1. Thirteenth Parliament, since the Act of Union in 1707, when the Parliaments of England and Scotland were united under the title Great Britain.
2. The source material for this chapter has come primarily from the Colonial Office and State Papers in the Public Record Office in London, the Dartmouth manuscripts, the Correspondence of George III edited by Sir John Fortescue, various contemporary diaries, including Horace Walpole’s Last Journals, the Parliamentary History of England and newspapers of the day. I have also used the Memoirs and Life of Benjamin Franklin.
3. Only a courtesy title like the titles of other lords in the House of Commons, because he was the son of a peer.
4. Sometimes known as the Secretary for America, since he was responsible only for colonies west of the Atlantic.
5. A rail was carried on the shoulders of two men, and the victim was placed astride it, held in position by people on each side and carried through the streets.
6. Formerly William Pitt, the man who directed Britain to victory in the Seven Years’War.
7. Hutchinson had in fact been frustrated by weak British administrations for years. This almost certainly explains his lack of vigor.
8. The officer was defended by John Adams, then on the radical fringe, and acquitted.
9. The British Prime Minister is today technically the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer being the Second Lord. This was not the rule in the eighteenth century. Pitt, for example, ran the Seven Years’ War as the most senior Cabinet minister while Secretary of State for the Southern Department.
10. There was no formal opposition party, as there is today. Opposition consisted of members who disagreed with government policy. Edmund Burke tended to be the most dominant figure among opposition members because he was an orator of extraordinary talent.
1. Sources: the copious correspondence between Lieutenant General Gage and Lords Dartmouth and Barrington, the Secretary for War, provide the main research. Admiral Samuel Graves’ long and detailed story of the naval side in his Conduct, and the vivid letters written in diary form by Boston citizen John Andréws have provided important support. Wells’ Life of Samuel Adams, local Boston newspapers and a range of secondary sources, including Belcher, Bancroft, Frothingham, Trevelyan, French and Ward, have also been consulted.
2. According to Trevelyan, who does not cite his source.
3. Massachusetts had two legislative houses: the Assembly, the lower house (of which Adams was clerk) that was elected by vote, and the Council, the executive body which ruled the province. The members of the Council were appointed by the Assembly, except for the governor and the lieutenant governor, who were, of course, appointed by the King.
There was, therefore, a strong democratic element to the government. This, however, could be controlled by the governor’s power of veto. Parliament decided this was not enough in its growing sense of outrage as the result of the tea party and provided that all members of the Council would be nominated by the King for the time being.
4. The story of this attempt to bribe Adams does not appear in British sources to my knowledge, but it is told graphically by Wells in his life of Adams, as well as in other American sources. In the context of the situation, it seems likely it was true.
5. Andréw Oliver, lieutenant governor in the letters scandal involving Franklin, had now died.
6. John Andréws.
1. Sources: Colonial Office Papers, domestic and foreign State Papers, Calendar of Home Office Papers in the PRO. The Parliamentary History, the Memoirs and Life of Benjamin Franklin and Walpole ‘s Last Journals have also been used.
2. The speed of this crossing seems hardly possible. However, the departure date of September 9 is recorded on Gage’s copy of the letter. It had reached London by October 17, when Dartmouth mentioned it in his reply as having arrived by the Scarborough.
But this reply was long and detailed and, since it laid down new policy, must have taken well over a week.
This brings us very close to October 3, when, from the Calendar of Home Office Papers, we know a Cabinet meeting was held at 10 Downing Street, where it was decided to send the three ships of the line. This decision—and Gage is informed of this in Dartmouth’s letter of October 17—must have been made after news from America. When the government’s reaction to rebel accounts of Concord is recollected, it is unlikely that they would have made a major decision without an official report from Gage.
The prevailing winds at this time of the year were westerly, and I can only conclude that the Scarborough did make a very fast crossing.
3. Only the draft of this letter exists, but I am assuming it was sent.
4. As a plan, this was second best. The King had asked Sir Jeffrey Amherst, supreme commander of British and American troops in the Seven Years’ War and much respected by the colonials, to take over as C in C, but Amherst asked leave to decline. He was not the only one: Several other men who were offered various appointments, including Admiral Augustus Keppel, also refused because of their opposition to the government’s policy.
