1.Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 2–8, and chap. 14.
1.The U.S. Library of Congress catalog lists 115 books in English under “Pearl Harbor Attack.” Many address the diplomatic prelude rather than the attack itself. A few espouse conspiracy theories.
2.National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Holocaust-Era Assets: A Finding Aid to Records at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland (Washington, D.C.: NARA, 1999). The files are in Office of Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, RG 56, NA (hereafter cited as OASIA), and Records of the Federal Reserve System, RG 82, NA. Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to National Archives, Agreement to Transfer Records and accompanying letter, 23 January 1997; and Greg Bradsher to author, e-mail, 26 January 2007, both in author’s files.
3.Record 3, no. 4 (May 1997); William W. Stiles, Secretary of the Board of Governors to Assistant Archivist for Records Services, National Archives, declassifications agreement and letter, 23 January 1997, in author’s files.
4.Prologue 2, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 415.
5.See chapter 16, note 16.
1.Jonathan Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940–41,” Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives, Spring 1976, 24.
1.“Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Documents for the Study of American History, http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/fdrquarn.html (accessed 8 December 2006); press conference, 6 October 1937, American Presidency Project web site, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu (accessed 2 December 2006).
2.Emeric De Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (New York: Berry and Rogers, 1787), chap. 8, para. 90.
3.Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (New York: Octagon Books, 1927).
4.House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 4704, Trading with the Enemy, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 29–31 May 1917 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 17).
5.William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce, testimony, in ibid., 29 May 1917.
6.Dr. Edward E. Pratt, Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, testimony, in ibid., 29 May 1917.
7.William C. Redfield, testimony, in ibid., 29 May 1917.
8.The bill also upheld contracts whereby U.S. fire insurance companies hedged excess risks with German reinsurance companies, and royalty payments for German patents so as to allow U.S. manufacture of Salvarsan, a German medicine for venereal diseases that afflicted many American draftees.
9.Senate, Subcommittee on Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 4960, Sen. Joseph E. Ransdell presiding, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 23 July–2 August 1917 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917). Includes text of House bill.
10.McAdoo came close to winning the Democratic nomination for president in 1924.
11.William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, testimony, Senate, Subcommittee on Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 4960.
12.William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce, testimony, in ibid., 13 August 1917.
13.Who Was Who in America, Vol. 1.366 (Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 1966). Washington Post, 2 January 1914, 1, 7 July 1914, 2, 1 April 1917, SM10, 1 December 1918, 19, 6 March 1919, 6. Wall Street Journal, 27 April 1915, 8. Milton C. Elliott, General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board, testimony, in ibid., 27 July, 17 August 1917; House, Committee on Ways and Means, Conference Report: House Report No. 155 to Accompany H.R. 4960, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 21 September 1917 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917); see especially “Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House,” appended to the report, citing amendment 18(b).
14.Congress, Trading with the Enemy Act: To Define, Regulate, and Punish Trading with the Enemy, and for Other Purposes, Act Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 6 October 1917, Section 5(b) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917).
15.House, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977); House, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 and Markup of Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 29, 30 March, 19, 26 April, 5 May, 2, 8, 9, 13 June 1977 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977).
16.Charles Huberich, The Law Relating to Trading with the Enemy . . . (New York: Baker Voorhis, 1918).
17.Exceptions were disposals of seized German assets in the United States and settlement of claims with other countries that extended into the 1930s and in some court cases beyond World War II.
18.President Richard Nixon ended the prohibition order, but law-abiding Americans and U.S. businesses never profited from the rise of gold from an official price of thirty-five dollars to several hundred dollars per ounce that citizens of foreign countries later enjoyed in the 1970s.
19.In 1940–41 Section 5(b) provided the authority for Roosevelt to freeze U.S. assets of conquered countries and eventually those of Germany and Japan, and to impose controls of domestic consumer credit. After the war it formed the legal basis for President Harry Truman’s intervening in a steel strike, Lyndon Johnson’s controls on Americans investing abroad, and several presidents’ limiting of trade with communist and other disapproved countries. Some executive orders cited an emergency, and some did not bother. In the wake of the 1970s Watergate scandal, Congress grew restless about “emergency” powers. In 1976 the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce recounted the extraordinary number of national emergencies that presidents had declared: “A majority of the people of the United States have lived all their lives under emergency government.” Senator Jonathan B. Bingham, chairman, had learned to his dismay that invocations of 5(b) since December 1950 had relied on an “unlimited emergency” declared by Truman when Chinese forces swarmed into Korea to fight U.S. troops. Appalled by cabinet officials’ stumbling justifications of “Alice in Wonderland” actions, he sputtered, “Your position is incredible.” In 1977 Congress enacted the International Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which reconfirmed presidential power to invoke controls over foreign financial transactions and to freeze U.S. assets of foreign countries, firms, and individuals if he found “any unusual and extraordinary threat” from abroad, but not declarations of a national emergency for any reason he fancied. He was to consult with Congress if time permitted and in any case to report every six months to allow Congress time to write legislation. The president was empowered to assign any government agency as administrator, ending the automatic ascendancy of the Treasury Department. The reforms eliminated unintended nuisances by exempting ordinary travel expenses and the import and export of information in any format. Most important, it eliminated the right to invoke controls over purely domestic transactions during peacetime. Through 2005 the United States has invoked the IEEPA more than fifty times, against nations and, especially since 2000, against terrorists and terrorist organizations. Yet Section 5(b) lives on. The Jimmy Carter administration pleaded for its indefinite survival so that presidents could act instantaneously and sweepingly in a war emergency, and because more than four hundred government actions that rested upon it would have been jeopardized. In 1976 the TWEA was abbreviated and renamed the War Powers Act. A president now may invoke its draconian powers, including controls over domestic financial transactions, only in case of an emergency involving an actual war, declared or undeclared. Power has not been easily surrendered.
1.Harold G. Moulton with Juinichi Ko, Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: AMS Press, 1931), Appendix A.
2.Commerce Department, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, The United States in the World Economy; the International Transactions of the United States During the Interwar Period, prepared by Hal B. Lary (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1943), charts. Japan suspended payments during World War II and the postwar occupation but eventually paid every penny of prewar debt, the last of it in 1970.
3.Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings: Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States Pursuant to S. Res. 19, 72nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1932), Pursuant to S. Res. 19, esp. testimony of Thomas W. Lamont, 18 December 1931, 12–13, and Otto Kahn, 4 January 1932, 359–61.
4.House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Prohibition of U.S. Loans to Japan Due to Japanese War Activities in Violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 7 March 1932, microfiche, CIS 72 HFo-T.23, Library of Congress; Congressional Record, 9 March 1945, 1932, 5587.
5.“Inter-Allied Debts,” Encyclopaedia Britannica 12:462–67. As recently as the 1980s the annual report of the U.S. secretary of the treasury reported the war debts, which had more than doubled due to unpaid accrued interest.
6.U.S. Attorney General, “Opinion Upon the Act to Prohibit Financial Transactions with Any Foreign Government in Default on Its Obligations to the United States,” American Journal of International Law 29, no. 1 (January 1935): 160–67; Ray Tucker, “Johnson’s Johnson Act,” Scribner’s Commentator, February 1941, 7–12.
7.Japan had not borrowed abroad during World War I. It had loaned about $120 million to tsarist Russia that the Soviet government declined to repay. The Johnson Act prevented allied borrowings from U.S. investors in World War II. After the war its terms were vitiated by exempting governments that subscribed to the IMF and World Bank, thus reopening U.S. capital markets to most nations, except the Soviet bloc until the end of the Cold War. Annex C to NSC 5808/1, The Johnson Act (18 U.S.C. 955), 13 April 1954, electronic database, Library of Congress Declassified Documents Reference System.
8.Congress, Joint Resolution Extending and Amending Public Resolution Numbered 67, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., 29 February 1936, in Public Laws of the United States of America, vol. 49, pt. 2, 1152–53.
9.Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), 11–12.
10.Ibid., 13–16.
11.John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 1:74 and passim; American National Biography Online, http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00652.html (accessed 4 May 2006). Morgenthau’s secretary, Henrietta Klotz, saved minutes of meetings and documents, filling over eight hundred volumes of diaries, indispensable to historians of the era.
12.Civil Service Commission, Official Register of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1930–42); Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 1:160–61; Viner: New York Times, 26 December 1933, 17, 31 March 1934, 21, 20 April 1938, 4, 24 September 1938, 5; White: American National Biography Online and New York Times, 18 August 1948, 1; Taylor: Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 1:487–89; Knoke: New York Times, 15 October 1931, 41, 29 February 1936, 23, 9 January 1937, 24.
13.A. Lochead to Morgenthau, Japanese Balances in New York, 14 December 1937, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA.
14.Richard D. McKinzie, “Oral History Interview with Bernard Bernstein,” 23 July 1975, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo., online at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bernsten.htm (accessed 1 January 2005).
15.Ibid.
16.Meeting Re Possible Control of Japan’s Credits and Purchasing Channels in United States, 17 December 1937, in Henry Morgenthau Jr., The Morgenthau Diaries, Robert E. Lester, project coordinator, microfilm, 250 rolls (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America, 1995–97) (hereafter cited as Morgenthau Diaries), Roll 28.
17.Ibid.
18.Ibid., 17 December 1937.
19.Ibid., 18 December 1937.
20.Miller, War Plan Orange, 213.
1.The literature on silk is voluminous. Listed below are those relevant to the pre-1939 years. For later years, see chapter 12. For Japan the bedrock source is Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association, 1987) (annual figures, 1868 to post–World War II), vols. 1 and 2 for sericulture and manufacturing, vol. 3 for international trade. Japan Year Book (later Japan and Manchukuo Year Book) (Tokyo: Japan Year Book Office, 1905–41) is also useful. Narratives on sericulture, manufacture, and exports appear in most standard works in English about emergence of the Japanese economy. Useful studies include William W. Lockwood Jr., “Japanese Silk and the American Market,” Far Eastern Survey, 12 February 1936, 31–36; Kenzoo Hemmi, “Primary Product Exports and Economic Development: The Case of Silk,” in Agriculture and Economic Growth: Japan’s Experience, ed. Kazushi Ohkawa, Bruce F. Johnston, and Hiromitsu Kaneda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press and Tokyo University Press, 1970); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Sericulture and the Origins of Japanese Industrialization,” Technology and Culture, January 1992, 101–21; Kym Anderson, “The Perspective of Japan in Historical and International Perspective,” in New Silk Roads: East Asia and World Textile Markets, ed. Kym Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Silk magazine (see below) published articles on Japanese sericulture. Export finance is described in Raw Silk Importers, Incorporated, “Memorandum of Raw Silk Distribution in U.S.A. Market,” 15 September 1941, submitted by Japanese Embassy to State Department, File 894.6552/24, Roll 16, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
The U.S. government studied the domestic silk business extensively (works cited in this note are Washington, D.C.: GPO unless otherwise noted). The Commerce Department, Bureau of the Census published elaborate censuses of manufactures: Silk Manufacture or Silk and Silk Goods, 1900, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1921, 1925, 1927; Silk and Rayon Goods, 1931, 1933, 1935 (included in Cotton Manufactures and Rayon and Silk, 1937); Hosiery and Knit Goods, 1914; Clothing, 1914; and Wearing Apparel, 1921, 1923, 1925, 1927. Exports and imports are in Commerce Department, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, annual (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1893–1942). Older data is in Tariff Commission, Historical Statistics of the United States on CD-ROM: Colonial Times to 1970, 1986 [1975] series U295-316. Hearings were held by House, Committee on Ways and Means, Schedule 12, Silk and Manufactures of, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., February 1929. The Tariff Commission published detailed studies of the domestic industry and foreign competition: Silk and Manufactures of Silk, Schedule L, 1918; Silk, Silk Yarns and Threads, and Silk Pile Fabrics, 1921; Broad-Silk Manufacture and the Tariff, 1926; Textile Imports and Exports, 1891–1927, 1929; Economic Analysis of Foreign Trade of the United States in Relation to the Tariff, 1933; and Annotated Tabular Survey [1928–36]: Japanese Trade Studies, 1945. The National Recovery Administration, Division of Review, published The Silk Textile Industry, Evidence Study No. 37, mimeograph (Washington, D.C., 1935).
U.S. history is in Shichiro Matsui, The History of the Silk Industry in the United States (1927; reprint, New York: Howes, 1930). Books on silk manufacture include Leo Duran, Raw Silk: A Practical Hand-Book for the Buyer (New York: Silk Publishing, 1913, 1921) and Isabel B. Wingate, Textile Fabrics and Their Selection, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970). By far the most useful periodicals are Silk (earlier Silk Reporter), 1877–1932, and Silk and Rayon Digest (monthly), 1933–37, which covered every aspect of the silk trade, including prices. For rayon, see William Haynes, Cellulose: The Chemical that Grows (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953).
Books and articles on women’s outerwear fashions, often dedicated to one era or decade, are too numerous to list. They are readily found in library catalogs under headings of fashion, dress, or costume. A notable nineteenth-century work is National Council of Women of the United States, “Symposium on Women’s Dress,” Arena, September 1892, 488–506, Microfilm 05422, Roll 93, Library of Congress. Specialized works are Claudia B. Kidwell and Margaret C. Christman, Suiting Everyone: The Democratization of Clothing in America (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1974); Elizabeth Ewing, Dress and Undress: A History of Women’s Underwear (New York: Drama Book Specialists, 1978); and the special focus of Valerie Steele in Fashion and Eroticism: Ideals of Feminine Beauty from the Victorian Era to the Jazz Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) and Women of Fashion: Twentieth Century Designers (New York: Rizzoli International, 1991).
The history of hosiery is in Milton N. Glass, History of Hosiery, from the Piloi of Ancient Greece to the Nylons of Modern America (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1955); Johannis Dirk de Haan, The Full-Fashioned Hosiery Industry in the U.S.A. (The Hague: Mouton, 1957). Technical works include From Raw Silk to Silk Hosiery, monograph (New York: Charles Chipman and Sons, 1920); Holeproof Hosiery Company, Better Hosiery: The Story of Holeproof (Milwaukee: Holeproof, 1924); Edward Max Schenke, The Manufacture of Hosiery and Its Problems (New York: National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers, 1935); Max C. Miller, Knitting Full Fashioned Hosiery (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937); and Irene Miller, Buying and Selling Hosiery (New York: Fairchild Publications, 1949). Useful trade journals include the monthly Hosiery Retailer, later the Hosiery Age, 1922–31; the National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers’ Special News Letter, a weekly published in Charlotte, North Carolina, 1923–66; the National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers’ Quarterly Statistical Bulletin of the Hosiery Industry, New York, 1934–39, with excellent statistics; and Underwear and Hosiery Review, 1935–41 (East Stroudsberg, Pa.: Knit Goods Publishing), especially “The Story of Hosiery Fashions from 1918 to 1938,” January 1938, 90–113; “Hosiery Saleswoman’s Handbook,” September 1938, 52–73; and “To Sell Hosiery Successfully . . . ,” October 1939, 34–55.
2.Haru Matsukata Reischauer, Samurai and Silk (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986), 157.
3.Silk knitting terminology was confusing. Gauge indicated the number of needles on a knitting bar of standard length; high-gauge machines knitted finer yarns into sheer fabric. Denier indicated the weight of a standard length of yarn, so a low denier meant a sheer knit. It is simplest to describe stocking yarns by the number of silk threads twisted together, as in six thread, three thread, and so forth, the fewest threads yielding the finest yarns and sheerest hosiery.
4.Japan Year Book, 1937.
5.National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin of the Hosiery Industry, 1939 Review.
6.Interdepartmental Committee on Silk, “The Economic Vulnerability of the United States in Raw Silk and Silk Waste,” March 1941, Studies Prepared for the Office of the Administrator of Export Control (AEC), prepared by Ruth E. K. Peterson, Entry 44, Boxes 1–2, Records of the Tariff Commission, RG 81, NA (hereafter cited as Records of the Tariff Commission).
7.Ibid.
1.Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, vol. 3.
