What follows are model answers for 32 of the basic exercises—the ones for which a model is possible. Some exercises—namely, those for §§ 4, 19, 21, 22, 26-28, 30, 33, 41-47, 49, and 50—don’t lend themselves to “model” answers, so they don’t appear here.
§ 1 Case: People v. Nelson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011)
Facts: Carl Nelson stopped his car on the roadway at a red light, got out his cellphone, dialed, and held it up to his ear. When he noticed a motorcycle police officer watching him, he put the phone away. Then the light turned green, and he drove into the intersection. The officer stopped him and cited him for using the phone while driving. On appeal, Nelson asserted that as the California Supreme Court defined driving, sitting in a stopped vehicle did not qualify. The People responded that the statute forbids operating a vehicle on a public roadway, so it didn’t matter that Nelson had briefly stopped.
Question: California law forbids using a hand-held wireless telephone while driving. Does while driving mean that the car must actually be in motion when the phone is in use?
Holding: No. Mr. Nelson was driving even though his car wasn’t moving. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction.
Reasoning: The court of appeals analyzed three factors in its decision: (1) the language of the statute at issue and other similar statutes suggests that the terms drive and while driving encompass a driver’s fleeting pauses at traffic signals while on public roads; (2) the legislature used drive and operate interchangeably, and the statute was enacted to address the unsafe practice of using hand-held wireless telephones while operating motor vehicles, without restriction to only moving vehicles; and (3) applying the statute to only moving vehicles would result in significant safety hazards on public roads, such as drivers using their phones in stop-and-go traffic, at stop signs, and during other momentary pauses, thereby creating a sea of distracted drivers who are likely to begin a phone call while stopped but then find it difficult to end those calls when traffic resumes moving.
§ 2 Nonlinear Outline
Linear Outline
1. Executive Summary
• Issue: Charged with drug trafficking, Oscar Winchell retained Millard Gilmer, a veteran criminal-defense lawyer (assisted by Norman Newman, a first-year lawyer). Six weeks before trial, Gilmer had emergency heart surgery; he required eight weeks to recuperate. Winchell moved for a one-month continuance (unopposed), and the court denied the motion. With Newman as his only attorney, Winchell was tried and convicted. Was denying the continuance reversible error?
• Answer: An appellate court would likely hold that if lead counsel suddenly fell ill and cocounsel was too inexperienced to handle the case, the trial court erred in not granting a continuance for three reasons:
(1) The refusal to postpone the trial resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.
(2) Newman had insufficient time and experience to prepare adequately for a trial of this magnitude and a case of this complexity.
(3) Winchell has a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel of choice, and this right cannot be arbitrarily denied. Winchell had not retained Newman as trial counsel. Rather, Newman had been associated in a research capacity only.
2. When illness of counsel is the ground for a continuance, reversal need not be predicated on a finding of abuse of discretion but may be based simply on the resulting unfairness of the trial. Arabian Am. Oil v. Scarfone, 939 F.2d 1472, 1479 n.17 (11th Cir. 1991).
• Although the general standard of review for the denial of such a request is abuse of discretion, the caselaw establishes an attorney-illness exception.
• The facts of this case satisfy the requirements for applying the exception and reversal: counsel was ill, cocounsel was relatively unprepared and inexperienced, the time sought for continuance was short, and the case was complicated. Smith-Weik Mach. Corp. v. Murdock Mach. Corp., 423 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1970).
3. In the alternative, the court’s denial of the continuance was an abuse of discretion because it left inexperienced cocounsel unguided—and with only five weeks to prepare for his first trial.
• A showing of abuse of discretion, resulting in specific substantial prejudice, mandates reversal of a conviction.
• The facts of this case are essentially indistinguishable from the facts of United States v. Verderame, 51 F.3d 249 (11th Cir. 1995), a case in which the Eleventh Circuit reversed a conviction on the ground that without the continuance, there was insufficient time to prepare.
• Neither the prosecution nor the judicial system would have been prejudiced by the delay.
• The prosecutor did not oppose a continuance.
• As to two earlier continuances, both the court and the prosecutor stated on the record that Winchell was blameless.
• The record demonstrates how the denial of a continuance substantially prejudiced the defense. This prejudice resulted mostly from Newman’s inexperience.
• Even an experienced advocate would have found the time insufficient to (a) digest copious discovery, (b) investigate new exculpatory evidence, and (c) prepare or assemble witnesses.