5. This incident involving Lord Sandwich is not reported in the Parliamentary History of England, which is an abridged version of what went on in Parliament, but Franklin covered it fully in his letters.
1. The main sources of the pre-Lexington period described in this chapter are the Colonial Office Papers in the Public Record Office in London and Allen French’s General Gage’s Informers, based on the Clinton Papers. Most of the correspondence between Gage and London has been published (Correspondence with Secretaries of State), but some of the enclosures, such as intelligence reports, captured letters and newspaper clippings, have not, although some of these are still in the London files. I have depended heavily on private and official accounts of British officers, notably: Lieutenant William Sutherland, Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie, Lieutenant John Barker, Ensign Jeremy Lister, Major General Martin Hunter (then an ensign), Ensign Henry de Berniere, Lieutenant William G. Evelyn. Major John Pitcairn and Colonel Francis Smith.
I have also combed American sources for details of the terrain, concentrations of rebel gunfire and information not contained in the British reports, especially Paul Revere’s versions of what happened during the night, which I have used to support brief British references. Among the books, French, Belcher, Trevelyan and Ward have proved useful, and in particular Frank W. Cobum’s Battle of April 19th and Arthur B. Tourtellot’s William Diamond’s Drum.
Admiral Graves’ Conduct provides interesting detail of some of the events that took place in the harbor.
2. At this time, a British infantry regiment usually consisted of 450 to 500 men divided into companies of 38 privates each. Each regiment usually had two light guns attached to it, though these were often detached to the rest of the artillery for battle.
3. There is no reference to horses in any British reports of the April 19 conflict, but the custom at the time was for a 6-pounder gun to be drawn by six horses. Cleaveland, the artillery colonel, had written to London on April 17 saying that he had twenty horses, and under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that they would not have been used to draw guns on a march of at least 18 miles in hilly country, even though no eyewitness appears to have mentioned them. I have therefore taken the view that horses would have been used.
4. The figure is not clear in the manuscript. It is either 15,000 or 75,000—both impossible in the context. Because 1,500 would be too few, I have assumed 7,500 to be correct, although it sounds a bit high.
5. Although intelligence reports exist, there is, in fact, no proof that they came from Church. There is little doubt that Church was a British spy, and I am assuming that intelligence about the inner workings of Congress came from him; but it is probable that Gage had other informers.
6. Each British regiment had a company of grenadiers and a company of light infantry attached to it, both corps consisting of specially selected and trained men. For this operation, Gage had drawn them from the regiments to which they were normally attached and was using them as a single commando-type group.
7. Renamed Arlington.
8. Sutherland reported that Adair called out that the “two fellows were galloping express to alarm the country.” But they were going the wrong way—i.e., toward the marching troops. At that stage, Adair knew nothing about the famous ride of Paul Revere. Sutherland, it is assumed, got it a bit mixed up in hindsight.
9. This incident is reported by Sutherland. I am assuming Grant rode out with the artillery chaises the previous afternoon. He could have been one of the officers selected for lookout duty on the roads; but the artillery must have had an officer in charge of them, and Gage’s orders indicate that the chaises were to meet up with Smith’s column on the road.
10. It may seem strange that the troops would have marched this far with unloaded muskets, but the reports of both Sutherland and Pitcairn are clear on this.
11. This incident, timed as I have written it, was in both Sutherland’s and Pitcairn’s reports.
12. All the British reports, including Pitcairn’s, suggest he gave this as a general direct order to the troops, but I cannot believe he did it this way. A column of 200 men would be 100 to 150 yards long—impossible to address adequately. He must have issued his orders through an officer of some kind, as I have indicated in the text.
13. Many American eyewitness reports state that Pitcairn fired the first shot with his pistol, though some of them concede that he might have done so merely to frighten the militiamen into dropping their guns. They also assert he urged his men to open fire. This is in complete contrast with Pitcairn’s own report and those of the other British officers and is unlikely. Pitcairn had nothing to gain and everything to lose by allowing his men to open fire and presumably kill some of the provincials. His account, which is virtually what I have written, is completely credible in the context of the situation. The American eyewitnesses were interrogated by Provincial Congress leaders intent on painting the situation as blackly as possible so they could exploit it, and it is probable that, following the drama of the day, imaginations ran a bit wild.
