CWIHP: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
DASJA: Department of the Army Staff Judge Advocate
FEER: Far Eastern Economic Review
FRUS: United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (U.S. Government Printing Office, various years)
HUSAFIK: “History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea,” unpublished manuscript available in the U.S. Army Center for Military History, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., and the Historical Office of Eighth U.S. Army at the Yongsan U.S. Army Base, Seoul, Korea
HMGK: History of the United States Army Military Government in Korea, unpublished manuscript available in the U.S. Army Center for Military History, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., and the Historical Office of Eighth U.S. Army at the Yongsan U.S. Army Base, Seoul, Korea
JFK: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
LBJ: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
MOFAT: Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (archives), Seoul, South Korea
MHI: U. S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Penn. (archives)
NARA: National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.
NKIDP: North Korea International Documentation Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
NSF: National Security Files, at JFK and LBJ libraries
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea
1 Ernst Oppert, A Forbidden Land: Voyages to the Corea (G. P. Putnam’s Son, 1882), p. 3.
2. U.S. policymakers generally have fallen into two main camps in their approach to North Korea. The so-called “optimists” believe that negotiating with North Korea is possible and that the reason the P’yŏngyang regime
has so far been unwilling to abandon its nuclear ambitions is due its legitimate fear for its own national security. By contrast, the so-called “pessimists” view P’yŏngyang actions far more cynically, identifying a familiar pattern of behavior with the outside world, which is to “start negotiations, squeeze aid out of the international community by making incremental concessions (while trying to cheat), and then walk away from talks and stage a provocation or two—only to return in exchange for more payoffs.” For the pessimists, North Korea’s main goal is to maintain its hold on power by any means possible, including using nuclear blackmail. See Andre Lankov, “Changing North Korea: Information Campaign Can Beat the Regime,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2009), pp. 95–97.
3 Quoted in B. R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters (Melville House, 2010), p. 149. Myers makes a similar point, that the threat to North Korea is the prosperity and well-being of South Korea and the legitimization crisis that will ensue if these facts become known among the North Korean population. However, unlike Myers, I do not foresee another attempt by the North at “liberating” the South anytime soon, as I make clear in the epilogue.
1 The story is told in Richard Kim, Lost Names: Scenes from a Korean Boyhood (University of California Press, 1988), pp. 164–166. Though written as fiction, the novel is based on Richard Kim’s own childhood experience.
2 FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, vol. 6: The British Commonwealth, the Far East (1969), p. 1098; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 106–109.
3 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, p. 118.
4 United States Department of Defense, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–45 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 51–52.
5 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives,” CWIHP Working Paper 8 (November 1993), p. 10.
6 Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1953), pp. 635–639; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Belknap Press, 2006), p. 141.
7 The Soviets had been aware of the bomb through their wartime espionage operations in the United States. The Americans were later able to confirm this through the Venona Project, a highly secret intelligence operation involving interception of Soviet intelligence messages. At Potsdam, President Truman was not aware that the Soviets knew about the Manhattan Project. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (Yale University Press, 2000); Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (John Murray, 2001); Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Code-Breaking in World War II (Free Press, 2002).
8 Andrei Gromyko, Memories (Hutchinson, 1989), p. 109.
9 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, pp. 178–193; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 18.
10 FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 1039; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 120–121.
11 According to historian Kathryn Weathersby, the fate of Korea as a potential “springboard for Japanese invasion onto the Asian continent” and the Soviet Far East was a foremost concern for Stalin. These views were not challenged. The long-held assumption that debate within the Soviet government was limited is correct. She claims that in the hundreds of documents she has studied in the Soviet Central Committee and Foreign Ministry archives, she has never come across a “document indicating a policy debate of any kind.” Thus, she concludes, we can assume that the June 1945 report accurately reflected the opinion from the top and that if “its recommendation had not already been approved, the authors would never have written it.” Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War,” p. 11; Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 120–121.
12 Radio Address of Generalissimo Stalin, Soviet Embassy Information Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), September 6, 1945. Quoted in Harold R. Isaacs, No Peace for Asia (MIT Press, 1947), p. 256. See also Max R. Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951 (Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 246.
13 New York Times, November 4, 1945.
14 Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning (University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 48–50; Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Korean Pacific Press, 1947), p.45.
15 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 388–389; Richard E. Lauterbach, Danger from the East (Harper & Brothers, 1964), pp. 213–217.
16 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Policy toward Korea: 1944–1946,” PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1990, p. 191.
17 Most scholars who studied the Soviet occupation of North Korea concluded that Soviet policies were well received owing to Soviet authorities’ taking popular measures such as prosecuting collaborators, especially those who worked in the detested police, and confiscating Japanese farms and farms belonging to Korean landowners to redistribute them. Recent historians have revised this view of the Soviet occupation. They argue that the Soviet occupation was anything but popular. They also question the alleged discontinuity between the colonial and postcolonial regime in North Korea. These scholars make clear that the Soviet occupation was an imperialist occupation and that the Soviets continued many unpopular policies that were identical to Japanese colonial policy such as state purchase of grains. They also argue that many Korean mid-level managers and administrators who had worked for the colonial regime remained and worked for the new government. See Mitsuhiko Kimura, “From Fascism to Communism: Continuity and Development of Collectivist Economic Policy in North Korea,” Economic History Review 52, no. 1 (February 1999); Kim Ha-yŏng, Kukchejuŭi sigak eso pon hanbando [The Korean Peninsula from an International Perspective] (Seoul: Ch’aek pŏlle, 2002); Chung’ang ilbo t’ŭkpyŏl ch’wijaeban, eds., Pirok chosŏn minjujuŭi inmin konghwaguk [Secret History of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] (Seoul: Chung’ang ilbosa, 1992). For recent studies on the Soviet occupation of North Korea, see Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960 (Rutgers University Press, 2002); Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization (University of Hawaii Press, 2005); Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945–1947 (Berg, 1989); CWIHP Bulletin: New Evidence on North Korea, no. 14/15 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004); Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Cornell University Press, 2003). The most comprehensive book in English on this period of North Korean history is Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee’s monumental two-volume Communism in Korea (University of California Press, 1972).
18 Chong-sik Lee and Ki-Wan Oh, “The Russian Faction in North Korea,” Asian Survey 8, no. 4 (1968), p. 272.
19 Henry R. Huttenbach, “The Soviet Koreans: Product of Russo-Japanese Imperial Rivalry,” Central Asian Survey 12, no. 1 (1993), pp. 59–69. See also German N. Kim, “The Deportation of 1937 as a Logical Continuation of Tsarist and Soviet Nationality Policy in the Russian Far East,” The Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin 12 (2001), pp. 19–43; Dae-sook Suh, ed., Koreans in the Soviet Union (University of Hawaii Press, 1987); Walter Kolarz, The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (Archon Books, 1969).
20 Lim Ŭn, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-sŏng (Tokyo: Jiyusha, 1982), p. 144.
21 Quoted in Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p. 59.
22 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 12. Having good reason to fear reprisal, the Japanese approached local influential Koreans about organizing an interim governing body that could help keep law and order after liberation. Thus was formed the Chosŏn kŏnguk chunbi wiwŏnhoe, or Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI). Within weeks of liberation, the CPKI organized tens of thousands of Koreans into local branches aimed to maintain law and order. These self-governing groups, which sprang up throughout the country, eventually evolved into People’s Committees. While the Americans disbanded these self-proclaimed governing groups in the South, in North Korea the Soviets chose instead to infiltrate and manipulate them and eventually allying with them to serve the interests of the pro-Soviet North Korean regime. See van Ree, Socialism in One Zone; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 267–350.
23 Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p. 54.
24 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Little, Brown, 1970), p. 370.
25 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution: 1945–1950 (Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 53.
26 Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng, “The Shtykov Diaries: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in Korea,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 69.
27 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 10–11; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p. 238.
28 Yu Sŏng-ch’ŏl, “Testimony,” installment 6, November 7, 1990, in Sydney A. Seiler, Kim Il Sung 1941–48: The Creation of a Legend, the Building of a Regime (University Press of America, 1994), p. 122.
29 Lim, Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea, p. 153. See also Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 79–80.
30 Yu, “Testimony,” p. 105.
31 North Korean propaganda purports that Kim Il Sung led the “Korean People’s Revolutionary Army.” This force never existed. Wada Haruki, Kim Il-sŏng gwa manju hangil chŏnjaeng [Kim Il Sung and the Anti-Japanese Struggle in Manchuria] (Seoul: Changjakkwa pip’yŏngsa, 1992), pp. 136–141. See also Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 49–76; Suh Dae Sook, Kim Il Sung: North Korean Leader (Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 37–47; Sydney A. Seiler, Kim Il Sŏng, 1941–1948: The Creation of a Legend, The Building of a Regime (University Press of America, 1994), pp. 29–41.
32 Yu, “Testimony,” pp. 112–116.
33 Quoted in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, pp. 324–325, from O Yŏng-jin, So kunjoŏng ha ŭi Pukhan: Hana ŭi chung-ŏn [North Korea under Soviet Military Government: An Eyewitness Report] (Seoul: Chung’ang Munhwasa, 1952).
34 Yu, “Testimony,” pp. 124–125.
35 Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p. 113; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 331.
36 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 332.
37 Mitsuhiko Kimura, “From Fascism to Communism: Continuity and Development of Collectivist Economic Policy in North Korea,” Economic History Review, New Series, 52, no. 1 (February 1999), p. 77.
The Land Reform Act of March 5, 1945, was the first major action of the newly formed North Korean Provisional People’s Committees. While land reform promoted the distribution of cultivated lands previously owned by the Japanese and a small number of Korean rural gentry to thousands of Korean tenant farmers, Soviet authorities still established price controls that forced these farmers to sell their produce at fixed low prices to state cooperative associations. Immediately after the completion of land reform, the new government also established 25 percent tax-in-kind, “which was to exact approximately 25 percent of the gross produce and constitute the sole burden upon the farmer.” Thus, land distribution was just one part of the communist agrarian reform. The other major aspect of land reform was taxation and market policies, which remained essentially unchanged from the Japanese colonial era. See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, part 11, pp. 1023–1025. There were other parallels between the colonial and the postcolonial agricultural landholding systems. As the essential element in a capitalist system, private ownership of land derives from the right of the owner to dispose of his property according to his own will. But despite becoming landowners on paper due to land reform, this right was denied to the North Korean farmer. Indeed, the 1945 Land Reform Act strictly prohibited the sale or lease of land transferred by deed. “The former tenant was given a legal document guaranteeing ownership of that land, but this had little meaning because of the strict constraints on the disposal of his property.” See Kimura, From Fascism to Communism, pp. 76–77.
New scholarship on postliberation North Korea is emerging about the extent to which both Stalinist and Japanese imperialist fascism ideology became the main currents of North Korea’s economic policy. After August 15, 1945, and despite the Soviet and North Korean leaders’ rhetoric about “cleansing” their zone of former Japanese collaborators and influences, many Korean administrators and managers who had worked for the colonial regime at intermediate levels had, in fact, remained to work for the new government and only later defected or were expelled after it was firmly established. The continuity between Japanese and North Korea economic policy was largely due to the apparent sympathy between Soviet and Japanese ideas on economic planning. The conversion of Japanese communists to imperial fascism in the late 1930s had a substantial impact on policy making in the wartime Japanese economy. This conversion was most apparent in Manchuria, where many former Japanese Marxists played an important role in developing the strategic plans for the industries in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. These same Soviet influences, which had helped to shape wartime Japanese economy in Manchuria, also dominated North Korea after 1945. Ibid., p. 82. See also Andrei Lankov, “The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945–1960), Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 104–109. For a discussion of the relationship between Japanese fascism and North Korean communism, see Brian Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Korean See Themselves (and Why It Matters) (Melville House, 2010), pp. 30–38. Leonid Petrov has also noted that many South Korean intellectuals who had been trained in Japan eventually settled in the north. For example, Paek Nam-ŭn (1894–1979) was a leading North Korean intellectual whose major works were all written in Japanese. It was only after liberation that he translated these works into Korean. After the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Paek Nam-ŭn, and other Japanese-trained intellectuals like him, settled in P’yŏngyang, where they went on to be appointed to high positions within the NKWP and DPRK government. Paek himself held various high administrative posts throughout his career, including educational minister and president of the academy of science. Most of these intellectuals would later come to regret their decision to side with the North Korean regime, as they were later destroyed during the North Korean purges of the late 1950s. See Leonid A. Petrov, “Foreign and Traditional Influences in the Historiography of Paek Nam-un,” Proceedings of the Twelfth New Zealand International Conference on Asian Studies, Massey University, November 19–26, 1997, pp. 205, available at http://www.north-korea.narod.ru/paek.htm (accessed July 26, 2012).