• No motion was made for an order directing the prosecutor to define the charged narcotics conspiracy or to list the participants.
4. In the second alternative, the denial was structural error. The right to counsel of choice is a component of due process, requiring courts to balance a defendant’s choice of counsel against the general interest in a fast and efficient trial. Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1326 (5th Cir. 1979).
• Arbitrary action prohibiting the use of counsel of choice violates due process. Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1326.
• Violation of the right to counsel of choice is a structural error, requiring automatic reversal. United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1986).
• This ground requires no proof of prejudice: the right is either respected or denied.
• Competence of substitute counsel is irrelevant.
• No harmless-error analysis applies. Rankin, 779 F.2d at 958.
5. Conclusion
• the likelihood of success on appeal
• briefing schedule
• likely time allotment for oral argument—what the clerk says
• additional avenues of reversible error to explore
§ 3 • In March 2010, Gilbert Spaulding applied to the Workforce Commission for extended unemployment benefits. The commission denied the request because Spaulding was ineligible for the benefits during the period for which he sought them. The trial court affirmed.
• Plaintiff, Pilsen Corporation, moved for a partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of fraud. The trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. On further appeal, however, the state supreme court reversed.
• Davis Energy owns a fuel-storage yard that can be reached only by a private road. For seven years, owners of adjacent lots have used the road to reach their property. For the past three years, Davis has had a guard at the road’s entrance but has posted no other notice about private property or permission to enter. Has Davis, through its actions or silence, granted its neighbors an easement to use the road?
• Plaintiff Los Angeles Dodgers, a corporation owning a professional baseball team, began in New York as the Brooklyn Dodgers. In 1958, the team moved the site of its home games from New York to California and changed its name. The organization’s principal corporate offices are now in Los Angeles.
§ 5 • The Business Corporation Law does not address whether a New York corporation can indemnify nonemployees.
• Even assuming that the fog caused Cetera’s accident, Pardone had no duty to prevent such a freakish and unforeseeable injury.
• Before the initial public offering, no one knew or had reason to know that Palm Harbor could not be properly completed on time.
• Beale has not alleged facts that, if true, would establish either public injury or reduced competition among the nation’s law schools. So her restraint-of-trade claim must be dismissed.
• The court examined many cases but found few that imposed a duty to disclose the illegal conduct of candidates for elected office.
§ 6 • Oral argument would be of little benefit for two reasons. First, the dispositive issue has recently been decided by the Texas Supreme Court [footnote citation] and by this Court [footnote citation]. Second, the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and the record. [70 words]
• No cases explicitly hold that Kansas requires a corporation to have a valid business purpose to engage in certain specified corporate transactions. But in 2013 the Supreme Court of Kansas decided a case that bears on the question. The case involved a cash-out merger in which the dissenters claimed that the defendant’s board of directors had breached its fiduciary duties to them. The court found that a corporation need not show a valid corporate purpose for eliminating stockholders. [80 words]
• The court of appeals cited two salient points. First, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had already issued the applicant a National Pollution Elimination System permit for the actual discharge of wastewater from the outfall pipe. Second, under the Clean Water Act, the issuance and conditions of such permits are generally exempt from compliance with the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement. So the court concluded that the Corps had properly excluded the environmental implications of the outfall-pipe discharges from its analysis. The court considered only the construction and maintenance of the pipeline itself in determining that issuing the permit did not constitute a major federal action. [107 words]
§ 7 • While struggling as a single parent to provide for her children, Ms. Lenderfield accrued considerable debt to her family and others.
• Chesapeake incorrectly asserts that it is not a proper defendant in this case and that therefore relief cannot be granted.
• Finding that Officer McGee was acting more as a school employee than as a police officer in searching Robinson, the court ruled that an official’s primary role is not law enforcement.
§ 8 • The court relied heavily on the district court’s statement that (1) the would-be intervenors retained the right to appear through counsel, to participate in the fairness hearing, and to conduct discovery, and (2) they had standing to appeal the court’s approval or disapproval of the class-action settlement.
• Tenant will probably not be able to have the lease declared void and unenforceable for vagueness. It contains all the essential elements of a lease: a description of the premises, the amount of rent to be paid, the term of the lease, and the identity of the parties.
• The Younger doctrine also applies to a state civil proceeding that (1) is ongoing, (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) affords an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.
§ 9 • After the plaintiff testified, three witnesses testified for the corporation.
• The court decides this purely legal question.
