A half century of political change in the South has transformed the region into a competitive two-party area in which Republicans have an electoral edge, at least for presidential and congressional elections. This study helps us to understand one dimension of that change: how southern political party organizations have adapted in recent decades. This understanding, in turn, leads us to understand that the realignment in the South has involved more than just a shift in the electoral balance between the two parties. It also has involved a change in the nature of the political party organizations and the political party system in the South. Our data deal specifically with political party activists, who are only one aspect of the party system, but other studies report changes in other aspects of the southern party system that are consistent with the conclusions of this study. Thus, our findings, while based primarily on our analysis of party activists, lead to broader statements about the nature of the political party system in the South at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Equally important, this study tells us something about the contemporary state of political parties in the United States, especially about local political party organization. Little systematic data on local party organizations exist. The systematic data that have been collected by previous studies of party organizations focus primarily on national and state organizations. County-level party organizations have often been the subject of case studies, but few scholars have attempted to systematically collect data on grassroots party organizations over a number of states. For this reason, the results of this study, even though they deal only with one region, are a useful addition to our knowledge about American party organizations. Also, while our study focuses only on grassroots party activists, the findings of many studies of American political parties suggest that other changes in party organizations are consistent with what we report. Our work therefore complements and contributes to the efforts of others to understand political party development in the contemporary United States.
The findings reported earlier in this study can be summarized and discussed from two perspectives: the responsible party perspective and the party renewal perspective. Each perspective has a conceptual framework, a set of theoretical concerns, and a number of conclusions about the state of American parties. These perspectives seem highly relevant for our study, as we believe that our findings indicate that southern political parties have moved in the direction of more responsible party organizations and have developed their organizational capacity in a manner that indicates substantial party renewal. Furthermore, we believe that by reviewing the conclusions of the earlier chapters in this book through these two perspectives, we are placing our empirical findings in a richer theoretical context. Such an approach should contribute more to our understanding of party organizational change in the South and elsewhere.
Arguments for more responsible political parties in this country have been made for a long time. Over fifty years ago, the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties issued a report that called for the development of a more responsible two-party system (Committee on Political Parties 1950). The report drew immediate attention from both critics and defenders, and it continues to stimulate debate even today (Green and Herrnson 2002). The report had several goals and contained a number of recommendations. The most important element of the report, however, was the conclusion that American political parties needed to be more programmatic. They needed to be more ideologically cohesive, and they needed to present voters with clear policy alternatives.
Criticisms of the report came from a variety of directions. One complaint was that the report envisioned a party government model that was unrealistic given the social and institutional characteristics of the country. These limiting characteristics include the large and heterogeneous nature of American society, the emphasis placed on the protection of minority rights at the expense of majoritarian democracy, and the presence of a separation of powers and a federal system (Herrnson 1992; Kirkpatrick 1971; Ranney 1951). Another criticism was that highly cohesive ideological parties could be dysfunctional, creating divisions rather than reducing conflict in the political system (David 1992). Critics also argued that the report confused internal party responsibility with accountability between the parties (Ranney 1951; White 1992). Some even claimed that the report underestimated the extent to which the parties already were responsible (David 1992).
Despite all of the criticism leveled at the report, there does appear to be considerable support among political scientists and analysts for a more qualified position on this issue, one that simply argues that American political parties can and should be more responsible than they were in the 1950s—which, after all, was the title of the report. A number of prominent scholars and analysts have argued that stronger parties are needed for effective government in the United States (Broder 1971; Burnham 1982; Coleman 2003; David 1992; Pomper 1971; Price 1984; White 2001). Furthermore, there is a large literature on party renewal in this country, which argues that while parties are weaker in some ways than they were decades ago, they also are stronger in some important ways (Cohen, Fleisher, and Kantor 2001; Green and Farmer 2003; Green and Shea 1999; Kayden and Mahe 1985; Maisel 1998; Pomper 2003). Moreover, most of this literature either implicitly or explicitly suggests that party renewal is a desirable development, that the United States is better off with stronger parties, and that one aspect of stronger parties is greater party clarity and cohesiveness on major issues of public policy.
