.com), May 10, 2004.
17.	Janis Karpinski with Steven Strasser, One Woman’s Army: The Commanding General at Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story (New York: Miramax Press, 2005).
18.	BBC Radio 4 interview with Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, June 15, 2004. She also repeated these accusations in a conference held at Stanford University, which I introduced, on May 4, 2006.
19.	The psychological assessment consisted of an interview with the military psychologist, Dr. Alvin Jones, on August 31 and September 2, 2004, followed by a battery of psychological tests. They included the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, Second Edition (MMPI-2); the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-111; and the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WASI). The official psychology consultation report and the test data were sent to me on September 21 and forwarded to Dr. Larry Beutler, head of the Ph.D. training program at the Pacific Graduate School of Psychology in Palo Alto. He provided an independent test interpretation blind to the status and name of the test client. I administered the Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) at my home during my interview with Chip, and it was sent for interpretation to an expert on job stress, Dr. Michael Leiter, Center for Organizational Development in Wolfville, Canada. His formal evaluation was received on October 3, 2004. He was also blind to the background of the test client.
20.	Psychology consultation report, August 31, 2004.
21.	See my trade book for a general summary of this and related shyness research: P. G. Zimbardo, Shyness: What It Is. What to Do About It (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1977).
22.	Personal letter, June 12, 2005.
23.	Mimi Frederick, e-mail correspondence September 21, 2005. (Permission given to quote.)
24.	The 372nd Military Police Company was a unit of reservists based in Cresaptown, Maryland. Most members of this company were from small, low-income towns in Appalachia, where military recruitment advertisements appear frequently in the local media. People there often join the military as teenagers in order to earn money or see the world, or just because it’s a way to leave the town where they grew up. The members of the 372nd reported being a tight-knit group. See Time magazine, Special Report, May 17, 2004.
25.	My interview with Chip, September 30, 2004, and personal letter, June 12, 2005.
26.	Summary of Dr. Alvin Jones’s report of his interview and battery of psychological tests with Frederick (August 31–September 2, 2004).
27.	Dr. Jones’s summary of all test results.
28.	These and other quotations are from the “Test Interpretation of Client” on September 22, 2004, by Dr. Larry Beutler in a written report to me.
29.	Dr. Leiter’s evaluation was provided to me on October 3, 2004, based on the raw data submitted to him of Chip’s responses on the MBI-General Survey. See C. Maslach and M. P. Leiter, The Truth About Burnout (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997). Also see M. P. Leiter and C. Maslach, Preventing Burnout and Building Engagement: A Complete Package for Organizational Renewal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000).
30.	There is a large psychological literature on cognitive overload and cognitive resource load. A few references are: D. Kirsh, “A Few Thoughts on Cognitive Overload,” Intellectica 30 (2000): 19–51; R. Hester and H. Garavan, “Working Memory and Executive Function: The Influence of Content and Load on the Control of Attention,” Memory & Cognition 33 (2005): 221–33; F. Pass, A. Renkl, and J. Swelle, “Cognitive Load Theory: Instructional Implications of the Interaction Between Information Structures and Cognitive Architecture,”Instructional Science 32 (2004): 1–8.
31.	Notes about the saga of Private Jessica Lynch are from a BBC 2 TV documentary indicating that the U.S. military faked and distorted virtually everything about her “heroic” narrative. The same military creation of a pseudohero occurred with the former NFL Arizona Cardinals football star Pat Tillman, who was killed by his own men’s “friendly fire”—which was covered up until his family forced the truth to come out. The BBC exposé of Jessica Lynch was “War Spin: The Truth About Jessica,” May 18, 2003 (reporter, John Kampfner). The transcript of the program can be accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/3028585.stm. The case of Pat Tillman was covered in a two-part series in The Washington Post: S. Coll, “Barrage of Bullets Drowned Out Cries of Comrades: Communication Breakdown, Split Platoon Among Factors of ‘Friendly Fire,’” The Washington Post, December 4, 2004, p A01; S. Coll, “Army Spun Tale Around Ill-Fated Mission,” The Washington Post, December 6, 2004, p A01; The two articles are available online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35717–2004Dec4.html and www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37679-2004Dec5.html. Pat Tillman’s father, Patrick, a lawyer, continues to investigate his son’s death. A recent New York Times article offers new details of the case: M. Davey and S. Eric “Two Years After Soldier’s Death, Family’s Battle is with Army,” The New York Times, March 21, 2006), p A01. See also the eloquent and powerful statement by Pat’s brother, Kevin, who joined the Army with Pat in 2002, and served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan; titled “After Pat’s Birthday.” Online: www.truthdig.com/report/item/200601019_after-pats-birthday/.
32.	All interview questions and answers are from the September 30, 2004, interview at my home, tape-recorded and then transcribed by my assistant Matt Estrada.
33.	R. J. Smith and J. White, “General Granted Latitude at Prison: Abu Ghraib Used Aggressive Tactics,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2004, p. A01, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35612-2004Jun11.html.
34.	A veteran military interrogator shared his view with me on the issue of interrogators manipulating Military Police personnel to assist them in getting the information they were after: “THIS is where the rub lies. Unscrupulous interrogators (of the kind, in descending order, of: junior military interrogators, contracted personnel, CIA personnel) willing to play into preconceived notions on the part of folks willing to believe in them. I have had the experience of personnel charged with the detention of others (in this case it was a company of infantry soldiers that were given the mission of running the prison) applying every stereotype of an “interrogator” in the range of American culture; however, when I took the time to explain not only that I did not engage in the behavior they suspected me of, but also why I didn’t do so, they not only understood my perspective on it, they agreed and willingly modified their operations to support it. The control of one human being over another is an awesome responsibility that must be taught, trained and understood, not ordered.” Received August 3, 2006; source prefers to remain anonymous.
35.	Chip Frederick, interview with me, September 30, 2004.
36.	Ken Davis’s statement was included in a documentary, “The Human Behavior Experiments,” that aired on the Sundance Channel, June 1, 2006.
37.	I. Janis, “Groupthink,” Psychology Today, November 1971, pp. 43–46. The Senate Intelligence Committee conclusions are available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/conclusions.pdf.
38.	S. T. Fiske, L. T. Harris, and A. J. Cuddy, “Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners,” Science 306 (2004): 1482–83; quote, p. 1483.
39.	Personal communication by e-mail, August 30, 2006, with permission to reprint. Writer is now working in the Security Office of the Department of Commerce.
40.	General Taguba’s report was presented to Congress on May 11, 2004.
41.	We will have more to say in the next chapter about Major General Fay’s report, which he co-authored with Lieutenant General Jones. Part of the Fay/Jones Report is presented in Steven Strasser, ed., The Abu Ghraib Investigations: The Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
	The full report is available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504 rpt.pdf.
42.	Fifth Estate, “A Few Bad Apples: The Night of October 25, 2003,” Canadian Broadcast Company Television News, November 16, 2005, available at http://cbc.ca/fifth/badapples/resource.html.
43.	M. A. Fuoco, E. Blazina, and C. Lash, “Suspect in Prisoner Abuse Has a History of Troubles,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 8, 2004.
