Exemplar is a term of considerable importance for Spinoza’s ethical theory. Cf. Eisenberg 2, 148.
Spinoza seems to be thinking primarily of moderation in eating. Cf. II/185 and II/202.
A synonym for modus.
I have generally followed Appuhn (3:367) who argues that Spinoza’s definition and usage require something broader than piété with its religious connotations. White, Elwes, and Shirley all have piety. This might be defensible if you think Spinoza is engaging here in a persuasive redefinition. But in fact the classical meaning of pietas is quite broad, encompassing dutifulness toward your native country and your relatives, and kindness in general.
Hayes 1, v, takes Spinoza’s consistent use of movere in the passive in his exposition of Descartes to reflect the Cartesian doctrine that bodies are always moved, because they have no force of themselves whereby they can move themselves. “For Descartes God is the principal cause of motion.” Hence he consistently translates the Latin passives by English passives.
I take these regular occurrences of the passive of movere, both in Descartes and in Spinoza, to have no philosophical significance, but to represent a conventional use of the passive in a middle sense. Spinoza uses the active only when movere is transitive. What Westfall 1, 61, observes regarding the causal interaction of finite bodies applies here also: “Descartes might not have admitted that one body can ever act, in the true sense of the word, on another. God is the only causal agent in the universe.… In practice, Descartes made no effort to maintain this ultimate metaphysical point of view, and he spoke of one body acting on another when it strikes it.”
I take it that the passage cited to show that Descartes conceives of matter as wholly inert (viz. AT VII, 26) does not show this, since it reflects a prephilosophic conception of body Descartes is in the process of disowning. For example, by the end of the Second Meditation he will reject the notion that bodies are perceptible by the senses. His physics seems content to assume that bodies have a vis se movendi. Cf. Principles III, 57-59 (and Spinoza I/209/12, 215/2).
See people
natura, see also ordo Naturae, origo Naturae
Kline 1 distinguishes three senses: 1) = universe or cosmos, 2) = kind, and 3) = essence. He contends that sense (1) is distinguished from the others by capitalization, but his data show that there is much inconsistency in the capitalization. Nevertheless, there are at least two senses which usually can be distinguished fairly easily: one in which natura = the whole of nature (in which it is frequently capitalized), and one in which natura = essence (in which case it is normally not capitalized). I have divided my index entries in two to reflect this division. No doubt in some of the occurrences indexed under my second heading natura is being used not as a synonym for essentia, but more generally, to refer to nonessential characteristics as well. A clear example is at II/104/14-15. But to try systematically to distinguish the more general from the more specific usage would introduce too many conjectures. See also Gueroult 1, l:269n
NATURA NATURANS/NATURA NATURATA
natura naturans/natura naturata
natuurende Natuur/genatuurde Natuur
Elwes: nature viewed as active/nature viewed as passive. I have preferred to leave the Latin untranslated, since any translation would involve more interpretation than I care to engage in. Spinoza’s predecessors used these terms to mark various contrasts. Gueroult 1, 1:564-568, gives the best available survey. But I think it is questionable whether Spinoza intended to use these terms in any of the senses in which they were used by his predecessors.
necessitas, see also existentia necessaria
I still think the account in Curley 3, 83-117, is correct.
Elwes uses high-mindedness, White generosity. The definition at II/188 makes the latter plausible, with its emphasis on a concern for the welfare of others. The former suggests more accurately the connection with Descartes’ générosité (PA 54, 153-156, 161, 164), which has a central role in his aristocratic ethic. Nowadays, however, high-mindedness has acquired negative connotations which are inappropriate. Wolfson 1, 2:219, 220, properly emphasizes the ancestry of this concept in Aristotle’s discussion of the great-souled man (Nicomachean Ethics 1123a-33ff.). Descartes’ générosité has voluntaristic connotations (PA III, 153) which distinguish the concept from Spinoza’s generositas.
nihil, tò nihil
Sometimes (e.g., at I/162, 268) Spinoza will use the Greek definite article τò to indicate that special use of nihil in which it is treated as if it were an expression referring to a thing which does not exist, has no properties, and yet might be the material out of which things are created. One of Spinoza’s criticisms of the traditional doctrine of creation ex nihilo is that it involves imagining that the negation of all reality is something real.
At I/83 the expressions in italics are in Latin in an otherwise Dutch context.
obedientia, see also obtemperare
See objectum
In general Spinoza seems to follow the Cartesian (ultimately, Scholastic) usage which contrasts formal reality with objective reality. All ideas have the same formal reality insofar as they are modes of a thinking thing. They differ in their objective reality insofar as they represent things which differ in their formal reality. Substances have more formal reality than modes, so ideas of substances would have more objective reality than ideas of modes. Cf. the Third Meditation (AT VII, 40, 41) and the First Replies (AT VII, 102-3). Cf. also Joachim (2, 56n) for an argument that Spinoza’s usage may differ significantly from Descartes’.
See odor
See unitas
opinio, see also imaginatio, cognitio primi generis
Waan is the usual term for the first kind of knowledge in KV (though sometime geloof occurs—see belief). Probably it represents opinio, which occasionally designates the first kind of knowledge in E. Always there is a connotation of inferiority and liability to error.
Opinie is troublesome. Sometimes it clearly designates the first kind of knowledge (e.g., at I/99/17). Sometimes it is used to designate that species of the first kind of knowledge which is elsewhere designated by experientia vaga (e.g., at I/57/12 = I/559/26). Sometimes it is used in conjunction with waan as if these terms designated two different cognitive states (e.g., at I/68/5). The first two occurrences may be accounted for by supposing that the Latin had opinio in both cases. (The fluctuation between waan and opinie for opinio would then be regarded as the work of a translator.) The third occurrence is more difficult. Wolf solves it by using imagination for waan, Appuhn and Francès by using erreur for waan. Since error captures the normal meaning of waan in ordinary Dutch, I have preferred their solution.
orde
See people
See Gueroult 1, 1:169, 170.
Existimatio is used in PA III, 149 for estime, where nothing is implied about the correctness of the judgment of the thing’s worth. Apparently it is used in a similar sense in KV II, 8. But in E it implies overestimation, the term White uses. Elwes uses partiality which has the advantage of suggesting the cause of overestimation. It would be desirable to have a term which captured the implication of the definition at II/160, that existimatio is a species of joy. But I can think of nothing suitable.
See deel
Both Caillois (Pléiade, 1429) and Gueroult (1, 2:294) see a distinction between particularis and singularis which escapes me. I should have thought that E IIP31C indicated that Spinoza was using these terms interchangeably. Cf. E IIP48S.
I have not used “affect” to translate any of the psychological terms of the KV, partly because it is not clear to me that at the time of writing that work, Spinoza has clearly distinguished between active and passive emotions. From the standpoint of the Ethics many of the occurrences of the various Dutch terms rendered by passion seem ‘nonstandard’ insofar as they embrace affects of which we might be the adequate cause (cf. E IIID2). Cf. I/56, n. 2, and I/65, n. 6. Rather than introduce “affect” into the Short Treatise, I have marked what I regard as nonstandard uses by single quotes. The term passie, which is used interchangeably with lijding, and which one would naturally assume to render passio, sometimes seems to require the same treatment, as does tocht. But it is often difficult to be sure whether a use should be marked as nonstandard. It should be observed that even in the Ethics Spinoza is not perfectly consistent about distinguishing between affectus and passio. Cf. II/204/2. See also Wolfson 1, 2:193. Passio is also awkward because there is no verb in English related to passion as passio is to pati. Some remedy this defect by pressing suffer into service. I have preferred to be acted on.