38 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 336, fn 49. The Sinŭiju uprising on November 23 was the single largest anti-communist demonstration during the “liberation” period. The incident was sparked by the arrest of a school principal who had publicly criticized Soviet soldiers and Korean communists. The arrest became the catalyst for a series of bloody clashes between students and armed Soviet and Korean communists linked to internal Korean security forces, called poandae, which was commanded by Kim Il Sung. See Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus, “Peripheral Influence: The Sinŭiju Student Incident of 1945 and the Impact of Soviet Occupation in North Korea,” Journal of Korean Studies 13, no. 1 (Fall 2008); Armstrong, North Korean Revolution, pp. 62–64. The South Korean historian Kim Ha-yŏng has argued that the uprising was fueled by genuine expressions of popular anger, which were both deep and widespread. According to her, Soviet occupation forces actually suppressed popular demands for democracy, and their success in doing so was in large part due to the fact that they were able to quickly gain full control over their zone. Moreover, their central aim was to recover the territory and influence that had been lost to the Japanese at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The basis for Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula was thus not revolutionary internationalism but the desire for imperialist expansion. Stalin’s policy toward Korea, in other words, was simply following the tradition of the tsarist empire. See Kim Ha-yŏng, “The Formation of North Korean State Capitalism,” trans. Owen Miller, International Socialism: A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Theory, June 1, 2006, available at http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=205 (accessed June 30, 2008). The original Korean version is Kim’s Kukchejuŭi sigak eso pon hanbando [Korean Peninsula from an International Perspective].
39 New York Times, December 6, 1945.
40 Kim Hak-chun, Pukhan 50 nyŏn-sa [Fifty Years of North Korean History] (Seoul: Tong’a ch’ulp’ansa, 1995), pp. 96–97; Kim, Kukchejuŭi sigak eso pon hanbando [Korean Peninsula from an International Perspective], p. 257; Armstrong, North Korean Revolution, pp. 62–63.
41 New York Times, July 9, 1947.
42 Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p. 120.
43 Ibid., pp. 122–123; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp. 336–337.
44 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (W. W. Norton, 1999), p. 78. See also D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964 (Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 287–300.
45 Kenneth Strother, “A Memoir: Experience of a Staff Officer, Headquarters XXIV Corps in the Occupation of Korea, September–November 1945,” Miscellaneous Collection S, MHI; James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 287–300.
46 HUSAFIK, vol. 3, chap. 4, pp. 16–17.
47 Strother, “Memoir,” pp. 13–14.
48 FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 1045–1050.
49 Ibid., p. 1135.
50 The Korean People’s Republic (KPR) was an outgrowth of CPKI peacekeeping activities that had begun immediately after liberation with Japanese support. On September 6, 1945, CPKI members from Seoul and nearby provinces came together to announce the formation of the KPR. It was a direct response to the impending arrival of American occupational forces. CPKI leaders were eager to establish their own provisional government before the arrival of the Americans, “both to show that Koreans could run their own affairs and to forestall either a prolonged American tutelage or the installation in power of other Koreans who might gain American favor.” Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, p. 84; Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950, pp. 46–47.
51 U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) G-2 Periodic Report no. 1, September 9, 1945, Headquarters XXIV Corps, “Activities of Left-Wing Korean Political Parties,” p. 13, H. L. Wolbers Papers, box 1, MHI.
52 FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 1064.
53 USAMGIK, “Activities of Left-Wing Korean Political Parties,” pp. 15–17.
54 New York Times, October 30, 1945.
55 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 375–379.
56 Lauterbach, Dangers from the East, pp. 218–219.
57 New York Times, November 4, 1945.
58 FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 1142–1143.
59 Charles H. Donnelly, “U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK),” unpublished memoir, pt. 3, 1947–53, p. 960, Charles H. Donnelly Papers, MHI.
60 New York Times, December 8, 1945.
61 Donnelly, “U.S. Military Government in Korea,” pp. 914, 957–958.
1 Soon Sung-cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950, An Evaluation of American Responsibility (University of California Press, 1967), p. 94.
2 Quoted in Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, p. 200; Ambassador Edwin Pauley to President Truman, June 22, 1946, in FRUS, 1946, vol. 8: The Far East (1971), pp. 706–709. Truman was impressed with Pauley’s letter; see his response, July 16, 1946, in FRUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 713–714; and in Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Doubleday, 1956), p. 366.
3 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 184–187; “Langdon to Secretary of State,” November 20, 1945, in FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, vol. 6: The British Commonwealth, the Far East (1969), p. 1131.
4 Letter from Mrs. Rhee to Mrs. Frye, May 4, 1947, “Robert T. Oliver File,” 79 #13011, Syngman Rhee Presidential Papers (hereafter “Rhee Papers”), Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. For a complete catalogue of the Rhee papers, see Young Ick Lew and Sangchul Cha, comp., The Syngman Rhee Presidential Papers: A Catalogue (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2005).
5 “Memorandum of February 5 and May 14, 1945,” in FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 1023, 1030.
6 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, p. 219; Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950, p. 69.
7 New York Times, December 29, 1945.
8 Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945–1947 (Berg, 1989), pp. 142–144; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 221–223; HUSAFIK, vol. 2, chap. 4, p. 78; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, pp. 276–277.
9 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 223–225; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, pp. 276–280.
10 Lim Ŭn, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-sŏng (Tokyo: Jiyusha, 1982), pp. 150–151; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp. 337–340; Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p. 143; Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960 (Rutgers University Press, 2002), pp. 23–24.
11 Lim, Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea, p. 152.
12 Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, pp. 145–146.
13 New York Times, January 27, 1946.
14 Quoted in Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, p. 227.
15 New York Times, March 11 and 13, 1946.
16 Stalin’s instructions to the Soviet delegation stated “that the Commission must consult only with those democratic parties and organizations that fully and without any qualifications support the Moscow Decision.” See Jongsoo James Lee, The Partition of Korea after World War II: A Global History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 96–102.
17 Memorandum, October 26, 1946, Major General Albert E. Brown Papers, Korea, 1946–47, box 3, MHI.
18 HUSAFIK, vol. 3, chap. 2, pp. 212–213. As Kathryn Weathersby demonstrates, briefing papers for the December 1945 conference reveal that Stalin was very concerned about the threat of a resurgent Japan and that his aim for Korea was to eradicate Japanese influence in the peninsula. “If Soviet policy is directed at the destruction of the military capability of the Japanese aggressors, at the eradication of Japanese influence in Korea, at the encouragement of the democratic movement of the Korean people and preparing them for independence, then judging by the activity of the Americans in Korea, American policy has precisely the opposite goal. The Americans have not only retained in Korea the old administrative apparatus, but have also left many Japanese and local collaborators in leadings posts. In the American zone, Japanese enjoy broad political rights and economic possibilities.” The Soviets also were well aware that Rhee’s political views were staunchly anti-Soviet, and they understood that should a government hostile to the Soviet Union come into power, they would not be able to safeguard their economic and strategic interests there. This concern was highlighted in another briefing report prepared for the December conference which concluded that “the Japanese military and heavy industry in North Korea must be transferred to the Soviet Union as partial payment of reparations, and also as compensation for the huge damage inflicted by Japan on the Soviet Union throughout the time of its existence, including damages from the Japanese intervention in the Far East from 1918–1923.” Quoted in Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives,” CWIHP Working Paper 8 (November 1993), pp. 17–20. See also Wada Haruki, “The Korean War, Stalin’s Policy and Japan,” Social Science Japan Journal 1, no. 1 (1998), pp. 5–29.
19 HUSAFIK, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 29.
20 Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng, “The Shtykov Diaries: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in Korea,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 92–96; Letter from Mrs. Rhee to Mrs. Frye, May 4, 1947, “Robert T. Oliver File,” 79 #13011, Rhee Papers.
21 Rhee to Oliver, May 6, 1947, “Robert T. Oliver File,” 79 #13011, Rhee Papers.
22 “Statement by Rhee,” January 23, 1947, “Robert T. Oliver File,” 79 #13004, Rhee Papers.
23 New York Times, May 29, 1947.
24 “Draft Report of Special Interdepartmental Committee on Korea, February, 25, 1947, FRUS, 1947, vol. 6: The Far East (1972), pp. 611–612.
25 Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950, p. 120.
26 James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, part 1: The Korean War (Michael Glazier, 1979), pp. 13–14.
27 “Robert Lovett to V. M. Molotov,” October 17, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, p. 837.
28 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 45–46; Andre Lankov, “What Happened to Kim Ku?” Korea Times, September 4, 2008; “Chronology of Activities of Opposition to the UN Election,” Albert E. Brown Papers, Korea, 1946–51, box 3, MHI.
29 An justified the killing by stating that Kim Ku was acting on behalf of the Soviets. An was tried and given a life sentence, but he was pardoned in time to fight in the Korean War, survived it, and became a successful businessman in exile. Many had long suspected that Rhee was ultimately behind An’s actions, but it was only in 1992 that An confessed to a major newspaper that Rhee’s chief of security had been behind the assassination. In October 1996, at the age of seventy-nine, An was beaten to death by an attacker wielding a club inscribed with the words “Justice Stick.” See Lankov, “What Happened to Kim Ku?” An’s story took a final strange turn when a U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) report from July 1, 1949, was discovered in the National Archives (NARA). It clearly states that An was a CIC informant and then an agent. He was also a member of a secret right-wing organization called the “White Clothes Society,” whose leader, Yum Dong-jin, supported Rhee and opposed Kim Ku and was considered “our man in Seoul” by the CIC. This raised speculation that the U.S. government might have ultimately been behind the assassination. The CIC report by Maj. George Cilley can be found at http://www.korean-war.com/Archives/2002/06/msg00085.html (accessed August 1, 2010).
30 Allan R. Millett, “Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of Korean Army, 1945–1950,” Armed Forces and Society, no. 4 (Summer 1947), p. 510.
31 Ibid., pp. 507–513; James Hausman, John Toland interview transcript, p. 37, Hausman Papers, Yenching Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
32 John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (University of Delaware Press, 1989), p. 67; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 254.
33 Merrill, Korea, p. 81.
34 HUSAFIK, pt. 3, p. 18.
35 Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950, p. 161.
36 James Hausman, “Notecards for a Speech on the Early Days of the Korean Constabulary,” Hausman Papers. See also Donald Clark, “Before the War—Western Encounters with Korea,” unpublished manuscript (author’s personal copy), p. 31.
37 James Hausman, “History of the Rebellion, 14th Constabulary,” Hausman Papers; Clark, “Before the War,” p. 33.
38 Hausman, “History of the Rebellion, 14th Constabulary”; Donald Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience, 1900–1950 (Eastbridge, 2001), pp. 335–336.
39 Keyes Beech, Tokyo and Points East (Doubleday, 1954), p. 141. Also partly quoted in Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, p. 265.
40 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, p. 265; Beech, Tokyo and Points East, p. 141; Kim Kye-yu, “Naega kyŏkkun yŏsunsagŏn” [My Experience of the Yŏsu Sunch’ŏn Incident], Chŏnan munhwa 4 (1991), pp. 54–57.
41 Hausman, “Notecards for a Speech.” The total number killed in Cheju-do is in dispute. Allan R. Millett, for example, doubts it was as high as thirty thousand, based on his own careful analysis. See Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950, p. 303, no. 74.
42 New York Times, May 7, 1949.
1 Kathryn Weathersby, “Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” CWIHP Working Paper 39 (July 2002), pp. 3–5.
2 Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Foreign Language Press, 1977), vol. 4, pp. 160–163.
3 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 24.
4 Shi Zhe, “ ‘With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of Mao’s Interpreter,’ Part 2; Liu Shaoqi in Moscow,” Chinese Historian 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 83. Mao’s resentment of Stalin was palpable during his 1956 conversation with the Soviet ambassador: “When armed struggle against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek was at its height, when our forces were on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that peace be made with Chiang Kai-shek, since he doubted the forces of the Chinese Revolution.” “Mao’s Conversation with Yudin, 31 March 1956,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 165.
5 Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 5, pp. 16–17.
6 Tony Saich, ed., The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis (East Gate, 1996), pp. 1368–1369; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 15–23, 33–57, 64–78.
7 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 85.
8 “Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow 16 December 1949,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 5; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, pp. 85–88.
9 Sergei Goncharov, “The Stalin-Mao Dialogue,” Far Eastern Affairs, no. 2 (1992), pp. 109–110. This article features Goncharov’s interview with Ivan Kovalev, Stalin’s personal envoy to Mao Zedong.
10 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 92.
11 New York Times, January 2, 1950; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, pp. 92–93. See also Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev (Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 60–62.
12 “Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 8.
