Glossary-Index
I BEGAN to compile this index at a very early stage of my work, mainly as an aid to translation. Anxious to achieve as much consistency as I could in the treatment of technical terms, I wanted a record of what English term(s) I had used for a given Latin term. As I accumulated data about Spinoza’s usage, I found that I was apt to change my mind about English terms to use, and not, in the beginning, having Professor Giancotti Boscherini’s Lexicon available, I also needed a record of the occurrences of key Latin terms, so that I could go back to make the necessary changes. Looking ahead to the time when I would begin translating works that were written in Dutch, or that have survived only in a Dutch translation, I also decided to keep a record of the terms used by Spinoza’s contemporary translators in the Dutch versions of works for which we possess a Latin original.
This was a laborious task and it has contributed much to delaying the appearance of the translation. But gradually I became convinced that the information I had originally compiled for my own use should be shared with my readers. Desirable as it might be to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the terms of the text and the terms of the translation, it cannot be done consistently without loss. Often it is hard enough just to find a term or phrase that will do for the context at hand, not to mention all the contexts. And often it seems best to blur in the translation distinctions in the text that seem to be merely verbal. And then there is the problem that arises when a family of words in the language of the text—a noun, related verb, related adjective, etc.—cannot easily be rendered by a family of words in the language of the translation. These are among the eternal problems of the translator, and all of them, it seemed, might be lessened if I made the language of the text the basis for the index and explained systematically how it was correlated with the language of the translation.1 One bonus of this procedure is that it should make it easier for students to use aids like the term index in Wolfson’s commentary.
So the first section of the Glossary-Index lists key terms used in the translation and indicates the Latin or Dutch terms they represent. (If only a Latin term is given, that means that the third section contains no Dutch correlate of the English. Similarly, if only a Dutch term is given, the second section contains no Latin correlate of the English.) Here I take the opportunity to comment on the reasons for adopting some possibly contentious translations, note alternatives, and offer explanations of terms where this seems necessary and has not already been done in the notes to the text. Hence the title “Glossary-Index.” But I must stress again that it is not my intention to produce a translation and commentary. No doubt many terms that get no explanation deserve some. No doubt many that get some, deserve more. The idea is simply to centralize and organize information which otherwise might appear in notes scattered throughout the text, but which would be no more appropriate in one place than another. In many cases the reader will have to work out his own theory of Spinoza’s meaning from the data supplied in the Index. The terms most apt to attract a Glossary entry are those which have caused me the most trouble as a translator, not necessarily those which would cause a commentator the most trouble. Much of the information one might want to give here is readily accessible in Wolfson’s commentary, and rather than multiply references to that work, I will limit myself to this general recommendation: Wolfson’s work contains a great deal of fascinating lore about the medieval and classical ancestry of Spinoza’s language, but it should be used critically and with caution.
The second section indexes key terms used in Spinoza’s Latin works, indicates the terms used for them by Spinoza’s contemporary Dutch translators (recording patterns of usage where I have noticed them) and also indicates the English terms used in this translation. Terms here are grouped in families (generally in the order: noun; verb; adjective; adverb). There is much to be said for providing separate entries for related words, as Professor Giancotti Boscherini does in her Lexicon. But that work was compiled for the specialist, who is presumed to have a good command of Latin and Dutch. Since I compiled my index to meet somewhat different needs, I have constructed it on different principles. References are to the volume and page numbers of the Gebhardt edition, which are given in the margins of this edition.
The third section indexes key terms used in those works which either were written in Dutch or have survived only in Dutch,2 and generally relates these Dutch terms to the Latin terms they are presumed to translate. Usually this relation has been established by examining the contemporary Dutch translations of Spinoza’s Latin works. In the case of letters written in Dutch and translated into Latin for the Opera posthuma, the Latin terms are those used in the OP. Sometimes the correlation is a matter of judgment or conjecture. Where serious doubt exists about the correlation, a question mark or a comment in the first section indicates that fact. If the Dutch term has been translated by an English term used for its Latin analogue, then no English term will appear, and the reader who is working from Dutch to English must consult the second section to see what the possible English terms are. Where the Dutch term has no Latin analogue in section II or where it is translated differently than its Latin analogue, then the English will be given in section III.
The indexes of the second and third sections do not profess to offer an exhaustive list of occurrences of the given term. For example, if a term has both a technical and a nontechnical use, I may index only one or two occurrences of the nontechnical use in order to illustrate it, but will leave many occurrences unnoted. And even with technical uses, quite apart from the inevitable inadvertencies, I have often deliberately been quite selective in the occurrences noted, omitting some which I judged of little importance for fixing the meaning of the term or displaying its use. No doubt this introduces an element of subjectivity, but those who wish a more objective approach and a more exhaustive coverage have the Lexicon Spinozanum available to them. What I offer here is, for the serious student, no substitute for the Lexicon. But it may in some cases usefully supplement that work even for the serious student, since I have sometimes indexed terms or noted occurrences that do not appear in the Lexicon.
Contexts where a more or less official definition of a term is given, or where the use of that term attracts comment in a note (either by Spinoza or by myself), are italicized numbers in the indexes. Where a term is defined in more than one place I have italicized each entry only where the definitions seemed, on the face of it, to differ.
