Europe, small navies and maritime
security
Robert McCabe, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller
This book examines the role of small navies in European security. It addresses the ways in which such navies have tried to fulfil a variety of traditional and non-traditional duties and how they have adapted to meet new and emerging challenges. The book has a dual purpose. First, it aims to explore the role of small navies within the European security architecture, and therefore to shed new light on European security matters within an environment that is often neglected. Widespread ignorance of that environment means that navies (particularly small navies) are commonly overlooked in popular considerations of national security, often being viewed as somewhat less vital than armies or air forces. This book demonstrates that such views are flawed. Second, the book aims to address wider points of interest about small navies themselves. Discourse on maritime strategy and security is dominated by the larger navies. Smaller navies are often overlooked, despite the fact that most navies within Europe, and worldwide, can be defined as ‘small’. This book seeks to redress that balance, examining ideas about small navies in general (in Part I) before exploring a number of case studies that address practical examples (Part II). The latter have been chosen to highlight the wide range of policies, actions and challenges facing Europe’s smaller navies, and also to demonstrate the various ways in which such navies make an important contribution to European defence and security.
The book does not seek to provide a comprehensive guide to each small European navy; that would require a much longer volume and would replicate the analysis provided in books such as Jane’s Fighting Ships.1 Instead it provides a more thematic examination of the topic that sheds new light on European security and on our understanding of navies and naval policy.
Until recently the maritime domain was rather neglected in post-Cold War discourse on European security, particularly as traditional naval threats appeared to have diminished with the demise of the old Soviet fleet. However, there is now a growing appreciation that threats to European maritime security are multifaceted and are perpetrated by a broad collection of national and transnational actors with diverse objectives. Threats and challenges include piracy and armed robbery against merchant vessels, terrorism at and from the sea, illegal migration, smuggling of arms, narcotics and other goods, the unregulated exploitation of marine resources, marine accidents and the problem of pollution at sea. They also include more traditional state-based challenges, including tension in the Black and Baltic Seas as well as Northern Waters, often linked to fears about a resurgent threat from Russia. In recent years, the sea has provided the medium for a number of European navies to project power ashore, notably during the Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars. The growing accessibility of the Arctic Ocean due to climate change adds another dimension, and one that is changing maritime geography. The maritime domain is central to European security today and it is certain to remain so in the years ahead.
Somewhat belatedly, policy makers now recognise this point. The European Union (EU) published its first Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan in 2014 to ‘secure the maritime security interests of the EU and its Member States against a plethora of risks and threats in the global maritime domain’.2 This complements maritime security strategies and declarations adopted at a national level within the EU by Spain (2013), Britain (2014) and France (2015), and internationally by countries including the US (2005) and India (2015) and by international organisations such as the African Union (2012) and the G7 (2015). The publication of these strategies highlights growing recognition of the need to secure the maritime space against non-traditional threats and also shows understanding that this relates not just to Europe but globally, given the transnational nature of threats and the interconnectedness of global seaborne trade. As will become clear, the growing emphasis on ‘maritime security’ by national and international bodies has given smaller navies a new salience in terms of security policy, providing impetus for many to develop this as a key role.
This book seeks to identify and address gaps in our understanding of maritime security and the role of small navies in Europe, including governance, information sharing, capacity building and capability development alongside actions (collaborative or otherwise) aimed at achieving more efficient and effective maritime security operations. With an increasingly connected, contested and complex international maritime security climate, the book also aims to develop better understandings of the strategic utility and operational nuances of smaller navies in addressing emergent threats in both coastal and blue-water spaces. This is crucial given that nearly 90 per cent of the EU’s external trade and more than 40 per cent of its internal trade is seaborne with nearly two billion tons of freight loaded and unloaded in EU ports each year.3 National and international security strategies recognise that the sea will remain a source of conflict, competition and instability, and a conduit for transnational challenges to impact on European prosperity and security.
