PREFACE
1. For a discussion of the levels of war in U.S. military doctrine, see FM 3–0 Operations (February 2008) at http://downloads.army.mil/fm3–0/FM3–0.pdf (accessed December 27, 2013), 6–1, 6–2; in the recent scholarly literature a fine summation of the three levels of war can be found in Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, trans. and ed. John T. Greenwood (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 6.
2. A discussion of this phenomenon by Wallace P. Franz can be found in the preface to Two Letters on Strategy, by Carl Von Clausewitz trans. and eds. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (repr., Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1984), ix–xiii.
3. The author learned about the operational level of war in books by F. W. von Mellenthin and Heinz Guderian, for example, F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), xiii.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 591–2. Unless otherwise noted, all citations refer to this translation of On War.
5. Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds. The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7–13. Knox and Murray define larger, “tectonic” changes in warfare as military revolutions in their introduction.
6. Thomas Paine, an Englishman, wrote The Rights of Man in the early 1790s for the French revolutionaries and in response to Edmund Burke’s denunciation of the Revolution. Available at Project Gutenberg at http://www.ushistory.org/paine/rights/ (accessed October 24, 2013).
7. See Clausewitz, Two Letters on Strategy, passim, especially the introduction by Wallace Franz, ix–xii; see also Jacob W. Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art, 1918–1936 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office) located at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/redopart.htm (accessed December 2013).
8. James J. Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of the Operational Art,” Theoretical Paper Number Four (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1991), 1, 38–67.
9. Jomini, Antoine Baron de. Summary of the Art of War, trans. Capt. G. H. Mendell and Lieut. W. P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), first published in 1862 by J. B. Lippincott & Co; Clausewitz, On War, 128, 225.
10. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966), Part 3 passim; Brent Nosworthy, With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies (New York: Di Capo Press, 1996), passim.
11. Clausewitz, On War, 100–12. For Clausewitz’s famous characterization of Napoleon as the “God of War,” see page 583.
CHAPTER 1
1. Wallace P. Franz, introduction to Two Letters on Strategy, by Carl Von Clausewitz, trans. and eds. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (repr., Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1984), xiii, n2.
2. See Michael D. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, eds. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Philips (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), 113–14; for the linkage to Jomini, see Bruce W. Menning, “The Imperial Russian Legacy of Operational Art, 1878–1914,” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, eds. Michael Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2005), 189–97; for the linkage to Delbrück, see Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 326–53; and for the linkage to Clausewitz, Delbrück, and A. A. Svechin, see David Stone, “Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism,” The Journal of Military History 76 (July 2012): 673–93.
3. For this characterization of the French Revolution, see Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, eds. The Dynamics of Military Revolution, introduction and chap. 4.
4. John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 146–47.
5. See Thomas M. Huber, “Jomini” in Rise of the Western Way of War, H100 Interactive Syllabus and Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Military History, 2013), 222, as well as numerous conversations between the author and Dr. Huber who worked together in the Department of Military History at the Army Command and General Staff College from 2004 to 2013.
6. Anonymous, Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), FM 3–0, Appendix A. See Clausewitz Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3–0 and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ARDP) 3–0 that can be found here: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf (accessed January 2015).
7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 148.
8. Ibid., 177.
9. Ibid., FM 3–0, 6–3.
10. Ibid., 177.
11. Ibid., vi.
12. Gordon Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 341–46.
13. Herbert Rosinski, “Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: The Rise and Decline of German Military Thought,” Naval War College Review 29, no. 1 (Summer 1976): 83–103.
14. Jacob W. Kipp, “Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art 1918–1936,” accessed March 10, 2014, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/redopart.htm. There are no page numbers listed for this source online.
15. Bruce W. Menning, “The Imperial Russian Legacy of Operational Art,” 191–92.
16. Ibid., 197–204.
17. David R. Stone, “Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism,” The Journal of Military History 76 (July 2012): 673–93.
18. Cited in Kipp, “Mass and Mobility.”
19. Stone, 677–78, “Misreading Svechin”; see also Kipp, “Mass and Mobility.”
20. Stone, “Misreading Svechin,” 690–93.
21. James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994), 3. Schneider uses the metaphor of the Soviet warfare state as a sprinter who is “always preparing to race from a running start.”
22. See V. K. Triandafillov, Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, trans. William A. Burhans (Moscow-Leningrad: 1929, copy located at Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas); and G. S. Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, trans. Bruce W. Menning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).
23. Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, 57–58.
24. James J. Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of the Operational Art,” Theoretical Paper Number Four (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1991), 1, 38–67.
25. Ibid., 40–41.
26. Ibid., 45–46.
27. Ibid., 54.
28. Ibid., 55–56.
29. Ibid.; for a discussion of the U.S. Army’s concept of mission command, see Donald P. Wright, general ed. 16 Cases of Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), iii–vi.
30. James J. Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil.”
31. Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), xii; see also Robert M. Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory: 1809 and the Emergence of Modern War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 173. Weigley argues that battles, in the context of winning a war in an afternoon, are indecisive. The durability of armies, particularly the nation-state army of mass conscription, is one element that contributed to this indecisiveness. Christopher Duffy’s Russia’s Military Way to the West (London: Routledge, Kegan, & Paul, 1981) provides an excellent account of the development of the Russian Army, perhaps the most durable of European Armies prior to the Napoleonic period.
32. Charles Oman, History of the Peninsula War, 7 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), passim; for a more recent discussion, see Rory Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 1769–1814 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 315.
33. Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil,” 56–59.
34. For a complete discussion of compound warfare, see Thomas M. Huber, ed., Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2002).
35. Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil,” 58–60.
36. See Kipp, “Mass, Mobility”; Stone, “Misreading Svechin”; and Menning, “Imperial Russian Legacy.”
CHAPTER 2
1. Thomas M. Huber, “The Rise of Napoleon,” in H100: Rise of the Western Way of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Military History, 2013), 99.
2. Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life, 178, see especially epigram mid-page.
3. Steven T. Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare,” The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987, ed. Harry R. Borowski (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 309–24.
4. Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare,” 309–24.
5. Steven T. Ross, “The Development of the Combat Division in Eighteenth-Century French Armies,” French Historical Studies 4, no. 1 (Spring 1965), 84–85.