Many of the terms Spinoza uses in Parts III and IV of the Ethics were also used by the Latin translator of Descartes’ Passions of the Soul (PA). The correlations with Descartes’ French terms are also given in the Latin-Dutch-English section, since they often help to establish the connotations of the terms. These terms are inevitably the most difficult to translate,3 and are the ones most likely to attract comment in the Glossary.
The irregularity of seventeenth-century Dutch spelling presents a problem. Often the same word will be spelled differently in different passages—and sometimes even in the same passage. For the purposes of the Index, I have thought it best to settle on one spelling, and to give preference to the way the word would be spelled in modern Dutch.
Again, some Latin terms (idea, a priori, ideatum, attributum, proprium) are not always translated into Dutch in the Short Treatise; sometimes the Latin itself is simply carried over. For simplicity these terms will be treated in the Index as if they had been translated into Dutch.
This section concludes with an index of proper names and Biblical references.
English–Latin–Dutch
I have left this pair of terms untranslated. It should be noted that in the seventeenth century the medieval usage deriving from Ockham was still current. An a priori proof proceeds from cause to effect; an a posteriori one from effect to cause. Cf. Alquié 1, II, 582n. The equivalent terms in earlier writers like Aquinas are propter quid and quia. Cf. Summa theologiae Ia, 2, 2.
Generally I have simply anglicized the Latin. But the sense seems usually to be unconditional or without exception. Cf. Gueroult 1, 2:309.
In early correspondence (IV/13) Spinoza was content to define the term accidens in the way he would later define the term modus. There are traces of this usage in his exposition of Descartes, but it is rejected firmly in the Metaphysical Thoughts (I/236, 237). See Gueroult 1, 1:65, n. 193.
Generally per accidens occurs only as part of the phrase causa per accidens. See cause through itself.
Generally toeval represents accidens, but in KV App. I it apparently represents modificatio.
I mark the distinction between actus and actio by using act for the former and action for the latter. In scholastic Latin actus was regularly used in contrast with potentia to render Aristotle’s energeia and dunamis (Aquinas 1, IV, 131). So an affect like madness which is, by definition, a passion, may still be an actus insofar as it involves the actualization of a capacity (cf. II/191). Nevertheless, actus also seems to be used in a nontechnical sense in which it denotes whatever anyone does (cf. II/197).
See passio
doening, daad, werking, werk, aktie
See act. In its technical sense an actio is an affect of which we can be the adequate cause (E III D 3), but it seems to be used sometimes in a nontechnical sense even after the formal definition has been introduced. Cf. II/117, 142, 254. In their nontechnical senses actus and actio seem equivalent.
See adaequare
Elwes and Shirley use emotion for affectus; White simply anglicizes it, as I have, and as many commentators do. Emotion has the disadvantage of suggesting a passive state, whereas an affectus may well be active (II/139) in spite of the apparent equation with pathema animi at II/203 (cf. Rice 1, 105). It also has the disadvantages of suggesting an exclusively psychological state (whereas an affectus is a state both of the mind and of the body) and of not being broad enough. (It seems unnatural to call desire an emotion.)
The disadvantage of affect is that it has a technical meaning in psychology (the felt component of a stimulus or motive to action) which does not fit the Spinozistic context. But this usage is specialized enough that it should not confuse most readers.
On balance I prefer to preserve the etymological connection with affectio and afficere.
Wolfson says that Spinoza sometimes uses affectus in the sense of affectio (Wolfson 1, II, 194) but the text he cites (II/104/21) is probably corrupt.
In classical and medieval Latin both affectio and affectus were used indifferently for emotion or passion (Wolfson 1, 2:193). Descartes, however, uses affectio as a synonym for quality or mode (Gilson 1, 9) and Spinoza generally follows him in this. The definition at II/190 is more characteristic than that at I/240. Wolfson observes that Spinoza sometimes uses affectio in the sense of affectus and Gebhardt (II/390) goes so far as to say that he uses them as synonyms, citing II/104/21, 25 and II/183/32. Perhaps. But since affectus is usually used for a specific kind of affectio, the more general term might well be used correctly in those contexts without the terms being synonymous. So, for example, the occurrence of aandoening at I/48/28 might equally well be rendered by affect. See also Hubbeling 1, 59.
This is the adjectival form of anima so besouled (Joachim) is also to be considered, but no translation can resolve the question of what Spinoza means by using this term in the famous passage in which he says that all individuals are, in varying degrees, animata (II/96/27-28). The commentators (Wolfson 1, 2:56-64; Gueroult 1, 2:143-144) are helpful. In view of the conceptual connection between life and soul (see mind, cf. also Summa theologiae Ia, 75, 1) and Spinoza’s definition of life (at I/260), it seems likely that Spinoza would attribute life to all things. Cf. II/187/14 But it seems a reasonable inference from E V P39S that he would not attribute consciousness to all things.
Apparently animatus occurs only in the famous passage.
See toestemmen
eigenschap (KV)
The central definition of this key term (at II/45) is very ambiguous. For contrasting interpretations see Wolfson 1, ch. 5, and Haserot 1. See also Gueroult 1, t. I, app. 3 & 4, Wolf 1, and Curley 3, 4-18.
Eigenschap is the term normally used in the KV where the context makes it clear that it must be translated attribute. But eigenschap is also used for properties which are generally (but in Spinoza’s view, incorrectly) regarded as attributes. I mark these nonstandard uses of eigenschap by putting attribute in single quotes. Cf. I/27/11-29 and 44/22-35.
See also mode.