2.Ibid.; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities Imported from Japan,” mimeograph from typescript, Washington, July 1941; copy in New York Public Library, call no. TLH 1941, catalogue book 254-1-2, and Library of Congress call no. HF3127.A4, 1941b.
3.History and surveys of the Japanese cotton textile industry include Tariff Commission, Information Survey on the Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1921); Tariff Commission, Cotton Cloth: Report to the President on the Differences in Costs of Production of Cotton Cloth in the United States and in the Principal Competing Country, Report No. 112, 2nd ser. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1936); Tariff Commission, Records of Investigation Under Sections 332, 336, and 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 1929–66, Records of the Tariff Commission: Box 63, Cotton Cloth 1935–36; Box 60, Velveteens 1936; Box 58, Velveteens c. 1938; and Box 4, Long Staple Cotton 1933–34; Tariff Commission, Cotton Textiles, Special Industry Analysis No. 34, Japanese Trade Studies, prepared for the Foreign Economic Administration, September 1945, Boxes 1–2, Entry 43, Records of the Tariff Commission; Keizo Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1956). Reports on Japan’s imports of raw cotton include American Consul, Osaka, “Japan Cotton Situation—Review and Outlook,” 17 August 1940, File 868.1101, Roll 14, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; Interdepartmental Committee on Raw Textile Fibers and Cordage, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Raw Cotton,” 5 April 1941, Reports on the Economic Vulnerability of Japan, 1941–43, Entry 44, Boxes 1–2, Records of the Tariff Commission.
4.Commerce Department, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures: Cotton Manufactures, 1919–35 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920–36); Census of Manufactures: Cotton Manufactures and Rayon and Silk Manufactures, 1937, 1939; Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
5.Tariff Commission, Recent Developments in the Foreign Trade of Japan, Particularly in Relation to the Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1936), 3–9, 14–19, 25–49, 54–71; Tariff Commission, Cotton Cloth; Osamu Ishii, “Cotton-Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain and the United States, 1930–1936” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1977); Warren S. Hunsberger, Japan and the United States in World Trade (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), passim; Teijiro Uyeda, The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign Trade with Special Reference to Restrictive Policies of Other Countries and Attempts at Trade Agreements (Tokyo: Japanese Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936).
6.Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities”; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan and Their Relation to the Defense Program and to the Economy of the Country,” typescript, Washington, September 1941, copy in New York Public Library, call no. TLH 1941, catalogue books 254-1-2 and 254-2-2 (with annual details, 1935–40 and 1937–40, respectively); Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, vol. 3; Interdepartmental Committee on Raw Textile Fibers and Cordage, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Raw Cotton.”
7.Tariff Commission, Computed Duties and Equivalent Ad Valorem Rates on Imports into the United States from Principal Countries, Calendar Years 1929, 1931, and 1935, W.P.A. Statistical Project 265-31-7000, Richmond, Va., 1937.
8.C. R. Harler, The Culture and Marketing of Tea (London: Humphrey Milford, 1933); William H. Ukers, All About Tea (New York: Tea and Coffee Trade Journal, 1935); James Norwood Pratt, The Tea Lover’s Treasury (San Francisco: 101 Productions, 1982); Shin’ya Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialization in the World Economy, 1859–1899: Export Trade and Overseas Competition (Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Athlone Press, 1988), chap. 5.
9.Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan”; Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Menthol,” “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Peppermint Oil,” “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Agar-Agar,” “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Natural Camphor, Crude and Refined,” “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Pyrethrum Flowers,” and “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Creosote Oil,” April 1941, Reports on the Economic Vulnerability of Japan, 1941–43, Entry 44, Boxes 1–2, Records of the Tariff Commission.
10.Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Commerce Department, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade of the United States with Japan in 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 1939); Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan”; Interdepartmental Committee on Fishery Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Fish, Shellfish and Fish Livers,” 15 April 1941.
11.House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, Tariff Readjustment, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., February 1929, testimony of hat makers, importers, and unions, 6359–98, February 1929 (hereafter cited as House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings); Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan”; Interdepartmental Committee on Miscellaneous Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Miscellaneous Products,” 25 April 1941.
12.Tariff Commission, Cost of Production of Slide Fasteners and Parts Thereof; Report to the President, with Appendix Proclamation by the President, Report No. 113, 2nd ser. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1936); Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan.”
13.Tariff Commission, Planning Committee, recommendation re electric light bulbs, with related correspondence, 7 July 1933, Box 20, RG 81; Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan.”
14.Sidney Ratner, The Tariff in American History (New York: Van Nostrand, 1972); Congress, Tariff Act of 1930, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., in United States Statutes at Large, vol. 46, ch. 497 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1930); Senate, Economic Analysis of Foreign Trade of the United States in Relation to the Tariff, Report of the Tariff Commission in Response to Senate Resolution 325, 72nd. Cong., 2nd sess., Doc. 180 (with large statistical compendium of tariff rates for 1929, 1931 and 1932, annotated) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1933); Tariff Commission, Recent Developments in the Foreign Trade of Japan.
15.Statements of U.S. pottery producers and of David Walker representing Morimura Brothers, importers, vol. 2, Earths, Earthenware and Glassware; and Statement of Japanese merchants forwarded by Secretary of State Stimson at oral request of Japanese ambassador to Senate committee, 25 July 1929, vol. 18, Foreign Communications (hereafter cited as Statement of Japanese merchants), both in Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings, Tariff Act of 1929, 71st Cong., 1st sess., June 1929 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1929) (hereafter cited as Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings); Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan”; Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Pottery” and “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Glass and Glassware,” April 1941.
16.Statement of B. W. Doyle representing Pyroxylin Plastics Manufacturers’ Association, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings, vol. 1, Chemicals, Oils and Paints (hereafter cited as Senate, Statement of B. W. Doyle); Tariff Commission, Synthetic Camphor: The Relation of Domestic Production of Synthetic Camphor to Domestic Consumption (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1935); Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Natural Camphor, Crude and Refined.”
17.John K. Winkler, Five and Ten: The Fabulous Life of F. W. Woolworth (1940; reprint, Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1970); Statement of Japanese merchants; Statement of A. Q. Smith of Woolworth, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings, vol. 15, Sundries (hereafter cited as Statement of A. Q. Smith).
18.Statement of B. W. Doyle representing the Pyroxylin Plastics Manufacturers Association and other interests including American Brush Manufacturers Association, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, vol. 1 (hereafter cited as House, Statement of B. W. Doyle), and Senate, Statement of B. W. Doyle, vol. 1; Statement of Japanese merchants; Tariff Commission, Tooth and Other Toilet Brushes and Backs and Handles, Report no. 81 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1934); Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan.”
19.Tariff Commission, Sun Goggles, Report to the President, 14 December 1934, Box 11, Locator 6-24-5, Records of the Tariff Commission; Sun Glasses or Sun Goggles, Report 103, ser. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1935); Senate and House, Statement of B. W. Doyle; Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan.”
20.Statements of Fred W. Tauber, Celluloid Group of the National Council of Importers and Traders, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, vol. 1; A. C. Gilbert, Toy Manufacturers Association and the Doll Association, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, vol. 14, and Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings, vol. 14; Briefs of the Toy Group of the National Council of American Importers and Traders, Toy Manufacturers of the U.S., and Doll Manufacturers Association, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, vol. 14; House and Senate, Statement of B. W. Doyle; Statement of A. Q. Smith; Statement of Japanese merchants; Tariff Commission, Dolls and Toys of Pyroxylin Plastic, Box 78, Files 1932–1935, Locator 6-20-1, Records of the Tariff Commission; Commerce Department, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures: Toys and Sporting and Athletic Goods, 1935, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1937, 1940); Tariff Commission, Toys, Special Industry Analysis No. 8, Japanese Trade Studies, March 1945, Box 2, Entry 43, Records of the Tariff Commission; Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports for Consumption of the Principal Commodities” and “United States Imports from Japan.”
1.Herbert Feis, Economic Adviser, “Japan’s Ultimate Foreign Exchange Resources,” 20 September 1937, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA.
2.Titles and service years of most individuals are in Civil Service Commission, Official Register of the United States, 1937–41 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1937–41); and Congressional Directory (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1937–41).
3.New York Times, 24 October 1937, 64; Washington Post, 30 January 1968, B3.
4.New York Times, 24 October 1937, 64, and 19 June 1946, 41.
5.New York Times, 19 June 1946, 41, 2 December 1952, 1, and 6 June 1980, D15; Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Coe (accessed 30 May 2006). When Morgenthau retired in 1946, Secretary John W. Snyder cleared out most New Deal appointees. Coe left so fast to join White at the IMF that “high officials . . . did not know he had gone.” The House Un-American Activities Committee investigated Coe in 1948 on charges of spying for Soviet Russia, and the Senate again in 1952. He invoked the Fifth Amendment against self incrimination and resigned his IMF post. In 1958 he moved to Red China with his family and served the Mao government. He died there in 1980. Harry Dexter White, who faced similar accusations, died in 1948 (chapter 8, note 42).
6.American Men and Women of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences, 12th ed. (New York: Jacques Cattell Press, 1973), vol. 1.
7.New York Times, 22 October 1938, 23.
8.Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement 5, 1951–55, American Council of Learned Societies, 1977, electronic document, Biography Resource Center, Library of Congress; New York Times, 2 April 1953, 27.
9.Marquis Who’s Who (Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 2006), electronic document, Biography Resource Center, Library of Congress. Knapp later received the Decorated Order of the Rising Sun for postwar work at the World Bank and State Department.
10.On line at http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/GHarrisonbio.html (accessed 10 June 2006).
11.Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement 10,1976–80, electronic document; New York Times, 29 February 1936, 23.
12.New York Times, 15 October 1931, 41, 9 January 1937, 24, 26 January 1937, 29, and 29 February 1936, 23; transcript of meeting, 17 December 1937, Morgenthau Diaries, Roll 28.
13.New York Times, 12 October 1941, 38; Marquis Who’s Who, electronic document, Biography Resource Center, Library of Congress; American Men and Women of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 1.
14.American Men and Women of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 1.
15.New York Times, 8 May 1991, D22; American Men and Women of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 1.
16.New York Times, 21 May 1991.
17.Many of the young experts went on to distinguished careers. Collado was named the first U.S. executive director of the International Monetary Fund, and ultimately became a senior executive of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, now Exxon Mobil. Moore stayed on as research chief at the New York Fed, subsequently consulting for Latin American governments. Tamagna advised various U.S. agencies during the war; he ultimately rose to chief of international finance and policy at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. At the Treasury, Kamarck became chief of the International Finance Division and after the war was the director of development of the World Bank.
18.American National Biography Online; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor.
19.Who Was Who in America, vol. 3 (Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 1966).
20.Accompanying letter from Col. J. M. Churchill, Acting Assistant COS, G-2, 6 April 1940, file 894.50/119-1/2, Roll 11, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; meeting, 10 October 1940, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 26; Pehle: New York Times, 19 June 1946, 41.
21.E. F. Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938, File Japan International Position 1937–46, Box 50, International Subject Files, 1907 to 1974, International Finance Division and predecessors 1907–1974, Records of the Federal Reserve Board, RG 82, NA (hereafter cited as FRB).
22.O. E. Moore, “The Effect of the War with China,” 18 August 1939, Box 50, File Japan International Position 1937–46, FRB.
23.G. F. Luthringer, “Japanese Gold and Foreign Exchange Resources at the End of 1939,” 23 January 1940, File 894.51, Roll 11, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; W. H. Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Dollar Expenditures, 24 February 1940, Box 50, File Japan International Position 1937–46, FRB.
24.Norman E. Towson, “The Economic Position of Japan: Current Estimate,” 26 March 1940; and Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations, 30 April 1940, both in File 894.50-119-1/2, Roll 11, State Department microfilm LM-68, RG 59, NA.
25.Moore, “Effect of the War with China.”
26.Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938; Towson, “Economic Position of Japan,” 26 March 1940.
27.FDR to the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, 5 August 1939, OASIA; BB (probably Bernard Bernstein), Memorandum to the President, 5 August 1939, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
28.Edward S. Miller, “Japan’s Other Victory: Overseas Financing of the War,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, edited by John W. Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff, and Shinji Yokote (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2005), 466–78.
29.Moulton with Ko, Japan, appendix; unsigned, Some Pertinent Data on Restrictions on Japanese Trade, 1937, Box 21, File Japanese Foreign Funds Control Program, OASIA.
30.Laurence Phillips Dowd, “Japanese Foreign Exchange Policy 1930–1940” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1952), chaps. 2–3.
31.Unsigned, Japan: Our Gold Import Point, Japan: Our Gold Export Point, 26 May 1933, Box 50, File International Japan Gold 1928–1954, FRB.
32.Gold and silver were and are traded in troy ounces about 10 percent heavier than the familiar avoirdupois ounces. There are 12 troy ounces in a troy pound and 32.15 per kilogram.
33.Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; E.G. Collado to Knoke, Japanese Gold Stocks, 16 December 1937, Box 50, File International Japan Gold 1928–1954, FRB.
34.O. E. Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940, Box 50, File International Japan Gold 1928–1954, FRB.
35.White (signed by Haas) to Morgenthau, Restricting Areas in Which Japan Could Sell Her Gold, 9 October 1937, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA; W. H. Rozell and F. M. Tamagna to Knoke, Japan’s Gold and Dollar Assets, 31 March 1941, Box 50, File International Japan Gold 1928–1954, FRB.
36.Rozell, Yokohama Specie Bank Reports, 28 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan Banking—Yokohama Specie Bank, FRB (hereafter cited as Yokohama Specie Bank Reports).
37.Allan Sproul, memorandum, 23 June 1937, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
38.Commerce Department, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, The Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1937 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938); Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; E. G. Collado to Knoke, Japanese Exchange Balances—Japan’s Present International Position, 20 October 1937; FT (prob. Frank T. Tamagna), Japan’s International Position, 28 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan International Position 1937–46, FRB; Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940; unsigned, Survey of the Gold Fund Special Account, August 1945, and J. Tenenbaum to Friedman, Japanese Gold Production and Operation of Gold Fund Special Account, 2 January 1946, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
39.Unsigned, Relations with Foreign Banks, 20 January 1936, Box 69, File International Foreign Accounts General 1927–1954 (1), FRB; unsigned table, Japan Official Gold Stocks, 29 September 1938, Box 50, File Japan General, FRB; H. D. White to Morgenthau, Recent Changes in Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 28 October 1938, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA; Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938; Luthringer, “Japanese Gold and Foreign Exchange Resources”; unsigned table, Net Imports of Gold to the United States from Japan, c. 13 January 1942, Box 50, File Japan International Gold 1928–1954, FRB; Commerce Department, United States in the World Economy, charts.
40.Towson, “Economic Position of Japan,” 26 March 1940; A. M. Kamarck to White, Preliminary Memorandum on Japanese Foreign Exchange Resources, 31 October 1940, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA.
41.Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Dollar Expenditures, 24 February 1940.
42.Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; unsigned table, Japan Official Gold Stocks, 29 September 1938; Tamagna, Japan’s International Position, 28 August 1940.
43.Feis, “Japan’s Ultimate Foreign Exchange Resources”; unsigned table, Japan Official Gold Stocks, 29 September 1938; Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938; P. S. Brown to White, Japan’s Stock of Gold, 19 January 1940; unsigned, Gold Shipments, 29 October 1940; WHT (prob. W. H. Taylor), Japan: Gold Production in Ounces by Areas and Total Value, 31 January 1941, File Japan Gold and Silver; and Tenenbaum to Friedman, Japanese Gold Production and Operation, 2 January 1946, all in Box 21, OASIA; Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940; Commerce Department, Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce, Manchurian Gold Mining Experiences Poor Year in 1939 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 4 March 1940); “Gold Production Subsidy Increased,” Far Eastern Financial Notes 2, nos. 5 (March 1940) and 11 (June 1940); Tamagna to Knoke, Japan’s Undisclosed Gold Stock, 10 September 1940, File International Japan Gold; and J. B. Knapp, “Japanese Gold Production,” 13 February 1941, File International Japan Gold 1928–54, both in Box 50, FRB; Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), Natural Resources Section, Gold and Silver in Japan, Report No. 128, prepared by Robert Y. Grant, Tokyo, June 1950.