6. Ibid., 84–46; see also John Elting, Swords around a Throne: Napoleon’s Grande Armée (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 267–80.
7. Jerome A. Greene, The Guns of Independence: The Siege of Yorktown, 1781 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2005), 79–87.
8. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 124.
9. Ibid., 81–82.
10. Ibid.
11. Ross, “Development of the Combat Division,” 86.
12. Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare”; for the Gribeauval system, see Kevin F. Kiley, Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004); Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 5–8; 138–39.
13. Ross, “Manuever Warfare”; see also R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 105–111.
14. Leo Gershoy, The French Revolution and Napoleon (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933), 206–07.
15. Gershoy, The French Revolution, 206–207; Ross, “Development of the Combat Division,” 88.
16. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 123–25.
17. Ross, “Development of the Combat Division,” 89. YES/jtk
18. Steven T. Ross, Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy, 1792–1799 (London, UK: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1973), 45–47.
19. Ross, “Development of the Combat Division,” 87–89.
20. Ibid., 90–92.
21. Ibid., 91–93.
22. Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare.”
23. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 81–82.
24. Ibid., 38–39.
25. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 315.
26. Ross, Quest for Victory, 88–91.
27. John T. Kuehn, “The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon” (unpublished master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997), 17.
28. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 56–57; 137–39.
29. Ross, Quest for Victory, 94–95; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 46–47.
30. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 49, quotes the operations order at length.
31. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 166–67.
32. Ibid., 168.
33. John T. Kuehn, “Coalition Tactics on the Napoleonic Battlefield and Their Influence on Unity of Effort,” unpublished monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1997), 12–14; see also Rothenberg, 167–68.
34. Ross, Quest for Victory, 97–98. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 63–76. Ross lists much higher numbers for all three armies, but the numbers listed here represent actual field forces available and do not include various garrisons and remote detachments.
35. For more on John Boyd, see Grant Hammond, John Boyd and American Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2004), see also Boyd’s papers, especially “Patterns of Conflict,” (December 1986), 30–37, 130–35, available from Air Power Australia at http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Boyd-Papers.html (accessed October 1, 2013).
36. Ross, Quest for Victory, 99; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 78–79.
37. Ross, Quest for Victory, 99.
38. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 84–85; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 163.
39. Ross, Quest for Victory, 98–99.
40. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 92–93.
41. Ross, Quest for Victory, 100–1.
42. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 199; Vincent J. Esposito and John R. Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, rev. ed. (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), narrative with map 16.
43. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with map 17; Ross 101.
44. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with maps 18 and 19; Ross 101–2.
45. Ross, Quest for Victory, 101–2; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with map 20.
46. Ross, Quest for Victory, 102–3; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with maps 23 and 24.
47. Ross, Quest for Victory, 103–4; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with maps 28 and 29.
48. Ross, Quest for Victory, 104.
49. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with maps 29 and 30; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 122; Ross, Quest for Victory, 104–5.
50. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 123–24; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with map 30.
51. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 125; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, narrative with map 31.
52. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 125, takes this view that war was almost guaranteed by leaving Austria a foothold in Italy with Venice.
CHAPTER 3
1. Piers Macksey, Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798–1799 (New York: Longman Inc., 1974), 32.
2. Bruce W. Menning, “Train Hard, Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His ‘Art of Victory,’” Air University Review (November–December 1986), passim.
3. Christopher Duffy, Eagles over the Alps: Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland, 1799 (Chicago, IL: The Emperor’s Press, 1999), 39.
4. Menning, “Train Hard, Fight Easy”; see also Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 5.
5. Gershoy, The French Revolution and Napoleon, 333.
6. Paul W. Schroeder, “The Collapse of the Second Coalition,” Journal of Modern History 59 (June 1987), 250.
7. Macksey, Statesmen at War, 35.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. Schroeder, “Collapse of the Second Coalition,” 254.
10. Benedetto Croce, History of the Kingdom of Naples, trans. Frances Frenaye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 204.
11. Marshal Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, vol. I, trans. Stephen Louis Simeon (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1892), 216.
12. Ibid., 220.
13. Schroeder, “Collapse of the Second Coalition,” 244.
14. Joseph H. Parsons, Historical Papers upon Men and Events of Rare Interest in the Napoleonic Epoch, vol. II (New York, 1914), 310, 313–15. In 1800, Tsar Paul I formed a league of armed neutrality against Great Britain and seized all British shipping in Russian ports.
15. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, IN, 1978), 196.
16. Philip Longworth, The Art of Victory (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), 217. The specific example in Longworth is a translation of a passage in Suvorov’s Art of Victory—Nauka Pobezhda, sometimes translated “Science of Victory” and translated by Duffy as “How to Win”; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 37n7.
17. Gunther E. Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 59; Hans Delbrück, History of War of the Art of War, vol. IV, trans. Walter J. Renfroe (Westport, CN, 1985), 451; Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 199.
18. Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 199.
19. Christopher Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 156.
20. Walter Pinter, “Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1986), 356–57.
21. Cited in Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 17.
22. Menning, “Train Hard, Fight Easy,” 79. See also Frederick Anthing, Campaigns of Count Alexander Suworow Rymnikski (London: J. Wright, 1799), xxxiii.
23. Baron Antoine Jomini, “Summary of The Art of War,” in H100: Rise of the Western Way of War, Reading H107 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 2012), 235, 240; Menning, “Train Hard, Fight Easy,” 79–80.
24. Menning, “Train Hard, Fight Easy.”
25. Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, 50–53; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 23.
26. Quoted in Peter Paret, York and the Prussian Era of Reform (Princeton, NJ, 1966), 73–74.
27. Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, 54.
28. K. Osipov, Suvorov, trans. Edith Bone (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1945), 154; Schroeder, “Collapse of the Second Coalition,” 250; Karl A. Roider, Baron Thugut and Austria’s Response to the French Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 290; Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 167. Suvorov’s comments on the irrelevance of Vienna’s orders are found in Osipov, Suvorov.
29. Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 167.
30. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 124, 232. Parsons, Men and Events of Rare Interest in the Napoleonic Epoch, 289–331, passim.
31. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 89.