Classically vulgus can mean variously the people, the multitude, the public, or a mass, a crowd, etc. But it can also imply contempt, and Lewis and Short suggest such terms as the vulgar, the mob, the rabble. Spinoza does regularly use vulgus for people whose intelligence and opinions he has little respect for, but the contemptuous terms Lewis and Short suggest sound unduly priggish to my ear. Sometimes Spinoza contrasts vulgus with the philosophers (I/246) and the sense seems something like that of the modern philosopher’s man-in-the-street. Sometimes he will speak of a vulgus of philosophers (I/168), presumably meaning those philosophers whose opinions are quite conventional. Sometimes, particularly when he is echoing classical political commentary, the mob does seem right. For more on this, cf. Pléiade, 1443.
As White observed, it is important in understanding Spinoza’s analysis of perfection (see particularly the Preface to Part IV), to realize that perfectus is simply the past participle of perficere, to complete or finish, itself a derivative of facere, to make or do.
That Spinoza is quite self-conscious about using the term in a nonevaluative, metaphysical sense, is well indicated by his note at I/165/3-9.
See volharden
Note that the occurrences of philosophia in the TdIE appear to be as a title for a projected systematic treatise.
White: commiseration. The use of commiseratio in this sense is not classical (LS), but commiseratio is used (indifferently with misericordia) for pitié, in PA (cf. 62, 185, 186 and see Voss 1). This perhaps accounts for Spinoza’s difficulty in seeing a distinction between them at II/195.
titillatio, deliciae, libido, see also jucundus, libido
Elwes: stimulation; White: pleasurable excitement. Normally titillatio refers to a tickling sensation. But Spinoza regularly opposes it to dolor. Similarly, titillatio in the PA represents chatouillement which normally refers to a tickling sensation, but is opposed by Descartes to douleur. Alquié 1, 3:1024 n. 2 glosses chatouillement as plaisir and ascribes to Descartes the theory that pleasure is caused by moderate stimulation of the nerves, pain by excessive stimulation. Cf. also AT VII, 76
Cf. Pléiade, 1391, 1447.
potentia, potestas, vis, virtus
Some French scholars see an important distinction between potestas (which they render pouvoir, suggesting a mere capacity) and potentia (which they render puissance, suggesting a power “en acte”—cf. Pléiade, 1421, 345, Appuhn 3:31, 59, 60). Gueroult, who appears to accept this distinction (1, I, 387-389, 2:43, 44, 49, 50) comments that Spinoza introduces the distinction in order to reduce it immediately to nothing. It is unclear that a systematic examination of Spinoza’s usage would confirm even a prima facie distinction between potentia and potestas. The main symptoms of one seem to be that power in the phrase power of acting always represents potentia, whereas in the phrase in one’s power it always represents potestas. And potestas is the term used to refer to the political power held by an established government. But sometimes Spinoza uses the terms interchangeably, as he sometimes does vis and potentia. Cf. I/275, 280; II/54, 87, 210.
PREDETERMINATION; PREDETERMINE
behoudenis, onderhouden, voortgang
verwaandheid, verhovaardiging, hovaardigheid
Pride (Elwes, White) seems inevitable as a translation of superbia and its Dutch equivalents. But since these terms seem always to have a negative connotation in Spinoza, since Spinoza rejects the claim of humilitas to be a virtue, and since acquiescentia in se ipso has very positive connotations, arrogance and haughtiness deserve serious consideration as translations of superbia.
principium (usu.) ratio (occ.)
See Gueroult 1, 2:311n
I adopt this translation from Joachim (2, 120), who observes that a quaestio is a special problem in any branch of knowledge. He refers us to Descartes’ Regulae XII (AT X, 428-30)
Appuhn (1, 3:343) notes that Spinoza uses agere for the activities of a free thing and operari for what a compelled thing does (e.g., in E ID7). It seems desirable to reproduce this distinction in the translation in some way and the English represents an attempt to do that. (The most natural suggestion, operate, is awkward in contexts where operari takes a direct object.)
Though eigenschap generally represents attributum in the KV, sometimes it seems to represent proprietas, e.g., in II, xxvii.
I have often left proprium untranslated in its occurrences as a noun, since property is wanted for proprietas and I do not want to prejudge the question whether proprium is used in its common technical sense, a property which all and only members of a species always have, though it does not pertain to the essence of the species (e.g., having a capacity for laughter in men, cf. Gilson 1, 246-247). Eisenberg 1, 31-32, thinks it clear that in the TdIE Spinoza makes no distinction between proprietas and proprium. I find it not so clear. Certainly he sometimes makes the distinction in other works and his contemporary Dutch translators seem to have thought there was a distinction worth marking. And I find that the contract between proprium and essential property is wanted in both TdIE contexts. Spinoza does use proprium and proprietas interchangeably there but I think that is because he uses proprietas where proprium would have been more accurate.
In connection with mens and intellectus, purus means, roughly, free of ideas arising from external sources. Cf. II/34/3 the note to II/5/7, and the secondary sources cited there.
ratio (usu.), causa (rar.), see also dictamen rationis
reminiscentia
See memory. I have assumed that recordari corresponds to reminiscentia rather than to memoria.
The translation of conscientiae morsus is quite controversial. See Bidney 1, 4, 195-204. Some translators have been guided by the usual meaning of the term (White: remorse). Others have been influenced by Spinoza’s definition (Elwes: disappointment). Nietzsche (The Geneology of Morals II, xv) saw Spinoza’s definition at II/195 as deflationary (in the manner of Bierce’s Devil’s Dictionary), as expressing the view that if good and evil are fictions, there is nothing more to the sting of conscience than a disappointed expectation. I agree that to render conscientiae morsus by disappointment would be a mistake, but am influenced mainly by the considerations in the note at II/195/20. See also repentance.
As Spinoza sometimes defines poenitentia (e.g., at II/163), lack of self-esteem seems appropriate. Elsewhere (e.g., at II/197) repentance is clearly required. For the sake of consistency I have stuck to the latter term. Perhaps we have another deflationary definition in the first occurrence (cf. remorse). But the variation is puzzling. In the KV Spinoza draws a distinction between knaging ( = conscientiae morsus?) and berouw ( = poenitentia) which follows Descartes’ distinction between remords de conscience and repentir (PA 177, 191), but which does not, so far as I can see, correspond to any distinction in English.
In Curley 2, 30ff., I argued that report was preferable to the more literal hearing or hearsay in that it does not suggest a limitation to things heard rather than read, and that it does suggest a belief based on authority alone. Interesting in this connection is Descartes’ gloss on a passage in the First Meditation in his Conversation with Burman, and the commentary in Cottingham, 3, 53-54. See also the exchange between Ariew and Cottingham in Studia Cartesiana 1 (1979): 185-188.
quies, see also motus et quies
The Cartesian doctrine (AT XI, 40) is that rest is not merely the privation of motion, but a quality which must be atributed to a portion of matter while it remains in the same place. Spinoza apparently accepts this doctrine.