The Scholastics opposed aversio to cupiditas, as flight from evil to pursuit of good. There is an echo of this usage in Hobbes (Leviathan, I, 6), but Descartes rejects it on the ground that there is no pursuit of good which is not at the same time an avoidance of evil (PA II, 87). Hence, desire is a passion that has no contrary. Spinoza follows Descartes in regarding desire as a passion that has no contrary, but makes a place for aversion as a species of sadness. Cf. Bidney 1, 182-189.
The contrast between afkeer and haat in the KV is different from that between aversio and odium in E.
See aversio
See sensatio
See gevoel, gewaarwording
An axiom is a proposition suitable for use as a first principle in demonstrations. For this, truth is required, but not necessarily self-evidence (pace Joachim 2, 202n) or indemonstrability. In Letter 3 Oldenburg asks whether Spinoza regards the axioms he has sent as indemonstrable principles, known by the light of nature and requiring no proof. Spinoza treats this (in Letter 4) as an inquiry as to whether his axioms are common notions. He grants that they are not (IV/13/28), but resists the suggestion that they are not true and endeavors to derive them from his definitions of substance and accident. (See also II/139/25 where Spinoza uses axioma for a postulate derivable from previous postulates.)
On this reading Meyer’s statements about definitions, axioms and postulates (I/127) must be regarded as expressing his own view, not Spinoza’s. Evidence for this is Meyer’s neglect of the distinction between real and nominal definitions.
While I generally prefer to translate malus by evil (q.v.), sometimes I use bad.
The phrase esse in se is central to Spinoza’s philosophy, since it is used in the definition of his most important metaphysical concept, substantia. I would distinguish between a metaphysical use of the phrase (illustrated in II/45-47 and helpfully glossed at II/34), in which it connotes independent existence (cf. Curley 3, 14-18, and Gueroult 1, I, 58, 61-63), and an epistemological use (illustrated at II/125), in which it connotes the reality with which true ideas are supposed to conform.
Generally the second of KV’s three kinds of knowledge is designated indifferently as geloof (probably = fides) or ware geloof (probably = vera fides). But the example (at I/55/3) and definitions (at I/55/23 and I/59/23) Spinoza gives always suggest a belief that is not merely true, but based on demonstrative reasoning. Wolf notes precedents for this in Crescas and Maimonides. Particularly interesting is a passage from the Guide for the Perplexed, I, 50. At I/77/4 we will have a transition to the terminology of the Ethics when ware geloof is equated with reden.
Sometimes geloof is used where we would expect waan. I mark what appear to be nonstandard uses of geloof by putting belief in single quotes. See the note at I/54/10.
Sometimes beatitudo and its cognates clearly have the religious connotations suggested by blessedness, but it can equally mean happiness. If Balling was the translator of the KV, as some have suggested, then it seems likely that gelukzaligheid represents beatitudo rather than felicitas.
On the theological background of servitus see Wolfson 1, II, 184. It is unfortunate that the same term occurs both with negative connotations (when it is rendered by bondage) and with positive connotations (when it is rendered by service). Cf. II/136/6.
Wolf uses mass, but at this stage the term does not have the theoretical implications it acquired in Newtonian physics. Boyle’s English uses bulk, which I take to be equivalent to size.
It should be understood that Spinoza’s tendency to identify causa and ratio (e.g., in E I P11D2) does not sound so strange in Latin as it does in English, since reason is a standard dictionary entry for causa and causa does occur in Spinoza (e.g., at II/74/30) in a nontechnical use most naturally rendered by reason.
Spinoza distinguishes many different kinds of cause. See Gueroult 1, I, 60n, 243-257, and 330 for a good account of the relation between Spinoza’s terminology and that of the Scholastics.
See cause through itself.
Wolf 2, 172, contends that Spinoza understands this expression in a purely negative way, as implying that the thing which is causa sui “really has no cause at all.” But his evidence seems insufficient. Wolfson 1, 1:127, comes close to the same view (on equally inadequate evidence), but later avoids the trap (1:129). Spinoza’s adherence to the principle of sufficient reason, like Descartes’, is exceptionless. Cf. E IP11D2 with AT VII, 164-165. Also relevant are AT VII, 109-111, and the note at TdIE § 97.
Gueroult (1, I, 225n) cites a passage in Heereboord in which a remote cause is defined as one which produces its effect by the mediation of causes of the same kind. This is thought to be a reason for saying that a remote cause is not united in any way with its effect.
Spinoza regularly contrasts causa per se and causa per accidens. This traditional contrast goes back to Aristotle (Physics II, 5) and has been variously rendered into English (e.g., essential/incidental cause, direct/indirect cause). Wolfson 1, 1:307 glosses it with references to Burgersdijk and Heereboord, where it appears that an essential cause is one that produces something like itself (e.g., an animal of the same kind). But Gueroult 1, 1:253, n. 36 is sharply critical of Wolfson’s interpretation.
Whether or not Wolfson is correct about the passage there under dispute (E I P16C2), his account will not fit most of Spinoza’s uses of the contrast. Aquinas’ editors (Aquinas 1, XIV, 197) gloss two senses of causa per accidens: 1) an agent in respect to an effect that does not correspond to its power of purpose, or with respect to a side effect of its direct action; 2) an agent whose proper effect opens the way to another effect’s happening, especially as removing an obstacle to that effect. Examples occur at Summa theologiae 1a, 49, 1 and 1a, 104, 4 respectively.