13 New York Times, January 5, 1950.
14 This interpretation is implied in Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners. Also see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 72–73; William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 73. Lorenz Lüthi has argued, however, that despite the intricate maneuvers between Mao and Stalin, there was never really a chance of China’s rapprochement with the United States simply because Mao did not want it. Lüthi also rejects the notion that Mao was pretending to Stalin that such a rapprochement was possible or that he played the “American card” to get better terms from Stalin. See Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton University Press, 2008). Chen Jian agrees, stating that America’s “lost chance” with China is a myth and that the CCP’s adoption of its anti-American policy had “deep roots” that went way beyond U.S. support for the Nationalists (p. 48). Sergey Radchenko similarly describes Mao as a “revolutionary realist” who “worked toward one goal alone: China’s and his own power” (p. 69). Accordingly, Mao’s ultimate goal was to restore the nation’s independence and pride and to secure his control over China’s state and society. Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heaven: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 (Stanford University Press, 2009); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (University of Chapel Hill Press, 2001).
15 Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 65–66.
16 “Minutes of Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 7–8.
17 Text of the treaty in John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 214–216.
18 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, pp. 110–129. Mao also received another gift from Stalin: the Soviet leader provided Mao with a list of Chinese informers within the CCP who reported to Moscow. It was another instance of Stalin’s many betrayals that resulted in the purge of hundreds of pro-Soviet communists in the CCP. See Zubok and Pleshankov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 61.
19 An Sŭng-hwan, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsagomundanŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” in Hanguk chŏnjaengsaŭi saeroun yŏngu [New Research on Korean War History] (Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History Compilation, 2002), vol. 2, p. 371.
20 A list of the number of Soviet advisors assigned to the NKPA reveals the degree of effort to professionalize the NKPA at every level of its command structure in the months before the outbreak of the war:
Division level and higher (total 34)
• Commander (Shtykov)
• Chief advisor to NKPA Supreme Staff
• 10 functional branch advisors
• 18 Supreme Staff operations staff advisors (key group, responsible for war planning and execution)
• 5 division commanders’ advisors
Advisors at brigade level and below (total 202)
• 15 brigade advisors
• 68 regimental advisors
• 8 battalion advisors
• 9 military school advisors
• 28 military school faculty advisors
• 39 advisors to various other units
• 6 medical advisors
• 29 military specialists
From ibid., pp. 370–371.
21 Vladamir Petrov, “Soviet Role in the Korean War Confirmed: Secret Documents Declassified,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13, no. 3 (1994), pp. 51; Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” Journal of American–East Asian Relations 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 429.
22 Petrov, “Soviet Role in the Korean War Confirmed,” p. 51.
23 Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” pp. 9–11.
24 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, pp. 143–145; Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” pp. 11–12. Also see Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and edited by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Little, Brown, 1990), pp. 86–87; Khrushchev, “Truth about the Korean War: Memoirs,” Far Eastern Affairs, no. 1 (1991), pp. 63–69.
25 Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” pp. 12–13; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 145.
26 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 146. Sources differ as to how reluctant Mao actually was regarding his support of Kim’s invasion plans. According to Khrushchev and other Chinese officials close to Mao, it was Mao who convinced Stalin to back Kim because he firmly believed that the United States would not intervene. Thus, far from being manipulated into supporting the war, Mao, according to these accounts, was a strong advocate of Kim’s war. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 87–91; Krushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 368.
27 The full text of NSC 68 can be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm (accessed January 20, 2009).
28 David McCullough, Truman (Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 773; Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 1950 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 152. For an assessment of the significance of this document, see Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpretating NCS 68 (St. Martin’s Press, 1993).
29 Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, June 20, 1950, cited in Petrov, “Soviet Role in the Korean War Confirmed,” pp. 53–54. Petrov notes that when the NKPA captured Seoul, Stalin forbade General Vasiliev to go there because of its proximity to the front. He “did not want the United States, the United Nations and World opinion to catch him directly participating in the war,” although at that time few doubted the degree and nature of Moscow’s involvement. An Sŭng-hwan also noted how the Soviet advisory activity was restricted: “Advisors who went to North Korea just before and during the war travelled on their army or navy identification cards rather than with a passport and thus did not register with the Soviet Embassy. Advisors only wore civilian clothing and disguised themselves as Pravda correspondents.” An, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsagomundanŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” p. 369.
30 Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” p. 14.
31 “Interview of General Razhubayev by Aryuzunov, 29 May 2001,” cited in An, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsagomundanŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” pp. 439–440.
32 Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” pp. 14–15. See also Anatoly Torkunov, The War in Korea, 1950–1953: Its Origins, Bloodshed and Conclusion (Tokyo: ICF, 2000), p. 68.
1 Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea (University Press of Kentucky, 1991), p. 1.
2 “Letter to Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman from Joseph R. Darrigo,” July 2, 1953, Clay Blair Collection, box 78, MHI; Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 23–24.
3 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 20.
4 FRUS, 1950, vol. 7: Korea (1976), p. 49.
5 Quoted in Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (Times Books, 1987), p. 55.
6 FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, pp. 121–122.
7 U.S. News & World Report, May 5, 1950, p. 30.
8 Paik Sun Yup (Paek Sŏn-yŏp), From Pusan to Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs of the Republic of Korea’s First Four-Star General (Brassey’s, 1992), p. 8.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
10 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 404–405; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Doubleday, 1956), p. 332; McCullough, Truman, pp. 774–775.
11 FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, p. 124; McCullough, Truman, p. 777; Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 332–333.
12 FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, p. 129.
13 Marguerite Higgins, War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent (Doubleday, 1951), p. 16.
14 Beech, Tokyo and Points East, p. 111; James Hausman, Toland interview transcript, pp. 32–33.
15 Beech, Tokyo and Points East, pp. 112–113.
16 Hausman, Toland interview transcript, p. 34.
17 Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom, p. 18.
18 Quoted in D. Clayton James and Anne Sharpe Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command Crisis in Korea, 1950–53 (Free Press, 1992), p. 138.
19 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 76.
20 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: General of the Army (Naval Institute Press, 1964), p. 334.
21 Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 1950.
22 Anthony Leviero, “U.S. ‘Not at War,’ President Asserts,” New York Times, June 30, 1950.
23 John Toland, In Mortal Combat Korea, 1950–1953 (William Morrow, 1991), pp. 65–68.
24 Eric C. Ludvigsen, “An Arrogant Display: The Failed Bluff of Task Force Smith,” Army (February 1992), p. 38.
25 A recent study by Thomas E. Hanson suggests that the American soldiers in Japan might have been better prepared than commonly believed. See his Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War (Texas A&M University Press, 2010).
26 Quoted in Real Magazine, October 1952.
27 Michael W. Cannon, “Task Force Smith: A Study in (Un)preparedness and (Ir)responsibility,” Military Review 68, no. 2 (February 1988), p. 66.
28 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 75.
29 Letter from Dunn to Appleman, June 17, 1955, Clay Blair Collection, box 72, MHI.
30 New York Times, September 3, 1950.
31 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 110.
32 Comments critical of the ROK Army are found in most standard works in English on the Korean War such as Blair, Forgotten War; Appleman, South to the Naktong; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2. Allan Millett, however, has sought to correct this bias by focusing on many of the ROK Army’s accomplishments, especially at the beginning of the war when the ROK Capital Division and ROK First Division slowed the progress of the NKPA, thereby effectively thwarting Kim’s Il Sung’s victory drive to Pusan. See Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (University Press of Kansas, 2010), pp. 195-201. See also Korean Institute of Military History, The Korean War, vol. 1 (University of Nebraska Press, 1999), pp. 374–410.
33 Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom, p. 30.
34 Korea Institute of Military History, Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 299–300.
35 “Order from Supreme Commander, NKA, to All Forces, 15 Oct 1950,” quoted in James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 114n.
36 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 141.
37 Korea Times, October 1, 1999.
38 There are conflicting accounts as to why U.S. soldiers fired on the refugees. Some accounts contend that ill-trained and besieged soldiers had simply panicked, while others believe that they had been ordered. So far, no evidence has been uncovered that U.S. soldiers were given explicit orders to shoot the refugees at Nogŭnri; ample evidence supports the contention that there was a policy in place regarding the shooting of refugees. See Sahr Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No-Gun-ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (January 2005), p. 59; Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War (Henry Holt, 2001).
39 “One Korean’s Account: Too Frighten to Cry,” U.S. News & World Report, May 22, 2000, p. 52.
40 Department of the Army Inspector General, No Gun Ri Review, January 2001, pp. 149–150. An estimate of the number of deaths can be found in ibid., p. 191. The incident gained international attention as a result of a report by Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, published by the Associated Press in September 1999, that won the Pulitzer Prize in 2000. The AP team later published a much more extensive revision of their findings in The Bridge at No Gun Ri.
41 Donald Knox, The Korean War, vol. 1: Pusan to Chosin, an Oral History (Harcourt Brace, 1985), pp. 72–73.
42 Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 94–96.
43 Narrative Report of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, Office of the Chief, USMAG, 1946–1949, Provided by Col. Harold Fischgrund, (Ret.), KMAG, G3 Office, 1949. Copy obtained from Allan R. Millett.
44 Quoted in An Sŭng-hwan, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsa komundangŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” p. 443.
45 The soldiers of the ROK Sixth Division held firm and defended the city of Ch’unch’ŏn until noon, June 28. The speed of the North Koreans’ advance was seriously retarded and their tight timeline thrown to the winds. As events turned out, the North Korean army failed to execute the most important component of the operation as devised by Soviet planners—the encirclement and destruction of the ROK Army. The Soviet planners had envisioned a smaller-scale version of the epic campaigns of encirclement fought on the eastern front during World War II. The destruction of the ROK Army, not territorial advance, was the key to rapid victory. But the North Korean encircling forces, delayed by the ROK Sixth Division, were unable to encircle Seoul from the east and south to cut off the retreat route of the bulk of the ROK Army, which was located north of Seoul. See Kim Jwang-so, “The North Korean War Plan and the Opening Phase of the Korean War: A Documentary Study,” International Journal of Korean Studies (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 26–27. See also Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 95–96; Korean Institute of Military History, The Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 280–282.
46 “26 June 1950, Top Secret Report on Military Situation by Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 39–40.
47 Cables from Shtykov to Stalin on June 28, 1950, are cited in An, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsa komundangŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” p. 443.
48 “8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 43–44.
49 Cables cited in An, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsa komundangŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” p. 449.
50 Ibid., pp. 449–451. An is convinced that Soviet advisors were sent to the front with North Korean troops during the first weeks of the war. He believes that Stalin most likely ordered the withdrawal of most of the advisors before June 25. However, by July 8, realizing that the war was not going well, he agreed to send the requested twenty-five to thirty-five advisors. With regard to the earlier July 4 Shtykov cable requesting assignment of two advisors per two Army Group headquarters, and movement of General Vasiliev and a group of officers to the front headquarters in Seoul, Stalin replied only that it would be better for Vasiliev to remain in P’yŏngyang. An sees this as a silent consent for the assignment of the Army Group advisors. The South Korean historian Pak Myŏng-nim cites as further evidence the testimony of North Korean POWs. See Pak Myŏng-nim, Han’guk chongchaengui palbalgwa kiwŏn [The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins] (Seoul: Nanamch’ulp’an, 1996), vol. 1, pp. 196–197.
51 James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 453–454.
52 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 422.
53 James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 456–458.
54 MacArthur, Reminiscenses, p. 349.
55 Former secretary of the army Frank Pace Jr., interview, March 23, 1975, p. 8, MHI.
56 Quoted in James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, p. 461.
57 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 356.
58 Almond interview with Capt. Thomas Fergusson, March 28, 1975 (side 1 of tape 4), Edward Almond Papers, box 1, p. 20, MHI.
59 McCaffrey correspondence, September 10, 1978, Roy Appleman Collection, box 20, MHI.
60 O. P. Smith, “Summary of the Situation of 15 November Contained in Letter to Commandant of the Marine Corps,” Clay Blair Collection, box 83, MHI.
61 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 509–513.
62 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Doubleday, 1967), p. 42.
63 Clay Blair’s interview with Michaelis, April 4, 1984, Clay Blair Collection, box 77, MHI.
64 Oral reminiscences of Major General John H. Chiles, July 27, 1977, interview with D. Clayton James, Clay Blair Collection, box 77, MHI.
65 McCaffrey correspondence, September 10, 1978, Roy Appleman Collection, box 20, MHI.
66 Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea, 1950–51 (Newmarket Press, 1999), p. 105.
67 James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, p. 482; Schnabel and Robert Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, part 1: The Korean War, pp. 229–230.
68 Ridgway, Korean War, p. 42.
69 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 587.