Reveal also translates manifestare.
Perhaps, as Voss suggests, boerterij in KV II, 11, represents the PA’s jocus ( = raillerie). But Spinoza seems to make no distinction between boerterij and bespotting (cf. Pléiade, 1383), whereas Descartes does make a distinction between mocquerie and raillerie (cf. Passions of the Soul III, 178-181), the latter being a characteristic of the honnête homme. If boerterij in the KV is the same affect as jocus in E, then Spinoza has reversed his negative evaluation of boerterij. More likely they are not equivalent.
Elwes, Shirley: pain; White: sorrow. I reject pain because II/149/4ff. seems to dictate pain as a translation of dolor and something less tied to a specific sensory stimulation for tristitia. These choices are also influenced by PA 94. Sorrow seems a reasonable alternative.
Classically, salus means health, welfare, safety. But (except in the phrase salus publica) Spinoza seems always to use it in the sense it acquired in the Christian tradition.
When acquiescentia occurs alone, satisfaction generally seems satisfactory. When it occurs in the phrase acquiescentia in se ipso, self-esteem (q.v.) seems better.
See also knowledge
Elwes: disparagement; White: contempt. Contempt is a possible classical meaning, but its use earlier for dedignatio excludes its use here. Disparagement seems too mild, both for classical usage and Spinoza’s definition. If there were a noun for the verb to despise, that would be the natural choice. But scorn may suggest the element of hatred involved in this species of disdain.
See appetitus
As Wolf suggested, strafbare nederigheid very probably represents abjectio, for which I have used despondency in E, a debatable choice defended elsewhere. In the KV the emphasis is on the intellectual aspect rather than on the affective. Abjectio was the term used by the Latin translator of Descartes for bassesse ( = humilité vicieuse, PA 159). Wolf has culpable humility, which is a good literal translation of the Dutch. But if the Dutch is itself a translation we need not be bound by it. It has the disadvantage of suggesting that strafbare nederigheid is a species of nederigheid, which it can’t be, and of suggesting that Spinoza thinks that blame may sometimes be legitimate, which is doubtful (cf. II/81/32, I/75/14).
The Latin represents Descartes’ satisfaction de soi-même at PA 190, so White’s self-satisfaction was quite reasonable. But it has acquired negative connotations which are inappropriate. Elwes’ self-approval seems an acceptable alternative.
Edelmoedigheid probably represents generositas in KV II, 8, but its definition is so different from that of generositas in E that the two terms should not be rendered by the same English term. Nevertheless both edelmoedigheid as defined in KV and generositas as defined in E would be traits of Aristotle’s “great-souled man.” See nobility.
SENSATION, SENSE, SENSE PERCEPTION
gevoel, zin
In Aristotle (De Anima, 426b8-427a16), a faculty by which the soul discriminates between the perceptions of the different senses. In Descartes, sometimes the term is used in an Aristotelian sense (Dioptrique AT VI, 109; Regulae AT X, 414), sometimes it is identified with the power of imagination (Meditations AT VII, 32).
See stupor
For comment see lust.
amovere
See servitas
SHAME; SENSE OF SHAME, SHAMELESSNESS
beschaamdheid, schaamte; onbeschaamdheid
Spinoza distinguishes between the sadness we feel at being blamed by others for something we have done (pudor) and a fear of being blamed which would prevent us from doing something shameful (verecundia). Elwes and White used shame and modesty to reflect this distinction, but modesty has connotations I preferred to avoid.
See also disgraceful.
So far as I can see, Spinoza intends no distinction between beschaamdheid and schaamte in the KV.
See significatio
similaritas
See also mind and animate. Since ziel is the term which always represents anima and usually represents mens as well, in contemporary Dutch translations of Spinoza’s works, there is no way of knowing what Latin term ziel represents in the KV. But Giancotti Boscherini’s results incline me to translate as if it represents anima.
snelheid (PP), gezwindheid (E)
See also mind.
When state represents status, condition would be a plausible alternative. When it represents civitas, it refers to a political entity.
Elwes: strength of character; White: fortitude. Either is possible from a classical point of view, but Elwes’ seems preferable from the standpoint of generality since animositas ( = tenacity?) and generositas ( = nobility?) are both species of fortitudo. Cf. Wolfson 1, 2:218-220. One can only conjecture that moed represents fortitudo in the Short Treatise, but the emphasis there on manliness fits well with that conjecture.
Elwes, White: endeavor. The term conatus is often left untranslated in the secondary literature. There is much to be said for this, since any translation will be contentious and potentially misleading. Endeavor is one classical meaning of conatus, along with effort, exertion, struggle, attempt, etc. (LS). I prefer striving only for stylistic reasons. The real question is whether conatus should not be rendered by tendency, also a classical meaning of conatus. In favor of tendency is the fact that conatus is a central concept in Spinozistic-Cartesian physics, where the conatus ad motum refers to the tendency of things to ‘obey’ the principle of inertia (cf. I/206, 229 and in Descartes, Principles of Philosophy III, 56) with no implication of there being any psychic state present. Against tendency is the fact that Spinoza deliberately uses a term which he is aware will suggest the presence of a psychic state (cf. I/229). In any case I think the conatus by which each thing ‘strives’ to persevere in its being is best regarded as a metaphysical generalization of physical principle of inertia. For a discussion of its historical antecedents see Wolfson 1, II, 195-204. For a discussion of the concept’s relations to other concepts in the seventeenth-century physics and a critique of some recent interpretations see Rice 1. See also animate.
See fortitudo
In the KV subjectum sometimes occurs untranslated (but only in footnotes).
Spinoza’s central definition of substantia, because of its formal similarity to scholastic definitions, is apt to suggest that the relation of modes to substance is the inherence of predicates in a subject. Both Gueroult (1, 1:44-64) and Curley (3, 4-28), however, argue that the formal similarity is radically misleading.
Elwes and Shirley have courage, which is certainly one classical meaning of animositas (the English cognate, however, comes from Ecclesiastical Latin). But Spinoza regards presence of mind in danger, along with moderation and sobriety, as species of animositas. White has strength of mind, which has appropriate generality, but which I reject because I have used strength of character for fortitudo. Self-control is possible, but tenacity seems to suggest better the element of striving for self-preservation. See Wolfson 1, II, 218-220. The decision to use tenacity for kloekmoedigheid and stoutheid in KV is based on the fact that kloekmoedigheid is the term most often used for animositas in the NS version of E and that stoutheid seems to be used equivalently to kloekmoedigheid in KV. See also strength of character.
theologie, see also godgeleerde
denking
It is sometimes said that thought is a misleading translation of cogitatio, since the latter term was traditionally used to cover a wider range of activities of consciousness than the former. See Anscombe and Geach 1, xlvii. Against this it is argued that Latin usage was never as wide as that found in Descartes and that Descartes was consciously extending existing usage. See Kenny 1, 68-69. Spinoza seems to regard Cartesian usage as needing explanation. See I/145.
Note that think sometimes translates sentire and gevoelen (though thought never translates sensatio or gevoeling).