Unfortunately, and despite the premature claims of some, more traditional ‘hard security’ challenges are not a thing of the past. This is at least as true of maritime security as it is of security ashore, a point that has been reflected in the considerations of many national governments and of organisations such as NATO and the EU.4 The book also explores the role of small navies in meeting ‘traditional’ security threats such as those posed by state versus state confrontation and also by hybrid challenges. It includes a number of chapters focused on the Baltic and on Northern Waters, where the local (small) navies have, in recent years, reconfigured to meet a resurgent ‘threat’ from Russia. Many of these navies had previously re-shaped policy to meet less traditional challenges, such as those articulated in the EU Maritime Security Strategy. The case studies provide an interesting opportunity to explore how different European states view the current security environment in different ways and also how naval policy has undergone significant changes, from one role to another and then back again, all within the lifetime of the existing naval assets. In addition, this book examines how maritime security and naval development in Europe might evolve given that financial reality will continue to impact on naval procurement, which means that European states will increasingly have to do more with less in the maritime domain.
Most existing literature on maritime security and strategy focuses on larger navies. The dominant narrative derives from an Anglo-American tradition associated with the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) and Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922).5 These, and their fellow travellers, established concepts and principles that had a profound influence on the thought and practice of major navies in the twentieth century and that continue to be reflected in the published doctrine of many navies today.6 The best known alternatives to this tradition, such as the French ‘young school’ and the Soviet ‘new school’, argued that smaller navies should focus on coastal defence, local sea denial and/or commerce raiding.7 These ideas might well prove attractive to some navies, in some contexts, but such strategies were often relevant only in terms of a smaller navy’s relationship to a larger potential enemy. They did not relate to the concerns of all small navies. Moreover, traditional works of maritime strategy tended to focus on war and the preparation for war and usually had little to say about the kind of peacetime duties that might represent the most likely role for many navies. During the Cold War, discussion of small navies remained true to this general tradition and tended to focus on their role as potential allies or adversaries of larger navies; an issue of obvious interest to the latter but one that might not adequately reflect the actual role and purpose of the former.
The assumption tended to be that small navies were scaled-down versions of their larger counterparts, operating with limited means and therefore with limited aspirations, which usually resulted in a focus on defensive roles in local waters. Thus, in 1986 Joseph R. Morgan wrote that small navies
are configured to operate in basically defensive modes … none can exert ocean-wide influence, and all are designed with limited objectives and relatively small ocean areas in mind. The typical small navy, then, is one that is limited in its power-projection capability and operational range.8
Two years later, Morgan questioned if there was ‘something that clearly distinguishes small navies (the porpoises) from their larger relations (the whales) other than the mere size of the largest ships contained in each’. He concluded that small navies differed from large navies in their inability to ‘perform naval functions over large areas or with a great amount of force and effectiveness, and in their lack of ships capable of great force projection’.9 Morgan’s approach reflected a very traditional view of such navies and of naval roles, viewed through the lens of the Cold War, where to be small was an inferior state of being.
It is not easy to provide a clear and satisfactory definition of what one might mean by the term ‘small navy’. The definitional problem is complicated by the fact that many navies might prefer not to be described in such terms. Approaches that seek to categorise navies based on a simple quantitative assessment (i.e. numbers of platforms, personnel, weapons systems etc.) are problematic given the difficulty of making meaningful assessments on that basis. Is a navy with many obsolete vessels and lots of poorly trained personnel really ‘larger’ than one with a smaller number of modern, capable ships and sufficient numbers of well-motivated, highly trained crew? Does ‘size’ relate merely to numbers or does it also reflect capability, range and roles? Comparisons are particularly difficult as capability is usually dependent on technology that remains hidden to the casual observer and on factors such as training, education, doctrine and leadership that can be difficult to judge or compare. If one is to avoid the danger of paradigm/diffusion models, where one assumes that all navies can be judged in comparison to the role and capabilities of the largest (which would be absurd), then how does one judge the relative strengths of navies that are structured differently or that focus on entirely different roles? Thus, for example, is the contemporary Danish Navy ‘smaller’ than the Norwegian or Swedish navies? The latter both have submarines, a capacity that the Danish Navy does not possess. Conversely, Sweden does not have any frigates at all, while the Danish Navy has the largest frigates in Scandinavia, measured by tonnage (see Chapter 11).