32. Ross, Quest for Victory, 214–16.
33. Ross, 214–17; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 45.
34. Ross, Quest for Victory, 232; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 20; Steven Ross, “The Military Strategy of the Directory: The Campaigns of 1799,” French Historical Studies 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1967), 175.
35. Ross, “Military Strategy of the Directory,” 177.
36. Ross, Quest for Victory, 232–34.
37. Ross, Quest for Victory, lists around 120,000 French in Italy; Thomas Graham, Lord Lyndenoche, Campaigns of 1796–1799 in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, etc. Vol. IV (London, 1812), iv–26, passim. Graham lists approximately 130,000 French in Italy, but probably includes forces in Switzerland. Figures regarding force levels and casualties are from Graham unless otherwise noted. This study is a reprint held in the rare book room at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The original was published circa 1800–1803. Graham’s name is nowhere in the credits, but is listed in the national archives as the probable author. Graham was a liaison officer to the Austrian Army in Italy in 1796–1798, spoke French and German fluently and is known to have visited Paris during the brief peace of Amiens to examine the French records for the 1799 campaigns. These facts support Graham’s authorship and therefore his work can be considered a primary source.
38. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 46.
39. Ibid., 46; Ross, Quest for Victory, 240.
40. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 46–47; Graham, Campaigns of 1796–1799, 33.
41. Ross, Quest for Victory, 239–240; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 47.
42. Joint Pub 3–0, VI-7.
43. Roider, Baron Thugut, 300–301. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 216.
44. Duffy, Eagle over the Alps, 25.
45. Longworth, Art of Victory, 238–40; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 216.
46. Cited in Osipov, Suvorov, 138.
47. Ibid., 139; see also Marshal Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, ed. C. Rousset, trans. S. L. Simeon (London, 1892), 252–55.
48. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 216; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 23; Longworth, Art of Victory, 240; Osipov, Suvorov, 139–40
49. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 217.
50. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 48–49.
51. Ibid., 56–59; Ross, Quest for Victory, 241.
52. Ross, Quest for Victory, 241; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 60–68.
53. Longworth, Art of Victory, 240; Graham, Campaigns of 1796–1799, 95. The account of St. Juliano is from Graham and is almost exactly the tactic discussed by Longworth.
54. Ross, Quest for Victory, 242.
55. Ibid., 234.
56. Ibid., 234–35.
57. Graham, Campaigns of 1796–1799, 129.
58. Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, 248.
59. Ibid., 252.
60. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 218; Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, 253; Longworth, Art of Victory, 251–52. Longworth also discusses Suvorov’s column to double-line maneuver during this assault.
61. Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, 271; Longworth, Art of Victory, 252–53; Osipov, Suvorov, 151; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 129.
62. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 218; Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, 255–56; Ross, Quest for Victory, 246–47. The sources disagree about the losses, but it is certain that each side lost heavily and most of the French losses seem to have come on the last two days of the battle. See Graham, Campaigns of 1796–1799, for details of Bellegarde’s abortive attack.
63. Schroeder, “Collapse of the Second Coalition,” 253 (for Austrian complaints) and 251. Schroeder discusses how Suvorov had been subject to the control of the Austrian Emperor Francis, who now delegated this responsibility to Thugut.
64. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 26.
65. Osipov, Suvorov, 151; Longworth, Art of Victory, 252–55; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 218; Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, 253. Osipov states: “it is a curious fact that Melas again completely failed to understand the situation.”[emphasis original]
66. Longworth, Art of Victory, 255–56; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 216. Longworth in particular points to Bellegarde, who had been defeated by Moreau, as a principal malcontent.
67. Graham, Campaigns of 1796–1799, 218.
68. Osipov, Suvorov, 155.
69. Longworth, Art of Victory, 263. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 220. Kray’s troops were in possession of a verse written by Suvorov that praised Kray.
70. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 139–48.
71. Osipov, Suvorov, 157.
72. Longworth, Art of Victory, 266. Osipov, Suvorov, 159.
73. Roider, Baron Thugut, 318–19.
74. Osipov, Suvorov, 159.
75. Ross, Quest for Victory, 235.
76. Lawrence Shadwell, translator of the Swiss narrative compiled from the writings of Archduke Charles, Baron Jomini, et al. Mountain Warfare: Illustrated by the Campaign of 1799 in Switzerland (London: King & Company, 1875), 144–46.
77. Ross, Quest for Victory, 236.
78. Ibid., 236–37; Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 152–53.
79. Duffy, Eagles over the Alps, 160.
80. Ibid., 157, 162–63; Ross, Quest for Victory, 266.
81. Ross, Quest for Victory, 267–70.
82. Ibid., 271; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 219–20.
83. Ross, Quest for Victory, 271–72.
84. Ibid.; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 242–44.
85. Ross, Quest for Victory, 273; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 250, 258.
86. Macksey, Statesmen at War, 224.
87. Graham, Campaigns of 1796–1799, 264.
CHAPTER 4
1. Portions of this chapter adapted from John T Kuehn, “Warrior of the Waves: Nelson’s Legacy to Naval Commandership” and from Christopher R. Gabel, and James H. Willbanks, Great Commanders (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2012), 93.
2. Eric J. Grove, introduction and notes to Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian Corbett (1911; repr., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988,), 318. Sir Julian Corbett defines command of the sea in this classic work and he is, along with Captain A. T. Mahan, one of the founders of modern naval theory.
3. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty (New York: Viking, 1988), 92–93.
4. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 318.
5. See Composite Warfare Commander Concept, http://naval.dasa.ncsu.edu/sites/naval.dasa.ncsu.edu/files/Composite%20Warfare%20Concept.pdf (accessed April 27, 2014). The author operated under this doctrine for the entirety of his naval career from 1981 to 2004 and it remains the bedrock for naval operations by the U.S. Navy.
6. See Donald P. Wright, ed., 16 Cases of Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).
7. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
8. The major exception to this was the performance of the French during the American Revolutionary War, especially at the Battle of the Virginia Capes; see A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little Brown, 1890), 385–93, passim.