44.	Testimony by a military intelligence analyst at Graner’s pretrial hearing.
45.	Stipulation of Fact, Case of United States v. Frederick, August 5, 2004.
46.	Personal written communication from Chip Frederick to me from Fort Leavenworth, June 12, 2005.
47.	Guard “Hellmann” on “The Human Behavior Experiments,” June 1, 2006.
48.
49.	Ibid. MP Ken Davis’s report on “The Human Behavior Experiments.”
50.	See www.supportmpscapegoats.com.
51.	Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of Others,” May 23, 2004.
52.	“Now That’s Fucked Up”: www.nowthatsfuckedup.com/bbs/index.php (see especially www.nowthatsfuckedup.com/bbs/ftopic41640.html.)
53.	Allen et al., Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America.
54.	Browning, Ordinary Men (1993).
55.	Janina Struk, Photographing the Holocaust: Interpretations of the Evidence (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
56.	www.armenocide.am.
57.	For more on Teddy Roosevelt’s trophy photos with his son Kermit, see “On Safari with Theodore Roosevelt, 1909,” available at www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/tr/htm. Interestingly, although the expedition was billed as “collecting” a variety of animal species, it was actually a hunt-and-kill safari in which 512 animals were slain, among them 17 lions, 11 elephants, and 20 rhinoceros. Ironically, Theodore Roosevelt’s grandson Kermit Jr. was head of the CIA’s Operation Ajax in Iran, the agency’s first successful coup d’état, which removed from power the (democratically elected) Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. The CIA’s rationale for this first coup was the Communist threat posed by allowing Mossadegh to remain in power. According to Stephen Kinzer, a veteran New York Times journalist, this operation set a pattern for the next half century, during which the United States and CIA successfully removed (or supported the removal of) heads of state in Guatemala (1954), then in Cuba, Chile, the Congo, Vietnam, and, most relevant to our story here, all the way to Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003). Kinzer also notes that the environments in these countries after the coups d’état were often marked by instability, civil strife, and countless amounts of violence. These operations have had profound effects that reverberate to this day. The immense misery and suffering they created has turned whole regions of the world bitterly against the United States. To come full circle all the way from Operation Ajax and recently from the war zone of Iraq, the United States has embarked on another mission of counterintelligence and perhaps even made plans for war against Iran. Seymour Hersh, our familiar friend and journalist from The New Yorker who investigated My Lai and Abu Ghraib, exposed this revelation; www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050124fa_fact; S. Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003); S. Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006).
58.	The quote is from my notes recorded during the panel (which I introduced), in which Janis Karpinski spoke as part of a session on “Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration,” May 4, 2006. A veteran military interrogator casts doubt on this version of the top-down permission to MPs from interrogators to take the photos: “I do not believe that ‘permission’ to have come from the interrogators, if it came from anyone at all. . . . In my over two decades of being an interrogator and a supervisor of interrogation operations, I have heard just about every ‘approach’ there is, and it does not seem credible to me that an interrogator would not only willingly engage in an unlawful act that is of dubious value to the process of interrogation, but that he would conspire with others and depend on their trust.” Received August 3, 2006; source prefers anonymity.
59.	Judith Butler, “Torture, Sexual Politics, and the Ethics of Photography.” Lecture presented at Stanford University symposium Thinking Humanity After Abu Ghraib (October 20, 2006).
60.	This CBS report of abuses at Camp Bucca is available online at www.cbsnews/stories/2004/05/11/60II/main616849.shtml.
61.	These accounts and much more are available in the Human Rights Watch report “Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division,” September 24, 2005, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905.
62.	Chip Frederick’s eight-year sentence was reduced by six months by order of the Commanding General, and by another eighteen months by the Army Clemency and Parole Board (August 2006), based on a variety of appeals and justifications for leniency in my statements and those of many others.
63.	The kind of stress that Chip experienced nightly on Tier 1A, and later during his imprisonment, can have a major enduring impact on brain functioning, and in turn on mood, thinking, and behavior; see Robert M. Sapolsky, “Why Stress Is Bad for Your Brain,” Science 273 (1996): 749–50.
64.	Personal communication, June 12, 2005.
65.	E. Aronson and J. Mills, “The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 59 (1959): 177–81.
66.	Personal communication, February 25, 2005.
67.	Personal communication, June 15, 2005.
68.	Darius M. Rejali, Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). Also see his online essays available at http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/06/18/torture_methods/index.html and http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/06/18/torture_1/index.html.
69.	A military officer reported to me, “I have myself used the term ‘going Stanford’ when describing uncharacteristic sadistic behavior on the part of persons in charge of others.”
70.	Hensley is a Board Certified Expert in Traumatic Stress (BC ETS) and diplomate with the American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, who is now a psychological operations (PSYOP) and antiterrorism adviser to the federal government. Hensley, a doctoral learner at Capella University with a specialization in PTSD, has studied the abuses at Abu Ghraib extensively. Hensley also notes, “The reliability of the assertions expressed in this paper may be established by similar analysis of a representative selection of the defendants’ unit. A positive correlation of similar data might indicate the validity of the Zimbardo Effect at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, thus explaining the deviant behavior” (see here). A. L. Hensley, “Why Good People Go Bad: A Psychoanalytic and Behavioral Assessment of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility Staff.” A strategic courts-martial defense strategy presented to the Area Defense Council in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 2004.
71.	R. Norland, “Good Intentions Gone Bad,” Newsweek, June 13, 2005, p. 40.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Putting the System on Trial: Command Complicity

1.	Closing statement, October 21, 2004, by Major Michael Holley, Court-martial trial of Sergeant Ivan Frederick, Baghdad, October 20 and 21, 2005, pp. 353–54.
2.	My closing spontaneous statement, October 21, 2004, p. 329.
3.	“Administrative evil” functions by having agency operatives focus on developing the correct procedures, the right steps in a process that is the most efficient means to an end. These administrators do so without recognizing that the means to that end are immoral, illegal, and unethical. They are conveniently blinded from the realities of the substance of the abuses—and the horrendous consequences—that are generated by their policies and practices. Those guilty of administrative evil may be corporations, police and corrections departments, or military and government centers, as well as radical revolutionary groups.
	As we saw some forty years ago in the calculated approach of Robert McNamara to the war in Vietnam, reliance on a scientific-analytic mind-set along with a technical-rational-legalistic approach to social and political problems enables an organization and its members to engage in evil that is masked and ethically hidden. In one of its manifestations, the State sanctions its agents’ engagement in actions ordinarily considered immoral, illegal, and evil by recasting them as necessary for the defense of national security. Just as the Holocaust and the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II were examples of administrative evil, so too, I argue, is the torture program of the Bush administration as part of its “war on terror.”
	This profound concept of “administrative evil” has been developed by Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour in their provocative book Unmasking Administrative Evil, re. ed. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).
4.	A good single source on the Abu Ghraib chronology and the investigative reports can be found at www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/abu-ghurayb-chronology.htm.
5.	The investigative journalist Seymour M. Hersh broke the story of abuses and torture at Abu Ghraib in “Torture at Abu Ghraib. American Soldiers Brutalize Iraqis: How Far Up Does the Responsibility Go?,” The New Yorker, May 5, 2004, p. 42, available at www.notin ourname.net/war/torture-5may04.htm.