70 New York Times, October 6, 1950.
71 Washington Post, October 4, 1950.
72 New York Times, October 6, 1950.
73 Jefferson City Post, October 2, 1950.
74 New York Times, September 28, 1950.
75 TRC, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three Years (Seoul: Ch’ungbuk National University Museum, 2009), pp. 95–96.
76 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 587.
77 Account of Pvt. Herman G. Nelson in Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers (University Press of Kentucky, 2004), pp. 67–68.
78 Interview with Yi Chun-yŏng, a former guard at Taejŏn prison, November 21, 2007, TRC and Ch’ungbuk National University Museum in Han’guk chŏnjaeng chŏnhu mingan in chipdan hŭisaeng kwallyŏn 2007nyŏn yuhaebalgul pogoso [2007 Report on the Excavations of Human Remains Related to Civilian Massacres before and during the Korean War] (Seoul: Ch’ungbuk National University Museum, 2008) (hereafter 2007 Report on Excavations), vol. 2, pp. 255–256.
79 New York Times, July 14 and 27, 1950.
80 Time, August 21, 1950, p. 20.
81 New York Times, July 13 and 16, 1950.
82 Higgins, War in Korea, p. 89.
83 New York Times, July 26, 1950.
84 Muccio to Rusk, July 26, 1950, box 4266, 795.000 Central Decimal Files 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. The letter, uncovered by the historian Sahr Conway-Lanz, resides in a collection of State Department documents on the Korean War. The document was first cited in Sahr Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (January 2005), p. 59. The letter appears to prove that there was an official policy regarding the shooting of refugees. The revelations are part of a larger probe on the UN handling of the refugee problem during the war. The issue of American killings of Korean civilians is an extremely polemical one and has riled nationalist passions in both the United States and South Korea. An early pioneer in presenting the ferocious nature of the war is Bruce Cumings, whose two-volume study titled The Origins of the Korea War is considered a landmark in Korean War historiography. See also Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (Viking Press, 1988); Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 (University Press of Kansas, 2000); Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: Americans, Non-combatant Immunity, and Atrocity after World War Two (Routledge, 2006). South Korean coverage of civilian killings started even before the September 1999 AP No Gun Ri report and was divided along political lines. In June 1999 the conservative monthly Wŏlgan chosŏn published, as part of a series marking the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the war, an article detailing the North Korean massacre of South Korean soldiers in hiding and patients at the Seoul National University Hospital in Seoul on June 28, 1950, immediately after the city was captured (pp. 118–130). When the AP report was published, the left-liberal newspapers immediately linked it to a wider issue of U.S. responsibility and culpability and strongly supported the call for apology and compensation. (See, for example, Tong-a ilbo articles on September 30 and October 1, 1999. Also see the October 15 interview with Stanley Roth, who was then the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, which portrays a recalcitrant, skeptical, and even defiant American attitude toward U.S. involvement in the killing of civilians during the war; and the Chung’ang ilbo story and editorial on October 1, which unequivocally points to U.S. culpability in No Gun Ri and other alleged massacres and pointedly calls for a U.S. apology and compensation for the alleged killings.) On the other hand, the conservative press, while covering the AP story, did so in a matter-of-fact manner that did not immediately point to U.S. culpability and instead highlighted the possible mitigating circumstances—such as untrained troops, fear of North Korean soldiers, and confusion caused by North Koreans disguised as civilians—to try to conceptualize the incident as something comprehensible while acknowledging it as a tragedy that required an apology and compensation if proved true. (See for example, Chosŏn ilbo stories on September 30 and October 11, 1999, and its editorial on October 1, 1999.) The liberal press continued its attacks with further accounts of U.S. complicity in atrocities committed against South Korean civilians, with additional stories on the deliberate destruction of bridges (at Waegwan and Koryŏng) in early August 1950, which blocked refugees from moving south, and another air attack incident at Kwegaegul in January 1951. (See Chung’ang ilbo, October 15, 1999, for the Waegwan and Koryŏng story, and Tong-a ilbo, December 3, 1999, for the Kwegaegul story.)
85 General Paul Freeman, interview with Colonel James N. Ellis, November 29 and 30, 1973, U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, MHI.
86 H. K. Shin, Remembering Korea 1950: A Boy Soldier’s Story (University of Nevada Press, 2001), p. 44.
87 O. H. P. King, Tail of the Paper Tiger (Caxton Printers, 1962), p. 359.
88 Time, August 21, 1950, p. 20.
89 In January 2000 a liberal journal in South Korea broke a major story based on newly discovered documents and photographs from the U.S. National Archives that graphically show the execution of eighteen hundred political prisoners by the ROK Military Police and the Korean National Police, an incident that was long believed to be true but unsupported by documentary evidence. The total number believed to have been killed was roughly eight thousand, although this figure is not corroborated by documentary evidence (Han’gyorae 21, January 20, 2000, pp. 20–27). Another liberal journal, Mal, stoked the flames of anti-Americanism further with a series of articles in its February 2000 issue that provide both documentary and photographic evidence of killings of civilian political prisoners, allegedly communists, by South Korean security forces in Seoul in April 1950 before the war began, at Taejŏn in early July 1950, and at Taegu in August 1950 and April 1951. Both stories strongly implicated the United States, with photos showing American officers calmly observing the executions. The April 1950 incident is made more significant by the fact that it occurred before the war while the country was under peaceful civilian control, and yet the executions were carried out by the ROK Military Police. Also implicated in the killings is Rhee, who is portrayed as being in cahoots with the United States because purging the Left strengthened his dictatorial hold on power. While not the last in this Left-Right debate about wartime culpability, one additional example demonstrates the unending cycle of the accusatory debate, the kind of cycle that the South Korean historian Pak Myŏng-nim calls for an end to. In June 2000, Wŏlgan chosŏn published a long article on the North Korean massacre of several thousand civilians and POWs, South Korean and American, at Taejŏn in late September 1950. It happened as the North Korean forces reeled back from the success of the Inch’ŏn landing (pp. 264–287). This was a direct counter to the liberal media coverage of the South Korean killings at Taejŏn in July 1950. The article also made a semantic distinction between massacre, which characterizes what the North Koreans committed, and execution of prisoners by the South Korean police. The execution of political prisoners is indirectly justified, because their arrests, as menaces to national security, were legal under South Korean law at the time (and for a long time afterward). The debate is far from over. See Sheila Miyoshi Jager, “Re-writing the Past/Re-claiming the Future: Nationalism and the Politics of Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Japan Focus, July 29, 2005, at http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/1772 (accessed January 2010).
90 A compilation of oral histories of massacres can be found in the 2007 Report on Excavations.
91 In late 2005, the South Korean government initiated an ambitious project, the TRC, to bring closure to the many open historical wounds that had been eating into the soul and fabric of the South Korean people and society. The TRC was modeled on the many other similar efforts around the world (most notably in South Africa and Rwanda) that had sprouted since the 1990s as the end of the cold war opened up space for repressed histories and memories to come out in the open. The TRC was charged with investigating and finding the truth of contentious issues from the colonial period, the period of authoritarian rule in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Korean War. Truth could begin the national healing process. The historical issues concerned were charged with domestic and international political implications. For the colonial period, the most contentious were collaboration and the assertion that collaborators were never brought to justice and had instead prospered under the right-wing rule that controlled South Korea for most of the postliberation period. The focus of the 1960s–1970s period was on the massive human and civil rights violations that undermined democracy. American support for that regime, based on cold war logic, is linked to the substantial anti-Americanism that exists today in South Korea. But it is the alleged killings and massacres by North Koreans, South Koreans, and Americans before and during the Korean War that have taken up most of the commission’s efforts. They are also the most sensitive and politically explosive issues attesting to the enduring impact of the civil conflict that still feeds deep antipathies and enmities in South Korean society. TRC findings of evidence of massacres in the South by South Korean security forces made headlines in the summer of 2008 when excavations of massacre sites, testimonies by perpetrators and witnesses, and gruesome photographs from American archives were revealed with the suggestion of American complicity or at least acquiescence. TRC, Truth and Reconciliation. Also see Charles J. Hanley and Jae-Soon Chang, “Summer of Terror: At Least 100,000 Said Executed by Korean Ally of US in 1950”; Jae-Soon Chang, “Hidden History: Families Talk of Korean War Executions, Say US Shares Blame”; Charles J. Hanley and Jae-Soon Chang, “U.S. Okayed Korean War Massacres”; Charles J. Hanley, “Fear, Secrecy Kept 1950 Korea Mass Killings Hidden,” all AP reports dated July 4, 2008, all available at http://japanfocus.org/-Charles_J_-Hanley/2827 (accessed December 2008). The main excavation report is a massive three-volume set, 2007 Report on Excavations.
92 2007 Report on Excavations, vol. 2, pp. 319–335.
93 Chang, “Hidden History”; Hanley and Chang, “U.S. Okayed Korean War Massacres”; Hanley, “Fear, Secrecy”; Millett, War for Korea, pp. 160–161.
94 Wŏlgan chosŏn, June 2000, pp. 264–287. According to Kim Tong-ch’un (Kim Dong-choon), the former commissioner for the Sub-Committee of Investigation of Mass Civilian Sacrifice at the TRC, as many as three hundred thousand suspected communists and leftists may have been executed during the months of June to July 1950 alone. Kim Dong-choon, Chŏnjaeng’gwa sahoe [War and Society] (Seoul: Tolpaegae, 2000).
95 2007 Report on Excavations, vol. 2, pp. 239–241.
96 Ibid., p. 248.
97 Ibid., p. 236.
98 Ibid., p. 237.
99 Ibid., p. 259.
100 Alan Winnington, I Saw the Truth in Korea (People’s Press Printing, 1950), pp. 5–6.
1 The central pillar of the international coalition, the integration of U.S. and South Korean armed forces, continues to exist today as the foundation for the security of South Korea, a part of the legacy of the unending war.
2 The arrangement of the South Korean military being put under UN/U.S. control lasted until 1994, when peacetime operational command was transferred to South Korea, but wartime operational control still remained with the UN/United States and is not due to be transferred to South Korea until 2015.
3 UN naval and air forces entered the war before ground forces. Two days after the invasion U.S. air and naval forces based in Japan were committed. British naval forces based in Japan followed a day later. Australian air and naval units also based in Japan entered the war on July 1. By the end of July 1950, while the only UN ground forces were American, naval forces from Canada, France, and New Zealand and air forces from Australia and Canada had joined in the effort. By the summer of 1951, additional naval forces from the Netherlands, Thailand, and Colombia as well as a South African fighter squadron and a Greek air transport squadron had joined the coalition. The UN coalition’s command structure for controlling air and naval units was straightforward. At the top, the U.S. Far East Command in Japan controlled the coalition as the UNC. The Far East Command’s ground, air, and naval components controlled their respective coalition component forces. Air forces were simply organized because coalition contributions were few and small. These units were attached to matching U.S. Air Force units. Coalition naval forces were more substantial, with ships up to the size of aircraft carriers (United Kingdom and Australia) coming from eight nations. They were integrated into the U.S. Naval Forces Far East Command.
4 Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 513.
5 William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 10–14.
6 Ibid., pp. 84–85.
7 Ibid., pp. 158–159.
8 Ibid., pp. 155–158.
9 Ibid., pp. 150–155.
10 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 545.
11 David Curtis Skaggs, “The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965,” Military Affairs 38, no. 2 (April 1974), p. 55; Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 547.
12 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 503n.
13 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 86, 165–166.
14 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 492.
15 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 167.
16 Skaggs, “KATUSA Experiment,” p. 53.
17 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 168; Skaggs, “KATUSA Experiment,” p. 53; Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 492.
18 Skaggs, “KATUSA Experiment,” p. 53; Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 492.
19 Skaggs, “KATUSA Experiment,” p. 53.
20 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 503–509, 512, 520–523, 527–531, 541; Skaggs, “KATUSA Experiment,” pp. 53–54.
21 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 501.
22 I am indebted to Col. Don Boose (U.S. Army retired) for pointing this out. James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 232–240. These operations are also covered in more detail in Arnold Lott, Most Dangerous Sea: A History of Mine Warfare and an Account of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Operations in World War II and Korea (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1959). See also Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” Asian Pacific Journal 10, issue 31, no. 1 (July 30, 2012); Reinhardt Drift, “Japan’s Involvement in the Korean War,” in J. Cotton and I. Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 20–34.
23 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 514.