• The court should deny McCormick’s motion for partial summary judgment on the duty to defend.
• The court should disregard Thompson’s opposition because it violates California Rule of Court 313.
§ 10 • Notice will be effective only if it is delivered in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested.
• Without contrary proof, the court should presume that the administrator’s functions continue.
• Termination will be approved only after the administrator reviews the application and finds it complete.
• The jurors may have believed that Payton’s mitigation evidence was within their reach. They certainly had judicial direction.
§ 11 • On August 27, in response to the Governor’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, this Court dismissed the whistleblower claims against the Governor.
• The single most important factor in determining whether, within the meaning of the Act, a party is in charge of the work is the right to stop the work.
• The Commission is not now in a position to provide additional affidavits and other evidence to support its contention that Bulworth and Islington are an integrated enterprise.
• For good cause, the court may authorize a preappearance interview between the interpreter and the party or witness.
• Arguing that it had no control over the release of the hazardous substance that created the emergency, Silver Sidings contests whether, under the Spill Bill, the Department of Natural Resources has jurisdiction. But Silver Sidings is, under the Spill Bill’s definition, “a person having control over a hazardous substance involved in a hazardous-substance emergency.” Four statutory factors demonstrate this: (1) Silver Sidings owned the property where the release occurred, (2) it owned the underground storage tanks from which the hazardous substance was released, (3) it permitted the hazardous substance to be stored in its tanks on its property, and (4) it had every right as a landowner to control the use of its land and tanks.
§ 12 • On July 15, 2010, in a prehearing conference, the court extended Rawson’s time to respond to Vicker’s motion until August 6. But Rawson failed to file a response.
• An employee who is subpoenaed to testify in a judicial or administrative proceeding must give the company prompt notice of the subpoena so that it can decide whether to seek a protective order.
• The court asks whether the plaintiff is guilty of unreasonable delay in asserting its rights. This determination is within the court’s discretion. The emphasis is on the delay’s reasonableness, not its length.
• After the Bank dishonored and returned the forged check, the US Attorney subpoenaed the Bank, directing it to deliver to his office, upon receipt, all bank checks, cashier’s checks, and similar items stolen in the July 2, 2010 robbery.
§ 13 • Jones agrees with Smith.
• The professional fees in this project depend entirely on what planning techniques the client favors.
• The judge believes she has discretion to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies.
• With or without an express agreement, most courts hold that the authority continues for a reasonable time in light of all the circumstances.
§ 14 • Jenkins knew about the computer’s access port.
• This Court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.
• Courts have identified several factors in determining whether a defendant’s use of another’s registered trademark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.
• A party can preemptively protect the enforceability of the contract’s provisions by inserting a severability clause.
• A party may waive a provision of this agreement only by signing a written waiver.
§ 15 • An interested party may apply to modify or revoke an antidumping order (or to terminate a suspension agreement) during an annual administrative review. The board normally won’t consider revoking an order unless there have been no sales at less than fair value for at least three consecutive years. (Suspension can’t be changed in the phrase suspension agreement.)
• In analyzing the ADA claim, the court noted that the company terminated the decedent and reduced his AIDS benefits before the ADA became effective. Plaintiff nonetheless alleged that limiting AIDS benefits beyond the ADA’s effective date—in effect discriminating between plan members with AIDS and members without AIDS—violated the general rule of Title I.
• A finding that reasonable grounds exist to revoke parole should first be made by someone directly involved in the case. But the preliminary evaluation and resulting recommendations should be in the hands of someone not directly involved. (The words evaluation and recommendations probably need to be retained.)
§ 16 • Licensee will perform the work in compliance with all applicable laws.
• While the witness’s truthfulness may be challenged on cross-examination, it cannot be further challenged through extrinsic evidence of matters not already in the record.
• If you fail to perform an obligation under this agreement, we may choose to perform the obligation and then recover from you the cost of our performance. (For purposes of this revision, the bailor becomes we; the bailee becomes you.)
• Seller must assist Buyer in this process but will not bear the associated costs.
§ 17 Foster does not dispute that his complaint against Pine National wasn’t filed until after the applicable limitations period had expired. Rather, Foster seeks to avoid time-bar by arguing that (1) the statute is tolled because this is a case of misnomer and (2) the equitable exception described by the Texas Supreme Court in Enserch Corp. v. Parker [footnote citation] applies. Foster argues that the question whether Pine National was prejudiced by the late filing creates, under the exception, a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
Yet neither argument states a valid ground for tolling the statute. First, the undisputed facts show, as a matter of law, that this is not a case of misnomer but of misidentification. And cases of misidentification do not toll limitations. Second, the equitable exception is unavailable on these facts. Although Foster argues that the late filing creates a material fact issue, prejudice to Pine National is irrelevant under the Enserch exception. So Foster has failed to show any basis for applying the exception. His claims are time-barred as a matter of law.