Spinoza’s normal use of causa per accidens is in psychological contexts, where it seems most closely related to the first of these senses. An accidental cause is one that has its effect not because of its own nature but because of its coincidental association with something whose nature it is to produce that effect.
The Latin certus can mean both definite and sure (or beyond doubt) and the English certain conveniently has the same ambiguity, so I have felt no need to use two words for one. Pace Caillois (Pléiade, 1420), Spinoza does sometimes use certus to mean sure, as a survey of the index entries will show. But in conjunction with determinatus, the sense does always seem to be definite. See, however, Gueroult 1, 1:75-76.
Spinoza’s use of certus at II/11/29 is puzzling, but presumably reflects a tendency to vacillate between a purely psychological conception of certainty ( = absence of doubt) and a normative conception ( = absence of legitimate doubt). Both senses seem to be at work in TdIE § 26.
If the fixed and eternal things are, as I would guess, the attributes and infinite modes, then presumably the singular changeable things are the finite modes.
This term sometimes occurs merely as a synonym for axioma (cf. Wolfson 1, 2:118-199). But it seems to connote, more strongly than axiom does, a proposition known to all. See axiom. Note that in Descartes (Principles I, 50) a common notion is a truth which can be known very clearly and distinctly, but which may not be, because of prejudice.
A notion may also be called common because it involves properties common to all things (cf. E II P38C and TTP VII [III/102]).
In most of its occurrences in the KV, gemeenschap seems adequately rendered by something in common. But not, I think, in II, xxiv. Wolf has fellowship.
See pity.
The two Latin terms occur frequently in the Boyle-Spinoza correspondence. Confirmare seems invariably to mean what its English cognate generally means in philosophical English: to make (more) probable. But confirm, in ordinary English, can also mean to make certain. When translated by comprobare (as it sometimes is by the Latin translator of Boyle’s Essays) it leans heavily toward the stronger interpretation. Some of the disagreement between Boyle and Spinoza over the value of experiments may stem from a misunderstanding of comprobare (e.g., at IV/29/12ff.).
Wolf dealt with the ambiguity of comprobare by vacillating between confirm and prove. I have tried to give readers a better feel for the Latin by using confirm consistently for comprobare and putting it in scare-quotes when I think it means prove.
This policy has the disadvantage that readers encountering confirm may wonder which Latin term it represents. But a glance at the Index should resolve these doubts, since confirmare and comprobare never seem both to occur on the same page.
bewust(heid), medegeweten
The equation of E’s consternatio with KV’s vervaardheid is purely conjectural.
Elwes, White: scorn. Etymology favors disdain, but I have used that for contemptus. In Descartes dedignatio is a species of contemptus which occurs when we consider the object of our disesteem as a free cause. This would suggest contempt, which seems to have the proper moralistic flavor. At II/192 Spinoza declines to define dedignatio, but at II/181 he says that it arises from our disdain for foolishness. See also disdain and scorn.
Implicantia and contradictio are synonymous as Ep. XII illustrates (pace Wolf). Implicare is a trap, since it is equivalent to implicare contradictionem (cf. TdIE 19-20).
See corpus
See vergaan
The meretrix is a standard figure in Latin comedies, where she is often portrayed quite sympathetically. Given Spinoza’s familiarity with the works of Terence, we should bear these associations in mind in those passages in which Spinoza discusses sexual relationships.
Sometimes the temptation to render factum by fact (with the suggestion of a correspondence theory of truth) is strong (I/246). But though I believe Spinoza usually thinks of truth in terms of correspondence, to introduce that technical term would be anachronistic. So far as I have been able to discover that usage has no classical or medieval precedent. The usual classical meaning always seems appropriate in Spinoza. Hobbes’ use of fact is interesting. The etymological connection with the past participle of facere (to do) is dominant, but the seeds of the modern usage are clearly discernible. Cf. Leviathan, chapters 5, 9, 26, and 27.
bepaling, beschrijving, definitie
Dunin-Borkowski 1, 4:487, alleged that Spinoza’s theory of definition derived from the Port Royal Logic, but as Gueroult (1, 1:25n) observes, this seems excessive. For a comparison and contrast of the two theories, see Curley 3, 108-113.
It is crucial in understanding the role of definition in Spinoza’s axiomatic method to determine whether he regarded his definitions as real or nominal. Each alternative can be supported and Gueroult (1, I, 21) contends that they are both real and nominal, a conclusion I find difficult to understand. But perhaps Bennett’s useful discussion (in Bennett 2, 17-18) articulates in a clearer way the intuition Gueroult sought to express. It is important to be aware of Spinoza’s discussions of definition in the KV, TdIE, and Letters 9 and 10. Gueroult’s emphasis on the influence of Hobbes and the constructive character of Spinoza’s definitions seems right.
See Descartes’ letter to Morin, 13
July 1638 (A II, 72).
dependentie, see also afhangen
Elwes and Shirley use self-abasement, which has the advantage of preserving the connection with Descartes’ bassesse (= humilité vicieuse, PA 159), but wrongly suggests that the person himself is the cause of his condition. The emphasis on sadness favors White’s choice of despondency, but fails to capture the element of misjudgment of one’s capacities. No term seems entirely satisfactory.
