1. Framing Your Thoughts
1. Chase v. Kalber, 153 P. 397, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915).
2. See Betty S. Flowers, Madman, Architect, Carpenter, Judge: Roles and the Writing Process, 44 Proceedings of the Conference of College Teachers of English 7–10 (1979).
2. Phrasing Your Sentences
3. Elizabeth R. Koller Whittenbury, Individual Liability for Sexual Harassment under Federal Law, 14 Lab. Law. 357, 370 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Rudolf Flesch, How to Write Plain English: A Book for Lawyers and Consumers 20–27 (1979); Robert Gunning, The Technique of Clear Writing 32–34 (1952).
5. W. W. Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence 48 (1945).
3. Choosing Your Words
6. See Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 294–297 (3d ed. 2011).
7. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174–79 (2012) (discussing the presumption against surplusage). See also, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208 (1985) (“[W]e must give eff ect to every word that Congress used in the statute”); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“[I]n construing a statute we are obliged to give eff ect, if possible, to every word”); Burdon Cent. Sugar-Ref. Co. v. Payne, 167 U.S. 127, 142 (1897) (“[T]he contract must be so construed as to give meaning to all its provisions, and . . . that interpretation would be incorrect which would obliterate one portion of the contract in order to enforce another part”).
8. Jerome Frank, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 6 Scribes J. Legal Writing 97, 99 (1996–1997), reprinted from 29 Va. L. Rev. 625 (1943).
9. Rudolf Flesch, The Art of Readable Writing 82 (1949).
10. See, e.g., Wayne A. Danielson & Dominic L. Lasorsa, A New Readability Formula Based on the Stylistic Age of Novels, 33 J. Reading 194, 196 (1989).
11. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 114–19 (2008) (debating contractions); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) (containing no contractions).
12. See Arthur O. England, Getting Your Message Across by Plain Talk, 34 J. Applied Psychol. 182, 182 (1950).
13. Francis Christiansen, Notes Toward a New Rhetoric, 25 College English 9 (1963); see also Bryan A. Garner, On Beginning Sentences with “But,” 3 Scribes J. Legal Writing 87 (1992).
Part Two: Principles Mainly For Analytical and Persuasive Writing
1. See Garner, The Winning Brief §§ 8–12, at 53–97 (2d ed. 2004); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 85–87 (2008).
2. Quoted in Jon Winokur, Writers on Writing 111 (2d ed. 1987).
3. Nebraska Equal Opportunity Comm’n v. State Employees Retirement Sys., 471 N.W.2d 399 (Neb. 1991). For a discussion of this case, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 185–86 (2012).
4. For authorities debunking the false prohibition of one-sentence paragraphs, see John R. Trimble, Writing with Style 92–93 (2d ed. 2000); Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style 62 (2d ed. 2002); Theodore M. Bernstein, The Careful Writer 324 (1965).
5. Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, 55 vols. (1978–1999).
6. John Minor Wisdom, How I Write, 4 Scribes J. Legal Writing 83, 86 (1993).
7. See Garner’s Modern American Usage 675–76 (3d ed. 2009); Wilson Follett, Modern American Usage 423–24 (1966); Bergen Evans & Cornelia Evans, A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage 100 (1957).
a James Bradley Thayer, “Unilateral Mistake and Unjust Enrichment as a Ground for the Avoidance of Legal Transactions” (1900), in Harvard Legal Essays 466–89 (1934) (including three paragraphs containing 1,000+ words).
b Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Holdsworth’s English Law” (1909), in Collected Legal Papers 285–90 (1920).
c James Barr Ames, “Two Theories of Consideration,” in Lectures on Legal History 323–32 (1913).
d John Alderson Foote, A Concise Treatise on Private International Jurisprudence 126–42 (Coleman Phillipson ed., 4th ed. 1914) (including a one-sentence paragraph of only 22 words!).
e Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 57–67 (1928).
f Harry D. Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks §§ 259–60, at 688–95 (3d ed. 1929).
g William F. Walsh, A Treatise on Equity § 48, at 238–50 (1930).
h Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 472 (1939) (entire essay).
i William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 24, at 143–50 (1941).
j 2 Samuel Williston, The Law Governing Sales of Goods §§ 425–26, at 605–13 (rev. ed. 1948).
k Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 532, at 487–90 (1952).
l Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills § 96, at 499–505 (2d ed. 1953).
m Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 56–61 (1960).
n Frederick Bernays Wiener, Briefing and Arguing Federal Appeals § 62, at 197–200 (1967).
o Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 1–5 (1975).
p Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law § 4.5, at 74–79 (2d ed. 1977).
q Susan Estrich, Real Rape 58–63 (1987).
r George T. Bogert, Trusts § 113, at 408–11 (6th ed. 1987).
s Michael E. Tigar, Federal Appeals § 5.13 (2d ed. 1993).
t Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System 41–46 (1997).
u Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1, at 1–5 (1999).
v Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 1–9 (2001).
w Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 1–9 (6th ed. 2009).
Part Three: Principles Mainly For Legal Drafting
1. George Coode, On Legislative Expression (1843).
2. J. G. Mackay, Introduction to an Essay on the Art of Legal Composition Commonly Called Drafting, 3 Law Q. Rev. 326, 326 (1887).
3. Lord Thring, Practical Legislation 81 (1902).
4. Alison Russell, Legislative Drafting and Forms 12 (4th ed. 1938).
5. J. K. Aitken, The Elements of Drafting 55–56 (5th ed. 1976).
6. Robert D. Eagleson, “Efficiency in Legal Drafting,” in Essays on Legislative Drafting 13, 13 (David St. Kelly ed., 1988).