9. Admiral Richard Lord Howe was the brother of William Howe of American Revolutionary War fame.
10. In the naval terminology of Nelson’s day, a “ship of the line” mounted 50 or more guns and typically 74, usually on two or more gun decks. These ships could therefore take their place in the “line” of battle and thus their name. Smaller vessels, frigates, brigs, sloops, and so on, were used for reconnaissance, screening, and patrol but often did not participate in the main battle.
11. Herbert Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, ed. B. Mitchell Simpson (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), 3.
12. Rosinski, Development of Naval Thought, 6.
13. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 23–24; see also Lukas Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patters of Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 2: 239–41.
14. Having the wind is a naval term, sometimes called having the weather gauge. It means that the vessel A has the wind at his back (or is upwind) from vessel B (downwind). A, therefore, has the advantage and can refuse or accept battle at will and if in a faster ship can overtake the downwind vessel. Vessel A also has advantages in maneuverability if it has the wind.
15. Roger Knight, The Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievement of Horatio Nelson (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 517. This paper uses the term battleship to apply to ships of the line.
16. Knight, Pursuit of Victory, 3–7, Knight’s biography portrays Nelson within the institutional context of the Royal Navy of his day.
17. Wright, 16 Cases of Mission Command, v; Jervis’s approach matches the elements in army mission command entitled: “Build cohesive teams through mutual trust” and “Create shared understanding.”
18. Tom Pocock, Horatio Nelson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 121, 126–27, 345. The number in parentheses indicates the number of guns aboard the vessel. Hereafter, only the ships’ names will be listed in italics without the HMS.
19. Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 342–43, 345. An earlier attempt to invade Ireland had been frustrated by foul weather and a single frigate under Captain Edward Pelew of Horatio Hornblower fame.
20. Pocock, Horatio Nelson, 128–29; Herman, To Rule the Waves, 345–36.
21. Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves, 346–49.
22. Pocock, Horatio Nelson, 130–33, 148; A. T. Mahan, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, vol. 1 (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., 1897), 271–75.
23. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 151.
24. Ibid., 353; Pocock, Horatio Nelson, 135–45. The British lost over 150 men killed in this fiasco. The Spanish were shocked at the scale of their victory and generously returned all Nelson’s wounded to him under a flag of truce.
25. Cited in Mahan, The Life of Nelson, 306.
26. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 205–6.
27. These were Nelson’s own words for his battle plan for Trafalgar, relayed to former British prime minister Henry Addington in the summer of 1805. See Colin White, The Nelson Encyclopaedia (London: Chatham Publishing, 2002), 236.
28. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 266–67; Herman, To Rule the Waves, 353.
29. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 213–24.
30. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 353–56; Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 577.
31. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 356–57; Captain Peter Hore, The Habit of Victory (London: The National Maritime Museum, 2005), 150.
32. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, xxxv.
33. See Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, xxxi–xxxv, for a detailed description of Nelson’s famous signals at the Nile. See also Chandler, Part IV for a complete discussion of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign.
34. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 288–303.
35. Ibid., 290–303; Hore, The Habit of Victory 150–51.
36. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, xxxi–xxxv.
37. The principal cause of the war (casus belli) was the failure of the British to return Malta to French control as they had agreed to at Amiens. There were numerous French infractions of the treaty as well, not the least of which was Napoleon’s continued territorial aggrandizements in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy.
38. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 372–73.
39. Ibid., 376–77; the Spanish had been goaded into war when the British preemptively seized one of their treasure fleets.
40. Vincent J. Esposito and John R. Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars (New York: Praeger, 1966), map 45 and facing page text. See also Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 469–70.
41. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 469–70.
42. Ibid., 480.
43. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 376–78.
44. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 480–93; Herman, To Rule the Waves, 376–79.
45. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 487–94.
46. Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, 27–30. Hore, The Habit of Victory, 169. Keegan is among those who portray Calder in a poor light and argue that events surrounding Villeneuve’s retreat were not strategically decisive. He makes no mention of the fact that Napoleon abandoned his invasion attempt and subsequently dispatched a replacement to relieve Villeneuve. Hore’s judgment is more balanced, calling Calder’s action “one of the decisive events of the whole war.”
47. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 494–99.
48. See John T. Kuehn, “The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813,” (unpublished master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997), chapter 3, for a discussion of the formation of the Third Coalition.
49. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 501–7; Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 421–22.
50. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 506–7.
51. Peter Hore, The Habit of Victory (London: The National Maritime Museum, 2005), 178–80.
52. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 510–11.
53. Herman, To Rule the Waves, 386, relays that the French and Spanish certainly already felt defeated, see also Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 501–7, who does not state this explicitly but implies it.
54. “Wearing” is different than “tacking” into the wind. Tacking requires better seamanship and could lead to a more confused formation if executed improperly. However, wearing was a slower, easier technique involving a gradual turn. In executing the slower maneuver Villeneuve lost valuable time in trying to flee from his pursuer. Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, 60.
55. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 503–17; Hore, The Habit of Victory, 180–82.
56. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 514.
57. Pocock, Horatio Nelson, 322: Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 515–18.
58. Pocock, Horatio Nelson, 327–28.
59. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory, 519.
60. Ibid., 520.
61. This was the famous “Battle of the Saints.” It was here that Rodney decisively defeated the French Navy under the Comte de Grasse. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, chapter XIII.
62. Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), 307–15. See also Mark Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813 (Chicago: The Emperor’s Press, 1990), 26–28. For the role of the Continental System in uniting Europe against Napoleon, see John T. Kuehn, “The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813,” master’s thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), chapter 3 passim.
CHAPTER 5
1. Cited in Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life (Harvard University Press, 2004), 536n6.
2. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Constance Garnett (New York: The Modern Library, no date listed), 1.
3. See John T. Kuehn, “Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813,” 40–42.
4. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 327–28.
5. Both Jomini and Clausewitz attribute this innovation to Napoleon and emphasize in their theoretical writing. See Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, 244, 266; Clausewitz, On War, 195, 204, 208.
6. Rothenberg, The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon, 128; see also Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 332–33.
7. Donald D. Horward, “Austerlitz and Masséna’s Army of Italy,” in The Consortium on the revolutionary Era 1750–1850, Selected Papers 2006, eds. F. C. Schneid and Denise Davidson (High Point University, 2007), 205–6.