14. According to Sutherland.
15. Although the British believed for a long time this was a scalping, and Percy reported it formally as such, American sources have claimed that a farm boy hit the soldier wounded from gunfire over the head with an ax as he tried to get up off the ground. The wound he caused resembled a scalping.
16. It is uncertain what Percy referred to in his report, unless the cruelty comment stemmed from the incident at the North Bridge in Concord, when the soldier’s head was opened in what the British believed was a scalping but which the Americans claimed was an axing (see note 15). I have seen no other incidents in the British records.
17. Sources for the Battle of Bunker Hill are copious and to some extent contradictory. Howe’s letters and orderly book and the Clinton papers, Burgoyne’s letters, accounts by Marine Adjutant Waller, Lieutenant John Clark, Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie, Gage, Colonel Samuel Cleaveland, Admiral Graves in his Conduct, Dr. Grant, Lord Rawdon, Captain George Harris, Ensign Martin Hunter and some unknown British officers have been used. A few incidents, mainly anecdotal, have been taken from American eyewitness sources. Samuel Drake’s Bunker Hill and Harold Murdock’s story of the day have also been used, as well as Allen French’s highly detailed account in The First Year of the American Revolution.
18. No mention is made of drummers in any reports of the battle, either British or American, that I have seen. However, the drum was the normal method of passing orders in the field from the infantry commanders, as the trumpet was for cavalry, and I am assuming that it was employed this time as usual.
19. I have assumed the time when the light infantry moved to the beach and the three lines became two lines since this is obscure in the reports.
20. Writers have made great play with the story that the guns could not fire because 12-pound shot had been sent for 6-pound guns. This story does not hold up as it has been represented. Four 12-pound cannon were among the guns sent over from Boston and 12-pound shot were, of course, sent for them. Cleaveland insisted later that he sent sixty-six rounds for each gun. It is possible that only 6-pound guns, which would have been lighter to haul, were sent forward from Moulton’s Hill to support Howe. It is possible, too, that boxes of 12-pound shot were taken forward in error from Moulton’s instead of 6-pound shot, but in this event the correct ammunition would not have been far away; it certainly would not have been in Boston, as the story suggests, since Howe reported the firing at the start of the advance. It may have been added to the holdup. There is some doubt if the guns shot ball, as well as grape, when they again came into action later.
21. The sources for this anecdote are two people who heard it from Small himself on separate occasions. However, the fact is that Small was a marine officer and should have been fighting on the left—not on the right where I have placed him. However, the anecdote could not have happened on the left. If Putnam had done what he did behind the walls of the redoubt, Small could never have seen him. There is no doubt that, during this stage of the battle, Putnam was behind the rail fence. I am therefore assuming Small was not with his own unit, as, indeed, Marine Major Pitcairn had not been at Lexington.
22. The question of whether there were rifles at Bunker Hill is controversial. Rifles manufactured in Pennsylvania were certainly in use in America by this date. The issue is whether or not they were employed in New England by the woodsmen. In view of their superior accuracy, although they took longer to load than muskets, it seems probable that they were.
1. Most early press reports gave the number of rebels pursuing the British as 100 (the Gazetteer writer, in quoting 150, had not read his own newspaper properly), whereas, in fact, it was several thousand. This error was possibly a deliberate misrepresentation by the rebels, but it is more likely it originally referred to the number of provincials lined up at dawn on Lexington Green and was then misreported.
2. General sources of the chapter: As for earlier chapters on London scene, the Correspondence of George III, the Home Office Calendar and the Colonial Office Papers, the Dartmouth correspondence, contemporary newspapers, the Parliamentary History of England and Walpole’s Last Journals have provided the main research structure.
3. Newspapers in London did not have political policies as such. Each carried editorials contributed by correspondents of widely differing viewpoints.
4. The casualty figure, of course, was wrong.
5. Prussia, Britain’s ally in the Seven Years’ War, had not been satisfied by treaty arrangements at the end of that conflict and now regarded Britain somewhat coldly.
6. Lord Germain’s title, like so many others, was held by courtesy. He could, therefore, sit in the Commons.
7. Until the post of Secretary of State was created for the colonies, or for America, as it was sometimes known, there had only been two Secretaries of State for foreign affairs: for the Northern and the Southern Departments. Both occupants of the traditional positions had fought the idea of the new secretaryship carrying the same status as theirs. Dartmouth had accepted this, but not Germain.