6.	Available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThR1.14.
7.	Part of the Fay/Jones Report is presented in Steven Strasser and Craig R. Whitney eds., The Abu Ghraib Investigations: The Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). The full report is available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf. Also see Strasser and Whitney The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission: Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11: Testimony from Fourteen Key Witnesses (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
8.	It is reported that CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid requested that an officer of higher rank than Major General Fay lead the investigation so that he would be able to interview senior officers, which Army regulations prevented Major General Fay from doing but allowed Lieutenant General Jones to do so.
9.	Steven H. Miles, Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity, and the War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2006).
10.	Captain Wood’s case was described in detail in “A Few Bad Apples,” CBC News, The Fifth Estate, November 16, 2005.
11.	Eric Schmitt, “Abuses at Prison Tied to Officers in Military Intelligence,” The New York Times, August 26, 2004.
12.	The members of the Independent Panel to Review DoD [Department of Defense] Detention Operations briefed Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as they delivered their final report on August 24, 2004. The four members of the panel included former secretary of defense Harold Brown; former representative Tillie Fowler (R–Fla.); General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Retired); and former secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger, Panel Chair. The full report, including Appendix G, can be found at www.prisonexp.org/pdf/SchlesingerReport.pdf.
13.	See www.hrw.org. Another valuable resource to review is that provided in the report by the Canadian Broadcast Company’s Fifth Estate program “A Few Bad Apples,” which aired on November 16, 2005. It focused on the events in Tier 1A on the night of October 25, 2003, when several soldiers tortured Iraqi prisoners while others looked on. It is the incident reported in chapter 14, that was started by the rumor these prisoners had raped a boy, which turned out to be false. The CBC site is a source for a chronology of events leading up to this abuse, Seymour Hersh’s articles on Abu Ghraib, and memos by Bush, Rumsfeld, and Sanchez; available at www.cbc.ca/fifth/badapples/resource.html.
14.	See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040506-9.html.
15.	“Abu Ghraib Only the ‘Tip of the Iceberg,’” Human Rights Watch Report, April 27, 2005.
16.	E. Schmitt, “Few Punished in Abuse Cases,” The New York Times, April 27, 2006, p. A24. This summary is based upon a full report prepared by New York University’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice in association with Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First. Their researchers compiled the statistics from about 100,000 documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. They note that about two thirds of all the abuses occurred in Iraq.
17.	“Abu Ghraib Dog Handler Gets 6 Months,” CBS News Video Report, May 22, 2006. Available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/22/iraq/main1430842.shtml.
18.	The full report is available at http://humanrightsfirst.info/PDF/06425-etn-by-the-numbers.PDF.
19.	The full HRW report, including the quotations that I have extracted from it, is available at www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/1.htm (for Executive Summary); see also /2.htm up to /6.htm for additional sections of this lengthy report.
20.	Congressional Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Federal News Service, May 7, 2004.
21.	See www.genevaconventions.org/.
22.	“Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation,” February 2004. See http://download.repubblica.it/pdf/rapporto_crocerossa.pdf.
23.	Amnesty International, “Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq,” 2006, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE140012006/.
24.	Quote from “A Question of Torture,” PBS Frontline, October 18, 2005.
25.	J. White, “Some Abu Ghraib Prisoners ‘Ghosted.’” The Washington Post, March 11, 2005.
26.	A. W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Henry Holt, 2006), pp. 5, 6.
27.	Testimony of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Iraq Prisoner Abuse, May 19, 2004.
28.	Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terrorism (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2004), p. 33.
29.	Janis Karpinski, interview on “A Question of Torture,” PBS Frontline, October 18, 2005.
30.	From Lt. Ricardo Sanchez to Commander Central Command, memorandum, Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, September 14, 2003, available at www.aclu.org/Safeand Free/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17851&c=206.
31.	Joseph Darby interview, GQ magazine, September 2006.
32.	The New Yorker’s Jane Mayer, quoted on “A Question of Torture,” PBS Frontline, October 18, 2005.
33.	More recently (June 2006), nearly ninety detainees at Gitmo went on extended hunger strikes to protest their false imprisonment. A Navy commander dismissed this action as nothing more than an “attention-getting” tactic. To prevent them from dying, officials had to begin daily forced feeding through nose tubes of at least six of them administered by medics. That itself resembles a new kind of torture, though officials claim it is “safe and humane.” See Ben Fox, “Hunger Strike Widens at Guantanamo,” Associated Press, May 30, 2006, and Andrew Selsky, “More Detainees Join Hunger Strike at Guantanamo,” Associated Press, June 2, 2006.
	In an earlier chapter, I noted the role of hunger strikes by political prisoners in Ireland and elsewhere to draw a parallel with the tactic used by our Prisoner Clay-416. One of the most celebrated of the Irish hunger strikers, who died for the cause, was Bobby Sands. It is remarkable that the organizer of the hunger strikes at Gitmo, Binyam Mohammed al-Habashi, has proclaimed that he and the other hunger strikers will either have their requests respected or die like Bobby Sands, who “had the courage of his convictions and starved himself to death. Nobody should believe for one moment that my brothers here have less courage.” See Kate McCabe, “Political Prisoners’ Resistance from Ireland to GITMO: ‘No Less Courage,’” www.CounterPunch.com, May 5, 2006.
34.	“GITMO Suicides Comment Condemned. U.S. Officials’ “Publicity Stunt” Remark Draws International Backlash,” Associated Press, June 12, 2006. The government official was Colleen Graffy, deputy assistant, U.S. Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. The naval officer was Henry Harris.
35.	Janis Karpinski, interview on “A Question of Torture,” PBS Frontline, October 18, 2005. Also reported in “Iraq Abuse ‘Ordered from the Top,’” BBC, June 15, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3806713.stm. When Miller arrived at Abu Ghraib, he said, “It’s my opinion that you’re treating the prisoners too well. At Guantánamo, the prisoners know that we are in charge, and they know that from the very beginning.” He said, “You have to treat the prisoners like dogs, and if you think or feel differently, you’ve lost control.” Available at www.truthout.org/docs_2006/012406Z.shtml.
36.	Scott Wilson and Sewell Chan, “As Insurgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2004. Also see Janis Karpinski, One Woman’s Army (New York: Hyperion, 2005), pp. 196–205.
37.	Jeffrey R. Smith, “General Is Said to Have Urged Use of Dogs,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2004.
38.	General Kern in “A Question of Torture,” PBS Frontline, October 18, 2005.
39.	Major General Geoffrey Miller retired from the military on July 31, 2006. He elected to retire without seeking a promotion or his third star because his legacy has been tarnished by allegations of his direct role in torture and abuse in Abu Ghraib and Gitmo prisons, according to military and congressional sources.
40.	General Myers’s statement about his continuing to blame only the MP “bad apples” for all the Abu Ghraib abuses, while ignoring or dismissing all the evidence from the many independent investigations that reveal extensive complicity by senior officers and many systemic failures indicates either his rigid perseverance or ignorance. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/etc/script.html.