Eric Grove’s nine-fold ‘typology’ has remained a popular way of categorising navies, focusing on a combination of numbers, range, role and overall capabilities to place navies in one or other of the following categories:10
1 Major Global Force Projection Navy
2 Major Global Force Projection Navy (Partial)
3 Medium Global Force Projection Navy
4 Medium Regional Force Projection Navy
5 Adjacent Force Projection Navy
6 Offshore Territorial Defence Navy
7 Inshore Territorial Defence Navy
8 Constabulary Navy
9 Token Navy
Grove suggested that navies in ranks four down to nine tended to be ‘small navies’, but some small navies figure higher in the ranking (with Singapore identified as the most powerful ‘small’ navy, in rank three).11 The roles, composition and activities of ‘small navies’ vary greatly from categories four to nine; note the local power projection and expeditionary activities of the Iranian and Saudi Arabian navies (rank 5) compared to the chiefly constabulary naval activities of Ireland and Iceland (rank 8). Given this, Geoffrey Till has questioned whether it is worth thinking about small navies as a distinct group, arguing that the differences between small navies are likely to be as great as those between small navies and their larger counterparts.12 That point is revisited by Till in Chapter 2 of this book. Similarly, in Chapter 4 Mallia and Xuereb identify that small navies have wide variations in their roles, organisational concepts, technical means and institutional performance, challenging the notion that they should be thought of as a distinct group.
This book follows the lead set by Mulqueen et al. in 2014 and does not attempt to define scientifically the term ‘small navies’.13 Instead it takes a more subjective approach, accepting Till’s suggestion that a small navy is simply one that has ‘limited means and aspirations’.14 This allows us to explore the activities of a wide range of different navies, none of which are large, without having to rely on an artificial theoretical construct that limits our enquiry unnecessarily. Within the context of this book the term ‘small navies’ includes some organisations whose aspirations are constrained by very limited means (i.e. Croatia, Ireland), and others that have some large and powerful assets and the capacity to project these far from home (i.e. The Netherlands). It excludes navies that have the full range of military capabilities or those who aspire to maintain the capability to undertake independent large- or medium-scale operations beyond the adjacent seas. Equipped with nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, significant amphibious forces and numerous ocean-going escorts, the British, French and Russian navies are not small. One can argue the case for the navies of Italy, Spain and perhaps also Germany, who have a significant range and scale of capability and ambition. For the purpose of this book, all other European navies are considered small.
Morgan’s suggestion that small navies tend to be limited in terms of the range at which they operate, and in their ability to project power, may not be as true today as it seemed 30 years ago. In terms of maritime security operations, small navies are able to project power, influence and operational impact well beyond the littoral, particularly in the context of cooperative European security architectures. The Irish Naval Service, for example, has deployed a series of vessels to the Mediterranean to participate in EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, contributing to an important multinational mission, supporting Irish diplomatic efforts and saving tens of thousands of migrants who might otherwise have drowned.15 Even the tiny Croatian navy has contributed to multinational counter-piracy operations in the western Indian Ocean, very far from home (see Chapter 13).
Effective maritime security implies the need for closer collaboration between navies of all sizes, and various other stakeholders, such as coastguards, but also a wider range of public and private actors including port authorities, the judicial and penal system, the shipping industry and coastal community groups.16 As Combes reinforces in Chapter 9, coastal navies need to identify and document their specific maritime security needs and build their forces and capabilities to meet their requirements that span the constabulary and military dimensions of maritime security. Solutions require a ‘maritime security’ discussion and not a ‘naval’ one. This point has been well understood by many governments and by international organisations, giving smaller navies an imperative to respond and an opportunity to exploit.
