Introduction
1. See also Sun Wu. Tzu is an honorific title that means “master.” Although Sun Tzu’s work was known in the West in the eighteenth century, few good translations existed until the twentieth century. See Arthur Waldron, “Sun Tzu,” The Reader’s Companion to Military History, edited by Robert Cowley & Geoffrey Parker (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 452.
2. See Thomas Huynh, The Art of War: Spirituality for Conflict (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Path Publishing, 2008), 46.
3. This idea can be related to Carl von Clausewitz’s statement that warfare should ideally be directed at the heart of the enemy with final victory the goal. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 582. The best strategy, according to Clausewitz, is “always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point.” See Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007), 130.
4. See G. E. Rothenberg, Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 298.
5. In the 1970s, yet a book was discovered, the Military Methods, which appears to have been composed by Sun Pin, possibly Sun Tzu’s great grandson. See Ralph D. Sawyer, One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 10.
6. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China: including The Art of War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 267.
7. Ibid., 113.
8. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 116. Early twentieth century Japanese karate instructor Hironori Ohtsuka noted that although violence is an element of martial arts, its purpose is to “seek and attain the way of peace and harmony.” See Robert Hunt, “The Way of Harmony,” Martial Art (Nov. 2002), 92. The idea that wars can be stopped by waging war, or by fighting fire with fire, may seem contradictory to the attainment of harmony through the balanced observance of the yin and the yang. However, national leaders from all parts of the world have justified warfare by emphasizing that wars are fought to end all wars; in other words, out of compassion for the people.
9. See Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30.
10. See John K. Fairbank, Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 8.
11. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 46-47.
12. See David Graff and Robin Higham, A Military History of China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 15. While the purpose of training in the Western combat arts is to prepare for physical conflict, the Asian arts often emphasize training for the perfection of character and health. Although such views have made the classic Western texts seem less relevant to the traditional martial arts, it should be borne in mind that Chinese warfare was treated within a larger political and cultural framework. Many of the writers of Chinese military history were not practicing generals but the literate elite with ambitions extending beyond a particular campaign, which resulted in a generalized approach to writing about combat strategy and a scarcity of specific examples of battles for illustrative purposes. Sun Tzu’s Art of War has also served as a source of inspiration in business writing. However, without understanding the underlying currents of the historical situation that served as the foundation for strategy, such exercise tends to result in misleading ideas or misguided assessment.
13. The “cookbook” approach is common in several of the ancient Chinese military texts. Wu-Tzu, for example, lists the eight conditions under which one engages in battle. There is also a question/answer approach in the text, where Marquis Wu asks, “If the enemy is numerous while we are few, what can I do?” and Wu Ch’i replies: “Avoid them on easy terrain, attack them in narrow quarters.” See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 220. Note that the question/answer approach can also be found in some Western texts, for example, in the dialogue between Fabrizio Colonna and Cosimo Ruccelai in Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Art of War.
14. See Hans van de Ven, Warfare in Chinese History (Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishing, 2000), 8.
15. A reason why there was a samurai class in Japan but not in China is because China relied on mobilizing large parts of the commoners against the threat coming from the steppe enemies. By contrast, the development of the samurai class in Japan prevented the commoners from carrying arms, and thus prevented individual nobility from raising large armies.
16. See Jane Hallander, “Historical Beginnings: The Evolution of the Korean Art of Kuk Sool Won,” Martial Art (Oct. 2002), 61.
17. See Greg Brundage, “Hwarang History,” Black Belt (Feb. 2006), 42.
18. See Jasmine Cho, “Foot Fighting,” Black Belt (Jul. 2004), 59.
19. See Christon Archer, et al., World History of Warfare (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 79.
20. Ibid., 140. Note that the Middle Age, or medieval period, is mostly a Western concept.
21. See Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 187.
22. See Howard, 32.
23. Although Clausewitz avoided the “cookbook” approach, remarkable similarities to the Asian texts can be found in other Western works. For example, Antoine-Henri Jomini, who wrote about the Napoleonic wars, listed “six distinct parts” to the art of war, and “twelve essential conditions” for making a perfect army. See A. H. Jomini, The Art of War, translated by H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1879), Article XIII.
24. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 1982), 22.
25. See Strachan, 56.
26. The media has fueled popular interest in the subject for several decades through releases of such movies and television shows as Karate Kid, Blood Sport, and Walker, Texas Ranger; through televised sports events such as the Ultimate Fighting Championship; and through documentary series such as the Human Weapon.