44.P. S. Brown to White, Japan’s Production and Supply of Gold in 1937, c. January 1938, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
45.Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940; unsigned, Gold Shipments, 29 October 1940, and U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, No. 5416, Japan’s Gold Position, 28 February 1941, both in File 894.51/714, Roll 14, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; SCAP, Gold and Silver in Japan, 112.
46.Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940.
47.Brown to White, Japan’s Production and Supply of Gold in 1937, c. January 1938; Brown to White, Japan’s Stock of Gold 19, January 1940; Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940; Commerce Department, Manchurian Gold Mining; P. Mihalik to Knoke, Japanese Gold Reserves, 7 May 1940, Box 50, File International Japan Gold 1928–1954, FRB; Tamagna to Knoke, Japan’s Undisclosed Gold Stock, 10 September 1940; George A. Nakinson, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, Japan’s Gold Position, 22 November 1940, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA; W. H. Taylor to White, Japanese Foreign Exchange Reserves, 7 February 1941, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA.
48.Brown to White, Japan’s Production and Supply of Gold in 1937, c. January 1938; Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940; Commerce Department, Manchurian Gold Mining; unsigned, Gold Shipments, 29 October 1940.
49.Brown to White, Japan’s Production and Supply of Gold in 1937, c. January 1938; Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940.
50.Knapp, “Japanese Gold Production”; SCAP, Gold and Silver in Japan, 23.
51.SCAP, Gold and Silver in Japan, tables 7 and 8.
52.Taylor to White, Japanese Foreign Exchange Resources, 7 February 1941; H. D. White to Morgenthau, Japanese Foreign Exchange Resources, 7 February 1941, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA.
53.Tenenbaum to Friedman, Japanese Gold Production and Operation, 2 January 1946; SCAP, Gold and Silver in Japan.
54.Feis, “Japan’s Ultimate Foreign Exchange Resources”; E. G. Collado to Knoke, Japan: Silver Statistics, 28 January 1938, Box 50, File Japan General 1932–1941, FRB; Ernest A. Tuppar, Division of Foreign Trade Statistics, Department of Commerce to Frank Dietrich, Treasury Department, 29 January 1938, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA; E. G. Collado to Knoke, Japan: Increase in Fiduciary Note Issue Limit, Withdrawal of Subsidiary Silver Coin, 25 February 1938, Box 50, File Japan General 1922–1941, FRB; Moore, “Effect of the War with China”; SCAP, Gold and Silver in Japan.
55.Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; Brown to White, Japan’s Production and Supply of Gold in 1937, c. January 1938; Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938; Brown to White, Japan’s Stock of Gold, 19 January 1940; Luthringer, “Japanese Gold and Foreign Exchange Resources”; Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940; Tamagna to Knoke, Japan’s Undisclosed Gold Stock, 10 September 1940; U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, Japan’s Gold Position, 28 February 1941; Tenenbaum to Friedman, Japanese Gold Production and Operation, 2 January 1946.
56.Moore to Knoke, Japanese Gold Production and Reserves, 29 February 1940.
57.Brown to White, Japan’s Stock of Gold, 19 January 1940.
58.Unsigned, Japan Foreign-Currency Holdings Reported (Trans-Pacific, 14 February 1935), Box 21, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA; Feis, “Japan’s Ultimate Foreign Exchange Resources”; Collado to Knoke, Japanese Exchange Balances, 20 October 1937; unsigned (probably H. D. White), “How Effective Could the ‘Quarantine’ Be Made,” c. autumn 1937, Box 21, File Japan Foreign Funds Control Program, OASIA; Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; H. D. White and A. Lochead, “Estimate of Japanese Assets in the United States as of 15 December 1937,” n.d., Morgenthau Diaries, Roll 28; unsigned, Some Pertinent Data on Restrictions on Japanese Trade; Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938; W. H. Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Investment in the United States and American Investments in Japan, 11 September 1940, Box 50, File Japan General 1922–1941, FRB; W. H. Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Investments in the United States, 3 February 1941, Box 94, File Loans and Investments—Foreign Deposits in U.S. 1926–41 (1), FRB; Taylor to White, Japanese Foreign Exchange Reserves, 7 February 1941; White to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Position, 25 February 1941, Box 2, File Japan’s Foreign Exchange Position, OASIA.
59.Great Britain, for example, requisitioned its subjects’ U.S. and Canadian stocks and bonds to finance munitions purchases before the advent of Lend-Lease aid.
60.Collado to Knoke, Japanese Exchange Balances, 20 October 1937; Haas to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Resources, 13 December 1937; unsigned, Some Pertinent Data on Restrictions on Japanese Trade; Lamb to Knoke, Japan: International Assets, 28 December 1938.
61.Collado to Knoke, Japanese Exchange Balances, 20 October 1937; White and Lochead, “Estimate of Japanese Assets”; Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Investments in the United States, 3 February 1941; Treasury Department, Census of Foreign-Owned Assets in the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1945), 15ff, 63–83; Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Period March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1943); Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1944); Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1946 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946).
62.After the war the Specie Bank reported sterling deposits worth only $3 million.
63.Even restraints on buying of Japanese silver (which was of a purity desirable for photographic film) by U.S. refineries, as suggested by Senator Key Pittman, might undermine faith in gold, it was believed. R. S. Brown to White, Should We Continue to Purchase Japanese Silver? 17 January 1940, and F. Dietrich to Silver File, 23 January 1940, both in Box 21, OASIA.
64.White (signed by Haas) to Morgenthau, Restricting Areas, 9 October 1937, FDR to the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, 5 August 1939; Bernstein, Memorandum to the President, 5 August 1939; Brown to White, Should We Continue to Purchase Japanese Silver? 17 January 1940; Dietrich to Silver File, 23 January 1940; White to Morgenthau, Senator Pittman’s letter on Treasury purchases of silver from Japan, 25 January 1940, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
65.W. H. Rozell to McKeon, Yokohama Specie Bank Reports, 3 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan Banking—Yokohama Specie Bank, FRB.
1.Senate, Joint Resolution 173, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 31 August 1935, in United States Statutes at Large, vol. 49, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1936), 1081–85; Joseph C. Green, Executive Secretary, Minutes of the Meeting of the National Munitions Control Board, 24 September 1935; President of the United States, Proclamation: Enumeration of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War, 25 September 1935, File National Munitions Control Board Designation, Box 82, Central Files 1917–1956, OASIA; President of the United States, Proclamation, 5 October 1935, in American Journal of International Law 30, no. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (January 1936): 63–65; Stuart L. Weiss, “American Foreign Policy and Presidential Power: The Neutrality Act of 1935,” Journal of Politics 30, no. 3 (August 1968): 672–95.
2.Senate, Joint Resolution 51, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1 May 1937, in United States Statutes at Large, vol. 50, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1937), 121–28; James Wilford Garner, “The United States Neutrality Act of 1937,” American Journal of International Law 31, no. 3 (July 1937): 385–97; Frederick C. Adams, “The Road to Pearl Harbor: A Reexamination of American Far Eastern Policy, July 1937–December 1938,” Journal of American History 58, no. 1 (June 1971): 73–92; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 119–22; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 41.
3.Correspondence among Chinese Ambassador Want, Secretary of State Hull, and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, 1–12 June 1938; memoranda by Joseph C. Green, Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control, and Charles W. Yost, Assistant Chief, to Hull, 13–26 June 1938, 618–22, and State Department to British Embassy, 9 November 1938, 625–26, all in State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938) (hereafter cited as FRUS); Acting Secretary of State, statement, 3 June 1938; Yost to 148 Persons and Companies Manufacturing Airplane Parts, 1 June 1938, FRUS; State Department, Office of Research and Intelligence, D.C. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan, 1931–41 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1943) (hereafter cited as FRUS Japan), 2:201–2; Benjamin J. Williams, “The Coming of Economic Sanctions in American Practice,” American Journal of International Law 37, no. 3 (July 1943): 388–89; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 19n3, 44n7; Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction, International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949). Aircraft statistics in Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1936–42.
4.Treaty and protocol signed at Washington on 21 February 1911 and related ratifications, in Charles I. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United Sates of America 1776–1949, Department of State Publication 8615 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), 9:416–22; T. A., Division of Trade Agreements to Hull, Possible Termination of Commercial Treaty with Japan, 30 July 1938; George C. Sprague, attorney, to Osaka Syosen Kaisha, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 Between Japan and the United States, 15 August 1939, File 894.512/53, RG 59, NA; Correspondence among Hull, Grew, Eugene H. Doorman, Henry Grady, Japanese Ambassador Kensuke Horinouchi, and others, 7 July 1939–1 September 1940, FRUS, The Far East, 1939, 3:560–635, 1940, 4:630–636.
5.FDR, address recommending revision of the Neutrality Law, 21 September 1939, online at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/7-2-188/188-14.html (accessed 6 October 2002), Paper 14; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 21, 41; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 40–45; Encyclopaedia Britannica 1945, 22:848–49.
6.State Department, press release, 15 December 1939, and Hull to Horinouchi, 6 and 27 January 1940, both in FRUS Japan 2:202–6; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 119–21, 152, 179–85; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 44n7.
7.Interdepartmental Committee on Non-Ferrous Metals and Manufactures, study prepared for the Office of the Administrator of Export Control, Report No. IO 4-2, Industrial Objectives, Japan, Aluminum and Magnesium, 25 Aug 1941; Foreign Economic Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, Enemy Branch, Preliminary Survey of Japanese Aluminum, 18 Oct 1942; Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis Branch, R. and A. No. 2155, Japanese Aluminum Production and Fabrication, 31 May 1944; L. C. Raymond, Tariff Commission, Special Industry Analysis No. 2, Aluminum, prepared for the Liberated Areas Branch, FEA, January 1945; SCAP, General Headquarters, Economic and Scientific Section, Statistics and Research Division, The Aluminum Industry of Japan, Special Report No. 9, 3 April 1946, File 407-100 Aluminum, Boxes 21–23; War Department, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Handbook: Japan: Section 6, Natural Resources, Manual M-354-6, 22 July 1944, File 401-200 (A), Box 10, all in ONI, Japan Monographs 1939–47, RG 38, NA; Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1936–42.
8.Interdepartmental Committee on Industrial Objectives, “Japan, Aluminum and Magnesium,” 25 Aug 1941; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, 158–60.
9.Robert H. Ridgway and H. W. Davis, “Molybdenum, Tungsten, and Vanadium,” in Interior Department, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, annual (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1939–42); Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1936–42.
10.State Department, press release, 20 December 1939, Horinouchi to Hull, and Hull to Horinouchi, memo, 6 January 1940, all in FRUS Japan 2:203–7; Encyclopaedia Britannica 15:827; American Chemical Society, “The Houdry Process,” Washington, 1999, online at http://acsweb-content.acs.org/landmarks/landmarks/hdr/index.html (accessed 2 November 2002); Bruce A. Finlayson, University of Washington, “The Fluidized Bed Reactor Page,” on line at http://faculty.washington.edu.fanlayso/Fluidized_Bed/FBR_Intro/history_fbr.htm (accessed 3 November 2002); Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 180–82. The holy grail was a true antiknock fuel of 100 octane. British production arrived in time to win the Battle of Britain, but U.S. production of 100-octane fuel did not come on line until May 1942.
11.Robert F. Maddox, “Senator Harley M. Kilgore and Japan’s World War II Business Practices,” West Virginia History 55 (1996): 127–142, on line at http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh55-6.html (accessed 2 November 2002).
1.War Department Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “History,” on line at http://www.ndu.edu/ICAF/history/index.htm (accessed 25 October 2006); Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 1:18–21, 68–70; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1949–1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), 180–90.
2.Congress, An Act to Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense, H.R. 9850, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 2 July 1940, in Public Laws of the United States of America, vol. 49, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1941), 712–14.
3.Senate, Joint Resolution 173, 1081–85; Green: Washington Post, 11 August 1931, 8, and 19 September 1934, 1; New York Times, 18 July 1935, 4, 18 August 1935, 7, 22 September 1935, 1, and 14 January 1940, 34; Yost: New York Times, 22 September 1935, 1, and 23 May 1981, 21. Yost went on to a distinguished postwar career as ambassador to three Third World countries, and in 1969–71 as the American delegate to the United Nations.
4.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 74; FEA, Records Analysis Division, “Pre-Pearl Harbor Organization,” File FEA Administrative History Pearl Harbor Organization, Box 13, Entry 145, RG 169, NA.
5.National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. F, 1939–1942 (New York: James T. White, 1942), 514–15; Who Was Who in America 3:467; New York Times, 25 November 1968, 47; extract from War Department, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “History.”
6.Industrial Mobilization for War 1:71–73; NARA, Federal Records of World War II (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 1:149.
7.State Department, “Application for License to Export Articles and Materials (Other than Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War and Tin-Plate Scrap) Designated by the President as Necessary to the National Defense Pursuant to Section 6 of the Act of Congress Approved July 2, 1940,” Box 4863, File Frozen Credits 1940–44, RG 59, NA.
8.Roosevelt, Proclamation 2413 with Regulation, 2 July 1940; Proclamation 2417 with Regulations, 26 July 1940; Proclamation 2433, 12 September 1940; Proclamation 2449, 10 December 1940; Proclamation 2451, 20 December 1940; Proclamation 2453 and EO 8631,10 January 1941; Proclamation 2456 and EO 8668, 4 February 1941; Proclamation 2461 and EO 8594, 25 February 1941; Proclamation 2464 and 2465, EO 8702 and 8703, 4 March 1941; Proclamation 2468, 27 March 1941; Proclamation 2476, 14 April 1941; and Proclamation 2488, 28 May 1941, all in FRUS Japan 2:211–18. Press releases are also included for most items.
9.Japanese Embassy to U.S. Department of State, 3 August 1940; Department of State to Japanese Embassy, 6 August 1940; Roosevelt, Proclamation 2433, 12 September 1940, all in FRUS Japan 2:218–20; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 93; Irvine H. Anderson Jr., “The 1941 De Facto Embargo Oil of Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex,” Pacific Historical Review, May 1975, 207–12; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 190–91; Roland H. Worth Jr., No Choice but War: The United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1995), 30–33.
10.In the 1960s and 1970s the world steel industry converted again, to basic oxygen and electric furnace processes.
11.Tariff Commission, Iron and Steel: A Survey of the Iron and Steel Industries and International Trade of the Principal Producing and Trading Countries . . . , Report No. 128, 2nd ser. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 61–63, 75–77, 125–139, 279–300, 381–93; Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook, 1932–42, chapters on iron and steel; Interior Department, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Resources of Japan, Foreign Minerals Survey vol. 2, no. 5 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1945); Interdepartmental Committee on Iron and Steel, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Iron, Steel and Ferro-Alloys,” Reports on the Economic Vulnerability of Japan, 1941–43, Entry 44, Boxes 1–2, Records of the Tariff Commission; War Department, Civil Affairs Handbook: Japan; Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison (OCL), The Place of Foreign Trade in the Economy of Japan: An Analysis in Two Volumes of the External Trade of Japan Proper between 1930 and 1943 Focusing on Possible or Probable Post-war Developments, Intelligence Research Report OCL-2815 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1943–46), vol.1, pt. 2, 234–63; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Basic Materials Division, Coal and Metals in Japan’s War Economy, Report No. 36 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946); Cohen, Japan’s Economy, 118–19, 48.
12.Equivalent calculations by the author.
13.Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings: A Bill to Provide for the Protection and Preservation of Domestic Sources of Scrap and Steel. 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 4 April 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 77–179; Interior Department, Bureau of Mines, Consumption of Ferrous Scrap and Pig Iron in the United States, Reports of Investigation 3329 (1935), 3366 (1936), 3420 (1937–38) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1935–38); thereafter scrap survey in chapters on iron and steel in Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook; Jack Gutstadt, Scrap Iron and Steel: An Outline of the Many Ramifications and Developments of a Major Industry Together with Statistics, Formulas, and Other Similar Data (Chicago: Jack Gutstadt, 1939); Edwin Charles Barringer, The Story of Scrap (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel, 1954). Exports by U.S., regional, and total are in Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1936–42.