1. My sources for the events that occurred in Canada in 1775-76 were reports to London by Governor Sir Guy Carleton and Lieutenant Governor Hector Cramahe; the diaries and accounts of officers living in Quebec, notably those of Thomas Ainsley, John Coffin, Colonel Caldwell, Captain Patrick Daly; and, to a lesser extent, several anonymous accounts accredited to British and militia officers in compilations of documents by Frederick C. Wurtele. An important additional source, which included the detailed story developed by Simon Sanguinet only a few months after the siege was over, was another set of documents collected for the Quebec centenary celebrations in 1875.
Very occasionally I have used rebel sources—notably John Henry, Abner Stocking and Major Meigs—when they have enhanced the British stories. British naval reports have also been employed.
2. Historians, writing from all perspectives, have made heavy emotional weather about the use of the Indians and the question of who first employed them. American writers, I notice, have tended to ignore this early letter of Ethan Allen (in the Colonial Office Papers at the PRO), which is a clear appeal for killing, and concentrated their arguments on the formal conference with Indian chiefs conducted by Schuyler a few months later, in which he urged them to stay out of the conflict altogether. Schuyler’s reasons were not as humane as they sound, for he knew if the Indians were involved at all, more would be likely to side with the British, who had great influence through the Indian Department, than with the rebels.
Gage later recorded the fact that the rebels had used Indians at Bunker Hill—a civilized tribe, but technically Indians—as a complete justification. Possibly this was why Carleton was more willing to employ them in 1776 than he was now in 1775.
Indians had been employed by both sides in the Seven Years’ War. Since then, however, continuing trouble with the Indians, Pontiac’s uprising in particular, had made the issue especially sensitive.
3. According to Carleton, although other sources disagree.
4. By definition, a frigate was a warship with one tier of guns covered by a deck. A sloop had one tier of guns that were positioned on the upper deck and therefore uncovered.
5. The letter was actually addressed to John Manir, but since there was no one known of this name, it was assumed to be for John Mercier. Mercier, anyway, was imprisoned.
6. There is dispute whether Arnold’s couriers joined Maclean in error or deliberately, as Kenneth Roberts, for one, has suggested. I have no evidence of the latter and have therefore assumed the former.
7. According to Carleton, it was a whaler, although other sources have suggested it was a skiff, propelled by paddles, and a canoe.
8. The approach of this ship was probably the source of the rumors of the planned attack on Arnold’s rear that the rebel colonel referred to in his report as one of the reasons why he fell back to Pointe aux Trembles. There is no reference in the British records to any other vessel, certainly none with any soldiers on board, as Arnold believed.
9. There is some dispute about the weather. I have relied on Ainsley because he had a keen eye for detail and good descriptive powers.
10. The total number available to Montgomery is not known for certain. There were, it appears, just under 1,000 Americans, in addition to which there were Canadians. Some historians have questioned the presence of Canadians, but there is frequent reference to them in contemporary accounts by Quebec inmates and rebel leaders.
11. According to Ainsley, although some accounts have put the number of bodies lower.
12. Simon Sanguinet.
13. James Graham, Life of General Daniel Morgan.
14. Britain also still had a small post in Florida, though this was not one of the thirteen colonies, and the sea base of Halifax in Nova Scotia that was useful for the ships, but, remote as it was, not much help from the viewpoint of internal colonial control.
1. Sources: Colonial Office correspondence, Clinton, and Sir William Howe’s Orderly Book.
2. According to a note in his papers, Clinton told Howe it was his opinion that “they would attempt to burn the town on Dorchester side.” Howe answered that he was sure they would not attempt it because they would not dare risk their mortars on Dorchester Heights; “If they did, we must get at it with our whole force.” (American Rebellion, 23). I provide this note for the benefit of readers, though, for me, it does not begin to explain Howe’s neglect. Why should they not risk their mortars?
1. Sources: Colonial Office Papers and Admiralty Papers.
1. Sources: Correspondence between General Howe and the Colonial Office and Lord Howe and the Admiralty (in the Public Record Office); the journals of Ambrose Serle and Captain Henry Duncan, respectively secretary and flag captain to Lord Howe; The American Rebellion by Sir Henry Clinton, which provides his personal account of the Battle of Long Island and the assault on Manhattan, supported by his notes from the Clinton Papers; the letters of Lord Rawdon in the Hastings MSS; the diaries of Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Kemble, Captain John Montresor and the Hessian adjutant general, Major Carl Baurmeister; Max von Eelking’s German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence.