41.	More than 100,000 pages of government documents have been released detailing the abuses and torture of detainees, which can be searched via the ACLU’s search engine for public access to these documents at: www.aclu.org/torturefoiasearch. The story about the April 2004 Army Information Paper is available at www.rawstory.com/news/2006/New_Army_documents_reveal_US_knew_0502.html.
42.	Eric Schmitt, “Outmoded Interrogation Tactics Cited,” The New York Times, June, 17, 2006, p. A11.
43.	The Toledo Blade newspaper in Ohio and its reporters won a Pulitzer Prize for the investigation of atrocities committed by the “Tiger Force” in Vietnam, which, over a seven-month period, left a trail of civilian murders and mayhem that have been concealed by the military for three decades. This commando unit of the 101st Airborne Division was one of the most highly decorated units in Vietnam. The Army investigated allegations of their war crimes, mutilations, torture, murder, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and found probable cause to indict eighteen soldiers but did not file any charges against them. See “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths,’” www.toledoblade.com. Experts agree that an earlier probe of the Tiger Force rampage could have averted the My Lai carnage six months later.
44.	An American reporter, Nir Rosen, who has been living in Iraq for three years and speaks Arabic, even its Iraqi dialect, reports that “The occupation has become one vast extended crime against the Iraqi people, and most of it has occurred unnoticed by the American people and the media”; see Nir Rosen, “The Occupation of Iraqi Hearts and Minds,” June 27, 2006, available at http://truthdig.com/dig/item/20060627_occupation_iraq_hearts_ minds/. See also the related commentary by the reporter Haifer Zangana, “All Iraq is Abu Ghraib. Our Streets Are Prison Corridors and Our Homes Cells as the Occupiers Go About Their Strategic Humiliation and Intimidation,” The Guardian, July 5, 2006.
45.	Anna Badkhen, “Atrocities Are a Fact of All Wars, Even Ours: It’s Not Just Evil Empires Whose Soldiers Go Amok,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 13, 2006, pp. E1, E6. Quote by John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, on p. E1.
46.	Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). Grossman’s website is www.killology.com.
47.	Vicki Haddock, “The Science of Creating Killers: Human Reluctance to Take a Life Can Be Reversed Through Training in the Method Known as Killology,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 13, 2006, pp. E1, E6. Quote by former Army private Steven Green, p. E1.
48.	David S. Cloud, “Marines May Have Excised Evidence on 24 Iraqi Deaths,” The New York Times, August 18, 2006; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Iraqi Leader Lambasts U.S. Military: He Says There Are Daily Attacks on Civilians by Troops,” The New York Times, June 2, 2006.
49.	D. S. Cloud and E. Schmitt, “Role of Commanders Probed in Death of Civilians,” The New York Times, June 3, 2006; L. Kaplow, “Iraqi’s Video Launched Massacre Investigation,” Cox News Service, June 4, 2006.
50.	MSNBC.COM, “Peers Vowed to Kill Him if He Talked, Soldier Says,” Associated Press report, August 2, 2006, available at www.msnbc.com/id/14150285.
51.	T. Whitmore, “Ex-Soldier Charged with Rape of Iraqi Woman, Killing of Family,” June 3, 2006, available at http://news.findlaw.com/ap/0/51/07–04–2006/d493003212d3/a9c.html; Julie Rawe and Aparisim Ghosh, “A Soldier’s Shame,” Time, July 17, 2006, pp. 38–39.
52.	“Blair Promises Iraq ‘Abuse’ Probe,” BBC News, February 12, 2006; the story and the video images of this abuse are available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/UK/4705482.STM.
53.	Roger Brokaw and Anthony Lagouranis, on “A Question of Torture,” PBS Frontline, October 18, 2005, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews.html.
54.	“To take the gloves off” is generally taken to mean to fight an opponent with one’s bare knuckles, removing the protection of the softer prizefighting gloves that are usually worn in such fights. Colloquially, it means to fight hard and tough, without constraints of the usual rules governing such combat between adversaries.
55.	T. R. Reid, “Military Court Hears Abu Ghraib Testimony: Witness in Graner Case Says Higher-ups Condoned Abuse,” The Washington Post, January 11, 2005, page A03. “Frederick, a staff sergeant who was demoted to private after pleading guilty to abuse at Abu Ghraib, said he had consulted with six senior officers, ranging from captains to lieutenant colonels, about the guards’ actions but was never told to stop. Frederick also said that a CIA official, whom he identified as ‘Agent Romero,’ told him to ‘soften up’ one suspected insurgent for questioning. The agent told him he did not care what the soldiers did, ‘just don’t kill him,’ Frederick testified.” Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62597-2005Jan10.html.
56.	A. Zagorin, and M. Duffy, “Time Exclusive: Inside the Wire at Gitmo,” Time, available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1071284,00.html.
57.	Quoted in Jane Mayer, “The Memo,” The New Yorker, February 27, 2006, p. 35.
58.	Details of the interviews with Captain Fishback and the two sergeants are posted on Human Rights Watch’s report “Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division,” September 2005, vol. 17, no. 3(G), available at hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905/1.htm. Fishback’s full letter to Senator McCain was published in The Washington Post on September 18, 2005; available at www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/27/AR2005092701527.html.
59.	Erik Saar and Viveca Novak, Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier’s Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantanamo (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
60.	Eric Saar, radio interview with Amy Goodman, “Democracy Now,” Pacifica Radio, May 4, 2005, available at www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/05/04/1342253/.
61.	Maureen Dowd, “Torture Chicks Gone Wild,” The New York Times, January 30, 2005.
62.	These quotes by Saar and Interrogator “Brooke” are in Inside the Wire, pp. 220–228.
63.	See a fascinating story, A. C. Thompson and Trevor Paglen, “The CIA’s Torture Taxi,” San Francisco Bay Guardian, December 14, 2005, pp. 15 and 18. This investigation revealed a Boeing jet, no. N313P, owned by a private company, that had unprecedented clearance to land at any Army base in the world; its use was traced to the kidnapping of a German citizen of Lebanese descent, Khaled El-Masri. It is alleged to be one of twenty-six planes in the CIA fleet used for such renditions, according to one ACLU human rights expert, Steven Watt.
64.	See Human Rights Watch, “The Road to Abu Ghraib,” June 2004, available at www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/. See also John Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff, “The Roots of Torture,” Newsweek, May 24, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/site/newsweek/: “According to knowledgeable sources, the president’s directive authorized the CIA to set up a series of secret detention facilities outside the United States, and to question those held in them with unprecedented harshness.”
65.	Frontline, “The Torture Question,” transcript, p. 5.
66.	Ibid.
67.	Jan Silva, “Europe Prison Inquiry Seeks Data on 31 Flights: Romania, Poland Focus of Investigation into Alleged CIA Jails,” Associated Press, Nov. 23, 2005.
68.	“21 Inmates Held Are Killed, ACLU Says,” Associated Press, October 24, 2005; full report by ACLU, “Operative Killed Detainees During Interrogations in Afghanistan and Iraq,” October 24, 2005, available at www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=19298&c=36.
69.	See M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
70.	White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks by the President on Iraq (October 7, 2002). Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007=8.html.
71.	“Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public Statements on Iraq,” prepared by the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform—Minority Staff’s Special Investigations Division, March 16, 2004, available at www.reform.house.gov/min/.
