Cartwright, Nancy Professor of Philosophy, London School of Economics and Political Science
Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement
Print ISBN 0198235070, 1994
doi:10.1093/0198235070.001.0001
 
Abstract: This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies from both econometrics and quantum mechanics.

Keywords: capacities, Nancy Cartwright, causal powers, cause, econometrics, empiricism, measurement, philosophy of science, quantum mechanics
 
Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement
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Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement
CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
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© Nancy Cartwright 1989


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To Marian and to Yot Beygh
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Acknowledgements
Many of the ideas in this book have evolved in conversation with John Dupré, and the work on abstraction has been deeply influenced by Henry Mendell. Indeed, section 5.5 is taken almost verbatim from a paper which Mendell and I have written together. I have learned about econometrics and its history from Mary Morgan, about exogeneity in econometrics from Anindya Banerjee, and about the classical probabilists and associationist psychology from Lorraine Daston. My concern to embed empiricism in practice has been heightened, and my views have become more developed, by working with the historians of science Norton Wise, Tim Lenoir, and Peter Galison. Part of the research for the book was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF Grant No. SES—8702931), and it was written while I was a fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, where Elissa Linke typed it. Corrections throughout are due to J. B. Kennedy, who was helped by Hibi Pendleton. I want to thank the Wissenschaftskolleg, the NSF, and all the other people who have helped.
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Contents
 
Introduction 1
1. 
How to Get Causes from Probabilities 11
1.1. 
Introduction 11
1.2. 
Determining Causal Structure 13
1.3. 
Inus Conditions 25
1.4. 
Causes and Probabilities in Linear Models 29
1.5. 
Conclusion 34
 
Appendix: Back Paths and the Identification of Causes 37
2. 
No Causes In, No Causes Out 39
2.1. 
Introduction 39
2.2. 
Causes at Work in Mathematical Physics 40
2.3. 
New Knowledge Requires Old Knowledge 55
2.4. 
How Causal Reasoning Succeeds 62
2.5. 
Discovering Causal Structure: Can the Hypothetico-Deductive Method Work? 71
2.6. 
Conclusion 85
3. 
Singular Causes First 91
3.1. 
Introduction 91
3.2. 
Where Singular Causes Enter 95
3.3. 
When Causes Are Probabilistic 104
3.4. 
More in Favour of Singular Causes 118
3.5. 
Singular Causes In, Singular Causes Out 131
3.6. 
Conclusion 136
4. 
Capacities 141
4.1. 
Introduction 141
4.2. 
Why Should Increases in Probability Recur? 142
4.3. 
Forecasting and the Stability of Capacities 148
4.4. 
Beyond Modality 158
4.5. 
Mill in Defence of Capacities 170
4.6. 
Conclusion 179
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5. 
Abstract and Concrete 183
5.1. 
Introduction 183
5.2. 
Idealization and the Need for Capacities 185
5.3. 
Abstractions versus Symbolic Representations 191
5.4. 
What do Abstract Laws Say? 198
5.5. 
Concreteness and Causal Structure 212
5.6. 
Conclusion 224
6. 
What Econometrics Can Teach Quantum Physics: Causality and the Bell Inequality 231
6.1. 
Introduction 231
6.2. 
Bell's Inequality 232
6.3. 
A General Common-Cause Criterion for the EPR Experiment 234
6.4. 
Quantum Realism and the Factorizability Condition 236
6.5. 
A Common-Cause Model for EPR 238
6.6. 
Quantum Mechanics and its Causal Structure 242
6.7. 
Factorizability and the Propagation of Causes 243
6.8. 
Conclusion 248
 
Appendices
I. 
A More General Common-Cause Model for EPR 251
II. 
Do Quantum Causes Propagate? 253
III. 
Propagation, Effect-Locality, and Completeness: A Comparison 255
 
Index 265
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