The political and military backgrounds to this book are founded upon the plans which actually were in existence and they are only varied when inherent military probability demands it. Naturally the German plans have had to be changed rather more than those of the British: to fulfil my terms of reference they would have had to undergo a fundamental alteration. In any case, the Germans had far more options open to them than the British, who were penned-in and weaker than at any time in their history. But the conditions of weather, light and tide which I describe are real and the top personalities are those who were involved. Of necessity, however, I have created fictional characters in the lower stratus of fighting men and civilians in order to inject the realism desired.
In as many instances as possible I have made use of actualities in order to place a cloak of authenticity over this account. To enable the reader to evaluate for himself the feasibility of a German invasion of Britain in July 1940, the notes below may be of assistance, giving as they do the sources from which I drew many of the actual facts, and explaining, for example, when an actuality has been deliberately misplaced in time in order to fit the demands of my theme.
CHAPTER I
1. The Defence of the United Kingdom by B. Collier, page 14. My development of this event forms, of course, the starting-point for the fictional side of this book. In fact Hitler showed no interest in invasion at this moment.
2. Hitler Confronts England by W. Ansel, page 39 et seq.
3. Kesselring by K. Macksey, page 74. A conference similar to this took place on 5 June 1940.
4. The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force – Anon, page 75, based on a German directive of 12 July 1940.
5. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 175.
6. Ibid, page 123.
7. The Ultra Secret by F. W. Winterbotham, page 34.
8. The War in France and Flanders by L. F. Ellis.
9. The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 123–125.
10. The Second World War, Vol II by W. S. Churchill, pages 22–23.
11. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 119.
1. The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, page 72.
2. Hitler confronts England, pages 108–110. In reality this conference between Halder and Schniewind took place on 1 July.
3. Ibid, page 240.
4. In reality Directive No 16 was signed on 16 July 1940.
CHAPTER III
1. The Naval War against Hitler by D. Macintyre, pages 41–42, The War at Sea by S. W. Roskill, pages 194–196 and Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine im Kampf 1939–45 by B. Herzog.
2. This account is based on The War in France and Flanders, To Lose a Battle by A. Horne and The Rommel Papers, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart.
3. The Second World War, Vol II, page 198.
4. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 138.
CHAPTER IV
1. Based on various accounts in Civil Defence by T. H. O’Brien and Living through the Blitz by T. Harrisson.
2. Based on reports in the June and July issues of The Dover Express and The Folkestone Herald.
3. The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 156–158.
4. Most Secret War by R. V. Jones, page 105.
5. Based in general on Operation Sea Lion by Peter Fleming, pages 167–172, British Intelligence in the Second World War by F. H. Hinsley, pages 159–190 and on various entries in The Defence of the United Kingdom. The concept of the East Coast being the likely main target is to be found in various messages and appreciations emanating from British Military Intelligence Branches and from GHQ Home Forces, and adopted by the War Committee in Whitehall. The GHQ Home Forces note referred to here as ‘30th June’ actually was written on 8 September and reflected an opinion never entirely rejected even as the German Invasion craft poured down the Channel. It is apparent from Hinsley that British Intelligence possessed neither the capacity nor the organization and expertise to collect and adequately synthesise the material available in order to draw correct conclusions regarding the nature, direction or date of the impending invasion – a condition which applied almost as equally to the days of September (when the Battle of Britain was actually in full swing) as it did in June and July prior to the opening of the air battle over the Channel. In fact, the Intelligence organizations tended much more to mislead than give constructive guidance. The inhibiting effects of over-estimating of German air strength were another product referred to on page 73.
6. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 440.
7. Information supplied by the Kent Defence Research Group. Work was held up by air raids and the gun had not been delivered by the end of July and only came into action later in August.
8. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 137.
9. Ibid, page 129.
10. Ibid page 130 and War Diaries.
11. This description of the actual defences of Kent at this period is based upon their real state taken from material to be found in the Operational Instructions and Returns of the Formations and Units concerned, relevant sections of The Defence of the United Kingdom, The Black Cats at War, Sealion, A Handbook of Kent’s Defences and information gathered by the author from local sources including Town Council Minutes and the press.
12. The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 127 and 128.
13. Ibid, page 125.
14. The Black Cats at War, page 18.
15. The description of the development and use of radar is based upon information in The Design and Development of Weapons, by M. Postan and others, pages 373–389; The Defence of the United Kingdom, various sections, and Battle over Britain by F. Mason, pages 91–96 and 124.
16. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 121 and Royal Air Force by D. Richards, page 156.
17. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 162 for a general idea of the pilot position.
18. Ibid page 143.
19. Civil Defence gives a useful description of organizations and methods. Innumerable other sources have been consulted along with personal recollections of the author who was an ARP Messenger during the ‘Blitz’ and, for a short time, Private in the Home Guard after the threat of invasion had receded.
20. Operation Sea Lion, page 62.
21. Civil Defence, page 357.
CHAPTER V
1. The story told here of the air battles over the convoys constitutes compression in imagination of the battles which actually took place between 10 July and 10 August. The weather conditions, however, are those which actually pertained on the dates in question, while losses are close in proportion to those actually suffered by both sides.
2. From reports in The Dover Express and from The War at Sea, Vol I, page 325. The first shells fell on Dover and Folkestone and a convoy on 12 August, not 22 August as usually stated.
3. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 132. The withdrawal actually took place on 29 July and was due to the danger of bombing alone.
4. This account follows that in The War at Sea, Vol I, pages 240–244, amplified by various other references, and took place on the dates given in the text.
CHAPTER VI
1. First signs of the German build-up were not actually apparent until the first week in September.
2. Compiled from Hitler confronts England. The information about codes and ciphers come from The War at Sea, Vol 1, page 267 and British Intelligence in the Second World War, page 141.
3. Ibid, pages 242–243.
4. Ibid, page 279.
5. Battle over Britain, pages 612–613.
6. The Defence of the United Kingdom and information from local sources.
7. The Dover Express.
8. The GS I (x) opinions were actually presented on 8, 12 and 21 September at a time when the intended date of invasion was set for 22 September. The comments from Naval Intelligence and by Churchill are to be found in Operation Sea Lion, pages 169–173.
9. War Diary of Dover Command, 12 September.
10. Operation Sea Lion, page 173.
11. Figures in proportion to this are recorded in respect of July and August in The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 225.
12. Based on War Diary of Dover Command and The War at Sea, Vol I.
13. See Operational Instructions for 1st (London) Division and 2nd (London) Brigade, c 5 July 1940 and History of the Irish Guards by Fitzgerald.
14. The Second World War, Vol II, page 148.
15. Ibid, page 569.
16. Ibid, page 151.
17. Hitler confronts England, pages 272–273.
CHAPTER VII
1. This actually took place on 7 August. See Battle over Britain, page 212.
2. The Luftwaffe War Diaries, by C. Bekker, page 200.
3. Battle over Britain, page 237. Adapted from the events of 11 and 12 August which were immediately prior to the actual ‘Eagle Day’on 13th.
4. An operation similar to this did take place on 12 August, but included an attack on the CHL station at Dover (which was not ready on 8 July) and did not include an attack on Conewden, which is added here as a likely operation by the Germans in the context of this book.
5. Figures for the losses among RAF fighters and all German types are those for 12 August as supplied in Battle over Britain, pages 234-236. Those for RAF bombers are synthetic.
6. Based upon German plans and selected events which occurred during the morning battles of 13 August 1940, but modified in a manner to suit the better weather conditions of 9 July. See The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 184–186 and Battle over Britain, pages 237–9.
7. Ibid and based, with variations, respectively, on pages 186–188 and pages 239–243.
8. Royal Air Force, page 162–164.
9. Battle over Britain, page 244.
10. Although my account of the fighting on 11 July is substantially based on that which actually occurred on 15 August 1940 (see The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 190–197 and Battle over Britain, pages 247–264), I have modified certain critical episodes to take account of the imminence of S Day (13 July). The Luftwaffe would have behaved differently, as in my imaginary scenario, from the way it actually did on 15 August 1940 when S Day was still a month distant in September.
11. Royal Air Force, page 176.
12. Hitler confronts England, page 286.
13. Based on the realities of 16 August 1940. See The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 197–199 and Battle over Britain, pages 264–273.
14. Based on the actual events of 7 September 1940 as described in The Defence of the United Kingdom, pages 223–4.
CHAPTER VIII
1. The German techniques are those described by Oberst Rudolf Witzig in his account of the taking of Fort Eban Emael on 10 May 1940 in Purnell’s History of the Second World War, pages 184–192. A similar operation was carried out in the early hours of 6 June 1944 by British glider troops against the Germany battery at Houlgate in Normandy.