Thomas W. Field’s The Battle of Long Island, Henry P. Johnston’s The Campaign of 1776 and Thomas Jones’ The History of New York During the Revolutionary War have provided invaluable supporting material, especially since all three have big appendices of original documents. Alexander Flick’s Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution and Carl Van Tyne’s Loyalists in the American Revolution have also been helpful.
2. Also known as the North River.
3. The source material on Mrs. Loring is very unsatisfactory, although many writers have played up her role. Most of the colorful copy is anonymous, attributed to unnamed British officers, although Charles Stedman makes a reference to her. Stedman wrote a history of the war in 1794, but his comment is especially interesting because he claimed to have been an officer in the army in America at the time.
4. This ramp-equipped landing craft is a great surprise since, according to naval experts at the Royal Maritime Museum at Greenwich, they were not in general use until the First World War. However, Francis Hutcheson, who was present on Staten Island at the time, mentions the design specifically in a letter in the Haldimand Papers. He, too, was surprised.
5. One of the most difficult facts to establish is how horses, cannon and wagons were transported across water. The general methods are known, but surprisingly—since this must have created far more problems than carrying infantry—the systems employed in individual actions are rarely referred to. Hundreds of horses, batteries of cannon and scores of wagons appear as if by magic across what are sometimes large stretches of water. In this instance, I have made some assumptions based on the methods in current usage and the landing craft employed, the details of which are fully recorded, after consultation with historical experts at the Royal Naval Maritime Museum at Greenwich, England. The reference by Hutcheson (see Note 4) to ramp-fronted landing craft is made by no one else, to my knowledge, and I suspect the reason is that they were unsuccessful, probably letting in water at the joins. It would also explain why they did not pass into normal military usage. In my description, I have thus assumed that the traditional landing barges were used in the assault, some of which, even if those of the new design were also employed, most certainly were.
6. It seems extremely unlikely that the British would have landed on an enemy beach without putting down any covering barrage. Nevertheless, the records suggest this is what happened. All British accounts say the ships “covered the landing"; this could imply that they fired or that they were merely ready to if necessary. However, on other occasions when barrages were put down, such as before Bunker Hill and at Kip’s Bay later in this chapter, the personal accounts always make a feature of them. Field, relying mainly on American sources, though he does not cite them in this instance, suggests the assault craft fired single cannon mounted in the front of the boats. I have found no British records to support this, and it seems unlikely, since grape from the warships would be far more effective.
There were no enemy defending. In that flat terrain, the British could presumably see this.
7. Records indicate the Hessians traveled in this way a few days later when another contingent crossed from Staten Island. I am assuming the officers insisted on it on both occasions.
8. In the ever-changing rebel command situation, Sullivan, previously in command of all troops on Long Island, was now number two under General Putnam and, in this capacity, in charge of the Flatbush-Bedford sector.
9. Johnston quotes accounts from the captured rebel officers and apparently interviewed their relatives. But he gives no story of the actual capture; nor does Evelyn, the British officer in charge of the patrol, although several of his letters on other matters exist. Both Clinton and Howe say they were captured quietly, interrogated by Clinton himself and revealed that the pass was undefended.
10. Field.
11. According to a rebel source. By this time, the red-and-white-striped flag was in use, and it is strange that this was not flying above the redoubt. To my knowledge, no British records mention it. A red flag, such as the one described, was flown at Bunker Hill, but this was before a suitable design could be developed.
12. Both Franklin and Adams give highly detailed accounts of this meeting.
13. Mackenzie, watching from Long Island, says the rebels went to a point up the river, but Clinton was much closer, so I stay with his version.
14. Trumpets were not normally used by the infantry at this time, but several rebel accounts report this incident and even suggest it was partially responsible for Washington deciding to make some kind of move to repair the shattered morale of his men.