8. Rothenberg, Art of War, 128, see also Elting, Swords around a Throne, 249–56.
9. Rothenberg, Art of War, 143–44; see Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, Appendix D, 1103 for order of battle at Austerlitz.
10. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 236–37; Rothenberg, Art of War, 141–42.
11. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 367–78.
12. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 170–73: John A. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789–1815,” French Historical Studies 16, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 152–73.
13. Jack A. Meyer, “Napoleon’s Generalship Reconsidered, or did Napoleon Really Blunder to Glory?” in The Consortium on the Revolutionary Era 1750–1850, Selected Papers 1994, eds. Ronald Caldwell, Donald Horward, John W. Rooney, Jr., and John Severn (Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University Press), 539–46; author conversation with Professor Connelly in 2005 revealed that Connelly preferred the title “Scrambling to Victory” but was dissuaded from using it by his publishers.
14. Jon T. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2011), from Appendix 3 in the paperback edition, Addenda provided to John T. Kuehn via e-mail on December 29, 2010 by Jon T. Sumida.
15. Clausewitz, On War, 580.
16. Rothenberg, Art of War, 128–29; for Napoleon’s semaphore system, see Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 365–67.
17. Clausewitz, On War, 566. For Clausewitz the culminating point of victory was that point of diminishing returns, when the offensive had spent the power of the attacker.
18. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 330–32.
19. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 382–85, see also chapter 3.
20. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 390.
21. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 47 and facing page text.
22. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 49 and facing page text.
23. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 397–402.
24. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 402–3.
25. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 402–402.
26. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 405–8; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 52 and facing page text.
27. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 54 and facing page text.
28. Leslie Anders, “Austerlitz, a Clash of Command Systems,” Military Review 38, no. 3 (June 1958): 50–57.
29. Anders, “Austerlitz” 50–57; Rothenberg, Art of War, 146.
30. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 417–33.
31. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 439–47; Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 62–64.
32. Lit. “to excess.”
33. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 443–52, 456.
34. “Old Fritz” was the contemporary nickname of Frederick the Great.
35. Peter Paret, “The Genesis of On War,” in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 8; and Baron Carl von Müffling, Memoirs of Baron Carl von Müffling, trans. P. H. Yorke (repr., London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 5.
36. Peter Paret, ed. and trans., Carl von Clausewitz Historical and Political Writings (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 90–91.
37. Müffling, Memoirs of Baron Carl von Müffling, 5–8; Paret, Carl von Clausewitz, 89.
38. Rothenberg, Art of War, 188–89; Frederick the Great famously defeated a French army at Rossbach in 1757 as a result of an audacious cavalry attack by Friederich von Seydlitz, his cavalry commander, see Russell Weigley, The Age of Battles (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 184–86; Clausewitz is cited in Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 454.
39. Rothenberg, Art of War, 189–90; Weigley, Age of Battles, 391–92; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 456–58. Rothenberg lists the Prussian field force at 128,000. Chandler lists the Prussian strength as 150,000, rising to 170,000 when the Saxon Army was forcibly added to its ranks in September.
40. In Paret, Carl von Clausewitz, 77–81.
41. David G. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, 39–44.
42. David G. Chandler, Jena 1806: Napoleon Destroys Prussia (Oxford, UK: Osprey Campaign Series, 1993), 9.
43. Cited in Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 44.
44. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 38–39.
45. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 45–46.
46. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 46–47; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 62 and facing page text.
47. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 47–48.
48. Ibid., 50–52; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 64.
49. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 48–58.
50. Clausewitz, On War, 230–35.
51. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 60–61.
52. Paret, Carl von Clausewitz, 91–92.
53. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 60–62; Elting and Esposito, map 68.
54. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 62.
55. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign,” 62–63; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 68 and facing page text.
56. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 505–09.
57. Gordon Craig, in Makers of Modern Strategy, 341.
58. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 509–12; Gregory Fremont-Barnes, ed. The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, vol. II (Oxford, UK: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2006), 413–14.
59. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 68 and facing page text.
60. Ibid., map 69 and facing page text.
61. Ibid., map 71a and facing page text; see also Elting, Swords around a Throne, 137–38.
62. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 528–35.
63. Paret, Carl von Clausewitz, 92–93; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 535–55, lists only 9,000 Prussian troops actually making it to the battlefield.
64. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 555.
65. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 75 and facing page text.
66. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 553–55.
67. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 76 and facing page text; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 560–64.
68. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 77 and facing page text.
69. Ibid., map 78 and facing page text.
70. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 586–90; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 83 and facing page text.
CHAPTER 6
1. Robert M. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth Century Warfare,” The Journal of Military History 56, no. 3 (July 1992): 375–88; Thomas Huber, “Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare,” in Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 2002), 91–109.
2. Huber, “Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework,” in Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 2002), 1–10.
3. Huber, “Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare,” 91–109.
4. Huber, “Compound Warfare,” 3.
5. Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsula War, 7 vols. (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1902–1930), passim. Oman makes a constant theme of Napoleon’s failure to effectively exercise operational command from outside the theater.
6. Cited in Huber, “Napoleon in Spain and Naples,” 91.
7. Charles Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 276–77.
8. Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 324; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 512.
9. Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 326–29.
10. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 596; Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 340.
11. Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 330–31.
12. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 36; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 596, 603.
13. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 605.
14. Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 332–45.
15. Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life, 340–41; Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 342–44.
16. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 85 and facing page text.
17. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 84–86 and facing page text.
18. Rory Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 1796–1814 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 37.
19. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 215–218.
20. Ibid., 229.
21. Ibid., 169–70, 235–50.
22. Ibid., 244–57; Oman, History of the Peninsula War, vol. 1, 260–63. Oman labels Burrard an incubus.
23. Oman, History of the Peninsula War, 279–284. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 86 facing page text.
24. Oman, History of the Peninsula War, 291–92.
25. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 87 and facing page text; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 361; Oman, History of the Peninsula War, 402–16.
26. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 90–91 and facing page text; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 643–657.
27. Huber, “Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare,” 91–92.
28. Huber, “Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare,” 92–109.
29. Cited in Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 295.
30. Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 167–69. The Walcheren Expedition further reinforced the idea that Wellesley seemed to be the only British general who could win consistently against Napoleon’s generals.