Our study of grassroots political party activists in the South indicates that the party organizations are more ideologically cohesive now than they were a few decades ago. Moreover, substantial change occurred during the 1990s. As chapter 5 clearly indicates, party activists already were fairly well divided in 1991. Still, party divisions widened considerably by 2001. Republican activists were clearly conservative in 1991, but they became even more so by 2001, as nearly all called themselves conservatives, with a majority claiming to be very conservative. Democratic activists in 1991 were definitely more liberal when compared to Republican activists, but many Democrats classified themselves as moderate or even conservative. The number of conservative Democratic activists was greatly reduced by 2001, with over 80 percent of the Democratic activists then calling themselves moderate or liberal. These ideological classifications of activists reflect real differences on issues of public policy. On every issue examined in chapter 5, Democrats are more liberal than Republicans. On many issues, the party differences are great. Moreover, the analysis indicates that party differences on specific policy issues expanded during the 1990s. Thus, the ideological and issue orientations of southern political party activists are more polarized along party lines than they were in the past. At least in terms of the party organizations, programmatic parties are a reality in the southern political landscape.
The growth in party distinctiveness has been accompanied by an increase in party cohesion. As already mentioned, Republican activists are now overwhelmingly conservative. Democrats are somewhat more ideologically heterogeneous, but they clearly are more cohesive now than in the recent past. A similar pattern of development exists for some, although not all, issues. For example, Republican activists were quite divided by abortion in 1991, but by 2001 there were far fewer pro-choice voices in the party. Democratic activists became more clearly liberal on abortion. The result is that now the two groups of activists clearly represent the two basic positions in the abortion debate.
Increased party cohesiveness exists not only in terms of ideological and issue orientations but also in terms of the attachments that activists have with their party at all levels. Chapter 6 shows that both Democrats and Republicans identify more strongly with their state and national parties now than they did a decade ago. The change is most notable for Democrats. In previous decades many Democrats did not have a strong attachment to their party, especially the national party. Even as late as 1991, there were sharp differences in the attachment of Democratic activists to their state and national parties. In 2001, the differences were very small. Republican activists remain more strongly committed to their party than do Democrats, but the gap has been greatly narrowed and both groups of activists now display stronger attachments.
While ideological differences between these two groups of party activists have increased and ideological cohesion within each group has decreased, both party organizations remain at least somewhat heterogeneous. Factionalism is down in both parties, as chapter 7 reports, but it is far from gone. Among Democratic activists, the most important division involves race and race-related issues, a topic discussed in chapter 3. African Americans have been a crucial element of the Democratic electoral coalition in every southern state for at least three decades, but their representation among party activists was relatively low for most of this time. Even as late as 1991, only about 14 percent of grassroots Democratic activists were black. Now over one-fifth of these activists are African American. This increased pressure could exacerbate tensions within the party organization, particularly on race-related issues, as the discussion in chapter 3 points out. Questions of affirmative action, for example, divide Democrats along racial lines. In fact, in terms of their attitudes on affirmative action issues, white Democratic activists actually are closer as a group to Republican activists than they are to black Democratic activists. On the other hand, it might be that the increased number of black Democratic activists will help to cement the Democratic biracial coalition by promoting more dialogue among black and white party activists.
Among Republican activists, religion stands out as the most important source of internal division, as chapter 2 emphasizes. About one-half of the Republican activists in our study identified themselves as supporters of the Christian Right. This group differs from those Republican activists who are not supporters of the Christian Right, with the differences most pronounced on some key social issues, such as abortion. On other issues, however, differences between these two groups are small. Nevertheless, the few issues on which substantial divisions exist can be the basis for bitter conflict. The danger is that Christian Right Republican activists will withhold support from candidates who do not fully agree with them on these crucial moral issues, a conflict that has divided the party in some places at some times. Still, as chapter 2 points out, while this is a danger, it is far from a reality across the South. Many Republican candidates have successfully united both groups of Republicans.
One of the concerns of the critics of the responsible government model is that highly cohesive ideological parties could be too divisive. If the parties become dominated by purist extremists, they may be unwilling to compromise. The result could be government inaction and an alienated electorate. Our analysis suggests that there is some potential for this problem to emerge. First, activists now are heavily motivated to be involved in party politics by issues and public policy rather than by social or material factors, a point discussed in detail in chapter 10. Second, both groups of activists are more ideologically polarized than are the voters for both parties, as chapter 8 explains. Democratic activists are to the left of Democratic voters, and Republican activists are to the right of Republican voters. Third, in both parties there is a sizable minority of activists who hold strong purist views, which is discussed in chapter 9. These purist activists are less willing to compromise on issues for the sake of electoral success. On all three dimensions, Republicans display more potential for disruptive behavior. They are more ideologically distant from the center of public opinion, more motivated by issues, and more purist in orientation. However, the differences between Democratic and Republican activists on these dimensions are less now than they were in 1991, largely because Democrats have moved to the left and become more purist.