1. Sources: letters to the Admiralty by naval officers, supported by the journals of Lieutenant James M. Hadden, Lieutenant William Digby, General von Riedesel and Captain Georg Pausch. A. T. Mahan’s Major Operations of the Navies in the American War of Independence and C. H. Jones’ The History of the Campaign for the Conquest of Canada in 1776 have been helpful. I have also consulted the letters of Arnold and Burgoyne, the helpful. I have also consulted the letters of Arnold and Burgoyne, and the memoirs of General James Wilkinson.
Because the. action of the Battle of Valcour Island was focused in a very limited area that everybody present could clearly see, there are few of the discrepancies between the various accounts that have faced me in previous battles, which by their nature were more complex, with several areas of action.
2. A schooner was a vessel whose sails were rigged fore and aft, like modern yachts, and not square-rigged across the main line of the ship as were the men-of-war.
3. Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River flowed north into the St. Lawrence. For this reason, Carleton’s fleet traveled “up” the lake, even though it was proceeding south.
1. Sources: The same as Chapter 9, since it forms part of the same campaign. In addition, for my description of the storming of Mount Washington I have used an article by Edward F. DeLancey in the Magazine of American History, February, 1877, which—although one or two of the facts are wrong, as has become clear from contemporary material since published—has been particularly useful because of its detailed study of the Manhattan terrain in the eighteenth century. I also referred to William Abbatt’s The Battle of Pell’s Point.
2. This maneuver by Cornwallis is mentioned only by Clinton and Von Baurmeister to my knowledge, but I have featured it since these must be regarded as prime sources.
3. Both the terrain on the rebel left and their movements before the main British attack on October 31, when they were found to have evacuated their lines, are subjects of dispute in various accounts. I rely on Clinton, for he was there and involved at the highest level.
4. Several historians put the attack time earlier, although both Robertson’s and Howe’s official report put it at noon, as I have.
5. There is no actual record that Cornwallis had dragoon patrols out looking for Lee at this stage, but this was an obvious move. A dragoon patrol actually captured Lee less than two weeks later.
1. Sources: The action at Versailles is taken almost entirely from the long and vivid letters to London of Lord Stormont, the British ambassador. For the Bancroft material, I have used Edward Bancroft’s Narratives of the Objects and Proceedings of Silas Deane as Commissioner of the United States to France (which includes the first of the spy’s reports to London), Carl Van Doren’s Secret History of the American Revolution and various secret documents in Steven’s Facsimiles of Mss. in European Archives. For the London scenes, I have used Knox, Clinton, the Correspondence of George III, the Domestic State Papers and the correspondence between Germain and Howe. Piers Mackesy’s The War for America, Alan Valentine’s Lord George Germain and De Fonblanque’s Political and Military Episodes . . . of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne have also served as guides.
2. Howe expressed his views at length in his examination before a parliamentary committee.
1. Sources: Burgoyne’s Orderly Book, State of the Expedition (and Supplement), Letter to His Constituents’; correspondence with Germain, Howe and Lord Derby; his speeches in Parliament and the inquiry. Journals of Lieutenants James Hadden, Thomas Anburey, William Digby and Captain Georg Pausch; correspondence of Major General Baron von Riedesel and Baroness von Riedesel. De Fonblanque ‘s Political and Military Episodes . . . of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, Samuel Drake’s Burgoyne’s Invasion of 1777, Hoffman Nickerson’s Turning Point of the Revolution, F. J. Huddlestone’s Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne and the several books of W. L. Stone have been used as guides.
2. Reports vary whether Burgoyne was on the Maria or the Royal George, but the latter seems most likely.
3. Again, there is variation between reports on whether the advance took place on July 1 or June 30.
4. Reports conflict about whether the guns were actually on the summit by sunset or whether the rebel general assumed, when he saw men standing on the top of the hill, that the guns would soon be there. Lieutenant Digby reports the movement of the two 12-pounders past his picket in darkness on the night of the fifth. Other reports suggest the guns were on the hill but unassembled by nightfall. I find it difficult to accept that the rebels would have evacuated so quickly without the glint of a gun and have therefore assumed that Digby was possibly mistaken on his timing.
5. Some evidence has been produced that she was actually shot by rebels and scalped by the Indians afterward, but since neither Burgoyne nor General Gates (who later exploited the incident) knew of this, it does not affect the story.
1. Sources: reports by Howe and Von Knyphausen, journals of John Montresor, Stephen Kemble, Von Baurmeister, Major John André and Ambrose Serle.