24 Although there was some talk after the outbreak of the war to directly recruit Japanese soldiers for the war effort, this proposal was immediately squashed by General MacArthur, owing to the sensitive nature of the proposal. Given Stalin’s heightened sensitivity about revived Japanese militarism, public evidence of direct involvement by Japan might have led him to risk full-scale Soviet involvement in Korea, something the Americans wanted to avoid at all costs. In addition, South Koreans were adamantly adverse to any Japanese involvement in the war effort because of their recent colonial experience. South Korean backlash and outright defections from the ROK Army were enough concerns to MacArthur that he emphatically stated that “no Japanese were to be employed with the army in Korea.” That said, recent evidence suggests that some Japanese nevertheless fought alongside the Americans, although their numbers were quite small. Most had worked for American soldiers in Japan as male cooks, drivers, interpreters, or servants and then later followed their employers to Korea. See Tessa-Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” pp. 2–5.
25 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 513
26 And indeed, all U.S. Army units stationed in South Korea to the present day have KATUSAs.
27 Lt. Col. Russell L. Prewittcampbell, “The Korean Service Corps: Eighth Army’s Three-Dimensional Asset,” Army Logistician (March–April 1999), at http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MARAPR99/MS337.htm (accessed July 15, 2010); Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 513; Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (University Press of Kansas, 2010), pp. 158–159. Another way to consider the multinational character of the UN army and the significance of the non-U.S. contributions is to quantitatively examine the allocation of the most important fighting elements in the war, the infantry battalions. These units formed the backbone of the front line and provided the overwhelming bulk of men who fought and died. Each nation had its own unique structure, but generally the units were roughly equivalent in terms of battlefield presence. From the beginning of the armistice talks to its conclusion two years later, the UN army nearly doubled in size. These increases were accounted for not only by the growth of the South Korean army but also by a 20 percent increase in U.S. forces and a near doubling of forces from other nations. In the summer of 1951 the Eighth Army had a total of 185 infantry battalions, of which 96 were Korean, 72 American, and 17 from other UN member states. Roughly 10 to 15 percent of all U.S., French, Dutch, and Belgian battalions were also manned by KATUSAs. In other words, conservatively, the KATUSA strength in the U.S. and UN battalions was the equivalent to about eight Korean battalions. The final tally of infantry battalions is then 104 ROK, 65 American, and 16 other nationalities. In percentage terms they are, respectively, 56, 35, and 9 percent. In early 1953, due to a shortage of men, the Commonwealth Division received 1,000 KATUSAs, now dubbed KATCOMs (Korean Augmentation to Commonwealth soldiers), who were integrated down to section (squad) level in the British, Canadian, and Australian infantry battalions. By the summer of 1953, the Eighth Army now had grown to 222 infantry battalions. The ROK number increased to 129, the American contributions stayed the same at 72, and the number from other UN nations increased to 21. The number of KATUSAs remained about the same but was now augmented by the KATCOMs in Commonwealth units. The Korean battalion equivalent in U.S. and other UN units was about 9. After adjustments for this, the final figures (and percentages) are 138 ROK (62 percent), 65 U.S. (29 percent), and 19 from other UN nations (9 percent). If we consider just the U.S. and other UN battalions, the 65 U.S. battalions in 1951 comprised 80 percent of the total (81 battalions), while in 1953 the same number of U.S. battalions (65) comprised 77 percent of the total (84).
A number of general observations can be based on these comparisons and trends from 1950 to 1953. First, the proportion of ROK to UN battalions increased from a little over half to two-thirds. Second, the proportion of U.S. battalions to other UN nations decreased a bit from 80 percent to 77 percent. More important, the share from other UN countries increased from 20 percent to 23 percent. This seems significantly out of proportion to the absolute number of men: 253,000 Americans to 20,000 other UN forces in 1951, to 300,000 Americans to 39,000 other UN forces by 1953. This discrepancy can be explained by the much higher number of Americans who were involved in support functions compared to the number of other UN forces. The “tooth to tail” ratio, in military parlance, was much lower for the American force, a circumstance exaggerated because, except for the Commonwealth units, other nations completely depended on the United States to provide their “tail.”
28 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (Random House, 2012), pp. 282–283. See also Callum A. McDonald, Britain and the Korean War (Blackwell, 1990), pp. 1–4.
29 John M. Vander Lippe, “Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey’s Participation in the Korean War,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 1 (January 2000), p. 98.
30 Richard Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 141; John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 541–546.
31 Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,” Journal of American–East Asian Relations 1, no. 1 (1993), pp. 29–55; Akagi Kanji, “The Korean War and Japan,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 24, no. 1 (June 2011), pp. 145–184; Akitashi Miyoshita, “Japan,” Encyclopedia of the Korean War, vol. 1 (ABC-CLIO, 2000), pp. 284–285.
32 Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 182–183; Sri Nandan Prasad, History of the Custodian Force (India) in Korea (Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1976).
1 Schnabel and Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3: The Korean War, p. 244.
2 Ibid., pp. 242–244.
3 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, p. 182.
4 Schnabel and Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, p. 243.
5 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War (University of Nebraska Press, 2000), vol. 1, p. 762.
6 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 614–615.
7 Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China (University of California Press, 2005), p. 220. For an excellent overview of the Imjin Wars, see also Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2009); Stephan Turnbull, The Samurai Invasion of Korea, 1592–1598 (Cassell & Company, 2002).
8 The war would continue over the next few years. While Ming China emerged victorious from the struggle, the heavy financial burden had adversely affected its military capabilities, thus contributing to its fall to the Manchus in 1644. Hideyoshi’s misadventure had also cost the Japanese. After the war, Japan would not venture out into the world again until 1894–95, when it fought and won in another war against China.
9 James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 348–349.
10 Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 567.
11 Quoted in James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, p. 503.
12 Ibid., pp. 503–505.
13 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (W. W. Norton, 1990), pp. 168–169.
14 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Doubleday 1956), p. 363.
15 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 576.
16 McCullough, Truman, p. 808.
17 Schnabel and Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, p. 499. Six months later, General Collins cited this incident as the first instance when MacArthur violated a JCS directive. J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (Louisiana State University Press, 1979), pp. 179–181.
18 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 579.
19 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 468.
20 K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat (George Allen & Unwin, 1955), pp. 108–110; New York Times, October 2, 1950; New York Herald Tribune, October 1, 1950.
21 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 362.
22 Lim Ŭn, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-sŏng (Tokyo: Jiyusha, 1982), pp. 145, 181–184.
23 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Archives,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 98, 112.
24 “Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 114.
25 This account of Mao’s October 3 communication with Stalin, informing him of China’s refusal to enter the war, is based on documents declassified after the fall of the Soviet Union. The message contradicts the purported Mao-to-Stalin message of October 2 that was published in 1987 in an official Chinese document compilation and had since been relied on for numerous scholarly accounts. The official account cites that Mao wrote to Stalin that the Chinese leadership had decided “to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [Chinese People’s] Volunteers to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee.” However, Mao apparently did not send the cable, probably because of the divided opinion among the top CCP leadership. See Shen Zhihua, trans. Neil Silver, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s (Routledge, 2012), pp. 149–158. For the texts of the two versions of Mao’s October 2, 1950, telegram, and two interpretations of them, see Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim and China’s Decision,” pp. 94–119; Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 8/9 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 237–242.
26 “Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 114–115.
27 “Letter, Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] October 1950,” CWHIP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 116.
28 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 185.
29 Xiaomin Zhang, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War over Korea (Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp. 74–76.
30 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal (University Press of the Pacific, 2005), p. 473. See also Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly, no. 121 (March 1990), p. 106.
31 Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, p. 473.
32 Mansourov, Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision, p.101.
33 Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” CWIHP Working Paper 1 (June 1992), p. 29; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 279.
34 Mansourov, Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision, p. 100; Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 144–152.
35 There are different versions of what took place during the Zhou-Stalin meetings. See Chen, “Sino-Soviet Alliance,” pp. 31–32; Mansourov, Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision, p. 103. See also Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, pp. 170–174; Zubok and Pleshankov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 67–69.
36 Mansourov maintains that Stalin never betrayed Mao and that the account of Stalin’s betrayal is fictional. See Mansourov, Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision, p. 105.
37 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, pp. 192–193.
38 Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millet, and Bin Yu, eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (University Press of Kansas, 2001), p. 41.
39 Chen, “Sino-Soviet Alliance,” p. 32.
40 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 222–223.
41 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, “A Reminiscence of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the Korean War,” China Quarterly, no. 98 (June 1984), p. 295.
42 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (Times Books, 1987), pp. 387–390; Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 305–306.
43 Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 391.
44 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 677.
45 Schnabel and Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, p. 281.
46 James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 519–520; Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 373. The reason MacArthur seems to have discounted the possibility of a major intervention in Korea, despite ample evidence to the contrary, appears to be linked to his belief that the time had passed for the CPV to have derived any tactical benefits from entering the war at this time. A Far East Command daily intelligence published on October 28 sums up this view: “From a tactical viewpoint, with victorious U.S. Divisions in full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious time for such [Chinese] intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness.” See Schnabel and Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, p. 281.
47 William T. Y’Blood, ed., The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 257.
48 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 374–375.
49 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, pp. 585–589; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 464; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 243–246; James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 520–522.
50 Schnabel and Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, pp. 301–302; Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, pp. 590–591.
51 “Section 7: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea 6 November 1950,” National Intelligence Council, Selected National Intelligence Estimates on China 1948–1976, available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_foia_china.html.
52 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 594.
53 An Sŭng-hwan, “Chupukhan ssoryŏn kunsa komundangŭi pukhangun chiwŏn hwaldong (1946–1953) [Soviet Military Advisory Group Support to the NKPA, 1946–1953],” p. 455.
54 Cited in ibid., p. 456.
1 Washington Post, November 23, 1950.
2 New York Times, November 23, 1950.
3 Ibid., November 21, 1950.
4 Chicago Tribune, November 23, 1950.
5 William T. Y’Blood, ed., The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 299.
6 Toland, In Mortal Combat Korea, p. 281.
7 Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 440; Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 336–337.
8 Beech, Tokyo and Points East, p. 196.
9 Oliver P. Smith, “Aide de Memoir … Korea, 1950–1: Notes by General O. P. Smith on the Operations during the First Nine Months of the Korean War,” 1951, folder 3, pp. 604–610, PD 110, Collection Unit, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; “Forgotten War,” Clay and Joan Blair Collection, Alphabetical Files S-V, box 83, MHI.
10 There are many accounts of the battle of Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, but the most recent is David Halberstam, Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (Hyperion, 2007). The most detailed military histories of the battle are Roy E. Appleman’s East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 (Texas A&M Press, 1987) and Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951.
11 Almond quoted by Martin Blumenson, “Chosin Reservoir,” in Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 69–70.
12 Donald Knox, The Korean War, vol. 1: Pusan to Chosin, an Oral History (Harcourt Brace, 1985), pp. 552–559; Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (Texas A&M University Press, 1989), p. 133.
13 Time, December 18, 1950, p. 26.
14 Max Hastings, The Korean War (Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 159.
15 New York Times, December 11, 1950.
16 Washington Post, December 11, 1950.
17 Time, December 8, 1950, pp. 26–27.
18 New York Times, December 24, 1950; Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 328.
19 William Whitson, The Chinese High Command (Praeger, 1973), p. 96; John J. Tkacik Jr., “From Surprise to Stalemate: What the People’s Liberation Army Learned from the Korean War—A Half Century Later,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75 (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), p. 303.
20 Quoted in Chester Cheng, “Through Chinese Eyes: China Crosses the Rubicon,” Journal of Oriental Studies 31, no. 1 (1993), p. 11.
21 “Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, 2 December 1950,” in Guang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944–1950 (Imprint, 1996), p. 211.
22 Quoted in Tkacik, “From Surprise to Stalemate,” pp. 302–303.
23 Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950–July 1951 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 165–176.
24 Bill Gilbert, Ship of Miracles (Triumph Books, 2000), pp. 77–157.
25 Time, December 11, 1950, pp. 17–18. Fifty-five percent of Americans believed that the United States was in World War III. Washington Post, December 6, 1950.
26 U.S. News & World Report, December 8, 1950, pp. 16–22; Hugh Baillie, High Tension (Harper’s & Brothers, 1959), pp. 225–226. See also James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, p. 540; New York Times, December 1, 1950; Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, pp. 601–602.
27 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 384.
28 James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, p. 542.
29 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 381–382.
30 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 603; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited (Doubleday, 1967), pp. 77–78.
31 James Chase, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 306–308; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 476–477; George F. Kennan, George F. Kennan: Memoirs 1950–1963 (Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 27–35; John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (Penguin, 2011), pp. 412–413.
32 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 476; Kennan, George F. Kennan, p. 31.
33 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 476–477; Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 418; Kennan, George F. Kennan, p. 32.
34 Kennan, George F. Kennan, p. 33.
35 J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (Louisiana State University Press, 1979), p. 373; Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, pp. 606–607.