14.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 11–12.
15.Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 189.
16.Ibid, 91; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 49, 92–94.
17.Roosevelt, Proclamation 2417 with Regulations, 26 July 1940, FRUS Japan, 216–17; Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 105–7; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 101–8; Yost to Maxwell, 10 September 1940, Boxes 271–72, File 400.3295, Entry 98, FEA, Office of the Administrator of Export Control, Central File (Area) “Japan,” RG 169, NA.
18.White House, press release, 26 September 1940; Regulations Governing Exports, 30 September 1940; Embassy of Japan to Department of State, 7 October 1940; Japanese Ambassador to Secretary of State, 8 October; Secretary of State, memorandum, 8 October 1940; and State to Japanese Embassy, 23 October 1940, all in FRUS Japan 2:223–29. The Tripartite Treaty is available online at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/triparti.htm.
19.Yost to Maxwell, 10 September 1940; Roosevelt, Proclamation No. 2449, EO 8607, State Department press release, 10 December; Embassy of Japan to Department of State, 21 December 1940; Department of State to Japanese Embassy, 10 January 1941, FRUS Japan 2:232–38; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 190–91; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, chap. 14. In 1915 Japan forced some of its “Twenty-One Demands”on China by a treaty that would have reduced it to an economic colony. U.S. protests of violation of the Open Door free trade policy were unavailing. Meanwhile, Japan’s shiplines were profitably taking over Pacific trade routes abandoned by the warring powers, and its shipyards were booming with orders for ships assembled from imported American steel plates. When the United States entered the war in 1917 it restricted steel exports, a severe blow to Japan. Viscount Kikujiro Ishii came to Washington to confer with Secretary of State Robert Lansing. The Lansing-Ishii Notes of 2 November 1917 reaffirmed the Open Door but conceded Japan’s “special interests” in China due to “propinquity.” The United States resumed steel shipments, for which Japan agreed to sell or lease to it an equivalent tonnage of ships. Japan delivered only a handful of ships before the Armistice. The Lansing-Ishii agreement was withdrawn in 1923. Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing’s Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962); William J. Williams, “American Steel and Japanese Ships: Transpacific Trade Disputes During World War I,” unpublished paper, Colorado Springs, Colo., in author’s files.
20.Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook; Interdepartmental Committee on Iron and Steel, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Iron, Steel and Ferro-Alloys”; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 234–63; USSBS, Coal and Metals; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 239, 255–58, 263–70; James William Morley, ed., The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 239, 255–58, 263–70.
21.Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1936–42; An Act . . . , White House Press Release, 2 July 1940, in President of the United States, Press Releases, mimeograph, Washington, 1933, call no. E740.5.A3, Library of Congress; A Review of Licenses for Tools to Japan with View of Recommending Revocation, 1 October 1940; reports on machine tool loadings and licenses, 10 and 11 October 1940, File 164 Japan, Box 271; Machinery, Summary of Information, 7 April 1941, File 412.3 Japan, Box 272, Central File (Area) “Japan,” all in Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA; Assistant Secretary of State Berle, memorandum, 19 and 30 November; Secretary of State to Morishima, 9 and 17 December 1940, FRUS Japan 2:211–16, 229–32; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 184–85.
22.Roosevelt, Proclamation 2453, EO 8631, 10 January; Proclamation 2456, EO 8669, 4 February; Proclamation 2461, EO 8693, 25 February; Proclamations 2463–2465, EOs 8702–8703, 4 March; Proclamation 2468, 27 March; Proclamation 2476, 14 April; Proclamation 2488, State Department press release, 28 May 1941; State Department, Bulletin 4:84, 1 February 1941, 128; and Bulletin 4:85, 8 February 1941, 158, all in FRUS Japan 2:239–63. Various agencies, recommendations for licensing, 13 articles, 12 February 1941; phosphates, 20 and 31 March 1941, 8 April 1941; cotton linters, 3 April 1941; and toluol and specialty metals, 23 April 1941, all in Files 164 Japan and 411.820 Japan, Box 271, Central File (Area) “Japan,” Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
23.Maxwell to Acheson, with memorandum criticism of export licensing arrangements, 21 April 1941, File 811.20(d) Regulations/4987, Box 2683; Leonard H. Price, Division of Controls, to Green, 9 July 1941, Box 3677, File 811.20(d) Regulations/3909, RG 59, NA; FEA, “Pre-Pearl Harbor Organization”; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 142.
24.FEA, “Pre-Pearl Harbor Organization.”
25.Major T. S. Riggs, Assistant to Administrator of Export Control, to Acheson, Extent of Control Report, 23 July 1941, Box 3677, File 811.20(d) Regulations/3874, RG 59, NA; Major John E. Russell, Chief, Programs Section, Percentage of United States Exports Now Under Control, 29 August 1941, File Planning Division, Box 77, Entry 97, Central File, Office of the Administrator of Export Control RG 169, NA.
1.See chapter 2.
2.“Yokohama Specie Bank,” Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).
3.Rozell to McKeon, Yokohama Specie Bank’s Reports, 3 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan Banking-Yokohama Specie Bank, FRB.
4.McKeon, untitled memorandum, 7 August 1940, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking, vol. 1, OASIA.
5.Rozell to McKeon, Yokohama Specie Bank’s Reports, 3 August 1940; Rozell to McKeon, 10 August 1940, Yokohama Specie Bank Reports.
6.McKeon to L. Werner Knoke, untitled, 10 August 1940, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking, vol. 1, OASIA.
7.McKeon to Knoke, untitled, 10 August 1940; J. B. Knapp to Morse, International Capital Movements—Japanese Revisions, 27 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan Banking YSB, FRB.
8.Rozell, Yokohama Specie Bank Reports, 28 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan Banking YSB, FRB.
9.Knapp to Morse, International Capital Movements—Japanese Revisions, 27 August 1940, Box 50, File Japan Banking YSB, FRB.
10.Frank M. Tamagna to Board of Governors, Japan’s International Position, 28 August 1940. In 1946 this report about the hidden account was sent to the Justice Department for use in the Tokyo war crimes trials as an illustration of the duplicity of Japanese leaders planning for an aggressive war. The report was not introduced at the trials. Handwritten notation: “Certified copy given Justice Dept. 5/28/46 for use in Tokyo trials.”
11.Commerce Department, Balance of International Payments, 1937, 61.
12.Donald Moggridge, ed., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (Cambridge: Macmillan/Cambridge Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1979), 23:1–10; Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom (New York: Viking, 2001), 74–76.
13.Tamagna, Japan’s International Position, 28 August 1940; Charles H. Coe to Harry Dexter White, The Incomplete Reporting of Foreign Assets and Liabilities by the Yokohama Specie Bank of New York, 9 October 1940, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking, vol. 1, OASIA.
14.Knapp to Morse, International Capital Movements, 27 August 1940.
15.Coe to White, Incomplete Reporting of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 9 October 1940.
16.Edward H. Foley Jr., General Counsel, to Morgenthau, 23 September 1940, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 28.
17.Meeting, 10 October 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:26.
18.EO No. 8389, 10 April 1940, as amended; Regulations under Executive Order No. 8389, as Amended, State Department, Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control, 16 August 1941, Box 4683, File Frozen Credits 1940–41, RG 59, NA. This forty-six page compendium includes approximately ninety orders, rulings, decisions, circulars and general licenses issued from 10 April 1940 through 16 August 1941.
19.Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Period March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943.
20.Coe to White, Incomplete Reporting of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 9 October 1940.
21.Meeting, 10 October 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:26.
22.Kamarck to White, Preliminary Memorandum, 31 October 1940.
23.Tamagna to Knoke, Japan’s Undisclosed Gold Stock, 10 September 1940.
24.Kamarck to White, Preliminary Memorandum, 31 October 1940.
25.George A. Nakison, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy, Tokyo to Secretary of State, Japan’s Gold Position, 22 November 1940, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
26.J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Morgenthau, 29 November 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:30.
27.Wiley to Morgenthau, enclosing memorandum on Foreign Exchange Control to submit to the secretary of state, 2 December 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:30.
28.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 141–44; Jacob Viner to Morgenthau, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 3 December 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:39.
29.Viner, Mr. Wiley’s draft of memorandum for the Secretary of State on general exchange control, with attachment, 3 December 1940; Wiley to Morgenthau, 4 December, 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:31.
30.Entries of 30 December 1940 and 6 January 1941 in Morgenthau Diaries, cited in Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 143n20, 144n22.
31.Confidential memo, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 to Chief of Staff No. 30, Freezing of Japanese Funds in America, 24 October 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:27.
32.Viner, Mr. Wiley’s draft of memorandum, 3 December 1940; Wiley to Morgenthau, 2 and 4 December 1940; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 227n3.
33.Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Investments in United States and American Investment in Japan, 11 September 1940, Box 50, File Japan General 1922–1941, FRB.
34.Notes of meeting, 9 October 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:26.
35.H. E. Hesse to White, 6 December 1940, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking, vol. 1, OASIA.
36.Merle Cochran, Morgenthau Meeting, 10 October 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:26.
37.Kamarck to White, Cooperation of the Bank of America with the Japanese, 12 December 1940, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking vol. 1, OASIA.
38.Coe to White, Incomplete Reporting of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 9 October 1940; Hesse to White, 6 December 1940.
39.Meeting, October 15, 1940, Morgenthau Diaries 2:26.
40.Rozell to Knoke, Japan’s Financial Position vis-à-vis the United States, 23 January 1941, Box 50, File Japan Finance 1922–51 (1), Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter cited as FRBNY).
41.Taylor to White, Japanese Foreign Exchange Resources, 7 February 1941.
42.The name of Harry Dexter White conjures up the postwar accusations that he assisted Soviet espionage before and during World War II, perhaps even spied for the Russians. His case has been addressed in several books and innumerable articles. White, a brilliant economist, had joined the Treasury in 1934 and risen as Morgenthau’s admired aide and brains-truster to head the Division of Monetary Research. In 1944 he led the U.S. delegation in conferences that designed the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the 1990s the federal government released “Venona” decrypts of Soviet messages confirming that he passed information to Moscow. It is unclear whether White acted on behalf of Soviet interests in 1941 in shaping U.S. financial policy toward Japan. Vitali Pavlov, a former KGB (Soviet state security) official in an article and a later a book written during the post–Cold War information thaw of the 1990s, described “Operation Snow” (a play on White’s name). Pavlov wrote that he contacted White under diplomatic cover in a restaurant in Washington in late April 1941, urging him to promote U.S. actions to draw Japanese ambitions for conquest away from Siberia and toward a confrontation in the Pacific, perhaps including a war with the United States, so that the USSR would not have to fight on two fronts when Hitler attacked.
There is no evidence that the Soviets influenced White’s recommendation of February 1941 to freeze Japan’s assets immediately. White’s one alleged meeting with Vitaly Pavlov occurred in April 1941. The flight of Japan’s money from New York was reason enough for urgency. Both Morgenthau and White then lost interest in Japan as they focused on Lend Lease. After February White’s input on the subject of freezing Japanese assets largely disappeared from the records. His voice was notably absent in late July when the freeze was discussed with Roosevelt, decided upon, and implemented. White was not appointed as the Treasury’s representative on the powerful three-man policy board that determined the severity of the freeze. He was passed over in favor of Edward H. Foley Jr., the Treasury Department’s senior lawyer—and not even an assistant secretary—leaving command of what became the draconian total freeze to Dean Acheson in the State Department. The momentum toward launching financial war against Japan was an American phenomenon, not Soviet inspired. Later in 1941 White drew up a utopian scheme for peace in Asia through withdrawal of the U.S. fleet from the Pacific, Japanese evacuation from China matched by Soviet troops backing away from Manchuria, non-aggression pacts, huge American economic aid and loans to both Japan and China, and sale by Japan of three-fourths of its military production to the United States at cost plus. The paper languished until Morgenthau forwarded it to Hull and Roosevelt on 17 November 1941, long after the freeze of Japan’s assets. On 26 November Hull incorporated for the president a watered-down version of the wildly unrealistic scheme as a possible basis for diplomatic settlement. White’s fantasy of buying off Japan was the antithesis of Pavlov’s alleged prodding to inflame it to war. It came, of course, to naught. Sources: Vitaly Pavlov, “The Time Has Come to Talk About Operation Snow,” Novosti Razvedki I Kontrrazvedki (News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence), No. 11-12, Moscow, 1995, translation kindly provided by Dr. John Haynes, Library of Congress; Jerrold Schechter and Leona Schechter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), chap. 2.
43.Taylor to White, Japanese Foreign Exchange Resources, 7 February 1941; White to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Position, 25 February 1941.
44.White to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Position, 25 February 1941.
45.Taylor to White, Japanese Gold Movements and Dollars [sic] Balances in the United States, January to March 1941, 21 March 1941, Box 21, File Japan Gold and Silver, OASIA.
46.White to Morgenthau, 3 April 1941, Morgenthau Diaries 2:44.
1.Three others held that title: Adolf A. Berle Jr., Breckenridge Long, and G. Howland Shaw. All were junior to Secretary Cordell Hull and Undersecretary Sumner Welles.
2.Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), 16–35; Robert A. Divine, “Acheson, Dean Gooderham,” American National Biography Online; James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 84–87.
3.R. R. Stout, 1st Lt., to Maxwell, 15 February 1941, Notes on Meeting of 6 February 1941 in Maxwell’s office, File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC,” Files 336.11–350.05, Box 184, FEA, Office of the Administrator of Export Control, Entry 97, Central File, RG 169, NA (hereafter cited as File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning, OAEC”).
4.The CEDC was to consist of an odd combination of the secretaries of the State and Treasury Departments, the attorney general, the federal loan administrator, and somebody from the Office of Production Management. It would advise the president, congress and other agencies, and set policy for a stunning array of regulatory activities: financial including asset freezing, export control including direction of the ECA, defense procurement for foreign countries (presumably including Lend-Lease), and shipping requisitions. Financial controls would be applied immediately to Germany, Italy, and the European neutrals, but not Japan. In an administrative tangle, the Treasury would administer all operations but could not alter the ECA’s licensing procedures without State’s approval. The State Department would have a sort of veto power on issues that affected foreign relations—presumably everything. The attorney general would bring indictments against violations of foreign controls that detrimentally affected defense. In a final bit of obfuscation, all actions of the secretary of the treasury and the attorney general were to be “conclusively presumed” to be in accord with the policies of State and the CEDC.
5.Schwarz to Morgenthau, 14 February 1941; Hull to FDR, Memorandum on the Freezing of Foreign Funds, 14 February 1941; Treasury staff conference, 14 February 1941, a.m.; Shea, draft executive order; and Foley to Morgenthau, all in Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 1, Roll 40; Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 2:332–37.
6.Foley, Memorandum for the Secretary’s Diary, 18 February 1941; Morgenthau to Foley and Pehle, 21 February 1941; and Foley and Pehle to Morgenthau, 21 February 1941, all in Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Rolls 40–41; Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 1:457n.
7.Morgenthau to Gaston, 3 March 1941, Morgenthau Diaries 2:42.
8.Acheson, Present at the Creation, 27–30; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, chap. 9.
9.Grew to Secretary of State, 10 March 1941, FRUS 5:794–95; internal memo, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department, 12 March 1941, file 894.5034, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
10.Carlton Savage biography, Savage Endowment for International Relations and Peace, http://oip.uoregon.edu/savage/bio.php (accessed 20 July 2006); Washington Post, 26 May 1990, B6; New York Times, 17 January 1936, 8, 2 August 1938, 17, and 7 June 1939, 7. In 1943 Savage prepared a publication of diplomatic papers, War and Peace, concerning the events leading up to World War II.
11.Savage considered alternative schemes, cosmetically less strident but yielding roughly similar results. For example, an executive order might freeze the assets of every country, then license transactions for all except Japan; or require licensing of all foreign transactions but grant unrestricted licenses to all nations except Japan; or revoke with respect to Japan alone the unrestricted global exchange license of 1934.