Being small (in terms of numbers or capabilities) does not necessarily mean a navy cannot be ‘powerful’ relative to its national maritime strategic aspirations. According to Hu and Oliver, ‘if a navy is able to fulfil and meet the functional needs required by the environment or circumstance in which it serves, it is a powerful navy regardless of its physical size’.17 Take the tiny Slovenian Navy as an example. It is formally a branch of the Ground Force and effectively consists of just two ships, yet has been able to maximise its influence by embracing expeditionary maritime security operations. As Flynn highlights in Chapter 5, Slovenia deployed a number of naval personnel to the Djibouti-based operational command of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in 2009 and is credited with the rescue of over 400 migrants and the removal of nine people-smuggling vessels from circulation in support of the Italian government’s Mare Nostrum operation in 2013 and 2014.18 This contribution was not merely symbolic.19 In terms of power and impact, size is not everything.
Fulfilling the strategic ambitions of a navy, particularly one with ‘limited means and aspirations’ can be challenging. The Royal Norwegian Navy, for example, struggles in terms of its defence planning and strategic thinking between balancing capabilities to influence developments globally, maintaining sovereign rights and fulfilling more traditional defensive requirements (see Chapter 10). Here, context is important, given its geostrategic position in waters that have become key securitised projection spaces for Russia, the US and NATO. Indeed, the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas are all similar in that they are ‘mature’ seas, with functioning navies or coastguards that ensure local and international maritime laws are policed and enforced; that enjoy productive diplomatic relations with (most of) their neighbours and maritime disputes are typically resolved via internationally recognised processes. However, all three seas could quickly transition to ‘contested’ seas – as they have many times over the distant and recent past.20
In the decade after the Cold War, most European navies went through a process of downsizing, in terms of ship numbers if not necessarily in terms of overall tonnages (see Chapter 7). With the demise of the Soviet threat, and no peer able to rival the dominance of the US Navy, most Western navies reduced their emphasis on sea control and denial against first-class opposition and focused instead on power projection capabilities and on the ability to contribute to maritime security operations including humanitarian missions far from home. In the absence of an obvious domestic threat, they focused on the ‘away game’, contributing to peace and security further afield. Unfortunately, the situation in European waters now looks less benign than it once did. The revitalisation of the Russian armed forces, Vladimir Putin’s assertive foreign policy and Russian use of hybrid tactics to destabilise its neighbours (notably Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014) have caused a number of European states to refocus on an apparent threat to the east. Traditional naval concerns relating to sea control and denial are now back on the agenda. This happens at a time when the US Navy has refocused its attention on the emergence of a possible peer rival in east Asia and President Trump has cast doubt on the nature of the US commitment to Europe. European navies may have to face the challenge from Russia with rather less support than they have been used to. This has profound implications for many navies, and these are explored in detail in Part II of this book.
The book is organised in two parts. Part I focuses on thinking about the idea of small navies, seeking to establish defining characteristics, common features and shared experiences and to explore the extent to which such navies should be thought of differently to the larger navies that have dominated the academic and policy debate to date. The analysis here contextualises the case studies that follow and makes an important contribution to our understanding of maritime security and also traditional maritime strategy when understood from the perspective of smaller navies. Part II includes a number of case studies that explore maritime security and strategy within the European context. These address a number of navies of differing size, outlook and capability in order to provide a broad ranging analysis that provides insight into the array of plans, policies and actions adopted by different navies. Together these provide the opportunity to explore the diversity of threat perception within the European context and the impact that this can have on maritime security and naval policy and practice. They also provide the opportunity to explore the multitude of tasks undertaken by smaller navies and the ways in which they have adapted to match scarce resources to the challenges that they face.