A situation in which party activists are highly motivated by issues, more ideologically extreme than party voters, and uninterested in compromising on issues has the potential to be dysfunctional. At this point, the problem does not seem to be a critical one in either party. Both parties seem primarily concerned with winning. Pragmatists clearly outnumber purists among activists, especially among county chairs, who are particularly important grassroots activists. Both parties retain some ideological diversity among their activists, especially the Democrats. Furthermore, the candidates of both parties are likely to be more pragmatic and more interested in winning. While the activists in the party can influence the character of the party’s candidates, there are many other influences as well; and differences among candidates, voters, and activists in a party can coexist without resulting in the party being uncompetitive (Jackson, Brown, and Bositis 1982; McClosky, Hoffman, and O’Hara 1960). Nevertheless, developments in this area among southern party activists in future years are worth monitoring.
The emergence of more responsible grassroots party organizations is matched by similar developments in other aspects of the southern political party system. Candidates and officeholders are now much more clearly distinguished along party lines. This is most evident among members of Congress, as their legislative voting records provide us with considerable data on their policy orientations. A number of studies have analyzed the changes in congressional voting patterns, and they all have found that southern Democratic members of Congress have moved closer to northern Democrats, creating a large gap between themselves and southern Republican members (Black and Black 2002; Berard 2001; Rohde 1991; Whitby and Gilliam 1991). These changes resulted in part from the replacement of conservative southern Democrats by more liberal Democrats, but they also were due to southern congressional Democrats changing their voting patterns, changes that can be attributed to changes in the composition of their districts (Berard 2001; Whitby and Gilliam 1991).
The development of clear policy differences between Democratic and Republican candidates and officeholders demonstrates an enormous shift in the character of southern politics. Party differences at the elite level were blurred in the Solid South. The Democratic Party may have been the party of white supremacy, but Republicans at that time hardly championed civil rights. There were some notable populists among southern Democrats, and some among mountain Republicans as well, but for the most part the Democrats and Republicans supported business interests equally well. The lack of pronounced policy differences between Democratic and Republican candidates and officeholders was a major reason why southern elections frequently were described as issueless (Key 1949).
The southern electorate also is more ideologically divided along party lines than in the past. Republicans identify themselves as conservatives much more than do Democrats (Black and Black 1987, 1992, 2002; Carmines and Stanley 1990; Cowden 2001). This new alignment of ideology and partisanship developed partly through conversion and partly through replacement (Carmines and Stanley 1990; Wattenberg 1991). Many conservative white voters ceased to identify as Democrats, becoming either independents or Republicans, a process of conversion that sometimes operated slowly. Younger voters entering the electorate in the post–civil rights era generally had less firmly established party loyalties and have been more likely to align along ideological lines than the older members of the electorate whom they were replacing. Even when older conservative white Democrats retained their party identification, they became unreliable Democratic voters (Black and Black 2002). Furthermore, the ideological differences between Democratic and Republican voters now involve the full range of policy issues—economic and social welfare issues, race-related issues, social issues, and even foreign policy and defense issues. The breakup of the Solid South may have been precipitated by civil rights issues, but the current party cleavages go far beyond that one dimension (Cowden 2001; Prysby 1989). Of course, partisanship undoubtedly is more clearly linked to issue orientations now because of the increased ideological differentiation of the candidates and the activists of the parties. The interrelationship of these emerging divisions among voters, candidates, and party activists indicates that we should not view changes in the party activists as isolated from other changes in the parties and the party system.
The party renewal perspective emerged in response to research indicating a decline in the importance of parties in the 1970s. Journalist David Broder (1972) noted that parties had become less capable of offering meaningful choices to the electorate and then delivering policies consistent with those choices. Others focused on changes in the presidential nominating system that led to a diminution of the role of organizational leaders (Kirkpatrick 1976) or the disappearance of urban party machines (Ware 1985). Still others identified weakened ties to party in the electorate or a lack of party voting in Congress as evidence of the decline in parties more generally (Wattenberg 1994; Crotty and Jacobson 1980).