12.Savage to Welles, 24 March 1941, with draft executive order attached, File 894.5151/242, Roll 15, State Department microfilm LM-68, RG 59, NA. Savage had been reassigned from the historian’s office and named an assistant to Assistant Secretary Breckenridge Long, and later as an aide to Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle Jr. Long was an aging lawyer and politician who returned to department headquarters in 1940 after assignments abroad. His involvement with the world emergency involved control of immigrant visas for refugees. Berle was a lawyer of wide government experience, a charter member of FDR’s “brain trust,” and best known as an author of seminal book on corporate control of the economy, “a Bible of the New Left”; his later biographer titled his book Liberal. It seems unlikely that either Long or Berle would have sponsored Carlton Savage’s draft freeze order. He forwarded it to Welles at the request of Herbert Feis, economic adviser.
13.Acheson, Present at the Creation, 23.
14.Chandler Morse to Hewes, Thoughts on Methods of Economic Warfare, 10 January 1941, and Staley to Hewes, 30 January 1941, both in File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
15.Morse to Hewes, Thoughts on Methods of Economic Warfare, 10 January 1941; Staley to Hewes, 30 January 1941; and Ralph Turner to Hewes, 4 April 1941; H. Lary, Japan’s Vulnerability to Financial Pressure, 4 March 1941, Far Eastern Regional Studies (lists of), File General Correspondence, Projects Section Foreign Funds, E88, Box 700, Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
16.Hewes to Maxwell, US-UK Cooperation, 31 March 1941; and Hewes to Bernstein, 4 April 1941, both in File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
17.Hewes to Ralph Turner, Techniques for the Study, 8 April 1941, File “A Plan for Administering the Preclusive Purchasing of World Commodities”; Warren S. Hunsberger, “Loans as an Instrument of Economic Warfare (Studies in the Technique of Economic Warfare),” File Economic Warfare by Loans, both in Box 698, General File of Chief, Export Section, Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
1.F. H. Miles Jr., Colonel, Office of the Commandant of the Army Industrial College to Maxwell, 23 September 1940; Maxwell to Secretary of War, 1 October 1940; and Secretary of War to Maxwell, 7 October 1940, all in File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
2.NARA, Federal Records of World War II 1:150ff.
3.Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense to the President, memo, 27 November 1940, File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
4.Who Was Who in America, vol. 3; Washington Post, 3 February 1941, 7.
5.American Men and Women of Science: Economics, 1974 (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1974); New York Times, 28 September 1954, 19.
6.Who Was Who in America and World Notables, 1977–81 (Chicago: Marquis Who’s Who, 1981), vol. 7.
7.Washington Post, 28 December 1934, 5.
8.Thomas Hewes, draft letter Maxwell to FDR, 17 December 1940, File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
9.R. R. Stout, 1st Lt., to Maxwell, notes on meeting of 6 February 1941 in Maxwell’s office, 14 February 1941; Hewes to Maxwell, US-UK Cooperation, 31 March 1941; Lee, cable from London to AEC with copies to secretaries of war, navy, and treasury re: British organization for economic warfare, 29 April 1941; and Hewes to Maxwell, Prompt Initiation of Economic Pressure, 2 May 1941, all in File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
10.R. L. Maxwell, Administrator, to Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission, 20 December 1940, File: Projects General, Box 700; Louis S. Ballif, Chief Sundries Div., U.S. Tariff Commission to Chandler Morse, AEC, “The International Use of Economic Pressure as an Instrument of National Policy,” 17 February 1941, File: Commodities, Report Correspondence, Box 699; Far Eastern Regional Studies, File: General Correspondence, n.d., Box 700, 26 February to 19 July 1941; and Administrator of Export Control, all in Entry 88, RG 169, NA.
11.Louis S. Ballif to Hewes, “Assistance of Existing Government Agencies in Economic Warfare,” 13 December 1940, File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
12.Minutes of the First Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Export Control Commodity Studies, 24 February 1941, File: Commodity Committees, General File of Chief, Export Section, Box 698, Entry 88, Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
13.Joint letter from Stark and Marshall, 4 April 1941, in WPD 4402-6, cited in War Department, Office of the Chief of Military History, “Planning the Defeat of Japan: A Study of Total War Strategy,” unpublished monograph, prepared by Lt. Col. Henry C. Morgan, 1961, 96; Maxwell to CNO and COS, Economic Warfare Committee on Far Eastern Trade, 17 March 1941, and Stark and Marshall to Maxwell, Economic Warfare Committee on Far Eastern Trade—Policy Affecting Army and Navy Representatives, 17 March 1941, both in File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC.”
14.The number is approximate. Some studies were supplemented or updated later in 1941 and during the war.
15.Morse to Moser, Chairman of Far East Research Unit, Additional Research Projects, 11 March 1941, File: Current Projects Unit Genl File, 1941, Box 700; Chandler Morse to all members of the Steering Committee and committee chairmen, Form of Commodity Reports, 15 March 1941; unsigned, Projects Section to Commodity Chairman, Special Reports on Possibilities for Preclusive Purchasing, 19 March 1941; Hewes to Maxwell, Handling of Reports to Projects Section from Interdepartmental Commodity Committees, 3 April 1941, File: Commodity Committees, all in General File of Chief, Exports Section, Administrator of Export Control, FEA, Entry 88, Box 698, RG 169, NA.
16.Transmittal letter with list or reports of Economic Vulnerability of Japan, 11 April 1941, File: Commodities, Report Correspondence, Box 699, General File of Chief, Export Section, Administrator of Export Control, FEA, Entry 88, RG 169, NA. This lists most of the studies. In August, after the freeze and full embargo was imposed, a few vulnerability studies were further updated.
17.Richard Sanger to Hewes, transmittal of reports to General Maxwell, 9 May 1941, and Commerce Department to Morse, 26 May 1941, both in File: Commodities, Report Correspondence, Box 699, General File of the Chief, Projects Section, Administrator of Export Control, Entry 88, RG 169, NA. A full set of the vulnerability studies is in Boxes 698–700. Another set is in Reports on the Economic Vulnerability of Japan 1941–43, Boxes 1–2, Entry 44, Records of the Tariff Commission.
18.Administrator of Economic Control (Brig. Gen. R. L. Maxwell) to Chief of Staff [Marshall] and Chief of Naval Operations [Stark], and many other addressees, “Coordinated Plan of Economic Action in Relation to Japan,” draft in 2 vols., 1 May 1941; transmittal letters to various officials and letters of acknowledgment, c. 6 to 13 May 1941, are found in Boxes 271–72, File 350.05, Central File (Area) “Japan,” Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA. Some of the prewar studies, including the Coordinated Plan, cannot be located. The ECA, reorganized several times, evolved into an enormous wartime bureaucracy under other names. It was disestablished by executive order on 15 September 1941, after the financial freeze was imposed on Japan. Its functions were subsumed into an Office of Export Control under an Economic Defense Board, also created in 1941 to strengthen international economic relations. After Pearl Harbor it was renamed the Board of Economic Warfare. In 1943 its functions were transferred to a new Office of Economic Warfare which in turn was superseded by the Foreign Economic Administration within the Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The collection of these agencies’ records at the National Archives measures 2,598 cubic feet, of which those of the ECA and its successors handling export controls constitute 201 linear feet.
19.Hewes to Maxwell, Prompt Initiation of Economic Pressure, 2 May 1941.
20.Interdepartmental Committee on Iron and Steel, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Iron, Steel and Ferro-Alloys.” The interdepartmental committee reports in notes 20–36 are all in Boxes 698-700, General File of the Chief, Projects Section, Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
21.Interdepartmental Committee on Non-Ferrous Metals and Manufactures, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Copper.”
22.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Abrasives,” 1 April 1941.
23.Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Carbon Black,” 7 April 1941.
24.Interdepartmental Committee on Raw Textiles, Fibers and Cordage, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Miscellaneous Vegetable Fibers,” 5 April 1941.
25.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Bauxite and Fluorspar,” 2 April 1941.
26.Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Methanol, Butanol and Acetone,” 7 April 1941. A study on dynamite and other explosives amounted to one page because Japan was self-sufficient and U.S. exports were embargoed.
27.Interdepartmental Committee on Petroleum, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Petroleum,” April 1941.
28.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Bauxite and Fluorspar,” 2 April 1941.
29.Interdepartmental Committee on Iron and Steel, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Ferro-Alloys,” April 1941.
30.Interdepartmental Committee on Iron and Steel, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Iron, Steel and Ferro-Alloys.”
31.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Asbestos,” 7 April 1941.
32.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Quartz Crystals,” 2 April 1941.
33.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Mica,” 2 April 1941.
34.Interdepartmental Committee on Miscellaneous Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Miscellaneous Products,” 25 April 1941.
35.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Graphite,” 2 April 1941.
36.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Optical Glass,” 1 April 1941. Interdepartmental Committee on Raw Textiles, Fibers and Cordage. “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Miscellaneous Vegetable Fibers,” 5 April 1941.
37.State Department Far Eastern Division (Jones), Japan: Economic Estimate, 27 May 1941, file 89450/154, Roll 11, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
1.Secondary works on Japan’s consumer economy, especially food and fertilizer, include historical statistics: Cohen, Japan’s Economy; Hunsberger, Japan and the United States in World Trade; William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change 1868–1938 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954); and W. J. Macpherson, The Economic Development of Japan c. 1868–1941 (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1987). U.S. prewar reports other than the vulnerability studies include Far Eastern Division, State Department (Jones), Japan Economic Estimate, 27 May 1941, File 894.50/154, Roll 11, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
Wartime U.S. studies were largely based on prewar data: War Department, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Handbook: Japan, 22 July 1944; Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI Japan Monographs, File 401-200 (A), Box 10, Section 6, Natural Resources, RG 38, NA; Navy Department, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Civil Affairs Guide: Far Eastern Nutritional Relief (Japanese Culture), 15 August 1944, OPNAV 13-18, Box 18, File Agriculture-Food-General, RG 38, NA; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 160-231, tables II-1 to II-16.
Postwar studies include accurate prewar information: SCAP, General Headquarters, Japanese Food Situation, 1 May 1946, Box 18, Japanese Monograph Series, RG 38, NA; USSBS, Over-All Economic Effects Division, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy, December 1946, 53–54, 188, 195–96, 235–37; USSBS, Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division, The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower, January 1947, 1–16, 99–104; Chemicals in Japan’s War, 1946, appendix. Prewar statistics are available in Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan. U.S. exports in Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
2.At the time of Commodore Perry’s arrival Japan’s population was larger than that of the United States and of any European country except Russia. It ranked third in the world behind China and India.
3.The imperial policy also had a cultural dimension. The Japanese, then as now, preferred short-grained, glutinous “Japonica” rice grown in the temperate home islands and Korea. Although “Indica” rice of tropical southeast Asia cost only half, and by 1939 only one third as much as Japonica, only the poorest citizens tolerated “inferior” Indica rice, scarcely preferable to coarse field grains. During a visit by the author in the 1990s a domestic rice shortage forced the government to mandate blending of domestic rice with 10 percent California Japonica and 6 percent Thailand Indica. Rather than blend, the food markets tied together three plastic bags of appropriate sizes. The California rice was tolerated but consumers threw away the little bags of Indica.
4.Jerome B. Cohen, Economic Problems of Free Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1952), 7–8.
5.Ibid., 16.
6.Encyclopaedia Britannica 1941, 12:901.
7.State Department, Japan Economic Estimate, 27 May 1941, 3.
8.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 182–205.
9.Reference works on fertilizers including crop responses: Ministry of Economic Warfare, “Japan: Supplies of Fertilizers in 1942 in Relation to Food Production,” London, 30 December 1941, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan 1940–1944, decimal files 894, File 894.659/FERTILIZER/2, Roll 13, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; SCAP, General Headquarters, Natural Resources Section, Fertilizers in Japan; a Preliminary Report, Report 55, prepared by Maj. G. L. W. Swanson and Mr. Tanada, Tokyo, 10 September 1946; Kazushi Ohkawa, Bruce F. Johnston, and Hiromitsu Kaneda, eds., Agriculture and Economic Growth: Japan’s Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1970); John J. Doyle, The Response of Rice to Fertilizer, FAO Agricultural Studies 70 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1966); Moyle Strayhorn Williams and John W. Couston, Crop Production Levels and Fertilizer Use (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1962); O. P. Engelstad, ed., Fertilizer Technology and Use, 3rd ed. (Madison, Wisc.: Soil Science Society of America, 1985); Isaburo Nagai, Japonica Rice: Its Breeding and Culture (Tokyo: Yokendo, 1959); Kym Anderson and Rod Tyers, “Japanese Rice Policy in the Interwar Period: Some Consequences of Imperial Self Sufficiency,” Japan and the World Economy 4 (1992): 102–27.
10.Around 1900 the only accessible source of nitrogen was sodium nitrate mined in the deserts of northern Chile, which in 1903 supplied 67 percent of world nitrogen demand. But sodium nitrate was inefficient in wet paddies, and required dollars Japan could ill afford. In the gaslight era industrial countries produced ammonium sulfate containing 20 percent nitrogen as a byproduct of “town gas” from coal baked in ovens, reacted with sulfuric acid. In 1905 Japan commenced manufacture of ammonium sulfate from domestic coal, using iron-sulfur pyrites for acid. However, demand for coproduct town gas and solid coke residue did not grow fast enough. Around the time of World War I chemists learned to fix atmospheric nitrogen by combining air with hydrogen gas obtained from passing steam over incandescent coke, and conversion to ammonium sulfate. Japan adopted the process but still imported 62 percent of its need in 1928.
11.Germany ranked first. The United States, ranked second, relied mainly on its huge coke industry and on imports.
12.Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Fertilizers,” “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Ammonium Sulfate,” and “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Sodium Nitrate and Other Nitrates,” 7 April 1941, all in Boxes 698–700, General File of the Chief, Projects Section, Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
13.USSBS, Coal and Metals, 147–54, 158; Chemicals in Japan’s War, appendix, 10–25; Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 11–12.
14.Nineteenth-century agronomists observed the benefits of phosphates in crushed animal bones (and human bones from graveyards according to legend) and in guano, ancient bird excrement on a few dry Pacific islands that were mined out in a few years. Japan was deficient in livestock bones. Green manures supplied some, but fish, soybean cake, and fuel ashes were not rich in phosphates.
15.State Department, Japan Economic Estimate, 27 May 1941; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade 1:192–97, 2:57, tables II-9, II-10; USSBS, Chemicals in Japan’s War, 83–84, and appendix, 47–48; Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 12; Effects of Strategic Bombing, 155–57, 193.
16.Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Phosphate Rock,” 8 April 1941; Interior Department, Bureau of Mines, “Mineral Resources of Germany’s Former Colonial Possessions,” Foreign Minerals Quarterly 2, no. 3 (July 1939).
17.Bertrand L. Johnson and K. G. Warner, “Phosphate Rock,” in Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook, 1937–41.
18.Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Phosphate Rock.”
19.USSBS, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 12; USSBS, Coal and Metals, 155, 157, 193.
20.International Potash Institute, Japanese Potassium Symposium (Berne, Switz.: Second Japanese Potassium Congress, 1958); Stanley A. Barber, Robert D. Munson, and W. B. Dancy, “Production, Marketing, and Use of Potassium Fertilizers,” in Fertilizer Technology and Use, 2nd ed., ed. R. A. Olson (Madison, Wisc.: Soil Society of America, 1971).
21.J. H. Hedges, “Potash,” in Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1941; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 182–205, tables II-11, II-12; Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Potash”; correspondence, 1 November 1940, 5 February, and 2 May 1941, Boxes 271–72, Files 428.3 Japan, Central File (Area), Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA; Robinson Newcomb, “Potash Scarce,” Far Eastern Survey, 20 November 1940, 272. In an offer of barter trade in September 1941, Japan sought to acquire six thousand tons of manure salts, second in value to oil on its shopping list. See chapter 17.
22.USSBS, Effects of Strategic Bombing, 235–37.
23.Interdepartmental Committee on Fishery Products, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Fish, Shellfish and Fish Livers”; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 169–72, tables II-3, II-4; USSBS, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 14.
24.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 172, tables II-1, II-2; Navy Department, Civil Affairs Guide; USSBS, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 16; “World Food Needs Benefit Average Soybean Producers,” Farm Week, 1 September 1967.