Gueroult (1, 1:338n) observes that determinari can have two distinct senses. In an expression like determinatum ad existendum it means to be caused to exist; in determinata existentia it can mean finite or limited existence. And since whatever is finite is also caused to exist by something else, both senses may come into play in a context like E IP28. In other contexts, the sense of determinatus may be assignable (cf. Gueroult 1, 1:75).
Determinatio is also a technical term in Cartesian physics. In such contexts it will sometimes occur in conjunction with a phrase like versus certam aliquam partem (= in some definite direction). Whether that phrase occurs explicitly or not, I think it should always be understood. I take determinatio in these contexts to be equivalent to tendency. For different views, see Sabra 1, 116-121, and Westfall 1, 91.
diabolus, princeps scelestorum spirituum
DICTATE (OF REASON, INTELLECT)
dictamen (rationis, intellectus)
Donagan (1, 164) thinks diversus is used technically, as a synomyn for realiter distinctus, but some of the contexts disconfirm this (e.g., II/178/17, II/132/24, II/99/13, II/79/9) and the NS renders distinctus and diversus by different terms. I take it that diversus is a more general term, appropriate when the things differentiated are really distinct (as in E IP10S), but also where they are not.
See determination
Elwes, White, Shirley: contempt. Etymology makes contempt a natural choice (analogously, disdain for dedignatio). But contempt seems to have changed its meaning since the seventeenth century. (Cf. Hobbes’ Leviathan vi: “Those things which we neither desire nor hate we said to contemn.”) Spinoza’s definition reflects Cartesian usage. When first introduced at PA54, contemptus represents mépris, is opposed to estime, and is defined as an inclination to consider the baseness or smallness of what is mépris. So something closer to disesteem seems preferable. See also contempt and scorn.
Versmading represents contemptus in the NS and possibly in the KV also. The definitions seem sufficiently close to let one term translate both. But in the KV versmading is opposed to aching, whereas in E, contemptus is opposed to admiratio.
Verachting is sometimes used in the NS for despectus. But in the KV it seems to be used interchangeably with versmading. I assume that there it too represents contemptus.
Wolf treats versmading and verachting as interchangeable in the KV, but thinks they represent despectus rather than contemptus. Possibly they do, or possibly the variation corresponds to a merely verbal distinction in the Latin. The Latin translation of Descartes’ PA which Spinoza used would have encouraged some confusion about the relation of these terms. The translator uses contemptus for mépris in 2:54, and despectus for dédain, which is a species of mépris, in 2:55. But later (at 3:149) he uses despectus for mépris.
Elwes, White, Shirley: base. I have preferred dishonorable, as less ambiguous.
The definitions Spinoza gives of a real distinction seem to follow the Cartesian usage of the Second Replies (AT VII, 162) and the Principles (AT VIII-1, 28), but it is difficult to see how Spinoza could allow that any two things might be really distinct in the Cartesian sense. For Descartes a real distinction can occur only between two or more substances, but for Spinoza there is really only one substance. Of course, each of the attributes satisfies the definition of substance, and each is really distinct from every other, but there is no possibility of any attribute existing without the others.
See emotion
See difference
See divinus
See deel
See actio
gewrocht, uitwerking, uitwerksel
ontroering, ontsteltenis, beweging van de ziel, des gemoeds
Sometimes commotio animi seems to be used in a very neutral and general way, as equivalent to affectus. Cf. E VP2 and Descartes’ PA 27 (quoted at II/279) where it translates the French émotion. In those contexts I have used emotion. But other contexts (e.g., II/7/22) seem to require something less general and more negative. There I have used disturbance of the mind. Perhaps the more negative term would have been preferable in KV II, vi.
See also joy. Cf. Pléiade, 1391.
See aequitas
The conception of essence which Spinoza criticizes in E IIP10CS is exemplified in Descartes’ Principles I, 53.
Joachim (2, 212n) notes Spinoza’s apparent identification (through sive) of essentia and definitio at II/34/19, but argues that this does not exclude all difference between the alternatives, and that Spinoza “sharply distinguishes” essentia and definitio at II/34/29. Nevertheless, it seems fair to identify essence with what a good definition states.
Few terms in Spinoza’s moral psychology are as troublesome as gloria. Classically it can mean fame, renown, praise, honor, etc., or the desire for and tendency to claim fame, renown, etc. Spinoza defines it as a species of joy felt when we believe ourselves to be praised, but seems also to use it for the state of being praised or well thought of. In the latter contexts I have used esteem, reserving praise for laus. In the former, love of esteem. (Elwes uses honor, which seems possible in the nonpsychological contexts, though I have rejected it as too ambiguous. White has self-exaltation, which is plausible in the psychological contexts, but has the disadvantage of suggesting that the person’s satisfaction with himself results from self-praise, not praise by others.)
One difficulty is to find a suitable verb for gloriari. The classical meanings (brag, pride o.s., etc.), generally seem inappropriate. In most contexts I have settled on to exult at being esteemed. If it were not so cumbersome I would use exultation at being esteemed for gloria in psychological contexts.
Although the miles gloriosus (braggart soldier) is a stock figure of fun in classical comedy, a concern for reputation is also an important element in the conception of the hero in tragedies like those of Corneille. Neither Descartes nor Spinoza gives it an entirely negative evaluation. Cf. Alquié 1, 3:1097, with helpful annotation, and II/253. See also honor.