36 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 478–482; M. L. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950–June 1951,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 62, no. 3 (Summer 1986), p. 466; Rosemary Foot, “Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert Expanded War, December 1950–January 1951,” Diplomatic History 10, no. 1 (Winter 1986), p. 49; FRUS, 1950, vol. 7: Korea (1976), pp. 1376, 1383, 1431–1432.
37 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 482.
38 FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, pp. 1462–1464, 1473–1475, 1479; Schnabel and Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, part 1, p. 379; William Stueck, ed., The Korean War in World History (University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 140; Beisner, Dean Acheson, p. 421.
39 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 485.
40 Washington Post, December 9, 1950.
41 Knox, Korean War, vol. 1, p. 659.
42 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 318.
43 Knox, Korean War, vol. 1, p. 657.
44 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, p. 395. UN pilots charged with carrying out the strafing and bombing campaigns often justified these sorties by labeling civilians as “disguised troops” or as “supporters” of enemy activity. One pilot recalled, “If we saw civilians in the village, just because they look like civilians, from an airplane you can’t tell whether he’s a civilian or a soldier, anything in North Korea I consider an enemy. They’re definitely not on our side, therefore I have no mercy … Anything supporting enemy troops is an enemy of ours; therefore, I consider it worthwhile to strike it.” Sometimes, this view was justified. In one case, a pilot had spotted a group of people in a village in white clothing. The presence of women and children in the streets and their friendly waves made him hesitate. But he strafed them and received heavy fire in return from the “peaceful civilians.” Raymond Sturgeon was more circumspect about his mission. Dropping napalm and strafing people was a “difficult job,” “I can’t say I enjoyed it. You’re there and that’s what you do … we were instructed to hit civilians because they did a lot of the work, but I just couldn’t do it.” John Darrell Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War (New York University Press, 1996), pp. 104–106.
45 Quoted in Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, pp. 393–394.
46 H. K. Shin, A Boy Soldier’s Story: Remembering Korea 1950 (University of Nebraska Press, 2001), p. 143.
47 “Seoul after Victory: Reverse Side to South Korean Rule,” London Times, October 25, 1950.
48 Peter Kalischer, “2 U.S. Priests Protest as S. Koreans Kill Prsoners,” Washington Post, December 17, 1950.
49 Muccio to Secretary of State, December 21, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, p. 1586.
50 “Atrocities and Trials of Political Prisoners in Korea, British Foreign Office to Korea and Tokyo, and to Washington and United Kingdom Delegation, New York,” December 19, 1950, Telegram no. 125, WO 371/84180, National Archives, Kew, UK.
51 Letter from Private Duncan to Member of Parliament, FO 371/92847, National Archives, Kew, UK.
52 Washington Post, December 17, 1950.
53 New York Times, December 19, 1950; Washington Post, December 18, 1950. Reports of the execution of children were never officially confirmed. Graves opened by UN investigators looking into the allegations did not find children’s bodies. Ambassador Muccio also believed the reports to be false, writing on December 20 that “UNCURK had sent a military observer, Colonel White, Canada, to observe exhumation of bodies on December 17, which was conducted under orders of Home Minister and Justice Minister. Exhumation proved allegations re shooting of children wholly false.” FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, p. 1579.
54 “Mass Executions of Reds in Korea End,” Washington Post, December 22, 1950. See also “From Foreign Office to Korea,” Telegram no. 129, December 21, 1950, WO 371/84180, National Archives, Kew, UK.
55 Donald W. Boose Jr., “United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social and Military History (ABC-CLIO, 2000), pp. 681–683.
56 Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 374–375. Recent reports provided by South Korea’s TRC provide new evidence that children may have indeed been executed. In late 1950 and early 1951, the commission estimates that more than 460 people, including at least 23 children under the age of ten, were executed in Namyangju, about sixteen miles northeast of Seoul. The TRC also reported that children were among the victims in at least six other mass killings during this period. See Charles J. Hanley and Jae-soon Chang, “Children Executed in 1950 South Korean Killings,” Associated Press, December 6, 2008. See also Kim Tong-ch’un, Chŏnjaeng’gwa sahoe [War and Society]. Kim headed the TRC from December 2005 to its closing in December 2010.
57 Chicago Daily Tribune, December 19, 1950.
58 Muccio to Secretary of State, December 20, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, p. 1580; Chicago Tribune, December 14, 18, and 19, 1950; New York Times, December 21, 1950; Washington Post, December 17 and 22, 1950.
59 René Cutforth, Korean Reporter (Allan Wingate, 1952), p. 52. For other descriptions of the conditions at Sŏdaemun Prison, see Martin Flavin, “Korean Diary,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1951.
60 Washington Post, December 21, 1950.
61 Muccio to Secretary of State, December 22, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, p. 1587.
62 James Plimsoll, Australian Representative to the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, February 17, 1951, Departmental Dispatch no. 2/51 FO 371/92848, p. 3, National Archives, Kew, UK.
63 Plimsoll, Dispatch no. 2/51, pp. 4–6; Washington Post, December 27, 1950; Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion, 1950–53 (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 154–168. On December 22, the UNC instructed the Eighth Army Public Information Office (PIO) to check all stories emanating from Korea for security violations. Nevertheless, some stories did get out. Reprisals against suspected leftists continued through early 1951. The most well-known massacre during this period, the Kŏch’ang Civilian Massacre, took place on the east side of the Chiri Mountains. Although the number of people reported killed during the incident varies widely, it attracted enough attention that Rhee ordered Defense Minister Shin Sŏng-mo and Home Minister Cho Pyŏng-ok to resign. Those who were directly involved in the massacre were later court-martialed and imprisoned. Kim Tong-ch’un, Chŏnjaeng’gwa sahoe [War and Society], pp. 301–302.
64 Cited in Richard Fried, Men against McCarthy (Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 102; Thomas Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy (Madison Books, 1997), pp. 347–350.
65 Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Little, Brown, 1980), p. 474.
66 Dean Acheson, “Memories of Joe McCarthy,” Harper’s Magazine, October 1969, p. 120. Also see Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 366.
67 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 365.
68 Acheson, “Memories of Joe McCarthy,” p. 120; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 366.
69 Elmer Davis, “The Crusade against Acheson,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1951, p. 24.
70 Washington Post, December 20, 1950.
71 Davis, “Crusade against Acheson,” p. 29.
72 Acheson, “Memories of Joe McCarthy,” p. 124.
73 Almond Diary, December 27, 1950, Edward Mallory Almond Papers, box 10, MHI; Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 390–397.
74 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 314.
75 Halberstam, Coldest Winter, p. 486.
76 James Michener, Draft Article, December 29, 1951, MRP Official Correspondence, series 2, p. 25, MHI. Portions of the draft were later published under the title “A Tough Man for a Tough Job,” Life, May 12, 1952, pp. 103–118.
77 Interview with Ridgway, March 5, 1988, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, series 5, Oral Histories, 1964–1987, box 88, MHI; Ridgway, Korean War, p. 83.
78 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 616.
79 Ridgway interview, “Troop Leadership at the Operational Level: The Eighth Army in Korea,” Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, May 9, 1984, series 5, Oral Histories, box 8, p. 7, MHI.
80 Ridgway, Korean War, p. 84.
81 Ibid., pp. 86–87.
82 Clay Blair Collection, box 68, MHI.
83 The Jeter story was well known. Clay Blair interviewed many soldiers who repeated it and it became another Ridgway legend. Blair, Forgotten War, p. 574.
84 Ridgway interview, “Troop Leadership at the Operational Level,” p. 18.
85 Interview with Maj. Matthew P. Caulfield and Lt. Col. Robert M. Elton, August 29, 1969, Matthew Ridgway Papers, series 5, Oral Histories, box 88, MHI.
86 Interview with General Walter Winton, May 9, 1984, Matthew Ridgway Papers, series 5, Oral Histories, box 8, MHI.
87 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, “A Reminiscence of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the Korean War,” China Quarterly, no. 98 (June 1984), p. 295.
88 Pingchao Zhu, “The Korean War at the Dinner Table,” in Philip West, Steven Levine, and Jackie Hilt, eds., America’s War in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 185.
89 Guang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944–1950 (Imprint, 1996), pp. 214–215; Xiobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (University Press of Kansas, 2001), p. 18.
90 Cited in J. Chester Cheng, “The Korean War through Chinese Eyes: China Crosses the Rubicon,” Journal of Oriental Studies 31, no. 1 (1993), p. 13.
91 Ibid., p. 18.
92 Shen Zhihua, “Sino-North Korean Conflict and Its Resolution during the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 14/15 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004), p. 10.
93 Ridgway, Korean War, p. 93.
94 Li et al., eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, p. 19.
95 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshall: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) (University of Hawaii Press, 2005), p. 478.
96 Zhang Da, “Resist America, Aid Korea!” in Zhang Lijia and Calum MacLeod, eds., China Remembers (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 27.
97 Cited in Roy B. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (Texas A&M University Press, 1990), p. 155.
98 Shen, “Sino-North Korean Conflict,” p. 94.
99 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 619; full text of MacArthur’s January 10 telegram (quoted in text) in Matthew Ridgway Papers, series 3, Official Papers, Eighth Army, Special Files, December 1950–April 1951, box 68, MHI.
100 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 492.
101 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 515.
102 Collins, Lightning Joe, pp. 253–254.
103 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 623.
104 Washington Post, January 15, 1951.
105 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 94.
106 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 513.
107 Beisner, Dean Acheson, p. 423.
108 New York Times, January 13, 1951; Beisner, Dean Acheson, pp. 423–424; Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (Hippocrene Books, 1986), p. 388.
109 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 273; Blair, Forgotten War, p. 652.
110 Ridgway, Korean War, p. 105.
111 Evgueni Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–1951,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 90.
112 Quoted in Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, p. 219.
113 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 669; Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 398–399.
114 Ridgway telegram to GHQ, February 3, 1951, Clay Blair Collection, box 68, MHI.
115 Maj. Gen. George Craig Stewart, “My Service with the Second Division during the Korean War,” p. 17, Clay Blair Collection, Forgotten War, Alphabetical Files S, box 77, MHI.
116 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 690; Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs of the Republic of Korea’s First Four-Star General (Brassey’s, 1992), p. 125.
117 Gary Turbark, “Massacre at Hoengsŏng,” Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine, February 2001.
118 Blair, Forgotten War, pp. 711–712; Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, p. 391.
119 Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, pp. 479–480.
1 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life (Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 626; Schnabel and Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, p. 468; FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Korea and China, Part 1 (1983), pp. 251–256.
2 New York Times, March 24, 1951.
3 Washington Post, March 27, 1951; Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, p. 427.
4 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 519.
5 Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 441–442.
6 David McCullough, Truman (Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 837.
7 “Collins Interview with Lt. Col. Charles C. Sperow,” 1972, pp. 309–311, Senior Oral History Program Project, MHI.
8 McCullough, Truman, p. 837.
9 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 519.
10 Washington Post, April 6, 1951.
11 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, p. 299.
12 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 630.
13 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, p. 309; Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 630.
14 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 210–211.
15 Rogers M. Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean (University of North Carolina Press, 1987), p. 137.
16 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, pp. 630–631.
17 Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988/89), p. 74; Daniel Calingaert, “Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 2 (June 1988), pp. 177–202; Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion, 1950–53 (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 230–231.
18 Anders, Forging the Atomic Shield, p. 140.
19 McCullough, Truman, p. 840.
20 James, The Years of McArthur, vol. 3, p. 600; Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (Times Books, 1987), pp. 788, 794–797; Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949–1953 (W. W. Norton, 1967), pp. 340–362.
21 Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, as Told to Harold H. Martin (Harper, 1956), p. 223.
22 Mathew Ridgway Papers, series 3, “Official Papers,” box 72, MHI.
23 James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 602–603.
24 William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation Ambassador William Sebald (W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 235.
25 Frank Tremaine cited in “MacArthur,” American Experience, PBS, Enhanced Transcript, p. 29, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/filmmore/transcript/index.html (accessed October 1, 2010).
26 Time, April 30, 1951, p. 23.
27 Life, April 23, 1951, pp. 42–46.
28 Time, April 23, 1951, p. 28; James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, p. 610.
29 Washington Post, April 12, 1951; McCullough, Truman, pp. 846–847; James, Years of MacArthur, vol. 3, pp. 607–608; Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (Berkley, 1974), pp. 311–312; United Press International, May 12, 1951.
30 General (Ret) Hong Xuezhi, “The CCPV’s Combat and Logistics,” in Xiobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (University Press of Kansas, 2001), pp. 131–132.
31 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism (University Press of Kansas, 1995), pp. 145–146.
32 Li et al., eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, p. 125.
33 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 807.
34 Paschal N. and Mary H. Strong, “Sabres and Safety Pins” [Oral History], p. 414, Clay and Joan Blair Collection, “Forgotten War,” Alphabetical Files S–V, box 83, MHI; Bittman Barth, “Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea” [Oral History], pp. 74–75, MHI.