Elwes: timidity; White: fear. See also fear.
See absolutus
See passio
See unitas
See eenheid
See unitas
See eenheid
universalis, notio universalis
See mulier
See injuria
See utilitas
See nut
Elwes has vacillation of soul, but the decision to use mind for animus excludes that. See mind. The definition given in E of fluctuatio animi is different from that given in KV of wankelmoedigheid, but not enough different to warrant the use of different English terms.
In Descartes vénération is a species of estime of an object considered as a free cause. Though Spinoza declines to define it at II/192, at II/180 he makes it a species of wonder at someone who far surpasses us in prudence, diligence or some other virtue.
See verbum
See voluntas
See wil
See appetitus
I have generally used this as the verb corresponding to appetite.
The ambiguity noted in connection with salus and heil (see salvation) also seems to characterize welstand. In some contexts well-being or welfare seems clearly indicated (e.g., at I/104-105). In others salvation is a serious alternative (e.g., at I/80, 88, 89). I have opted for well-being, but with misgivings. See also the note at I/11.
Generally the distinction between particular acts of volition and the general faculty of will is marked in Latin by the volitio/voluntas pair and in Dutch by willing/wil. For an exception, see I/82/9.
White: astonishment. But this seems too strong. Occasionally admiratio is used in the sense of its English cognate (e.g., at II/273). See also surprise.
Cf. Gueroult 1, 1:396n.
[PA 159: bassesse]
neerslachigheid (E), strafbare nederigheid (KV); nederig, neerslachtig
despondency (E), self-depreciation (KV); despondent, II/198, 199, 250, 251, 252, 272
volstrekt (usu.), volkomen (occ); volstrektelijk, volkomenlijk, ganselijk (rar.)
absolute; absolutely, unconditionally, I/148, 151, 161, 163, 182, 183, 217, 219, 224, 238, 247, 249, 253, 254, 255, 266, 267, II/11, 18, 38, 39, 45, 46, 49, 54, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 92, 116, 117, 129, 162, 225, 226, 230, 233, 256, 277, 279, 283, 295, IV/8, 13, 43, 47, 66, 127, 147
aftrekkig; abstractlijk (Ep.)
abstract, abstractly, I/132, II/11, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 59, 135, 257, IV/9, 56, 58, 61, 91
accident; accidental; I/150, 154, 165, 203, 236, 237, 249, 255, 269, II/13, 235, IV/11, 13, 14
bij (door) toeval
accidental(ly), II/210. See also causa per accidens.
real accident, I/249, 281, IV/65
gerustheid; in gerust wezen
satisfaction, peace; to be satisfied, II/193, 267, 276, 283, 288, 297, 300, 304, 308
[PA 190: satisfaction de soi-même]
gerustheid op (in) zich zelf (E), edelmoedigheid (KV?)
self-esteem, II/163, 179, 183, 196, 197, 198, 248, 249, 253
doening, werking, bedrijf (rar.), werk (KV); werken, doen; doender
action; to act (usu.), to do (occ), to be active (rar.); agent, I/175, 182, 183 221, 243, 259, 273, II/24, 25, 26, 46, 61, 78, 79, 84, 85, 87, 97, 105, 117, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 163, 183, 187, 188, 206, 207, 214, 222, 226, 246, 254, 255, 266, 281, 283, 289, 291, 302, 306
dadelijkheid (usu.), werkelijkheid (CM); dadelijk; werkelijk, in der daad, dadelijk
actuality; actual; actually, I/185, 190, 191, 230, 239, 244, 252, II/20, 22, 50, 62, 71, 72, 75, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 104, 108, 128, 144, 162, 176, 204, 225, 294, 295, 296, 298 IV/59
daad (E, Ep.), werk (E), bedrijf (Ep.), doening (CM)
act, I/181, 254, 259, 270, II/19, 191, 197, 203, IV/10, 13, 147
ADAEQUARE; ADAEQUATUS; ADAEQUATE
gelijkmaken; evenmatig; evenmatiglijk
to match; adequate; adequately, II/10, 12, 13, 28, 95, 96, 114, 119, 134, 256, 267
ADAEQUATA IDEA ( = idea clara & distincta, II/117)
adequate idea, II/15, 28, 85, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 140, 141, 144, 145, 187, 188, 259, 266, 291, 293, 296, 298
[PA 53: admiration]
wonder (usu.), admiration (occ.); to wonder at, admire, II/81, 121, 142, 180, 181, 191, 192, 193, 201, 273
gevlei; pluimstrijker
flattery; flatterer, II/251, 272, IV/69. See also parasitus
kwaal (zwakheid) des gemoeds
[PA 172: émulation]
naijvering, krijgelheid; naijveren, krijgelen; naijverig, krijgelig
emulation; to emulate; emulous, II/160, 200
AEQUITAS; AEQUUS; AEQUALIS; INIQUUS
billijkheid; gelijkmatig, rechtmatig; gelijk; onbillijk
fairness; fair; equal; unfair, I/185, 189, 190, 224, 228, 279, II/55, 135, 162, 183, 184, 198, 201, 209, 270, 272, 275, IV/61
gelijkmoediglijk
met een rechtmatig gemoed, gelijkmatiglijk
eternity; eternal, I/178, 239, 241, 243, 244, 249, 250, 251, 252, 262, 263, 265, 271, II/7, 8, 36, 37, 38, 45, 46, 52, 60, 64, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 75, 80, 127, 128, 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, IV/53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 133
(bestendige en) eeuwige dingen
fixed and eternal things, II/7, 36, 37, 38, 294, IV/56
AETERNITATIS, SUB (QUADAM) SPECIE
onder de (een zekere) gedaante van eeuwigheid
under the (a certain) species of eternity, II/39, 126, 257, 295, 296, 298, 299, 300, 302
from eternity, I/265, 270, 271, II/62, 75
to eternity, II/5, 62. See also veritas, aeterna
aandoening; aandoen
affection; to affect, I/184, 233, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247, II/45, 47, 48, 49, 68, 69, 71, 93, 96, 190, 281, 282, IV/25, 28, 47, 54, 57, 60, 77
hartstocht (usu.), lijding (rar.), tocht (rar.)