The opening chapter is provided by Geoffrey Till, who begins by positioning small navies in the current strategic context, outlining the challenges for all navies in trying to cope with a broad range of contingencies whether they are global in their outlook (large navies), principally regional (medium navies) or preoccupied with local concerns (small navies). The balance they strike between these missions and the way in which they are interpreted reflects the characteristics of the nations they seek to defend, which bear some passing resemblance to the elements of seapower identified by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Till identifies important characteristics, such as the extent to which states see themselves as outward-looking trading countries and the importance of geographic location. For example, states next to large assertive powers like Russia – such as the Baltic and Scandinavian countries – generally have a much greater sense of threat than countries such as Ireland, which are sheltered by their location. Others in similar strategic circumstances such as Finland accord a much higher priority to decisional sovereignty. Till concludes that, if the right combination of technology, effective strategy and political, legal and psychological frameworks are achieved, smaller navies, in the right general context, could aspire to significant strategic effect even when confronting apparently much greater navies.
In Chapter 3, Basil Germond examines traditional conceptualisations of seapower and the transferability and relevance of these notions to contemporary small navies. The concept of seapower is so firmly associated with the writings of Mahan that in collective imaginaries it still implies binary categorisations. Big navies are the depository of seapower and can exert it, whereas small navies are destined to live in the shadow of the big navies and remain footnotes in (naval) history. Germond challenges this vision and shows that small navies can also exert some form of seapower. He explores the interlinkages between seapower, maritime security and ocean governance, as well as the types of seapower that small navies can exert, at which level and with which effect.
In Chapter 4, Mallia and Xuereb examine the use of force multipliers by small navies, framing this examination within case studies, in order to verify the effectiveness and efficiency of this approach. They do so with specific reference to small navies on the basis that, being already limited in size, such navies have far more to gain from force multipliers than their larger counterparts. They begin by considering what constitutes a small navy and analysing the specific challenges that they face before going on to define and introduce the concept of force multipliers, highlighting the advantages and also potential pitfalls, limitations and drawbacks. Mallia and Xuereb conclude that force multipliers offer a real option for enhancing the capability of small navies; but planners must consider potential shortcomings and unintended effects, noting that force-multipliers can only be as effective as the existing force structure to which they are applied.
Following this, in Chapter 5, Brendan Flynn examines naval procurement challenges for a contrasting set of very small European states. These include a pair of non-NATO navies (Ireland and Cyprus) and a trio of very small navies that sit within the NATO alliance (Iceland, Slovenia and Latvia), providing for a geographic spread. Flynn makes three core arguments. First, that alliance membership, either of NATO or the EU, may be much less important than is assumed in explaining how and why small states develop their limited naval capabilities. Second, that there is a dearth of strategic thinking evident in how small navies procure vessels and other core equipment. Finally, despite their small size and meagre resources, the participation of small navies in expeditionary maritime security operations has been of value and could produce significant changes in their limited procurement plans.
In Chapter 6, Niklas Granholm explores how small navies need to find ways to achieve enhanced cooperation to meet emergent security threats within an environment where traditional and non-traditional threats are apparent. Focusing on the Baltic Sea, he argues that Western navies must be able to deal with ‘grey-zone warfare’ that blurs the line between criminality and hybrid warfare, and they must also cater for the possibility of more direct ‘high-end warfare’. Failure to do so may create opportunities for an adversary that has already proven willing and able to exploit the weakness of its neighbours in the Black Sea region. The multifaceted nature of the threat requires navies to be able to operate across a broad spectrum and to cooperate effectively with each other and with other security agencies. The challenge is made more difficult as the requirements to deal with ‘grey-zone challenges’, emphasising numbers and presence, may conflict with those needed for high-end warfare, where expensive war fighting capabilities are required.