31. Arthur Wellesley, The Duke of Wellington, The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during His Various Campaigns from 1799 to 1818, vol. IV (London: John Murray, 1837), hereafter Wellington’s Dispatches, 261.
32. Wellington’s Dispatches, vol. 4, 261–63.
33. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 296–301.
34. Ibid., 301–302; Joint Publication 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2010).
35. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 302–9.
36. Ibid., 309–15.
37. Wellington’s Dispatches, vol. 4, 343–45.
38. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 92 and facing page text; Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 305.
39. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 320–21.
40. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 379.
41. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 318–28.
42. Ibid., 329–39.
43. Ibid., 341–43.
44. Ibid., 339–44; Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles, 418–20.
45. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 340 and passim.
46. Rothenberg, Art of War in the Age of Napoleon, 179.
47. Rothenberg, Art of War in the Age of Napoleon, 169–70.
48. The Hungarian Insurrectio and Croatian Ban were feudal levies that were authorized in time of war and required approval by the Hungarian Diet and the Banus (governor) of Croatia. In 1809 they were theoretically capable of supplying 100,000 militia type troops for the Austrian Armies, but in fact provided only about 40,000 poorly trained and poorly equipped troops who fought for the most part in Dalmatia and Hungary. See Robert M. Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994), chapter 3, and F. L Petre, Napoleon and the Archduke Charles (London: John Lane and Co., 1909), chapter 2, passim.
49. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 378.
50. Ibid., 377–79; Rothenberg, Art of War in the Age of Napoleon, 170–73.
51. Rothenberg, Art of War in the Age of Napoleon, especially, makes this judgment, 170; Weigley is a bit more generous, 418–21.
52. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 378; Weigley, Age of Battles, 421.
53. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 378; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 92–93 and facing page text.
54. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 378–79; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 96–100 and facing page text.
55. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 100 and facing page text. When the term French is used henceforth it refers to Napoleon’s multinational formations, too, in this case mostly Germans.
56. Weigley, Age of Battles, 423–24; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 100 and facing page text.
57. Weigley, Age of Battles, 424–25.
58. Glenn J. Lamar, Jerome Bonaparte: The War Years, 1800–1815 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 61–75; Elting and Esposito, map 100 and text.
59. Weigley, Age of Battles, 425–29.
60. Weigley, Age of Battles, 428.
61. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 103 and facing page text; Weigley, Age of Battles, 428–29.
62. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 379; Weigley, Age of Battles, 428–34.
63. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 379–81.
64. Felix Markham, Napoleon (London: The New American Library, 1963), 183.
65. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity,” 378–88; Weigley, Age of Battles, 536–43. See chapter 1.
66. Paul Schroeder, cited in Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life, 324.
CHAPTER 7
1. David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2007) advances this position; for a more modern discussion of total war as it relates to World War I, see Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., Great War, Total War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, with the German Historical Institute), 1–15.
2. Clausewitz, On War, Book VII: 22, 570–72.
3. Weigley, Age of Battles, 436.
4. Oman, History of the Peninsula War, vol. 3, 152; Weigley, Age of Battles, 436.
5. Cited in Oman, History of the Peninsula War, vol. 3, 210–11, 344–45; Weigley, Age of Battles, 435–436;
6. Oman describes this best in his introduction to volume 3 of his history, iv–v, 211.
7. Weigley, Age of Battles, 436.
8. Oman, History of the Peninsula War, vol. 3, 341–46, 353.
9. Weigley, Age of Battles, 436; Oman, History of the Peninsula War, vol. 3, 547.
10. Oman, History of the Peninsula War, vol. 3, 388–95, 556–58.
11. Ibid., 410–11, 437–48.
12. Weigley, Age of Battles, 438.
13. Ibid., 438–39.
14. Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 418–426.
15. Weigley, Age of Battles, 439–40; Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 436–45.
16. Weigley, Age of Battles, 486–87.
17. Ibid., 487–89.
18. Ibid., 489–90.
19. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 739–47; Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 449.
20. Armand de Caulaincourt, Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, 1812–1813, ed. Jean Hanoteau, trans. Hamish Miles (London: Cassell and Company, 1935), 69.
21. Jonathan M. House, “The 1812 Campaign,” in H100 Rise of the Western Way of War, Syllabus and Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Military History, June 2012), 217–19.
22. Riehn, Richard K., 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 50.
23. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 748–49; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 29.
24. See chapter 1.
25. Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 448.
26. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 50–52.
27. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 753–56; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 425.
28. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 760–62; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 33–36
29. See Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 52–53 and chapter 8 for an informative discussion of these logistical considerations.
30. Numbers come from Riehn, who lists Cossacks separately and does not include artillerists in his overall numbers in 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 49–50.
31. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 29, 88–91.
32. Fabian refers to a Roman general, Fabius Cunctator, who avoided battle with Hannibal during the Second Punic War.
33. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 33–34.
34. Ibid., 33–36; Frederick the Great had created the famous entrenched camp of Bunzelwitz during the Seven Years’ War, which had kept superior Austrian forces in check during a critical period.
35. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 45–49; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 750–53, 764–65; Alexander Mikaberidze, The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon against Kutuzov (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2007), 6–9, 12–13.
36. For the argument about Eugene, see Robert M. Epstein, Prince Eugene at War: 1809 (Arlington, TX: Empire Games Press, 1984); Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 756.
37. Esdaille, Napoleon’s Wars, 412–14.
38. Forrest A. Miller, introduction to The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, by Carl von Clausewitz, trans. anonymous (reimpression of the London edition of 1843, Hattiesburg, MS: Academic International, 1970), vii.
39. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 48–49; Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 8–10.
40. Cited in Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 9.
41. Ibid, 10; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 108 and facing page text.
42. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 178–83.
43. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 775–76.
44. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 169–75; Baron de Marbot, Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, trans. Arthur John Butler, vol. 2 (London: Greenhill Books, 1988), 215, 290–92, 316.
45. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 775–77; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 174–79.
46. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 109 and facing page text; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 181–91.
47. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 184, 191.
48. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 777.
49. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 192–98.
50. Ibid., 196–201; Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 110–11 and facing page text.
51. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 205.
52. Ibid., 201.
53. Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 10–11; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 268–76.
54. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 60; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 181–90, 207–8.
55. Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 14; Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 113.
56. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 60; Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 13–14; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 204–9; Clausewitz put the number at 185,000, by this point in the campaign he was serving on the staff of Pahlen’s Cavalry Corps.
57. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 109; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 207.
58. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 62; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 206–21.
59. Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 14–17; Clausewitz, 62–63.
60. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 63–65, 142; Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 20–22; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 216.
61. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 64–66; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 239–43; Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 49–51, lists 31,000 militia at the battle instead of 10,000, which gave the Russians a numerical if not qualitative edge over Napoleon’s army.
62. These numbers are contentious, but give a sense of the right proportions. See Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 50–52, 216–18; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 242–43, 255; Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 166.
63. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 254–56, 259; Mikaberidze, Battle of Borodino, 203–4; Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 168–69.
64. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 142–43; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 259–61.
65. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 147.
66. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 808; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 263.
67. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 67–72; Adam Zamoyski, Moscow 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 368–75; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 273–77.
68. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 335–57; Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 212.
69. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 211.
70. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 823–48; Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 360–90.
71. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 390–97, 503; Michael Leggiere, soon to be published manuscript Napoleon and Germany: The Franco-Prussian War of 1813: Volume II: The Defeat of Napoleon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), introduction. Leggiere lists 93,000 troops but his numbers probably included Poniatowski’s V Corps of mostly new Polish recruits and Reynier’s Saxons and both of these corps would be unavailable to Napoleon for the spring campaign of 1813.
72. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 252, 255.
CHAPTER 8
1. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 240–41.
2. John T. Kuehn, “The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813” (master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997), chapter 3 passim.
3. George F. Nafziger and Marco Gioannini, The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, 1813–1814 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 220.
4. Count von Gneisenau, The Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, trans. J. E. Marston (London: Sherwood, Neely & Jones, 1815), 54.
5. Weigley, Age of Battles, 460.
6. Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 165. See also Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 873.
7. Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 188–89.
8. Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Morgan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 90; Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 189. See also Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: Praeger, 1953), 20.
9. Müffling, Memoirs, 4–5.
10. Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 93.
11. Ibid., 191.
12. Michael Leggiere, “Bulow’s 3rd Prussian Army Corps during the War of Liberation.” Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750–1850, Selected Papers, 1996 (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1996), 240, passim; Weigley, Age of Battles, 460.
13. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 56.
14. Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 192. Peter Hofschroer, Prussian Reserve, Militia & Irregular Troops 1806–15 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1987), 5–7; Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 57–58. The Landwehr is not to be confused with the Landsturm, both of which were called up in 1813. The Landwehr was a “trained” militia and included many of the older Krumper. The Landsturm were an armed, untrained levée en masse and Gneisenau calls them by that French term.
15. Cited in Rothenberg, Art of Warfare, 193.
16. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 59.
17. Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 98; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 871–73. The addition of the Landwehr and other recruits would eventually result in a huge force of nearly 250,000 by August of 1813.
18. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 246–47; Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 230–31.
19. Müffling, Memoirs, 31.
20. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100–5, Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), glossary-6.
21. Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 213–14; Michael Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany: The Franco-Prussian War of 1813 Volume II: The Defeat of Napoleon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), introduction; Müffling, Memoirs, 31; Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 73.
22. Reihn, 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 395–96.
23. Kuehn, “Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition,” 60.
24. Ibid., 63–64.
25. Hofschroer, Prussian Reserve, Militia & Irregular Troops 1806–15, 18–19, 58–61.
26. These figures come from both Gneisenau and Müffling.
27. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 874.
28. Scott Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813 (Chicago: The Emperor’s Press, 1990), chapters 1–4, passim.
29. Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writing, 98.
30. Charles William Vane Stewart, Marquess of Londonderry, Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814 (London: Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley, 1830), 54; Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 79; Müffling, Memoirs, 44. Stewart, Lord Castelreagh’s half-brother had served with Wellington in Spain and was assigned as an observer with the Allied forces in the summer of 1813.
31. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 20.
32. Müffling, Memoirs, 32.
33. Cited in Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 878.
34. Cited in Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 887.
35. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 106.
36. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 131 and facing page text; see also Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813, 100–101.
37. Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813, 106; Müffling, Memoirs, 35–41.
38. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 895–96; Christopher Bassford, “Jomini,” http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm#JOMINI (accessed August 22, 2014). Defenders of Jomini forget that the two witnesses—Ney and Berthier—who can best attest to his errors, both died in 1815 and could never repudiate his libels of them in the years after the wars had ended.
39. John Kuehn, Coalition Tactics on the Napoleonic Battlefield and Their Influence on Unity of Effort, Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997), 36–38.
40. Cited in Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813, 111–12.
41. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 10.
42. Ibid., 30; Peter Hofschroer, Prussian Reserve, Militia & Irregular Troops 1806–15 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1987), 24; Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 226–28, 239–46. Clausewitz eventually became the legion’s commander when it was absorbed into the Prussian army between April 1814 and May 1815.
43. G. F. Nafziger, “Cossack Operations in Western Germany, Spring 1813,” from Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1850, Proceedings 1992 (Tallahassee, Florida State University, 1992), 382.
44. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 5.
45. Nafziger, “Cossack Operations,” 381–82. Nafziger estimates that this cavalry constituted 35 percent of the total available French cavalry for the theater.
46. Nafziger, “Cossack Operations,” 376.
47. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 65–66.
48. See chapter 1.
49. Nafziger, “Cossack Operations,” 381.
50. See Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813, passim.
51. Müffling, Memoirs, 158–59; Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 135–42; Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 85–109.
52. Kuehn, Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition, chapter 6 passim; see also Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany, Vol. II, assessments, passim.
53. Clausewitz, On War, 583.
54. Müffling, Memoirs, 358–59. See also Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 918. Müffling provides an excellent précis of Napoleon’s dilemma. Chandler provides the pro-Napoleon view.
55. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 142–45.
56. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 72.
57. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 53.
58. Kissinger, A World Restored, 73.
59. Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany, 18–21, 30.
60. Ibid., 4–6; pages hereafter cited from unpublished manuscript.
61. Müffling, Memoirs, 55.
62. Franklin D. Scott, Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), 84.
63. Müffling, Memoirs, 55–56.
64. Scott, Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon, 73.
65. Müffling, Memoirs, 56.
66. Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany, assessment, passim.