§ 18 Appellant provides a substantially correct statement of the procedural history. On July 27, 2010, Keith W. Hillman filed for benefits with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. Exactly a month later, the Director of the Division of Crime Victims’ Compensation denied the claim because Hillman’s conduct had contributed to his injury and because Hillman had not cooperated with law enforcement. In December 2010, Hillman requested a review of the denial. The deputy commissioner held a hearing in April 2011.
§ 20 • Enclosed are the following documents: [list]. (Or: Here are the four documents you requested. You’ll find that . . .)
• As you requested, I met with Roger Smith today. (The case is referred to in the subject line. Omit any reference to it in this sentence.)
• The discovery cutoff in this case is Monday, March 20, 2014.
• After talking with Alex in your office this morning, I called the trustee.
• We would like to retain you as a consultant in this case.
• Thank you. If you have any questions, please call.
§ 23 In a Texas federal district court, R&B Music sought injunctive relief against the McCoys to prevent them from any further use or disclosure of R&B’s trade secrets. A day later, the Texas court issued an order restraining the McCoys from using or disclosing certain R&B property and proprietary information. At the same time, the court set an evidentiary hearing on R&B’s preliminary-injunction motion, giving the parties ten days’ notice.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the McCoys moved to dismiss for an alleged lack of venue and personal jurisdiction. Alternatively, they asked the court to transfer the case to an Illinois federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or § 1406.
When the parties arrived for the injunction hearing, the Texas court indicated its intent to hear testimony and rule on the McCoys’ dismissal or transfer motion, to which R&B had been given no chance to respond. The testimony established that the McCoys had had significant contacts in Texas for the past eight years—including daily phone calls and faxes to and from R&B; their three visits to R&B’s Texas headquarters; and their work in negotiating R&B contracts with Texas musicians.
The next day, the Texas court transferred the case to this Court, noting that the transfer was for the reasons stated on the record. As the transcript reveals, the Texas court decided that while it had personal jurisdiction over John McCoy, it lacked personal jurisdiction over Kate McCoy. According to the court, the case should be transferred because “to accord relief to R&B down here while leaving the Illinois court to deal with Kate McCoy simply would not provide an effective situation” for any of the parties. The judge did not indicate which statutory section governed the transfer.
In the same order, the Texas court further ruled that its earlier order restricting both John and Kate McCoy from using or disclosing R&B’s trade secrets would remain in effect pending further orders of the Illinois court. After the case arrived in Illinois, R&B filed a supplemental motion for preliminary injunction, asking this Court to extend and expand the injunctive relief that the Texas court had already granted.
§ 24 The modern legal researcher must work in two realms: paper and electronic.
§ 25 1. The automobile made its first appearance on the streets, for all practical purposes, in the first decade of this century.
2. By 1940, the United States had become an automobile society. (By 1940 : temporal progression; automobile society : echo link.)
3. The numbers have continued to rise, as automobiles choke the roads and highways and millions of people, living in the land of suburban sprawl, use the automobile as their lifeline—connecting them to work, shopping, and the outside world in general. (The numbers : pointing word plus echo link; continued: echo link.)
4. Thus, a person who parks overtime and gets a “ticket” will get an order to appear in court and face the music. (Explicit connective.)
5. In many localities, traffic matters got handled by municipal courts, police courts, justices of the peace, and sometimes specialized departments of a municipal court. (Echo link.)
6. The traffic court judge, as one would expect, did not have the prestige and dignity of a higher-grade judge. (Echo link.)
7. The root of this evil was, perhaps, the fact that defendants did not—and do not—see themselves as criminals, but rather as unlucky people who got caught breaking a rule that everybody breaks once in a while. (Pointing word plus echo link.)
8. This attitude came to the surface in a 1958 American Bar Association report on traffic matters in Oklahoma. (Pointing word plus echo link.)