27. See John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2003), 44.
Chapter 1
1. See Gregory E. LeBlanc, “Sticky Hands: The Fighting Soul of Wing Chun Lives On in Chi Sao Training,” Black Belt (Sep. 2003), 95.
2. Jonathan Maberry, “Myths and Misconceptions,” Black Belt (Jan. 2006), 97.
3. See Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 127.
4. Bujutsu, the military fighting arts of Japan, differ from budo (military way) by focusing on combat to the death rather than on personal achievement and self-improvement. See Jose Fraguas, “Lost Along the Way,” interview with William J. Dometrich, Martial Art (Jul. 2003), 84-85.
5. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 6.
6. See Kathleen Ryor, Military Culture in Imperial China, edited by Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 223.
7. See Joanna Waley-Cohen, Military Culture in Imperial China, edited by Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 281 & 292.
8. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 68.
9. See Walther Heissig, “Tracing Some Mongol Oral Motifs in a Chinese Prosimetric Ming Novel of 1478,” Asian Folklore Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1994), 231-243
10. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 53.
11. See Art of War, Sun Tzu Documentary, History Channel (Jul. 13, 2009). Note that diplomacy does not have as much relevance in sports competition as it does in real-life events. If two martial arts competitors refuse to engage in combat and instead settle the match “peacefully,” the audience will no doubt be disappointed.
12. See Subrata Saha, China’s Grand Strategy: From Confucius to Contemporary, U.S. Army War College.
13. See Nicola Di Cosmo, Military Culture in Imperial China, edited by Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 18.
14. See Blue Johnson, “Shorinji Kempo: This Little-Known Offspring of Shaolin Kung Fu is Alive and Kicking in Japan—and Making Inroads in the USA!” Black Belt (Sep. 2002), 57.
15. See Michael Rosenbaum, Kata and the Transmission of Knowledge in Traditional Martial Arts (Boston, MA: YMAA Publication Center, 2004), 42.
16. See Terry L. Wilson, “Shock & Awe,” Martial Art (Sep. 2003), 57
17. Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai, Chapter 7. The same principle held true for the Western soldier fighting on modern battlefields hundreds of years later, as evidenced by soldier notes from the late nineteenth century. The similarity is striking: If his bayonet broke, the soldier would strike with the stock; if the stock gave way, he would hit with his fists; if his fists were hurt, he would bite with his teeth. See Christopher Amberger, “Classifications of Combat,” Black-friar’s Journal, from M. I. Dragomiroff’s Notes for Soldiers, c. 1890.
18. Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings, translated by Victor Harris (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1974), 86-87.
19. See Dan Ivan, “Defense Against a Punch,” Martial Arts & Combat Sports (Aug. 2002), 51.
20. See Jose Fraguas, “Forever Budo,” interview with Fumio Demura, Martial Art (Sep. 2003), 29.
21. See Mark Cheng, “Hard School of the Soft Art,” Black Belt (May 2004), 114.
22. See Stephen Petermann with Loren Franck, “Shatter Your Nightmares,” Martial Art (Aug. 2003), 53-54.
23. See Massad Ayoob, “Greek Pankration: The Ancient Art of All-Power Combat,” Black Belt (Oct. 2005), 94.
24. See Frank Daros, “Greek Pankration,” interview with Jim Arvanitis, Black Belt (Sep. 2004), 100-105. The martial arts were written about and studied by the elite or commoners, depending on the military establishment’s relation to the state. States have at times chosen to employ mainly the nobility in the armed forces, and at other times mainly commoners and mercenaries.
25. See Ayoob, 96.
26. See Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation, translated by Yuan Shibing (New York, NY: Sterling Innovation, 2006), 52.
27. See Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), xv.
28. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, 1988), 95.
29. See Gabriel Suarez, “Musashi for the 21st Century,” Black Belt (May 2004), 66.
30. See Jason K. Martin, “Code of Isshin-Ryu: Karate’s Deepest Meaning Can Be Extracted from a Handful of Cryptic Statements,” Black Belt (Sep. 2002), 73.
31. See Jose Fraguas, “The Snow Tiger Roars,” interview with Bong Soo Han, Martial Art (Jul. 2003), 34.
32. Zhang Yun, The Art of Chinese Swordsmanship (Boston, MA: Weather-hill, 1998), 265.
33. See Thomas J. Nardi, “Folklore of Tai Chi,” Martial Art (Jul. 2003), 53.
34. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 180.
35. Ibid., 327.
36. See Howard, 41.
37. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles (New York, NY: Barnes and Nobles Classics, 2003), 16.
38. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 195.
39. Ibid., 3.
40. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, Vol. 2, translated by Christian E. Detmold (Boston, MA: James R. Osgood and Company, 1882), 422.
41. See W. Hock Hochheim, “12 Combat Commandments from the School of Hard Knocks,” Black Belt (Aug. 2003), 60.
42. See Jason William McNeil, “Slammin’ Shuai Chiao,” Black Belt (Jul. 2004), 100.
43. See Cho, 59.
44. Tamas Weber, “Budo on the Battlefield,” interview by Jose Fraguas, Martial Arts & Combat Sports (Jun. 2002), 61.
45. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (New York, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1910), Section 1.71.
Chapter 2
1. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 34.
2. See Dave Lowry, “What’s in a Name?” Black Belt (Jan. 2006), 44-46.
3. Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai, translated by William Scott Wilson (New York, NY: Kodansha, 1983).
4. Many of Carl von Clausewitz’s thoughts on warfare are remarkably similar to Sun Tzu’s. However, although Sun Tzu’s Art of War was translated approximately two hundred years ago, and “was reportedly studied and effectively employed by Napoleon,” it is unlikely that Clausewitz had studied Sun Tzu, and more likely that he came to his conclusions after many years of personal experience of war. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 149.
5. Jim Wagner, “The Fast-Food Menu Concept,” Black Belt (Aug. 2005), 48. Proponents of modern Western martial arts, such as krav maga, claim that these arts are continuously enhanced to meet the demands of fighting in the contemporary world. As more information about the enemy emerges, new techniques are integrated as seen fit.
6. See Tao Hanzhang, 22.
7. Ibid., 44.
8. See Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2005), 9.
9. See Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, editors, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 197
10. Gichin Funakoshi, Karate-Do Kyohan: The Master Text (New York: NY: Kodansha America, Inc., 1973), 238.
11. Since taking the initiative by setting the time and place for battle is not always possible, many of Sun Tzu’s statements should be used as guiding principles rather than adhered to blindly. His advocacy of winning without fighting, or through deception by exploiting the adversary’s strength, is perhaps more relevant in a street confrontation, for example, if one has the option of offering some calming words or walking away without physically engaging the adversary.
12. Clausewitz acknowledged that some confrontations can be resolved without resorting to physical force, for example, by diplomatic means that lead to a mutual agreement to avoid engagement. The difference between Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s views is that Clausewitz would not have defined diplomatic action as an element of war. Furthermore, he who desires to use physical intimidation as a deterrence in the hope that a fight will not take place, must still be fully prepared to engage in battle, to fight and shed blood if need be.
13. See Strachan, 14 & 137. Clausewitz’s military theory was also evident in his personality. When he “was put forward as a possible ambassador to London in 1821... he was deemed to be too brusque, too undiplomatic, and—above all—too radical for such a post.” See Strachan, 64.
14. United States Marine Corps, Warfighting, 1989, based on Clausewitz’s On War, 32-33.
15. Not synonymous with intelligence in the traditional sense, judgment depends on natural talent rather than on classroom learning; it is capability and decisiveness.
16. See Tao Hanzhang, 45.
17. See Huynh, 148. A prescriptive theory of war prescribes the means by which one achieves success. A descriptive theory of war analyzes combat without suggesting a solution to a particular problem. A descriptive theory can lead to a prescriptive theory after sufficient analysis has been conducted to determine which elements can be used with greater efficiency than others.
18. See Handel, 41.
19. See Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 54.
20. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 223.
21. See Robert H. Larson, “Max Jähns and the Writing of Military History in Imperial Germany,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Apr. 2008), 354.
22. Keith Vargo, “Way of the Warrior: Martial Art or Martial Science,” Black Belt (Feb. 2003), 28.
23. See Strachan, 74.
24. See Tao Hanzhang, 34.
25. See Huynh, 60-61.
26. See Tao Hanzhang, 39.
27. See John Corcoran and Emil Farkas with Stuart Sobel, The Original Martial Arts Encyclopedia: Tradition and History (Los Angeles, CA: Pro-Action Publishing, 1993), 18.
28. Ibid., 105-110.
29. See Tao Hanzhang, 76.
30. See Handel, 44.
Chapter 3
1. See Doug Jeffrey, “Strict Eyes: Shotokan Great Tsutomu Ohshima Opens Up During a Rare Interview,” Martial Art (Aug. 2003), 36.
2. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 155-156.
3. See Waley-Cohen, 283.
4. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 42.