67. See Appendix: The Trachenberg Convention. Bernadotte’s Army of the North included various independent commands, such as Wallmoden’s corps that was observing Davout and Tauenzien’s Prussian landwehr corps and when these are subtracted, his strength was approximately that of Blücher. Tauenzien’s corps operated as part of Bernadotte’s army and is often omitted from the total strength because it was not present at Leipzig.
68. Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, 180.
69. Kuehn, “Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition,” 85.
70. Albert S. Britt, The Wars of Napoleon (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 1973), 198.
71. Gordon Craig, Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813–1814, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History Number Seven (Colorado: United States Air Force Academy, 1965), 5.
72. See Appendix. Blücher’s army totaled nearly 98,000 by mid-August.
73. Britt, Wars of Napoleon, 198.
74. General Sir Robert Wilson, Private Diary of General Sir Robert Wilson, vol. 2 (London: John Murray, 1861), 85.
75. Leggiere, “Bulow’s 3rd Prussian Army Corps,” 25–28.
76. Cited in Felix Markham, Napoleon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 206.
77. Wilson, Private Diary of General Sir Robert Wilson, 85.
78. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 106; Wilson, Private Diary of General Sir Robert Wilson, 84.
79. Müffling, Memoirs, 56.
80. Peter Hofschroer, The Battle of the Nations (London: Reed International Books, 1993), 16.
81. Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A Biography (New York: Stein & Day, 1970), 231.
82. Goerlitz, German General Staff, 41–42.
83. Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany, 30; Napoleon agreed at the last moment to abandon the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, restore Prussia to its pre-1806 borders, and return Dalmatia to Austria—but the Allies wanted the status quo ante bellum prior to 1805.
84. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 902.
85. Britt, Wars of Napoleon, 206.
86. Wilson, Private Diary of General Sir Robert Wilson, 104.
87. Britt, Wars of Napoleon, 207; Wilson, 91.
88. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 903–12.
89. Jean V. Moreau, Memoirs of General Moreau, ed. and trans. John Philippart (London: A. J. Valpy, Tookes Court, 1814), 232.
90. Wilson, Private Diary of General Sir Robert Wilson, 100.
91. Cited in Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 903.
92. Poultney Bigelow, History of the German Struggle for Liberty, vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1896), 187. Kuehn, “Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition,” 80.
93. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 192.
94. Ibid., 192–97.
95. Müffling, Memoirs, 292; see also Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 154.
96. Müffling, Memoirs, 311.
97. Macdonald, Memoirs of Marshal Macdonald, 55–56. Macdonald claimed that Napoleon instructed him to make a “diversion,” but his account of his battle plan makes clear that the attack he planned on August 26 was more than a diversion.
98. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 26, 171.
99. Britt, Wars of Napoleon, 208.
100. Hofschroer, Leipzig 1813 (London, UK: Osprey, 1993), 58–61.
101. Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813, 160–61.
102. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 138–139 and facing page text.
103. Wilson, 125; Bowden, 167.
104. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 26, 177–78.
105. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 136–37. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 26, 203–4.
106. Stewart, War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, 141–42. Bowden, 166.
107. Hofschroer, Prussian Reserve, Militia, & Irregular Troops, 37–42.
108. Britt, Wars of Napoleon, 212.
109. Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany, chapter 10.
110. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 217–18. Gneisenau’s grudging admiration of Napoleon is a departure from his usual rabid anti-French rhetoric, for example, he uses “Napoleon” vice Bonaparte and calls him a “military genius.”
111. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 138–39 and facing page text, numbers approximate.
112. Weigley, Age of Battles, 478–82; Hofschroer, Leipzig, 64–88.
113. Leggiere, Napoleon and Germany, chapter 16. Leggiere estimates that these were followed by another 20,000 “marauders,” many who never returned to the colors.
114. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 182.
115. Leggiere, Napoleon, and Germany, see for example, Gneisenau’s communications throughout chapter 9.
116. Gneisenau, Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blücher, 179.
EPILOGUE
1. Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, trans. and eds. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, 207.
2. Ibid., 206–207.
3. This allusion to Napoleon’s dual nature as general and statesman comes from Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 660.
4. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 194.
5. See Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 205–19; and Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, and Gregory W. Pedlow, trans. and eds., On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington and the Campaign of 1815 (Clausewitz.com, 2010), which includes significant primary source material, letters, and the correspondence of the Duke of Wellington in response to Clausewitz’s work.
6. Duchesse de Reggio, Memoirs of Marshal Oudinot Due de Reggio, trans. Alexander Teixeira de Mattos (New York: Appleton and Company, 1897), 272. The Tsar reputedly articulated this characterization shortly after he entered Paris in 1814.
7. See chapter 2.
8. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 146 and facing page text; Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 194–97; Gershoy, The French Revolution and Napoleon, 515–17.
9. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 992–1004.
10. This refers to the end of the Seven Years War, when Frederick the Great was clearly losing and his inveterate opponent the Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia died. Her son Peter, slavishly devoted to Frederick, pulled Russia immediately out of the war and saved the Hohenzollern regime, the so-called “Miracle of the House of Brandenburg.” David Fraser, Frederick the Great. King of Prussia (London, UK: Allen Lane, 2000), 420.
11. Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 218.
12. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 201–7.
13. Weigley, Age of Battles, 92–98; Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times Abridged (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1966 edition), passim.
14. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 157 and facing page text.
15. Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 207–11.
16. See chapter 7.
17. Clausewitz, On Waterloo, in Bassford, Moran, and Gregory, 177–78.
18. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, maps 157–162 and facing page text; Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo (New York: Random House, 2010), 87–88.
19. See chapter 5.
20. Bassford, Moran, and Gregory, On Waterloo, 187–91.
21. Jomini, “Summary of the Art of War,” in H100: Rise of the Western Way of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Military History, 2012), 240–42.
22. Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory, 201–02.
23. Bassford, Moran, and Gregory, On Waterloo, 1.
24. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 1042–64.
25. Esposito and Elting, Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 156.
26. Most famously Clausewitz in On War and Jomini in Art of War.