Part II focuses on case studies of maritime strategy and security within a European context. In Chapter 7, Jeremy Stöhs sets the scene by examining how European states have adjusted their naval policies to deal with the changing international security architecture. He addresses the aspects of decline among the smaller navies in Europe, discusses some of its causes (technical, fiscal) and its consequences (limitations, advantages, focus on soft-security issues). This chapter also explores the limits to niche specialisation and the trend towards more balanced fleets (Norway, Poland) and larger platforms (Sweden, Finland, Belgium). Finally, the chapter addresses the question of whether or not small navies provide policymakers more deliverables to achieve political ends than they did 20 or 30 years ago, despite narratives of decline.
In Chapter 8, Anselm van der Peet focuses on the example of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) and the impact of the Cold War on the development of operations and doctrine. In the first decade after 1990, the Dutch government positioned the navy as a tool of first resolve as a reaction to international crises. This chapter explores the reasons for this shift and how the RNLN influenced Dutch foreign and security policy in the context of European and/or bilateral defence and security cooperation. The Dutch government published a new naval doctrine in autumn 2005, which was updated in February 2014, and also restructured the RNLN fleet. Van der Peet questions whether this was the result of a new (inter)national maritime security environment and different mission requirements, or of an increasingly shrinking defence budget.
William Combes (Chapter 9) focuses on the Baltic region and identifies the maritime challenges and de-facto maritime strategies of the Baltic States, contrasting these with other small navies who face significant security concerns (Georgia and Israel). He proposes recommendations on how the very small nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could develop a maritime security strategy. Such strategies are crucial as securing access to the Baltic Sea, protecting international freedoms on the sea and challenges to sovereignty from the sea are vital to the future security of the Baltic States and their contribution to NATO and the EU.
In Chapter 10, Tor Ivar Strømmen explores the strategic roles of the Royal Norwegian Navy as a tailor-made organisation for Norway’s specific geostrategic environment and security requirements, balancing both existential military-strategic requirements and other maritime security interests. This includes the role of the navy in relation to land and air forces in defence of Norway, as well as how littorals can be effectively utilised to enhance Norway’s maritime security. By virtue of its geography, economy and culture, Norway as a coastal state is an overwhelmingly maritime nation with a distinct maritime outlook and maritime-related threats. Norwegian maritime strategy is therefore not subordinated to national military strategy as it, rather than merely complementing it, is a constant, central component within it. Consequently, as this chapter illustrates, Norwegian military strategy is essentially a maritime strategy.
Johannes Riber (Chapter 11) argues that maritime strategy is not only a strategy for major powers and that smaller states like Denmark are able to establish political influence through a maritime strategy. Denmark might not be willing or able to project maritime power; however, it uses its navy as a bargaining chip to create political influence in international institutions such as NATO and the UN, as well as bilateral influence with the US. Danish naval strategy has changed directions multiple times since the Cold War. During the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, it was predominantly characterised by a strategy of influence; however, increased international focus on the Arctic, Greenlandic aspiration for independence and later Russia’s new role in European security during the 2010s, has forced Danish naval strategy toward a dual track strategic approach that includes both influence and autonomy.
Focusing on a different sea, but one that also faces a Russian ‘threat’, in Chapter 12 Deborah Sanders describes how the Russian Federation’s rapid and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 had a profoundly negative effect on the Ukrainian Navy. The service lost access to a third of its Black Sea coastline, control of the Kerch Straits and access to the defence industries and bases located in Crimea. It lost the majority of its service personnel and access to its military and maritime infrastructure in Crimea. The Ukrainian Navy also lost the majority of its most modern platforms. The chapter examines the progress Ukraine has made in rebuilding its small navy and examines its ability to address the increased maritime security threats that now exist in its maritime domain.
Finally, in Chapter 13 Ciarán Lowe examines three very small navies; those of Croatia, Ireland and Malta. Lowe establishes that all three have adopted different approaches tailored to their own needs, there is no ‘small navies template’ and the differences between these navies may be as significant as their similarities. However, it is apparent that all three have, in different ways, made an important contribution to national defence policy despite their limited size. Notably, each has exploited the opportunity to contribute to international maritime security operations and has used this to make a meaningful contribution to European (and international) security and also to demonstrate their relevance to a domestic audience.