72.	Ron Suskind, “The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11” (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 10.
73.	Adam Gopnik, “Read It and Weep,” The New Yorker, August 28, 2006, pp. 21–22.
74.	Philip Zimbardo with Bruce Kluger. “Phantom Menace: Is Washington Terrorizing Us More than Al Qaeda?” Psychology Today, 2003, 34–36; Rose McDermott and Philip Zimbardo elaborate on this theme in the chapter “The Politics of Fear: The Psychology of Terror Alerts,” in Psychology and Terrorism, eds. B. Bonger, L. M. Brown, L. Beutler, J. Breckenridge, and Philip Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 357–70.
75.	The Washington Post, October 26, 2005, p. A18.
76.	Letter to Senator John McCain by thirteen retired military commanders and ambassador Douglas Peterson, July 23, 2005. (Ultimately signed by twenty-eight retired military commanders.) Available at www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/pdf/mccain-100305.pdf. McCain’s comments about it on the Senate floor available at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1611>&Content_id=1611.
77.	John McCain, “The Truth About Torture,” Newsweek, November 21, 2005, p. 35.
78.	Cheney’s remarks about the “dark side,” made on Meet the Press with Tim Russert, September 16, 2001, at Camp David, Maryland, can be found in full at www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html.
79.	Quoted in Maureen Dowd, “System on Trial,” The New York Times, November 7, 2005.
80.	James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the C.I.A. and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006).
81.	Anthony Lewis, “Making Torture Legal,” The Washington Post, June 17, 2004, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo2 0020801.pdf. The DOD memo of March 6, 2003, advising Rumsfeld on interrogation tactics is also online at www.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/toture/30603wgrpt/.
82.	K. J. Greenberg. and J. L. Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Some of this material is available at www.ThinkingPiece.com/pages/books.html.
83.	Quote by Anthony Lewis, in Introduction to The Torture Papers, p. xiii. It should also be mentioned that a small coterie of Justice Department lawyers, all appointed by the Bush administration, rebelled against the legal rationales being proposed to give the president virtually unlimited powers for spying on citizens and torturing suspected enemies. Newsweek reporters revealed this “Palace Revolt” (February 2006) as “a quietly dramatic profile in courage.” Some of them have paid a high price for defending the principle of a nation of laws and not men—being ostracized, denied promotions, and encouraged to leave the service.
84.	Joshua Dratel, “The Legal Narrative,” in The Torture Papers, p. xxi.
85.	B. Minutaglio, The President’s Counselor: The Rise to Power of Alberto Gonzales (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
86.	R. J. Gonzalez, Review of Minutaglio’s The President’s Counselor, San Francisco Chronicle, July 2, 2006, pp. M1 and M2.
87.	Online: “Gitmo Interrogations Spark Battle Over Tactics: The Inside Story of Criminal Investigators Who Tried to Stop the Abuse,” MSNBC.COM, October 23, 2006. www.msnbc.com/msn.com/id/15361458.
88.	“FBI Fed Thousands of Spy Tips. Report: Eavesdropping by NSA Flooded FBI, Led to Dead Ends,” The New York Times, January 17, 2006.
89.	Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report.” The New York Times, December 23, 2005. Also Adam Liptak and Eric Lichtblau, “Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law,” The New York Times, August 18, 2006.
90.	Bob Herbert, “The Nixon Syndrome,” The New York Times, January 9, 2006.
91.	C. Savage, “Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws.” The Boston Globe, April 30, 2006.
92.	L. Greenhouse, “Justices, 5–3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees,” The New York Times, June 30, 2006. A Navy lawyer who represented an assigned client detainee at Gitmo, was denied promotion by the Bush administration for taking his duty seriously and honestly. Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift did not get his Yemeni citizen client to plead guilty before a military tribunal, as he had been urged to do. Rather, he concluded that such commissions were unconstitutional, and provided support for the Supreme Court’s decision to reject them in Hamdan v. Rumseld. Denial of his promotion spelled the end of his twenty-year distinguished military career. According to a New York Times editorial, “With his defense of Mr. Hamdan and his testimony before Congress starting in July 2003, Commander Swift did as much as any single individual to expose the awful wrongs of Guantánamo Bay and Mr. Bush’s lawless military commissions.” “The Cost of Doing Your Duty,” New York Times, October 11, 2006, p. A26.
93.	Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, Unmasking Administrative Evil (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004). Similarly important background reading to understand the extent of the disaster visited on Iraq by the Bush administration’s flawed policies and the Pentagon’s denial of battlefield realities is found in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
94.	The original story of this stealth attempt to gut the War Crimes Act was written by R. Jeffrey Smith, “War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat of Prosecution,” The Washington Post, August 9, 2006, p. A1. It is more fully reported and developed by Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith in “Bush Aims to Kill War Crimes Act,” The Nation online, September 5, 2006. Available at www.thenation.com/doc2006918brecher.
95.	Lieutenant Colonel Jordan, who supervised the interrogation task force at Abu Ghraib, was charged with seven offenses and found guilty of criminal abuse by Army investigators—several years after those abuses came to light. He is reported to have dealt with the abuses by building a plywood wall so that he could not see them in action (according to a report on Salon.com, April 29, 2006). Jordan was charged with seven offenses from the articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on April 26, 2006, but no decision has been reached as of September 6, 2006. Available at cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/26/iraq/main 1547777.shtml. Colonel Pappas was granted immunity from prosecution in a plea bargain to testify into Jordan’s alleged offenses. Major General Geoffrey Miller invoked his constitutional right against self-incrimination when called to testify in related cases involving the use of dogs to threaten detainees. Story in Richard A. Serrano and Mark Mazzetti, “Abu Ghraib Officer Could Face Charges: Criminal Action Would Be First in Army’s Higher Ranks,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2006.
96.	In January 2006, a tribunal was held in New York City by The International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration of the United States. Among other charges this tribunal leveled at the Bush administration were the following six counts that are in accordance with the command complicity charges I have brought against Rumsfeld, Tenet, Cheney, and Bush.
	Torture. Count 1: The Bush administration authorized the use of torture and abuse in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law and domestic constitutional and statutory law.
	Rendition. Count 2: The Bush administration authorized the transfer (“rendition”) of persons held in U.S. custody to foreign countries where torture is known to be practiced.
	Illegal Dentention. Count 3: The Bush administration authorized the indefinite detention of persons seized in foreign combat zones and in other countries far from any combat zone and denied them the protections of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and the protections of the U.S. Constitution; Count 4: The Bush administration authorized the roundup and detention in the United States of tens of thousands of immigrants on pretextual grounds and held them without charge or trial in violation of international human rights law and domestic constitutional and civil rights law; Count 5: The Bush administration used military forces to seize and detain indefinitely without charges U.S. citizens, denying them the right to challenge their detention in U.S. courts.
	Murder. Count 6: The Bush administration committed murder by authorizing the CIA to kill those that the president designates, either U.S. citizens or noncitizens, anywhere in the world.
	For more information about this tribunal and its conclusions, see www.bush commissionindictments_files/bushcommissionindictments.htm. Three videos of the testimonies from the Bush Crimes Commission are available for viewing, see details at: www.BushCommission.org.