35 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 162–164.
36 “Memorandum for Commanding General, Eighth Army,” April 25, 1951, Matthew Ridgway Papers, series 3, Official Papers, CINC Far East, 1951–53, box 73, MHI.
37 Ridgway, “Ltr, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 25 April 1951, sub. Letter of Instructions,” Matthew Ridgway Papers, series 3, Official Papers, CINC Far East, 1951–53, box 73, MHI.
38 Bradley and Blair, General’s Life, p. 640.
39 “Instructions Given Orally to Colonel Paul F. Smith, in the Presence of Major General Doyle Hickey, Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC,” April 26, 1951, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, series 3, Official Papers, Commander-in-Chief Far East, 1951–52, box 72, MHI.
40 Interview with General James A. Van Fleet by Colonel Bruce H. Williams, tape 4, March 3, 1973, p. 23, MHI.
41 Quoted in Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (Frederick Muller, 1954), p. 49.
42 Ibid., p. 54.
43 E. J. Kahn, “A Reporter in Korea: No One but the Glosters,” The New Yorker, May 26, 1951, p. 15; Barry Taylor, “Open Road Barred,” Military History 7, no. 5 (April 1991), pp. 47–52; Brian Catchpole, “The Commonwealth in Korea,” History Today (November 1988), pp. 33–39.
44 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 847.
45 Van Fleet to Ridgway, May 11, 1951, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, series 2, Correspondence Official, Eighth U.S. Army, January 1951–June 1951, “N-Z,” box 13, MHI.
46 Life, May 11, 1953, p. 132.
47 Blair, Forgotten War, p. 859; Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951, pp. 443–444.
48 Interview with Lieutenant General Almond (Retired) by Captain Fergusson, March 29, 1975, side 1, tape 5, p. 26, Edward Almond Papers, MHI.
49 Life, May 11, 1953, p. 132.
50 Van Fleet interview, p. 53. See also Van Fleet, “How we can win with what we have,” Life, May 18, 1953, pp. 157–172.
51 Mathew Ridgway Papers, series 3, Official Papers, Commander-in-Chief Far East, 1951–52, box 72, MHI.
52 Life, May 11, 1953, p. 127.
1 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Korea and China, Part 1 (1983), p. 547.
2 Quoted in Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 925.
3 Stalin to Mao, June 5, 1951, CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 59.
4 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, p. 507.
5 Mao to Stalin, June 13, 1951, CWHIP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 61.
6 Kathryn Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 34–35.
7 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 100.
8 Ibid., p. 101.
9 C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (Macmillan, 1955), p. 4.
10 Quoted in Blair, Forgotten War, p. 933.
11 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, p. 100.
12 Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 19.
13 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 4–9.
14 Mao telegram to Stalin, July 3, 1951, CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 66.
15 Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 26–35.
16 Mao to Stalin, August 12, 1951, CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 68.
17 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, p. 745.
18 Mao to Stalin, August 27, 1951, CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), p. 68; Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, pp. 228–229.
19 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, pp. 848–849, 850–852.
20 Mao to Stalin, August 27, 1951, p. 68.
21 Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, series 3, Official Papers, Commander-in-Chief Far East, 1951–52, box 72, MHI.
22 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, pp. 774–776.
23 Rosemary Foot, “Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert Expanded War, December 1950–January 1951,” Diplomatic History 10, no. 1 (Winter 1986), p. 66.
24 Shiv Dayal, India’s Role in the Korea Question (Delhi: Chand, 1959), p. 143.
25 Stueck, Korean War, pp. 236–237.
26 Quoted in Blair, Forgotten War, p. 957; FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, p. 1099.
27 New York Times, November 17, 1951.
28 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, p. 1093.
29 Ibid., p. 618.
30 Ibid., p. 622.
31 Foot, “Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis,” p. 88.
32 J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 340.
33 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Part 1, pp. 857–858.
34 The Geneva Convention of 1949, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, August 12, 1949, Article 118, available at http:// www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument (accessed January 2009).
35 U. Alexis Johnson (with Jeff Olivarius McAllister), Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 133; Foot, “Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis,” pp. 88–89.
36 Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 135–136. Among the many controversial decisions made at Yalta was the agreement that when World War II ended in Europe, Soviet citizens, regardless of their individuals histories, be sent back to the Soviet Union. Although the agreement reached at Yalta did not specifically state that the Allies must return Soviet citizens against their will, this was what happened in many cases. Rather than return to face the firing squad or the Gulag, many Soviet citizens who were forced to return committed suicide instead. For a heartbreaking account of the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens after the war, see Anne Applebaum’s Pulitzer prize–winning book, Gulag: A History (Anchor Books, 2003), pp. 435–439.
37 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 133.
38 FRUS, 1952–54, vol. 15: Korea, Part 1 (1984), p. 401.
39 Allen Goodman, ed., Negotiating while Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference (Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 137.
40 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 141; Goodman, Negotiating while Fighting, p. 154. According to the Hanley Report of November 1951 on North Korean war crimes, compiled by Colonel James M. Hanley, chief of the Eighth Army’s war crimes section, 2,513 U.S. POWs and more than 25,000 South Korean POWs were killed. See Korean Atrocities: Report of the Committee on Government Operations Made through Its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations by Its Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities Pursuant to S. Res. 40 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954). The report can be accessed at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/KW-atrocities-Report.pdf.
41 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 142.
42 Goodman, Negotiating while Fighting, p. 181; Major General (Ret) Chai Chen-gwen, “The Korean Truce Negotiations,” in Xioabing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (University Press of Kansas, 2001), p. 216.
43 Chai, “Korean Truce Negotiations,” p. 217.
44 Goodman, Negotiating while Fighting, p. 208.
45 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 135.
46 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, p. 152.
47 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 135.
48 Anthony Eden, March 21, 1952, FO 371/99564, National Archives, Kew, UK.
49 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 139.
50 FRUS, 1952–54, vol. 15: Part 1, pp. 76–77, 58–59.
51 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 139.
52 Chai, “Korean Truce Negotiations,” pp. 217–224.
53 Washington Post, February 26, 1952.
1 Philip Crosbie, March Till They Die (Browne & Nolan, 1955), p. 54.
2 “Maryknoll Missionary Follows in Steps of Missionary Bishop in North Korea,” Catholic News Agency, May 13, 2008.
3 Philip Crosbie, Pencilling Prisoner (Hawthorne Press, 1954), p. 98.
4 Ibid., p. 101.
5 Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea (University Press of Kentucky, 1991), p. 85.
6 Nugent, vol. 4, Department of the Army Staff Judge Advocate (DASJA), p. 692. The bulk of primary sources were obtained from the DASJA through the Freedom of Information Act by Raymond B. Lech, to whom I am indebted for giving me access to them. The material consists of eighty volumes of transcripts of the fourteen U.S. Army court-martial proceedings. Each transcript is formally known by the name of the person being tried. The transcripts are now in the MHI; Nugent, vol. 8, DASJA, p. 2015; vol. 12, DASJA, pp. 139–140; Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner of North Korea (University of Kentucky Press, 1991), p. 88. Also see Raymond B. Lech, Broken Soldiers (University of Illinois Press, 2000).
7 Zellers, In Enemy Hands, pp. 90–91.
8 Ibid., p. 100.
9 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, p. 380.
10 Crosbie, Pencilling Prisoners, pp. 141–146.
11 “Testimony of Major Green,” Nugent, vol. 8, DASJA, p. 2044.
12 Crosbie, Pencilling Prisoners, p. 181.
13 “Testimony of Major Booker,” Nugent, vol. 8, DASJA, pp. 2144–2146.
14 Liles, vol. 4B, DASJA, pp. 1817–1818.
15 Fleming, vol. 11, DASJA, pp. 1418, 1477.
16 Ibid., pp. 1497–1500.
17 Ibid., p. 1516.
18 Liles, vol. 2, DASJA, p. 74.
19 “Testimony of Captain Sidney Esensten,” Liles, vol. 2B, DASJA, p. 82; “Testimony of Anderson,” Liles, vol. 2, DASJA, p. 428. See also Raymond B. Lech, Broken Soldiers (University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp. 42–48.
20 Liles, vol. 2, DASJA, p. 86.
21 Liles, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 143.
22 Ibid., pp. 1443–1444.
23 Erwin, vol. 4, DASJA, p. 1146.
24 Liles, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 144.
25 Erwin, vol. 3, DASJA, pp. 815–816.
26 Fleming, vol. 11, DASJA, p. 1544.
27 Olson, vol. 2, DASJA, pp. 29–30.
28 “Testimony of PFC Theodore Hilburn,” Olson, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 133.
29 “Testimony of Staff Sergeant Leonard J. Maffioli,” Olson, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 175.
30 “Testimony of Master Sergeant Chester Mathis,” Olson, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 213.
31 Olson, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 88.
32 “General Court-Martial Order, 10 June 1955,” Olson, vol. 2, DASJA, pp. 22–23.
33 “Harrison Testimony,” Olson, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 104.
34 Olson, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 278.
35 Fleming, vol. 2, DASJA, p. 305.
36 Liles, vol. 5, DASJA, pp. 279–280.
37 Fleming, vol. 4, DASJA, p. 207; vol. 9, DASJA, p. 1061.
38 Lech, Broken Soldiers, p. 124.
39 Liles, vol. 2B, DASJA, p. 724; Lech, Broken Soldiers, p. 124.
40 Liles, vol. 3, DASJA, p. 944.
41 Ibid., p. 1053.
42 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, p. 192.
43 “Dunn Testimony,” Nugent, vol. 5, DASJA, pp. 996–1024.
44 Liles, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 154.
45 “Testimony of Major Harold Kaschko,” Liles, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 211.
46 Lech, Broken Soldiers, p. 147. “Testimony of Major David McGhee,” Fleming, vol. 10, DASJA, p. 1163.
47 Fleming, vol. 10, DASJA, p. 1164.
48 Liles, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 148; “Affidavit of Captain Waldron Berry, 3 Nov 1954,” Nugent, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 98.
49 “Affidavit of J. D. Bryant, Captain, United States Air Force, 3 Nov 1954,” Nugent, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 98.
50 Fleming, vol. 9, DASJA, pp. 1150–1151.
51 “Testimony of Van Orman,” Fleming, vol. 7, DASJA, p. 483.
52 Alley, vol. 4, DASJA, p. 205.
53 “Deposition of Comdr R. M. Bagwell, 10 Sep 1954,” Fleming, vol. 4, DASJA, p. 2.
54 “Affidavit of Major Filmore Wilson McAbee, 22 Sep 1954,” Nugent, vol. 1, DASJA, p. 354.
55 Cho Ch’ang-ho, Toraon saja [Return of a Dead Man] (Seoul: Chiho ch’ulp’ansa, 1995).
56 Pak Chin-hŭng, Toraon p’aeja [Return of the Defeated] (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 2001), p. 73.
57 Ibid., pp. 78–79, 91–92.
58 Ibid., pp. 94, 98–99.
59 Ibid., pp. 100–101.
60 Ibid., p. 102.
61 Ibid., p. 100.
62 Ibid., p. 104.
63 Ibid., p. 116.
64 Ibid., p. 121.
65 “Hardly Known, Not Yet Forgotten: South Korean POWs Tell Their Story,” Radio Free Asia, January 25, 2007, at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/korea_pow-20070125.html (accessed March 5, 2010).
66 Cho reiterated this claim in his testimony before the U.S. Congress on April 27, 2006. His testimony stated, “As a POW, I didn’t even know that the war ended and the exchange of POWs had been occurred. I’ve learned that fact long after war ended. All of returned POWs whom I’ve met were not much different. They didn’t know that the exchange of POWs had been occurred either.” North Korea: Human Rights Update and International Abduction Issues: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, April 27, 2008 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), p. 43. This congressional hearing provides many more details about Cho’s circumstances and stories of other ROK POWs’ experience in North Korea.
67 “Hardly Known, Not Yet Forgotten,” Radio Free Asia.
68 Cho Song-hŭn, Han’gukchŏn kukkunp’oro silt’aepunsŏk [An Analysis of the Actual Conditions of South Korean POWs] (Seoul: Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏnguso, 2006), p. 103.
69 Ibid., pp. 56–57. See also 2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010), pp. 480–485. http://www.kinu.or.kr/upload/neoboard/DATA04/2010%20white%20paper.pdf (accessed October 15, 2012). For an excellent description of the recent plight of former South Korean POWs, see Melanie Kirkpatrick, Escape from North Korea: The Untold Stories of Asia’s Underground Railroad (Encounter Books, 2012), pp. 117–133.