25.Interdepartmental Committee on Fats and Oils, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Fats and Oils,” 31 March 1941; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 172–73; USSBS, Coal and Metals, 194–95; Navy Department, Civil Affairs Guide, 9, 16; USSBS, Chemicals in Japan’s War, appendix, 83. Mitsubishi placed large orders for lard in March and April despite a 4 March executive order requiring licensing of edible oils because shortages were appearing. On 25 July, the day before the dollar freeze, it sold at a loss sixty-five carloads on the West Coast.
26.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 167–69; USSBS, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 16; USSBS, Coal and Metals, 238.
27.Commerce Department, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Commerce Reports, weekly, 30 September 1939, 878; State Department, Naval Attaché, Tokyo, Japan’s Soda Industry and Its Dependence on Imported Salt, 16 September 1940, File 894.659/23, Roll 13, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 284–89 and tables II-26 to II-28; War Department, Civil Affairs Handbook, 22 July 1944; State Department, Office of Research and Intelligence, Situation Report: Japan, the Status of the Japanese Textile Industry, pt. 2, Rayon, 24 May 1946, file 3479.1, Box 19, ONI Japan Monographs; Interdepartmental Committee on Forest Products and Manufactures, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Forest Products and Manufactures,” 29 March 1941; Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Salt,” 7 April 1941, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Soda Ash (Calcined Sodium Carbonate),” 8 April 1941, and “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Caustic Soda (Sodium Hydroxide),” 7 April 1941; USSBS, Chemicals in Japan’s War, appendix, 85; USSBS, Coal and Metals, 146, 194; “Rayon Fiber,” fibersourcehome, http://www.fibersource.com/f-tutor/rayon.htm (accessed 8 October 2005). Japan obtained caustic soda by processing soda ash (sodium carbonate, Na2CO3) with ammonia or by electrolysis. Soda ash, in turn, was manufactured from common salt (sodium chloride, NaCl).
28.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 276–81, tables II-24, II-28; Seki, Cotton Industry of Japan; Interdepartmental Committee on Raw Textile Fibers and Cordage, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Raw Cotton”; Tariff Commission, Cotton Textiles, 2, cited in Cohen, Japan’s Economy; USSBS, Coal and Metals, 230–31; Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 116, 118.
29.Interdepartmental Committee on Hides and Skins, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Hides and Skins, Leather and Leather Manufactures, and Furs, Special Report on Hides and Skins, Leather and Leather Manufactures, and Furs,” 27 June 1941; Special Report on the Possibilities for Preclusive Purchasing of Hides and Skins, 21 March 1941; Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Vulnerability of Japan in Vegetable Tanning Materials,” 7 April 1941; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 319–22, table II-30; USSBS, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 41–42, 119–20.
30.Interdepartmental Committee on Rubber, “The Vulnerability of Japan in Rubber,” 6 March 1941; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 313–16, table II-30; Tariff Commission, Footwear, Rubber Soled, investigations under 1930 Act, 1931–35, Records of the Tariff Commission; USSBS, Japanese Wartime Standard of Living, 41–42, 119–20.
31.Interdepartmental Committee on Forest Products and Manufactures, “Vulnerability of Japan in Forest Products and Manufactures”; OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 299–306, table II-29; War Department, Civil Affairs Handbook, 22 July 1944; “Japan Needs Wood,” Far Eastern Survey, 26 February 1941, 32.
32.Interdepartmental Committee on Chemicals, Fertilizers and Related Products, “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Gum Rosin,” 7 April 1941, and “The Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Borax,” 7 April 1941. This committee also submitted reports on several minor vegetable products.
33.OSS, Central Information Division, name and subject card indexes to Series 16, Country: Japan, 117583C, Boxes 297–303, Entry 2.12, January 1946, RG 226, NA; Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1936–42; Grew to Hull, 20 January 1940, FRUS, vol. 4.
1.Official statistics from Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan”; Commerce Department, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures: Cotton Manufactures and Rayon and Silk Manufactures, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940); Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, vol. 3 (comparative analyses by the author); Underwear and Hosiery Review, May, November 1939; de Haan, Full-Fashioned Hosiery Industry, 42–44; Earl Constantine, President, National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers, correspondence and discussions with State Department officials, including Donald Hiss, Stanley Hornbeck, and Henry Grady, 15, 17, and 23 February 1940, Files 611.9431 and 694.11, Roll 9, Records Relating to U.S. Commercial Relations with Japan 1929–1949, RG 59, NA; E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, “Nylon,” online at http://heritage.dupont.com/touchpoints/tp_1935-2/depth.shtml (accessed 18 October 2006).
2.Interdepartmental Committee on Silk, “Economic Vulnerability of the United States in Raw Silk and Silk Waste,” W. S. Hunsberger, Silk, 11 April 1941, File 423 Silk Japan, Entry 98, Records of the FEA Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
3.FEA, Far Eastern Committee, Projects Section, “Preliminary, Summary Report on Silk: Japan and the United States,” 27 April 1941, prepared by Wirth Ferger, Box 698, General File of Chief, Projects Section, Entry 88, Office of Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA. In August 1941 Du Pont lifted licensing restrictions against blending with nylon. The U.S. government mandated blending for the few silk stockings still in production and urged at least 50 percent blending of other yarns, even for nylons.
4.Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan.”
5.Interdepartmental Committee on Silk, “Economic Vulnerability of the United States in Raw Silk and Silk Waste”; FEA, “Preliminary, Summary Report on Silk: Japan and the United States”; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan,” 174–75; Acheson to Hull, 13 September 1941, File 894.6552/23, Roll 16, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA. In September military needs were deemed secret.
6.Interdepartmental Committee on Silk, “Economic Vulnerability of the United States in Raw Silk and Silk Waste”; Lt. Col. John G. Burr to Chief of Ordnance, War Department, The Possibility of the Use of Raw Silk for Powder Bags, 22 May; and Office of the Chief of Ordnance to Administrator of Export Control, 27 May 1941, both in File Commodities—Reports Correspondence, Box 699, General Files—Projects, Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan,” 181–85.
7.Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1935–41; Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, vol. 3.
8.In the United States both silk and nylon went to war. American women wore shiny stockings of heavy six-thread rayon or cotton, or they applied suntan lotion and drew mock seams up the backs of their legs with eyebrow pencil. The Japanese uprooted the mulberry trees to free up land for growing food. After the surrender MacArthur’s occupation staff found about eight million pounds of raw silk in bales, less than two months of average prewar exports. They tried to auction it to American mills to raise occupation support funds, but received few bids at low prices. When full-fashioned hosiery production resumed in America nylon took the entire market. By 1955 silk stockings disappeared from shops. Seamless nylons in turn yielded to spandex-nylon pantyhose during and after the miniskirted 1960s. Japan today does not produce silk except for the weaving of a few ceremonial articles. China supplies the relatively small world demand for a fiber, now a novelty, valued for its natural imperfections in casual vogues that have displaced the lavish elegance of bygone days.
9.Interdepartmental Committee on Fishery Products, “Vulnerability of Japan in Fish, Shellfish and Fish Livers”; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan,” 25–65.
10.Interdepartmental Committee on Miscellaneous Products, “Vulnerability of Japan in Miscellaneous Products”; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan,” 194–97.
11.Interdepartmental Committee on Nonmetallic Minerals and Manufactures, “Vulnerability of Japan in Pottery”; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan,” 203–14.
12.Interdepartmental Committee on Miscellaneous Products, “Vulnerability of Japan in Miscellaneous Products”; Tariff Commission, “United States Imports from Japan,” 215–34.
1.Oil volumes were, and still are, commonly expressed in barrels of forty-two U.S. gallons. Seven barrels weigh about one short ton of two thousand pounds, depending on the crude or refined liquid product. Data were often expressed in barrels produced, consumed, or transported per day.
2.Commerce Department, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Fuel and Power in Japan, Trade Information Bulletin No. 821 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 1935); Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States; Navy Department, “Report on Petroleum Situation of Japan,” 12 March 1941, prepared by Lt. Cdr. A. H. McCollum, USN, File 894.6363/383, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan 1940–1944, File 894, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; Interdepartmental Committee on Petroleum, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Petroleum”; FEA, Special Areas Branch, Far East Enemy Division, Prewar and Wartime Civilian Fuel and Lighting Consumption in Japan Proper, July 1944, File 401-200, Japan, Box 9, ONI, Japan Monographs 1939–47, RG 38, NA; War Department, Civil Affairs Handbook: Japan; USSBS, Oil and Chemicals Division, Oil in Japan’s War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1946); Irvine H. Anderson Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933–1941 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
3.Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook, 1936–42, chapters on petroleum.
4.Ibid.; Anderson, Standard-Vacuum Oil; Interdepartmental Committee on Petroleum, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Petroleum.”
5.Stanley K. Hornbeck to Hull, 11 January 1941, File 894.6363/378, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; Anderson, Standard-Vacuum Oil.
6.G-2 of Headquarters, Eighth Corps Area, Confidential informant, reliable, 29 November 1940; Rejection of Appeal by Tide Water Associated Oil Co.; and Yost (State) to Maxwell, sending report by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Herbert E. Gaston, 9 May 1941, all in File 463.7 Japan, Box 272, Central File (Area), Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
7.Correspondence between Division of Controls, State Department, and Export Control Administration re: steel drums, 20 November 1940, 19, 21, 24 February, 8 May, 21 June 1941, and re: dismantled tanks, 29 April 1941, all in File 457.1 Japan, Central File (Area), Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA. In World War II steel drums were vital for fueling planes at advanced bases. Japanese aircraft carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack carried drummed fuel.
8.White to Ullman, Export Control—Shipments to Japan, 28 January 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 36; Japan: United States Principal Exports to, Monthly and Five Months 1941, c. 17 August 1941, Table VII-8-1, Area File 041.221 Japan, FEA, RG 169, NA. Per-barrel figures calculated by the author.
9.Joseph C. Green, Division of Controls to A-A, Memorandum, 19 July 1941, Box 3677, File 811.20 (D) Regulations/3884 1/2 PS/MNP, RG 59, NA. Figures converted to barrels by the author.
10.Welles, telegram to all Collector of Customs, 30 July 1941, File 911.20 (D) Regulations/3882A, Box 3677, Department of State Regulations [of Export Controls] 811.20(D), RG 59, NA.
11.Unless otherwise noted, following information is from Navy Department, “Report on Petroleum Situation of Japan”; Interdepartmental Committee on Petroleum, “Economic Vulnerability of Japan in Petroleum.”
1.Grew to Secretary of State, 15 November 1940, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 29; F. W. Tamagna to Knoke, Japanese Dollar Balances, 29 November 1940, Box 94, File Loans and Investments Foreign Deposits in U.S. (1), International Finance Division and Predecessors 1907–1974, FRB.
2.J. B. Knapp to Gardner, Bank of Brazil to hold official dollar accounts of Japan and Portugal, 26 November 1940; and W. H. Rozell, Transfer of Japanese Funds from New York to Brazil, 5 May 1941, both in Box 50, File Japan General 1922–1941, FRB.
3.White to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Position, 25 February 1941; Rozell to Knoke, Japanese Funds in New York, 16 March 1941, Box 50, File Japan General 1922–1941, FRB.
4.Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, vol. 3.
5.Rozell to Knoke, N.Y. Account of Netherlands Purchasing Commission, 24 May 1941, File Loans and Investments Foreign Deposits in U.S. (1), Box 94; Tamagna to Knoke, 13 June 1941, Transfers of Dollar Funds from Java Bank to Yokohama Specie Bank, 13 June 1941, File Java Banking; and Transfers of Dollar Funds from Java Bank to Yokohama Specie Bank, 16 July 1941, File Japan Banking, Box 51, all in Records of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, International Finance Division and Predecessors 1907–1974, FRB; Secretary of the Treasury to Secretaries of State, War and Navy, May–December Japanese Withdrawals of Funds from U.S., n.d. 1941, File 894.51/719, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan 1940–1944, Roll 14, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
6.Meeting at State Department with Aetna Insurance Company, 17 May 1941; Louis Pink, New York State Insurance Commissioner to Herbert Feis, 17 October, 20 December 1940, 16 May 1941; and Feis to Pink, 28 December 1940, 27 May, 9 July 1941, all in File 894.51, Roll 14, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
7.Dietrich to Silver File, January 23, 1940; Acheson to Bankers Trust Company, 20 June 1941, File 894.51/735, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
8.New York Times, 18 June 1941, 11, 3 July 1941, 31; FRBNY, Monthly Review, June and July 1941.
9.J. Edgar Hoover to Russell L. Maxwell, 21 May 1941; Maxwell to Hoover 26 May 1941; and Office of Stanley Hornbeck, re: Treasury report, 13 May, 1941, all in File 463.7 Japan, Box 272, Central File (Area), Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
10.White to Ullman, Export Control, Table VII-8-1. June and July are inferred from Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1941.
11.Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, Memorandum of Conversation; and British Embassy to the Department of State, 14 July 1941, both in FRUS, 1941, 5:826–27.
12.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 204. The declaration also triggered presidential powers such as requisitioning merchant ships.
13.State Department, Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control.
14.Treasury Department, Census of Foreign-Owned Assets, 5.
15.Ibid., vii, 1–13.
16.Two ships ran the blockade during the fall of 1941. Operations continued in 1942 but thereafter diminished as the naval noose tightened and largely ended in 1944 due to sinkings.
17.Charles W. Yost, Assistant Chief Division of Controls, 9 April 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:808–9; Joseph C. Green, Division of Controls to A-A, 19 June 1941, and Maxwell to Acheson, 30 June 1941, both in File 811.20 Regulations, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA. Months of supply calculated by author.
18.These events are related in detail in the many diplomatic histories of the coming of war. Among the most relevant to this narrative are Barnhart, Japan Prepares; Utley, Going to War with Japan; and Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor.
19.Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, and Hornbeck, memorandum of conversation, 16 July 1941, both in FRUS, 1941, 5:826–32.
20.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 229.
21.E. H. Foley Jr. to Morgenthau, 21 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 55.
22.Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations to FDR, 21 July 1941, enclosing Turner memo of same date; and Acheson, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 July 1941, both in FRUS, 1941, 5:835–42; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 239–41.
23.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 247.
24.Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24.
25.Hornbeck, Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations, 19 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:832–33.
26.Green to A-A, 19 July 1941; Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24. Utley cites memoranda of Edward Foley of 19, 21 July in Morgenthau Diaries.
27.Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1935–41.
28.Green to A-A, 19 July 1941.
29.Calculations by the author.
30.Welles to Grew, 1 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:851.
31.Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1935–41; Principal Exports . . . Five Months 1941, c. 17 August 1941, Table VII-8-1. Inferred quotas calculated by the author.
32.Foley to Morgenthau, 21 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2; Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24.
33.Memo from Undersecretary to Morgenthau, Cabinet Meeting, 24 July 1941; and D. H. Bell to E. H. Foley Jr., 24 July 1941, both in Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2; Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24.
34.Meeting of Welles, Acheson, and Treasury officials, 25 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, cited in Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24; Stark to FDR, 21 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:835–36.
35.Meeting of Welles, Acheson, and Treasury officials, 25 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 56. Jonathan Utley notes that decisions at this conference were confirmed between Acheson and Canadian and British diplomats; “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24.
36.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 244–45.
37.New York Times, 26 July 1941, 5.
38.Rozell to Knoke, Yokohama Specie Bank’s Reports, 23 July 1941, Yokohama Specie Bank Reports; Liquidation of Dollars by Japan, 15 July 1941, Box 50, File Japan General 1922–41, FRB.
39.FRBNY to Treasury, 23 July 1941, File 894.51/733, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
40.Feis, Economic Affairs, 25 July 1941, Box 4861-4863, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/2737, RG 59, NA.
41.State Department, re FBI advice, 1 August 1941, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; Hornbeck to Hiss, 2 August 1941, File Frozen Credits July 26 to December 21, 1941; Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1946.
42.Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Period March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943.
43.See chapter 8.