97.	Personal communication in interview with Colonel Larry James, Honolulu, April 25, 2005. James has reviewed and approved the accuracy of this section.
98.	The horrors of Abu Ghraib are not over for Iraqis still detained there since the Americans have abandoned it—they are worse. A recent report indicates that their new captors, Iraqi guards and Iraqi authorities, are torturing them, nearly starving them on diets of rice and water, forcing them to live in filth, oppressive heat, and crammed into small cells almost twenty-four hours a day. On September 6, 2006, the first mass executions since the days of Saddam Hussein were carried out against twenty-seven men imprisoned in that hellhole. Some prisoners report wishing that the Americans were back in charge. Story available online at www.theage.com.au/articles/2006/09/10/1157826813724.html.
99.	Reported in Vanora McWalters, “Britain’s Top Legal Adviser: Close Guantanamo, Symbol of Injustice,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2006.
100.	E. Sciolino, “Spanish Magistrate Calls on U.S. to Close Prison at Guantanamo,” The New York Times, June 4, 2006.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Resisting Situational Influences and Celebrating Heroism

1.	These and related data are found in an important resource book published by the American Association of Retired People (AARP), based on extensive research by the social psychologist Anthony Pratkanis of hundreds of audiotapes recorded of con men and swindlers pitching their wares to potential victims. See his important book filled with specific advice about how to detect hoaxes and not be taken in by them: Anthony Pratkanis and Doug Shadel, Weapons of Fraud: A Source Book for Fraud Fighters (Seattle: AARP Press, 2005).
2.	Andrew Wolfson, “A Hoax Most Cruel,” The Courier-Journal, October 9, 2005.
3.	Quote by former assistant manager Donna Summers in “The Human Behavior Experiments,” Jigsaw productions, Sundance TV, June 1, 2006.
4.	Zorba the Greek is Niko Kazantzakis’s classic novel, written in 1952. Alexis Zorba was portrayed by Anthony Quinn in the 1964 movie of the same name, directed by Michael Cacoyannis, and co-starring Alan Bates as the shy, intellectual boss who is the foil to Zorba’s boundless extroversion and devotion to living life with unbridled passion.
5.	B. J. Sagarin, R. B. Cialdini, W. E. Rice, and S. B. Serna, “Dispelling the Illusion of Invulnerability: The Motivations and Mechanisms of Resistance to Persuasion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 526–41.
6.	The MKULTRA program, secretly sponsored by the CIA in the 1950s and ’60s, is well presented in John D. Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979). A more detailed scholarly presentation is found in Alan W. Scheflin and Edward Opton, Jr., The Mind Manipulators (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978). See Alex Constantine’s Virtual Government: CIA Mind Control Operations in America (Los Angeles: Feral House, 1997) for a fuller exposition of many other CIA-sponsored programs, such as Operation Mockingbird, designed to influence the American press and program public opinion.
7.	A sample of my work in these diverse domains of social influence can be found in these publications: R. P. Abelson and P. G. Zimbardo, Canvassing for Peace: A Manual for Volunteers (Ann Arbor, MI: Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1970); P. G. Zimbardo, “Coercion and Compliance: The Psychology of Police Confessions,” in The Triple Revolution Emerging, eds. R. Perruci and M. Pilisuk, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 492–508; P. G. Zimbardo, E. B. Ebbesen, and C. Maslach, Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977); P. G. Zimbardo and C. E. Hartley, “Cults Go to High School: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Initial Stage in the Recruitment Process,” Cultic Studies Journal 2 (Spring–Summer 1985): 91–147; P. G. Zimbardo and S. A. Andersen, “Understanding Mind Control: Exotic and Mundane Mental Manipulations,” Recovery from Cults, ed. M. Langone (New York: Norton Press, 1993), pp. 104–25; P. G. Zimbardo and M. Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
8.	To learn more about basic social influence principles, see R. B. Cialdini, Influence, 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001); A. R. Pratkanis, “Social Influence Analysis: An Index of Tactics,” in The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress, ed. A. R. Pratkanis (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2007, in press); A. R. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (New York: W. H. Freeman, 2001); Robert Levine, The Power to Persuade: How We’re Bought and Sold (New York: Wiley, 2003); Daryl Bem, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970); Richard Petty and John Cacioppo, Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986); Steven Hassan, Combatting Cult Mind Control (Rochester, VT: Park Street Press, 1988); Brad Sagarin and Sarah Wood, “Resistance to Influence” in The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress, ed. A. R. Pratkanis (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, in press, 2007).
9.	J. M. Burger, “The Foot-in-the-Door Compliance Procedure: A Multiple-Process Analysis and Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (1999): 303–25.
10.	J. Freedman and S. Fraser, “Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4 (1966): 195–202.
11.	For some references to prosocial applications of the foot-in-the-door tactic, see J. Schwarzwald, A. Bizman, and M. Raz, “The Foot-in-the-Door Paradigm: Effects of Second Request Size on Donation Probability and Donor Generosity,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 9 (1983): 443–50; B. J. Carducci and P. S. Deuser, “The Foot-in-the-Door Technique: Initial Request and Organ Donation,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 5 (1984): 75–81; B. J. Carducci, P. S. Deuser, A. Bauer, M. Large, and M. Ramaekers, “An Application of the Foot in the Door Technique to Organ Donation,” Journal of Business and Psychology 4 (1989): 245–49; R. D. Katzev and T. R. Johnson, “Comparing the Effects of Monetary Incentives and Foot-in-the-Door Strategies in Promoting Residential Electricity Conservation,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 14 (1984): 12–27; T. H. Wang and R. D. Katsev, “Group Commitment and Resource Conservation: Two Field Experiments on Promoting Recycling,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 20 (1990): 265–75; R. Katzev and T. Wang, “Can Commitment Change Behavior? A Case Study of Environmental Actions,” Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 9 (1994): 13–26.
12.	M. Goldman, C. R. Creason, and C. G. McCall, “Compliance Employing a Two-Feet-in-the-Door Procedure,” Journal of Social Psychology 114 (1981): 259–65.
13.	For references on the prosocial effects of positive models, see J. H. Bryan and M. A. Test, “Models and Helping: Naturalistic Studies in Aiding Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 6 (1967): 400–7; C. A. Kallgren, R. R. Reno, and R. B. Cialdini, “A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26 (2000): 1002–12; R. A. Baron and C. R. Kepner, “Model’s Behavior and Attraction Toward the Model as Determinants of Adult Aggressive Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14 (1970): 335–44; M. E. Rice and 14. J. E. Grusec, “Saying and Doing: Effects on Observer Performance,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975): 584–93.
14.	J. H. Bryan, J. Redfield, and S. Mader, “Words and Deeds About Altruism and the Subsequent Reinforcement Power of the Model,” Child Development 42 (1971): 1501–8; J. H. Bryan and N. H. Walbek, “Preaching and Practicing Generosity: Children’s Actions and Reactions,” Child Development 41 (1970): 329–53.