I have also used esteem for achting in KV. Although achting represents existimatio in the NS version of E, and perhaps represents existimatio in KV also, I assume that achting in KV expresses a different concept than existimatio in E, the concept expressed by gloria in its nonpsychological sense. Existimatio in E implies a misjudgment of the things’s worth. Achting in KV (like existimatio in PA III, 149) does not. Hence I use esteem for achting, overestimation for existimatio, and love of esteem for eer (gloria in its psychological sense).
aeternitas, see also aeternitatis, aeterno, aeternum
The major question here is whether to translate species in the famous phrase sub specie aeternitatis by species (= kind, sort) or by aspect (= point of view). Gueroult 1, 2:609-615, sets out the issues very nicely. He favors aspect. The main weakness in his argument, it seems to me, is the assumption that there is only one species of necessity or eternity. Cf. II/74/5ff. I note that Spinoza’s contemporary Dutch translators consistently render species by gedaante in this phrase.
These are generally identified either with the infinite modes, or with the attributes and infinite modes. Cf. Pollock 1, 140-144; Curley 3, 66-73; Wolfson 1, 1:251; Delbos 1, 103; Harris 1, passim.
Malus can be translated by either bad or evil. At one stage I preferred bad wherever possible, since evil has connotations which seem inappropriate to Spinoza’s philosophy. I now think it best to retain the term and to regard Spinoza’s definition as deflationary. Like Nietzsche’s, Spinoza’s philosophy is, in some sense, beyond good and evil.
wezenlijkheid, bestaan, existeren
bevinding, ervarenheid, ervaring, ondervinding
Elwes: mere experience; White: vague experience. I once proposed vagrant experience (Curley 2), which has the advantage of preserving etymological connections and the connotations of the Baconian passage from which the phrase originates (Novum Organum I, 100). But random also conveys the appropriate disorderliness and requires less explanation. The suggestion goes back at least to Joachim (2, 135) but was particularly urged on me by Bennett.
See carpere
Elwes: fear; White: fear, apprehension. Descartes (PA 36) had made a distinction between crainte (Kemp Smith: anxious apprehension), which anyone would feel at the sight of something strange and frightful, and peur (fear?), which one might subsequently feel, depending on the body’s temperament or the soul’s strength (though one might also feel hardiesse, boldness). Unfortunately, Descartes’ translator blurred this distinction by using timor for crainte and metus for both crainte and peur (see Voss 1). Spinoza’s metus apparently corresponds to Descartes’ crainte and his timor to Descartes’ peur. Generally I use fear for the more fundamental emotion and timidity for the disposition to respond to fear in a particular way. See II/170. But it is not clear that Spinoza maintains a sharp distinction here.
See fictio
See fiction
I use to feign and fiction for fingere and fictio, but it is important to realize that the English terms have connotations which may be misleading. A feigned or fictitious idea is not necessarily a false one, as the references in the TdIE illustrate. To hypothesize and hypothesis are closer to the meaning and might have been used, if hypothesis were not wanted to represent hypothesis.
It is unclear what distinction Spinoza intends to make between fingere and putare in contexts like II/21/11. I have used allow there for putare, but find it difficult to see a difference between ‘allowing’ and what Spinoza usually calls fiction.
I am skeptical of de Deugd’s contention (1, 92-93) that fictio and related terms have significant aesthetic connotations.
Where it has seemed possible I have rendered vis by force, but where this would sound very unnatural I have used power, which see.
On the ambiguity of force (vis) in Cartesian physics see Westfall 1, ch. 2, and Appendix B.
Sometimes forma and the Dutch terms which translate it seem equivalent to nature or essence (e.g., at II/208/26). Cf. Gueroult 1, 2:306n. 6. Sometimes they seem equivalent to quality (e.g., at I/79/27). Sometimes external appearance is clearly indicated.
Formaliter is usually opposed to objective (q.v.), rarely to materialiter (cf. IV/49/28).
libertas, see also causa libera, homo liber
voortbrenging, genereren
See Meyer’s preface to Descartes “Principles,” my preface to the Ethics, and the glossary entries on axiom, definition, and known through itself.
Elwes, joy. In Principles IV, 190, Descartes had used gaudium for that species of purely intellectual joy, entirely independent of the state of the body, which the Stoics had allowed that their wise man might experience. This distinction is not observed in the PA where laetitia is the usual term for joie, even when it is intellectual (PA 147). Gaudium is also used there for joie, without any apparent distinction being intended. (See Voss 1.) Classically a distinction is made between gaudium as inward joy and laetitia as joy which shows itself externally (LS). None of this seems to correspond to Spinoza’s usage. In St. Thomas (De Veritate 26, 5) gaudium is listed with tristitia, spes and timor as one of the four principal passions of the soul (cf. Summa theologiae Ia, IIae, 25, 2-3.
See also cognitio Dei; divinus; ens perfectissimum; essentia Dei; existentia Dei; idea Dei; intellectus Dei; substantia increata.
See also cognitio boni et mali, boni, bonum.
This translation is sanctioned both by Lewis and Short and by Deferrari and Barry. But in Spinoza’s use beneplacitum is associated with the extreme Cartesian view of God’s will as completely indifferent.
The group at IV/12 and 37 is the nascent Royal Society. The group at IV/39 is Spinoza’s circle of friends.
See pondus
Generally the Latin honor is translated in NS by eer. But in KV eer sometimes seems to represent gloria and I have translated it accordingly. Appuhn 1, I, 410, sees a distinction between eer in KV and gloria in E on the ground that gloria can arise from a knowledge of our own perfection and hence need not be contrary to reason (II/253). I do not find either the definitions or the evaluations of eer (in II, xii, though not in II, v) and gloria to be sufficiently different to warrant a distinction.