44.Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1941; Japan Statistical Association, Historical Statistics of Japan, Table 10-5-a; Tenenbaum to Friedman, Japanese Gold Production and Operation, 2 January 1946.
45.Calculations by the author.
46.White to Morgenthau, Japan’s Foreign Exchange Position, 25 February 1941.
1.The following articles in Oil and Gas Journal: unsigned, 8 May 1941, 33; 15 May 1941, 20–21, 26; 29 May 1941, 14–15; 12 June 1941, 18, 20; Norman H. Stanley, “Industry May Avert Severe Cut in East Coast Supplies,” 3 July 1941, 8–9, 24; unsigned, “Ways Explored to Replace Capacity of 50 Tankers,” 10 July 1941, 26–27, 31, 34, 42; unsigned, 17 July 1941, 14, 17; 24 July 1941, 22; 7 August 1941, 9, 14, 19; 14 August 1941, 24, 28, 31, 80; 21 August 1941, 25–26, 30, 74; 28 August 1941, 24–25, 30; 4 September 1941, 16–17; 11 September 1941, 15; 18 September 1941, 60–61; 25 September 1941, 30–31, 115; 2 October 1941, 16, 22; 9 October 1941, 20, 24; 16 October 1941, 28, 30; P. L. Stockman, “Adequate New Reserves Found [in California] to Offset This Year’s Output”; A. H. Bell, “Voluntary Crude-Oil Curtailment in California Effective,” 30 October 1941, A46, A94; unsigned, “Tanker Diversion and Japanese Embargo Cut California Exports,” 30 October 1941, A89–90; 30 October 1941, A109; and 6 November 1941, 81; Commerce Department, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States; Interior Department, Minerals Yearbook.
2.Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Report of Proceedings: Hearings Held Before the Committee, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 22 April 1941 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1941); Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Gasoline and Fuel-Oil Shortages Pursuant to S.Res. 156, Hearings, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (hereafter cited as Senate, Special Committee, Hearings), pt. 1, 28–29 August, 3–6, 9, 19 September 1941; pt. 2, 1–2 October 1941; Senate, Special Committee, Hearings, 11 September 1941.
3.Oil and Gas Journal, 29 May, 3, 10 July, 7 August, and 11 September 1941; Catherine B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (London: HMSO, 1955), 190–97; H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: HMSO, 1955); D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and Administration (London: HMSO, 1971), xvii, 129, 146–53, 162–63, 178–81, 195–211, 243–45, 375–79, 488–89.
4.“Ways Explored,” Oil and Gas Journal, 10 July 1941.
5.Payton-Smith, “Notes on Weights and Measures,” in Oil, xvii; Oil and Gas Journal, 11 September 1941, 17.
6.T. H. Watkins, “Ickes, Harold LeClair,” American National Biography Online; New York Times, 4 February 1942, 1; Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 2:344, 349–53, 358; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 3:392, 456.
7.Oil and Gas Journal, 18 September 1941, 61.
8.Davies testimony, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 1, 28 August 1941, 1–52.
9.Ickes, Secret Diary 3:96, 537, 543–60, 567–68; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 206–7; Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, 24 February, 21 June 1941 (handwritten note re: FDR), Box 72, File 457.1 Japan, Entry 98, Central File (Area), Office of the Administrator of Export Control, RG 169, NA.
10.Oil and Gas Journal, various dates, May–July 1941, esp. 3 and 10 July 1941.
11.Exhibit, Report of W. Alton Jones, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 2, 286–87; Statement of John J. Pelley, President of the Association of American Railroads, 3 September 1941, pt. 1, 81–112; Statement of Josiah W. Bailey, President, American Automobile Association, 24 August 1941, pt, 1, 73–79; Oil and Gas Journal, 10 July 1941, 26–27, 42.
12.Oil and Gas Journal, 24 July 1941, 22.
13.Maxwell Hamilton, memorandum, 22 July 1941, 834, and Welles to FDR, 31 July 1941, 846–48, both in FRUS, 1941, vol. 5.
14.Stark to Hull, enclosing memo to FDR, 22 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:835; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 237.
15.Radio Bulletin No. 176, issued by the White House, 25 July 1941, in Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 236–37.
1.President of the United States, Press Releases; also in Foley to Morgenthau, 25 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 56; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 238.
2.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 242–43; New York Times, 26 July 1941, 4; Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 25.
3.EO 8832, 26 July 1941, and related orders and licenses, State Department, Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control; Undersecretary to Morgenthau, cabinet meeting, 24 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 56.
4.Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 247. The committee of Acheson, Foley, and Shea was sometimes referred to in documents as the Interdepartmental Policy Committee, or just the Policy Committee, when establishing regulations and rules, and as the FFCC when it passed judgment on specific transactions. The practice varied informally.
5.New York Times, 26 July 1941, 4, 5, 12; 27 July 1941, 4, 18, 19, 41; 29 July 1941, 4; 30 July 1941, 4; and 2 August 1941, 21; Cochran to Morgenthau, 26 July 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 56.
6.Treasury Department, Census of Foreign-Owned Assets; Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries 2:341.
7.General Licenses 54 to 66, 26 July 1941, State Department, Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control.
8.YSB Seattle branch, telegrams and letters to head office Tokyo, to other YSB branches, and to correspondent banks, 26 July–16 August 1941, notebook “S13,” Office of Alien Property Custodian, Box 30, Entry 190, Yokohama Specie Bank Treasury Papers 1940–42, Records Relating to World War II, Seized Records of Japanese Banks, RG 131, NA; Welles to U.S. Embassy Chungking, Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 2, Roll 56.
9.Application for License (blank), Box 4683, File Frozen Credits 1940–41, RG 59, NA.
10.YSB Seattle branch, files, and notebook registers of applications for licenses to transfer funds, various dates, 26 July–1 October 1941, Box 30, Office of Alien Property Custodian, Yokohama Specie Bank Treasury Papers 1940–42.
11.Jones to Acheson, 8 August 1941; National Council of American Importers to Hornbeck, 11 August 1941; Acheson to Iguchi, 15 August 1941; and Miller to Acheson, 20 September 1941, all in FRUS, 1941, vol. 5; Japanese Financial Commission to Acheson, 25, 28 August, 8 September 1941; Jameson to Hiss, 27 August 1941; Jones, Far Eastern Division, American-owned Transit Cargo in Japan, 4 September 1941; George Atcheson Jr. to Hecht, 9 October 1941; and Acheson to Bacher of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 23 October 1941, all in Box 3359, File 800.8890, RG 59, NA.
12.George F. Luthringer to Acheson, Suggested Policy with Respect to the Control of United States–Japanese and Philippine-Japanese Trade Under Executive Order no. 8389, as Amended, 30 July 1941, FRUS 1941, 5:844–45.
13.Welles to FDR, 31 July 1941 (with footnote: “President Roosevelt approved the recommendations, with the notation ‘SW OK. FDR’”), FRUS, 1941, 5:846–48; Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 25–26; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 230–32; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 247–48.
14.Acheson to Hull, Trade with Japan, 22 September; and Nomura to Hull 3 October 1942, both in FRUS, 1941, 5:881–84, 892.
15.Henry Gass to Harry Dexter White, Japanese Unblocked Foreign Exchange Assets, 11 August 1941, Box 4866, File 840.51 Frozen Credits 1940–1944, RG 59, NA.
16.Ibid.; W. H. Rozell to Knoke, Yokohama Specie Bank’s Reports, 23 July 1941, Yokohama Specie Bank Reports. The value of the official yen in Shanghai was estimated at eleven cents on 18 August 1941, and military yen occupation currency at twelve cents, based on cross-rates of the Chinese yuan. By 1944 the yen was estimated to be worth only five to seven cents due to inflation. Commerce Department, Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce, “The Role of the Bank of Japan in the Japanese War Effort,” mimeograph, Washington, D.C., 1944, call no. HG3326.U5, Library of Congress; Oriental Economist, December 1941, 618.
17.Gass to White, Japanese Unblocked Foreign Exchange Assets, 11 August 1941.
18.Welles to Collectors of Customs, 1 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:850.
19.Acheson to Welles, 16 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:859; and MMH (Hamilton) re Shiriya, 8 August 1941, Box 4864, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3337, RG 59, NA.
20.Hull (initialed by Acheson) to Collector of Customs, Los Angeles, telegram, 11 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:850.
21.Acheson, Memorandum of Conversation (with Iguchi), 15 August 1941, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3302; A.U. Fox, Memorandum, 19 August 1941; Donald Hiss to Miller, c. 21 August 1941; Jones to Acheson, 22 August 1941, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3476; and Yost, memorandum, 4 September, and addendum, 5 September 1941, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3336, all in Boxes 4861–4865, RG 59, NA.
22.Federal Reserve bank examiners assisted. In both eras the treasury cooperated with export controllers, the Commerce Department in World War I and the ECA and State’s Division of Controls in 1940–41, but there was no precedent for sharing the licensing of financial transactions with any other agencies or cabinet departments.
23.For origins of the FFCC, see chapter 9. For biographies of individuals see index. An Acheson biographer states he was chairman of the FFCC, but there is no record of this. Chace, Acheson, 85. Acheson, as later secretary of state under Roosevelt and Truman, is recognized as one of the most important statesman of American history for his internationalist policies during the early Cold War as a supporter of the Marshall Plan and military alliances. He wrote several books, including a Pulitzer Prize–winning autobiography. Inquiries to the Harry Truman Library in Missouri which holds Acheson’s papers for his period as secretary of state, and to the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University which holds his personal papers, indicated that there is nothing of further interest about the freeze of Japanese assets in 1941 in those collections. The others’ careers were less distinguished. Foley served in the army in World War II, returned to the treasury as head of a contracts settlements division, and rose to undersecretary under Truman. He left government in 1953 to establish a law firm that specialized in tax matters, and raised funds for democratic politicians. Shea did not rise in rank at the Justice Department. After the war he assisted his former boss Jackson as an assistant prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. He cofounded a Washington law firm and spent four decades in litigation and antitrust work.
24.Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 24.
25.Anderson, Standard-Vacuum Oil, 178–79; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 231; Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, 246–48; Utley, Going to War with Japan, 155–56; Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 26–27; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, 655.
26.Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom,” 28.
27.Acheson, Present at the Creation, chaps. 3 and 4.
1.The idea of a high-level committee arose in part from proposals and counterproposals during the first half of 1941 in which the Treasury, the ECA, and the Interdepartmental Policy Committee each argued that it should take charge of export control, subject to policy guidance from an advisory committee. The ECA’s proposal suggested the vice president as “director.” A major element of the 1941 reorganizations was subordinating the agency dealing with allocation of materials to the civilian economy with the Office of Production Management (OPM), which allocated materials for military needs. Industrial Mobilization for War, vol. 1; Bureau of the Budget, Office of Administrative Records, Records Analysis Division, The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 65–67, 71–86, 89–91; OEM, United States Government Manual (Washington, D.C.: GPO, c. 1945), 98–99A.
2.Who Was Who in America, vol. 5.
3.Bureau of the Budget, United States at War, 86.
4.Ralph Turner to Col. Charles McKnight, Chief, Projects Section, Meeting with Vice-President Wallace on 19 August, 21 August 1941, File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC,” Box 184, FEA, Office of the Administrator of Export Control, Entry 97, Central File, RG-169, NA.
5.Bureau of the Budget, United States at War, 67.
6.Acheson, Memorandum of Conversation, 15 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:857–58.
7.Haruo Iguchi, “An Unfinished Dream: Yoshisuke Ayukawa’s Economic Diplomacy Toward the U.S., 1937–1940,” Kyoto, Doshisha University, Sophia Education and Research Center for Education Services, Sophia University Institute for American and Canadian Studies web site, http://www.info.sophia.ac.jp/amecana/Journal/16-2.htm (accessed18 January 2006).
8.Desvernine to Hull, Desvernine to Wallace, 5 September 1941, File 894.6552/22, Internal Affairs of Japan 1940–1944, Roll 16, State Department microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA.
9.Raoul E. Desvernine, Democratic Despotism (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1936), 112–23; Frederick Randolph, “The American Liberty League, 1934–1940,” American Historical Review 56, no. 1 (October 1950): 19–33; Washington Post, 3 June 1996, B3; New York Times, 24 August 1935, 3; 6 May 1938, 33; 26 August 1941, 30; 16 November 1941, F3; and 3 June 1966, 38.
10.R. R. Stout, to Maxwell, notes on meeting, 14 February 1941, File Binder, “Economic Warfare Planning OAEC”; George F. Luthringer to Acheson, Suggested Policy re: Trade under E.O. 8389 as Amended, 30 July 1941; Welles to FDR, 31 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:844–48.
11.Ragnar Nurske, League of Nations, International Currency Experience, Geneva 1944, in International Finance, ed. Mira Wilkins (New York: Arno, 1978), 177–83; “Clearing Accounts,” online at http://www.bankinghistory.de/Bulletin/EABH-web (accessed 1 September 2003); “Dollar Pooling in the Sterling Area,” American Economic Review 44, no. 4 (September 1954): 559–76; Richard S. Sayers, Financial Policy, 1939–1945 (London: HMSO, 1956), 232–41; F. M. Tamagna to Knoke, Transfers of Dollar Funds from Java Bank to Yokohama Specie Bank, 13 June 1941, File Java Banking, Box 51, International Subject Files, 1907 to 1974, International Finance Division and Predecessors 1907–1974, FRB.
12.Noel Hall to Acheson, The Freezing Order and Japan, 12 August; and untitled 18 August 1941, both in Box 4854, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3478, /3479, RG 59, NA.
13.Lubricating oils, although one-third of the value of petroleum-related purchases in 1941, were not on the list.
14.Desvernine to Wallace, 5 September 1941, with tables attached.
15.Calculations by the author.
16.Acheson to Hull, 13 September 1941; Acheson, Memorandum of Conversation, Japanese Silk and Barter Proposal, 18 September 1941, File 894.6522/23 and 124, RG 59, NA.
17.Hull to Attorney General, 23 January 1943, File 894.6552/26, RG 59, NA; Ambassador Nomura, Dispatch to Tokyo, 19 September 1941, in Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, eds., The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004), 136–234.
18.Acheson, Memorandum of Conversation, 18 September 1941; Miller to Acheson, 20 September 1941; and Acheson to Miller, 20 September 1941, all in File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3546, RG 59, NA.
19.Ambassador Nomura, two dispatches to Tokyo, 19 September 1941, in Goldstein and Dillon, Pacific War Papers. These messages makes clear that high Japanese authorities knew of the Desvernine mission and supported it.
20.Nomura, dispatch to Tokyo, 5 December 1941, in Goldstein and Dillon, Pacific War Papers.
21.Attorney General to Hull, 28 December 1942; Hull to Attorney General, 23 January 1943; and Salisbury, Far Eastern Affairs to Hull, 22 September 1943, all in File 894.6552/9, Roll 16, Department of State microfilm series LM-68, RG 59, NA; Congressional Research Service, “Conducting Foreign Relations Without Authority: The Logan Act,” online at http://www.pennhyill.com/foreign policy (accessed 1 September 2003); Raoul E. Desvernine, summaries of Wake Up America broadcasts on ABC Blue Network, 1943–46, GOLDIndex, http://www.radioindex.com (accessed 29 August 2003); Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Washington Post, 10 December 1945, 5.
22.Miller to Acheson, 20 September 1941.
23.Nomura to Hull, two oral messages, 3 October 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:892.
24.“Japanese Embassy to Treasury, oral, 9 October 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:895–96; “U” to Welles, 17 October 1941, and Edward G. Miller, Memorandum for the Files, 24 October 1941, both in Box 4868, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/4184–4185, RG 59, NA.
25.Joseph W. Ballantine, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 October 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:891–92; Acheson to Hamilton, handwritten, 24 October 1941, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/4185, RG 59, NA.
26.Acheson, Present at the Creation, 26–27.
27.See notes to Appendix 1, this volume.
28.Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, 2 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:852.
29.Jones, Application by a Japanese cotton firm in the United States to change its business from export trade to domestic trade, 7 October; and MMH, reply, 14 October 1941, both in File 840.51 Frozen Credits/4182, RG 59, NA.