The presence of these trends was hardly in dispute, although some of them have reversed direction since then. Instead, critics of the decline school focused on one area where parties seemed to be getting stronger: their organizations. At the national level, once moribund organizations developed new vitality. Both parties grew increasingly professionalized and developed permanent headquarters and stable staff resources (Cotter and Bibby 1980). Republicans led the way in the use of financial incentives to spur organizational development and to support candidates at all levels, and Democrats quickly followed suit (Bibby 1980, 1998; Herrnson 1988). Boosted by infusions of cash from the national parties, state parties soon became stronger, too (Cotter et al. 1984). State parties in the South, once the weakest organizationally, were among the strongest by 1999 (Aldrich 2000). The organizations that evolved are oriented toward providing services to candidates to help them in their election efforts. Some went so far as to suggest that decline in partisan attachments contributed to stronger organizations as party leaders sought to compensate for changes in the electorate (Schlesinger 1985).
While state and national party organizations are stronger now than in the past, the condition of local party organizations is less clear. To be sure, the decline of big city party machines indicates weakening in some places, yet these organizations were more exceptional than their prominence in the literature would suggest. John Bibby (1998, 151) notes that, in the post-war era, “Most local organizations did engage in party building and candidate support activities, but these organizations were operated in an improvising mode by volunteers and were characterized by organizational slack.” There is less systematic data on the strength and vitality of local parties, yet some studies indicate party renewal at this level as well (Cotter et al. 1984; Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1989). In particular, they focused on activity levels during and between campaigns, levels of communication among party officials, and the general bureaucratic development of the organizations.
Urban machines may have been anomalies in most parts of the country, yet even their weaker counterparts were largely missing in the South until fairly recently. Without competition in the formerly “Solid South,” there was little reason for either Democrats or Republicans to organize. In many places across the region, local Democratic Party organizations existed to run primary elections rather than to actively campaign on behalf of the party’s candidates, serving more as election boards than political entities (see, for example, Clark 1997). Republicans simply were not organized other than in a few mountainous regions (Key 1949).
Given this weak baseline, virtually any evidence of local party activity in the southern states would seem to be evidence for party renewal. Our findings go well beyond that minimal baseline. We find that the parties are active at the local level in the South. While not approaching the threshold of the old machine, they are clearly more of a presence than they were half a century ago.
One way that grassroots party activists make their presence known is through campaign activities. As chapter 11 shows, the amount of campaign activity has increased or at least remained constant over the last decade. We lack the data to draw conclusions about how the current activity levels compare to what existed in the 1950s and 1960s, although obviously there has been a big improvement for the formerly unorganized Republicans. But the fact that our survey of activists shows that they are at least as involved now as they were in 1991 provides support for the conclusion that there has been party renewal at the local level. Also, the fact that Democrats closed the activity gap that existed in 1991 indicates that party organizations can and do respond to changes in their competitive environment. A competitive South likely means that we will have more organized and active parties that contest elections at all levels (Key 1949; Schlesinger 1985; Aldrich 2000).
In the not-too-distant past, some analysts predicted that media and money would overtake the labor-intensive activities best handled by local parties (e.g., Kayden and Mahe 1985). Our data show that grassroots activists still perform traditional campaign activities, such as getting out the vote, at high levels. These activities are especially useful for candidates for lower-level offices, such as state legislator or county commissioner (Frendreis and Gitelson 1999; Hogan 2003).
Activists are involved between election campaigns as well as during them (Feigert and Todd 1998b). The respondents in our survey rate as important a range of noncampaign activities. County chairs naturally are more involved than others, but there are few differences across parties. While direct comparisons are difficult due to slight changes in the response codes, it appears that the importance of performing each activity reported by these activists has increased since 1991 on all six party maintenance items: participating in party meetings, raising money, recruiting and organizing workers, increasing political information for party workers, policy formation, and county party organizational work.
The party renewal thesis implies that party organizations will become increasingly integrated with one another as they work together (Bibby 1998). As chapter 12 shows, grassroots activists in 2001 report an increase in levels of communication with other party officials. This is especially true for Republican contacts with elected officials, no doubt due to the increased success of GOP candidates across the decade. Democrats, in contrast, had less contact with elected officials, which in turn affected their overall levels of integration. Robust communications networks are shown to have implications for campaign activity and support for the party as a whole.