affect, feeling, II/49, 85, 137, 138, 139, 143, 144, 151, 153, 154, 160, 166, 168, 178, 179, 184, 185, 186, 187, 203, 204, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 292, 293, 294, IV/42
strijdige hartstocht
opposite affect, II/209, 210, 214, 215, 304, 305
AFFECTUS PRIMARIUS, PRIMITIVUS
voorname, eerste en oorspronkelijke hartstocht
primary, primitive affect, II/149, 186, 189, 192, 203
AFFIRMATIO; AFFIRMARE; AFFIRMATIVUS
bevestiging; bevestigen; bevestiglijk
affirmation; to affirm; affirmative, I/132, 234, 277, 278, II/15, 20, 33, 34, 35, 49, 129, 130, 132, 133, IV/130
verdichten
to ascribe fictitiously, I/227, II/20, 21, 49
roemzucht; roemzuchtig
ambition; ambitious, II/162, 164, 165, 170, 185, 202, 203, 243, 273, 283, 288
vriendschap; vijandschap; vriend
friendship; enmity; friend, II/166, 188, 236, 263, 269, 270, 271, 273, 288, 294, IV/5, 7, 69
[PA 56, 79-85: amour]
liefde; beminnen (usu.), liefhebben (occ.), lieven (occ.); vrister
love; to love; lover, I/235, 247, 264, II/7, 40, 71, 85, 136, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 184, 185, 186, 189, 192, 193, 222, 242, 243, 245, 252, 269, 271, 272, 281, 283, 287, 289, 294
God’s love, I/264, II/291, 292, 302, 303
AMOR DEI (OBJ. GEN.), ERGA DEUM
Gods liefde, liefde tot God
love of, toward God, I/158, II/7, 290, 291, 292, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 307, 308
evenredenheid, gelijkvormigheid
proportion, measure, I/162, 263, IV/8
ontbinding
engel
angel, I/161, 179, 188, 262, 267, 275
soul; animate, I/132, 144, 146, 150, 188, 260, 275, 276, 277, 278, II/11, 15, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 96, 117, 187, 278, 279, IV/6, 77
ziel of geest, II/278
voedende ziel
nutritive soul, I/259
verstandelijke ziel
intellective soul, I/259
gevoelige ziel
sensitive soul, I/259
groeijige ziel
vegetative soul, I/259
[PA 171: courage]
kloekmoedigheid (usu.), stoutmoedigheid (rar.), stoutheid (KV)
tenacity, II/188, 203, 262, 265, 288, 306, 307
mind (usu.), spirit (occ.), intention (occ.), disposition (rar.), I/141, 159, 249, 273, II/5, 6, 7, 18, 29, 30, 74, 93, 102, 135, 136, 142, 158, 173, 174, 183, 201, 222, 244, 246, 250, 251, 252, 264, 269, 270, 276, 288, 289, 307, 308, IV/39, 73, 151, 159
a posteriori, I/159, 250, II/54
begeerte (CM, EI), lust (EIII-V); begeren (usu.), betrachten (occ.)
appetite; to want (usu.), to seek (occ.), I/278, II/78, 80, 138, 143, 144, 147, 148, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169, 186, 187, 190, 199, 203, 207, 210, 223, 263, 283, 289, IV/128, 129
bekwaam
capable, II/10, 11, 97, 103, 142, 297, 304, 305
kunst
art, skill, ingenuity, II/6, 9, 81, 142, 143, 269, 274, 277
de Buridansche ezel
Buridan’s ass, I/277, 278, II/133, 135
toestemming; toestemmen
assent; to assent, I/146, 173, 174, 175, 239, II/23, 24, 25, 132, 133
toevlucht, schuilplaats, der onwetenheid
refuge for, sanctuary of, ignorance, II/81, IV/12
toeeigening (usu.), eigenschap (KV), sometimes untrans., toevoeging (rar.); toeeigenen
attribute; to attribute, I/145, 150, 158, 160, 161, 163, 185, 237, 238, 239, 240, 244, 248, 250, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 261, 266, 269, 273, 274, 275, 280, II/29, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 82, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 98, 108, 109, 121, 127, 141, 143, 144, 190, 213, 228, 239, 267, IV/5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 36, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 127, 133, 148
toeeigening van God, sometimes untranslated
attribute of God, I/158, 238, 239, 244, 248, 253, 255, 257, 259, 274, 275, II/29, 64, 65, 66, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 122, 146, 267, IV/36, 124
[PA 171: hardiesse]
stoutheid; stout
daring; daring, II/179, 201, 262, 280
gehoor (TdIE, Ep), horen zeggen (KV)
report, hearing (nontech.), II/10, 12, 28, IV/77
zelfsbewegsel, zelfsbeweegbar
AUXILIA (INTELLECTUS, IMAGINATIONIS)
hulpmiddelen (van het verstand, van d’inbeelding)
aids (of the intellect, of the imagination), II/15, 37, IV/57, 58
gierigheid, gulzigheid; gierigaard
greed; greedy (man), II/7, 79, 170, 185, 202, 203, 210, 243, 288
[PA 80: aversion]
aversion; to be averse to, avoid, be repelled by, II/162, 163, 193, 223, 258
kundigheid (TdIE, and usu. E), gemene Kennis (PP), geloofspreuk (rar. E), gemene kundigheid (Ep.)
axiom, I/127, 151, 201, II/12, 28, 34, 50, 120, 139, IV/10, 11, 13, 40, 43, 72
zaligheid (usu. in E), gelukzaligheid (PP, EII); zalig (usu.), gelukzalig (CM)
blessedness; blessed, I/158, 159, 264, 271, II/84, 135, 225, 250, 267, 277, 280, 300, 301, 303, 307, 308, IV/127, 131
weldaad; weldoen
benefit, favor; to do good to, benefit, II/157, 161, 169, 172, 173, 179, 236, 248, 252, 262, 263, 271
(God’s) welbehagen
(God’s) good pleasure, I/201, II/76, 77
[PA 81: bienveillance]
goedwilligheid
in opzicht van ’t goede, onder schijn van goed
for the sake of the good, for what seems good, I/278, II/76
the greatest good, II/5, 8, 228, 234, 235, 236, 253, 273, 292
good (usu.), good fortune (rar.), I/235, 247, 248, 249, 264, 278, 279, II/5, 6, 7, 8, 76, 78, 81, 82, 83, 148, 170, 179, 205, 208, 209, 215, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 253, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 266, 267, 268, 275, 276, 288, IV/130
BRUTUM ( = ANIMALE IRRATIONALE)
stomme beest
lower animal, I/160, 247, 259, 260, II/26, 142, 187, 234, 236, 237, 262, 270
hitte; warm
heat; warm, II/81, IV/25, 28, 67, 68
kalk
verstand (PP, CM), bevatting (E, TdIE); verstaan
grasp, power of understanding; grasp, I/132, 190, 191, 243, 244, 254, II/6, 9, 33, 79, IV/129, 130
overhalen en uitmaken, berispen
to censure, find fault, II/137, 197, 252, 269
kuisheid; zuiver en oprecht
chastity; pure, II/185, 203, IV/28
cause (usu.), reason (occ.), ground (occ), I/150, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 164, 165, 169, 170, 172, 173, 176, 179, 180, 196, 197, 201, 220, 221, 222, 226, 227, 229, 236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 243, 250, 262, 277, 280, II/10, 11, 15, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 34, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 85, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 120, 122, 125, 129, 131, 137, 138, 142, 154, 163, 166, 167, 190, 191, 192, 209, 210, 213, 215, 261, 280, 281, 284, 286, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 300, 301, 302, IV/9, 11, 14, 20, 32, 53, 61, 62, 65, 68, 77, 91, 93, 128, 130
evenmatige oorzaak
adequate cause, II/139, 140, 212, 213, 299
buitenkomende oorzaak
adventitious cause, I/279, 280
uitwerkende, werkende oorzaak
efficient cause, I/170, 242, 268, II/60, 61, 67, 68, 74, 85, 152, 153, 207, 208
cause of being, II/67
uitwendige, uitterlijke oorzaak
external cause, I/158, 165, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 241, 256, 281, II/14, 20, 25, 32, 51, 54, 74, 99, 145, 147, 151, 163, 165, 185, 186, 212, 213, 214, 222, 224, 281, 283, 287, 293, 305, 308, IV/9
eindelijke oorzaak
final cause, II/78, 79, 80, 207
formal cause, II/299
tusschenmiddelige oorzaak
intermediate cause, II/80
inwendige, innerlijke oorzaak
internal cause, I/158, 241, 256, II/163
free cause, II/61, 71, 72, 76, 77, 129
middel oorzaak
mediating cause, I/265
natural cause, I/226
CAUSA INADAEQUATA SEU PARTIALIS
onevenmatige of ten deel oorzaak
inadequate or partial cause, II/139, 212
bijzondere oorzaak
oorzaak door toeval, bij toeval
accidental cause, II/61, 151, 152, 153, 167, 177, 193, 196
cause through itself, II/61, 152, 153
first cause, I/155, 156, 157, 254, II/34, 49, 61, 76, 107, 138, 207, IV/8, 15, 36, 51
CAUSA PRIMARIA (SIVE GENERALIS)
primary (or general) cause, I/200, II/207
principal cause, I/200
proximate cause, II/10, 19, 34, 35, 37, 70, 90, 145, 233, 266, 279
afgelege, verder oorzaak
bijzondere oorzaak
singular cause, II/280
genoegzame oorzaak
sufficient cause, I/165, 179, 277, 280
cause of itself, II/34, 45, 49, 55, 67, 68, 77, IV/11
snelheid (PP), gezwindheid (E)
speed, I/185, 192, 193, 194, 199, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, II/97, 99, 100, 101, 142
hersenen (usu.), brein (occ.)