§ 29 This Court held that Julia was entitled to damages for loss of consortium and affirmed that portion of the judgment. But the Court reversed on mental anguish because Julia did not witness the accident:
[A] claim for negligent infliction of mental anguish that is not based on the wrongful-death statute requires that the plaintiff prove that he or she was, among other things, located at or near the scene of the accident, and that the mental anguish resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observation of the incident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after the occurrence. Julia has not met either of these requirements and therefore may not recover for mental anguish.
Thus, . . .
§ 31 • Nothing in this Agreement gives anyone, other than the parties and the Buyer’s permitted assignees, any rights or remedies under the Agreement.
• The Corporation and the Executive agree that they have negotiated this Agreement at arm’s length and that legal counsel for both parties have had an adequate opportunity to review this Agreement so that any court will fully enforce it as written.
• The employee agrees not to compete and further agrees that the limitations relating to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained are reasonable. This agreement is supported by independent, valuable consideration as required by Texas Business and Commerce Code § 15.50.
§ 32 (1) Commitment. This letter defines the commitment made on behalf of Lucky Development Company (Seller) to sell to ABC Company (Buyer) 111.3 acres of land out of the Benbow House Survey, Abstract 247.
(2) Buyer Obligations. Buyer must pay, in cash, a sum equal to the product of $5.50 multiplied by the total number of square feet within the land’s boundaries. Payment must be made under the terms of a Sale-and-Purchase Agreement acceptable to and executed by both Buyer and Seller. Buyer must exercise its best efforts to
(a) enter into the Sale-and-Purchase Agreement within the stated time; and
(b) secure any essential commitments from high-quality department and specialty stores to establish, construct, and operate a regional mall.
(3) Limitation of Commitment. No sale or purchase agreement or contract of sale is intended until Buyer and Seller agree to the Sale-and-Purchase Agreement. If Buyer and Seller do not agree within 60 days from the date of this letter, neither party will have any liabilities or obligations to the other.
§ 34 7.7 Insurance
(A) Policies. Borrower must provide the insurance policies described in Exhibit I, together with all other insurance policies that Lender may reasonably require from time to time. All insurance policies must:
(1) be continuously maintained at Borrower’s sole expense;
(2) be issued by reputable, responsible insurers that are satisfactory to Lender;
(3) be in form, substance, and amount satisfactory to Lender;
(4) with respect to liability insurance, name Lender as an additional insured;
(5) provide that the policies cannot be canceled or modified without 60 days’ prior written notice to Lender; and
(6) with respect to insurance covering damage to the Mortgaged Property, name Lender as a mortgagee, contain a “lender’s loss payable” endorsement in form and substance satisfactory to Lender, and contain an agreed-value clause sufficient to eliminate any risk of coinsurance.
(B) Proof of Coverage. Upon request, Borrower must deliver to Lender the original policies, copies of them, or certificates evidencing the policies.
§ 35 • Escrow Agent is entitled to receive an annual fee in accordance with standard charges for services to be rendered under this Agreement.
• Each member may transfer all or any part of his membership interest to any other member without restriction of any kind.
• The occurrence of any one or more of the following constitutes an event of default: (a) if Borrower fails to pay any installment of principal or interest on an advance. . . .
• After completing its work, Licensee must restore the License Area to the condition in which Licensee found it upon first entering.
• The sender fully complies with the requirement to send notice when the sender obtains electronic confirmation. (This one expresses a status, not a duty. An alternative wording: The sender has fully complied with the requirement to send notice when. . .)
§ 36 • The Buyer must pay in full for product previously delivered. But the quantity of product whose delivery or acceptance is excused by force majeure will be deducted without liability from the quantity otherwise subject to delivery or acceptance.
• For travel and subsistence expenses actually and necessarily incurred by Contractor in performing this Contract, Contractor will be reimbursed in the same manner as in the current Commissioner’s Plan, but not in an amount that exceeds $2,000 or the amounts provided for under the Plan.
• The Borrower may, at any time and from time to time, prepay the Loans in whole or in part, without premium or penalty, upon at least one business day’s notice to the Lender, specifying the date and the amount of the prepayment. Each prepayment must be accompanied by the payment of all accrued but unpaid interest on the amount prepaid to the date of the prepayment.
§ 37 • AmCorp and Havasu have the sole right to use inventions covered by this Agreement and to obtain patent, copyright, trade-secret, and any other form of legal protection for the inventions.
• Immediately upon notice from Pantheon, Licensee must discontinue producing licensed items at every print shop.
• No change, waiver, or discharge of this Agreement is valid unless in a writing that is signed by an authorized representative of the party against whom the change, waiver, or discharge is sought to be enforced.