2. The guards regiments, in this case the Coldstream Guards, were the elite regiments of the army that had developed from the sovereign’s personal guards. Their officers ranked above equivalent officers of other regiments. They differed from those other elite units, the light infantry and the grenadiers (not the Grenadier Guards), in that these were not formed as a regiment (see Note 6, Chapter 4).
1. Sources: The same as Chapter 13.
2. This is a more extreme view than that taken by most historians, many of whom have blamed Germain for the whole affair. I cannot accept this. Any orders to generals at that time were clearly intended to be altered, as Germain was to point out later, if the local situation made it necessary, as it certainly did on the upper Hudson. Other historians have blamed Howe, but Howe made it plain in plenty of time what he was going to do and gave his reasons.
The truth is—and it becomes obvious when the details of the actions are examined—that Burgoyne was a very poor general. His decision now was inexcusable and would never have been accepted by Howe, Clinton or Cornwallis. Leaving Canada before he had properly organized his means of communication caused all his trouble. Otherwise, he would now have been at Albany; nothing would have held up his advance against a much smaller force. His fighting of the two battles of Freeman’s Farm indicates a clear weakness in both tactics and use of forces at his disposal.
3. Morgan had been returned to the continental army in one of the exchanges-of-prisoners that were under constant negotiation between the British and Americans.
4. Von Riedesel’s doubts about what he should do are very strange, as is the time it took him to get his troops into action. By his own account, he sent an officer to Burgoyne for orders at two o’clock, fairly near the beginning of the battle, but even though the center was under terrible pressure, the Hessians were not engaged until near the end of the day.
Why did Burgoyne call them up so late? The same question could be asked about the disengaged Twentieth Regiment which General Phillips eventually brought into action.
By all contemporary accounts, Burgoyne was personally brave, but apparently he became very harassed under battle conditions.
5. Other sources have suggested it was one of Burgoyne’s messengers to Clinton, not the other way around as Digby states, who was captured and swallowed the silver bullet. I merely report what Digby wrote in his journal on a specific date.
6. Strangely, none of the British sources available have referred to this famous story of Arnold’s ride, although they have confirmed that its purpose was achieved: the capture of Colonel Breymann’s redoubt. I have therefore used rebel sources for this incident.
7. Some historians, notably Stone, who specialized in this period of the war, have stated that he leaped his horse over the wall of the redoubt. This seems extremely unlikely: First, the wall would probably have been too high. Second, landing in a redoubt in which there were 200 hostile men would have been hazardous and, under the circumstances, pointless.
8. None of the British sources available refer to this minute gun described by Lossing, though one of them does suggest that the rebels may not have realized the purpose of the gathering. Baroness von Riedesel quotes Gates as saying after Saratoga that he ordered the guns to stop firing as soon as the true nature of the gathering was reported to him.
1. Sources: the same as previous chapters on the London scene: Parliamentary History, Walpole, Correspondence of George III, Cabinet papers, State Papers, contemporary newspapers, etc. Also, the Auckland Papers in the British Museum.
2. Walpole’s information seems to have been a mixture of the actions at Bennington and Fort Stanwix.
3. Vergennes had, in fact, discussed the main points of agreement with Franklin and Deane on December 12.
1. Sources: Clinton; William B. Willcox’s Portrait of a General’, William S. Stryker’s Battle of Monmouth; the Journal of Major John André, Simcoe’s Military Journal; A. C. Flick’s Loyalism in New York; C. Van Tyne’s Loyalists in the American Revolution.
2. Historians agree that it is extremely difficult to establish exactly what happened at Monmouth. As in previous battles, I have selected Clinton whenever there is doubt, although his version conflicts with other sources. I have also used André, who drew some very good and detailed sketches, and a highly detailed map drawn by Lieutenant Spencer of the Queen’s Rangers.
3. Both the British and the rebels claimed a victory at Monmouth. If Clinton’s version is accepted, the rebel claim must be regarded as specious;he had driven the rebel army back across three ravines, and was now withdrawing to continue retreat.