Spinoza never defines honor, but in the early sections of the TdIE seems to use honor and gloria interchangeably.
See also esteem.
Classically the person who has honestas may either be honored or be worthy of honor. Spinoza’s definition suggests that the latter meaning is primary for him. (That definition also makes honestas difficult to distinguish from generositas.) Elwes and White use honor, but I have preferred to reserve that for its Latin double. None of the classical meanings of honestas seems quite appropriate to Spinoza’s usage, since his definition makes it a particular kind of desire.
See homo; mens humana; corpus humanum
I have used humility both for humilitas in E and for nederigheid in KV. The definitions of these terms are not the same but it would be very misleading to translate otherwise. In KV nederigheid involves an accurate judgment of one’s imperfection and presumably is (like edelmoedigheid) dispassionate. In E humilitas seems to be neutral as regards the accuracy of the judgment involved and is certainly not dispassionate. This should be borne in mind in estimating the apparent change in Spinoza’s evaluation of nederigheid/humilitas.
See also self-depreciation and the note to I/68/25.
Descartes’ use of the term idea to mean the form of any thought by the immediate perception of which I am conscious of the thought itself (AT VII, 160) caused much misunderstanding among his contemporaries. See particularly the First and Third Replies. Descartes explained to Hobbes (AT VII, 181) that he used the term idea because it was commonly used by the philosophers to signify the forms of the perceptions of the divine mind (cf. Summa theologiae I, 44, 3). The point was that man, like God, might conceive of something without having an image of it.
Spinoza follows Descartes in sharply distinguishing ideas from images (e.g., at II/131/30ff.) and is aware of the medieval usage (cf. I/42/28ff.). But he differs from Descartes in regarding ideas as the bearers of truth & falsity. For discussion see Curley 5.
In E & TdIE the Latin idea is usually translated by denkbeeld. In KV idea is usually carried over into the Dutch without being translated. Notable exceptions are the Second Dialogue of KV, I, and II, xxvi, 8-9.
See also asylum ignorantiae.
innatus, nativus
See indifferens
infinitas, see also intellectus infinitus
To be considered here is Kline 1.
lexinvloeging
intellectus, see also dictamen intellectus
intuitus, see also scientia intuitiva; cognitio intuitiva
Intuitus was used by the medievals to designate an immediate (noninferential), intellectual awareness, such as we might have of first principles (see McKeon 1, 2:466). It is used in a similar sense by Descartes (AT X, 368), though primarily in a work which Spinoza may not have had access to (the Regulae ad directionem ingeni, first published in Glazemaker’s Dutch translation in 1684).
Intuitus (and its related forms) also has a classical nontechnical use in which it may simply mean a look or consideration. Sometimes it is used in this sense by Spinoza (e.g., at II/5). Descartes sometimes uses intueri as a verb of sense perception (e.g., at AT VII, 19; but cf. AT VII, 36), as does Spinoza (II/117, 278).
We should be cautious about assuming that intuitus must mean in Spinoza what it means in his predecessors. Spinoza’s discussions of his three kinds of knowledge are very brief and arguably his conceptions of them changed somewhat from KV to E. See Curley 2.
Elwes, Shirley: pleasure; White: joy. Wolfson 1, 2:206 defends the rendering of laetitia by pleasure on the ground that laetitia was one of a number of terms used for the Greek hēdonē in Latin translations of Aristotle. Nevertheless, I believe that joy is more suggestive of the overall sense of well-being that I believe Spinoza has in mind. I also think it preferable to reserve pleasure for titillatio. See pleasure and sadness
Cognitio is Spinoza’s most common and general term for knowledge, but sometimes scientia is used in an equivalent way. When it is not, it is generally approximately equivalent to our science, except that Spinoza would be more apt than we are to number mathematics and metaphysics among the sciences. He apparently does not distinguish cognitio from scientia in the way Descartes does (AT III, 65; VII, 141). When cognitio occurs with Dei, the genitive is almost invariably objective; when scientia occurs with Dei, the genitive is invariably subjective.
It is important to remember that cognitio does not imply the truth of the proposition ‘known.’ The first kind of cognitio may involve false ideas (EIIP41).
Traditionally this Scholastic phrase has been rendered in English by self-evident. The tradition has this much in its favor: in Scholastic usage being known per se was connected with what a twentieth-century philosopher is apt to call analyticity, so that a per se nota proposition might plausibly be identified with one which would be known as soon as the terms were understood (cf. Aquinas 2, I, 10, where this connection is considered a possible ground for regarding per se nota propositions as indemonstrable). Similarly English usage of self-evident is colored by Locke’s assumption that “universal and ready assent on hearing and understanding the terms” is characteristic of self-evident propositions (Locke 1, I, ii, 18).
But Aquinas distinguishes between what is per se nota in itself and what is per se nota to us (Aquinas 2, I, ii, or 1, Ia, 2, 1). What is per se nota in itself but not to us will not be self-evident in Locke’s sense. So even in Aquinas the traditional rendering can be misleading.