brain, I/149, 160, II/21, 31, 82, 83, 130, 132, 278, 280
zekerheid; zeker
certainty; certain, I/128, 129, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155, 166, 172, 174, 201, 207, 209, 234, 244, 247, 267, II/5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 23, 28, 29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 46, 50, 52, 54, 57, 58, 68, 70, 72, 78, 84, 96, 124, 131, 134, 155, 194, 228, 246, 257, 278, 279, 287, 300, IV/40, 132
verdichtzel (CM, Ep.), ’t gedrocht (TdIE), untranslated (KV)
chimaera, I/82, 233, 240, 241, 242, II/20, IV/45
Christus
stoffscheiding; stoffscheider, stoffscheidig
chemistry; chemist, chemical, IV/48, 49, 50, 51
circumstance, I/221, II/36, 167, 168
staat (usu.), burgerschap (rar.); burger; burgerlijk
state (usu.), community; citizen; civil, II/9, 136, 236, 237, 238, 241, 244, 248, 264, 265, 270
CLARUS ET DISTINCTUS; CLARE ET DISTINCTE
klaar en onderscheiden(lijk); klaar en onderscheid
clear and distinct; clearly and distinctly, I/132, 142, 144, 145, 146, 153, 157, 168, 171, 172, 173, 179, 190, 192, 196, 200, 233, 238, 243, 247, 260, 261, II/24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 36, 38, 39, 50, 113, 114, 117, 119, 120, 125, 127, 139, 227, 248, 249, 255, 276, 279, 282, 283, 287, 289, 290, 294, 297, 298, 304, IV/13, 59, 130
schok (CM), stand (E), bende (Ep)
class, I/234, 235, II/175, IV/57
goedertierenheid
gedwongen
intomen, bedwingen
to restrain, II/277, 285, 287, 307, 308
denking (usu.), gedacht (rar.); denken
thought; to think, I/132, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 160, 173, 175, 225, 229, 233, 234, 235, 244, 245, 246, 250, 257, 269, 270, 277, 279, 280, II/6, 7, 9, 22, 23, 26, 28, 30, 38, 45, 65, 66, 72, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 107, 108, 109, 129, 130, 132, 135, 141, 144, 148, 162, 188, 203, 204, 207, 208, 274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 286, 288, 295, 306, IV/5, 6, 10, 13, 40, 45, 57, 78, 132
knowledge; to know, I/127, 132, 133, 144, 148, 151, 158, 162, 226, 227, 229, 244, 262, 263, 266, 275, II/8, 11, 13, 19, 26, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37, 38, 46, 50, 57, 74, 84, 89, 92, 93, 95, 97, 107, 108, 110, 116, 117, 122, 123, 124, 135, 246, 260, 265, 266, 273, 280, 283, 287, 289, 293, 294, 303, IV/8, 39, 87
adequate knowledge, II/96, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 122, 123, 127, 128, 296
kennis van goed en kwaad
knowledge of good and evil, II/215, 219, 220, 221, 223, 257, 258, 259, 261
knowledge of God, II/30, 34, 57, 136, 228, 234, 235, 236, 267, 295, 296, 297, 299, 305, IV/131
inzienige kennis
intuitive knowledge, II/267
natural knowledge, I/275
kennis van ’t eerste geslacht (slag)
knowledge of the first kind, II/122, 123, 125, 297, 298. See also opinio, imaginatio
weerkerige kennis
reflexive knowledge, II/15, 16, 38
kennis van het tweede geslacht (slag)
knowledge of the second kind, II/122, 123, 297, 298, 303, 304. See also ratio
kennis van zich (zelf)
knowledge of oneself, II/114, 249, 300
kennis van het derde geslacht (slag)
knowledge of the third kind, II/122, 123, 128, 294, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304. See also scientia intuitiva
group (Spinoza circle), IV/39
COLLEGIUM PHILOSOPHICUM, PHILOSOPHANTIUM
filosofische vergadering, vergadering der filosofeerders
philosophical group, group of philosophers, IV/12, 37
verwe
color, I/255, IV/25, 50, 67, 158, 159
aanbevelen, aanprijzen
verdichtsel
medelijden; deernis hebben over
pity; to pity, II/157, 160, 161, 195, 247, 253, 271, 285
gemakken; nuttigheid
conveniences; interest, II/79, IV/51
[PA 27: émotion]
ontroerenis, beweging (gemoeds, van de ziel)
emotion, disturbance of the mind, II/7, 197, 221, 279, 281
common, ordinary, shared, general, I/142, 183, 188, II/5, 31, 40, 46, 47, 48, 53, 55, 79, 96, 107, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 128, 134, 135, 136, 137, 179, 180, 184, 195, 223, 228, 229, 234, 235, 236, 238, 241, 245, 250, 264, 265, 270, 282, 285, 288, 289, 292, 293, 301, 307, IV/7, 14
gemene ordening (loop) de natuur
common order of nature, II/114, 115, 213, 252, 268
vergelijking; vergelijken, stellen, verkrijgen
comparison; to compare, constitute, acquire, I/162, 234, 244, 245, 262, II/7, 165, 179, 183, 204, 207, 208, 214, 220, 231, 234, 242, 271, 274, 280, 283, 293, IV/128
COMPOSITIO; COMPONERE; COMPOSITUS
zamenzetting; te zamen zetten (maken); te zamen gezet
composition; to compose; composite, I/227, 258, II/24, 25, 26, 32, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 111, 189, 203, IV/50, 56, 67, 68
bewijzen, bevestigen
to confirm, ‘confirm,’ IV/21, 29, 30
CONATUS, CONAMEN (II/153); CONARI
poging; pogen (usu.), trachten (occ.), betrachten (rar.)