Some of the case studies focus on navies that have emphasised the importance of meeting non-traditional security tasks within a multi-national context for operations beyond littoral waters. Some address navies that have refocused on conventional and hybrid threats closer to home, others feature navies whose interests remain largely constabulary. The process reveals much about the ways in which naval policy is developed and the challenges that this can pose to any navy, regardless of size. It also offers the opportunity to explore the different ways in which small European navies cooperate with each other, and also with larger navies. As has been discussed, the case studies address issues that are of growing importance within the context of current European defence policy but focus on actors that are often neglected. This book aims to challenge that neglect, to demonstrate the importance of the topic and to encourage further debate.
1 Commodore Stephen Saunders (ed.), IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2017–18 (London: IHS Jane’s, 2017).
2 Council of the EU, EU Maritime Security Strategy. 2014, 3 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT [2 February 2019].
3 Isabel Novo-Corti and Fernando González-Laxe, ‘Maritime Transport and Trade: The Impact of European Transport Policy. An Overview of Maritime Freight Transport Patterns’, European Research Studies 12, no. 1 (2009): 135.
4 For example, see NATO News, ‘To combat Russian subs, NATO allies are teaming up to develop naval drones’ in NATO Source. Atlantic Council, 2 October 2018. www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/to-combat-russian-subs-nato-allies-are-teaming-up-to-develop-naval-drones [2 February 2019].
5 For example, see Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1911: 2004); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1890).
6 For example, see JDP 0–10, British Maritime Doctrine, 5th edn (Swindon: DCDC, 2017) or Australian Maritime Doctrine. RAN Doctrine 1 2010, 2nd edn (Seapower Centre, 2010).
7 Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 2nd edn, pp. 56–71.
8 Joseph R. Morgan, ‘Small Navies’, Ocean Yearbook 6 (1986): 388.
9 Joseph R. Morgan, ‘Porpoises among the whales: small navies in Asia and the Pacific’, East West Center Special Reports, No. 2, March 1994, p. 12.
10 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press, 1990) pp. 237–40.
11 Eric Grove, ‘The ranking of small navies revisited’, in Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (eds.), Small Navies. Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) pp. 15–20.
12 Geoffrey Till, ‘Can small navies stay afloat?’, in Jane’s Navy International, May 2003. Also, Geoffrey Till, ‘Are small navies different’ in Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, pp. 21–32.
13 Mulqueen et al., Small Navies, Introduction.
14 Till, ‘Can small navies stay afloat?’, Jane’s Navy International.
15 ‘Minister Kehoe Secures Dáil Approval For Deployment Of Defence Forces To EU Naval Mission – Operation Sophia’. www.defence.ie/en/press/press-releases/minister-kehoe-secures-dail-approval-deployment-defence-forces-eu-naval [2 February 2019].
16 C. Bueger, T. Edmunds with R. Alcock and R. McCabe, ‘Mastering Maritime Security: Reflexive Capacity Building and the Western Indian Ocean Experience – A Best Practice Toolkit’ (2018): 5. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1157961 [2 February 2019].
17 Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu and James K. Oliver, ‘A Framework for Small Navy Theory: The 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention’, Naval War College Review 41, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 40.
18 Andrej Osterman, ‘Republic Of Slovenia in NATO – Slovenian Armed Forces ten years later’, Contemporary Military Challenges 16, no. 3 (October 2014): 50.
19 Naval Today, ‘Slovenian patrol ship departs EUNAVFOR’s Op Sophia’, 14 March 2016, available at https://navaltoday.com/2016/03/14/slovenian-patrolship-departs-eunavfors-op-sophia/ [19 February 2019].
20 See William Combes, ‘Value of the Freedom of the Seas’ (July 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028642 for a more detailed discussion on the four types of seas: mature, contested, transitional and ungoverned.