The same is true both in Descartes and in Spinoza. Descartes, for example, thinks the proposition that God exists is per se nota only to those who are free of prejudices (AT VII, 162, 163, 164, 167). In Spinoza the principle of inertia provides an analogous example. Most people, prejudiced by random experience, will instinctively reject it as false. Though it would be legitimate to take a per se nota proposition as an axiom, it is not always necessary to do so, since some are demonstrable. Cf. II/98-99 and I/201-203. See Curley 2, 52-54, Gueroult 1, l:355n; Rivaud 1.
See magnitudo
The natural light (of reason) is to be contrasted with the supernatural light (of revelation), not with experience. Cf. Descartes, Principles I, 30; Locke, Essay I, iii, 13.
White and Elwes sometimes use regret for desiderium which in turn represented Descartes’ regret in the PA (III, 209). Wolf used grief for beklag, which is generally thought to represent desiderium in KV. I have preferred longing in the hope of conveying the mixture of sadness and desire which is involved. At II/168 desiderium is defined as a species of sadness (as beklag is at I/76 and as regret was). But at II/199 desiderium is defined as a species of desire. Spinoza’s explanation of this (II/200) seems to display an uncharacteristic concern for ordinary usage. The emphasis on memory at II/199 suggests nostalgia as a possible alternative. In some contexts (e.g., I/248, II/170) desiderium seems to be used in an extra-systematic sense in which it would be a synonym for cupiditas. Not to prejudge that, however, and to preserve the verbal distinction, I have abstained from desire.
To the various references in Wolfson 1 (see particularly 2:275-283, 302-308) may be added Descartes’ letter to Chanut of 1 February 1647.
Libido is troublesome. LS give the following classical meanings: pleasure, desire, eagerness, longing, fancy, inclination, unlawful or inordinate desire, passion, caprice, wilfullness, wantonness, sensual desire, lust. Spinoza’s definitions at II/185, 202 suggest lust as most appropriate for E, insofar as libido clearly refers to an immoderate sexual desire in those passages. (II/185 specifies an immoderate desire, II/202 doesn’t, pace White, but the contexts at II/202-203 and II/243/25 seem to settle the matter.) I take it that both the sexual and the negative connotations are implied in current English usage of lust.
However, libido in E is not always a specifically sexual desire, and sometimes is both the desire for sexual union (the term I prefer for coitus since it seems to me that Spinoza’s language need not be construed as referring exclusively to genital intercourse, cf. Matheron 2, 443) and the joy one derives from satisfying that desire. Since lust in the sense of pleasure or delight is now obsolete in English, something is lost by using lust for libido.
In TdIE libido seems generally to refer more to the state desired than to the desire. It is also not clear that the state desired necessarily involves sexual gratification. So there I have normally used sensual pleasure (as Elwes did). It seems clear that in TdIE libido does not always imply a negative evaluation (cf. §§ 6-7 with § 11).
homo, see also mens humana, corpus humanum
Spinoza distinguishes memoria from reminiscentia in TdIE § 83. The distinction goes back to Aristotle’s short treatise on the subject in the Parva naturalia (449b-453b), though it is not clear that Spinoza’s distinction is equivalent to Aristotle’s. For further discussion see Wolfson 1, 2:88-90, and Gueroult 1, 2:230-231.
Animus, like anima, derives from the Greek anemos (wind). But whereas classically anima is often used in the sense of wind, air or breath, animus is not. LS give a line from Nonius Marcellus which expresses a key classical distinction: animus est, quo sapimus, anima qua vivimus, i.e., animus designates the intellect, reason, or principle of thought, anima the principle of life. When Descartes, then, identifies mens, animus, intellects, and ratio (Second Meditation, AT VII, 29) his usage is classical.
Descartes also identifies mens and anima rationalis (Fifth Replies, AT VII, 355-356). And since he rejects Aristotelian talk of nutritive and sensitive souls as a symptom of intellectual confusion, he is willing simply to identify mens and anima (though with the reservation expressed in the Second Replies, AT VII, 161).
As Gueroult notes (Gueroult 1, 2:10), Spinoza’s usage of mens, animus and anima is generally Cartesian, i.e., he uses all three terms pretty much indifferently for the mind, conceived intellectualistically. A good passage to illustrate this is II/29/19ff. Nevertheless Spinoza does tend to use anima more frequently in his earlier works and mens more frequently in his later works (see Giancotti Boscherini 1, and Akkerman, 173-176). This may be because anima is more suggestive of traditional religious views, which Spinoza increasingly wishes to dissociate himself from.
I have generally used mind for mens and animus, and soul for anima. But sometimes animus used in a nontechnical sense which requires translation by spirit (e.g., at II/173/12) or in the idiom aequo animo (calmly).
Often connections are at the surface in the Latin which are concealed in the English. In this case, it is helpful in some contexts (e.g., II/81) to recall that miraculum is related etymologically to admirari, to wonder at.
See people
Modus is a technical term in Descartes (though with Scholastic precedent) for relatively specific (hence, accidental, potentially transient) properties of things, as opposed to attributum, which designates highly general (hence, essential, enduring) properties of things. Cf. The Principles of Philosophy I, 53-58. In Spinoza, however, particular things (which in Cartesian usage would normally be finite substances) are modes (E IP25SC). There is an important transition to the Spinozistic usage in the Synopsis to Descartes’ Meditations, where Descartes argues that only “body taken generally” is a substance and hence that particular bodies are not substances.
Note also that modus has a nontechnical sense in which it might be rendered by way or manner. Often it is unclear whether the technical or the nontechnical sense is intended, e.g., at E IP16.