5. See Allen Fung, “Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, Special Issue: War in Modern China (Oct. 1996), 1024-1026.
6. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 151-153.
7. See Tao Hanzhang, 57.
8. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 113.
9. See Tao Hanzhang, 23.
10. Ibid., 46.
11. Zhuge Liang, The Way of the General, translated by Thomas Cleary, http://kongming.net/novel/writings/wotg/.
12. See Rev. Kensho Furuya, “Internal Power: How to Cultivate Ki in Aikido,” Martial Art (Nov. 2002), 39.
13. See Hirokazu Kanazawa, “Purely Traditional: The Teaching and Philosophy of Hirokazu Kanazawa,” interview by Jose Fraguas, Martial Art (Oct. 2002), 31.
14. See Petermann, 54.
15. See Keith Vargo, “Way of the Warrior: Truth Seekers,” Black Belt (May 2004), 24.
16. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 242.
17. See Tao Hanzhang, 94.
18. See Brian Jacobs, “Birth of Judo,” Black Belt (Sep. 2004), 94 & 96. Traditional martial arts sometimes encompass healing practices. Knowledge of how to resuscitate a person who has been harmed in combat gives the student the ability to choose whether to kill or heal, and can be a tremendous source of power. See Jacobs, 93-94.
19. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 69.
20. See PBS, Secrets of the Samurai Sword: Way of the Warrior, Nova, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/samurai/way-nf.html.
21. Mark Cheng, “Legends of Kung Fu: The Arts Are Still Evolving,” Black Belt (Sep. 2002), 24.
22. See Corcoran and Farkas, 88.
23. Ibid., 90-91. During the Wei and Qi dynasties approximately 1,500 years ago, Chinese emperor Xiaowen built a monastery deep in the woods at the foot of the Shaoshi Mountain, and named it Shao-lin (lin refers to woods).
24. For more information about the Shaolin monks and their rigorous kung-fu regimen, please refer to the excellent documentaries found on the National Geographic Channel.
25. See Xue Fei, “Know Your Major: Sanda,” Global Times (Dec. 29, 2009).
26. See Howard, 29.
27. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 101.
28. Lt. Col. Dave Grossman with Loren Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (Belleville, IL: PPCT Research Publications, 2004), 197.
29. Ibid., 36.
30. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1976), 18.
31. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 6.
32. See Strachan, 125.
33. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Classic Book on Military Strategy (London, England: Faber & Faber, 1954), 3.
Chapter 4
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Thomas Cleary, 166.
2. See Tao Hanzhang, 24.
3. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 81.
4. See Tao Hanzhang, 80.
5. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 252.
6. See Dan Ivan, “Sizzling Stances,” Martial Art (Aug. 2003), 59-63.
7. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 23.
8. See John Clements, Medieval Swordsmanship: Illustrated Methods and Techniques (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1998), 121.
9. See Tao Hanzhang, 73-74.
10. Ibid., 128.
11. Ibid., 84.
12. Ibid., 35.
13. Chris Crudelli, The Way of the Warrior: Martial Arts and Fighting Styles from Around the World (London, England: DK Adult, 2008), 125.
14. See Tao Hanzhang, 45.
15. See J. Torres, “Continuous Fist Fighting,” interview with Sid Campbell, Black Belt (May 2004), 100-102 & 126.
16. See United States Marine Corps, Warfighting, 1989, based on Clause-witz’s On War, 36. Although the Western military tradition emphasizes direct attack and pitting strength against strength, the purpose of movement is ultimately to gain a strategic advantage that allows one to exploit the enemy’s numerical superiority, for example, by attacking his flanks. Or, as Sun Tzu said, appear weak when you are strong and strong when you are weak. Attacking the enemy’s weak points by luring him into a position of inferiority allows one to retain the initiative.
17. See Huynh, 119.
18. See Tao Hanzhang, 24.
19. See Handel, 218.
20. See Huynh, 75.
21. See Tao Hanzhang, 50.
22. Although drawn from the field of physics, center of gravity is a metaphor used to illustrate a concept. It is not intended to imply that Clausewitz relied on physics as a science for his war strategies.
23. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 198.
24. See Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 270-271.
25. See Strachan, 112.
Chapter 5
1. See Tao Hanzhang, 49.
2. See Strachan, 142.
3. Although nonresistance is commonly thought of as less brutal than aggressive offense, perhaps because of Daoist thinking which purpose it is to neutralize the fight so that harmony can be restored, it is an effective option that allows the martial artist to seize the initiative with minimum energy expenditure.