70 “Soviet Embassy Charge d’Affaire to North Korea S.P. Suzdalev to Foreign Minister Molotov,” December 2, 1953, in Yang Chin-sam, “Chŏnjaenggi chungguk chidowa pukhan chidobu saiŭi mosun’gwa kaltung [Contradictions and Discord between the Chinese and North Korean Authorities during the Korean War],” Hanguk chŏnjaengŭi saeroun yŏngu [New Research on the Korean War], vol. 2 (2002), p. 619. See also Yonhap News, June 16, 2005.
71 Cho, Han’gukchŏn kukkunp’oro silt’aepunsŏk [An Analysis of the Actual Conditions of South Korean POWs During the Korean War], pp. 94–95.
72 Pak, Toraon p’aeja [Return of the Defeated], p. 199.
73 Ibid., p. 204.
74 Ibid., pp. 218–219.
75 Ibid., pp. 211–212.
76 Ibid., pp. 226–228.
77 Ibid., pp. 232–233.
78 Ibid., p. 206.
1 FRUS, 1951, vol. 7: Korea and China, Part 1 (1983), p. 176.
2 Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: American, Noncombatant Immunity and Atrocity after World War II (Routledge, 2006), p. 151. Biographical sketch of Charles Joy at http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/unitarians/joy.html (accessed April 6, 2009).
3 Quoted in Balázs Szalontai, “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse in North Korea: The Forgotten Side of a Not-So-Forgotten War,” in Chris Springer and Balázs Szalontai, North Korea Caught in Time (Garnet, 2010), p. xii.
4 Freda Kirchwey, “Liberation by Death,” Nation, March 10, 1951, p. 216.
5 Harold Ickes, “Sherman’s Hell, Korea’s Hell,” New Republic, March 1951, p. 18.
6 Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage, p. 155.
7 John Gittings, “Talks, Bombs and Germs: Another Look at the Korean War,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 5, no. 2 (1975), p. 214.
8 Soviet journalist Vassili Kornilov, quoted in Springer and Szalontai, North Korea Caught in Time, p. 20.
9 Washington Post, May 16, 1951.
10 The belief that airpower could have coercive force by itself had existed since the invention of airpower in World War I. But World War II, the first time massive strategic bombing was employed to both destroy and terrorize, demonstrated that it had an opposite effect in both Germany and Japan. The bombing seemed to embolden the bombed even more to fight and resist. In Germany, war production actually increased toward the end of the war even as factories were destroyed. There is significant evidence as well that not even the atomic bombs, the ultimate strategic bombing, convinced the Japanese people to surrender. See, for example, The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), a massive detailed assessment of the effects of bombing in Germany and Japan. The report, issued in the fall of 1945, concluded that strategic bombing had a decisive effect, but subsequent analyses concluded otherwise. A good introduction and summary as well as guides for finding the hundreds of USSBSs available can be accessed at http://www.ussbs.com/ (accessed May 7, 2009). Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, in Racing the Enemy Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Harvard University Press, 2006), argued that rather than the atomic bombs, the Soviet Union’s entry into the war was the decisive factor that convinced Japan to capitulate. The debate over the efficacy of airpower still rages today, for example, whether air attacks deterred Serbia in Kosovo in 1999 and the efficacy of the “shock and awe” campaign against Iraq in 2003. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman provide good summaries of the advocates of Kosovo airpower in their criticism of it in “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5–38.
11 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 313–340; Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion (Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 147–149.
12 Quoted in John J. Tkacik Jr., “From Surprise to Stalemate: What the People’s Liberation Army Learned from the Korean War—A Half Century Later,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75 (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), pp. 303–304.
13 Quoted in ibid., pp. 304–305.
14 Quoted in ibid., p. 308.
15 General (Ret.) Yang Dezhi, “Command Experience in Korea,” in Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millet, and Bin Yu, eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (University Press of Kansas, 2001), pp. 153–155; Tkacik, “From Surprise to Stalemate,” p. 311.
16 Yang, “Command Experience in Korea,” p. 154.
17 Quoted in Tkacik, “From Surprise to Stalemate,” p. 313.
18 By the fall of 1951 eighteen of twenty-two major cities in North Korea had already been at least half obliterated. In early 1952, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) began to target power plants and dams along the Yalu River. The huge Suiho hydroelectrical plant was destroyed in June 1952. The Sokam and Chasan Reservoirs in South P’yŏngan province were destroyed in May 1953, causing huge floods that destroyed hundreds of villages and much livestock and food. See Conrad Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 (University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 122–124. See also Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (Yale University Press, 1987).
19 “Crawford Sams Memoir: Medic, 1910–1955,” pp. 709–710, Crawford Sams Papers, box 1, MHI.
20 Ibid., p. 715.
21 Ibid., p. 716.
22 Ibid., p. 718; Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] published in English in Foreign Radio Broadcasts, May 4, 1952.
23 The pioneer work exposing the activities of Unit 731 and subsequent cover-up was done by John W. Powell. See his “Japan’s Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 12, no. 2 (1980), pp. 2–17, and “Japan’s Biological Weapons, 1930–1945: A Hidden Chapter in History,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 37, no. 8 (October 1981), pp. 43–52. See also Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932–45 and the American Cover-Up (Routledge, 1994), p. 54.
24 Milton Leitenberg, “New Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 187–188.
25 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (University of California Press, 2004), p. 293.
26 Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] published in English in Foreign Radio Broadcasts, April 9, 1952.
27 Fang Shih-shan, “Effects of War on the Health of the People,” Chinese Medical Journal 71, no. 5 (September–October 1953), p. 324.
28 William Dean, General Dean’s Story (Viking, 1952), p. 276.
29 William E. Banghart, “Court Martial Papers,” vol. 1, Department of the Army Staff Judge Advocate (DASJA), pp. 199–200, MHI.
30 Yang, “Command Experience in Korea,” p. 166.
31 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 295.
32 The Three-Anti campaign launched in late 1951 aimed to eradicate (1) corruption, (2) waste, and (3) bureaucracy. The Five-Anti campaign was launched in January 1952 to eliminate (1) bribery, (2) theft of state property, (3) tax evasion, (4) cheating on government contracts, and (5) stealing state economic information. The two campaigns evolved into an all-out war against the bourgeoisie. See also Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, pp. 288–289; Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (W. W. Norton, 1990), pp. 536–538.
33 Quoted in Simon Winchester, The Man Who Loved China (HarperCollins, 2008), p. 201.
34 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, pp. 288–289.
35 Lynn T. White, “Changing Concepts of Corruption in Communist China: Early 1950s versus Early 1980s,” in Yu-Ming Shaw, ed., Changes and Continuities in Chinese Communism (Westview Press, 1988), pp. 327–330.
36 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 289.
37 A. M. Halpern, “Bacteriological Warfare Accusations in Two Asian Communist Campaigns,” in U.S. Air Force, Project Rand Research Memorandum 25 (April 1952), pp. 54–55.
38 Philip Short, Mao: A Life (Henry Holt, 2000), pp. 436–437.
39 New York Times, March 13, 1951.
40 “Telegram to V.M. Molotov from Beijing from the Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov, about the Results of a Conversation with Mao Zedong on 11 May 1953 [Not Dated],” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 183.
41 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 26, pt. 1, April–June 1952, pp. 427–428.
42 Ibid., pt. 2, April–June 1952, pp. 925–926.
43 Milton Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 190. According to Kathryn Weathersby, in anticipation of Acheson’s request to the chairman of the ICRC that the ICRC investigate the Chinese and North Korean charges of bacteriological warfare, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko began to immediately prepare for a strategy to refuse such a visit. Citing the Geneva Convention, which specified that “the parties participating in armed conflict would themselves investigate the facts of any alleged violation of the convention,” Gromyko advised the North Koreans to refuse any proposal made by the ICRC to conduct on-site investigations. The Soviets at the highest level were also involved in helping the North Koreans avoid inspections proposed by members of the World Health Organization (WHO). When North Korean leaders received the third, and last, telegram from UN Secretary General Trygvie Lie on April 6 requesting that the WHO be allowed to visit North Korea for inspections, the ambassador to North Korea, V. N. Razuvaev, advised that the DPRK respond that “the proposal cannot be accepted because the World Health Organization did not have proper international authority.” No doubt, it was because of intense international pressure to prove the truth of allegations, and to fend off further requests for inspections, that the International Scientific Commission, the group organized in 1952 by the Soviet-bloc World Peace Organization, was formed to provide its own on-site investigations. Kathryn Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea,” CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 178.
44 New York Times, April 2, 1952.
45 Winchester, Man Who Loved China, p. 204.
46 Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China, with Appendixes (Commission, 1952), p. 60.
47 Albert E. Cowdrey, “‘Germ Warfare’ and Public Heath in the Korean Conflict,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 39 (April 1984), pp. 169–170.
48 Quoted in Ruth Rogaski, “Nature, Annihilation, and Modernity: China’s Korean War Germ-Warfare Experience Reconsidered,” Journal of Asian Studies 61, no. 2 (May 2002), p. 403.
49 Ibid., pp. 403–404.
50 Needham to Dr. Alfred Fisk, October 11, 1953, cited in Tom Buchanan, “The Courage of Galileo: Joseph Needham and the ‘Germ Warfare’ Allegations in the Korean War,” History 86, no. 284 (October 2001), p. 513.
51 Winchester, Man Who Loved China, p. 206.
52 Rogaski, “Nature, Annihilation, and Modernity,” p. 402.
53 Cowdrey, “ ‘Germ Warfare’ and Public Health,” p. 170.
54 New York Times, April 3, 1952.
55 Ibid., May 31, 1952.
56 Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers,” p. 177. See also Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations,” pp. 185–199.
57 “Explanatory Note from Lt. Gen. V.N. Razuvaev, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK and Chief Military Advisor to the KPA, to L.P. Beria,” April 19, 1953, CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 181; “Explanatory Note from Glukhov, Deputy Chief of the Department of Counterespionage of the USSR Ministry District and Former Advisor to the Ministry of Public Security of the DPRK, to L.P. Beria, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,” April 13, 1953, ibid., p. 180.
58 Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers,” p. 179; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (Columbia University Press, 1994).
59 “Resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers about letters to the Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov, and to the Charge d’Affaire of the USSR in the DPRK, S P. Suzdalev,” May 2, 1952, CWIHP Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 183.
60 Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers,” p. 177. For the text of the decision by the Council of Ministers to reach a negotiated settlement in Korea, adopted March 19, 1953, see CWIHP Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, no. 6/7 (Winter 1995), pp. 80–82.
61 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited (Doubleday, 1967), p. 204.
62 Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (Routledge, 1995), p. 84.
63 Mark Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 30.
64 Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 233–235.
65 Ridgway, Korean War, p. 206.
66 “Sir Esler Dening to British Foreign Office, Feb 25, 1952,” FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.
67 FO 371/99638, April 11, 1952, National Archives, Kew, UK.
68 “Memorandum by P.W. Manhard of the Political Section of the Embassy to the Ambassador of Korea in Korea (Muccio),” March 14, 1952, in FRUS, 1952–54, vol. 15: Korea, Part 1 (1984), pp. 98–99.
69 “Koje POW Camps,” May 6, 1952, FO 371/99639, National Archives, Kew, UK.
70 “United Nations Commission Report,” March 27, 1952, FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.
71 “Summary of Events: Koje-do May 7 through May 10, 1952,” FO 371/99639, National Archives, Kew, UK.
72 Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington, Koje Unscreened (Britain-China Friendship Association, 1953), p. 72. British journalists Burchett and Winnington were well-known communist sympathizers.
73 Zhao Zuorui, “Organizing the Riots on Koje,” in Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, eds., Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korea and Chinese Soldiers (University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 256. A fictionalized account of this scene also appears in Ha Jin’s prize-winning War Trash (Pantheon Books, 2004). Ha cites Zhang Zhe-shi’s Meijun Jizhongying Qinli Ji [Personal Records in the American Prison Camps] (Chinese Archives Press, 1996) as a source for his historical novel.
74 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 250.
75 “Statement of Brig. General Francis T. Dodd,” May 12, 1952, FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.
76 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 252.
77 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 46.
78 “Statement of Brig. General Francis T. Dodd,” May 12, 1952.
79 Ridgway, Korean War, p. 214.
80 Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 253–254.
81 C. H. Johnston, “Conditions in Prisoner of War Camps under the Control of the United Nations Command,” May 23, 1952, FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.
82 “Record of the Conversation with Mr. Acheson at the United Nations Embassy, Paris,” May 28, 1952, FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.
83 “Telegram to F.D. Tomlinson from Charles Johnston,” June 16, 1952, FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.
84 “Confidential 1553/25/52,” May 29, 1952, FO 371/99638, National Archives, Kew, UK.