striving; to strive, I/206, 229, 248, II/8, 79, 146, 147, 148, 150, 153, 155, 156, 158, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 182, 183, 186, 188, 189, 190, 199, 200, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 248, 255, 266, 276, 292, 296, 297
samenschakeling; samenschakelen
connection; to connect, II/23, 30, 34, 35, 77, 107, 141, 281, 287, 293, 305, IV/77
CONCEPTUS; CONCIPERE; INCONCEPTIBILIS
bevatting, begrip; bevatten, begrijpen; onbevattelijk
concept; to conceive; inconceivable, I/132, 145, 148, 150, 151, 155, 157, 162, 192, 240, 244, 245, 251, 257, 258, 264, 269, II/11, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 55, 56, 84, 85, 86, 89, 98, 109, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 212, 216, 257, 261, 265, 274, 279, 282, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, 299, IV/7, 10, 13, 43, 44, 45, 46, 55, 132
eendracht; eendrachtiglijk
harmony; harmoniously, II/237, 241, 270, 271, 272
God’s concurrence; to concur, I/181, 200, 201, 202, 243, 247, 262, 263, 273, 274, 275, 280
verdikking
condensation, I/186
to confirm, IV/17, 24, 31, 50, 66
bestrijden werden
to be torn, troubled, II/143, 144, 173, 178, 214, 220, 231, 287, 293, 305
CONFUSIO; CONFUNDERE; CONFUSUS; CONFUSE
verwarring; verwarren (usu.), vermengen (rar.); verward; verwardelijk
confusion; to confuse; confused; confusedly, I/144, 145, 164, 175, 182, 234, 245, II/11, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 39, 49, 72, 78, 81, 82, 83, 97, 113, 114, 117, 121, 122, 123, 140, 147, 203, 204, 211, 265, 293, 298, IV/8, 9, 61, 77
samenknoping
connection, I/273, 274, II/36, 89, 90, 92, 108, 191, 281
CONSCIENTIA; CONSCIUS; INSCIUS, SUI
meewustigheid, medeweting, geweten, medegeweten; meewustig, bewust, kundig; onkundig van zich zelf
consciousness; conscious, aware of; unconscious of oneself, I/149, II/18, 21, 78, 117, 143, 147, 148, 163, 190, 207, 215, 216, 223, 259, 276, 285, 300, 301, 305, 308
[PA 177: remords de conscience]
toestemming, stemming
behoudenis, behoudening; onderhouden, behouden, bewaren
preservation; to preserve, I/145, 157, 161, 163, 165, 166, 169, 170, 172, 188, 191, 200, 242, 243, 247, 248, 252, 255, 262, 263, 264, 267, 269, 270, 274, II/7, 102, 147, 151, 155, 168, 174, 188, 190, 213, 215, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 238, 239, 240, 241, 251, 253, 256, 261, 264, 265, 268, 273, 274, IV/129
CONSISTENTIA; CONSISTERE; CONSISTENS
bestandigheid; bestandig worden; bestandig
coming to rest, solidification; to come to rest, solidify; solid, IV/17, 18, 28, 29, 31, 65
standvastigheid, bestandigheid
verslagenheid (usu.), verbaasdheid (rar.)
consternation, II/171, 180, 201
gesteltheid (usu.), gesteltenis (occ.); stellen
constitution, condition; to constitute, II/45, 51, 52, 104, 106, 115, 153, 189, 190, 204, 211
gewoonte, gemeenschap
custom, association, II/107, 197, 269, 273, 274
aanschouwen
regard (usu.), contemplate (rar.), II/104, 105, 106, 112, 114, 291
[PA 54: mépris]
versmading; versmaden, verachten disdain; to disdain, II/136, 179, 180, 181, 192, 198, 244, 245, 247
contingency; contingent, I/155, 242, 247, 261, 262, II/70, 71, 74, 87, 115, 125, 126, 209, 217, 218, 219, 221, 284, IV/130
gedurig; geduriglijk
continuous; continually, I/127, 130, 148, 170, 172, 179, 203, 204, 205, 206, 220, 221, 222, 228, 234, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 270, 276, II/58, 100, 165, 244, 274, 287, 303, 305, IV/130, 149
tegenzeglijkheid; tegenstelling
contradiction; contradictory, I/162, 227, 233, II/19, 20, 48, 53, 56, 74, 256, IV/53
strijdig, tegendelig
opposite, contrary, I/185, 204, 207, 208, 211, 216, 221, 222, 281, II/81, 143, 145, 149, 153, 154, 185, 206, 212, 215, 222, 224, 229, 230, 231, 232, 269, 281, 287, 292
overeenkoming (usu.), overeenkomst; overeenkomen
agreement; to agree, I/154, 162, 185, 235, 245, 246, II/12, 16, 17, 22, 47, 63, 82, 85, 98, 110, 114, 116, 119, 124, 146, 206, 222, 223, 229, 230, 232, 268, 276, IV/50, 66
body; corporeal, I/132, 150, 151, 152, 153, 167, 176, 177, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 196, 198, 202, 203, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 260, 275, 276, 281, II/11, 21, 22, 28, 31, 32, 33, 45, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 84, 86, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 119, 120, 121, 141, 142, 143, 144, 150, 162, 165, 189, 191, 215, 223, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 287, 293, 294, 295, IV/10, 29, 55, 60, 74, 77, 131
het menselijke lichaam
the human body, II/96, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 239, 240, 241, 244, 274, 295, 296, 298, 299, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306
lichaamtje
CORRUPTIO; CORRUMPI; CORRUPTUS; CORRUPTIBILIS
verderving, verdervenis; vergaan; bedorven; verderfelijk, vergankelijk
corruption; to be corrupted; corrupt; corruptible, I/255, 276, II/31, 60, 82, 83, 115
CREATIO; CREATOR; CREATURA; CREARE; CREATUS; CREABILIS
schepping; schepper; schepsel; scheppen; geschapen; schepbar
creation; creator; creature; to create; created; creatable, I/143, 146, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168, 170, 172, 177, 179, 191, 201, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 280, II/23, 27, 35, 50, 57, 62, 75, 76, 80, 82, 83, 93, 120, 261, IV/11, 14, 36, 129
continuous creation, I/170, 254, 273, IV/129, 130
wreedheid
kristal; kristallig maken
crystal; to crystallize, IV/17, 23, 49
[PA: désir]
desire; to desire, I/132, 145, 166, 173, 256, 267, II/6, 8, 12, 71, 72, 79, 80, 85, 129, 130, 148, 149, 151, 152, 160, 161, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 220, 221, 225, 235, 242, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263, 265, 266, 267, 271, 275, 283, 297, IV/149, 150, 151
schade; schade aandoen
injury; to injure, II/157, 162, 174, 201, 232, 234, 237, 238, 244
bedrog; bedrieger
deception; deceiver, I/145, 147, 148, 171, 172, II/28, 30
decision, II/142, 143, 144, 192, 197, 264, 265, 280
God’s decree, I/177, 179, 240, 241, 243, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 276, II/62, 75, 136, IV/127, 128, 130
[PA 163; dédain]
afleiden (usu.), deduceren (rar.), uittrekken
deduce, I/153, 172, 227, 229, II/16, 23, 24, 36, 78, 97, 102, 128, 143, 153, 180, 212, 213, 235, 266, 279, 280, 287, 289, IV/91, 149
DEFINITIO; DEFINIRE; DEFINITUS
bepaling (usu.), beschrijving (KV), definitie (Ep.); bepalen (usu.), beschrijven (KV); bepaald
definition; to define, limit; definite, I/127, 130, 158, 160, 163, 171, 203, 233, 235, 236, 239, II/34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 46, 50, 51, 60, 74, 92, 145, 186, 190, 280, IV/8, 10, 13, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 53, 54
lelijkheid
berading
DELICIAE; DELECTARE; DELECTARI
(+ ABL.)