4. See William C. C. Hu and Kim Pyung Soo, “Korean Ssirum Wrestling,” Black Belt (Sep. 2004), 70-73.
5. See George Alexander, “Shaolin Ancestors,” Martial Art (Aug. 2003), 40.
6. See Patrick McCarthy, Bubishi: The Bible of Karate (Boston, MA: Tuttle Publishing, 1995), 27.
7. See Dennis Rovere, The Xingyi Quan of the Chinese Army, translated by Chow Hon Huen (Berkeley, California: Blue Snake Books, 2008), xviii-xix.
8. See Martin, 73.
9. See Handel, 166.
10. Ibid., 171.
11. See Lucas Wiltse, “Good Kung Fu: Meeting Wing Chun Master Lo Man Kam,” Travel in Taiwan (Jul. / Aug. 2010), 49.
12. See Corcoran and Farkas, 137.
13. See Tony Wolf, “A System Which He Termed Bartitsu,” Journal of Manly Arts: European and Colonial Combatives, 1776-1914 (May 2006).
14. See The History Channel, Human Weapon, for more detailed information about the history, training, and combat applications of Russian sambo.
15. See Rovere, 7.
Chapter 6
1. See Huynh, 59.
2. See Handel, 166.
3. See Huynh, 113.
4. See Handel, 54.
5. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 276.
6. See Handel, 157.
7. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 345.
8. See Tao Hanzhang 34. Sun Tzu was quite precise in his calculation of strength: “When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If double his strength, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him with some good plan.” See Hanzhang, 34.
9. Ibid., 70.
10. Ibid., 49.
11. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 265.
12. See Strachan, 163.
13. See Corcoran and Farkas, 74.
14. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 306.
15. See Wally Jay, Small-Circle Jujitsu (Valencia, CA: Ohara Publications, 1989), 25.
16. See Bruce Tegner, Savate: French Foot & Fist Fighting (Ventura, CA: Thor Publishing Company, 1983), 14.
17. Please refer to the National Geographic Channel, Human Weapon for more information about savate.
18. See Handel, 279.
19. Ibid., 140. Sun Tzu, by contrast, argued that if possible, one should try to make peace without destroying the enemy forces by making them move over to one’s side. It is possible, I suppose, to make a friend of a former enemy in the martial arts. However, much of the training takes place under the assumption that battle will have to be fought. Needless to say, there could be no martial arts competition if the two “belligerents” decided to “make peace” and become friends before entering the ring.
20. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 121.
Chapter 7
1. See David Graff and Robin Higham, 13.
2. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 353.
3. See Huynh, 49.
4. See Strachan, 157.
5. Carl von Clausewitz may have considered defense the stronger form of war because of the Napoleonic Wars and Prussia’s political situation at the time. See Tetsuro Sumida, 79.
6. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 112.
7. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 346-348.
8. See James W. McNeil, “Splashing Hands: A Splash of Kung-Fu,” Inside Kung-Fu, http://insidekung-fu.com/.
9. See Strachan, 94.
10. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 160.
11. See Blue Johnson, “Never Attack First,” Martial Art (Jul. 2003), 37-40 & 95.
12. See Jose Fraguas, “The Snow Tiger Roars,” 35.
13. Similarly, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union would not have been classified as a war per Clausewitz.
14. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 357.
15. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 90.
Chapter 8
1. See Handel, 276.
2. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 177.
3. See Sid Campbell, Kobudo and Bugei: The Ancient Weapon Way of Okinawa and Japan (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1998), 1.
4. See Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34.
5. See Miyamoto Musahsi, A Book of Five Rings, translated by Victor Harris, 74.
6. Ibid., 61.
7. Ibid., 56.
8. See Corcoran and Farkas, 92.
9. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 120.
Chapter 9
1. See Huynh, 66.
2. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 140.
3. Ibid., 139.
4. Ibid., 140.
5. See Richard Cohen, By the Sword: A History of Gladiators, Musketeers, Samurai, Swashbucklers, and Olympic Champions (New York, NY: Modern Library, 2002), 41.
6. See Archer, et al., 79.
7. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 142.
8. See Tao Hanzhang, 30.
9. Ibid., 34.
10. Ibid., 85.
11. Ibid., 63.
12. Ibid., 90.
13. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 260.
14. See Huynh, 91.
15. See Armstrong Starkey, “Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry during the American Revolution,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan. 1994), 27.