1. Sources: Clinton’s American Rebellion’; Cornwallis’ Correspondence; Colonial Office correspondence with commanders in chief; William B. Willcox’s Portrait of a General; Bernhard A. Uhlendorf’s Siege of Charlestown; Banastre Tarleton’s History of Campaigns in Virginia; Robert D. Bass’ The Green Dragoon’; Hastings MSS (includes Cornwallis’ long and vivid letter about the Battle of Camden), Archibald Robertson’s Diaries and Sketches in America.
1. Sources: Clinton; C. C. Van Doren’s Secret History of the American Revolution, whose main sources are Clinton’s British headquarters papers at Ann Arbor University; Winthrop Sargent’s Life and Career of Major John André, Adjutant General of the British Army in America’, Isaac N. Arnold’s Life of Benedict Arnold.
2. Quoted by Sargent.
1. Sources: Cornwallis; Clinton; Stopford-Sackville papers (Lord Germain); Tarleton; Simcoe; Robert D. Bass’ The Green Dragoon; Charles Ross’ The Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Comwallis.
1. Sources: Colonial Office Papers; Clinton; Cornwallis; Correspondence of George III; S. F. Bemis’ Diplomacy of the American Revolution; B. F. Stevens’ Campaign in Virginia.
1. Sources: Clinton, Cornwallis, Simcoe, Captain Henry Duncan, the Sandwich Papers (for Graves and Hood), the Hood Papers, logs of HM ships, The Campaign in Virginia edited by B. F. Stevens for exact dates of arrival of letters between Cornwallis and Clinton, Henry P. Johnston’s The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis, William B. Willcox’s “The British Road to Yorktown,” Randolph G. Adams’ “A View of Cornwallis’ Surrender.”
2. Not to be confused with Admiral Samuel Graves, in command at Boston in 1775.
3. According to William B. Willcox in Portrait of a General, Clinton misinterpreted the reference to French intentions, which were not worded so dogmatically in the captured letters.
The issue of the captured letters is something of a mystery, because Clinton had to send them to London for decoding, and the plain-language versions did not reach him in New York until August. A possible explanation is that his staff in New York succeeded in decoding parts of them—the vital parts. At any rate, the quote is taken from his own version of what happened in The American Rebellion.
4. Clinton notes in The American Rebellion that Tarleton told him after the war that on discovering St. Simon’s troops, he pleaded with Cornwallis to make a breakout attempt but that Ross dissuaded the earl in view of Clinton’s letters of the second and sixth promising relief. This cannot be completely correct because there was a time gap of some nine days between the day St. Simon went up the James and the arrival of Clinton’s first letter on the thirteenth. By the time Clinton made this note, though, his quarrel with Cornwallis had become very bitter, and he was exploiting every fact he could to lay blame on him.
5. Cornwallis put it at 4,000 combat troops fit for duty, discounting sick and nonfighting personnel.
6. The French had relinquished the wind in the previous clash at the Chesapeake earlier in the year when Arbuthnot prevented enemy ships from blockading Arnold.
7. Aware of criticism by his junior admiral, Graves made a special point in his report that the “line of battle” signal was not flying all the time during the action, though the London’s log shows it was hoisted during the battle. In any case, Hood surely should have put his ships, now the rear guard, into action; he had two hours to do so. The point he made was that “engage” involved independent ship action while the “line” signal required the ships to keep station in the fleet. The two signals were therefore contradictory.
8. Mackenzie.
9. Some historians have suggested that Rodney’s misjudgment of De Grasse’s plans was partly due to the fact that Rodney was ill and was in fact on his way home to recover.
10. All sources do not agree with Simcoe’s version of this in the Journal of Operations of the Queen’s Rangers. According to some accounts, Tarleton was actually riding with the foragers when the French cavalry attacked, possibly because he thought the decoy had not worked.
11. It is strange that fire balls, such as those used by the defenders of Quebec in 1775, were not employed to provide illumination.
12. The point about the Charleston surrender was that the rebels were refused permission to march out with their colors unfurled. This was regarded as ignominious, and now the British would have to march out with their colors “cased.”
1. Sources: My main source for the meeting between the King and John Adams, and for the dialogue in particular, which he quotes, is taken from Adams’ highly detailed letter to Jay in Congress. Most of the London dailies reported the occasion, indicating its importance, but gave no details beyond the presentation of credentials. The London Chronicle reported the thunderstorm, and I have taken a slight liberty in assuming that it occurred during the morning.