2. A similar operation was attempted in the Ardennes on 10 May 1940. See To Lose a Battle, page 185.
CHAPTER X
1. Quoted from Operation Sea Lion, page 269.
2. After Churchill had offered 67-year old Marshal of the RAF Lord Trenchard the post of General Officer Commanding ‘all land, sea and air forces at home in the event of invasion’, on 23 May and Trenchard had refused, Churchill himself had, to all intents and purposes, assumed that appointment. On page 42 of his Churchill as Warlord, R. Lewin supports General Sir Alan Brooke in arguing the perils which might have arisen from Churchill’s ‘impulsive nature and tendency to arrive at decisions through a process of intuition as opposed to “logical” approach’.
3. A similar condition was reached at Dunkirk when the Navy had to abandon the evacuation by day. The extent of losses in this battle can be compared to some extent with those inflicted, at night, by the Royal Navy on the attempted German seaborne invasion of Crete (when the invasion force was largely destroyed by light forces), and RN losses with those at Dunkirk as well as Crete. The German invaders of Crete did not have anything like the support of surface forces as were available to them in the Channel in July 1940, nor were the crossing points so narrow or easy to mine. In consequence, the Royal Navy’s problem off Crete was, in some respects, easier and less hazardous at night while appallingly dangerous in daylight from the Luftwaffe alone. On balance, therefore, I do not think the extent of losses assumed here are unreasonable and the ammunition problem was always severely detrimental.
4. Figure based on official returns to Dover Council showing stocks in July.
5. Strengths and locations extracted from War Diaries.
CHAPTER XI
1. Both 2nd and 5th RTR underwent a very similar experience in France at the end of May 1940 when attacking an entrenched enemy.
CHAPTER XII
1. Quoted from Churchill and the Admirals, page 121.
2. The Second World War, Vol II, page 576.
3. Ibid, page 581. Cabinet discussions on this issue took place in July and August and produced divisions reflected in these quotes from Churchill’s minutes. A clear enunciation of a practical formula governing the behaviour of the civilian Services would appear to have been unlikely in the actual event of invasion. In Living though the Blitz page 180, it refers to the reluctance of the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, to overrule ‘any elected mayor or council, duly appointed Town Clerk or Chief Constable’. No doubt Sir John Anderson would have followed the same policy and each Chief Constable and many of his men would have followed their own dictates.
4. Quoted from Operation Sea Lion, page 258.
5. The Defence of the United Kingdom page 180, and Operation Sea Lion pages 260–264, and relevant documents some of which are reproduced in this book.
6. The Second World War, Vol II, page 51.
7. Ibid, page 355.
8. Summarised in Churchill as Warlord, page 37, by reference to the underlying commercial and self-interested approach by the United States in nearly all her principal dealings with Britain throughout the war, with examples of how they operated.
9. This conversation actually took place on 26 July in connection with the exchange of old US destroyers for island bases, and is quoted from Mr Roosevelt’s War by P. Abbazia, page 94.
CHAPTER XIII
1. Living through the Blitz, page 31.
2. I have based my assessments of the reactions of the civil populace upon the accumulated evidence in Civil Defence, Living through the Blitz and numerous contemporary documents relating to people’s behaviour under stress. To this I have added my own observations of events at the time along with the reminiscences of associates who also experienced the ‘Blitz’. As Living through the Blitz says (page 32), ‘the reasons for [evacuees] coming and going were multiple, complex, highly varied and variable, not justifying simple classifications or fear or compromise, forethought or apathy’. But on page 249, Ibid, there appears a clear simplification by a Manchester woman who said ‘We are carrying on because we’ve got to’.
CHAPTER XIV
1. The Defence of the United Kingdom, page 143.
2. Ibid page 143. To comprehend Ironside’s problems and the overall weakness of the British defences in June (which were only marginally improved by mid July) it is sufficient to read Chapter VIII (pages 127–146) of the above reference.
CHAPTER XV
1. A useful summary of the problems related to what might have happened if King and Government had been compelled to leave the British Isles can be found in If Britain had fallen by Norman Longmate, pages 112–116.
2. Sir Oswald Mosley has stated what his attitude and action would have been in his book My Life, Chapter 21 and has confirmed this in a letter to the author.
3. Mosley in the letter referred to under Note 2 above says that he cannot conceive Fuller playing the part of Pétain. Anthony Trythall, Fuller’s biographer, is more flexible in his opinion, admitting that Fuller had many of the qualifications, that in the summer of 1939 he was under MI 5 surveillance and saying ‘I do not believe that he would have advocated or formed a Military junta but a Pétain-like state is a different matter’.
4. See If Britain had fallen page 52 and Operation Sea Lion page 95.