• The settlement is binding on all classes of creditors and stockholders of this Corporation.
§ 38 • An employee who has earned more than 25 credits is eligible for positions under § 7.
• The fire marshal is responsible for issuing any permit listed in this section.
• Each shareholder of the corporation has only one vote.
• If an appealing party has not satisfied the requisites for an interlocutory appeal, that party’s appeal will be dismissed.
• When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried with the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if it had been raised by the pleadings.
§ 39 Before the entry of the final decree on June 5, 2010, the parties participated in four hearings before three Commissioners in Chancery, took three additional sets of depositions of healthcare providers, and had at least 12 live hearings. The court granted a divorce on the ground of separation in excess of one year, granted spousal support and $5,000 in costs and attorney’s fees to the wife, and equitably distributed the property.
§ 40 Two of the three passages seem to have real meaning, but they are all poorly expressed.
• I’m not sure I understand this sentence. It might mean this: “It is illegal for a savings and loan holding company to obtain control of an uninsured institution or to retain control (for longer than 12 months) of any institution that has become uninsured.”
• This is an odd, even surprising provision because it seems to give the nonspouse in a bigamous relationship more rights than the bigamist’s innocent spouse. It seems to mean this: “ ‘Spouse’ means the person (1) to whom the Cardholder is legally married, or (2) with whom the Cardholder has been cohabiting as husband and wife for at least two years. If the Cardholder is legally married but has been cohabiting with someone outside the marriage for at least two years as husband and wife, then that someone is considered the spouse.”
• This is a weird contractual provision. If you sign the agreement, you seem to be violating it no matter what you do. So it seems to have no genuine meaning at all. But it might be trying to say something like this: “In imposing requirements, standards, and rates, the 911 provider must treat the Company just as it treats an incumbent local-exchange company.”
§ 48 The following abbreviations appear in these answers:
• When Margot arrived, Rodney told her that David had laid down because of his pain. (Laid should be lain.)
GMAU at 501–02.
MAU at 175.
AHBEU at 113.
U&A at 170.
GDLU at 528.
S&W at 51.
MEU2 at 327.
TCW at 254–55.
• Mrs. Clements testified that Kenneth was waiving the gun wildly and pointing it at Bill. (Waiving should be waving.)
GMAU at 850.
U&A at 372.
GDLU at 934.
AU&S at 411.
MEU2 at 685.
• Counsel testified that because the testimony would have harmed her case, she opted to forego it for reasons of trial strategy. (Forego should be forgo.)
GMAU at 368.
AHBEU at 97.
U&A at 120.
GDLU at 371–72.
MEU2 at 205.
• Since the Oneida line of cases are now binding federal law in California, this Court is bound to follow them. (Are should be is; the subject is line.)
GMAU at 801–03.
AHBEU at 36.
U&A at 211.
GDLU at 881–82.
AU&S at 366.
MEU2 at 402.
TCW at 301–02.
• The cost of any arbitration proceedings will be born by the party designated by the arbitrators. (Born should be borne.)
GMAU at 111.
AHBEU at 78.
U&A at 49.
AU&S at 52.
MEU2 at 62.
• The gas would likely be inventory under the Idaho statutes defining the term, but these provisions might not apply since they do not effect Idaho taxable income. (Effect should be affect.)
GMAU at 26.
AHBEU at 69.
U&A at 8.
GDLU at 34–35.
AU&S at 52.
S&W at 45.
MEU2 at 13.
TCW at 29.
• Texas law prohibits the unjustified interference with a parties’ existing or prospective contractual relations. (Parties’ should be party’s)
GMAU at 635–38.
AHBEU at 241.
GDLU at 684–85.
S&W at 1.
• For the reasons stated in Jones’s initial motion, Jones maintains that the Court’s August 27 order precludes Fillmore from preceding on count six in this action. (Preceding should be proceeding.)
GMAU at 649.
GDLU at 696.
AU&S at 300.
TCW at 347.
• The laws of the State of Massachusetts (irrespective of its choice-of-law principals) govern the validity of this Agreement, the construction of its terms, and the interpretation and enforcement of the parties’ rights and duties. (Principals should be principles.)
• Neither Mr. Robinson’s affidavit nor Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony carry the force of law. (Carry should be carries.)
GMAU at 637.
MAU at 116.
U&A at 204.
GDLU at 684–85.
MEU2 at 386–87.
TCW at 121–22.