15.	For references on social identity labeling, also known as “altercasting,” see R. E. Kraut, “Effects of Social Labeling on Giving to Charity,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 9 (1973): 551–62; A. Strenta and W. DeJong, “The Effect of a Prosocial Label on Helping Behavior,” Social Psychology Quarterly 44 (1981): 142–47; J. A. Piliavin and P. L. Callero, Giving Blood (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
16.	Robert S. McNamara et al., Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Perseus Books, 1999); R. S. McNamara and B. Van deMark, In Retrospect: The Tragic Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Vantage, 1996). Also see the DVD of Errol Morris’s film The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara, 2004.
17.	When a blaze broke out in 1979 in a Woolworth store in the British city of Manchester, most people escaped, but ten died in the fire when they could have readily fled to safety. The fire chief reported that they had died because they were following a “restaurant script” rather than a survival script. They had finished dinner and were waiting to pay their bill; one does not leave a restaurant until one’s bill is paid. No one wanted to stand out from the others; no one wanted to be different. So they waited, and they all died.
	This event is described in one of the vignettes in a British television production in which I was involved, called “The Human Zoo.” It is available from Insight Media, New York.
18.	E. J. Langer, Mindfulness (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1989).
19.	D. F. Halpern, Thought and Knowledge: An Introduction to Critical Thinking, 4th ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2003).
20.	C. Poche, P. Yoder, and R. Miltenberger, “Teaching Self-Protection to Children Using Television Techniques,” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, vol. 21 (1988): pp. 253–61.
21.	D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 262–91. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1991): 1039–61.
22.	G. Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2004). G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
23.	P. G. Zimbardo and J. N. Boyd, “Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual Differences Metric,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (1999): 1271–88.
24.	Andre Stein, Quiet Heroes: True Stories of the Rescue of Jews by Christians in Nazi-Occupied Holland (New York: New York University Press, 1991).
25.	This passage is from pp. 216–20 of Christina Maslach’s reflections on the meaning of the Stanford Prison Experiment in the chapter written jointly with Craig Haney and me: P. G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000).
26.	The alternative meanings of suicide terrorism can be found in a new book by the psychologist Fathali Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy Us (New York: Praeger, 2006).
27.	For full details, see Michael Wood’s fascinating account of his attempt to follow the journey that Alexander took in his conquests: In the Footsteps of Alexander The Great: A Journey from Greece to Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). There is also a remarkable BBC documentary of Wood’s journey, produced by Maya Vision (1997).
28.	Many of the ideas presented in this section were developed in collaboration with Zeno Franco and offered in greater detail in our co-authored article “Celebrating Heroism: a Conceptual Exploration,” 2006 (submitted for publication). I am also engaged in new research that tries to understand the decision matrix at the time an individual resists social pressures to obey authority. My first study, in collaboration with Piero Bocchario, was recently completed at the University of Palermo, Sicily. “Inquiry into Heroic Acts: The Decision to Resist Obeying Authority.” In preparation.
29.	M. Seligman, T. Steen, N. Park, and C. Peterson, “Positive Psychology Progress,” American Psychologist 60 (2005): 410–21. Also see D. Strumpfer, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Notes on Early Positive Psychology (Psychofortology),” South African Journal of Psychology 35 (2005): 21–45.
30.	ARTFL Project: 1913 Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/ARTFL/forms_unrest/webster.form.html.
31.	Adapted from definition footnotes pp. 334 and 689.
32.	A. Eagly and S. Becker, “Comparing the Heroism of Women and Men,” American Psychologist 60 (2005): 343–44.
33.	Lucy Hughes-Hallett, Heroes (London: HarperCollins, 2004).
34.	Ibid., p. 17. We should also remember that after Achilles has died and is a shade, he tells Odysseus that he would rather be the live servant of a peasant than a dead hero. Homer does not define heroism as battle skill and daring, but more socially as the establishment and maintenance of bonds of fidelity and mutual service among men. A swineherd can be as heroic as Achilles (and is so in Homer’s Odyssey, where one protects Odysseus) if he upholds the rules of courtesy and mutual respect. “If ever my father, Odysseus, has served you by work done or promise kept, help me,” Telemachus says as he visits the surviving heroes of the Trojan War in search of his father. Homer’s take on heroism is thus far different from that of Hughes-Hallet.
35.	Ibid., pp. 5–6. This is Aristotle’s definition of a “tragic” hero. Macbeth is a hero in this sense, evil though he is and is known to be. The tragic hero must fall because he thinks he “is the law,” as is seen in the character of Creon in Antigone.
36.	“Medal of Honor Citations,” available at www.army.mil/cmh-pg/moh1.htm.
37.	U.S. Code, Subtitle B—Army, Part II—Personnel, Chapter 357—Decorations and Awards.
38.	“Victoria Cross,” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_cross.
39.	M. Hebblethwaite and T. Hissey, “George Cross Database,” available at www.gc-database.co.uk/index.htm.
40.	Governor-General, “Australian Bravery Decorations,” available at www.itsanhonour.gov.au/honours_announcments.html.
41.	S. Becker and A. Eagly, “The Heroism of Women and Men,” American Psychologist 59 (2004): 163–78; quote, p. 164.
42.	Peter Martens, “Definitions and Omissions of Heroism,” American Psychologist 60 (2005): 342–43.
43.	J. McCain and M. Salter, Why Courage Matters (New York: Random House, 2004), 14.
44.	D. J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. New York: Vantage Books, 1992 [1961], pp. 45, 76.
45.	D. Denenberg and L. Roscoe, 50 American Heroes Every Kid Should Meet (Brookfield, CT: Millbrook Press, 2001).
46.	Pseudoheroism at its worst comes from the example of the shameless exploitation by the U.S. military of the American soldier Private Jessica Lynch. By exaggeration and falsehoods, Lynch was converted from an ordinary wounded, unconscious, captured young soldier into a Medal of Honor hero who had allegedly fought off her brutal captors singlehandedly. A totally fabricated scenario was constructed because the Army needed a hero at a time when there was little good news to send home from the war in Iraq. A BBC documentary exposed the many lies and deceptions that were involved in creating this fraudulent heroine. Nevertheless, Private Lynch’s story was just too good not to be told by an NBC docudrama, headlined in major magazines, and retold in her book, which earned a million-dollar advance. See “Saving Pvt. Jessica Lynch,” BBC America documentary, July 18, 2003; Rick Bragg, I Am a Soldier, Too: The Jessica Lynch Story (New York: Vintage, 2003).
47.	A. Brink, “Leaders and Revolutionaries: Nelson Mandela,” available at www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/mandela.html.
48.	D. Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995).
49.	W. F. Cascio and R. Kellerman, Leadership Lessons from Robben Island: A Manifesto for the Moral High Ground (manuscript submitted for publication).
50.	G. A. Kimble, M. Wertheimer, and C. L. White, Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1991).
51.	V. Navasky, “I. F. Stone,” available at www.thenation.com/doc/20030721/navasky.
52.	I had the good fortune to spend several days with Václav Havel on the occasion of my being awarded the Havel Foundation Vision 97 Award for my research and writings in October 2005. I recommend his collection of letters sent to his wife, Olga, from prison, and the political background provided in their introduction by Paul Wilson: Václav Havel, Letters to Olga: June 1979–September 1982 (New York: Knopf, 1988).