30.E. T. Wailes to Hiss, 25 August 1941, “Regulations” File 1941 811.20(D)/4425; Yokohama Specie Bank (Seattle Branch), “Application(s) for a License to Engage in a Foreign Exchange Transaction, Transfer of Credit, Payment, Export or Withdrawal from the United States, or the Earmarking of Gold or Silver Coin or Bullion or Currency, or the Transfer, Withdrawal or Exportation of, or Dealing in, Evidences of Indebtedness or Evidences of Ownership of Property,” filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and notarized affidavits of residency and ownership, c. 26 July to 7 December 1941, Box 30, Office of Alien Property Custodian, Yokohama Specie Bank Treasury Papers 1940–42, RG 131, NA.
31.Acheson, untitled memorandum, 18 August; Grew to Secretary of State, 22 August; and Secretary of State to Grew, 5 September 1941, all in FRUS, 1941, 5:861–64, 871–72.
32.Adrian S. Fisher, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 October; application for release of funds for port expenses of the SS Tatuta Maru and SS Taiyo Maru, 23 October; and licenses for obtaining fuel and supplies in Honolulu for SS Tatuta Maru, 24 October 1941, all in File 840.51 Frozen credits/FW4223, FW4868, RG 59, NA.
33.Looseleaf notebook S.13, Box 30, Yokohama Specie Bank License Papers 1940–42, Box 30, Entry 190, Seized Records of Japanese Banks, Alien Property Custodian, RG 131, NA.
34.Donald Hiss, Chief Foreign Funds Control Division, to the Iron Age, 3 December 1941, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/4354, RG 59, NA.
35.E. G. Miller to Fisher, 25 August 1941, enclosing Memorandum of Nishiyama, Financial Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, 20 August 1941, forwarded to Acheson, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3546, RG 59, NA.
36.Feis to Acheson, 19 September; and G. L. Luthringer, Interest Payments Due on Japanese Dollar Bonds in the Near Future, 23 September 1941, both in File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3787, RG 59, NA.
37.C. Ashwood, National Bank Examiner, Comptroller of the Currency, Yokohama Specie Bank, New York, meeting with T. Nishiyama, 14 October, with forwarding letters to Pehle and Acheson 18 October 1941, File 840.51 Frozen Credits/3714, RG 59, NA; W. P. Folger, Chief National Bank Examiner to Delano, 21 October 1941, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking, vol. 1, OASIA.
38.Miller to Acheson, 5 September 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:869–70.
39.Feis to Acheson, 19 September 1941.
40.C. Ashwood, National Bank Examiner, meeting with Nishiyama and Nishi, 14 October 1941; and correspondence and phone conversations between comptroller of the currency, Bernstein, Fox, Miller, and Fox re: Yokohama Specie Bank West Coast branches, 20 and 21 October 1941, all in File 840.51 Frozen Credits/4448, RG 59, NA.
41.New York Times, 29 November 1941, 4.
42.Office of Alien Property Custodian, Report for the Period March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943 and Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1944.
43.New York Times, 1 December 1944, 33; 3 June 1955, 23; 30 September 1955, 38; 11 April 1967, 24; and Wall Street Journal, 20 April 1946, 4.
44.President, Yokohama Specie Bank, to Minister of Finance; Reorganization Plan of the Yokohama Specie Bank, 22 March 1946; and Ministry of Finance of the Japanese Government to Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, 9 April 1946, all in Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking Foreign, vol. 1, OASIA; Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), 99.
45.Acheson to Secretary of State, Present Effect of the Freezing Control in the Economic Control as Exercised Upon Japan, 22 November 1941, FRUS, 1941, 4:903–4.
1.Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, vol. 1, and History and Current Policy and vol. 2 Supplemental Case Histories, both 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
2.Frank S. Williams, Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background Report, October 27–November 8, 1941, endorsed by Grew, 10 November 1941; Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 20:4051–57, online at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha.
3.White to Morgenthau, 1 October 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, 447:48–49, as reprinted in Morgenthau Diary (China), vol. 1, U.S. Senate, Internal Security Subcommittee on the Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965), 472.
4.Williams, Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background Report, 10 November 1941; Grew to Department of State, 3 December 1941, PHA 14:1049–51. Some of Grew’s reports cited in this chapter, apparently paraphrased, appear in Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), chap. 5.
5.Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, 21 October 1941, PHA 15:1845.
6.Morley, Final Confrontation, 159–69 and Appendix 5.
7.Ibid., 175, 289–96; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 246.
8.White to Morgenthau, untitled, 1 October 1941; Williams, Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background Report, September 15–27, 1941, PHA 20:4041–49; Brigadier-General Sherman Miles, Army G-2, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 5 September 1941, PHA 14:1353; Grew to Department of State, Report of Conditions During the Month of August 1941, PHA 20:4051–52; OP 16-F to Chief of Naval Operations, 21 October 1941, PHA 15:1845.
9.Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 239, 246–48, 255–58; Morley, Final Confrontation, 159–69, 289–96, Appendix 5; Worth, No Choice but War, chaps. 7–8.
10.Grew to Department of State, Report of Conditions During the Month of July 1941, cited in Worth, No Choice but War, 175–77; White to Morgenthau, 1 October 1941; Williams, Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background Report, October 27–November 8, 1941, 10 November 1941; Miles, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 5 September 1941.
11.Morley, Final Confrontation, 159–169, 289–93, 326, Appendix 5.
12.American Men and Women of Science: Economics 1974, 234; American Economic Association, Directory of Members, American Economic Review, October 1974, 173; National Archives, Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States, Records of the National Emergency Council, RG 44.3, NA, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/044.html#44.3 (accessed 24 October 2006).
13.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, includes vol. 1, pt. 1, xvii, 1–158, issued 29 August 1946; vol. 1, pt. 2, 159–362, issued September 1946; and vol. 2 (statistical summary and charts) xii, 1–128, issued January 1946. The OSS was the ancestor of the Central Intelligence Agency, established in 1947. William W. Lockwood, an economics professor and author on Japan’s economy, called it “a valuable study” as late as 1954. Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, 314. Jerome Cohen, a professor of economics at the City College of New York, criticized the study because it did not address the motivations for prewar Japanese trade-control measures and thus “hinders an attempt to understand the problem as the Japanese then saw it.” Cohen, Japan’s Economy, 12n27. Lockwood and Cohen had access to 1937–41 data after the war that was unavailable to Hersey until nearly the end of the study. Cohen’s point is irrelevant for applying the study to this chapter, which is intended as a speculation on how U.S. authorities might have evaluated the impact of the dollar freeze on Japan if continued for a few years.
14.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 1, i–vi, 1–42, 67–108; vol. 1, pt. 2, 159–351; vol. 2.
15.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 21–28, 110–11.
16.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 43–66 91–97 109–145; vol. 1, pt. 2 177–81, 205–12, 231–33, 254–63, 272, 294–98, 308–10, 344–45, 352–59.
17.“China Food,” International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/data/diet/diet_1.htm (accessed 24 October 2006).
18.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 2, 165–71.
19.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 64.
20.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 61–66 (Asiatic diet, 64), 114–15, 134–37, 143, app. 145–48, 152–53, tables I-20, I-21 I-22; vol. 1, pt. 2, 177–81, 208–12, 231–33, 254–64, 272–74, 294–98, 305–6, 309–10, 319, 322, 327–28, 336–37, 339, 341, 344–45, 348–49, 352–59.
21.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 95–101.
1.The U.S. Library of Congress lists 115 books in English under “Pearl Harbor Attack,” several dealing with the diplomatic and military preludes rather than the attack itself (and a few espousing conspiracy theories). The principal published documentary sources are FRUS, 1941, vol. 5; FRUS Japan; Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings; and Defense Department, The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978). General works include Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War; Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962); Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamato, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931–1941, Studies of the East Asia Institute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973); Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: Viking, 1991); and Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999). Works that focus on the freeze and embargo in the negotiations include Utley, Going to War with Japan; Barnhart, Japan Prepares; and Worth, No Choice but War. On the Japanese side, see Morley, Final Confrontation; and Goldstein and Dillon, Pacific War Papers, 136–234.
2.State Department officers contributed advice, but Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was relegated to incidental adviser and message carrier. Neither the secretaries of war and the navy nor their uniformed chiefs, who tended to favor a softer line to gain time for building up defenses, participated in direct negotiations, nor did other cabinet-level officials, although some operated as advisers and go-betweens. Consultations within the government were eclectic, ranging from sideline discussions to full cabinet meetings. Intelligence agencies provided Roosevelt, Hull, and a very few others with deciphered messages between Tokyo and its ambassadors. Historians have differed on whether code breaking helped U.S. negotiators or hindered them due to misunderstandings and poor translations. In Japan, Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe was an expansionist. Shortly before the freeze the foreign ministry passed from the quirky, pro-Axis Yosuke Matsuoka to the relatively moderate Admiral Teijiro Toyoda who was more wiling to negotiate. However, the Army and Navy held the balance of power because a general and an admiral served as mandatory members of the cabinet so either could bring down a government by resigning. Policy was set in liaison conferences, often lasting hours, conducted among the Army and Navy officers, in cabinet conferences including at least the prime minister and foreign minister and service chiefs, and ultimately imperial conferences before Emperor Hirohito and his household advisers.
3.Morley, Final Confrontation, 175ff, 243.
4.Ibid., 261–65, Appendix 9.
5.Ibid., 262 316; Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 254–59.
6.Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 235, 260; FRUS, 1941, 4:642–44; Hull, Memoirs 2:1070.
7.Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941 (New York: Norton, 1976), 457, 466–69.
8.Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 235; Morley, Final Confrontation, 305, 317–20.
1.Estimates by the author. In March 1941 the Bank of Japan reported $117 million of gold in its vaults. Mine production through July was about $20 million. Another $23 million is attributed so scrap gold purchases, residual holdings in the Gold Fund Special Account and gold held by other government agencies assumed from postwar data, minus industrial use. In February 1941 the FRBNY had estimated that Japan held about $205 million of gold, an exaggeration probably due to an older statement of the Bank of Japan and overestimating gold production. Liquid dollar assets of the Yokohama Specie Bank and other Japanese banks in the United States were about $40 million as reported by the Office of Alien Property Custodian, more or less depending on settlements of domestic liabilities ultimately allowed by the APC. Just before the freeze virtually all strategic products except oil had been embargoed, but Japan probably could not have purchased more than the recent $50 million of U.S. oil (annual rate) due to tanker shortages. Purchases of nonstrategic civilian products from America, some subject to licensing but likely to be allowed due to abundance such as cotton, lumber, pulp, phosphate, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, and some chemicals, had been about $25 million per year. Against this potential $75 million of U.S. supplies, Japan was exporting $150 million to the United States (although the $100 million of raw silk was sure to decline due to nylon’s inroads). Purchases from other dollar countries were curtailed by American and British preemptive buying of raw materials. As Kurt Bloch, a reporter for the Far Eastern Survey, noted, “Japan’s financial difficulty abroad is no longer finding means of paying for foreign goods, but rather finding foreign goods for which available means of payment can be used. . . . At present, Japan’s gold problem may not differ greatly from that of the United States,” an ironic statement because the United States had no need of gold for international transactions as all nations would gladly have accepted unlimited amounts of dollars. BB, Memorandum to the President, 5 August 1939. Kurt Bloch, “Japan on Her Own,” Far Eastern Survey, 3 November 1941, 244–49.
2.In 1945 an accounting submitted to the occupation forces reported that the Bank of Japan, the mint, and other government agencies held approximately $461 million in gold bullion and coin, $134 million of which was said to be held on earmark for the account of Thailand and French Indochina for goods purchased from them during the war. Government agencies also held $49 million in silver bullion and coins and $4 million in currencies, primarily U.S. and British. The Yokohama Specie Bank reported its overseas branches owned $10 million in U.S. dollars and $4 million in sterling, which of course had been frozen, $20 million of Swiss, Swedish, and Portuguese currency accounts, and minor holdings of South American currency accounts. The government also held $28 million (prewar value) of German marks, yen, military yen, and local currencies of the colonies and of occupied China and conquered areas, nominally worth hundreds of millions of dollars but all of dubious value. Jenkins to I. S. Friedman and Coe, Gold Bullion and Other Foreign Exchange Assets in Japan, 16 October 1945; Division of Monetary Research, Tokyo Reports on gold, silver, platinum, currency, etc., owned by Japanese Government or Bank of Japan, 1 November 1945, File Japan Foreign Exchange Position; Survey of the Gold Fund Special Account, c. August 1945; Tenenbaum to Friedman, Japanese Gold Production and Operation, 2 January 1946; J. Tenenbaum to Jenkins, Foreign Exchange Assets of the Yokohama Specie Bank, 1 March 1946, Box 20, File Japan Banks and Banking, vol. 1, OASIA.
3.Bloch, “Japan on Her Own.”
4.Acheson to Secretary of State, Present Effect of the Freezing Control in the Economic Control as Exercised Upon Japan, 22 November 1941, FRUS, 1941, 4:903–4.
5.R. John Pritchard, commentator International Military Tribunal for the Far East, The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (New York: Edward Mellen Press, 1998), 90:43159–62.
1.See chapter 15 for the period prior to the financial freeze.
2.Ralph H. Davies, Acting Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, testimony, pt. 1, 28 August, 1–52; letter from Davies, 4 September, 165–67; and Davies statement, 9 and 10 September 1941, 272–347, 356–80, all in Special Committee, Hearings.
3.Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 1, 29 August, 73–79; 8 September 1941, 215–39.
4.Ralph Budd, a transportation advisor to the Council of National Defense, calculated 29,000 idle cars. Statement, Special Committee Hearings, pt 1, 4 September 1941.
5.John J. Pelley, President of the Association of American Railroads, Statement and Testimony, 3 September, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 1, 81–112; letter from Pelley, 5 September 1941, 191–214; Statement and Testimony, 2 October, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 2, 605–38.
6.Special Committee, Report No. 576, Gasoline and Fuel-Oil Shortages: Preliminary Report, 11 September 1941.
7.Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, Statement and Testimony of 1 October 1941, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 2, 383–593; Ickes, Secret Diary, 622–23.
8.Ickes, Secret Diary, 630–32; Statement of Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman, Maritime Commission, 29 August 1941, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 1, 53–73; Senator Francis Maloney, comment, 1 October 1941, Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 2, 574–75; Economist, 26 July 1941, cited in Special Committee, Hearings, pt. 1, 28 August 1941, 354–55.
9.Oil and Gas Journal, 30 October, 9, 12, 18 1941; 6 November 1941, 59; 20 November 1941, 18; and 4 December 1941, 16; Ickes, Secret Diary, 631–32. Pelley’s claims were ultimately justified. In April 1942, when German U-boats were sinking many tankers off the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the railroads moved six hundred thousand barrels per day to the East Coast, a volume almost 50 percent of the prewar rate of total supply for the region.
10.Payton-Smith, Oil, 129, 162–63, 178–81, 195–211, 375–79, Appendixes IV, VI; Oil and Gas Journal, 9 October, 1941, 24.
11.Oil and Gas Journal, 4 August 1941, 28, 80; 21 August 1941, 26; 11 September 1941, 14–15; 2 October 1941, 16; 6 November 1941, 59, 66; 4 December 1941, 20.
1.For description of the study, see chapter 18, note 13.
2.OCL, Place of Foreign Trade, vol. 1, pt. 1, iii.
3.Ibid., iv; vol. 1, pt. 2, tables II-32 to II-34.
4.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, iii; 11–21.
5.Ibid., 2–21.
6.Ibid., 110–11.
7.Ibid., 121.
8.Ibid., 43–66, 91–97, 109–145; vol. 1, pt. 2 177–81, 205–12, 231–33, 254–63, 272, 294–98, 308–10, 344–45, 352–59.
9.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 61–66, 114–15, 134–37, 143, app. 145–48, 152–53, tables I-20, I-21, I-22; vol. 1, pt. 2, 177–81, 208–12, 231–33, 254–64, 272–74, 294–98, 305–6, 309–10, 319, 322, 327–28, 336–37, 339, 341, 344–45, 348–49, 352–59.
10.Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, 67–87.