geneugten; aangenaam aan … zijn, vermaken, verheugen; vermak hebben (scheppen) in, z. verheugen over
pleasures; to please; to take pleasure in, be pleased by, II/9, 82, 83, 138, 163, 165, 167, 168, 189, 244, 252, 253, 300
spoorloosheid (usu.), suffing (occ.); spoorloos zijn; spoorloos
madness; to be mad; mad, II/23, 24, 143, 159, 243, 271, IV/77
betoging, bewijs; betogen, bewijzen
demonstration, to demonstrate, I/127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 141, 142, 202, 203, II/11, 17, 20, 23, 35, 138, 222, 296, 303, IV/8, 25, 29, 34, 39, 40, 44, 72, 77, 126, 133
uitwendige, uitterlijke afnoeming
extrinsic denomination, I/246, 250, II/26, 36, 124, 203, IV/29
innerlijke afnoeming
intrinsic denomination, II/85, 124, 216
DEPENDENTIA; DEPENDERE; DEPENDENS
afhangelijkheid; afhangen; afhangig, dependent
dependence; to depend; dependent, I/142, 144, 153, 154, 197, 241, 242, 253, 266, 274, II/27, 46, 70, IV/36, 131
description, I/233, 236, IV/43
[PA: regret (usu.), désir (occ.)]
longing; to long for, desire, I/248, II/168, 170, 173, 199, 200, 248
[PA 55: dédain; 149, 150: mépris]
verachting, ongeachtheid; versmaden
scorn; to scorn, II/160, 195, 196, 246, 265
[PA 160: désespoir]
wanhoop; wanhopen
despair; to despair, II/155, 193, 246, 288
verderf, vernietiging; vernietigen
destruction; to destroy, I/275, 276, 278, II/87, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 155, 156, 161, 162, 170, 175, 176, 208, 210, 273, 281, 282, 283, 292, 295
DETERMINATIO; DETERMINARE; DETERMINATUS
bepaling (E, KV, Ep.), afpaling (PP: bepaling regularly corrected to afpaling in errata); bepalen; bepaald
determination (usu.), direction (usu. in PP); to determine; determined, determinate, I/132, 164, 171, 173, 174, 196, 204, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 234, 242, 244, 261, 273, 274, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, II/10, 26, 28, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39, 46, 58, 61, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 77, 84, 85, 92, 93, 98, 99, 105, 111, 114, 115, 121, 129, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 163, 176, 180, 181, 185, 192, 203, 209, 225, 236, 249, 254, 273, 279, 283, 284, 288, 306, IV/9, 42, 47, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 77, 129, 148
God, I/145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 155, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 178, 179, 188, 191, 200, 201, 237, 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 263, 266, 267, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, II/20, 26, 34, 45, 49, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 127, 128, 135, 136, 140, 141, 206, 213, 228, 235, 267, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 299, 300, 302, 306, 308, IV/7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 36, 127, 128, 130, 131
bedrieger God
deceiving God, I/147, 172, II/26, 30
God of natuur
[PA 83: dévotion]
verloving, overgeving
gezeg van de verstand
dictate of the intellect, I/278
voorspelling, voorschrift van de reden
dictate of reason, II/188, 222, 223, 233, 235, 247, 250, 254, 257, 261, 264, 265, 283, 292
tweedracht
discord, II/241, 262, 271, 273
DISTINCTIO; DISTINGUERE; DISTINCTUS; DISTINCTE
onderscheid(ing); onderscheiden; onderscheiden; onderscheidelijk
distinction; to distinguish; distinct; distinctly, I/145, 237, 244, 257, 259, 266, II/17, 21, 28, 96, 97, 99, 100, 120, 121, 123, 181, 210, 211, 249, 285, IV/55
wijzige onderscheid
modal distinction, I/248, 257, 258, II/59
onderscheid van reden
distinction of reason, I/248, 258, 259, 280, II/282
zakelijke onderscheid
real distinction, I/146, 151, 248, 257, 258, II/33, 52, 59, IV/55
onderscheid door woorden
verbal distinction, I/248
difference, diversity; different, I/245, II/12, 47, 48, 52, 74, 79, 90, 99, 117, 132, 175, 178, 230, IV/11, 41, 54
divine, I/201, 239, 251, II/49, 53, 56, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 68, 81, 89, 93, 135, 137, 307, IV/132, 133
DIVISIO; DIVIDERE; DIVISIBILIS; DIVISIBILITAS
deeling; delen; deelbaar; deelbaarheid
division; to divide; divisible, divisibility, I/176, 181, 184, 190, 191, 192, 194, 199, 200, 201, 228, 229, 230, 235, 236, 237, 244, 249, 251, 257, 267, 274, 275, II/24, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, IV/29, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61
wealth, II/5, 6, 7, 185, 202, 275, 289
lering
doctrine, instruction, II/9, 80, 131, 132, 135, 136
leerstuk
doctrine, maxim, I/129, 131, II/287, 288, IV/132
[PA 94: douleur]
treurigheid, pijn (KV)
pain (usu.), sorrow (rar.), I/142, 179, II/149, 191, 221, 242, 253
bedrog
DUBITATIO; DUBITARE; DUBIUS; INDUBIE
twijfel, twijfeling; twijfelen, twijfelachtig; ontwijfelijk
doubt; to doubt; doubtful; without doubt, I/129, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 160, 166, 173, 247, 248, II/10, 17, 19, 29, 30, 32, 50, 54, 105, 123, 124, 131, 134, 153, 154, 155, 194, IV/39, 40, 67
during; duren
duration; to have duration, to endure, to last, I/202, 234, 244, 250, 251, 252, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, II/31, 39, 46, 65, 66, 67, 85, 91, 114, 115, 127, 147, 209, 257, 294, 295, 296, 298, 301, 302, IV/53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60
hardheid; hard
hardness; hard, I/184, 186, 187, 189, 225, II/82, 100, 102
dronkenschap; dronke mensch
drunkenness; drunk, II/143, 185, 187, 202
opvoeding; opvoeden
education; to educate, II/9, 183, 197, 203, 269, 272
gewrocht, uitwerksel (KV), uitwerking (KV)
effect, I/150, II/23, 32, 63, 70, 77, 80, 89, 96, 140, 196, 197, 198, 283, 283, IV/22, 77
voortpassende eigenschap
verkiezing
eerste beginselen
verbetering; verbeteren (usu.), zuiveren