7. Peter Siviglia, Writing Contracts 73 (1996).
8. Joseph Kimble, Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please: The Case for Plain Language in Business, Government, and Law 40 (2012).
9. See Garner, Securities Disclosure in Plain English §§ 62–64, at 99–102 (1999).
10. I.R.C. § 509(a).
11. See Rudolf Flesch, The Art of Plain Talk 36–37 (1946); see also Rudolf Flesch, The Art of Readable Writing 226–27 (1962).
12. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic–N.J., Inc. v. Tate, 962 F. Supp. 608 (D.N.J. 1997).
13. See, e.g., Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1960).
14. See, e.g., Cassan v. Fern, 109 A.2d 482 (N.J. Super. 1954).
15. See, e.g., Local Lodge No. 1417, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
16. Moore v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 312 U.S. 630, 635 (1941).
17. Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168, 170 (1877).
18. West Wis. Ry. v. Foley, 94 U.S. 100, 103 (1877).
19. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 146 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Gutirrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 n.9 (1995) (adding that “certain of the Federal Rules use the word ‘shall’ to authorize, but not to require, judicial action,” citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)).
21. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 712 (1990).
22. 39 Words and Phrases 173–259 (2011), plus pp. 37–43 in 2012 pocket part.
23. Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of “Shall,” 3 Scribes J. Legal Writing 61, 71 (1992). See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 112–15 (2012).
24. See Garner, Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules § 4.2(A), at 29 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Thomas R. Haggard, Legal Drafting in a Nutshell 129–31 (1996); G. C. Thornton, Legislative Drafting 79–81 (4th ed. 1996); Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 727 (3d ed. 2011); Barbara Child, Drafting Legal Documents 322 (2d ed. 1992); Michèle M. Asprey, Plain Language for Lawyers 107–09 (1991); E. L. Piesse, The Elements of Drafting 67–71 (J. K. Aitken ed., 7th ed. 1987); Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting § 6.9, at 128–29 (2d ed. 1986); Robert C. Dick, Legal Drafting 92–100 (2d ed. 1985); John A. Bell, Prose of Law: Congress as a Stylist of Statutory English 10–12 (1981); Reed Dickerson, Materials on Legal Drafting 194 (1981); Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation 86, 110–20 (1956).
26. 2 Emory Washburn, A Treatise on the American Law of Real Property 26 (5th ed. 1887) (“The word ‘proviso’ or ‘provided,’ itself, may sometimes be taken as a condition, sometimes as a limitation, and sometimes as a covenant”). See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 154 (2012).
27. See, e.g., Barbara Oil Co. v. Patrick Petroleum Co., 566 P.2d 389, 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (“A proviso in a contract creates a condition . . .”).
28. See, e.g., Bounds v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 172 S.E.2d 379, 383 (W. Va. 1970) (“[T]he statute, by the proviso, creates an exception . . .”).
29. See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Mann v. City of Methuen, 129 N.E. 662, 665 (Mass. 1921) (“[A] proviso in statutes, contracts, or wills not infrequently introduces new or independent matter . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Grupo Protexa, S. A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 954 F.2d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he language [in a proviso] qualifies the duty imposed by the language preceding the proviso . . .”); Hospital Ass’n v. Axelrod, 565 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (App. Div. 1991) (“[G]enerally, a proviso limits the clause or terms immediately preceding it”), appeal denied, 577 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1991); Schneider v. Forcier, 406 P.2d 935, 938 (Wash. 1965) (en banc) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. Thus a proviso is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it”); Essex v. Washington, 176 P.2d 476, 481 (Okla. 1946) (“[A proviso] qualifies and restricts that which immediately precedes it”).
31. See, e.g., Hill v. Board of Educ., 944 P.2d 930, 332 (Okla. 1997) (“[A] proviso need not be confined to the immediately preceding subject where it clearly appears to have been intended to apply to some other matter”); Sanzone v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 592 A.2d 912, 919 (Conn. 1991) (“While sometimes a proviso is said to limit only the language immediately preceding it, the better rule is that the proviso limits the entire section or, as the case may be, subsection within which it is incorporated”).
32. See William Strunk Jr. & E. B. White, The Elements of Style (4th ed. 2000); Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern American Usage 428–29 (3d ed. 2009); Sheridan Baker, The Complete Stylist 55–56 (2d ed. 1972).
33. Sandman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 969 P.2d 277, 281 (Mont. 1998) (“[T]he use of this much-maligned and overused conjunctive–disjunctive reflects poor draftsmanship and generally should be avoided”); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194 n.8 (Ct. App. 1989) (“ ‘And/or’ is taboo in legislative drafting”); Klecan v. Schmal, 241 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Neb. 1976) (“[T]he use of ‘and/or’ in a statute is not to be recommended as it leads to uncertainty”); In re Bell, 122 P.2d 22, 29 (Cal. 1942) (noting that and/or “lends itself . . . as much to ambiguity as to brevity [and] cannot intelligibly be used to fix the occurrence of past events”); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Tollefsen, 263 N.W. 376, 377 (Wis. 1935) (noting that and/or is a “befuddling, nameless thing, that Janus-faced verbal monstrosity”).
Part Four: Principles of Document Design
1. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 32.
Part Five: Methods For Continued Improvement
1. See Garner, The Winning Brief § 99, at 454–57 (2d ed. 2004).
Appendix A: How to Punctuate
1. Hugh Sykes Davies, Grammar Without Tears 167 (1951).