53.	D. Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995).
54.	S. Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath (New York: Random House, 1970). One of the most thorough accounts of the My Lai massacre, including personnel involved, photographs, and the events that led up to the trial of Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., is provided by Doug Linder in his “Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial,” available online at www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftirals/mylai/MY1_intro.htm/.
	The photographs of the My Lai massacre of dead women, children, babies, and elderly Vietnamese were taken by the Army photographer assigned to Charlie Company, Ronald Haeberle, using his private camera, on March 16, 1968. He recorded no such atrocities on his second official Army camera. His photos exposed the military cover-up alleging that those killed were insurgents rather than innocent, unarmed civilians murdered in cold blood. However, unlike Abu Ghraib, none of his photos included U.S. soldiers posing during acts of atrocity.
55.	T. Angers, The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story (Lafayette, LA: Acadian House Publishing, 1999).
56.	The lyrics of the ode to Lieutenant Calley ran “Sir, I followed all my orders and did the best I could. / It’s hard to judge the enemy and hard to tell the good. / Yet there’s not a man among us who would not have understood.”
57.	Ron Ridenhour, letter of March 29, 1969, reproduced in David L. Anderson, ed., Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press; quote, pp. 201–6.
58.	M. Bilton and K. Sim, Four Hours in My Lai (New York: Penguin, 1993).
59.	Joe Darby spoke out publicly for the first time since exposing the Abu Ghraib atrocities in an interview with Wil S. Hylton in GQ magazine, September 2006, entitled “Prisoner of Conscience.” (Darby quotes are from this source.) Available online at http://men.style.com/gq/features/landing?id=content_4785/.
60.	K. Zernike, “Only a Few Spoke Up on Abuse as Many Soldiers Stayed Silent,” The New York Times, May 22, 2004, p. 1.
61.	E. Williamson, “One Soldier’s Unlikely Act: Family Fears for Man Who Reported Iraqi Prisoner Abuse,” The Washington Post, May 6, 2004, p. A16.
62.	Colonel Larry James, personal communication, April 24, 2005.
63.	H. Rosin, “When Joseph Comes Marching Home: In a Western Mountain Town Ambivalence About the Son Who Blew the Whistle at Abu Ghraib,” The Washington Post, May 17, 2004, p. C01.
64.	S. Pulliam and D. Solomon, “How Three Unlikely Sleuths Exposed Fraud at WorldCom,” The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2002, p. 1.
65.	M. Swartz and S. Watkins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron (New York: Random House, 2003).
66.	R. Lacayo and A. Ripley, “Persons of the Year 2002: Cynthia Cooper, Colleen Rowley and Sherron Watkins,” Time.
67.	Jim Jones’s final speech, November 1978, available at http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/AboutJonestown/Tapes/Tapes/DeathTape/death.html.
68.	D. Layton, Seductive Poison: A Jonestown Survivor’s Story of Life and Death in the People’s Temple (New York: Doubleday, 2003). Also see her website, www.deborahlayton.com.
69.	My ideas relating the mind control tactics of Jim Jones and those in Orwell’s 1984, along with a dose of the CIA’s mind control program, MKULTRA, can be found in my chapter P. G. Zimbardo, “Mind Control in Orwell’s 1984: Fictional Concepts Become Operational Realities in Jim Jones’ Jungle Experiment,” in 1984: Orwell and Our Future, eds. M. Nussbaum, J. Goldsmith, and A. Gleason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). A detailed account of Jonestown as a CIA supported experiment is given in the thesis of Michael Meires, Was Jonestown a CIA Medical Experiment? A Review of the Evidence (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1968). (Studies in American Religion Series, vol. 35).
70.	See the story I co-wrote with the reporter Dan Sullivan about Richard Clark and Diane Louie: D. Sullivan and P. G. Zimbardo, “Jonestown Survivors Tell Their Story,” Los Angeles Times, March 9, 1979, part 4, pp. 1, 10–12.
71.	M. Grunwald, “A Tower of Courage,” The Washington Post, October 28, 2001, p. 1.
72.	United Airlines flight 93 was headed to San Francisco from New Jersey on the morning of September 11, 2001, when Saudi terrorists hijacked it. Evidence from the 9/11 Commission indicates that the pilot, flight attendants, and at least seven passengers fought back against the four hijackers. Their actions diverted the plane from its likely target of the Capitol building or the White House. All forty-four people aboard died when the plane nose-dived into an empty field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Its high-speed crash (nearly 600 mph) caused a crater 115 feet (35 meters) deep. A dramatic movie, United Flight 93, was made by Universal Studios in 2006.
73.	Brink, “Leaders and Revolutionaries.”
74.	H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (rev. and enlarged edition) (New York: Penguin, 1994 [1963]) pp. 25–26.
75.	Ibid., p. 276.
76.	Ibid., p. 252.
77.	C. R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperPerennial, 1992), p. xix.
78.	E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 126.
79.	Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
80.	J. Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture (New York: Knopf, 2000).
81.	M. Haritos-Fatouros, The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture (London: Routledge, 2003).
82.	M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
83.	This conception of the banality of heroism was first presented in an essay by Zimbardo on Edge Annual Question 2006, an annual event sponsored by John Brockman inviting a range of scholars to reply to a provocative question, which that year was “What is your dangerous idea?” See www.edge.org.
84.	See Francois Rochat and Andre Modigliani, “Captain Paul Grueninger: The Chief of Police Who Saved Jewish Refugees by Refusing to Do His Duty,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000).
85.	Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). Also see Philip Zimbardo, Craig Haney, William Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, “The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer: A Pirandellian Prison,” The New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1973, pp. 36 ff.
86.	Research on the personality correlates that differentiate “obedients” from “defiants” points to only a few significant predictors. Those who are high scorers on a measure of authoritarian personality (F-Scale) were more likely to obey authority, while defiants had lower F-scores. See A. C. Elms and S. Milgram, “Personality Characteristics Associated with Obedience and Defiance Toward Authoritative Command,” Journal of Experimental Research in Personality 1 (1966): 282–89.
	A second variable that may influence the tendency to obey or disobey is one’s belief in external controlling influences on one’s life versus internal control, with greater obedience among those who accept the notion of their behavior as being controlled by external forces. In a similar vein, among Christian research participants, obedience was greatest among those who believed in divine control of their lives while those who were low on measures of belief in external divine control tended to reject scientific as well as religious authority. See Tom Blass, “Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60 (1991): 398–413.
87.	E. Midlarsky, S. F. Jones, and R. Corley, “Personality Correlates of Heroic Rescue During the Holocaust,” Journal of Personality 73 (2005): 907–34.
88.	Malcolm Gladwell, “Personality Plus: Employers Love Personality Tests. But What Do They Really Reveal?” The New Yorker (September 20, 2004): 42. Available online at www.glad well.com/2004/2004_09_20_a_personality.html.
89.	Carol S. DePino, “Heroism Is a Matter of Degree,” El Dorado Times, available at www.eldoradotimes.com/articles/2006/01/17/news/news6.txt.
90.	Boorstin, (THE IMAGE, 1992), quote, p. 76.
91.	Aleksandr I. Solzhenistyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956 (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).