Finally, we asked activists to evaluate the change over the last five to ten years in the condition of their organizations on several dimensions of organizational vitality. We recognize that their responses are suspect for a variety of reasons. For example, they may overestimate improvement to justify their effectiveness as leaders, or they may not have an appropriate baseline for comparison. Nevertheless, the patterns we find are telling. Large majorities of Republican activists report substantial improvement on every dimension but the use of public opinion polls. Democratic activists were less positive in their assessments. Only once did a majority of Democrats report improvement in their local organizations (increased use of computer technology). On several questions, more said their party was weaker than it had been in the past. While slight variations may be found from state to state, the overall pattern is consistent across the region (Clark and Prysby 2003). These trajectories spell trouble for the Democratic Party, although they could represent Republicans catching up.
Taken together, the findings we present seem to give credence to the party renewal thesis. Several trends bear watching, however. For one thing, the activists surveyed in 2001 tended to be older than was true in 1991. It could be the case that the parties are maturing into stable organizations with longer apprenticeships before moving into positions of leadership. On the other hand, this trend might reflect a difficulty in recruiting new workers into party activity. Should the latter explanation hold, evidence of increased activity and communication could be swept away by a wave of retirements.
A second trend has to do with the increased polarization of the parties. The willingness of individuals to be involved in party organizations at a time when political and civic engagement is generally in decline nationally may be stimulated by the fact that the parties in the South have become much more ideologically distinct. Liberal activists may feel that it is even more important now to be involved in the Democratic Party. Conservatives may have similar feelings toward the Republican Party.
The increasing cohesiveness of the parties also may make participation more enjoyable and rewarding. As factional clashes diminish in intensity (see chapter 7), participation becomes more pleasant. The social aspects of involvement should not be ignored. As chapter 10 shows, people become active in party politics not only to influence government but also for personal reasons. If activists find more areas of agreement over issues, they may derive greater satisfaction from the social side of their activity. Solidary rewards may keep them active after the fires of issues have waned.
Although it is consistent with the responsible parties perspective, ideological purity may run counter to the goals of pragmatic, institutionalized party organizations (Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1989). The organizational principles espoused by Ray Bliss and Bill Brock, who chaired the Republican National Committee in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively, focused on electability rather than policy. At the present time, pragmatic orientations are widely held by the activists in our survey, yet this trend also deserves watching.
The findings of this study indicate that the attitudes of grassroots party activists in the South are much closer to the responsible party model than they were a few decades ago. Indeed, there has been significant development in this direction even in the last ten years. Democratic and Republican activists are more ideologically distinct and more ideologically cohesive than before. They are more strongly attached to their parties than before. They are more motivated by issues than before. These developments in the character of the party activists parallel developments among candidates and voters. The result is that the current political party system in the South is not only a much more competitive one but also one with more cohesive and distinct parties, a development that supporters of the responsible party model would applaud. To some extent the party activists may have contributed to this development rather than just be a reflection of it. The interesting question is whether there will be further ideological differentiation of the parties and, if so, what consequences will flow from such a development.
Likewise, our findings offer support for the party renewal thesis. Local party activists have increased their involvement during the campaign season. They devote more attention to the party’s operation between elections. They communicate regularly with those most proximate to them in the organizational hierarchy. Many of them perceive their parties to be stronger than in the past, especially Republicans.
This brief overview masks the fact that there is substantial variation among activists within the South. The contributors to this volume account for some of that variation by examining patterns of religion, race, and migration, for example. Additional research remains to be done, and we applaud those who pursue that path. In addition to following trends identified here, others may wish to examine how party organizations respond to the opportunities and setbacks that befall them (Appleton and Ward 1994; Klinkner 1994). Can electoral success be translated into organizational development? Will parties adapt to slow a decline in electoral fortunes?
A second open question involves how party organizations adapt to changes in the way campaigns are conducted. For decades, state and local parties were the beneficiaries of soft money largess. How will they respond to a different campaign finance regime that may restrict their ability to raise funds (La Raja 2003)? Will party organizations be able to take advantage of new innovations in campaign technology without losing the vitality of people who staff them between elections?
The decade of the 1990s brought increased partisan conflict and other changes to local party organizations in the South. The contributors to this volume have attempted to catalog these changes and place them into the context of the scholarship on political parties. The focus of our attention is, we should note, a moving target. This volume, therefore, represents a baseline from which to measure changes into the twenty-first century.