16. Kyung Won Chung, “Guest Editorial,” Black Belt (Apr. 2003), 12.
17. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 83.
18. Victor Davis Hanson, The Father of Us All: War and History (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 48.
19. See Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings, translated by Victor Harris, 45.
20. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 259.
21. Ibid., 259.
22. One reason why fine motor skill joint control techniques prove effective for police officers who must be ready to handle the chaos of the streets at a moment’s notice, is because the police officer holds the initiative from the start; he does not attempt to apply the joint lock in the midst of an ambush. By the time he applies the lock, the suspect has already been subdued by other means.
23. See David Rogers, “No-Nonsense Kung-Fu,” Inside Kung-Fu, http://www.insidekung-fu.com.
24. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 160.
25. See Tao Hanzhang, 45.
26. See Corcoran and Farkas, 5.
27. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War: The Complete Hobbes Translation, with notes and introduction by David Grene (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 67-68.
28. See Tao Hanzhang, 80.
29. See Handel, 276.
30. See Tao Hanzhang, 81.
31. See Chrissy Koeth, “An Open Mind: Once You Open the Mind, a World of Infinite Possibilities Exists,” Inside Kung-Fu, http://www.insidekung-fu.com/.
32. See Handel, 84.
Chapter 10
1. See Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory, Strategic Studies Institute (Apr. 2002), 21.
2. See Martin van Creveld, “War,” The Reader’s Companion to Military History, edited by Robert Cowley & Geoffrey Parker (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 499.
3. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 247.
4. See Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 161-162.
5. See Tao Hanzhang, 40.
6. See Handel, 113.
7. Saha.
8. See Handel, 147.
9. Ibid., 157.
10. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Thomas Cleary, 166.
11. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 213.
12. Victor Davis Hanson, Ripples of Battle (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2003), 59.
13. See Huynh, 184-185.
14. Saha.
15. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 218.
16. See Handel, xxi.
17. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, 330.
18. Ibid., 424.
19. The reason why Napoleon Bonaparte was so admired, even to this day, was not because he was a particularly ethical strategist nor because he had any kind of inherent right to fight for territory, but because he was successful. The same applies to Alexander the Great.
20. See Huynh, 41.
21. See Al Weiss and David Weiss, The Official History of Karate in America: The Golden Age: 1968-1986 (Los Angeles, CA: Pro-Action Publishing, 1997), 40.
22. Handel, 153.
23. Ibid., 315.
24. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War: The Complete Hobbes Translation, 46.
25. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 159.
26. See Huynh, 21.
27. See Tao Hanzhang, 34.
28. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 341.
29. See Art of War, Sun Tzu Documentary.
30. While it is tempting to use historical examples as guidelines for future strategy, one must remember that the soldiers on the battlefield lack the benefit of hindsight. The lessons must thus be placed in context and viewed as pillars of strength, not as equations for victory. Harry S. Truman’s often quoted statement, “It is amazing what you can accomplish, if you do not care who gets the credit,” offers a good example. What were the times and circumstances when Truman uttered those words? What were the personalities of the people involved? What were their backgrounds, goals, and desires? How can you remove an idea from a time sixty years in the past, and with the quick lash of your tongue transport it to the immediacy of today, and place it in a different group of people under a different set of circumstances; in short, in a different world, and think that nothing has changed? Although Truman’s presidency influenced a variety of war plans and foreign affairs, if we search history for examples of how war (or peace) should be conducted, we are likely to find numerous models that support whichever view we wish to take.
31. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War: The Complete Hobbes Translation, 32.
32. History can seldom be used to determine how or when a future conflict will begin or end. The author challenges the reader to examine the truth or fallibility of the saying that “history repeats itself.”
33. See Ralph D. Sawyer, 155.
34. Clausewitz, On War, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 584.
35. See Tao Hanzhang, 200.
Conclusion
1. From Ken Swope, Continuing Strategic Traditions & Creating Strategic Cultures, Lecture (Norwich University, VT, 2006).
2. See Christopher C. Rand, “Li Ch’uan and Chinese Military Thought,” Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jun. 1979), 107-108.
3. See Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chün Sawyer, 197.
4. Ibid., 360.
5. See Art of War, Sun Tzu Documentary.
6. See Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 190.
7. See Tetsuro Sumida, xvi.
8. Strachan, 79.
9. Dallas D. Irvine, “The French Discovery of Clausewitz and Napoleon,” The Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 1940), 144.
10. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 593.
11. Miyamoto Musashi, Book of Five Rings, translated by Thomas Cleary, 58.